PORT INFORMATION AND TERMINAL

REGULATION

GWANGYANG LNG RECEIVING TERMINAL

8.150m 7

WARNINGS
SMOKING
Sea Bottom
SMOKING IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED ON THE TERMINAL AREA AND ON BOARD
VESSELS ALONGSIDE, EXCEPT IN THOSE ENCLOSED SPACES ON BOARD
SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED BY THE MASTER AND MANAGER AS “SMOKING
AREAS.” FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THESE REGULATIONS WILL INVOLVE
CESSATION OF OPERATIONS AND MAY RESULT IN THE VESSEL VACATING THE
TERMINAL PENDING A COMPLETE INVESTIGATION AND RECEIPT OF WRITTEN
ASSURANCE FROM THE MASTER THAT EFFECTIVE CONTROLS HAVE BEEN
ESTABLISHED.

THE COMPANY RESERVES THE RIGHT, IN UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES, TO PROHIBIT

SMOKING AT ANY TIME IN ANY PLACE ON OR ADJACENT TO THE TERMINAL.

ARRESTMENT OF VESSELS AND/OR CARGO

COURT PROCEDURES IN KOREA ALLOW FOR THE ARRESTMENT OF VESSELS
AND/OR CARGO IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN COURT PROCEEDINGS ARE
COMMENCED. IF ARRESTMENT OF A VESSEL IS EFFECTED WHILE SHE IS BERTHED
AT THE TERMINAL, THEN IT MAY BE A CONTEMPT OF COURT TO MOVE OR ATTEMPT
TO MOVE THE VESSEL WITHOUT THE COURT’S APPROVAL. CLEARLY, THERE MAY
BE CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE GWANGYANG LNG TERMINAL WILL WISH TO
IMPLEMENT PROPER PROCEDURES TO PROCURE THE APPROVAL OF THE COURT
FOR THE VESSEL TO BE MOVED AND THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CERTAIN
PROVISIONS IN RELATION TO ARRESTMENT. YOUR ATTENTION IS PARTICULARILY
DRAWN TO PARAGRAPHS REQUIRING THE CO-OPERATION OF OWNERS, MASTERS
AND AGENTS IN THE CIRCUMSTANCE WHERE THE COURT SANCTIONS THE
REMOVAL TO ANOTHER BERTH, ANCHORAGE OR MOORING WITHIN THE PORT
AREA AS HERIN DEFINED.

ALCOHOL/DRUGS
MASTERS ARE ADVISED THAT OPERATIONS WILL CEASE, WHEN THE ACTIONS OF A
PERSON OR PERSONS INVOLVED IN OPERATIONS ARE NOT UNDER PROPER
CONTROL AS A RESULT OF THE USE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS.

OPERATIONS WILL NOT RESUME UNTIL THE MATTER HAS BEEN REPORTED TO AND
FULLY INVESTIGATED BY RELEVANT AUTHORITIES AND THE COMPANY CONSIDERS
IT SAFE TO DO SO. DELAY OR CANCELLATION IN A VESSEL’S DEPARTURE COULD
RESULT.

ACCESS TO THE RESTRICTED AREA FOR A PERSON OR PERSONS SIMILARILY

AFFECTED BY ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS WILL BE DENIED.

POLLUTION
IT IS AN OFFENCE TO:-
(i) SPILL LNG AND/OR OIL
(ii) DUMP GARBAGE
(iii) EMIT EXCESSIVE FUNNEL SMOKE
ALL INCIDENTS WILL BE INVESTIGATED AND PROSECUTION COULD RESULT
 COMMUNICATIONS

TELEPHONE NUMBERS
AND VHF RADIO CHANNELS

TELEPHONE VHF
Mobile Phone INTERNAL CHANNEL
ENERGY Project Department

LNG Technology Team

82-16-304-5476 82-2-3457-1326
- Team Leader Suk-chul Shin

Terminal Operation Team

82-17-622-9011 82-61-790-2321
- Team Leader Yeon-buom Lee

- (Main) 82-61-790-4758
Main Control Room
82-61-790-9030
82-61-790-9041

82-61-790-7921
Dock Master
Hot Line
Jetty Platform House(3rd Floor)
EMERGENCY SERVICES, POLICE/FIRE/AMBULANCE SHOULD BE CONTACTED VIA MAIN CONTROL
ROOM OR THROUGH VHF CHANNEL 16.

Extensions 82 61 790 7939 / 82 61 790 7940 are available for communicating operational and
emergency use with the terminal

VHF Channel 16 is used for ship/shore communications during berthing and unberthing operations
with Channel 16 as a back up if required.
ACTIONS IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY

WHILE YOUR VESSEL IS ALONGSIDE OUR TERMINAL A COPY OF THE TERMINAL EMERGENCY PROCEDURES (contained in the

Marine Policy and Procedures Manual) IS PLACED ON BOARD FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE.

THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING:

 EMERGENCY RESPONSE
 FIRE ON VESSEL MOORED TO LNG JETTY
 FIRE IN TERMINAL
 500M ZONE ENCROACHMENT
 VESSEL DRIFT or BREAKOUT
 OIL or LNG SPILL
 PERSON OVERBOARD FROM JETTY OR VESSEL
 MEDICAL FIRST AID / PERSONNEL INJURY
 BOMB OR THREAT FROM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
 VESSEL ARRIVING WITH STOWAWAYS OR REFUGEES
 PIRACY ATTACK

THE UNLOADING MASTER WILL DISCUSS WITH THE MASTER DETAILS OF THE
VESSEL’S EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND ACTIONS.
 GwangYang LNG Terminal Layout

① Jetty ③
② LNG Tank (100,000㎘×2) LNG
③ Send-out Facilities NG

④ Administration Building
⑤ Metering Station

④
FOREWORD ②
①

The jetty at Gwangyang LNG Terminal is owned and operated by/for POSCO as a
Liquefied Natural Gas import facility.

This is the first edition of the Port Information and Terminal Regulations Manual. This
manual has been produced by POSCO according to the recommendations and guidelines
of the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF) and the Society of International
Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO), to provide a general guideline for ships
using the facility. The manual outlines the requirements of POSCO LNG, drawing
attention to the arrival, berthing, mooring and safety procedures to be adopted. It also
outlines the facilities provided at the POSCO LNG and the assistance available to visiting
Shipmasters to promote safety on board the ship and at the berth.

Responsibility for the safe conduct of operations whilst a ship is berthed at the
terminal rests jointly with the Shipmaster and the responsible terminal representative,
nominally the Dock Master. However, primary responsibility for the safe conduct of
operations on board the ship rests with the Master. Nothing contained herein shall
be construed as relieving the Master of any ship from his responsibility for the safety
of the vessel under his command. Full co-operation is sought between the vessel
and POSCO LNG Terminal in the adoption and maintenance of the highest safety
standards in the mutual interests of a safe and efficient operation. There can be no
compromise with safety.
This manual does not supersede or replace in any way any hydrographic or official

publications relating to navigation in Gwangyang Bay or any navigation requirements

of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

The port management reserves the right at any time, to alter, change or amend any
or all of the provisions contained in these regulations without prior notice.
CONTENTS

ITEM NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION PAGE NO.

