II.

AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS

A. Amendment
Amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, deletes, without
altering the basic principle involved​.

B. Revision
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the Constitution​,
like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks and balances.
There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the
Constitution

C. Difference between Amendment and Revision

Lambino v COMELEC​: . ​Revision generally affects several provisions of the
Constitution; while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being
amended​.

D. Legal Tests
Two Part Test
​ roposed change is so extensive in its
Quantitative Test​ - WON the p
provisions as to change directly the “substance entirety” of the
Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous provisions​. The court
examines only the number of provisions affected​ and does not consider the
degree of the change.

Qualitative Test​ - Inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in
the Constitution. The main inquiry is WON the change will “​accomplish such
far-reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to
amount to a revision​”.

In the Lambino Proposal: constituted a revision, not simply an amendment of the

Constitution, because it involved a change in the form of government from
presidential to parliamentary, and a shift from the present bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.

E. Steps in the Amendatory

Proposal
Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII
A proposed amendment may come from:
1. Congress, by a vote of ¾ of all its members​. Majority of authorities
opine that this is to be understood as 3 /4 of the Senate and 3 /4 of the
House of Representatives.
2. Constitutional Convention​, which may be c​alled into existence either
by a ⅔ vote of all the members of Congress​, or (if such vote not
 obtained) by a ​majority vote of all the members of Congress with the
question of WON to call a Convention to be resolved by the people
in plebiscite​.

GONZALES V. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967)

FACTS: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary
injunction. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed the following resolutions,
(1) increasing the number of seats in the lower house from 120 to
180,

(2) calling for a constitutional convention, and

(3) allowing members of the Congress to run as delegates to the

constitutional convention without forfeiting their seats.

Congress passed a bill, which, approved by the President on 17 June

1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to
the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3
be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections on 14
November 1967.

ISSUE: WON a resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly,

violates the Constitution pursuant to Section 1 Article XV of the 1935
Constitution.

RULING:​ The power to amend the Constitution or to propose

amendments is not included in the general grant of legislative power
to Congress​. Pursuant to Section 1 Article XV 1935 Constitution, “The
Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of
this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification.” ​The said resolutions are null and void because the
Congress may not avail of both amending and calling a convention
at the same time and the election must be a special election not a
general election for amendment to the Constitution shall be
submitted for ratification​.

By Congress: Section 1, Article XV, 1935 Constitution

 Section 1.​ The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three fourth of
all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for
that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when
approved by a majority of the votes casts at an election at which the
amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.

GONZALES V. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967)

The said resolutions are null and void because the Congress may
not avail of both amending and calling a convention at the same
time and the election must be a special election not a general
election for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for
ratification.

By Constitutional convention, Section 3, Article XVII

Section 3​. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the
electorate the question of calling such a convention.

By the People through Initiative: Section 2, Article XVII; Sections 5 and 9 (b), Republic
Act No. 6735
Section 2​. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly ​proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters​, of which ​every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters therein​. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five
years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.

RA 6735
Section 5(a)​. To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per
centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the
same with the Commission.

Section 9(b)​. The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a

majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of
the plebiscite.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997)

FACTS: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with
 COMELEC ​a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits
of elective officials, through People’s Initiative. He based this
petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution​. Subsequently the
COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of
the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the
hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang
Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion
to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable
by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising
the several arguments, such as the following:

(1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the

constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed;

(2) The people’s initiative is limited to amendments to the

Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits
constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people’s
initiative.

The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.

ISSUE: WON lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a

revision or amendment of the Constitution.

RULING:​ The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a

revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such
as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of
equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting
political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative.​ However,
considering the Court’s decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether
or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

Ratification
In case the amendment is proposed by Congress or Convention, Paragraph 1, Section
4, Article XVII
Sec 4(1).​ Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section
1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
 ​ eld not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety
plebiscite​ which shall be h
days after the approval of such amendment or revision​.

In case of amendments proposed through initiative, Paragraph 2, Section 4, Article XVII

Sec 4(2). Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ​ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite​ which shall be ​held not earlier
than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the
Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition​.

