ATTY. MAURICIO C.

ULEP
Public International Law
UNCLOS and the Arbitral Ruling on the West
Philippine Sea

OUTLINE

Group 6

ROLAND LANCE A. PUNZALAN

JEMMIE B. IBASCO
KAISSER JOHN P. ACUÑA
SHEEBA PASCUAL
IVAN ROBIN S. GARNEL
Short background and history of UNCLOS
UNCLOS I
• In 1956, the United Nations held its first Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I)
at Geneva, Switzerland. UNCLOS I resulted in four treaties concluded in 1958:
• Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone , entry into force: 10 September
1964
• Convention on the Continental Shelf, entry into force: 10 June 1964
• Convention on the High Seas, entry into force: 30 September 1962
• Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas , entry into
force: 20 March 1966
• Although UNCLOS I was considered a success, it left open the important issue of breadth
of territorial waters
UNCLOS II
In 1960, the United Nations held the second Conference on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS II");
however, the six-week Geneva conference did not result in any new agreements. Generally
speaking, developing nations and third world countries participated only as clients, allies, or
dependents of the United States or the Soviet Union, with no significant voice of their own.
UNCLOS III
The issue of varying claims of territorial waters was raised in the UN in 1967 by Arvid Pardo of
Malta, and in 1973 the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea convened in New
York. In an attempt to reduce the possibility of groups of nation-states dominating the
negotiations, the conference used a consensus process rather than majority vote. With more
than 160 nations participating, the conference lasted until 1982. The resulting convention came
into force on 16 November 1994, one year after the 60th state, Guyana, ratified the treaty.
UNCLOS- is an international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place between 1973 and 1982. The Law of the
Sea Convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations with respect to their use of the
world's oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management
of marine natural resources. The Convention, concluded in 1982, replaced the quad-treaty
1958 Convention on the High Seas. UNCLOS came into force in 1994, a year after Guyana
became the 60th nation to ratify the treaty.
 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea lays down a comprehensive
regime of law and order in the world's oceans and seas establishing rules governing all uses of
the oceans and their resources. It enshrines the notion that all problems of ocean space are
closely interrelated and need to be addressed as a whole. The Convention was opened for
signature on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica. This marked the culmination of more
than 14 years of work involving participation by more than 150 countries representing all
regions of the world, all legal and political systems and the spectrum of socio/economic
development. At the time of its adoption, the Convention embodied in one instrument
traditional rules for the uses of the oceans and at the same time introduced new legal concepts
and regimes and addressed new concerns. The Convention also provided the framework for
further development of specific areas of the law of the sea. The Convention entered into force
in accordance with its article 308 on 16 November 1994, 12 months after the date of deposit of
the sixtieth instrument of ratification or accession. Today, it is the globally recognized regime
dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea lays down a comprehensive
regime of law and order in the world's oceans and seas establishing rules governing all uses of
the oceans and their resources. It enshrines the notion that all problems of ocean space are
closely interrelated and need to be addressed as a whole. The Convention was opened for
signature on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica. This marked the culmination of more
than 14 years of work involving participation by more than 150 countries representing all
regions of the world, all legal and political systems and the spectrum of socio/economic
development. At the time of its adoption, the Convention embodied in one instrument
traditional rules for the uses of the oceans and at the same time introduced new legal concepts
and regimes and addressed new concerns. The Convention also provided the framework for
further development of specific areas of the law of the sea. The Convention entered into force
in accordance with its article 308 on 16 November 1994, 12 months after the date of deposit of
the sixtieth instrument of ratification or accession. Today, it is the globally recognized regime
dealing with all matters relating to the law of the sea.
. The Convention (full text) comprises 320 articles and nine annexes, governing all
aspects of ocean space, such as delimitation, environmental control, marine scientific research,
economic and commercial activities, transfer of technology and the settlement of disputes
relating to ocean matters. Some of the key features of the Convention are the following:
Coastal States exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea which they have the right to
establish its breadth up to a limit not to exceed 12 nautical miles; foreign vessels are allowed
"innocent passage" through those waters;
* Ships and aircraft of all countries are allowed "transit passage" through straits used for
international navigation; States bordering the straits can regulate navigational and other
aspects of passage;
 * Archipelagic States, made up of a group or groups of closely related islands and
interconnecting waters, have sovereignty over a sea area enclosed by straight lines drawn
between the outermost points of the islands; the waters between the islands are declared
archipelagic waters where States may establish sea lanes and air routes in which all other States
enjoy the right of archipelagic passage through such designated sea lanes;
* Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction
over marine science research and environmental protection;
* All other States have freedom of navigation and overflight in the EEZ, as well as
freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
* Land-locked and geographically disadvantaged States have the right to participate on
an equitable basis in exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of
the EEZ's of coastal States of the same region or sub-region; highly migratory species of fish and
marine mammals are accorded special protection;
* Coastal States have sovereign rights over the continental shelf (the national area of
the seabed) for exploring and exploiting it; the shelf can extend at least 200 nautical miles from
the shore, and more under specified circumstances;
* Coastal States share with the international community part of the revenue derived
from exploiting resources from any part of their shelf beyond 200 miles;
* The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf shall make recommendations
to States on the shelf's outer boundaries when it extends beyond 200 miles;
* All States enjoy the traditional freedoms of navigation, overflight, scientific research
and fishing on the high seas; they are obliged to adopt, or cooperate with other States in
adopting, measures to manage and conserve living resources;
* The limits of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of
islands are determined in accordance with rules applicable to land territory, but rocks which
could not sustain human habitation or economic life of their own would have no economic zone
or continental shelf; * States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas are expected to
cooperate in managing living resources, environmental and research policies and activities; *
Land-locked States have the right of access to and from the sea and enjoy freedom of transit
through the territory of transit States;
* States are bound to prevent and control marine pollution and are liable for damage
caused by violation of their international obligations to combat such pollution;
* All marine scientific research in the EEZ and on the continental shelf is subject to the
consent of the coastal State, but in most cases they are obliged to grant consent to other States
when the research is to be conducted for peaceful purposes and fulfils specified criteria;
 * States are bound to promote the development and transfer of marine technology "on
fair and reasonable terms and conditions", with proper regard for all legitimate interests;
* States Parties are obliged to settle by peaceful means their disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of the Convention;
* Disputes can be submitted to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
established under the Convention, to the International Court of Justice, or to arbitration.
Conciliation is also available and, in certain circumstances, submission to it would be
compulsory. The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over deep seabed mining disputes.

Rights and Obligations of States in UNCLOS maritime zones

 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
• INTRODUCTION
Article 1
Use of terms and scope 1.For the purposes of this Convention:
(1) "Area" means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction;
(2) "Authority" means the International Seabed Authority;
(3) "activities in the Area" means all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the
resources of the Area;
(4) "pollution of the marine environment" means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly,
of substances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is
likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to
human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the
sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities;
(5) (a) "dumping" means: (i) any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels,
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea; (ii) any deliberate disposal of vessels,
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea; (b) "dumping" does not include: (i) the
disposal of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from the normal operations of
vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea and their equipment, other
than wastes or other matter transported by or to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made
structures at sea, operating for the purpose of disposal of such matter or derived from the
treatment of such wastes or other matter on such vessels, aircraft, platforms or structures; (ii)
placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, provided that such
placement is not contrary to the aims of this Convention.
2. (1) "States Parties" means States which have consented to be bound by this Convention and
for which this Convention is in force. (2) This Convention applies mutatis mutandis to the
entities referred to in article 305, paragraph l(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f), which become Parties to
this Convention in accordance with the conditions relevant to each, and to that extent "States
Parties" refers to those entities.
Article 2 - Legal status of the territorial sea, of the air space over the territorial sea and of its
bed and subsoil
1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters
and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of
sea, described as the territorial sea.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and
subsoil.
3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other
rules of international law. SECTION 2. LIMITS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA
Article 3 Breadth of the territorial sea - Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its
territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines
determined in accordance with this Convention.
Article 4 Outer limit of the territorial sea - The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every
point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of
the territorial sea.
Article 5 Normal baseline - Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal
baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as
marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.
Article 6 Reefs - In the case of islands situated on atolls or of islands having fringing reefs, the
baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the seaward low-water line of the
reef, as shown by the appropriate symbol on charts officially recognized by the coastal State.
Short background and History of UNCLOS
• UNCLOS lays down a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world’s oceans and
seas.
• The 1982 convention was signed by 117 states and it establishes rules governing all uses
of the ocean and its resources.
• The convention also provides the framework for the development of a specific area of
law of the sea.
• The convention is a lengthy document having 446 articles group in 7 parts in 9 annexes.
• UNCLOS came into force internationally on 16th Nov 1994.
• Objectives of the UNCLOS
• To promote the peaceful use of the seas and oceans;
• To facilitate International Communications;
• To enable equitable and efficient utilisation of ocean resources;
• To protect and preserve the marine environment;
• To promote Maritime safety.
Part XI of the Convention provides for a regime relating to minerals on the seabed
outside any state's territorial waters or EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zones). It establishes
an International Seabed Authority (ISA) to authorize seabed exploration and mining and
collect and distribute the seabed mining royalty.
The United States objected to the provisions of Part XI of the Convention on several
grounds, arguing that the treaty was unfavorable to American economic and security
interests. Due to Part XI, the United States refused to ratify the UNCLOS, although it
expressed agreement with the remaining provisions of the Convention.
From 1982 to 1990, the United States accepted all but Part XI as customary international
law, while attempting to establish an alternative regime for exploitation of the minerals
of the deep seabed. An agreement was made with other seabed mining nations and
licenses were granted to four international consortia. Concurrently, the Preparatory
Commission was established to prepare for the eventual coming into force of the
Convention-recognized claims by applicants, sponsored by signatories of the
Convention. Overlaps between the two groups were resolved, but a decline in the
demand for minerals from the seabed made the seabed regime significantly less
relevant. In addition, the decline of Communism in the late 1980s removed much of the
support for some of the more contentious Part XI provisions.
In 1990, consultations began between signatories and non-signatories (including the
United States) over the possibility of modifying the Convention to allow the
industrialized countries to join the Convention. The resulting 1994 Agreement on
Implementation was adopted as a binding international Convention. It mandated that
key articles, including those on limitation of seabed production and mandatory
technology transfer, would not be applied, that the United States, if it became a
member, would be guaranteed a seat on the Council of the International Seabed
Authority, and finally, that voting would be done in groups, with each group able to
block decisions on substantive matters. The 1994 Agreement also established a Finance
Committee that would originate the financial decisions of the Authority, to which the
largest donors would automatically be members and in which decisions would be made
by consensus.
On 1 February 2011, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) issued an advisory opinion concerning the legal responsibilities
and obligations of States Parties to the Convention with respect to the sponsorship of
activities in the Area in accordance with Part XI of the Convention and the 1994
Agreement. The advisory opinion was issued in response to a formal request made by
the International Seabed Authority following two prior applications the Authority's Legal
and Technical Commission had received from the Republics of Nauru and Tonga
 regarding proposed activities (a plan of work to explore for polymetallic nodules) to be
undertaken in the Area by two State-sponsored contractors – Nauru Ocean Resources
Inc. (sponsored by the Republic of Nauru) and Tonga Offshore Mining Ltd. (sponsored by
the Kingdom of Tonga). The advisory opinion set forth the international legal
responsibilities and obligations of Sponsoring States and the Authority to ensure that
sponsored activities do not harm the marine environment, consistent with the
applicable provisions of UNCLOS Part XI, Authority regulations, ITLOS case law, other
international environmental treaties, and Principle 15 of the UN Rio Declaration.
WHAT IS THE “WEST PHILIPPINE SEA”?
THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA refers to the part of the South China Sea that is closest, and
of vital interest, to the Philippines. On September 5, 2012, President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino
III issued Administrative Order No. 29, with Section 1 stating that the “maritime areas on the
western side of the Philippine archipelago are hereby named as the West Philippine Sea.” It
includes “the Luzon Sea, as well as the waters around, within and adjacent to the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG), and Bajo de Masinloc also known as Scarborough Shoal.”
WHAT IS THE “SOUTH CHINA SEA”? The South China Sea is the much broader expanse of water,
often described as a semi enclosed sea, bounded by China/Taiwan in the north, by the
Philippines in the east, and by Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Brunei in the west
and south. The Gulf of Tonkin and Gulf of Thailand also abut the South China Sea. Scattered
over the South China Sea are various geographic features, the most prominent of which are
known internationally as the Spratlys, the Paracels, Macclesfield Bank and Pratas Island. There
are overlapping claims by various countries to these features and to the waters and resources
surrounding them, including parts of the West Philippine Sea
WHAT IS THE “KALAYAAN ISLAND GROUP (KIG)”?
The Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) is a group of over fifty features and their surrounding waters
that belong to the Philippines, located in what is internationally known as the Spratly Islands.
The KIG is not the same as the Spratlys, however, as there are features in the Spratlys that are
not part of the KIG.
The KIG has been the subject of the Philippines’ official and private interests since before it
became an independent republic. The islands, reefs and rocks of the KIG are nearest the
Philippine main archipelago, and are believed to be both economically valuable and
strategically important for purposes of national security. The KIG was formally incorporated as a
municipality of Palawan province in 1978 during the administration of President Ferdinand E.
Marcos through Presidential Decree No. 1596. Nine (9) of its islands and reefs presently host
Philippine civilians and troops. Philippine sovereignty over the KIG is contested by some states
in the region.
WHAT IS BAJO DE MASINLOC (SCARBOROUGH/PANATAG SHOAL)?
Bajo de Masinloc is a large coral reef which lies off the coast of the Province of Zambales. It is
nearest to the Municipality of Palauig. Although uninhabited, with only some rocks visible
above water, the shoal has been considered part of the Philippines from Spanish colonial times.
Bajo de Masinloc is an area of fishing, navigation and other activities by Filipinos as well as
other nationalities. The 1734 Pedro Murillo Velarde map shows the shoal designated as Panacot
(meaning ‘to terrify’) , while an 1899 “Mapa General, Islas Filipinas” by the Observatorio de
Manila marks it as Bajo de Masinloc (Shoal of Masinloc). It is also locally known as Panatag and
Karburo. Its international name ‘Scarborough Shoal’ came into use after the British tea trading
ship Scarborough was shipwrecked in the area in 1748, as documented in the journals of the
Malaspina Expedition (1789-1794).4 In 2009, when the Philippine Legislature passed Republic
Act No. 9522, Bajo de Masinloc and the KIG were explicitly mentioned to be under Philippine
sovereignty and jurisdiction. In 2012, Bajo de Masinloc became the subject of a heated dispute
with China
HOW FAR ARE THE KALAYAAN ISLANDS AND BAJO DE MASINLOC FROM THE MAIN PHILIPPINE
ARCHIPELAGO?
The distance between Puerto Princesa (Palawan’s capital) and Pag-asa Island (the biggest island
of KIG municipality) is approximately 280 nautical miles. It takes 1 hour and 30 minutes to reach
Pag-asa Island by C-130 Hercules transport plane from Puerto Princesa, and 32 hours by motor
launch to get there from Ulugan Bay. Bajo de Masinloc, on the other hand, is only 124 nautical
miles away from the main archipelago’s coastline . It takes 12 hours for fishermen from
Zambales, Pangasinan and Bataan to travel to Bajo de Masinloc during the fishing season .
WHAT ARE THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA ALL ABOUT?
The disputes over the Kalayaan Island Group involve six parties that lay claim, for different
reasons, to all or part of the South China Sea. These parties are the People’s Republic of China,
Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam. The basic disagreements
are about sovereignty or ownership of the islands, rocks, and reefs in the ocean, including the
adjacent waters and seabed areas. Following the entry into force of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1994, countries also began to contest each
other’s rights to the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone and to a Continental Shelf,
particularly the rights to explore for, and exploit, fisheries, petroleum, and other marine
resources in these zones. Military garrisons and other facilities have been set up by various
claimant states to protect their claims. With regard to Bajo de Masinloc, on the other hand,
Philippine sovereignty is being disputed only by China and Taiwan. China and Taiwan call it
Huangyan Island, and claim sovereignty and historic rights over the shoal. In 2012, China
stationed ships on the shoal and began preventing Filipino fishermen from regaining access to
the shoal and its surrounding waters.
ASIDE FROM THOSE WHO CLAIM SOVEREIGNTY, ARE ANY OTHER COUNTRIES ALSO INTERESTED
IN THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA?
Yes. Many countries consider the South China Sea as a whole to be important especially
because of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs), i.e. the navigation routes connecting seas
and ports through which critical commodities like oil and other goods are transported to and
from the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, through Southeast and East Asia, and on to the
Pacific Ocean. Regional states such as Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia and members of
ASEAN are concerned that the ongoing disputes might break out into armed conflict, because
any instability in the region can upset regular economic activities and derail development. The
South China Sea also appears to play an important role in the naval strategies of major powers,
including China and the United States. There are disagreements between them over
navigational rights, with China asserting that military activities may not be undertaken in the
Exclusive Economic Zones of coastal states without their consent, while the US believes the
EEZs are international waters in which all states’ rights to freedom of navigation and overflight
are assured, subject only to the sovereign rights of coastal states to economically exploit the
resources within their own EEZs.
Map of multiple competing claims in the South China Sea beyond the 12 nautical mile (M)
territorial seas measured from the baselines of all States. For clarity, the respective baselines
and 12 M territorial seas of each country are not shown. If any one, some or all of the islands
within the Spratly, Paracel, or Pratas Islands generate their own EEZ or continental shelf, then a
correspondingly large adjacent area of the SCS could also be claimed by the coastal State to
which they belong.