A Warnings 35
B Communications 36
C Actions in the event of an Emergency 37
D Gwangyang LNG Terminal Layout 38
F Forward 38
1. General Description of the Terminal 41
2. Jetty Equipment 42
3. Limitations of Operation / Weather Working 42
4. Incident Reporting 43
5. Pollution & Dumping 44
6. Ship Board Radar & Radio 44
7. Repairs / Hot Work 44
8. Smoking 45
9. Matches and Lighters 45
10. Naked Lights 45
11. Photography 45
12. Drugs & Alcohol 45
13. Stores & Spares 46
14. Fire fighting Equipment 46
15. Ship Access & Security 47
16. Portable Battery Powered Equipment 48
17. General 48

※ Appendices
ITEM NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION PAGE NO.

Annex A Safety Letter To Masters of Tankers at Terminal 49

Annex B Ship Shore Safety Check List 50
Annex C ESD system - letter to Master 51
Annex D Material Safety Data Sheet 52
1. General Description of the Terminal
INDEX FUNCTION SPECIFICATIONS MAIN FACILITIES
Unloading Arm,
Working area for 20×48m 1set
1.Working Platform1,2 Jetty Control Room,
unloading operations 27.6×55.8m 1set
Pipes, Gangway
Safe berthing of vessel
(absorb the berthing Fender
2. Breasting Dolphin 12×15m 4set
energy) Quick Release Hook 

13×13 2set Oil Fence

3. Mooring Dolphin Safe mooring of vessel
11.5×11.5m 4set Quick Release Hook 
Ways connecting
Length:736m Road Way
4. Trestle between terminal
Degree:25˚ Pipe Way
process area and Jetty
Disposal of BOG from
Length:736m
5. Flare Stack storage and unloading  HP/LP Stack
20×20m 1set
facilities
Bridge between dolphins Width:1.2m Electric Wire
6. Catwalk
Total 13Span Communication Wire 
Information of berthing Mooring Line Monitoring
7. Berthing system speed, impact angle,   Docking Aid System
distance(bow and stern) Quick Release Hook
8. Meteorological Furnishing marine Wave, Tide, Current,
Observation information to keep Wind Speed, Fog Sign`
facilities berthing of vessel safe Sea Berth Tower
Preventing oil from
9. Oil fence (400+300) ×2
spreading
2. JETTY EQUIPMENT

The jetty and its trestle are protected by modern fire fighting equipment, including
remote controlled water monitors, chemical powders and water spray curtains.

The Terminal is also equipped with the following instrumentation to aid in the
berthing and safe operation of the LNG carriers:
 Buoyage and Day Markers
 Anemometer
 Weather station

 Berth Speed of Approach Indicator

 Mooring Tension Monitoring System

 Current/Tide meter
Wind and current information is available to the pilot and Master from the Terminal
Main Control Room
Weather data is used to determine the cessation of marine operations, such as:
 Port closure to arriving ships
 Manoeuvring in the approach channel
 Stopping cargo unloading operations
 Disconnection of the cargo arm

 Departure from the berth

3. LIMITATIONS OF OPERATION / WEATHER WORKING PARAMETERS

The environmental limitations to marine operations at the Terminal for LNG carriers
are as follows:

Wind Speed Limitations

○ Berthing : Less 10 m/sec
○ Unberthing : Less 15 m/sec
In case the wind speed exceeds those limitations, berthing and unberthing are
allowed ONLY if the additional number of tug boats are put in service for the
operation. It shall be discussed among Ship, Terminal and Pilots.
If the maximum wind speed indicates as defined whilst LNG ship is alongside the
jetty of the Terminal, Ship and the Terminal will discuss and decide to take the
following actions.

○ Stop unloading if more than 15.0 m/sec

○ Arm disconnection if more than 17.5 m/sec

Navigation Limititations
The limitation to marine operations for LNG ships entering into Gwangyang Port or
approaching to the jetty of the terminal to berth are as follows.

a) Restriction from entering into Gwangyang Port

- Maximum Wave Height will be 1.2 meter
- Navigation of LNG carriers within the approach channel will not be permitted
when visibility, from any cause, is judged to be less than one(1) nautical mile.
- Wind Speed will be less than 10 m/sec

b) Berthing Speed of Approach Indicator shows the approaching condition of the

ship as ship maneuvers to approaches the jetty as;
- Green indicates Normal : if less then 10 cm/sec
- Yellow indicates Warning : if 10 ~ 15 cm/sec
- Red indicates Danger : if more then 15 cm/sec
c) Berthing and unberthing is NOT permitted after sunset

Current Speed Limitations

Berthing and unberthing are not allowed if the current is more than 0.9 knots

Electrical Storms
All cargo unloading operations will cease during the passage of an electrical storm.

4. INCIDENT REPORTING

Any incident involving the LNG ship, tug, line handler, jetty or their personnel, which
could affect the safety of cargo or navigational operations, must be reported
immediately to the Dock Master of the Terminal and should be properly documented.
All personnel involved in an incident must co-operate in any investigation conducted
by POSCO and Master of LNG ship if necessary.
5. POLLUTION AND DUMPING
The discharge of oil, oily water mixtures, noxious liquid substances, plastics,
garbage or sewage into the harbour is strictly prohibited. Garbage disposal can be
arranged through the ship’s agent.

The internal transfer of any oil or slops is not permitted within the port limits without
the approval of the Terminal management.

In the event that pollution occurs within the waters of the port, regardless of cause or
origin, it must be immediately reported to the Dock Master. Immediate action must
also be taken to stop or minimise further pollution and contain or clean up any
spillage. Blowing of boiler tubes in port is prohibited.

The venting of cargo vapour to atmosphere is prohibited while the vessel is

alongside. A vapour return line is available at the terminal.

6. SHIPBOARD RADAR & RADIO

Radars must be switched off while a vessel is alongside the berth.

The vessel’s main transmitting aerials must be disconnected and earthed while the
vessel is alongside the berth and the main radio installation must not be used except
for receiving purposes.

7. REPAIRS / HOT WORK

Repair/maintenance work involving hot or cold work or the use of naked lights is
strictly prohibited unless, in exceptional circumstances, the permission of the
Terminal Manager has been requested and granted in writing. Repair/maintenance
work includes but is not restricted to boiler and boiler tube cleaning, chipping and
scraping, hull painting, testing or servicing of electrical equipment, (including radar
and domestic electrical equipment), and the retrofitting of any equipment.

If permission is granted to undertake repairs/maintenance, a detailed list of work and

contracted shore personnel; employed on a vessel must be given to the Manager
before the work commences.

8. SMOKING
Smoking is strictly prohibited in the Terminal and on board any craft within the
Restricted Area, except as herein defined.
Smoking is strictly prohibited on board vessels alongside the Terminal except in two
places designated by the Master. These two places shall be cabin compartment,
located aft the cargo tanks and shall have no doors or ports opened directly on to or
above the main deck. Any approved smoking rooms shall be kept closed for the
duration of the vessel’s stay. The Manager may, when circumstances warrant,
prohibit smoking altogether.

9. MATCHES AND LIGHTERS

The carrying and use of matches and lighters is prohibited except as authorised by
the Dock Master for a specific purpose.

10. NAKED LIGHTS

The use of naked lights is prohibited at all times and in all places.

11. PHOTOGRAPHY
Photography is prohibited anywhere on board the LNG carrier, on the jetty and in the
Terminal unless authorised by the Terminal Manager and Permit To Work is issued.

12. DRUGS AND ALCOHOL

The use, sale, possession, distribution and promotion of prohibited substances while
on the company’s premises are strictly prohibited.

“Prohibited Substances” include any alcoholic beverage or any substance which an

individual may not sell, possess, use or distribute under the laws of Republic of
KOREA or any otherwise legal but unlawfully used substance.

13. STORES / SPARES

Stores and laundry, other than hand carried provisions, are not allowed to be taken
on board the ship at Gwangyang Terminal.