Plebiscite to be called by Congress and supervised by COMELEC, but the initiative on

Constitution will be called by COMELEC
RA 6735 - An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor
Sec 8​ - COMELEC shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative or
referendum.

Initiative​ - power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitutions or to

propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

Three Systems of Initiative:

1. Initiative on the Constitution​ - refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution

2. Initiative on Statutes ​- refers to petition proposing to enact a national

legislation

3. Initiative on local legislation​ - refers to a petition proposing to enact a

regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance.

Plebiscite ​ - is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is

approved or rejected by the people.

Doctrine of Proper Submission

- Because the Constitution itself prescribes the time frame within which the
plebiscite is to be held, there can no longer be a question on whether the time
given to the people to determine the merits and demerits of the proposed
amendment is adequate.
- Other related Principles:
1. The plebiscite may be held on the same day as regular elections.
2. The use of the word “election" in the singular meant that the entire
Constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only;
furthermore, the people have to be given a “proper frame of reference” in
 arriving at their decision. Thus, submission for ratification of piece-meal
amendments by the Constitutional Convention (which is tasked to revise
the Constitution) was disallowed since the people had, at that time, no
idea yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would be

Theories regarding the position of a Constitutional Convention in our system of

Government
1. Theory of Conventional Sovereignty​ - where the Constitutional Convention is
supreme over the other departments of the government because the powers it
exercises are in the nature of sovereign powers

2. Inferiority of Constitutional Convention​ - Constitutional Convention is

considered inferior to the other departments of the government and with very
limited power purely delegated by the people or by a regularly constituted
legislature

3. Independence and Co-equality​ - so long as the Constitutional Convention

exists and confines itself within the sphere of its jurisdiction, it must be
considered an independent and a coordinate department of an existing
government

TOLENTINO V. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 701 (1971)

FACTS: The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of
two resolutions of the Congress approved in its capacity as a constituent
assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held on
November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural session on June 1,
1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, t​he Convention approved
Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION
AMENDING SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO
AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On September 30, 1971,
the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention,
that it will hold the said plebiscite together with the senatorial
elections​ on November 8, 1971.

Petitioner assailed COMELEC’s resolution and the holding of the

plebscite, arguing that:

- the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by

Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress​.
- the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the
people for ratification separately from each and all of the other
amendments. (Sec. 1, Art. XV – partly stated above)
 -
The COMELEC argued that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay
down the details of the plebiscite is within the authority of the
Constitutional Convention and that this power includes that of submitting
such amendments either individually or jointly.

ISSUE:
1. WON the Convention may call for a plebiscite on the sole
amendment contained in Organic Resolution 1 pursuant to Section
1 Article XV of the Constitution.

2. WON the Constitutional Convention is Governed by the

Constitution

RULING:
1. NO. The plebiscite is against Sec. 1, Article of the 1935
Constitution, which provides that:
“SECTION 1. … ​Such amendments shall be valid as part of
this Constitution when approved by a majority of votes cast
at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the
people for their ratification.​” (emphasis supplied)

The phrase “an election” refers to a singular election. ​The

rationale of which is that, to allow the people to realize the
wisdom and appropriateness of the provision, they need to
examine the amendments proposed by the Constitutional
Convention in harmony with the others, as well as the rest of
the Constitution​.

2. YES. As a creature of the Constitution,​ the Constitutional

Convention is governed by the same Constitution that
created it​. This Convention has not been called by the people,
that is, revolutionary convention). Consequently, it is not
completely without restrain and omnipotent all wise. Therefore, it
is subject to the constraints imposed upon it by the Constitution.

In addition, The SC which has the sacred duty to give meaning

and vigor to the Constitution by interpreting and construing its
provisions and by striking down any act violative thereof, has
jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the acts of a
ConCon.
Judicial Review of the Amending Process; Paragraph 1, Section 1, Article VIII
Par. 1, Sec 1 ​- The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.

