Aisporna vs.

Court of Appeals
Facts:
Petitioner-accused Mapalad Aisporna, wife of Rodolfo Aisporna duly licensed by
Insurance Commission as agent to Perla Compania de Seguros, was charged in the City of
Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. That on or before June 21, 1969, in
the city of Cabanatuan, petitioner accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously act as agent in the solicitation or procurement of an application for insurance by
soliciting therefor the application of one Eugenio S. Isidro, for and in behalf of Perla Compania
de Seguros, Inc., a duly organized insurance company, registered under the law of the Repulic of
the Philippines, resulting in the issuance of a Broad Personal Accident Policy No. 28PI-RSA
0001 in the amount not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) dated June 21, 1969, without
said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the office of
the Insurance Commissioner, Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioner-accused in her defense sought to show that being the wife of true agent,
Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal
and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband,
Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband’s desk to renew. The trial court
found herein petitioner guilty as charged. On appeal, the trial court’s decision was affirmed by
the respondent appellate court finding the petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
Issue:
Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of
Section 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same section.
Held:

No. Respondent appellate court seems to imply that the definition of an insurance agent
under the second paragraph of Section 189 is not applicable to the insurance agent mentioned in
the first paragraph. Parenthetically, the respondent court concludes that under the second
paragraph of Section 189, a person is an insurance agent if he solicits and obtains an insurance
for compensation, but, in its first paragraph, there is no necessity that a person solicits an
insurance for compensation in order to be called an insurance agent. The Supreme Court ruled
that legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole.
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also
applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a compensation by the agent
is an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. The
appellate court has established ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not receive any
compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro. Nevertheless, the
accused was convicted by the appellate court for, according to the latter, the receipt of
compensation for issuing an insurance policy is not an essential element for a violation of the
first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. The court ruled otherwise. It is well-settled
in jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and
proved. Petitioner-accused is acquitted of the crime charged against her.