Barges or craft carrying stores or spare parts are not allowed alongside the LNG
carrier while alongside the Terminal.

14. FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENTS

The LNG carriers’ fire fighting equipment must always be kept ready for immediate
use.

The following is a brief outline of the Terminal Fire Fighting philosophy:

If an LNG spill occurs from the unloading arms, some portion of the liquid will be
vaporized to form vapour cloud and the remaining portions will remain in liquid form.
Where possible, the liquid portion shall be controlled and collected in a remote Jetty
Impounding Basin by means of stainless steel catchment pan, grading with 1% slope
rearwards, curb, drainage and trenches.

Upon detection of LNG liquid leak, a high expansion foam system will be actuated
automatically to apply highly expanded foam onto LNG liquid spill surface in the Jetty
Impounding Basin, thus reducing the vaporization speed and controlling any resultant
fire

 If a fire occurs firewater shall be applied for cooling of structures, piping and
equipments having a possibility to be impinged with flame or heat radiation. For
such cooling, two remotely operated water monitors shall be provided on the
jetty head.

 A fixed water spray system shall be provided for the emergency egress routes
from jetty head along the trestle and from the jetty head to the nearest dolphin
to provide sufficient time for an operator to leave the area safely.

 If a fire occurs on the LNG tanker during unloading, provision shall be made to
avoid spreading the fire to the LNG jetty head. A water curtain system shall thus
be provided at front surface of the jetty head to segregate the ship and the jetty
head.

 For small spill fires at incipient stage, wheeled and portable dry chemical
extinguishers shall be provided on the jetty head.
 Tugboat connections shall be provided so that tugboat can supply firewater to
the fire main system in the Terminal if required.

 Hydrants shall be strategically located at jetty head and shall be located on

trestle according to Korean regulations.

15. SHIP ACCESS AND SECURITY

The Terminal will provide a safe means of access between the jetty and the ship.

The Terminal will also provide security arrangements to restrict unauthorised access
to the jetty, and the ship will be expected to provide its own security arrangements to
avoid unauthorised access on board. Only diesel engine vehicles are permitted to
access jetty with flame arrestor connected.
A lifebuoy with at least 30 meters of line should be placed on deck at the exit from
the gangway.

From sunset to sunrise, the gangway must be floodlit and a deck watch
implemented.

The vessel should also be on the lookout for and report the approach of any
unauthorised craft.
While alongside, the accommodation ladder on the side away from the jetty should
be rigged and the lifeboat lowered to the embarkation deck to provide secondary
means of escape from the vessel in the event of an emergency.

16. PORTABLE BATTERY POWERED EQUIPMENT

The use of mobile telephones, electronic equipment, calculators, cameras and

photographic flash units are not allowed on deck at any time while the vessel is
alongside the berth.
UHF/VHF portable transceivers and torches must be of an intrinsically safe type.

17. GENERAL
All vessels entering harbour limits must be equipped with communications equipment
which comply with applicable regulations and permit the vessel to communicate with
land stations and POSCO’s Main Control Room.

 Vessels employed within the harbour must:

 be equipped with adequate facilities for safe mooring, unmooring, port

navigation and cargo handling.

 be manned with a qualified and competent crew including, without

limitation, the Master and enough crew members fluent in spoken English
to communicate with port personnel.

 All personnel involved in cargo transfer operations must be conversant

with the information contained in the following publications:

Liquefied Gas Handling Principles on Ships and in Terminals (SIGTTO)

And International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT)

 comply with all applicable laws, treaties, conventions, requirements and

regulations of the country of vessel’s registry and the PRC as they may
be promulgated and amended or modified from time to time.

 be adequately covered by all customary marine insurance policies in the

amounts and at the levels customarily maintained by first class operators.

 VHF/UHF radios and any other instruments used on the deck of vessels, jetty
or in the plant must be intrinsically safe.

 No visitors are allowed on board vessels without the approval of the Terminal
Manager.

 No fishing, diving or swimming is allowed within 300 meters of the jetty or

channel markers.
Annex A POSCO LNG Terminal
PORT INFORMATION AND TERMINAL REGULATIONS - RECEIPT

The Master, Date…………..………………

Vessel s.s./ m.v……………………………………………………

Dear Sir,

SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

Responsibility for the safe conduct of operations whilst your vessel is at this Terminal rest jointly with
you, as Master of the vessel, and with the responsible Terminal representative. We, wish therefore,
before operations start, to seek your full co-operation and understanding on the safety requirements
set out in the Ship/Shore Safety Check List which are based on safe practices widely accepted by the
oil and tanker industries.

We expect you and all under your command to adhere to these requirements throughout your stay
alongside this Terminal, and, for our part, we will ensure that our personnel do likewise and co-
operate fully with you in the mutual interest of safe and efficient operations.

Before the start of operations and from time to time thereafter, for our mutual safety, a member of the
Terminal staff, where appropriate together with a responsible officer, will make a routine inspection of
your vessel to ensure that the questions on the Ship/Shore Safety Check List can be answered in the
affirmative. Where corrective action is needed we will not agree to operations commencing or, should
they have started, will require them to be stopped.

Similarly, if you consider safety is endangered by any action on the part of our personnel or by any
equipment under our control you should demand immediate cessation of operations.

THERE CAN BE NO COMPROMISE WITH SAFETY

Please acknowledge receipt of this letter, Port Information and Terminal Regulations by countersigning
and returning the attached copy.

Master
Annex B

SHIP/SHORE SAFETY CHECKLIST

Ship`s name :

Port : Gwangyang LNG Receiving Terminal

Date of arrival : Time of All Fast :

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION

 The Safety of Operations requires that all questions should be answered affirmatively. If an affirmative
answer is not possible, the reason should be given and agreement reached upon appropriate precautions to be
taken between the ship and the terminal.

When any question is not considered to be applicable, a note to that effect should be inserted in the
“remarks” column.

A box in the columns ‘Ship’ and ‘Terminal’ indicates that checks should be carried out by the party
concerned

The presence of letters “A”, “P” or”R” in the “Code” indicates the following:

A – any procedures and agreements should be in writing in the remarks column of this checklist or other
mutually acceptable form. In either case, the signature of both parties should be required.

P – In the case of a negative answer, the operation shall not be carried out without the permission of the Port
Authority.

R – Indicates items to be re-checked at intervals not exceeding that agreed in the declaration

PART ‘A’ BULK LIQUID GENERAL

GENERAL SHIP TERMINAL CODE REMARKS
Stop cargo at 30 kts
A1 Is the ship securely moored?
□ □
Disconnect at 35kts wind
R velocity

A2 Are emergency towing off wires Positioned both forward and

correctly positioned?
□ □ R aft and maintained

above waterline
1.5m

A3 Is there safe access between ship and

shore? □ □ R

A4 Is the ship ready to move under its

own power? □ PR

A5 Is there an effective deck watch in R

attendance on board and adequate □ □
supervision on the terminal and on the
 ship?
A6 Is the agreed ship/shore
communication system operative? □ □ AR

A7 Has the emergency signal to be used Long blast

by the ship and shore been explained

and understood?
□ □ A (more than 10 sec)

A8 Have the procedures for cargo and

ballast handling been agreed? □ □ AR

A9 Have the hazards associated with Material Safety Data Sheet

LNG handling been identified and

understood and the MSDS sheet been □
posted?
A10 Has the emergency shut-down
procedure been agreed? □ □ A