GONZALES V. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967)

ISSUE: WON Court has jurisdiction to review a Resolution of Congress
for unconstitutionality

Since observance of Constitutional provisions on the procedure for

amending the Constitution is concerned, the issue is cognizable by
this Court under its powers to review an Act of Congress to
determine its conformity to the fundamental law.​ For though the
Constitution leaves Congress free to propose whatever Constitutional
amendment it deems fit, so that the substance or content of said
proposed amendment is a matter of policy and wisdom and thus a
political question, the Constitution nevertheless imposes requisites as to
the manner or procedure of proposing such amendments, e.g., the
three-fourths vote requirement. ​Said procedure or manner, therefore,
from being left to the discretion of Congress, as a matter of policy
and wisdom, is fixed by the Constitution. And to that extent, all
questions bearing on whether Congress in proposing amendments
followed the procedure required by the Constitution, is perforce
justiciable, it not being a matter of policy or wisdom.

The issue WON a Resolution of Congress - acting as a constituent

assembly - violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not
political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.

TOLENTINO V. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 701 (1971)

ISSUE: WON the Constitutional Convention is governed by the
Constitution

RULING: YES. As a creature of the Constitution,​ the Constitutional

Convention is governed by the same Constitution that created it​.
This Convention has not been called by the people, that is, revolutionary
convention). Consequently, it is not completely without restrain and
omnipotent all wise. Therefore, it is subject to the constraints imposed
upon it by the Constitution.

In addition, The SC which has the sacred duty to give meaning and
vigor to the Constitution by interpreting and construing its
provisions and by striking down any act violative thereof, has
 jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of the acts of a
ConCon.

JAVELLANA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 50 SCRA 30 (1972)

FACTS: On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court
decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, ​Javellana filed this suit against
the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the
provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present
1935 Constitution​. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and
a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in
behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also alleged
that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the
new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in

implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground that the
President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to
create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed
constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino
people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the
proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of

Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation
which have the same import and objective.

ISSUE: WON the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a

justiciable question

RULING: YES. It is a justiciable and a non-political question.

To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends

upon whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in
accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution.​ It is well
settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the
constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the
constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old
constitution​.

The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in
accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is
justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned
our 1935 Constitution) shall show.
III. GENERAL PROVISIONS (ARTICLE XVI)

A. Flag of the Philippines

Section 1. The flag of the Philippines shall be ​red, white, and blue, with a sun and
three stars​, as consecrated and honored by the people and recognized by law.

B. Name of the Country, National Anthem and National Seal

Section 2. The Congress may, ​by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national
anthem, or a national seal​, which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals,
history, and traditions of the people.​ Such law shall take effect only upon its
ratification by the people in a national referendum.

C. Armed Forces of the Philippines

Section 4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be ​composed of a citizen armed
force which shall undergo military training and serve as may be provided by law​. It
shall keep a regular force necessary for the​ security of the State​.

Section 5. (1) All members of the armed forces shall ​take an oath or affirmation to
uphold and defend this Constitution​.

(2) The State shall strengthen the ​patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of
the military​, and respect for people’s rights in the performance of their duty.

(3) Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its
members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed forces shall be insulated
from partisan politics.

No member of the military shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan

political activity, except to vote​.

(4) ​No member​ of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, ​be
appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government​,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.

(5) Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their service.

(6) The officers and men of the regular force of the armed forces shall be recruited
proportionately from all provinces and cities as far as practicable.

(7) The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years.
However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the
President may extend such tour of duty.
D. Police Force
Section 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police force,​ which shall be
national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a
national police commission​. The authority of local executives over the police units in
their jurisdiction shall be provided by law
1. In Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of R.A. 6975, establishing the Philippine National Police under a
reorganized department, the Department of Interior and Local Government.

2. In Alunan v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 115824, January 28, 2000, the Supreme Court
said that R.A. 6975 created the new Philippine National Police which absorbed
the members of the former National Police Commission, Philippine Constabulary
and the Integrated National Police, all three of which were accordingly abolished.
The law had the effect of revising the whole police force system and substituting
a new unified one in its place.