HAVE STATES EVER ENGAGED IN ARMED CONFLICT OVER THESE ISLANDS AND REEFS?
Yes. There were two instances of armed conflict in the past, both of them between China and
Vietnam. The first was in 1974 when China seized the Paracels from Vietnam, and the second
was in 1988, where three Vietnamese vessels were sunk and 70 of its soldiers killed near Mabini
(Johnson) Reef in the Spratlys. These incidents were symptomatic of other deep-seated
problems in their bilateral relations.
Since then, there have been reports of minor skirmishes involving various claimant States -
especially over conflicting claims to resources. At times the tensions threatened to escalate into
violent confrontations, but fortunately these were managed without resort to the use of force.
Because of periodic tensions, growing nationalism, and the presence of armed troops of various
countries in the islands and reefs of the West Philippine Sea, some consider the territorial
disputes here as ‘an accident waiting to happen’.

HOW MANY FEATURES ARE PRESENTLY OCCUPIED BY THE CLAIMANT STATES?

At present, the Philippines occupies 9 features in the KIG, with both civilian and military
personnel present. China occupies 7, Taiwan occupies 1 (the biggest island of Ligaw or
Taiping/Itu Aba), and Vietnam holds the most number at 22 features. Malaysia occupies 4
features with civilian personnel, while Brunei has not physically occupied any feature. Most
claimant states are known to also send naval vessels to conduct patrols and military exercises in
the waters around their possessions.
Map showing the features in the Spratly Islands presently occupied by various claimant
countries in the West Philippine Sea, in the area of the KIG.
 NATIONAL INTERESTS
WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE KIG IN THE PHILIPPINE POLITICAL STRUCTURE?
THE KIG IS A 5TH CLASS MUNICIPALITY of the Province of Palawan, with a total land area of 85
hectares made up of one barangay (Pag-Asa) and with a population of 305 as of 2010.
The first election for local officials of the KIG was held in 1980.
As of November 2012, the Mayor of Kalayaan is Eugenio B. Bito-Onon Jr. while the Vice Mayor
is Rosendo L. Mantes.
For 2012, the municipality proposed to the provincial government priority development
projects, mainly infrastructure improvements, worth P7.404 million.
In 2009, Rep. Act No. 9522 described the baselines around the KIG (together with Bajo de
Masinloc) as subject to determination in accordance with the “regime of islands” under the
UNCLOS. This has no impact on the legal status of KIG within the Philippine political structure,
as enacted in 1978 Presidential Decree No. 1596.
WHY IS THE KIG IMPORTANT TO THE PHILIPPINES?
The KIG and its waters off Palawan are vital to the national security and economic survival of
the Philippines.
The KIG is critical to Philippine territorial integrity and security against external threats, keeping
in mind the country’s strategic location, history of foreign invasions, and its fragmented
geographic configuration which makes it vulnerable to intrusion from the seas.
We must avoid a repetition of history when, during the Second World War, Ligaw Island (Itu
Aba/Taiping) was used by the Japanese to launch aggression against the Philippines and other
Southeast Asian nations.
The KIG is important to the Philippines’ food security because of its rich fisheries and fish
breeding areas. Filipino scientists believe its ecosystem is linked to the Sulu Sea and other
marine ecosystems of the archipelago, which makes the fisheries resources in these areas
interrelated and interdependent. The livelihood and economic welfare, especially of hundreds
of our coastal communities, are tied to all our marine waters.
The KIG is important to energy security since it is known to have largely untapped petroleum
reserves as well as mineral deposits. Geological studies show that the Spratlys (also known as
‘Dangerous Grounds’), Palawan, the Reed Bank, and the Calamian block all form part of a single
micro-continent.
The nature and characteristics of the seabed underneath the KIG are similar to those of the
seabed elsewhere in the Philippine continental shelf, according to studies conducted in 1988
and 1989, showing that KIG is a submerged natural prolongation of Palawan.
Under UNCLOS, the Philippines is entitled to the area’s petroleum, mineral and other non-living
resources. Finally, the KIG and West Philippine Sea also represent vital sealanes of
communication, where freedom of navigation is critical to trade and other activities of user
states. The Philippines shares this interest with many other states
HOW IMPORTANT IS THE KIG TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT AND TO OUR FISHERIES?
The KIG is very important to the Philippine environment, because it is a coral-rich province with
a reef area of about 1000 sq. km. that hosts breeding grounds and shelters for fish and other
marine organisms.
Filipino marine scientists have found, through years of research, that the marine species found
in the KIG and Sulu Sea are genetically linked. These point to a clear connection between the
marine resources of the KIG and of the country’s archipelagic waters. It is believed that these
areas exchange and replenish each other’s living marine resources on account of the constant
and seasonal interchange of seawater between them.
The marine biodiversity in the KIG could account for the richness of the marine waters west of
Palawan. Some members of the Philippine and international scientific communities have
proposed that the KIG and its surroundings be declared a “Spratly Island Marine Park”, a
proposal that will benefit many countries of the region.
DO WE DEPEND ON THE KIG FOR FOOD SECURITY AND ECONOMIC WELFARE?
Yes. Although not many commercial fishing companies operate in the KIG, its extensive reef
complexes have long been major grounds of pa-aling operators. Moreover, the waters west of
Palawan, which are linked to the KIG, accounted for 13% of the country’s tuna production in
2007. The potential annual yield of these waters is estimated at 5 million tons,27 or around 20%
of the country’s annual fish catch. Since fish constitutes 22.4% of the total protein intake of the
average Filipino, the KIG is considered important for national food security.
WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE FISHERIES AND OTHER LIVING RESOURCES?
There are no comprehensive or systematic studies yet that quantify the economic value of the
fisheries and other living resources, but there are various estimates. One source in 1998 valued
the annual fish catch at US$ 47-105 Million.
Another study in 2004 placed it at PhP 773 Million, comprising 11% of the total value of the
country’s fish production in 2002. It has also been said that the potential revenue from
fisheries, tourism and research activities from Philippine coral reefs in the KIG may run close to
PhP 3 Billion.
The tourism potential of the KIG remains largely underdeveloped despite its extensive coral
reefs. Pag-Asa Island, the largest feature in the KIG, is very rich in marine life and is known to
have giant clams, sea turtles and a rare species of land crab found nowhere else in the country.
Game fishing, swimming, snorkelling, frontier and scuba diving, and fish feeding are among the
activities that can attract local as well as foreign tourists to Pag-Asa. Likas Island is a sea turtle
sanctuary, while Lawak Island is a bird sanctuary.
Aside from the obvious economic benefits, the features in the KIG can also serve as fishermen’s
shelters during storms, as refueling and naval stations, meteorological stations, and bases from
which to conduct marine biodiversity research.
IS IT TRUE THAT OIL AND GAS DEPOSITS CAN BE FOUND IN THE KIG AND THE WEST PHILIPPINE
SEA?
Based on the fact that many offshore oil and gas deposits have already been discovered in the
South China Sea coastal areas, it is believed that there may be deposits in the area of the KIG.
There are conflicting estimates of their quantities, however, and most deposits remain
unconfirmed, partly because vast areas of the Philippines, including its Exclusive Economic Zone
and Continental Shelf, have yet to be fully explored. Of the Philippines’ 16 sedimentary basins,
or potential areas where hydrocarbon deposits could be found, 3 are located in the West
Philippine Sea: Northwest Palawan, Southwest Palawan and Reed Bank. The area of Northwest
Palawan, including Reed Bank, is where significant discoveries have already been made and
where we are most likely to find petroleum resources, especially natural gas, in the near future.
WHAT IS THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE OIL AND GAS DEPOSITS?
Due to the absence of data on verifiable reserves, there are few available estimates of the
potential economic value of oil and gas resources in the KIG. But according to one expert, it
may be possible for the combined oil and gas resources in the WPS to cover the total fuel
demand of the country for the next twenty years.40 Offshore energy resources can have a
potentially transformative impact for a developing country like the Philippines, providing not
only energy security but revenues from oil and gas exports. For example, the Malampaya
Deepwater Gas to Power Project alone contributed about US$1 billion/year at current gas
prices to the national coffers, at the same time resulting in foreign exchange savings from
foregone energy importation estimated at US$500 million/ year.41 It also led to the emergence
of a local natural gas industry.
IS THE PHILIPPINES CURRENTLY EXPLORING AND EXPLOITING THESE OIL AND GAS DEPOSITS IN
THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA?
Yes. These activities have however been concentrated in the West Palawan region. Petroleum
exploration in West Palawan began in the mid-1960s. Since the introduction of the Service
Contract system in 1973, extensive exploration resulted in several oil and gas discoveries, not
all of commercial value and some of which were rapidly depleted. Nido-1 was the first
commercial oil discovery, in 1976.42 To date, it has produced 20 million barrels of oil, and is still
producing at a very reduced rate on a cyclical basis. Other discoveries include Cadlao, West
Linapacan, Matinloc, and Malampaya. The Malampaya Deepwater Gas to Power Project is the
country’s first petroleum production facility.43 It is located close to the shores of Palawan,
adjacent to Recto (Reed) Bank. For many decades, the Philippines had explored Recto Bank and
drilled wells in the area without encountering official protest from any country, until an incident
in March 2011 where a Philippine-licensed oil vessel MV Veritas Voyager was harrassed by a
foreign ship. The Philippine government had also issued Service Contracts to local and foreign
companies to explore for oil in the Kalayaan Islands. Such contracts have been published in
maps, including the International Petroleum Encyclopedia, for years.
WHAT HINDERS THE PHILIPPINES FROM MORE ACTIVE PETROLEUM EXPLORATION AND
EXPLOITATION IN THE KIG?
Lack of investment, poor access to technology, bureaucratic red tape, and tensions over the
unresolved territorial and maritime disputes are the main factors that have hindered further
exploration and exploitation of these resources. The dearth of reliable seismic studies is also to
be blamed for the failure to develop commercial oil production.44 The country has to drill more
wells in order to enhance its prospectivity which would, in turn, enable it to attract new
investors. Governance is a major factor. The country must develop a sound fiscal regime, strong
links between the public and private sectors, and stable policies commensurate to its geological
potentials.45 It can take as long as twenty years for a petroleum project to move from the
exploration to the production phase, but in the Philippine experience, there have been frequent
changes in leadership of the sector, conflicting requirements by various government offices,
and a need to harmonize national and local laws. The attitudes of various stakeholders, such as
local government units, mass media, church and environmental groups, also have an effect on
the investment climate in the country.
ARE THERE SOURCES OF MINERAL WEALTH OTHER THAN OIL AND GAS IN THE SURROUNDING
SEAS?
Yes. The Kalayaan Islands are known to be rich in phosphates and guano deposits, and the
seabed is a source of manganese nodules that yield magnesium, cobalt, nickel and
molybdenum. Experts have also listed beach to shallow shelf placers of gold, tin titaniferous
magnetite, zircon, monazite, phosphate, quartz sand, chromite sands, etc.; polymetallic massive
sulfide deposits, and rare-earth bearing monazite placers as being present in the West
Philippine Sea and North Palawan coastal areas
HOW DID THE KIG BECOME OFFICIALLY PART OF THE PHILIPPINES?
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Philippines decided to occupy the largest features
of the KIG, and later formally established the Municipality of Kalayaan through Presidential
Decree No. 1596 signed in June 11, 1978. PD 1596 reaffirmed and formalized the long standing
interest of the country in the KIG.
HAS THE PHILIPPINES DEMONSTRATED LONG-STANDING INTEREST IN THE KIG?
Yes, it has, over many decades and even preceding formal independence. In 1933, legislators
led by Senator Isabelo de los Reyes, who were then negotiating the transition to independence
with the American colonial government, proposed the inclusion of nine features of the KIG (at
that time known as “Las Corales”) that lay near Palawan into Philippine territory. In 1937,
Interior Secretary Elpidio Quirino filed a claim on the Philippines’ behalf with the US State
Department, citing national defense and geographical proximity as grounds.
The country’s security worries were validated when Japan annexed the features and placed
them under the Shinnan Gunto administrative region in 1939, and later used Ligaw (Itu
Aba/Taiping) Island as a base from which it launched attacks on the Philippines, Indonesia and
Malaysia.
In 1946, Quirino as Secretary of Foreign Affairs reiterated Philippine interests in the KIG in a
letter to Gen. Douglas MacArthur. In 1947, Quirino’s successor Carlos P. Garcia demanded that
the features be turned over to the Philippines as a security guarantee.
With Japan’s defeat, the negotiations for the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty resulted in
Japan’s renunciation of its claims to the Spratlys Islands and Paracel Islands without specifying
who would obtain control. Filipino navigator Tomas Cloma claimed to have found the reefs and
islands unoccupied in 1948. He took an active personal interest in the area and set out with
associates on a 38-day expedition in 1956. A farewell dinner for the expedition party was
attended by Vice President Carlos P. Garcia and Senator Lorenzo Tanada, among other officials.
The Philippine government’s position at the time was that the islands were under de facto
trusteeship of the Allied Powers, but were open for economic exploitation.
Cloma’s efforts to develop the area for phosphate mining were however countered by military
forces from Taiwan.
The Philippines started sending troops to the area in 1968, and the issue did not come into
prominence again until 1971, when the Philippines officially announced through a Presidential
Communique that it had occupied several of the features now known as the Kalayaan Island
Group, for reasons of national security and “to protect the interest of the state and its citizens”.
WHY WAS PHILIPPINE INTEREST IN THE KIG REKINDLED UNDER THE MARCOS GOVERNMENT?
A confluence of regional and global geopolitical developments at the time may have prompted
the Marcos government to take a more active stance in the KIG. In 1968, the Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East reported that the South China Sea’s continental shelf may
contain oil and gas deposits. This was followed by claimant states unilaterally drawing maritime
boundaries which overlapped with one another, and deploying troops on various maritime
features. Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia all began offshore oil exploration. Amid major
discoveries of offshore petroleum reserves and the 1970s oil crisis and price hikes, most
countries began to search for indigenous or alternative sources of energy, further fuelling the
contest in the South China Sea. In March 1976, after 80 years of unsuccessful commercial
petroleum exploration in the Philippines, a significant quantity of oil was discovered in offshore
northwest Palawan, re-igniting national interest in the KIG
Security concerns also apparently persuaded the Marcos government to take action. In July
1971, Taiwan troops on Ligaw (Itu Aba/Taiping) islands were reported to have fired on a boat
carrying then Philippine Congressman Ramon Mitra. The Philippine government sent a
diplomatic note asking Taiwan to withdraw its military garrison on Ligaw, arguing that the
presence of Chinese forces constituted a threat to the security of the Philippines.
WHEN DID THE PHILIPPINES BEGIN ITS OCCUPATION OF THE KIG?
The Philippines posted troops on Lawak island in 1970, followed with Kota, Likas, Pag-asa and
Parola islands in 1971. The Philippines lost one feature to the Vietnamese in 1975, then
occupied two more in 1978. A weather station was established on Pag-asa, along with a fishery
research unit and laboratory. Likewise, a modest runway for logistics support craft, a
lighthouse, an air force unit and a naval station were constructed. The Armed Forces of the
Philippines’ Western Command, which has jurisdiction over the Kalayaan Islands, was activated
as a unified military unit on March 12, 1976
HAS THE PHILIPPINES ACTUALLY EXERCISED SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION OVER THE KIG?
Yes. The Philippine has engaged in normal civilian exercise of sovereignty and state
administration in the KIG since 1971. Among such acts are the conduct of local elections, the
establishment of and exercise of functions by a municipal government with main and satellite
offices, the settlement of a small population on the KIG, and the conduct of development and
research activities. A weather station was established on Pag-Asa Island in 1979 and a
lighthouse was built in 1993. A town hall, police station, health center, and local election
building were built, along with houses to accommodate the growing number of settlers.
Livelihood projects were also introduced, such as an ice plant and cold storage facilities to
boost local fishing and animal husbandry. Water filtration and solar power were also installed in
200460 . The Philippine government has also granted permits for exploration for petroleum
resources, commercial fishing activities and the conduct of scientific studies on the islands and
surrounding waters.