A11 Are fire hoses and fire-fighting

equipment on board and ashore
positioned and ready for immediate □ □ R

use?
A12 Are cargo and bunker hoses/arms in
good condition, properly rigged and
appropriate for the service intended?
□ □
A13 Are scuppers effectively plugged and
drip trays in position, both on board
and ashore?
□ □ R

A14 Are unused cargo and bunker

connections properly secured with
blank flanges fully bolted?
□ □
A15 Are sea and overboard discharge
valves, when not in use, closed and
visibly secured?
□ □
A16 Are all cargo and bunker tank lids
closed? □
A17 Is the agreed tank venting system
being used? □ □ AR

A18 Have the P/V vents been operated

using the check lift facility, and the □ □
 operation of the vent verified?
A19 Are hand torches of an approved
type? □ □
A20 Are portable VHF/UHF transceivers of
an approved type? □ □
A21 Are the ship’s main radio transmitter
aerials earthed an radars switched
off?
□ □
A22 Are electric cables to portable
electrical equipment disconnected
from power?
□ □
A23 Are all external doors and ports in the
accommodation closed? □ R

A24 Are window types air conditioning

units disconnected □ □
A25 Are air conditioning intakes which may
permit the entry of cargo vapor
closed?
□ □
A26 Are the requirements for the use of
galley and other cooking appliances
observed?
□ □ R

A27 Are smoking requirements being

observed? □ □ R

A28 Are naked light requirements being

observed? □ □ R

A29 Is there a provision for an emergency

□ □
Gangway

escape?
A30 Are there sufficient personnel on
board and ashore to deal with an
emergency?
□ □ R

A31 Are adequate insulating means in

□ □
Insulation flanges installed on

place in the ship/shore connection? all loading arms

A32 Have measures been taken to ensure Should be kept operating

sufficient pump room ventilation?

□ □ R throughout

operation.
the cargo

A33 If the ship is capable of closed R

unloading, have requirements for □ □
 closed operations been agreed?
A34 Has the vapour return line been
connected? □ □
A35 If a vapour return line is connected,
have operating parameters been
agreed on?
□ □
A36 Are ship emergency fire control plans
located externally? □ □

PART ‘C’ BULK LIQUEFIED GASES

BULK LIQUIFIED GASES SHIP TERMINAL CODE REMARKS

Is information available giving the

C1
necessary data for the safe handing of
the cargo including, as applicable, a □ □
manufacturer’s inhibition certificate?
Is the water spray system ready for use?
C2 □ □
Is sufficient and suitable protective
C3
equipment (including self-contained
breathing apparatus) and protective □ □
clothing ready for immediate use?
Are hold and inter-barrier spaces properly
C4
inerted or filled with dry air as required? □ □
Are all remote control valves in working
C5
order? □ □
Are the required cargo pumps and
C6
compressors in good order, and have the
maximum working capacity been agreed □ □ A

between ship and shore?

Is reliquefaction system or boil-off control
C7
equipment in good order? □
 Is the gas detection equipment properly
C8
set for the cargo calibrated and in good
order?
□ □
Are cargo system gauges and alarms
C9
correctly set and in good order? □ □
Are emergency shutdown systems
C10
working properly? □ □ A

Does shore know the closing rate of Ship: second

C11
ship’s automatic valves; does ship have
similar details of shore system?
□ □ A
Shore: 15 second

Has information been exchanged

C12
between ship and shore on the
maximum/minimum
temperature/pressures of the cargo to be
□ □ A

handled?
Are cargo tanks protected against
C13
inadvertent overfilling at all times while
any cargo operations are in progress?
□ □
Is the compressor room properly
C14
ventilated, the electrical motor room
properly pressurised and is the alarm □ □
system working?
Are cargo tank relief valves set correctly
C15
and actual relief valve settings clearly and □ □
visibly displayed?

Tank #1 :

Tank #2 :

Tank #3 :

Tank #4 :

Tank #5 :

Tank #6 :
Declaration
We the undersigned, have checked, where appropriate jointly, the items in this checklist and have satisfied
ourselves that the entries we have made are correct to the best of our knowledge.
We have also made arrangements to carry out repetitive checks as necessary and agreed that those items with
the letter ‘R’ in the column ‘Code’ should be re-checked at intervals not exceeding 4 hours (not to exceed
6 hours).

For Ship For Shore

Name : Name :

Rank : Position :

Signature : Signature :

Date : Date :

Time : Time :

Revalidation

We have conducted a routine inspection and can confirm the repeatitive questions in the checklist continue to
be answered in the affirmative.

Division For Ship For Terminal

Date Time Name Signature Name Signature
Repeat checks during cargo operations

Time
Division (A-Part)

1. Is the ship securely moored?

2. Are emergency towing off wires

correctly positioned?
3. Is there safe access between ship and
shore?
4. Is the ship ready to move under its
own power?
5. Is there an effective deck watch in
attendance on board and adequate
supervision on the terminal and on the
ship?
6. Is the agreed ship/shore
communication system operative?
8. Have the procedures for cargo and
ballast handling been agreed?
11. Are fire hoses and fire-fighting
equipment on board and ashore
positioned and ready for immediate
use?
13. Are scuppers effectively plugged
and drip trays in position, both on
board and ashore?
17. Is the agreed tank venting system
being used?
23. Are all external doors and ports in
the accommodation closed?
26. Are the requirements for the use of
galley and other cooking appliances
observed?
27. Are smoking requirements being
observed?
28. Are naked light requirements being
observed?
30. Are there sufficient personnel on
board and ashore to deal with an
emergency?
32. Have measures been taken to
ensure sufficient pump room
ventilation?
33. If the ship is capable of closed
unloading, have requirements for
closed operations been agreed?

ANNEX C
POSCO LNG Terminal

EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

UNLOADING OPERATIONS

Vessel m.v./s.s………………………………………………………………. Date……………………………

I am aware of the Emergency Shutdown, (ESD), Functions, located at Gwangyang.

This facility is for use in an EMERGENCY situation only.

Initiation of the ESD push-button will sound audible alarms and:

ESD 1 Shuts down ship LNG unloading pumps

Closes PERC valves

Closes all liquid and vapor ESD valves on arms

Closes ESD valve on vapor header on-shore

Closes ESD valve on LNG header on-shore

Closes Jetty circulation valve on-shore

Closes Jetty circulation valve on jetty

Closes LNG ESD header valve on jetty

Closes drain lines on LNG arms

ESD 2 Does all of the functions of ESD 1

Including activating of PERC release.

I understand and have instructed the vessel’s personnel of the purpose, use and effect of the ESD
facility.

………………………………………………………..
Master
ANNEXD Material Safety Data Sheet
LNG Terminal Contingency Plan
Index:

Introduction Page No

Section 1 Collision 59

Section 2 Grounding 64

Section 3 Uncontrolled Venting 68

Section 4 LNG Leak from Ship`s Cargo Pipelines 70

Section 5 Cargo Fires 73

Introduction

These LNG Contingency Plans are intended to be a guide to emergency response in the event of an
incident involving an LNG carrier in the port of Gwangyang, while an LNG vessel is manoeuvring
inbound from the pilot station to the berth inbound and outbound from the berth to the pilot station.
POSCO maintain Contingency Plans that include incidents involving LNG ships moored at their
terminal. A copy of these plans is appended to this document.

The Contingency Plans evaluate the principle risks, detail the preventative measures in place to
prevent occurrence, list the possible consequences and provide check-lists for action that will be
required of the Port Authority and the action that may be expected of the ship in response to an
emergency.

