Strategy & Leadership

Co-opetition: Competitive and cooperative business strategies for the digital economy
Barry J. Nalebuff, Adam M. Brandenburger,
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Downloaded by University of Sydney Library At 12:28 15 July 2018 (PT)
The words we use influence how we think. For example,
when we think about business, most of us would prob-
ably say "Business is War." A company has to capture
J the market, beat the competition, make a killing, bury
the competition. Using this metaphor, we have a whole
vocabulary of winners and losers. Yet, in reality, that's often
misleading. We may think there will be victors and van-
quished in a price war, but in the end, no one wins.
At the other extreme, when we consider the importance
of partnerships, alliances, working together, listening to the
customer, and working with suppliers, it would seem that a
more appropriate metaphor might be "Business is Peace."
But that can't be right either, because we know there is
conflict with rivals over market share, conflict with cus-
tomers over price, and conflict with suppliers over cost.
If "business-as-war" is wrong, and "business-as-peace"
is too simplistic, what's the right mindset? It's War and
Peace—simultaneously. Creating value, a bigger pie, is
fundamentally a cooperative activity involving customers
and suppliers that a company can't accomplish alone. On
the other hand, the act of dividing up the pie is fundamen-
tally competitive.
A company has to keep its eye on both balls, creating
and capturing, at the same time. We have chosen to call
this "co-opetition," because it combines competition and
cooperation.1
Strategy E leadership
28
For example, in Columbia, S.C., the local newspaper,
The State, has lost market share to USA Today. The State tried
cutting prices, adding more color, including more local
news—all in an effort to keep its share of the pie. What the
paper's executives really needed to do was find ways of cre-
ating more pie and getting a slice of that bigger pie. The
State's large Sunday edition requires 50 percent greater
printing capacity than its weekday edition. Thus, some of
its presses sat idle for most of the week. USA Today doesn't
have a weekend edition. The co-opetition solution: The
State now prints USA Today during the week using its
Sunday printing presses. While the two papers compete for
customers and advertisers, they have found a way to coop-
erate in creating a larger pie.
Using Game Theory as a Tool
In traditional economics, markets are fixed; companies set
prices, and customers take the price or vote with their feet.
The "old" economy was based on decreasing returns to
scale—if you wanted more gold, you had to dig deeper. In
the information economy, by contrast, the costs are upfront
—the more people that want a product, the cheaper it is for
everyone.
Just as when cars first came out and we were missing
roads, gas stations, and mechanics, much of the infrastruc-
ture to support the information economy hasn't yet been
November/December 1997
 by Barry J . Nalebuff and Adam M. Brandenburger
Barry Nalebuff is the Milton Steinbach Professor at the Yale School of Management. Adam Brandenburger is a
professor at the Harvard Business School. They are pioneers in the practice of applying game theory to the art of
management. Their recent booh, Co-opetition, was published by Currency Doubleday in 1996. This article was
derivedfrom Professor Nalebuffs presentation at the International Strategic Leadership Conference in April 1997.

CO-OPETITION:
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COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE BUSINESS STRATEGIES FOR THE DIGITAL ECONOMY

developed. Online commerce doesn't work if you don't
have online payment devices. As the infrastructure is still
being developed, Adam Smith's invisible hand won't work,
because many of the markets are missing. Succeeding in
the new economy requires a different approach.
Because we're in a period of transition, today's firms
have the ability to influence what that future will be like.
Instead of accepting what is, they can ask, "What game
would I like to play?" That's a difficult question to answer,
because, normally, we learn these things through experi-
ence. But by the time we're in a new game, it's too late to
shape it. Game theory allows us to analyze the game
before we get into it.
The inventor of game theory was John von Neumann.
Now, fifty years later, game theory is coming into its own.
The FCC used game theory to design what has become a
$20 million auction of radio spectra. We are now teaching
game theory in management schools, and management
consulting companies are bringing it into their practices.
Game theory had its beginning in the early days of
World War II when the British air force was playing cat and
mouse with German submarines. The British discovered
that by applying what later became known as game theory,
they could increase their hit rate. In those early days, game
theory was used primarily to analyze particular problems.
It was focused on solving games rather than asking if it was
the right game.
To make the theory more useful to business, we had to
move away from finding the answer to a particular game.
Instead, we looked at the meta-game of designing the right
game. To do this, we went back to von Neumann's roots of
game theory and put value creation at center stage.
In thinking of business as a game, it is misleading to
imagine games such as poker, football, or chess. First, in
order to win at those games, someone else has to lose. That
rule doesn't always apply in the game of business. Intel's
success hasn't hurt Microsoft, and Microsoft's success hasn't
hurt Intel.
The second difference between business and most other
games is that in most games the playing field, the players,
and the rules are set. In business, the action comes from
changing the game.
A game has players and the added, value that each
player brings. A game has rules that structure the inter-
action between players. The game is also affected by
perceptions—what the players believe. And a game has
scope or boundaries and linkages to other games—where
one game ends, and another begins. (In reality, there's
only one big game, but that game is so complex we pre-
tend there are a lot of little games and think about how
they're connected.)