WHAT KINDS OF ACTIVITIES DO THE KALAYAAN POPULATION ENGAGE IN?

The civilian population live by means of fishing and aquaculture. There have been many efforts
to jumpstart development projects, including discovery tours, settlement programs, and
trainings on fisheries law enforcement. Economic progress in KIG has however been hampered
by lack of social services, regular transportation means, and fish storage facilities. In 2008, the
Municipal Government of Kalayaan commissioned the Western Philippines University (WPU) to
conduct a baseline survey of KIG’s resources. The WPU study recommended, among other
things, the establishment of a marine protected area in Pag-Asa.
HAS THE PHILIPPINES EVER BEEN INVOLVED IN ARMED CLASHES IN THE KIG?
No major armed clashes in the KIG have transpired involving the Philippines. Through the
decades, Filipino fishermen as well as Philippine Air Force planes have however reported being
issued warning shots by Chinese, Vietnamese and Malaysian troops from their respective
vessels or island-garrisons. Tensions between Manila and Beijing rose following China’s
occupation of Panganiban (Mischief) Reef in early 1995. The Philippines discovered that the
Chinese had set up manned structures on the hitherto unoccupied reef lying within the
Philippine EEZ, which according to the Chinese then were fishing shelters. Although China had
in the past erected markers on the reef, which the Philippine Navy would remove when found,
the 1995 occupation was the first time that China physically challenged the Philippine claim.
There was a brief standoff between a Philippine navy ship conducting law enforcement
operations and two Chinese fishing vessels reportedly backed up by PLA-Navy frigates in May
1995. More recently, in March 2011, a Philippine petroleum exploration vessel operating near
Recto (Reed) Bank was harassed by two Chinese vessels which maneuvered alongside it as if
threatening to ram the survey ship
WHAT KINDS OF ACTIVITIES DO THE KALAYAAN POPULATION ENGAGE IN?
The civilian population live by means of fishing and aquaculture. There have been many efforts
to jumpstart development projects, including discovery tours, settlement programs, and
trainings on fisheries law enforcement. Economic progress in KIG has however been hampered
by lack of social services, regular transportation means, and fish storage facilities. In 2008, the
Municipal Government of Kalayaan commissioned the Western Philippines University (WPU) to
conduct a baseline survey of KIG’s resources. The WPU study recommended, among other
things, the establishment of a marine protected area in Pag-Asa.
HAS THE PHILIPPINES EVER BEEN INVOLVED IN ARMED CLASHES IN THE KIG?
No major armed clashes in the KIG have transpired involving the Philippines. Through the
decades, Filipino fishermen as well as Philippine Air Force planes have however reported being
issued warning shots by Chinese, Vietnamese and Malaysian troops from their respective
vessels or island-garrisons. Tensions between Manila and Beijing rose following China’s
occupation of Panganiban (Mischief) Reef in early 1995. The Philippines discovered that the
Chinese had set up manned structures on the hitherto unoccupied reef lying within the
Philippine EEZ, which according to the Chinese then were fishing shelters. Although China had
in the past erected markers on the reef, which the Philippine Navy would remove when found,
the 1995 occupation was the first time that China physically challenged the Philippine claim.
There was a brief standoff between a Philippine navy ship conducting law enforcement
operations and two Chinese fishing vessels reportedly backed up by PLA-Navy frigates in May
1995. More recently, in March 2011, a Philippine petroleum exploration vessel operating near
Recto (Reed) Bank was harassed by two Chinese vessels which maneuvered alongside it as if
threatening to ram the survey ship

WHAT WAS THE PHILIPPINE REACTION TO CHINA’S OCCUPATION OF MISCHIEF REEF?

In the aftermath of the occupation of Mischief Reef by China, Philippine maritime law
enforcement agencies took more active measures in curbing poaching and intrusions in KIG, as
well as removing Chinese sovereignty markers put up on nearby features. To defuse the
tensions, Philippine and Chinese officials met in August 1995, signed a “Joint Statement on the
South China Sea and on Other Areas of Cooperation,” and embarked on bilateral confidence-
building measures. However, by 1998, what the Chinese had initially claimed as fishermen’s
shelters had been developed into a fortified military garrison, a move that was strongly
protested by the Philippines as a clear violation of the 1995 “code of conduct” agreed upon by
both parties. No effort was made to physically dislodge the Chinese due to Manila’s concern
that it may provoke actual hostilities. This incident gave momentum to the approval by the
Philippine Senate of the Philippine defense modernization plan. It also eventually led to
renewed interest in security ties with the US that had been in effect suspended since the 1991
closure of the US military bases in Clark and Subic.
WHAT WAS THE RECENT MEDIA COVERAGE OF CHINESE ACTIVITIES AROUND AYUNGIN SHOAL
ALL ABOUT?
After China installed structures on Panganiban (Mischief) Reef in 1995 and then fortified them
in 1999, the Philippine Navy stationed the BRP Sierra Madre on Ayungin Shoal, one of the reefs
closest to Panganiban (Mischief) Reef. Ayungin Shoal is located within the Philippine EEZ about
120 nautical miles from Palawan. The ship ran aground on the shoal, and since then it was used
to monitor activities around Panganiban (Mischief) Reef and to try to discourage any further
incursions into Philippine waters. In May 2013, the station reported an unusual increase in
Chinese activities around Ayungin Shoal. Chinese fishing vessels, accompanied by armed
Chinese maritime law enforcement ships, conducted fishing activities in and around the shoal in
full view of Philippine soldiers stationed there. The Chinese ships ventured closer to the BRP
Sierra Madre than ever before, prompting the Philippines to protest their presence as
provocative and illegal. The Philippines was understandably concerned considering what had
happened on Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal) the year before
WHAT IS THE STATUS OF BAJO DE MASINLOC IN THE PHILIPPINE POLITICAL STRUCTURE?
BAJO DE MASINLOC is an integral part of Philippine territory, being part of the Municipality of
Masinloc, Province of Zambales. It is located 124 nautical miles west of Zambales proper and is
within the 200 nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Philippine Continental
Shelf. The Philippine government asserts that under international law, the Philippines exercises
full sovereignty and jurisdiction over the rocks of Bajo de Masinloc, and sovereign rights over
the waters and continental shelf where the said rock features of Bajo de Masinloc are situated.
WHY IS BAJO DE MASINLOC IMPORTANT FOR THE PHILIPPINES?
Philippine interests in Bajo de Masinloc mainly relate to its national security and environmental
as well as food security. Bajo de Masinloc’s location west of Luzon, almost adjacent to the
major ports of Manila and Subic, makes it important for purposes of nationalsecurity. From
there, one can observe shipping traffic into and out of the two largest ports on that side of the
country. In the 1960s, local smugglers frequently used the shoal as a base, prompting the
Philippine Navy on at least two occasions to destroy structures that smugglers had built on the
feature. Being the only large reef structure west of Luzon, Bajo de Masinloc is also important
from an ecological perspective. It acts as a rich feeding and breeding ground for all kinds of fish
and marine species. Filipino fishermen, especially those based in Zambales, have been using the
reef as their main offshore fishing area.

CAN OIL AND GAS OR OTHER MINERALS BE FOUND IN BAJO DE MASINLOC?