The contingency plans should be used in conjunction with the Port Emergency Communication
Protocol appended to this document.
LNG ship owners have Emergency Response Procedures and are able to offer strategic resources,
trained response teams and specific technical advice in dealing LNG Contingencies.

Except where stated the incidents are assumed to occur with a fully loaded LNG carrier as this
poses the greatest risk.

Reference should also be made to:

SIGTTO publication ‘A Guide to Contingency Planning for the Gas Carrier Alongside and Within
Port Limits’
IMO publication ‘Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at Local Level for Port Areas’
SECTION 1: COLLISION

a) With another vessel underway

b) With the jetty, breakwater or other port structure
c) With a berthed vessel

Collision with a jetty, breakwater, or other moored vessel is likely to be at low speed, bow-on, or at a
shallow angle to the bow and unlikely to result in a rupture of the cargo system. The most likely
scenario for a rupture of the cargo containment system is a side-on impact by another vessel
underway.

The Contingency Planning for collision with moored vessel will depend on the nature of the cargo on
board the moored vessel.

Risk:

 Release of LNG from Primary Containment

Preventative Measures:

 LNG carrier design:

LNG carriers have special damage survival requirements as defined in the International Gas Code. The
cargo tanks are located at least 760mm from the ships side. The cargo tanks are located within an
inner hull. The possibility of cargo tank penetration will depend on the speed, striking angle,
displacement and bow type of the colliding vessel. Studies for a stopped, free floating 138,000m3
membrane LNG carrier have shown that penetration of the cargo containment system is possible with
the ship types, impact angles and speeds indicated in the attached table:

Ship type 90 80 70 60 50 45

Small Ro-Ro 8.4 kts 8.5 kts 8.9 kts 9.7 kts 10.9 kts 11.9 kts
Bulk Carrier 3.8 kts 3.9 kts 4.1 kts 4.4 kts 5.0 kts 5.4 kts
Container 4.7 kts 4.7 kts 5.0 kts 5.4 kts 6.1 kts 6.6 kts

 Effective traffic control:

Movement of other vessels in the harbour should be controlled during the transit of an LNG carrier,
particularly traffic movement likely to result in a crossing situation.

This may include a ban on all other traffic movement, or a moveable ‘Safety Zone’ around the LNG
carrier that other vessels are not permitted to enter.

Harbour speed control.

 Bridge Team Management. Effective inbound and outbound passage planning. Effective
monitoring of vessels movement and movement of other traffic in the port. Good
communications within the bridge team, master, pilot, officer of the watch, lookout and
helmsman.

 Ship vetting by terminal, prior to the vessels arrival, to ensure mandatory standards of
equipment, operation, crew certification and training are maintained

 Pre-arrival messages should confirm the correct operation of all navigation equipment,
propulsion, steering and safety systems. Any defects to critical equipment should be notified
to the Port Authority prior to entry.

 Application of restricted visibility limits for entry and sailing.

Consequences:

 Consequences will depend upon the extent of the damage to the cargo containment.

 LNG pool resulting in rapid vaporisation

 Cold vapour cloud, initially heavier than air, develops down wind of LNG pool, as vapour
warms to -110℃, the vapour will become lighter than air and disperse into the atmosphere,

 Cargo leakage into hold spaces and ballast tanks within the LNG carrier not designed for the
carriage of LNG resulting in rapid vaporisation that may reduce the rate of ingress.

 Structural damage to either vessel from ‘brittle fracture’ resulting from exposure of mild steel
hull and ship structure to LNG.

 Possible further structural damage resulting from ‘Rapid Phase Transition’, a ‘cold explosion’
similar to pouring water on boiling fat.

 Flammable limits of the vapour cloud are generally within the visible condensation cloud.
  Dispersion rate is dependent on wind and sea conditions.

 Flash-back from a down-wind ignition source with the flame front burning back to LNG source

 Secondary ignition of combustible materials in the path of the flame front

 Damage to hull of LNG carrier and second vessel from radiant heat

 Secondary fires starting on board either vessel from the radiant heat.

 Explosion of the LNG vapour will not occur in the open air but there may be explosions in
enclosed spaces onboard where the correct gas and air ratio develop.

 Explosive limits for natural gas between 5% and 15% gas in air.

 Membrane tanks may be put at risk, although not ruptured by the collision, if a crack in the
inner hull allows salt water to enter the insulation space between the inner hull and the
secondary membrane. The rapid build up of ice may detach the primary and secondary
membranes from the inner hull.

Action to be taken:

i) If the vapour cloud has not ignited:

1) Urgent warning to all vessels and installations in the vicinity, particularly downwind,
including the second ship, to ensure that strict control of ignition sources is imposed, this
may include the restriction on the movement of motor traffic on adjacent roads. Port VHF
Channel 10 & 16 for notifying shipping and Emergency Plan contacts for Port, Civil and
national agencies as required.

2) Determine if there are casualties and prepare to assist with evacuation and hospitalisation
in co-operation with local medical services.

3) Notify the relevant aviation authority in order to restrict low level overflights by helicopters
and aircraft close to the scene of the incident.

4) Establish exclusion zone.

5) Civil Authorities to evacuate shore installations that may be immediately down wind of the
vapour cloud.

6) Determine the extent of damage on board both vessels and whether vessels are still able
to manoeuvre under their own power.
 7) The stern of the LNG carrier should be manoeuvred upwind, where possible, to keep the
vapour cloud clear of the accommodation and engine housing. Particular care should be
taken to ensure that tugs and other support craft are kept well clear of the visible vapour
cloud and upwind of the spill.

8) If the two vessels are joined, the situation should be very carefully assessed before any
attempt is made to separate them, as this action may result in sparks that would ignite the
vapour cloud.

9) Additional tugs may be required to assist if either of the two vessels are unable to
manoeuvre and are drifting into greater danger.

10) Consider manoeuvring or towing the vessels to a safer part of the port. Due consideration
should be given to residual structural strength and the stability of either vessel before
towing or manoeuvring the either vessel outside of the harbour breakwater.

11) Tug fire monitors may be used to assist with the dispersal of the vapour cloud or provide
protection to the second ship that may not be fitted with water spray systems in
consultation with the ship’s master. Water spray systems are effective in dispersing
vapour clouds but the tug fire monitors should not be directed at the site of the leak as this
may result in a significant increase in vaporisation and the resultant size of the vapour
cloud.

The ship’s crew may be expected to take the following action:

1) Crew will be mustered and any casualties or missing personnel identified

2) First Aid will be given to any casualties

3) Emergency Teams equipped with breathing apparatus and fire suits will be used to rescue
casualties, prepare lifeboats, set up additional spray equipment and use portable gas
detection equipment to monitor atmosphere on deck.

4) Emergency notification to Port Authority, other shipping, Owners & Charterers

5) Cargo plant will be shut down, gas burning to the Engine room will be stopped. The
damaged tank will be isolated from the rest of the cargo system.

6) Ventilation systems will be shut down and fire dampers closed

7) Inert gas may be introduced to hold spaces and possibly effected ballast tanks.
 8) Water Spray systems will be activated to protect the accommodation housing and lifeboat
access, the motor and compressor rooms, also key valves in the cargo system

9) A damage assessment will be carried out by visual inspection and remote and local
sounding devices.

10) Damage stability calculations will be completed using software on board or by contract
with external agency.

11) Fixed and portable gas detection systems will be used to monitor atmosphere and spread
of cargo vapour.

12) Lifeboats will be prepared for evacuation

13) Additional portable water spray systems may be rigged to assist with the dispersal of the
vapour cloud and provide local protection against brittle fracture.