E. Consumer Protection
Section 9. The State shall ​protect consumers from trade malpractices​ and from
substandard or hazardous products.

F. Mass Media
Section 11. (1) The ownership and management of ​mass media shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines​, or to corporations, cooperatives or associations,
wholly-owned and managed by such citizens.

The ​Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies in commercial mass media

when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair
competition therein shall be allowed.

G. Advertising Industry
Section 11. (2) The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall be
regulated by law for the protection of consumers and the promotion of the general
welfare.

Only Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least seventy per centum

of the capital of which is owned by such citizens shall be allowed to engage in the
advertising industry.

The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in such

industry shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof, and all
the executive and managing officers of such entities must be citizens of the
Philippines.
IV. PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
A. ARTICLE II – DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
Preamble
1. Does not confer rights nor impose duties
2. Indicates authorship of the Constitution; enumerates the primary aims and
aspirations of the framers; and serves as an aid in the construction of the
Constitution.

Sets down the origin of constitution

1. Indicates the author and to whom it is promulgated

Serves as an aid of the constitution

People who made the constitution and not any representative.

Filipino people - sovereign

The Philippines is a democratic and republican State (Section 1)

Republicanism​ - The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them.

Essential features: Representation and Renovation

Manifestations
a. Ours is a government of laws and not of men
b. Rule of the majority
c. Accountability of public officials
d. Bill of rights
e. Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws
f. Separation of powers
- Purpose: To prevent concentration of authority in one person or
group of persons that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse
in its exercise to the detriment of republican institutions. “To
secure action, to forestall overaction, to prevent despotism and to
obtain efficiency”

- In La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association v. Ramos, G.R. No.

127882, December 1, 2004, the Court restrained itself from
intruding into policy matters to allow the President and Congress
maximum discretion in using the mineral resources of our country
 and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the
grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable
employment opportunities in the country. “​The Judiciary is loath
to interfere with the due exercise by co-equal branches of
government of their official functions​”. Let the development of
the mining industry be the responsibility of the political branches of
government. The questioned provisions of R.A. 7942 (Philippine
Mining Act of 1995) are not unconstitutional.

- Interdependency ​Principle of Blending Powers​ - Instances when

powers are not confined exclusively within one department but are
assigned to or shared by several departments, e.g., enactment of
general appropriations law.

- Principle of Checks and Balances​. This allows one department

to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or to rectify
mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments, e.g.,
veto power of the President as check on improvident legislation,
etc.

- Role of the Judiciary​. The judicial power, as defined in Sec. 1,

Art. VIII, “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse, of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government”

Note: When court mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries or

invalidates the acts of a coordinate body, what it upholds is not its
own superiority but the supremacy of the Constitution.

To test whether a power has been validly exercised by a particular

department is WON the power has been constitutionally conferred
upon the department claiming its exercise since the conferment is
usually done expressly.
- However absence of ​express conferment​, exercise of
power may be justified under the ​doctrine of necessary
implication,​ that grant of an express power carries with it
all other powers that may be reasonably inferred from it.
- Also powers may not be expressly nor impliedly conferred;
maybe ​inherent or incedental​ ex: President’s power to
deport undesirable aliens which may be exercised
 independently of constitutional or statutory authority,
because it is an “act of state”. Another example ​Marcos v
Manglapus​ where SC justified the action of Pres. Aquino
in banning the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines on
the basis of the President’s residual powers.

Political and Justiciable questions

A purely justiciable question implies a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative
of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law
said breach of right.

Political question - question of policy. It refers to those

questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.

Political question doctrine has been limited by the

2nd paragraph Sec 1 art viii, particularly the portion which
vests in the judiciary power “to determine WON there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.”

g. Delegation of Powers
Rule: Potestas delegata non potest delegare, based on the ethical
principle that ​delegated power constitutes not only a right but
a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
instrumentality of his own judgment​ and not through the
intervening mind of another.