Strategy E leadership N o v e m b e r / D e c e m b e r i 1997

29
 "A player is a complementor if customers value your product more when they have that player's product
than when they have your productalone.Aplayer is a competitor if customers value your product less when
they have that player's product than when they have your product alone."
If you want to change a game, you must change one of
these components. In this article, we spend most of our
time addressing the players and their added value, because
they are the most fundamental elements. However, when
you make a systematic change in one aspect of the game,
it is very likely you will create change in one or more of
the other aspects as well.
Knowing the Players
In the game of business, we sometimes list players as cus­
tomers, suppliers, and competitors. Then there's the gov­
ernment, which often pulls strings from behind the scenes
and sets some of the rules of the game. But there's yet
another type of player that is often overlooked.
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Think about the relationship between Intel and
Microsoft. Is one a customer of the other? Not really. The
real relationship between Microsoft and Intel is not cus­
tomer, nor supplier, but complementor. The Pentium chip
makes Windows 95 work better, and Windows 95 gives
people a reason for upgrading to the Pentium chip.
Similarly, WindowsNT and the Pentium II chip each make
the other more valuable.
Complementors are not just in the high-tech industries.
When cars first came out, the auto makers got together
with the headlight people and the tire manufacturers to
form the Lincoln Highway Association, which helped sub­
sidize the building of the first cross-country road. They
knew they could sell more cars if there were more roads.
Auto makers soon recognized that they could sell more cars
if people could borrow money, so General Motors formed
GMAC and Ford started Ford Motor Credit. (Ford now
makes more money on car loans than it does selling cars.)
A player is a complementor if customers value your prod­
uct more when they have that player's product than when
they have your product alone. A player is a competitor if
customers value your product less when they have that
players product than when they have your product alone.
The only difference between complementor and competi­
tor is that the word more is replaced by less, which tells us
that every strategy a company aims toward a competitor
should be applied in exactly the opposite way toward a
complementor.
Exhibit 1 contains the Value Net—a map of the whole
game, the players and their relationships to one another.
Money goes from the customers to the business and from
the business to its suppliers. Your customers have other sup­
pliers, and some of those suppliers are going to be good for
you in the sense that when customers buy their products,
your products become more valuable. These are your com­
Strategy & Leadership
30
plementors. If your customers' other suppliers sell products
that make yours less valuable, they are your competitors.
Similarly, your suppliers have other customers. If sup­
plying those other customers, makes it harder for those
suppliers to supply you, those other customers are your
competitors. If supplying them makes it easier to supply
you, then you have a complementor on the supply side.
To figure out if somebody is your competitor or your com­
plementor, you must see the world from the customers' and
suppliers' perspective. You must be allocentric —centered
on others, rather than egocentric—centered on yourself.
A company should have a strategy for every relationship
in its Value Net. A case in point is Intel. Its chief executive,
Andy Grove, has a strategy for each type of player. His
competitor strategy is to be constantly innovative, to make
sure that by the time competitors catch up with his technol­
ogy, he's advanced to the next improvement. Toward cus­
tomers, Grove's strategy was to create the branded ingredi­
ent, the "Intel inside" campaign. He also has an incredibly
well-thought-out complement strategy of pushing his cus­
tomers to the next level of technology. He understands that
software alone will not push the limits of processing cycles,
and without that push, why would people demand the
faster and faster chips his engineers have built?
Grove recognizes that it's video rather than numbers
and words that will create the next big push for upgrades.
He has formed an alliance with Hollywood Creative Artists
to create virtual reality video games for the PC; he's invest­
ed in ProShare for desktop video conferencing; he's
formed an alliance with MCI to get more fiber into
intranets to increase their capacity. Grove has asked: What
are all the things that will make my chips more valuable?
What can I do to engineer a demand for my product?
The traditional strategic approach to business strategy
has been "stick to your knitting." But you can't stick to
November/December 1997
 your knitting if there isn't enough demand for sweaters.
You have to prod the market to discover what type of
activities the market is not providing.
For example, Carnival Cruise Lines created Carnival Air
to overcome high airfares from the west coast to Florida.
Carnival Air's low fares brought more people into the cruise
market and forced United and Delta to bring their fares
down as well. Carnival Cruise Lines doesn't own and oper­
ate the planes, but it made the change happen.
Why hasn't the Internet taken off in Japan? Japan's local
phone calls are metered. If you were on AOL for ten hours
in Japan, you'd have a $100 phone bill. No matter what
the price of the AOL service is, the Internet is not going to
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take off. The complements have to be cheaper.
This is a general problem. If companies price their