14) All non-essential personnel will be kept within the accommodation housing

15) Consideration will be given to evacuating non-essential crew.

16) Master will discuss with Port Authority and Pilots the most appropriate action to take given
the extent of damage and the prevailing weather and sea conditions

17) Assist with the deployment of emergency towing gear if required

18) Adjust ballast as required to maintain trim, list, hull stresses and stability within acceptable
limits.

ii) If the vapour cloud has ignited:

1) The tugs are not equipped with dry powder monitors and water monitors are not suitable
for extinguishing an LNG pool fire.

2) Use tug fire monitors to assist with the cooling of the ship’s structure and assist with the
extinguishing of any secondary fires until the pool fire has been exhausted.

3) Prepare to embark local fire-fighting teams to assist in dealing with secondary fires.

The ship has extensive fire-fighting equipment and may be expected to use this as follows:

1) Provide additional boundary cooling for vulnerable ship structures

2) Extinguish secondary fires

SECTION 2: GROUNDING
Risk:
 Failure of the inner hull allowing the build-up of water in the insulation space and an increase
in heat input to the cargo.
 Release of LNG from primary containment

The above risks are considered to be extremely low but may occur:

i) In grounding at high speed on a hard rock bottom

ii) Sideways grounding on a hard rock bottom from drifting or hard manoeuvring
iii) Grounding on a falling tide or held fast after grounding in a heavy swell

Preventative Measures:
 The design of LNG carriers requires cargo tanks to be protected from grounding damage.
Cargo tanks located B/5 or 2m, whichever less, from the ship’s bottom. Grounding incidents
have occurred to both spherical and membrane LNG carriers without loss of cargo from the
cargo tanks demonstrating the effectiveness of the protection for high longitudinal impact
speeds. Studies have shown that sideways drift speeds of between three and five knots are
required before rupture of the cargo containment is possible. These impact speeds are
generally greater than the drift rate of a disabled LNG carrier and greater than the sideways
speed component of extreme harbour manoeuvres.

 Bridge Team Management including effective inbound and outbound passage planning.
Regular, frequent and effective monitoring of vessel’s position in respect of the intended
track. Good communications within the bridge team, master, pilot, officer of the watch,
lookout and helmsman.

 Escort towing for critical phases of the inbound and outbound passage.
 Pilot training in contingency manoeuvres in the event of main engine or steering system
failure.
 Ship vetting by terminal, prior to the vessels arrival, to ensure mandatory standards of
equipment, operation, crew certification and training are maintained.

 Pre-arrival messages should confirm the correct operation of all navigation equipment,
propulsion and steering systems. Any defects to critical equipment should be notified to the
Port Authority prior to entry.
  Application of limiting wind and sea conditions based on manoeuvring capability of the vessel
and the available number and power of harbour tugs.
Consequences:
A matter of conjecture but the following may be assumed:

If the inner hull is breached, but there is no initial damage to the cargo containment:

On a spherical LNG carrier, the salt water will enter the hold space and permeate the insulation. This
will result in an increase in heat input to the cargo. The resultant vapour generation may be more than
the ship’s boilers can burn. Excess cargo vapour may require venting to atmosphere.

On a membrane LNG carrier the membrane tanks may be put at risk. Salt water will enter the insulation
space between the inner hull and the secondary membrane. The rapid build up of ice may detach the
primary and secondary membranes from the inner hull. As with a spherical LNG carrier there will be an
increase in heat input to the cargo and an increase in vapour generation. There is also an additional
risk of membrane failure.

Where the main cargo containment is also ruptured:

For membrane tanks, an outflow of LNG will occur into the surrounding ballast space, duct keel and
into the sea, and for spherical tanks, an outflow of LNG will occur into the hold space until the
hydrostatic balance between the external water level and the cargo is achieved. For membrane
vessels there will be rapid vaporisation in the ballast spaces resulting in cargo vapour being expelled
via the ballast tank vents. For spherical tank vessels, the LNG leaking into the hold will mix with the
sea water and vaporise causing a rapid increase in hold space pressure, this will be relieved by the
hold space pressure relief valves. The vapour released initially from the ballast or hold spaces will be a
gas and air mixture and may be within the flammable range. There will be a sudden increase in vapour
generation in the effected cargo tank once the hydrostatic balance has been achieved between the
cargo and sea levels. This pressure will require venting to atmosphere, either by controlled venting or
via the tank relief valves. If the LNG enters the ballast or hold spaces in sufficient volume, i.e. in
excess of the rate of vaporisation, there is the risk of brittle fracture of the inner and outer hulls. In still
water conditions an ice plug may form sealing the breach and preventing further leakage.

Uncontrolled vapour release from tank vent masts, hold space relief valves and ballast tank vents will,
initially, be cold, and may be denser than air. The vapour will travel down wind before warming,
becoming lighter than air and dispersing. The flammable area of the vapour cloud is normally
contained within the visible vapour cloud. The visible cloud is caused by condensation of moisture in
the air. If the vapour cloud reaches a source of ignition it will burn back to the source, causing
secondary fires of combustible material in the flame path. The area of risk from an uncontrolled
vapour release is considerably smaller than that from a major release of LNG.

Action to be taken:

1) Urgent warning to all vessels and installations in the vicinity, particularly downwind, to
ensure that strict control of ignition sources is imposed, this may include the restriction
on the movement of motor traffic on adjacent roads. Port VHF Channel 10 & 16 for
notifying shipping and Emergency Plan contacts for Port Civil and national agencies.

2) Determine if there are any casualties and prepare to assist with evacuation and
hospitalisation.

3) Establish exclusion zone

4) Prepare to evacuate shore premises that may be immediately down wind of the LNG
carrier

5) Prepare to assist with the evacuation of non-essential crew.

6) Tugs to standby to assist with cooling using fire monitors should there be a flash-back
to the vent mast.

7) Notify the relevant aviation authority in order to restrict low level overflights by
helicopters and aircraft close to the scene of the incident.

8) Ensure that tugs and support craft are kept upwind of vessel as uncontrolled venting
may occur.

9) Liase with Master to ascertain the extent of the damage on board the vessel and the
damage or risk of damage to the cargo containment.

10) Action taken to re-float the vessel should be such that it takes into consideration and
loss of structural strength due to the grounding damage, any subsequent brittle fracture
and any further damage that may be caused to the cargo containment system. Any
course of action should be discussed and agreed with ship’s master, ship owners and
salvage experts.

The ship may be expected to take the following action:

1) Crew will be mustered and any casualties or missing personnel identified

2) Emergency Teams equipped with breathing apparatus and fire suits will be used to
rescue casualties, prepare lifeboats, set up additional spray equipment and use portable
gas detection equipment to monitor atmosphere on deck.

3) Emergency notification to Port Authority, other shipping, Owners & Charterers

4) Provide first aid to any casualties

5) Cargo plant may be shut down, gas burning to the Engine room may be
6) stopped. The damaged tank may be isolated from the rest of the cargo system.

7) Ventilation systems will be shut down and fire dampers closed

8) Inert gas may be introduced to undamaged hold spaces and possibly to ballast tanks.

9) Water Spray systems will be activated to protect the accommodation housing and
lifeboat access, the motor and compressor rooms, also key valves in the cargo system
in the event of a flash-back fire.
10) A damage assessment will be carried out by visual inspection and remote and local
sounding devices and by the monitoring of cargo temperatures and tank and hold
pressure and level sensors.

11) Damage stability calculations will be completed using software on board or by contract
with external agency via communication with owners.