Permissible Delegation:
Tariff powers to the president ​- Sec. 28(2) Art. VI “The
Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government’
 Emergency Powers to the President​ - Sec 23(2) Art VI In
times of war or other national emergency, the Congress
may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon
the next adjournment thereof

Delegation to the People ​- Referendum v Plebiscite -

Referendum is the power of electorate to approve or reject
legislation through an election called for the purpose.
Plebiscite is the electoral process by which an initiative on
the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people.

Delegation to LGU​ - grant of the authority to prescribe

local regulations, according to immemorial practice,
subject, of course, to the interposition of the superior in
cases of necessity. Recognizes the fact that local
legislatures are more knowledgeable than the national
lawmaking body on matters of purely local concern, and
are in a better position to enact appropriate legislative
measures thereon.

Delegation to Administrative Bodies​ - The power of

subordinate legislation.

Test for Valid Delegation

Completeness Test​ - law must be complete in all its
essential terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate
to do when it reaches him except to enforce it.

Sufficient Standard Test​ - intended to map out the

boundaries of the delegate’s authority by defining the
legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under
which it is to be pursued and effected. This is intended to
prevent a total transference of legislative power from the
legislature to the delegate. The standard is usually
indicated in the law delegating legislative power

Renunciation of war (Section 2) - Art. II

Section 2. ​The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the ​generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land​ and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.

Adoption of generally-accepted principles of international law (Section 2)

Adherence to a policy of peace, freedom, and amity with all nations

(Section 2)
Doctrine of Incorporation​ - Every state is, by reasons of its membership
in the family of nations, bound by generally accepted principles of
international law. By virtue of this clause, our Courts have applied the
rules of international law in a number of cases even if such rules had not
been previously been subject of statutory enactments.
- Generally accepted principles of international law refers to norms
of general or customary international law which are binding on all
states ex. Renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy,
sovereign immunity, a person’s right to life, liberty and due
process, and pacta sunt servanda (international treaties should be
upheld by all the signatories.)

- International law can become part of the sphere of domestic law

either by ​transformation or by incorporation​. The
transformation method requires that an international law principle
be transformed into domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism, such as local legislation. The incorporation method
applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law
is deemed to have the force of domestic law

- The doctrine of incorporation is ​applied whenever municipal

tribunals or local courts are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or
statute of the local state​. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both. In a situation,
however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to
be made between a rule of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts

Read in relation with Section 7 and 8

 Section 7​. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy.
In its relations with other states, the paramount consideration shall
be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and
the right to self-determination.

Section 8​. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest,

adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in
its territory.

a. Covenant of the League of nations​ - which provided conditions for the

right to go to war
b. Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928​ - General Treaty for the Renunciation of
War, ratified by 62 States, which forbade war as an instrument of national
policy
c. Charter of the United Nations.​ Art. 2 of which prohibits the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State.

Civilian supremacy (Section 3)

Section 3​. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed
Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to
secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

Role of the armed forces:

(a) Protector of the people and State;
(b) to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the
national territory (Section 3)

Compulsory military and civil service, under conditions provided by law (Section
4)
Section 4. ​The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
The Government may call upon the ​people to defend the State​ and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal, military or civil service.

Maintenance of peace and order, promotion of general welfare (Section 5)

Section 5.​ The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Recognition of hierarchy of rights (Section 5)

Right to bear arms​ - a statutory, not a constitutional right. The license to carry a
firearm is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does it create a vested
 right. The right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with
these constitutional duties. Being a statutory creation, the right to bear arms
cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right

Separation of Church and State (Section 6)

Section 6. ​The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Reinforced by:
a. Sec. 5 Art III (Freedom of religion clause)
b. Sec. 2 (5), Art IX-C (Religious sect cannot be registered as political party)
c. Sec. 5(2), Art. VI (no sectoral representative from the religious sector)
d. Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI (Prohibition against appropriation for sectarian benefit)

Exceptions
a. Sec. 28 (34), Art. VI (Churches, parsonages, etc., actually, directly and
exclusively used for religious purposes shall be exempt from taxation)
b. Sec. 29 (2), Art. VI (Prohibition against appropriation from sectarian
benefit, except when priest, etc. is assigned to the armed forces, or to any
penal institution or government orphanage or leprosarium
c. Sec. 3 (3), Art. XIV (Optional religious instruction for public elementary
and high school students)
d. Sec. 4 (2), Art XIV (Filipino ownership requirement for educational
institutions, except those established by religious groups and mission
boards)

Independent foreign policy (Section 7)

Section 7.​ The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations
with other states, ​the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty,
territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination​.