Available data on the geology of the area indicate that there is little probability of finding any
petroleum in Bajo de Masinloc or its immediate vicinity. However, massive sulfides and cobalt-
rich crusts are expected in the seamounts of the Bajo de Masinloc area.
IS BAJO DE MASINLOC VALUABLE AS A SOURCE OF FISHERIES?
Bajo de Masinloc is an important fishing ground for local fishermen of Zambales, as well as
neighboring provinces Bataan and Pangasinan. Eleven of the 13 municipalities of Zambales are
coastal, so that for many Zambaleños, fisheries are an important source of livelihood.
Three of the major fish landing sites of Region 3 (Central Luzon) can be found in Zambales -
Masinloc, Subic and Sta. Cruz - with a minor fish landing site in Candelaria. In the Northern
Zambales coast, motorized municipal fishermen are generally based in Sta. Cruz, while
commercial fishing vessels are usually based out of Masinloc and Sta. Cruz.
The potential yield of fisheries resources in offshore Northern Zambales including Bajo de
Masinloc is about 5,021.69 mt annually. 121 species from 33 fish families may be caught in its
waters; among them are yellowfin tuna, skipjack and shortfin scad. Most of the tuna are caught
near fish aggregating devices or payaos
HOW LONG HAS BAJO DE MASINLOC BEEN CONSIDERED PART OF THE PHILIPPINE
ARCHIPELAGO?
“Bajo de Masinloc” is Spanish for “Masinloc Reef” or “Masinloc Shoal”. The name Masinloc
belongs to the oldest town in Zambales, founded by the Spaniards in 1607. In early Spanish
maps of the Philippines (e.g. the 1734 Pedro Murillo Velarde map), the shoal appears under
different names such as “Panacot” and “Baxo de Masinglo”, and was likely also mistaken in
various maps to be different reefs with local place names such as “Galit”, “Lumbay”, “Bajo de
Bolinao”, and “Bajo de Miravelles.” British surveyors charted the reef and gave it the name
Scarborough Reef on account of the shipwreck there of the British tea trading ship SS
Scarborough in 1748. Spanish cartographers named the feature Maroona when it was surveyed
in April 1800 by the Spanish frigate Santa Lucia, dispatched by Admiral Malaspina from Manila.
The results of this survey were published in 1808 wherein Maroona Shoal was renamed Bajo de
Masingloc. Filipino fishermen have long used the shoal as fishing ground and sanctuary.
Historically, traders have long been familiar with the value of the shoal as a source of pearl
shells of excellent quality.
WAS BAJO DE MASINLOC ALSO PART OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS UNDER THE AMERICAN
COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION?
After the Spaniards ceded the ‘Philippine Islands’ to the United States in 1898 through the
Treaty of Paris, the United States conducted a census of all islands belonging to the archipelago,
and the published report listed ‘Scarborough Reef’ among them. Some confusion about the
status of the shoal resulted from the fact that maps of the archipelago marking the Treaty of
Paris Limits showed the shoal as lying outside the Treaty limits. However, there are sources that
consider the shoal to have been included in the cession under the terms of the Treaty of
Washington of 1900. Under the Treaty of Washington, Spain ceded to the US all other islands
and places to which it had “title or claim of title”, even if they were not within the lines drawn
by the Treaty of Paris. Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon, hoping to set up
navigational aids on the shoal, had also confirmed from the US State Department in 1937-38
that there were no other ownership claims that would hinder his government from doing so.
The 1900 Treaty of Washington was invoked by both the US Coast Guard and Geodetic Survey
and the US State Department as their legal basis for transferring control of Bajo de Masinloc to
the Philippines.

HAS THE PHILIPPINES ACTUALLY EXERCISED JURISDICTION OVER BAJO DE MASINLOC?

Yes. Records at the turn of the 20th century show that the government of the Philippine Islands
had indeed exercised jurisdiction over the reef, particularly in incidents involving maritime
navigation. During the American occupation, the Coast Guard exercised jurisdiction over the
shoal for purposes of search, rescue, and salvage of ships that were wrecked or stranded there.
For instance, in 1913, the Swedish steamship Nippon—loaded with copra and other goods
bound for Singapore from Manila—was stranded in Bajo de Masinloc and its crew was rescued
by Philippine Coast Guard cutter Mindoro which was sent by the Bureau of Navigation of
Manila. When disputes broke out between the salvaging company and the insurance company
over the proceeds of the salvaged cargo of copra, the case was heard in the Manila Court of
First Instance, then elevated to the Supreme Court of the Philippines. There are numerous
other demonstrations of jurisdiction, including a 1961 hydrographic survey by the Philippine
Coast and Geodetic Survey, and law enforcement operations against smugglers, such as the
bombing of illegal pier facilities and warehouses by the Philippine Navy in 1963 It must be
noted that no other country protested these anti-smuggling activities. A lighthouse and an 8.3-
meter high flag pole flying the Philippine colors were built on the feature in 1965. In the 1980s,
it was used as an impact range of Philippine and US air force pilots. Bajo de Masinloc has also
been a site of Philippine oceanographic and marine scientific studies. The Philippines built
another light station in April 1991, as listed in the Admiralty List of Lights and Fogs Signals No.
2681. The lighthouse remained unrepaired for years but is included among 129 lighthouses
slated to be rehabilitated under the foreign-funded Maritime Safety Improvement Projects III of
the Philippines.
SINCE WHEN HAS PHILIPPINE SOVEREIGNTY OVER BAJO DE MASINLOC BEEN CHALLENGED BY
OTHER COUNTRIES?
No government questioned Philippine activities in and jurisdiction over Bajo de Masinloc until
the 1980s. It appears that China and Taiwan lay claim to Bajo de Masinloc, naming it Huangyan
Island in 1983, as part of their extensive ‘nine-dash line’ claim over practically the entire South
China Sea. In 1997, a Chinese amateur radio association attempted to put up a communication
station on the shoal, claiming to have been authorized by the Chinese government. They were
expelled by the Philippine Navy. Filipino fishermen then helped remove the Chinese markers
that they found on the rocks and hoisted the Philippine flag. This incident was followed by a
notable increase in Chinese fishing activities in the vicinity of the shoal in the following years.
Noteworthy were cases of the use of illegal fishing methods and capture of endangered species,
which sometimes led to arrests and prosecution in Philippine courts. Attempts by the
Philippines to minimize foreign fishing in the Bajo de Masinloc area led to periodic tensions with
China beginning in 1997. In 1999, there was a collision incident involving Chinese fishing boats
and a Philippine naval vessel.
WHAT STARTED THE STANDOFF WITH CHINA IN APRIL 2012?
In April 2012, a Philippine naval vessel approached a group of Chinese fishing vessels near the
shoal and boarded them for inspection. The Chinese fishermen were discovered to have
illegally harvested live corals and captured sharks and giant clams. Ships of the paramilitary
Chinese Maritime Surveillance agency moved quickly to prevent the Philippine Navy from
apprehending the fishermen. The Philippines withdrew its naval vessel as ships from the civilian
Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) arrived, as
part of the country’s effort to de-escalate the tensions, even as the Chinese fishermen were
extracted by the ships sent by China. This incident led to a two-month long standoff between
government vessels of both sides, as neither side wanted to leave the shoal. At the height of
the standoff in May, nearly 80 Chinese vessels were sighted in Bajo de Masinloc and its vicinity.
At the beginning of the standoff, staff of the Philippine National Museum on board M/Y
Saranggani, which was to conduct an archaeological survey in the vicinity of Bajo de Masinloc,
also reported that they were harassed and intimidated by Chinese Maritime Surveillance ships
as well as aircraft.
ARE THE PHILIPPINE POSITIONS IN THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA SUPPORTED BY INTERNATIONAL
LAW?
Yes. The Philippines’ position on the KIG, as well as on Bajo de Masinloc, and the West
Philippine Sea itself, are consistent with international law. Its sovereignty and jurisdiction over
the islands and rocks of Bajo de Masinloc and the KIG were established in accordance with
customary international law through effective occupation and the exercise of acts consistent
with sovereignty, and its jurisdiction over adjacent waters is being exercised in accordance with
treaty law, particularly UNCLOS. The Philippines has gradually been undertaking measures to
bring its domestic laws on territory in line with international legal obligations. For a long period,
the absence of UNCLOScompliant baselines prevented us from determining our precise
maritime zones. In 2009, through Republic Act No. 9522, the Philippines enclosed the historic
main archipelago within archipelagic baselines in accordance with UNCLOS Art. 54, while the
baselines around the KIG and Bajo de Masinloc are to be determined in accordance with the
regime of islands under UNCLOS Art. 121.
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING TERRITORIAL DISPUTES?
Territorial disputes are normally addressed through various approaches. (See Appendix for
examples). Most countries resort to bilateral diplomatic negotiations in search of a political
settlement. Such processes may take decades to conclude, and always entail efforts to achieve
a win-win solution, thus ultimately requiring compromise. Some countries opt for conciliation
or mediation involving third parties, such as a neutral government or organization playing the
role of an honest broker, while others prefer resolution through arbitration by an international
court or arbitral panel. The outcomes of conciliation, mediation, or arbitration may not always
be entirely satisfactory to either disputing party, but they may help defuse tensions and
preserve normal ties. Yet another approach, as we have seen from history - including when
negotiations or other modes have failed – is to resolve a dispute by the use of force, which the
international community naturally frowns upon.
THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA The Territorial and Maritime Jurisdiction Disputes from a Filipino
Perspective In some instances, disputing countries opt not to address the sovereignty question
directly but merely try to “manage” rather than “resolve” disputes through pragmatic
arrangements. In cases where the territorial disputes are complicated by competition for
resources (e.g. oil and fisheries), joint development has been used by disputing states as a
means to cooperate in the exploitation of much-needed resources while setting aside sensitive
questions of sovereignty and ownership. Although all these approaches remain open in the case
of the Kalayaan Island Group, it is complicated by the fact that there are more than two parties
to the dispute; a total of six countries claim different portions of the West Philippine Sea.
CAN WE BRING THE TERRITORIAL AND MARITIME DISPUTES TO AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OR
TRIBUNAL FOR RESOLUTION?
Yes. Under international law, or “the law of nations” that governs the relations between all
States, taking any dispute before an international court is based ultimately upon the consent of
States. This consent is usually expressed in an international agreement, such as a compromis
d’arbitrage or agreement for arbitration, or a dispute settlement mechanism in a broader treaty
or convention to which the state has expressly given consent by ratification or accession.122
Part XV of the UNCLOS provides for dispute settlement mechanisms in cases of maritime
disputes. These range from bilateral modes such as fact-finding and negotiations, to those
involving third parties like good offices, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication. By ratifying
UNCLOS, the Philippines, China, and other claimants to various parts of the South China Sea
accepted that these mechanisms should be used to resolve maritime disputes that may arise
between them. Disputes over land territory, however, are not covered by UNCLOS, but may be
resolved in accordance with Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter which all the claimant
countries have ratified.123 Chapter VI also obliges all members of the UN to resort to peaceful
modes of dispute settlement especially in cases where the disputes may endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security. Like UNCLOS, these modes include arbitration
and adjudication. Since all claimants are also parties to the United Nations, they are also
deemed to have committed to use these peaceful modes of dispute settlement in cases of
territorial disputes.
CAN’T AN INTERNATIONAL COURT JUST ORDER THE OTHER CLAIMANT STATES NOT TO OCCUPY
OR EXPLOIT RESOURCES IN THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA OR THE PHILIPPINE EEZ?
Not exactly. Under international law at present, sovereignty is still the most important principle
governing the relations between States. This means that no State, whether large or small, can
be subject to the sovereignty of another, or subordinated to any international body, without its
consent. Moreover, there is no international law-making body that can enact laws
independently of states, nor is there any international executive agency that can act as a law
enforcer against States. While there is an International Court of Justice and many other
international tribunals, they cannot compel any State to submit to their jurisdiction. Neither do
they have any power to enforce their judgments against an unwilling State.124 In the case of
the KIG and Bajo de Masinloc, the Philippines has expressed its willingness to have its
sovereignty and jurisdiction adjudicated upon by an international tribunal, to the extent that it
has initiated arbitration proceedings against China. Considering the latter’s express objection to
the proceedings, the success of the arbitration thus initially depends upon whether or not the
arbitral tribunal will find that China gave consent to the arbitration upon its ratification of
UNCLOS. This could have major implications on the future of the SCS disputes, because to date
none of the other States parties to the dispute have been similarly inclined to expressly submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal.
CHINA SAYS IT EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS TO UNCLOS PART XV EARLIER ON AND SHOULD NOT
BE COVERED BY IT. WHAT DOES THAT MEAN?
UNCLOS allows States to make reservations against the application of the third party dispute
settlement procedures of UNCLOS Part XV to certain types of disputes. These are disputes
concerning sea boundary delimitations, historic bays or titles; disputes concerning military
activities and law enforcement activities relating to marine scientific research or EEZ rights; and
disputes already being addressed by the UN Security Council.125 Ten years after ratifying
UNCLOS in 1996, China made such reservations through a diplomatic note submitted to the UN
Secretary General in August 2006. It has been argued that these reservations are applicable
against the case that the Philippines brought before the international arbitral tribunal, in
support of its position rejecting the arbitration.126 The Philippines, on the other hand, argues
that the case it has brought is not covered by these reservations.
WHAT IS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PHILIPPINE DECISION TO BRING ITS DISPUTE WITH CHINA
BEFORE AN ARBITRAL BODY UNDER UNCLOS?
The decision to bring the dispute before an arbitral body is quite significant. First, normally
adjudication is only a last resort, as international disputes should be resolved primarily by
negotiations and most States would rather not bring their disputes before a third party
settlement mechanism. The decision to initiate arbitral proceedings indicates that the
Philippine government is not optimistic that a negotiated resolution to the issue is possible
under the prevailing circumstances. Second, the Philippines’ attempt to bring China before an
arbitral tribunal demonstrates its confidence in its legal position, and its belief that China’s
claims based on the nine-dash line will not be recognized by the international community. The
Philippines’ application directly challenges the validity of China’s expansive claims to the South
China Sea, and asks for a declaration of its illegality in light of UNCLOS. If the arbitration is
successful, it may vindicate the Philippines’ position that it is entitled to a full 200nm EEZ and
continental shelf within the SCS, and exclusive rights to explore and exploit the resources
therein, despite China’s claims to sovereignty and jurisdiction within the area of the nine-dash
line.
WHAT CAN WE EXPECT TO BE THE PROCESS OF THE ARBITRATION CASE INSTITUTED BY THE
PHILIPPINES AGAINST CHINA?
Annex VII of UNCLOS contains a procedure for coastal States to submit a maritime dispute to
arbitration by a 5-member arbitral panel. In accordance with this, the Philippines initiated
arbitration proceedings against China by sending a diplomatic note on January 22, 2013
containing a Notification and Application for arbitration. The Application also nominated ITLOS
Judge Rudiger Wolfrum (Germany) as arbitrator. Under the procedure laid out in UNCLOS
Annex VII, China had 30 days from receipt of the Notification and Application within which to
make a response to the Philippines’ Application, and appoint its own arbitrator. If no arbitrator
is appointed, the Philippines may within two weeks from the expiration of the 30 days, request
the President of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea to appoint the arbitrator for
China.
China officially returned the note and rejected the arbitration on February 19, 2013; thus the
Philippines on February 22, 2013 requested the President of ITLOS to appoint the second
arbitrator. ITLOS Judge Stanislaw Pawlak (Poland) was thereafter appointed.127 UNCLOS Annex
VII provides that within 30 days after the appointment of the second arbitrator, the parties
should agree upon the appointment of three more arbitrators to complete the 5-man panel, as
well as the panel’s president. If they cannot do so, one of the parties may request the President
of ITLOS to make those appointments. The Philippines made such a request on March 25, 2013.
The President of ITLOS subsequently appointed Jean-Pierre Cot (France), Alfred Soons
(Netherlands), and Chris Pinto (Sri Lanka) as members of the panel.128 Subsequently, Chris
Pinto was replaced by Thomas Mensah (Ghana).129 The panel is expected to undertake some
organizational activities like determining its venue, rules of procedure, and timetable for the
proceedings. It will then decide on the issues of its jurisdiction and the sufficiency of the
Philippines’ claim as stated in its Application for Arbitration, and afterwards proceed to hear the
merits of the case before making its decision. There is no strict timetable for the panel to
complete its work, but Philippines has stated that it expected the entire proceedings may take
up to 2 or 3 years.
References:
THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA The Territorial and Maritime Jurisdiction Disputes from a Filipino
Perspective A Primer
:The Asian Center and Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea University of the
Philippines
15 APRIL 2013
https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm
 CHINA VS PHILIPPINES MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES OVERVIEW