12) Fixed and portable gas detection systems will be used to monitor atmosphere in
accommodation, engine room, hold spaces and cargo machinery rooms.

13) Lifeboats will be prepared for evacuation

14) Additional portable water spray systems may be rigged to assist with the dispersal of the
vapour clouds.

15) All non-essential personnel will be kept within the accommodation housing

16) Consideration will be given to evacuating non-essential crew.

17) Master will discuss with Port Authority and salvage experts on the most appropriate
action to take given the extent of damage and the prevailing weather and sea conditions

18) Assist with the deployment of emergency towing gear if required

19) Adjust ballast as required to maintain trim, list, hull stresses and stability within
acceptable limits and minimise further damage to the cargo containment.

20) In the event of a vent mast or relief valve fire, resulting from uncontrolled venting, the
fire may be left to burn and the surrounding areas cooled with water sprays. The
 decision to extinguish the fire will consider the balance between the risk of re-ignition if
the fire is extinguished against the risk from radiant heat to the ship’s structure or
equipment.

21) Vent mast fires can be extinguished using fixed nitrogen systems. Other relief valve fires
may be extinguished using dry powder systems.

SECTION 3: UNCONTROLLED VENTING

Uncontrolled venting may occur if:

 Cargo tank pressures rise above the Safety Relief Valve Setting – commonly 250mbarG.

- Boil off gas is normally sent to the ship’s boilers. Where this is not possible for any
reason, tank pressures may rise above the safety relief valve setting.

- High heat ingress through the insulation causing a rapid increase in boil-off, in excess
of the boiler capacity. This may occur if the inner and outer hulls are breached and
there is seawater penetration of the insulation.

- The Saturated Vapour Pressure of the cargo is close to the safety relief valve setting
and the vessel is subject to heavy rolling or pitching

It is preferable to vent manually before the safety relief valves lift (Controlled Venting). The
manual vent facility is located on the forward vent mast, the furthest from the accommodation
and engine housing. If the safety relief valves lift, they may not re-seat correctly.
 The safety relief valves are defective

Risk: Flammable vapour cloud will develop down-wind of the vent mast

Preventative Measures

 Vessel to arrive with SVP of cargo within Safety Relief Valve setting (terminals commonly set
limits e.g. 170mbarG)

 Vessel to report any defects in the cargo system to the Port Authority prior to port entry

 Ship vetting by terminal, prior to the vessels arrival, to ensure mandatory standards of
equipment, operation, crew certification and training are maintained
 Consequences
 The vapour resulting from an uncontrolled release from tank vent masts will, initially, be cold,
and denser than air. The vapour will travel down wind before warming, becoming lighter than
air and dispersing. The flammable area of the vapour cloud is normally contained within the
visible vapour cloud. The visible vapour cloud being caused by condensation of moisture in
the air. If the vapour cloud reaches a source of ignition it will burn back to the source, causing
secondary fires of combustible material in the flame path. The area of risk from an
uncontrolled vapour release in considerably smaller than that from a major release of LNG. In
light winds a vapour plume may travel 100 - 150m down wind before warming and dissipating.

Action to be taken

1) Urgent warning to all vessels and installations in the immediate vicinity, particularly
downwind, to ensure that strict control of ignition sources is imposed, this may include
the restriction on the movement of motor traffic on adjacent roads. Port VHF Channel 10
& 16 for notifying shipping and Emergency Plan contacts for Port Civil and national
agencies.

2) Notify the relevant aviation authority in order to restrict low level overflights by
helicopters and aircraft close to the scene of the incident.

3) Monitor direction and extent of the vapour cloud. The flammable limits will be within the
visible condensation cloud.

4) Ascertain from the vessel the cause of the uncontrolled venting and actions that can be
taken to minimise the release.

5) Ensure that tugs and support craft are kept upwind of vessel

6) Manoeuvre vessel clear of the port

7) Tug fire monitors may be used, from upwind, to assist with the dissipation of a cold
vapour cloud.

The ship may be expected to take the following action:

1) Crew Mustered at Emergency Stations, Emergency Teams equipped with breathing

apparatus and fire suits will be used to prepare lifeboats, set up additional spray
equipment and use portable gas detection equipment to monitor atmosphere on deck.
 2) Where possible, the vessel will be manoeuvred to keep the accommodation and engine
housing clear of cargo vapour cloud.

3) Emergency notification to Port Authority, other shipping, Owners & Charterers

4) Maximise gas burning and ‘steam dumping’

5) Smoking and all hot-work will be prohibited

6) Air conditioning will be placed on re-circulation

7) Taken remedial action to minimise vapour release, including controlled venting

8) All external doors and vents will be closed

9) Prepare to activate water spray systems

SECTION 4: LNG LEAK FROM SHIP’S CARGO PIPELINES

The most likely cause of an LNG liquid leak is via a flange joint and the quantity of LNG released is
likely to be small. On rare occasions overfilling of cargo tanks has caused liquid leaks via the tank
venting system. On these occasions procedures were not followed and the design safety systems
were by-passed.

Risk:
 Hull and structural damage from brittle fracture

 Flammable vapour cloud developing down-wind of the leak

 Cold burns to personnel exposed to LNG

Preventative Measures:

 Ship design: The number of flanges in the cargo pipeline system are kept to a minimum –
all welded pipe and welded valve connections

 All isolatable sections of liquid transfer pipeline are protected against over-pressure by
safety relief valves

 Drip trays are provided beneath all liquid line flanges

 Potential areas of leakage, e.g. manifolds and liquid domes are protected by water spray
systems.

 Decks under the cargo manifolds are either insulated or fabricated of stainless steel.
  Water curtain are provided to protect the ships hull outboard of the cargo manifolds.

 Stainless steel drain lines, in conjunction with the water curtains, are provided for draining
overboard any accumulated LNG liquid in the manifold drip trays.

 Tank overfill protection is provided by High and High-High alarms and independent overfill
level sensors that will automatically close tank filling valves.

 Documented transfer procedures / cargo operations manuals

 Well trained and experienced crews

 Close monitoring of cargo pipelines during any transfer procedure

 Ship vetting by terminal, prior to the vessels arrival, to ensure mandatory standards of
equipment, operation, crew certification and training are maintained.

 Pre-arrival messages should confirm the correct operation of all navigation equipment,
propulsion and steering systems. Any defects to critical equipment should be notified to
the Port Authority prior to entry.

Consequences

 Brittle fracture of ship structure and hull plating. A small liquid leak on unprotected steel will
cause local structural damage but is unlikely to catastrophically affect the structural integrity of
the vessel.

 A flammable vapour cloud will develop downwind of the leak. The size and potential hazard of
the vapour cloud will depend on the quantity and duration of the leak. The vapour will be
initially heavier than air. It will warm and dissipate down-wind. If the combustible part of the
vapour reaches a source of ignition it will burn back to the source and continue to burn until
the source of the leak is stopped, or the fire is extinguished.

Action to be taken

i) Small leaks that can be controlled by the vessel and pose little threat to other port users or support
vessels:

1) Determine the nature and size of the leak and how long it will take to repair/stop the leak

2) Issue a precautionary safety warning to other port users

 3) In consultation with ship’s master and pilot, consider manoeuvring vessel clear of the
port until the leak has been stopped.

4) Manoeuvre the vessel to keep any visible vapour cloud clear of the ship’s
accommodation and engine housing

5) Keep tugs and support craft clear of any visible vapour cloud

ii) In the unlikely event of a major LNG leak from a rupture of the ship’s cargo pipeline system:

1) Urgent warning to all vessels and installations in the immediate vicinity, particularly
downwind, to ensure that strict control of ignition sources is imposed, this may include
the restriction on the movement of motor traffic on adjacent roads. Port VHF Channel 10
& 16 for notifying shipping and Emergency Plan contacts for Port Civil and national
agencies.