Sec 25, Art XVIII - After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning military
bases, ​foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and,
when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized
as a treaty by the other contracting State​.

Lim v Exec Secretary:​ Supreme Court said that these provisions, along with
Sec. 2, Art. II, Sec. 21, Art. VII, and Sec. 26, Art. XVIII, betray a marked antipathy
towards foreign military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in
general.
Freedom from nuclear weapons (Section 8)
Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and
pursues a policy of ​freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory​.

Promote a just and dynamic social order (Section 9)

Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from
poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.

Promote social justice in all phases of national development (Section 10)

Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.

Personal dignity and human rights (Section 11)

Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights.

Family as basic social institution, and natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth (Section 12)

Protection of the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception
(Section 12)

Section 12. ​The State recognizes the​ sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution​. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government.

Vital role of youth in nation-building (Section 13)

Section 13. ​The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

R.A. 7610, which penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuses, was
enacted in consonance with the policy of the State to ​“provide special
protection to children from all forms of abuse”​; thus, the Court grants the
victim full vindication and protection granted under the law

Role of women in nation-building (Section 14)

Fundamental equality before the law women and men (Section 14)
Section 14. ​The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.

Right to health (Section 15)

Section 15.​ The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.

Right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Section 16)

Section 16. ​The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Oposa v Factoran​ - petitioners, minors duly joined by their respective parents,

had a valid cause of action questioning the continued grant of Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) commercial logging purposes, because the cause focuses on
a fundamental right, to a balanced and healthful ecology.

C&M Timber Corporation v Alcala​ - on the issue that the “total log ban” is a
new policy which should be applied prospectively and not affect the rights of
petitioner vested under the Timber Licensing Agreement, the Supreme Court
declared that this is ​not a new policy but a mere reiteration of the policy of
conservation and protection expressed in Sec. 16, Art. II, of the
Constitution​.

Priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports (Section
17)
Section 17​. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology,
arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress, and promote total human liberation and development

Labor as a primary social economic force (Section 18)

Section 18.​ The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

Phil. Merchant Marine School, Inc. v CA​: held that requirement that a school
must first obtain a government authorization before operating is based on the
State policy that education programs and or operations shall be of good quality,
and, therefore shall at least satisfy minimum standards with respect to curricula,
teaching staff, physical plant and facilities and administrative and management
viability.
 While it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to
select a profession or course of study subject to fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements, the exercise of this right may be
regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals,
peace, education, order, safety and general welfare. ​Thus, persons who desire
to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical
knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to
engaging in their chosen careers. ​This regulation assumes particular
pertinence in the field of medicine, in order to protect the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance

Self-reliant and independent national economy (Section 19)

Section 19.​ The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

Indispensable role of private sector (Section 20)

Section 20​. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

Although the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it

nevertheless reserves to the Government the power to intervene whenever
necessary for the promotion of the general welfare.

Comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform (Section 21)

Section 21​. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and
agrarian reform.

Recognition and promotion of rights of indigenous cultural communities (Section

22)
Section 22. ​The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development.

Encouragement of non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral

organizations (Section 23)
Section 23. ​The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or
sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.

Role of communication and information in nation-building (Section 24)

Section 24. ​The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information
in nation-building.

Autonomy of local governments (Section 25)

Section 25.​ The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
 Decentralization of administration ​- merely delegation of administrative powers
to the local government unit in order to broaden the base of governmental
powers.

Decentralization of power​ - abdication by the national government of

governmental powers

Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form
of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and
confined within the extent allowed by the central authority.

Exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress

and the power of general supervision by the President

On the President’s power of general supervision, however,​ the President can

only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or
she finds that the latter had acted contrary to law.​ The President or any of his
alter egos,​ cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local
government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution.
Any directive, therefore, by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter
the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government
unit is a patent nullity, because it violates the principle of local autonomy, as well
as the doctrine of separation of powers of the executive and legislative
departments in governing municipal corporations

Equal access for public service and prohibition of political dynasties (Section 26)
Section 26. ​The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

Pamatong v Comelec​ - the Supreme Court said that this ​provision does not
bestow a right to seek the Presidency; it does not contain a judicially
enforceable constitutional right and merely specifies a guideline for
legislative action​. The provision is not intended to compel the State to enact
positive measures that would accommodate as many as possible into public
office. The privilege may be subjected to limitations. One such valid limitation is
the provision of the Omnibus Election Code on nuisance candidates.

Honesty and integrity in public service (Section 27)

Section 27. ​The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service
and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.

Policy of full public disclosure (Section 28)

 Section 28. ​Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.

B. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Separation of powers is a doctrine of constitutional law under which the three
branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial) are kept separate.
This is also known as the system of checks and balances, because each branch is
given certain powers so as to check and balance the other branches.

ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, G.R. NO. 45081, 15 JULY 1936, 63 PHIL. 139.
FACTS: Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as
member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth Government. On December 3,
1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who
have not been subject of an election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election

protest against the petitioner before the Electoral Commission of the National Assembly.
The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own
resolution providing that it will not consider any election protest that was not submitted
on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought
the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The Electoral Commission however denied his
motion.

ISSUE:
1. WON ​the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding
the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

2. WON the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter
of the controversy;

RULING:
1. NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its

constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest
 filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara,
and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any
manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as
the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe​.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an
implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the
power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its
cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the
performance of the other is also conferred.​ In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power
to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive
power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral
Commission​.

2. In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the ​necessity of a final
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two
agencies created by the Constitution. ​The court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant
to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
(Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution).

C.CHECKS AND BALANCE

a system that allows each branch of a government to amend or veto acts of another
branch so as to prevent any one branch from exerting too much power.

Congressional oversight: (i) Scrutiny; (ii) Investigation and monitoring of

implementation of laws
A. Scrutiny
1. Primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation
of government activities
 2. In the exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information
and report from the other branches of government
3. Based primarily on the power of appropriation of Congress
4. Congress can ask the heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either House of Congress on any matter pertaining to their
departments

Art. VI, Sec. 22. The heads of departments may, upon their own
initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments.​ Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the
Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three
days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When
the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the
President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in
executive session

Under the 1973 Constitution, a similar provision expressly referred to this

appearance as the “question hour”. In contrast to such provision,
however, the tenor of its counterpart in the present Constitution is merely
permissive. Hence, the President may or may not consent to the
appearance of the heads of departments; and even if he does, he may
require that the appearance be in executive session. Reciprocally,
Congress may refuse the initiative taken by a department secretary.

Congress exercises legislative scrutiny through its ​power of

confirmation​.

B. Congressional Investigation
Art. VI, Sec. 21. T​he Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committee ​may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure​. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

Limitations
- Must be in aid of legislative functions
- Must be conducted in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure
- Persons appearing therein are afforded their constitutional rights
 Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly
and effectively, ​such power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry —
with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function​. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body
does not itself possess the requisite information — which is not frequently
true — recourse must be had to others who do possess it.

ABAKADA PARTYLIST V. PURISIMA, G.R. NO. 166715, 14 AUGUST 2008,

562 SCRA 251
FACTS: This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from
implementing and enforcing the Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of
2005).

RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and

collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of
Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It
covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition ​challenging

the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. ​They
contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law
"transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only
in consideration of such rewards.​ Petitioners also ​assail the creation
of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers, for it permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of
the law​, when legislative function should have been deemed
accomplished and completed upon the enactment of the law.

Respondents, through the OSG, counter this by asserting that the

creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law
enhances rather than violates separation of powers, as it ensures the
fulfillment of the legislative policy.
ISSUE: WON the joint congressional committee is valid and constitutional

RULING: NO. It is unconstitutional.