Country: China (CN) Philippines (PH)

Capital: Beijing Manila

Population: 1 373 541 278 102 984 100

Area: 9 596 961 km2 300 000 km2

 Philippine vs. China
United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
and the Arbitral Ruling
TIMELINE:
LATEST UPDATES ON WEST PHILIPPINE SEA DISPUTE

File photo of an overview of fishing vessels at Julian Felipe Reef, in this Maxar handout satellite
image taken March 23, 2021
China’s vessels swarming Julian Felipe Reef, West PH Sea

Tensions in the West Philippine Sea have flared as the Philippines pushed anew to publicly call
out China’s aggressive behavior in the area, with other countries following suit. The growing
row was prompted by Chinese vessels found swarming Julian Felipe Reef (Whitsun Reef) and
other maritime features in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone starting in March, with
their presence continuing into April. 
The ships, which were earlier moored in the hundreds, had been massed up at Julian Felipe
Reef for weeks, taking shelter from what China had claimed were "rough sea conditions,"
though weather in the area had been clear. 
MARCH 20, 2021
The NTF-WPS – usually a quiet body – voices concern after it spotted around 220 Chinese
vessels, believed to be Chinese maritime militia, swarming Julian Felipe Reef, about 175 nautical
miles west of Bataraza, Palawan. The task force says it received verified reports from the
Philippine Coast Guard that the Chinese fishing vessels were first sighted near the reef on
March 7. 
MARCH 21, 2021
The Philippines files a diplomatic protest against China over the presence of hundreds of its
vessels near Julian Felipe Reef. Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr says the protest has been
filed following a recommendation from National Security Adviser Hermogenes Esperon Jr.
Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana likewise slams the presence of China’s vessels, saying it is
"a clear provocative action of militarizing the area."
MARCH 22, 2021
China denies allegations that vessels spotted in Julian Felipe Reef are manned by maritime
militia, denouncing the claim as an “unnecessary irritation.”
“There is no Chinese maritime militia as alleged,” its embassy in Manila says. In an official
statement, the Chinese embassy describes the massing of 220 ships near Julian Felipe Reef
(Whitsun reef) as a “normal practice” of fishing vessels to take shelter due to “rough sea
conditions.” 
MARCH 23, 2021
After the DFA has filed a diplomatic protest gain China, AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant General
Cirilito Sobejana says the military is opposed to any incursion in Philippine waters but so
far remains undecided about “the best course of action” to take on the issue. 
“Our mandate is to secure our territory so we really oppose any act of incursion in our
territorial waters, including our exclusive economic zone. But on the other hand, the NTF-WPS
takes into consideration other means. So we will jointly assess and decide what is the best
course of action to take for the area,” he says. 
The AFP confirms that at least 183 vessels believed to be Chinese maritime militia continue to
surround Julian Felipe Reef. The United States sounds off on the issue and backs the
Philippines, as it voices concern over the presence of Beijing’s maritime militia in the reef.
“We stand with the Philippines, our oldest treaty ally in Asia,” a spokesperson of the US
embassy says. Japan likewise expresses concern, saying it “strongly opposes any action that
heightens tensions” in the area. . 
MARCH 24, 2021
Why worry about Chinese vessels spotted near Julian Felipe Reef? Retired Supreme Court
senior associate justice Antonio Carpio warns that the continued presence of hundreds of
Chinese vessels could be a “prelude" to China's occupation of another maritime feature in the
West Philippine Sea. 
In an interview on ANC’s Headstart, Carpio says he is “particularly worried” that China – by
parking hundreds of ships believed to be manned by its maritime militia at the Julian Felipe
Reef – is using the same strategy it used in occupying Mischief Reef in 1995. 
Australia adds it voice to the issue and expresses concern over “destabilizing actions” that could
raise tensions in the highly volatile South China Sea. 
MARCH 25, 2021
The AFP increases its presence in the West Philippine Sea by deploying more naval vessels to
the area. 
Meanwhile, Europe, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are the latest to express
concern over flaring tensions in the South China Sea, adding their weight to increasing pressure
over China's recent actions in the maritime area. 
China hits back and accuses diplomats representing these countries in the Philippines of 
making "irresponsible comments" and stating "wrong facts."
MARCH 28, 2021
Lorenzana vows to send more vessels of the Philippine Navy and the Philippine Coast Guard to
the West Philippine Sea, as Chinese ships refuse to leave the vicinity of Julian Felipe Reef. 
“We are ready to defend our national sovereignty and protect the marine resources of the
Philippines. There will be an increased presence of the Philippine Navy and Philippine Coast
Guard ships to conduct sovereignty patrols and protect our fishermen in the West Philippine
Sea,” he says. 
MARCH 30, 2021
In an interview on CNN Philippines’ The Source, Lorenzana says the Philippines will not station
navy ships in the Julian Felipe Reef to avoid provoking the Chinese presence in the area.
Instead, a coast guard vessel will be sent in the meantime. 
Lorenzana says the NTF-WPS has suggested stationing a navy ship in the reef to mark the
Philippines’ sovereignty in the area, but that officials are still studying that options. There is “no
decision” yet, he says.
The Philippine will also deploy the ships of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR) to protect Filipino fishermen that may be staying in Julian Felipe Reef, he adds. 
MARCH 31, 2021
The NTF-WPS reports that, a month since Chinese vessels have been first spotted in Julian
Felipe Reef, the ships are now spread out over various reefs in the West Philippine Sea. 
The task force says it has spotted 44 ships “moored, anchored, and stationary” in Julian Felipe
Reef,  115 Chinese vessels in Kenna (Chigua) Reef, and 45 vessels in Pag-asa (Thitu) Islands.
Along with these, 50 Chinese ships are also reportedly dispersed along Panganiban (Mischief),
Kagitingan (Fiery), and Zamora (Subi) Reefs – all within the Kalayaan Island Group in Palawan.
Also seen are 4 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy vessels in Panganiban Reef, near China's
militarized manmade islands. 
APRIL 1, 2021
Esperon and White House National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan discuss their shared
concerns over Chinese activities in the South China Sea in a call on March 31, the White House
says on April 1. 
During the call, Sullivan reiterates to Esperon that the two countries' Mutual Defense Treaty –
which sees both sides commit to defend one another in case of an attack – covers the South
China Sea. Both sides also agree to coordinate closely in responding to challenges in the area.
APRIL 3, 2021
On April 3, Lorenzana reiterates the Philippines’ demand for Chinese ships to leave Julian Felipe
Reef in the West Philippine Sea since they have no more reason to "take shelter" amid good
weather.
The AFP echoes Lorenzana and voices “serious concern" over the continued presence of the
ships in Julian Felipe Reef, which it described as an "integral part of Pagkakaisa (Unity) Banks”.
China hits back, calling Lorenzana’s statement “unprofessional.”
APRIL 4, 2021
The word war between Lorenzana and China’s embassy continues. In a new statement,
Lorenzana calls out China for shunning international law, particularly the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), by continuing to claim the West Philippine Sea
despite the Philippines landmark legal victory against the regional giant in 2016. 
With the 2016 Hague ruling, Lorenzana points out, the Philippines’ claims “stand on solid
ground, while China’s do not.”
APRIL 5, 2021
Philippine senators back Lorenzana in his demand for China’s vessels to leave Julian Felipe
Reef. The DFA lambasts the Chinese embassy in Manila for entangling itself in a rare verbal war
with Lorenzana. 
“The Department of Foreign Affairs strongly denounces the embassy’s attempt to impugn the
Secretary of National Defense – a Cabinet Official of the Republic of the Philippines – by calling
his statement 'unprofessional.' Chinese embassy officials are reminded that they are guests of
the Philippine government, and as guests must at all times observe protocol and accord respect
to Philippine government officials,” the DFA says. 
APRIL 7, 2021
The Philippines starts lodging daily diplomatic protests against China over the lingering
presence of its ships in the West Philippine Sea. Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana on the
Chinese Embassy’s Statement justifying the presence of Chinese vessels in the Julian Felipe Reef
says,
“The utter disregard by the Chinese Embassy in Manila of international law especially the
UNCLOS to which China is a party is appalling. It’s nine-dash line claim is without any factual or
legal basis. This, together with its so-called historical claim, was flatly and categorically rejected
by the Arbitral Tribunal. The Philippines’ claims stand on solid ground, while China’s do not.”
APRIL 8, 2021
Alumni of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) rally behind Lorenzana and slam the
continued presence of Chinese ships at Julian Felipe Reef as a display of China's "hypocrisy" and
"bad faith."
On April 8, an ABS-CBN news team is chased by Chinese ships armed with heavy weapons in the
West Philippine Sea. ABS-CBN reporter Chiara Zambrano and her news team ride a motor boat
to Ayungin Shoal as part of efforts to report on the impact of China’s action on Filipino
fishermen.
Zambrano reports that even when their boat decided to return to Palawan to avoid possible
danger, "we were chased for about an hour by this white China Coast Guard ship."
APRIL 9, 2021
In a phone call on the Philippines’ Araw ng Kagitingan (Day of Valor), Locsin and Blinken tackle
Manila and Washington’s shared concerns about Chinese militia vessels in South China Sea.
Blinken reaffirms that the Philippines and the US’ Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the South
China Sea. The Department of National Defense orders the AFP to conduct a fact-finding
investigation into the incident involving an ABS-CBN news team chased away by armed Chinese
vessels in Philippine waters. 
“We are concerned for the safety of anyone – unarmed civilians – at sea. As such, we view the
report with concern,” says DND spokesperson Arsenio Andolong. 
APRIL 13, 2021
On April 13, the DFA says Huang, China’s envoy to the Philippines, has been summoned over
the continued presence of Chinese ships in the West Philippine Sea. It is a first for Huang since
assuming his role as Beijing’s envoy to the Philippines in December 2019. 
The DFA says that in the April 12 meeting with Huang, the Philippines expressed its “utmost
displeasure” over the continuing presence of Chinese ships around Julian Felipe Reef and other
maritime zones in Philippine waters. 
The Philippines also raises the landmark 2016 Hague ruling that struck down China’s historical
claims in the West Philippine Sea, and repeats its demand for China to withdraw its vessels
from the area. 
APRIL 14, 2021
The Philippines files another diplomatic protest after the NTF-WPS finds hundreds Chinese ships
still lingering in the West Philippine Sea, despite repeated demands to withdraw from the area. 
The task force says an estimated 261 Chinese vessels are still seen dispersed throughout the
West Philippine Sea during its latest sovereignty patrols last April 11. 
The NTF-WPS also warns of environmental concerns, saying the ships found around the Union
Banks and Pag-asa Islands are about 60 meters in length and that it is estimated each ship can
catch at least 1 ton of fish. 
APRIL 16, 2021
Carpio calls out Duterte's “disturbing” silence on the latest swarming of Chinese vessels in the
West Philippine Sea and warns it could be sending “mixed signals” to Beijing. 
“The President has to make a stand, make a public stand, make a personal statement. He
cannot hide behind his alter egos because China will not listen to this alter egos, will probably
only look at him for the correct signals. And right now, the President is not sending the right
signals,” Carpio tells Rappler editor. 
APRIL 19, 2021
Duterte finally makes a public statement on Chinese ships swarming Philippine waters, but
rather than joining his defense and foreign secretaries in calling out Beijing, the Chief Executive
repeats his old arguments against provoking the regional giant. 
In a televised address, Duterte repeats a debunked claim that asserting the Philippines’ rights in
the area will only lead to war with China and that China, not the Philippines, is "in possession"
of the West Philippine Sea.
APRIL 22, 2021
Sobejana says the AFP is “entertaining” the idea of putting up structures in the West Philippine
Sea, similar to what China has done in the waters. “It was agreed way back that no country
would construct in the area. But China broke that agreement. That’s why we should start our
own construction now. And again, that is subject to consideration of NTF-WPS,” he says in
Filipino. 
Experts, however, warn this could provide China with an excuse to engage in retaliatory actions
of building more structures in Philippine waters.
APRIL 24, 2021
The European Union calls out China's actions in the South China Sea, underscoring that the
recent large presence of its vessels in Julian Felipe Reef "endanger peace and stability in the
region."
"The EU reiterates its strong opposition to any unilateral actions that could undermine regional
stability and the international rules-based order. We urge all parties to resolve disputes through
peaceful means in accordance with international law, in particular UNCLOS, including its dispute
settlement mechanisms," a spokesperson says, recalling the 2016 Hague ruling.
APRIL 26, 2021
Eleven senators file a resolution to “condemn in the strongest possible terms the illegal
activities” of China in the West Philippine Sea. If adopted by the Senate, the document will
merely express the “sense” of the chamber. In a press briefing, China doubles down on its
claims in the West Philippine Sea and calls on the the Philippines to stop its drills in the
waterway.
“We urge the relevant side to respect China's sovereignty and rights and interests, and stop
actions complicating the situation and escalating disputes,” Chinese Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Wang Wenbin says in a press conference. 
APRIL 26, 2021
Locsin orders another diplomatic protest filed against China over Wang’s remarks. The protest
is separate from the daily protests that have been lodged by the DFA since April 5. 
The NTF-WPS says three CCG vessels are still spotted in Bajo de Masinloc, one more in waters in
the municipality of Kalayaan, and one in Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas Shoal). In a separate
statement, the DND says “China has no business telling the Philippines what we can and cannot
do within our own waters."
PHILIPPINES VS CHINA: CURRENT ACTIONS
PH steps up presence in the
West Philippine Sea

A photo taken on April 11, 2021 shows 136 Chinese maritime militia at the vicinity of Burgos
(Gaven) Reef in the West Philippine Sea (WPS).