competing products independently, prices will come down
as companies try to compensate for lower margin by gain­
ing profit from increased market share. The reverse situa­
tion is true for complements. The natural incentive is to
set prices too high, which makes the total package too
expensive. Complementors should agree to lower prices.
In this case, a monopoly that prices complements actually
leads to higher profits and lower prices for consumers. This
is also why we see so much bundling. It's a way of bringing
the prices of a complementary package down.
Unlike the invisible hand of Adam Smith, complements
don't take care of themselves. Complements tend to be
missing or too expensive. Often, the best solution is to get
involved. There are three approaches you can take.
♦ Do it yourself. If you are sufficiently large and you
own enough of the market to get a large fraction of the
benefits, then it may be worthwhile for you to undertake
the new venture alone. Think of Intel and chips.
♦ Form an alliance. Sometimes the project is too big,
e.g., building the roads for cars or building the infrastruc­
ture for electronic commerce. In these cases, you may need
to join with competitors as well as customers and suppliers.
♦ Set up a proprietary business. Barnes & Noble
and Starbucks have joined hands because coffee brings
people into the stores, and the stores bring people to
the coffee.
Identifying complements in the Value Net can help
determine how to make a business more profitable. The
Value Net can also help determine what makes a business
more valuable. When IBM was in a hurry to launch its PC,
it abandoned its tradition of internal development and
subcontracted the chip to Intel and the operating system
to Microsoft. At the same time, IBM decided on an open-
Strategy & Leadership November/December 1997
32
architecture policy, which allowed companies like
Compaq, Dell, and Osgood to build IBM clones. The
advantage of these moves was that a larger pie was created
sooner. But Intel and Microsoft got the majority of the
benefit, because they controlled the necessary technology
and software. IBM had to share its profits with its hard­
ware competitors. In retrospect, many people say that IBM
should have kept one piece of the puzzle, probably the
architecture, to itself.
We don't agree. A closed architecture would have made
a much smaller pie. Another way to share in the gain is to
invest in complementer companies. IBM owned 20 per­
cent of Intel and had options on another 10 percent; it had
a chance to buy half of Microsoft for $300 million. If IBM
had kept its Intel stake and bought Microsoft, it would be
$50 billion richer today.
Of course, we have the benefit of hindsight. But when
you own all the pieces, as IBM did in the beginning, you
can write the rules. You're protected because you have
equity stakes in all the key players, so you don't have to
guess right. You'll be there with whichever one turns out
to make the money. If you have helped other people to
become more valuable, you should share in some of their
gain. Too often we ask how much money other people
can help us make, rather than what we can do to make
the pie larger for others and then how we can share in the
gain we created.
The Value Net is a place to start. It is a complete map
of a business' relationships; it helps counter limited think­
ing, focusing only on competition and forgetting coopera­
tion; it is a prompt to understand the business from the
outside in; and it provides a shared template for discus­
sions of strategy. Before you redefine a business strategy,
you should write down your Value Net and the Value Nets
of your customers and suppliers. It's a challenging exercise,
but the insights are well worth it.
Assessing Added Value
The concept of added value helps determine how a pie will
be divided. By estimating the size of the pie when you're
in the game, and then subtracting the size of the pie when
you're out of the game, you can determine what would be
lost if you weren't in the game. You also need to identify
what others would lose if you were not in the game, and
what alternatives they have.
For example, what's the added value of NutraSweet,
the high intensity sweetener used in Diet Coke and Diet
Pepsi? It's the value that customers get from drinking Diet
Coke and Diet Pepsi compared to Tab and Fresca. And it's
 the profits Coke and Pepsi make selling Diet Coke and
Diet Pepsi compared to the profits they used to make sell­
ing Tab and Fresca. Add the profits that Monsanto makes
selling NutraSweet compared to the profits that were
made selling saccharin, plus all the profits Ajinomoto
makes supplying amino acids to Monsanto compared to
the petroleum makers who supply their products to sac­
charin makers. What would be lost in the entire market if
NutraSweet didn't exist?
In thinking about added value, you have to think about
the entire value chain and understand where your added
value comes from. To the extent that a company can make
sure it has added value throughout the game, it can claim a
bigger piece of the pie.
At the same time that you're trying to raise your added
value, you're also concerned with limiting the added value
of the other players. The best way to lower the added
value of a supplier is to bring more suppliers into the
game, so that any single one has less added value. How
can you bring more suppliers into the game?
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♦ Pay new suppliers to play. Give them a guaranteed
contract to get them to enter the game.
♦ Form a buying coalition to become a larger buyer.
American Express joined with RJR, Sears, IBM, and oth­
ers to buy $1 billion worth of HMO coverage rather than
the $15 million worth they would buy alone. That brought
200 HMO suppliers into the game, which guaranteed that
none of them would have much added value.
♦ Form a buying coalition with your future self. Instead