In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J. Puno, the power of

oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it
has enacted. Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures
undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to
prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess
executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of
legislative power itself and integral to the checks and balances inherent in
a democratic system of government.

Congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning,​ it

neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive
power to implement laws nor undermines the constitutional
separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and
balances inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in
fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the
over-accumulation of power in the executive branch.

However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment

"beyond the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic
and related constraints on Congress​. It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power. And,
when it exercises its legislative power, it must follow the "single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the
Constitution including the procedure for enactment of laws and
presentment.

Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be

limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight
must be confined to the following:

(​1) scrutiny​ ​based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation

and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power
to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by
 either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments
and its power of confirmation and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of

laws​ ​pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. ​Legislative vetoes fall in this class​.

Legislative veto
ABAKADA PARTYLIST V. PURISIMA, G.R. NO. 166715, 14 AUGUST 2008,
562 SCRA 251

RULING: ​Any action or step beyond (scrutiny and investigation) that will
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class​. Legislative veto is a statutory provision
requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or
through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or
disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in
the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an
inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than
through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law
initially delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of
the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in
enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.

Other cases:
BELGICA V. OCHOA, G.R. NO. 208566, 19 NOVEMBER 2013, 710 SCRA 1
ISSUE: WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork
Barrel similar to it are unconstitutional for being violative to the principles
of/constitutional provisions on checks and balances

RULING: ​YES.​ ​Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79
Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the said
amount would be further divided among individual legislators​ who
would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) is passed, effectively appropriate
PDAF funds based on their own discretion. ​As these intermediate
appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed
and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF
 appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration​.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting
system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which ​subverts
the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs
the President’s power of item veto​. As petitioners aptly point out, the
President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79
Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the
legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda
and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators
with legitimate projects.

Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, ​the 2013

PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the
lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere
funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending​ (i.e.
scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of
historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup
connotes that the ​appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and
purposes of the appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be
subject to the President’s power of item veto​.

The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson

relays, ​“​limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and
information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization
of said Funds​.” Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by
line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per
implementing agency.”

GONZALES III V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. NO. 196231, 28

JANUARY 2014, 714 SCRA 611
FACTS: Case primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Sec 8(2) of
RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) which gives the President the power
to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.

1st case: Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC) was

created upon the aftermath of the Manila Hostage Crisis, when Mendoza
made a public outcry against the blundering of government officials. IIRC
was tasked to determine the accountability for the incident through
conduct of public hearings and executive sessions.
IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and
inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of
procedure by allowing Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration to languish
for more than 9 months without any justification, in violation of the
Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in
administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission.

The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The

prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking.
Case was elevated to OP. OP instituted a Formal Charge against
petitioner Gonzales for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the
Performance of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other pertinent Civil
Service Laws, rules and regulations, and for Misconduct in Office under
Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

OP Dismissed Gonzales from his office.

2nd case: House of Representatives’ Committee on Justice passed a

resolution recommending the OP the dismissal of Deputy Special
Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate
charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate
government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount
to culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which
are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds
for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act. The dismissal
recommendation was caused when Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit
sought the Sandiganbayan’s approval of a PLEBARA entered into with
Major General Carlos F. Garcia.

ISSUE: WON the OP has jurisdiction to exercise administrative

disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor
who belong to the Constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.

RULING: Yes. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over

a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive

While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is

extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or
elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by
impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot
insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares
the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority over all government officials,
Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power
of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor​. A
harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in
R.A. No.6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had
intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent
disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, ​the manifest intent of
Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 -
in the same Organic Act was to provide for an external authority,
through the person of the President, that would exercise the power
of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the
constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all
government officials and employees. Such legislative design is
simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the
lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his
Deputy may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities​.

By granting express statutory power to the President to remove a Deputy

Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress merely filled an obvious
gap in the law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also
expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under
Section 2 of the same Article, there is, ​however, no constitutional
provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting
Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law
without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing
statutes​. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes
Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including
the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to
impeachment.