PH steps up presence in the West Philippine Sea

The Philippines has stepped up its presence in the West Philippine Sea (WPS) amid China’s
incursions into the country’s exclusive economic zone, Malacañang said on Wednesday, April
14.
“The presence of Philippine maritime security and law enforcement forces have been stepped
up in the municipality of Kalayaan to protect Filipino fishermen and the marine resources,”
Presidential Spokesperson Harry Roque said in a press statement.
Roque issued the statement the same day as the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) once
again filed two diplomatic notes against China after 200 Chinese vessels were spotted in the
Julian Felipe Reef on April 11.
The first diplomatic protest counts as the daily protest as long as there are Chinese ships in and
around Julian Felipe Reef and the second is on the dispersal of Chinese vessels to other parts of
Philippine maritime zones.
Apart from the filing of diplomatic protests, the DFA also summoned Chinese Ambassador
Huang Xilian over the current situation in Julian Felipe Reef, Roque said.
The Philippines first lodged a note verbale over the incident in Julian Felipe Reef on March 21
after around 200 Chinese vessels were spotted moored in line formation in the area. The
number reportedly decreased to 44 ships based on a March 30 patrol by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP).
AVOID ESCALING TENSIONS
During his commentary show “Counterpoint”, Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Salvador Panelo
told journalists to avoid going to the WPS, saying any activity in the contested waters could only
escalate tensions between the Philippines and China.
Panelo issued the statement after the news team of ABS-CBN reporter Chiara Zambrano earlier
received a radio message from a ship of the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) after trying to make its
way to Ayungin Shoal.
Panelo slammed Zambrano for “exaggerating” news about the WPS issue. He said, “She is fond
of exaggerating every issue. Her style of reporting is when she delivers news, she criticizes the
government”.
Zambrano’s news team was recently aboard a local civilian vessel to cover the situation of
Filipino fishermen amid the presence of Chinese vessels in the Julian Felipe Reef.
However, Zambrano’s team was reportedly driven away by CCG while onboard a civilian boat
four miles away from Ayungin Shoal.
According to the ABS-CBN report, the Filipino captain decided to steer the boat away from the
shoal but the CCG vessel “accelerated its speed and started to chase” the civilian ship and
followed “its path home to mainland Palawan for an hour.”
Philippines vows to continue maritime exercise in South China Sea
The Philippines will continue maritime exercises inside its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) in the South China Sea, the country's defence minister said, despite a call by China to stop
actions that it said could escalate disputes.
The Philippine coastguard and fisheries bureau started maritime exercises, having boosted its
presence in the area to counter the "threatening" presence of Chinese boats.
China claims almost the entire South China Sea, through which about $3 trillion worth of ship
borne trade passes each year, despite a 2016 ruling by an arbitration tribunal in The Hague that
Beijing's claim was inconsistent with international law.
"The conduct of maritime patrol in the WPS (West Philippine Sea) and Kalayaan Island Group by
the Philippine Coast Guard and the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources will continue,"
Defence Secretary Delfin Lorenzana said in a statement.
"The government will not waver in its position," he said.
A. History of South China Sea Dispute
The history of south china sea dispute can be traced back in 19 th century, with the
introduction of European practice of dividing territories above the sea level between states
enjoying full sovereignty. For long period trade through the South China sea was dominated by
junks from port cities in the Middle Kingdom. In other periods, when China was engulfed in war
where the emperor prohibits long distance trade, merchants from other countries were free to
dominate the trade in the South China Sea. Due to this, range of powerful states were sustained
such as Funan (part of Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam) , Angkor (Cambodia) , Sri Vijaya
(Indonesia), Ayutthaya (Thailand), Champa (Central and Southern Vietnam), and Melaka
Sultanate (Malaysia).
From 8th to 12th century, traders from Sri Vijaya, dominated in the area. Chinese
commercial and naval shipping went through new period of expansion in the 12 th to early 15th
century. Then suddenly the emperor ordered an end to the building of ocean-going ships that
opens opportunities for other maritime nations- Japan, Korea, and other countries around the
Indian ocean.
From 16th century new trading ships arrived from the far west- Portuguese, Spanish,
Dutch, British, and other European merchant companies capitalized on their naval and maritime
skills to tap into regional trade, and brought local products back to Europe. The Portuguese
took Melaka, the Spanish took Philippines, and then Dutch took over Melaka in 1612, and even
occupied Taiwan for a limited period. Most importantly, they are the ones who established the
colonial system and introduced the modern concept of sovereignty. This entails the
construction of new colonial states where the British held Singapore as the port city, took
Melaka from the Dutch which causes the latter to merge their possessions into a larger state
called the Netherlands indies or modern-day Indonesia, and the Spanish fortifying their hold in
the Philippines. France motivated by a quest for global power, and ambition to compete with
the British, colonized Indochina and the now northern part of Hainan.

• Towards the end of 19th century, two additional powers established colonies around the
South China Sea. First, Japan won the Sino- Japanese war resulting to prevent China’s re-
establishment as a naval power, and the United States of America where they took over
the Philippines. Since there is an establishment of the 5 external powers in the South
China Sea, naval conferences are regulated.
• However, Japan was the diplomatic loser causing to give up its acquired territories from
China, and was restricted to the number of ships to build. After the world crisis of 1929-
1930, which hit Japan hard, it entered a new period of military expansion due to the
occupation in Manchuria, in 1932, and war with China in 1937 that created a crisis in the
South China Sea, the other 4 external powers, sought ways to change the tide of
Japanese expansionism.
• They did not only bring the concept of territorial sovereignty to the region but also the
concept of freedom of navigation. They made a crucial distinction between land and sea
where the former was to be divided into territories and mapped with demarcated
borders, and the latter was open for all except a narrow band of territorial water along
the coasts, However, this did not suit the continental states of china and Thailand who
were concerned with defending their coasts against foreign ships but, they were obliged
to open up their countries to European trade and influence while also being invited to
join their international society, making them having the right to sign treaties of their
own and act as sovereign states.
• After Tokyo’s surrender at the end of World War II, the United States assumes control of
Japan. This includes the Ryukyu Islands, which Washington later interprets to include
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The greater Ryukyu Islands are seen as being of strategic
significance at a time when communism is spreading in the region. The Kuomintang-led
government of China makes repeated claims to the islands and in April 1948 calls for
their return. The U.S. occupation of Japan’s main islands lasts until the end of the
Korean War in 1952, but the United States continues to occupy Okinawa until 1972.
• However, the dispute intensified during the 1951 San Francisco Treaty, which failed to
stipulate possession of the Spratly islands when Japan lost its title to them after defeat
in the Second World War (art. 2 (f): "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the
Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands").
• The chain of 200 islets, coral reefs and sea mounts that constitute the Spratly and its
northern extension the Paracel islands spread across 250,000 square kilometers of the
 South China Sea, a vast continental shelf that constitutes a potentially rich source of oil
and natural gas. The Spratly’s contested ownership developed into an international
conflict when from the mid-1970s a number of claimants began extracting resources
from the seabed contiguous to their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). China and four
ASEAN states Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam all laid claim and/or
occupied part of the islands in the South China Sea.
• After extensive geological surveys in 1968 and 1969, a report published by the UN
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East finds “substantial energy deposits” in
the seabed between Taiwan and Japan—the waters off the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. The
paper marks one of the first credible findings of hydrocarbon resources there, reigniting
interest in the region. Although China has not previously disputed Japanese claims to
the islands, it asserts its own sovereignty over them in May 1970, after Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan hold talks on joint energy exploration in the East China Sea.
• In 1974, A year after the Paris Peace Accords, which end U.S. involvement in the
Vietnam War, Chinese forces occupy the western portion of the Paracel Islands, planting
flags on several islands and seizing a South Vietnamese garrison. Vietnamese troops flee
south and establish the first permanent Vietnamese occupation of the Spratly Islands.
Meanwhile, Beijing builds a military installation, including an airfield and artificial
harbor, on Woody Island, the largest of the Paracels. After the fall of Saigon and the
reunification of Vietnam, the newly formed Socialist Republic of Vietnam upholds the
South’s former claims to the Spratlys and Paracels. To this day, China maintains around
one thousand troops in the Paracels.
• In 1976, After an extensive exploration program, the Philippines finds the Nido oil field
off the coast of Palawan Island, marking the first oil discovery in the Northwest Palawan
Basin. The discovery comes four years after the government passes the Oil Exploration
and Development Act of 1972, which provides the legal basis for exploring and
developing petroleum resources as Manila pushes for energy independence. Philippine
Cities Service, Inc., the country’s first oil company, begins drilling a well in the Nido oil
field and launches commercial production in 1979, yielding 8.8 million barrels that year.
In 2012, the IMF notes that the Philippines’ petroleum industry may have “significant
potential” in the South China Sea, which is adjacent to the Northwest Palawan Basin.
• In 1982, After three decades of negotiations, the third and final United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS, culminates in a resolution that defines
the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of surrounding waters based
on exclusive economic zones and continental shelves. The measure comes into force on
November 14, 1994, a year after Guyana becomes the sixtieth nation to sign the treaty.
UNCLOS does not address sovereignty issues related to the South and East China Seas,
and its vague wording has prevented it from serving as a credible body of law in
resolving territorial disputes. Although the United States recognizes UNCLOS as
 customary international law, it has yet to ratify the treaty—a move that would give
Washington a greater platform from which it could advance its economic and strategic
interests.
• In 1992, China passes the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which
lays claim to the entire South China Sea based on its historical right to the area dating
from the Xia dynasty, which ruled between the twenty-first and sixteenth centuries BCE.
The law employs more generous methods of territorial determination that would not
necessarily be recognized and justified by UNCLOS, signed a decade earlier. The move is
seen by some as a bid by China to obtain greater maritime security for itself, as Beijing
was one of the most active countries at UNCLOS in attempting to obstruct the United
States and Soviet Union’s efforts to secure freedom of navigation for warships.
• In 1996, Three Chinese naval vessels fight a ninety-minute battle with a Philippine navy
gunboat near Capones Island in the Mischief Reef, part of the Spratly chain of islands
claimed by Manila. The incident marks the first time China engages in military
confrontation with an ASEAN member other than Vietnam. The clash, which triggers
a crisis in Sino-Philippine relations, revives U.S.-Philippine military ties; soon after the
incident, U.S. Navy SEALs conduct a joint exercise with their Philippine counterparts on
Palawan Island, although Philippine President Fidel Ramos denies that this is connected
to Manila’s row with Beijing. Tensions over the occupation subside by midyear, when
the Philippines and China sign a nonbinding code of conduct that calls for a peaceful
resolution to the territorial dispute and the promotion of confidence-building measures.
• In 1998, China and the United States sign the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement,
the first bilateral military agreement between the two countries, which serves as a
confidence-building measure after a period of frozen relations following the 1989
Tiananmen Square protests. From the mid-to-late 1990s, the Clinton administration
works toward security engagement with Beijing as China’s People’s Liberation Army
Navy (PLAN) begins to shift from being a mostly coastal defense force to operating a
blue-water fleet beyond Chinese territorial waters. The accord aims to promote defense
dialogue between naval forces to prevent misunderstandings. However, its efficacy is
questioned in April 2001, when a Chinese F-8 interceptor and a U.S. Navy surveillance
aircraft collide over the South China Sea, killing a Chinese pilot.

In 2002, China and the ten ASEAN states reach an agreement in Phnom Penh on the
ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, a code of
conduct that seeks to ease tensions and creates guidelines for conflict resolution. The
agreement comes after six years of negotiations. Beijing had previously insisted on
bilateral negotiations with claimants; China’s signing marks the first time it accepts a
 multilateral approach to the issue. Though the declaration falls short of a binding code
of conduct, as the Philippines had sought, it signals China’s recognition that such an
agreement could work in its favor by limiting the risk of conflict in the area, which could
involve the United States in the dispute.
In 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam file a joint submission to the UN Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf to extend their continental shelves beyond the standard
two hundred nautical miles from their coastlines, renewing friction over maritime
sovereignty in the South China Sea. China views this as a challenge to its territorial
claims and objects to the submission, saying it “has seriously infringed” on China’s
“indisputable sovereignty” over the islands in the South China Sea. Vietnam’s claims are
viewed as part of a campaign to bring the South China Sea issue to an international
forum, beginning with a conference held in November 2009 in Hanoi.
In 2010, The International Energy Agency reports that China has surpassed the United
States as the largest consumer of energy worldwide, consuming roughly 2.3 billion tons
of total energy in 2009, approximately 4 percent more than the United States. China
also becomes the second-largest consumer and net importer of oil, heightening the
strategic importance of trade routes in the East and South China Seas for tanker
shipments. The United States had been the world’s largest energy consumer since the
early 1990s.