2) Ascertain if there are any injuries on the vessel and prepare to assist with evacuation

3) Notify the relevant aviation authority in order to restrict low level overflights by
helicopters and aircraft close to the scene of the incident.

4) Monitor direction and extent of the vapour cloud. The flammable limits will be within the
visible condensation cloud.

5) Ascertain from the vessel the cause of the leak and actions that can be taken to
minimise the release and what assistance is required

6) Ensure that tugs and support craft are kept upwind of vessel

7) Manoeuvre vessel clear of the port

8) Tug fire monitors may be used, from upwind, to assist with the dissipation of a cold
vapour cloud.

9) Tug fire monitors may be used to in addition to the vessel’s water-spray systems to
protect the vessel’s steel work from brittle fracture but only after close consultation with
the ship’s master. Uncontrolled used of fire monitors may injure ship’s crew and cause
rapid vapour generation if directed at the source of the liquid leak.
The ships crew may be expected to take the following action:

1) Crew will be mustered and any casualties or missing personnel identified

2) Emergency Teams equipped with breathing apparatus and fire suits will be used to
rescue casualties, prepare lifeboats, set up additional spray equipment and use portable
gas detection equipment to monitor atmosphere on deck.

3) Smoking and hot-work will be prohibited

4) Emergency notification to Port Authority, other shipping, Owners & Charterers

5) Emergency shut-down system may be activated

6) Transfer operations will be stopped

7) Leaking lines will be drained back to the cargo tanks where possible.

8) Ventilation systems will be shut down and fire dampers closed

9) Water Spray systems will be activated to protect the hull and ship’s structure in the
vicinity of the leak

10) Fixed and portable gas detection systems will be used to monitor atmosphere and
spread of cargo vapour.
11) Lifeboats will be prepared for evacuation in the event of a large leak
12) Additional portable water spray systems may be rigged to assist with the dispersal of the
vapour cloud and provide local protection against brittle fracture
13) All non-essential personnel will be kept within the accommodation housing
14) Master will discuss with Port Authority and Pilots the most appropriate action to take
given the extent of the leak, associated damage and the prevailing weather and sea
conditions. Options may include anchoring or manoeuvring clear of the harbour.

SECTION 5: CARGO FIRES

Note: LNG does not burn. The source of the fuel is vaporised LNG, natural gas, mixed with air.

Risks:

 Damage to the ship’s structure caused by radiant heat

  Loss of cargo control and monitoring functions due to radiant heat

 Loss of navigation and propulsion systems due to secondary fires in accommodation,

machinery rooms, navigation and control centres.

 Loss of cargo control and monitoring functions may lead to uncontrolled venting as pressure
builds in the cargo tanks

Preventative measures

 Ship design: Intrinsically safe and explosion proof fittings in gas dangerous zones.
Sophisticated fire and gas detection systems. Fixed and portable extinguishing systems: Dry
Chemical Powder, Water Fog, CO2. Water spray protection systems for vulnerable area,
manifolds, tank domes, cargo machinery rooms, accommodation housing, lifeboat access.

 Strict control of ignition sources on board vessel. No lighters, matches, naked flames in the
cargo area, no non-intrinsically safe electrical/electronic equipment permitted in the cargo
area including: mobile phones and cameras.

 Well trained and experienced crews

 Strict control of all cargo operations to prevent any release of LNG liquid or vapour

 The atmosphere in the cargo system is carefully controlled to ensure that air is excluded from
the cargo containment.

 Ship vetting by terminal, prior to the vessels arrival, to ensure mandatory standards of
equipment, operation, crew certification and training are maintained.

 Pre-arrival messages should confirm the correct operation of all navigation equipment,
propulsion, steering and safety systems. Any defects to critical equipment should be notified
to the Port Authority prior to entry.

Consequences:

The consequences of a small LNG fire are minimal if the surrounding area is well
protected by water spray and the fuel supply is promptly isolated.

Larger fires, with extensive radiant heat, may cause local structural damage and impair the cargo
control and monitoring systems making it difficult to isolate the initial source of the leak, and affect
the vessels ability to control the tank vapour pressure. This, in turn, may lead to uncontrolled venting,
an ignition of the resultant vapour cloud, causing additional casualties, a vent mast fire, and possible
secondary fires caused by the flame path.
Provided that the water spray systems remain intact, a fire in the cargo area should not spread to the
accommodation or machinery rooms. The main navigation and propulsion systems of the vessel
should remain intact.

Action to be taken:
Note: The objective is to extinguish the LNG fire by starving the fire of fuel, by shutting down the
source of supply, and to protect the ship from the radiant heat caused by the fire. Premature
extinguishing of the fire, before the source of fuel has been stopped, can result in an uncontrolled
vapour cloud. The vapour cloud may reach a source of ignition some distance down-wind and
burn back to the source causing injuries to personnel and secondary fires.

1) Urgent warning to all vessels and installations in the vicinity, Port VHF Channel 10 & 16 for
notifying shipping and Emergency Plan contacts for Port Civil and national agencies.

2) Determine if there are any casualties and prepare to assist with evacuation and
hospitalisation.

3) Establish exclusion zone and control the movement of other shipping in the port.

4) Prepare to assist with the evacuation of non-essential crew.

5) Muster additional fire-fighting tugs

6) Assist with transporting local Fire Service officers and equipment to the vessel

7) Manoeuvre the vessel to keep flames clear of the accommodation and other vulnerable areas.

8) In consultation with the master and pilot consider manoeuvring the vessel clear of the
harbour.

9) Tugs to standby to assist. After close consultation with the ship’s master the tugs fire
monitors may be used to assist with the cooling of the ship’s structure and extinguishing any
secondary fires until the LNG supply to the fire has been shut-down.

10) Liase with Master to ascertain the extent of the damage on board the vessel and the damage,
or risk of damage, to the cargo monitoring and control equipment. Ascertain whether
uncontrolled venting is likely to occur.

The ships crew may be expected to take the following action:

 1) Crew will be mustered and any casualties or missing personnel identified.

2) Emergency Teams equipped with breathing apparatus and fire suits will be used to rescue
casualties, prepare lifeboats, set-up additional spray equipment for boundary cooling.

3) Extinguish secondary fires.

4) Emergency notification to Port Authority, other shipping, Owners & Charterers

5) Provide first aid to any casualties

6) Cargo plant may be shut down, gas burning to the Engine room may be stopped, depending
on the pressure in the cargo tanks.

7) Any cargo transfer will be stopped.

8) The source of fuel for the fire will be isolated and shut-down where possible.

9) Ventilation systems will be shut down and fire dampers closed

10) Water Spray systems will be activated to protect the accommodation housing and lifeboat
access, and the motor and compressor rooms,

11) A damage assessment will be carried out by visual inspection and monitoring the cargo
system including cargo tank pressure sensors.

12) Lifeboats will be prepared for evacuation.

13) Additional portable water spray systems may be rigged to assist with boundary cooling.

14) All non-essential personnel will be kept within the accommodation housing.

15) Consideration will be given to evacuating non-essential crew.

16) Master will discuss with Port Authority, Pilot, Owners and salvage experts on the most
appropriate action to take given the extent of the fire, any associated damage and the
prevailing weather and sea conditions.

17) Assist with the deployment of emergency towing gear if required.

END.