of buying for one year, go to a seven-year contract.
♦ Become your own supplier.
These same principles apply to customers. It's harder to
bring more customers into the game, but you can:
♦ Educate customers—the more people know about
your products and services, the more uses they may find
for them.
♦ Pay customers to play by giving away part of the ser­
vice. This works best in the early adopter stage.
♦ Bring in better and cheaper complementary products,
as in the Intel example.
♦ Become your own best customer. It's not a coinci­
dence that automakers own car rental agencies.
Differentiation Through Loyalty
If you could charge a different price to your customers ver­
sus your competitors' customers, to whom would you offer
a lower price?
Most people are tempted to give a lower price to their
competitors' customers. That's a poor strategy. What busi­
nesses do we know that give their competitors' customers
lower prices? Telephone companies—switch and get the
lowest prices. Cellular phones—switch and get a free cel­
lular phone. Credit cards—teaser introductory rates. All of
those businesses are plagued by massive churn.
Let's think about the businesses that charge their own
customers less than competitors' customers. If you're a
Strategy & Leadership November/December 1997
34
United Airlines customer, United charges you less than an
American Airlines customer, because the American person
doesn't get the upgrade, the Mileage Plus program, or the
special toll-free reservation number. In effect, the
American customer pays a higher price to fly on United.
Creating loyalty by rewarding it actually creates added
value. If all the customer looks at is the product, the trans­
action becomes anonymous—a commodity. But if cus­
tomers invest in the relationship, they will seek not only a
flight to Chicago, but a flight on United. The relationship
is a form of differentiation and a source of added value.
Thus, charging competitors' customers more adds value.
Sometimes you have to reward people for wanting to
repeat the same experience and form that relationship.
♦ Say thank you in kind, rather than with cash. If an
airline gives someone a free trip to Hawaii, the airline's
cost is $40 and some peanuts, but for the customer the
value added is $300.
♦ Save the best thank you for your best customers.
♦ Don't forget to say thank you, even if you have a
monopoly.
♦ Say thank you to suppliers as well as customers.
♦ Say you're going to say thank you.
♦ Say thank you in a way that builds your business.
♦ Allow competition to have loyal customers, too.
Just because you have added value doesn't mean you
should collect on it today. Sometimes the best way to use
the power of added value is to restructure the game—
change the rules, write down-stream revenue contracts,
create a branded ingredient. Then, if your product later
becomes a commodity, you will have created an environ­
ment that will preserve your added value.
What to Do if You Have No Added Value
When the NutraSweet patent was due to expire, a compa­
ny called Holland Sweetener built a new factory to pro­
duce aspartame, the generic form of NutraSweet.
Monsanto had been in the business for 17 years and
owned the customer-preferred brand name NutraSweet.
When Holland Sweetener entered the market, it lowered
the added value of Monsanto, but it had no added value of
its own. The company spent $50 million to build a plant,
entered the game, and watched Coke and Pepsi re­
negotiate their contracts with Monsanto and save them­
selves $200 million a year.
Holland Sweetner did not realize that what it was really
selling was competition. If you can't make money in the
game, you can get money for changing the game. Here are
a number of ways of getting paid to play.
♦ Ask for contributions for bidding expenses.
♦ Ask for a guaranteed sales contract.
♦ Ask for a last-look provision.
♦ Ask for better access to information.
♦ Ask to deal with someone who will appreciate what
you bring to the table.
 "Creating loyalty by rewarding it actually creates added value. If all the customer looks at is the product, the transaction
becomes anonymous - a commodity. But if customers invest in the relationship, theywillseek [your product]."

♦ Ask to bid on other pieces of business.
♦ Ask the customer to quote a price at which he would
give you his business.
♦ Cash is okay, too.
When bidding for new business, you should think about
how to bring new customers into the market versus how to
steal another company's customers. However, if you do go
after another company's customers, make sure you're get­
ting something for it. By negotiating what you're going to
get, you can make your bid more likely to succeed.
A Checklist for Change
Game theory is a tool to incorporate into your way of
thinking. You don't have to accept the game you find your­
self in. You have the freedom to change it. And that's
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Describe the whole game. Identify all the players and their
relationships. Think about complements. List the players
you would like to bring into the game.
♦ Calculate your added value. Think about how you
can increase your added value. Use the concept of added
value to understand who has the power in your game.
Game theory is a systematic approach to discovering
new strategies and changing the game. It helps you to
keep your eye where the real action is and to find a differ­
ent and better game to play.
Note
1. T h e term "co-opetition" was coined by Ray Noorda, founder of the
networking software company Novell.

where great future success will come from.

♦ Use the co-opetition mindset. Think about creating
and capturing pie—competing and cooperating.
♦ Write out the Value Net for your organization.

Strategy & Leadership November/December 1997

35
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