➢ In June 1, 2011, The Philippines summons a Chinese envoy to express its mounting
concern about naval incursions in its claimed territory after recording at least five
incursions by Chinese ships in the past year near the Spratly Islands and the Amy
Douglas Bank, off the coast of Palawan Island. These incursions begin in early March,
when Chinese surveillance ships force a Philippine vessel conducting surveys in the Reed
Bank to leave the area. Both parties declare the incident as violations of the 2002
ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and the
event sets off a series of skirmishes in the region between the two countries. The
diplomatic standoff in June comes days after Vietnam protests China’s alleged
harassment of its oil exploration ships; Vietnam had been working with multinational
corporations, including ExxonMobil and Chevron, to develop hydrocarbon assets.

➢ In October 2011, in response to a spate of skirmishes with Chinese vessels, the

Philippine government begins referring to the South China Sea as the West Philippine
Sea in all official communications and in October 2012 signs an administrative
order asserting its “inherent power and right to designate its maritime areas.” U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also begins referring to the South China Sea as the
West Philippine Sea, affirming in a November 2011 joint press conference with her
Philippine counterpart the “vigor” of the two countries’ alliance, particularly “at a time
when the Philippines is facing challenges to its territorial integrity” in the oceanic region.
➢ In 2012, Diplomatic relations between Manila and Beijing decline further after the
Philippines dispatches a warship to confront Chinese fishing boats in the Scarborough
Shoal, north of the Spratlys. China subsequently dispatches its own surveillance vessels
to protect its fishermen and a two-month standoff ensues. As China quarantines some
fruits from the Philippines and warns against tourism to the country, regional observers
worry that tensions will impede economic relations; Philippine losses in banana exports
in May are estimated at $34 million. Bilateral talks stall repeatedly over withdrawal from
the shoal, and the Philippine government claims it is pursuing various avenues, including
ASEAN involvement, legal options under UNCLOS, and an appeal to the United States for
a guarantee of assistance in the case of military confrontation. Beijing maintains regular
patrols that prevent Philippine fisherman from accessing these waters.

➢ In July 13, 2012, For the first time in its forty-five-year history, ASEAN fails to issue a
communiqué at the conclusion of its annual meeting in Cambodia. Its ten members
reach an impasse over China’s claims in the South China Sea, and member countries
disagree over whether to include the territorial issue in the joint statement. This
diplomatic freeze follows a maritime standoff between China and the Philippines in the
Scarborough Shoal three months prior, and is widely seen as a failure for the regional
body. Some observers view China’s influence on Cambodia, the 2012 rotating chair of
the conference, as having caused the exclusion of the Scarborough Shoal and EEZ
issues from the text, resulting in the deadlock.

In January 16, 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe kicks off his first
overseas trip in Vietnam, going on to visit Thailand and Indonesia in a push to
diplomatically engage the region. Abe points to a “dynamic change” in the strategic
environment of the Asia-Pacific, saying closer relations with ASEAN countries was in
“Japan’s national interest” and contributes to the region’s peace and stability. Japan’s
finance minister announces in May that Tokyo will strengthen its financial
cooperation with ASEAN nations by buying government bonds, financing infrastructure
development, and helping Japanese companies access funding in Southeast Asia. In the
backdrop are ongoing negotiations for TPP talks, which Japan joins in March. Japan’s
inclusion lends momentum to the free trade pact, which some observers see as the
economic centerpiece of Washington’s Asia pivot and Japan’s push to ally itself more
closely with Southeast Asia. The twelve-party talks include Southeast Asian nations such
as Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam. In late May, China’s Ministry of Commerce
announces it is studying the possibility of joining TPP negotiations.
In January 22, 2013, The Philippines initiates an international arbitration
case under UNCLOS over Chinese claims of sovereignty to the Spratly Islands and
Scarborough Shoal originating from the April 2012 clashes, acting on decades of stalled
 attempts at resolution. China rejects the process, forcing the court and its arbitration to
continue without its participation. The case marks the first time a country has brought a
claim against China under UNCLOS regarding the issue.

B. Philippines and China’s position in the PCA Dispute

The basis for the arbitration between Philippines and China before the PCA is the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the “Convention” or “UNCLOS”). Both the
Philippines and China are parties to the Convention, the Philippines having ratified it on 8 May
1984, and China on 7 June 1996. The Convention was adopted as a “constitution for the
oceans,” in order to “settle all issues relating to the law of the sea,” and has been ratified by
168 parties. The Convention addresses a wide range of issues and includes as an integral part a
system for the peaceful settlement of disputes. However, does not address the sovereignty of
States over land territory, and as well as to which State enjoys sovereignty over any land
territory in the South China Sea, in particular with respect to the disputes concerning
sovereignty over the Spratly Islands or Scarborough Shoal.
There were 15 submissions that were submitted by the Philippines with respect to its claims.
Submissions 1 and 2 relate to the broader claim of China that it has maritime entitlements in
the South China Sea which in the view of the Philippines go beyond those provided by UNCLOS.
Further, the Philippines sought a declaration from the Tribunal that the Chinese claims based
on the nine-dash line are inconsistent with UNCLOS and invalid.
Submissions 3 deals with the nature of Scarborough shoal (whether it is a sand bank or a mere
rock or, as the Chinese claim, it is an island, capable of generating maritime zones);
Submission 4 relates to Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Subi Reef, and the claim of
the Philippines that they are low-tide elevations and incapable of generating maritime zones,
while China considers them to be part of Nansha Islands and capable of generating maritime
zones; Submission 5 relates to the Philippines claim that the Mischief Reef and Second Thomas
Reef are part of its EEZ and continental shelf. China considers them to be part of Nansha
Islands. Also this claim relates to the question whether the Spratly Islands can generate an EEZ
and continental shelf.
Submission 6 is about the Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef), the claim of
the Philippines being that they are low-tide elevations;
Submission 7 is about Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef, raising the issue
whether they do or do not generate an entitlement to EEZ and continental shelf;
Submission 8 relates to the claim of the Philippines that China is unlawfully interfering with its
legitimate rights under UNCLOS within its EEZ;
Submission 9 relates to claims of fishing rights being exercised by China in an area in which the
Philippines considers it has sovereign rights;
Submission 10 is related to the rights of the Philippines’ fishermen within the territorial sea of
Scarborough Shoal;
Submission 11 concerns the claim of the Philippines that Chinese acts cause damage and do not
protect and preserve the marine environment surrounding the Scarborough Shoals and the
Second Thomas Shoal;
Submission 12 relates to Mischief Reef, a low tide elevation, claimed by the Philippines as part
of the seabed and subsoil of its EEZ and continental shelf. It may be noted that China claims the
same feature and is engaged in construction and other activities there.
Submission 13 is about law enforcement activities of China which the Philippines assert as a
violation of its obligations under the Convention on International Regulations for the
prevention of collisions at Sea and UNCLOS;
Submission 14 is about the Chinese activities at Second Thomas Shoal, claimed by the
Philippines as preventing it from exercising its right of stationing its forces on the shoal and
navigation around it.
The Submissions of the Philippines, as noted above, could be broadly summed up. As the
Tribunal noted that Submissions 1 to 7 “concern various aspects of the Parties’ dispute over the
sources and extent of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea”. Submissions 8 to14
“concern a series of disputes regarding Chinese activities in the South China Sea”, the
lawfulness of which is disputed by the Philippines.
China rejected the recourse to arbitration by the Philippines and adhered to the position of
neither accepting nor participating in these proceedings. It maintains further that the Tribunal
does not enjoy jurisdiction in the absence of its consent as the issues concerning interpretation
and application of the Convention could arise only after a State’s “sovereignty over maritime
features is determined”. “When not subject to State sovereignty”, China points out, “a
maritime feature per se possesses no maritime rights or entitlements whatsoever”. China also
objects to the selection of certain maritime features for the purpose of assessing their eligibility
to generate maritime zones, whereas its claim is for sovereignty over the entire Nansha
(Spratly) Islands group which is an archipelago comprising several islands, in particular the
“Taiping Dao”, the largest island, and other maritime features. “Taiping Dao” (Itu Abu Island) in
the Nansha (Spratly) Islands group, is currently controlled by the Taiwan authorities
The Philippines’ submission in this regard also excluded some other parts of Nansha Islands
(Spratly Islands group). China considers the parts of islands thus excluded by the Philippines to
be under illegal occupation by the Philippines; and this exclusion amounted to a distortion of
the “nature and scope of the China-Philippines disputes in the South China Sea”. Concerning
the third category of claims put forward by the Philippines, “China maintains that the legality of
China’s actions in the waters of Nansha (Spratly) Islands and Huangyan Dao (Scarborough Shoal)
rests on both its sovereignty over relevant maritime features and the maritime rights derived
therefrom”.
Arbitral Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of UNCLOS examined the various claims
submitted by the Philippines a 15 submissions.
1-7 concern various aspects of the Parties’ dispute over the sources and extent of maritime
entitlements in the South China Sea
Submissions 1 and 2
The broader claim of China which it has maritime entitlements in the South China Sea goes
beyond those provided by UNCLOS. 
Submissions 3
The nature of Scarborough shoal (whether it is a sand bank or a mere rock or, as the Chinese
claim, it is an island, capable of generating maritime zones);
Submission 4
Philippines claim that Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Subi Reef are low-tide
elevations and incapable of generating maritime zones, while China considers them to be part
of Nansha Islands and capable of generating maritime zones;
Submission 5
Philippines claim that the Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Reef are part of its EEZ and
continental shelf. China considers them to be part of Nansha Islands. Also this claim relates to
the question whether the Spratly Islands can generate an EEZ and continental shelf.
Submission 6
Gaven Reef and McKennan Reef (including Hughes Reef), are low-tide elevations;
Submission 7
Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef, raising the issue whether they do or do not
generate an entitlement to EEZ and continental shelf;
concern a series of disputes regarding Chinese activities in the South China Sea
Submission 8
That China is unlawfully interfering with its legitimate rights under UNCLOS within its EEZ;
Submission 9
That fishing rights being exercised by China in an area in which the Philippines considers it has
sovereign rights;
Submission 10
The rights of the Philippines’ fishermen within the territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal;
Submission 11
that Chinese acts cause damage and do not protect and preserve the marine environment
surrounding the Scarborough Shoals and the Second Thomas Shoal
Submission 12
Mischief Reef, a low tide elevation is part of the seabed and subsoil of its EEZ and continental
shelf. It may be noted that China claims the same feature and is engaged in construction and
other activities there.
Submission 13
The law enforcement activities of China violates its obligations under the Convention on
International Regulations for the prevention of collisions at Sea and UNCLOS;
Submission 14
Chinese activities at Second Thomas Shoal, claimed by the Philippines as preventing it from
exercising its right of stationing its forces on the shoal and navigation around it.
There is a valid exercise of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction from 22 January 2013, the date of the
Philippines’ Notification and Statement of Claim concerning claim of China.
Where a dispute exists between parties to the proceedings the Tribunal is required to
determine on an objective basis the dispute dividing the parties, by examining the position of
both parties.” Such a determination will be based not only on the “Application and final
submissions, but on diplomatic exchanges, public statements and other pertinent evidence.”
(which should be made “between the dispute itself and arguments used by the parties to
sustain their respective submissions on the dispute.”)
However, Philippines has not asked the Tribunal to rule on sovereignty as the Philippines’
submission are neither (a) the resolution of the Philippines’ claims would require the Tribunal
to first render a decision on sovereignty, either expressly or implicitly; or (b) the actual
objective of the Philippines’ claims was to advance its position in the Parties’ dispute over
sovereignty. Thus the Tribunal refrain from so doing.
Tribunal considers that a dispute concerning the existence of an entitlement to maritime zones
is distinct from a dispute concerning the delimitation of those zones in an area where the
entitlements of parties overlap.
 A maritime boundary may be delimited only between States with opposite or adjacent coasts
and overlapping entitlements.
In contrast, a dispute over claimed entitlements may exist even without overlap, where—for
instance—a State claims maritime zones in an area understood by other States to form part of
the high seas or the Area for the purposes of the Convention.
In these proceedings, the Philippines has challenged the existence and extent of the maritime
entitlements claimed by China in the South China Sea. This is not a dispute over maritime
boundaries
Because the Tribunal has not been requested to—and will not—delimit a maritime boundary
between the Parties, the Tribunal will be able address those of the Philippines’ Submissions
based on the premise that certain areas of the South China Sea form part of the Philippines’
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf only if the Tribunal determines that China could
not possess any potentially overlapping entitlement in that area.
. In the Tribunal’s view, two principles follow from this jurisprudence. First, where a party has
declined to contradict a claim expressly or to take a position on a matter submitted for
compulsory settlement, the Tribunal is entitled to examine the conduct of the Parties—or,
indeed, the fact of silence in a situation in which a response would be expected—and draw
appropriate inferences. Second, the existence of a dispute must be evaluated objectively
The Philippines’ contrasting view that entitlements in the South China Sea stem only from land
features is well set out in its Note Verbale of 5 April 2011, issued in explicit response to China’s
Notes Verbales of 7 May 2009. In addition to claiming sovereignty over the “Kalayaan Island
Group (KIG)” , the Note provides in relevant part: On the “Waters Adjacent” to the Islands and
other Geological Features SECOND, the Philippines, under the Roman notion of dominium maris
and the international law principle of “la terre domine la mer” which states that the land
dominates the sea, necessarily exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction over the waters around or
adjacent to each relevant geological feature in the KIG as provided for under the UNCLOS. At
any rate, the extent of the waters that are “adjacent” to the relevant geological features are
definite and determinable under UNCLOS, specifically under Article 121 (Regime of Islands) of
the said Convention. On the Other “Relevant Waters Seabed and Subsoil” in the SCS THIRD,
since the adjacent waters of the relevant geological features are definite and subject to legal
and technical measurement, the claim as well by the People’s Republic of China on the
“relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof” (as reflected in the so-called 9-dash
line map attached to Notes Verbales CML/17/2009 dated 7 May 2009 and CML/18/2009 dated
7 May 2009) outside of the aforementioned relevant geological features in the KIG and their
“adjacent waters” would have no basis under international law, specifically UNCLOS. With
respect to these areas, sovereignty and jurisdiction or sovereign rights, as the case may be,
necessarily appertain or belong to the appropriate coastal or archipelagic state – the Philippines
– to which these bodies of waters as well as seabed and subsoil are appurtenant, either in the
nature of Territorial Sea, or 200 M Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), or Continental Shelf (CS) in
accordance with Articles 3, 4, 55, 57, and 76 of UNCLOS.
However, Philippines claim was rehjected by China. China’s Note of 14 April 2011 stated in
relevant part that: China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea
and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over relevant waters as
well as the seabed and subsoil thereof. China’s sovereignty and related rights and jurisdiction in
the South China Sea are supported by abundant historical and legal evidence.
9. In the Tribunal’s view, the Philippines’ Submissions No. 3, 4, 6, and 7 reflect a dispute
concerning the status of the maritime features and the source of maritime entitlements in the
South China Sea. The Philippines has requested that the Tribunal determine the status—as an
island, rock, low-tide elevation, or submerged feature—of nine maritime features, namely:
Scarborough Shoal, Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, Subi Reef, Gaven Reef and McKennan
Reef (including Hughes Reef), Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef and Fiery Cross Reef. In this
instance, the Parties appear to have only rarely exchanged views concerning the status of
specific individual features.132 China has set out its view on the status of features in the Spratly
Islands as a group, stating that “China’s Nansha Islands [are] fully entitled to Territorial Sea,
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf.”133 The Philippines has likewise made
general claims, setting out its view that “the extent of the waters that are ‘adjacent’ to the
relevant geological features are definite and determinable under UNCLOS, specifically under
Article 121 (Regime of Islands) of the said Convention.”134 The Philippines has, however, also
underlined its view that the features in the Spratly Islands are entitled to at most a 12 nautical
mile territorial sea and that any claim to an exclusive economic zone or to a continental shelf in
the South China Sea must emanate from one of the surrounding coastal or archipelagic States.
In the Tribunal’s view, the Philippines’ Submission No. 5 merely presents another aspect of the
same general dispute between the Parties concerning the sources of maritime entitlements in
the South China Sea. In Submission No. 5, however, the Philippines has asked not for a
determination of the status of a particular feature, but for a declaration that Mischief Reef and
Second Thomas Shoal as low-tide elevations “are part of the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf of the Philippines.” Only if no such overlapping entitlement exists—and only if
China is not entitled to claim rights in the South China Sea beyond those permitted by the
Convention, the Tribunal be able to grant the relief requested in Submission No. 5
Submissions No. 11 and 12(b), which concern allegations that China’s activities in the South
China Sea have caused environmental harm,143 require particular consideration in light of their
reference to the provisions of the Convention on Biological Diversity (the “CBD”). In its
Memorial, the Philippines stated that “China’s toleration of its fishermen’s environmentally
harmful activities (the use of dangerous substances such as dynamite or cyanide to extract fish,
clams, or corals at and around) at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal . . . constitute
violations of its obligations under the CBD.” 144 The Tribunal has given consideration to
whether, for the purposes of its jurisdiction under Article 288, Submissions No. 11 and 12(b)
constitute “disputes concerning the interpretation and application of this Convention,” or
disputes that concern the interpretation or application of the CBD.
The Tribunal is satisfied that the incidents of environmental harm alleged by the Philippines
that these could involve violations of obligations under Article 194 of the Convention, read in
conjunction with Article 192 of the Convention, to take measures to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment. Although the Tribunal considers China’s actions
and failures to be inconsistent with the provisions of the CBD, the Philippines has not presented
a claim arising under the CBD as such.
1. WHETHER ANY THIRD PARTIES ARE INDISPENSABLE TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Third parties are not indispensable to the proceedings.

The determination of the nature of and entitlements generated by the maritime features in the
South China Sea does not require a decision on issues of territorial sovereignty. Viet Nam
and/or others legal rights and obligations do not need to be determined as a prerequisite to the
determination of the merits of the case. Because none of the Phlippines’ claims or questions
entail allegations of unlawful conduct by Viet Nam and/or other third States.
As early as April 2014, Viet Nam informed the Tribunal that it had been “following the
proceedings closely” and requested copies of the pleadings to help it determine whether “Viet
Nam’s legal interests and rights may be affected” and in order to protect its rights and interests
of a legal nature in the South China Sea . . . which may be affected in this arbitration. With
respect to jurisdiction, Viet Nam expressed support for “UNCLOS States Parties which seek to
settle their disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention
Viet Nam noted that matters of territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation had
deliberately been excluded from the Philippines’ claim. With respect to the merits of the claims,
Viet Nam “resolutely protests and rejects any claim . . . based on the ‘nine-dash line’ legal,
historical or factual basis and is therefore null and void.”160 With respect to the features
mentioned specifically in the Philippines’ Memorial, Viet Nam considers that none of them “can
enjoy their own exclusive economic zone and continental shelf or generate maritime
entitlements in excess of 12 nautical miles since they are low-tide elevations or ‘rocks’ under
Article 121(3) of the Convention.

Philippines was in favour of sharing documents with Viet Nam and allowing Viet Nam to be
present at any hearing as an observer. China did not directly comment on Viet Nam’s
Statement, but the Chinese Ambassador’s First Letter did express serious concern and
opposition to a procedure of “intervention by other States” as being “inconsistent with the
general practices of international arbitration.
Tribunal informed Viet Nam and other countried that it would “address the permissibility of
intervention in these proceedings; However, Viet Nam Viet Nam did not make a formal
application for such intervention.
Tribunal finds that Viet Nam is not an indispensable third party and that its absence as a party
does not preclude the Tribunal from proceeding with the arbitration.

2. whether the China–ASEAN Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,
dated 4 November 2002 (DOC) constitutes an “agreement” for purposes of Article 281 and, if
so, whether it is an agreement to seek settlement by friendly consultations and negotiations
only, to the exclusion of any other means of dispute settlement.
No. DOC is intended only as an aspirational political document.
China argues in its Position Paper that by signing the DOC, the Philippines and China have
undertaken a mutual obligation to settle their disputes in relation to the South China Sea
through “friendly consultations and negotiations” and thus “agreed to seek settlement of the
dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice” within the meaning of Article 281 which
states:
Procedure where no settlement has been reached by the Parties 1. If the States
Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a
peaceful means of their own choice, the procedures provided for in this Part
apply only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means
and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any further procedure.
2. If the parties have also agreed on a time-limit, paragraph 1 applies only upon
the expiration of that time-limit.
that the DOC’s status as an “agreement” is “mutually reinforced” by the multitude of other
bilateral instruments in which the two states have reiterated their commitment to peaceful
settlement of disputes through negotiations. China acknowledges that the DOC contains no
phrase expressly excluding further procedure. However, China does not consider that an
express exclusion is necessary. China recalls that the Parties have been engaged in
consultations regarding the “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea” and warns that denying
the DOC’s significance could lead to a “serious retrogression” in the current relationship
between China and the ASEAN member States.
On the other hand, Philippines argues that the DOC poses no obstacle for the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction under Article 281 for reasons:
 a) the DOC is not a legally binding “agreement” within the meaning of Article 281, but
merely a non-binding political document that was never intended to create legal rights
and obligations. As the DOC is merely confirming existing obligations and is intended as
a political document, reflecting a compromise reached as a “stop-gap measure” to
reduce tensions
b) that, even if the DOC was intended to be a binding agreement, no settlement has been
reached through the means contemplated in it. It is justified to conclude that continued
negotiation would be futile
c) that even if the DOC was intended to be a binding agreement, it does not exclude
recourse to the dispute settlement procedures established in Section 2 of Part XV of the
Convention.
d) that, even if the DOC were a binding agreement within the meaning of Article 281 and
even if it purported to exclude further procedures, China still cannot rely on it to avoid
jurisdiction due to China’s own conduct in “flagrant disregard” of the DOC. The
Philippines invokes the general principle of law that “a party which . . . does not fulfil its
own obligations cannot be recognised as retaining the rights which it claims to derive
from the relationship.” 193 In particular, the Philippines recalls paragraph 5 of the DOC,
in which the Parties “undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that
would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among
others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs,
shoals, cays, and other features.” China’s disregard of paragraph 5 would, according to
the Philippines, deprive it of any entitlement to claim the benefit of its alleged rights
under paragraph 4. The Philippines refers by way of example to China’s expulsion of
Philippine fishermen from Scarborough Shoal, China’s assumption of de facto control
over Second Thomas Shoal and, more recently, China’s large-scale land reclamations on
the features it occupies in the Spratly Islands.

The tribunal explained that To constitute a binding agreement, an instrument must evince a
clear intention to establish rights and obligations between the parties. Such clear intention is
determined by reference to the instrument’s actual terms and the particular circumstances of
its adoption.
Although the DOC is entitled a “declaration” rather than a “treaty” or “agreement”, the
Tribunal acknowledges that international agreements may take a number of forms and be given
a variety of names. The form or designation of an instrument is thus not decisive of its status as
an agreement establishing legal obligations between the parties. The Tribunal observes that
the DOC shares some hallmarks of an international treaty. It is a formal document with a
preamble, it is signed by the foreign ministers of China and the ASEAN States, and the signatory
States are described in the DOC as “Parties”. However, with respect to its terms, the DOC
contains many instances of the signatory States simply “reaffirming” existing obligations. 1 The
only instance where the DOC uses the word “agree” is in paragraph 10 where the signatory
States “agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment” of a Code
of Conduct. This language is not consistent with the creation of new obligations but rather
restates existing obligations pending agreement on a Code that eventually would set out new
obligations.
On the other hand, the DOC are suggestive of the existence of an agreement. For example, the
word “undertake”, in paragraph 4 2 and in paragraph 53. As China mentions, the Court observed
in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
that the word “undertake” is “regularly used in treaties setting out the obligations of
Contracting Parties” and found the ordinary meaning of “undertake” to “give a formal promise,
to bind or engage oneself, to give a pledge or promise, to agree, to accept an obligation.”
However, the Tribunal notes a number of differences between paragraph 4 of the DOC and
Article 1 of the Genocide Convention. First, the Court was operating in the context of a treaty,
whose legally binding character was not in any doubt. The Court was not seeking to determine
whether an agreement on the submission of disputes was binding but rather whether Article 1
of the Genocide Convention imposed an obligation to prevent genocide that was separate and
distinct from other obligations in the Genocide Convention. Notably, the Court looked beyond
the ordinary meaning of the word “undertake” to verify its understanding. It thus gave weight
to the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention and the negotiating history of the
relevant provisions.
It becomes apparent to this Tribunal that the DOC was not intended to be a legally binding
agreement with respect to dispute resolution. The purpose and circumstances surrounding the
DOC’s adoption reinforce the Tribunal’s understanding that the DOC was not intended to create
legal rights and obligations and its adoption amply demonstrate that the DOC was not intended
by its drafters to be a legally binding document, but rather an aspirational political document.
The Tribunal also observes that in recent years, at least before the arbitration commenced,
several Chinese officials described the DOC as a “political” document.
The Tribunal’s finding that the DOC was not intended as a legally binding agreement would be
sufficient to dispose of the issue of the DOC for the purposes of Article 281. No settlement has
been reached by recourse to the agreed means and no agreement of exclusions of any further

1
For example, in paragraph 1, they “reaffirm their commitment” to the UN Charter, the Convention, and other
“universally recognized principles of international law.” In paragraph 3, they “reaffirm their respect and
commitment to the freedom of navigation and overflight” as provided in the Convention. In paragraph 10, they
reaffirm “the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in
the region.”
2
“undertake to resolve their . . . disputes by peaceful means . . . through friendly consultations and negotiations by
sovereign states directly concerned”
3
undertake to exercise self-restraint
procedure (including those under Part XV of the Convention). despite years of discussions, the
disputes have intensified.

Substantive Issues and Ruling

The South China Sea Arbitration
(The Republic Of The Philippines V. The People’s Republic Of China)
The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague has released its Award concerning the
Philippines’ challenge to a number of China’s maritime claims and activities in the West
Philippine Sea on 12 July 2016.
Key Claims and Rulings
The Philippines initiated the arbitration in January 2013 under the dispute settlement
procedures of Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).
Challenge to China’s “nine-dash line” covering most of the South China Sea;
Whether certain land features in the Spratly Islands claimed by both China and the Philippines
are properly characterized as islands, rocks, low tide elevations (LTEs), or submerged banks;
Whether China violated UNCLOS by interfering with the Philippines’ rights and freedoms within
its EEZ;
Whether China’s land reclamation and construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands
after the arbitration was commenced, violated the obligations under UNCLOS to refrain from
conduct that “aggravates and extends” a dispute while dispute resolution proceedings are
pending.
On China’s Nine-Dash Line Claim

Ruling: UNCLOS comprehensively governs the parties’ respective rights to maritime areas in the
South China Sea. Therefore, to the extent China’s nine-dash line is a claim of “historic rights” to
the waters of the South China Sea, it is invalid.
Ratio: Whatever historic rights China may have had were extinguished when UNCLOS was
adopted, to the extent those rights were incompatible with UNCLOS.
On the Classification of Certain Land Features in the Spratly Islands

Under UNCLOS, an “island” generates both a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles and EEZ of up to
200 nautical miles, subject to delimitation of a maritime boundary with any other countries’
overlapping territorial seas or EEZs. A “rock” is entitled to a territorial sea no greater than 12
nautical miles, but not an EEZ. LTEs and submerged banks do not generate any such
entitlements.
On the Classification of Certain Land Features in the Spratly Islands
Ruling: None of the features in the Spratly Islands generates an EEZ, nor can the Spratly Islands
generate an EEZ collectively as a unit. As such, the Tribunal declared certain areas are within
the Philippines’ EEZ and not overlapped by any possible Chinese entitlement.
Ratio: The baseline of analysis is what the features can sustain in their “natural condition” (i.e.,
not after construction of artificial islands, installation of desalination plants, etc.). Based on
historical evidence, none of the features in the Spratly Islands can sustain either a stable
community of people or economic activity that is not dependent on outside resources or purely
extractive in nature. The current presence of personnel on the features is dependent on outside
support and does not reflect the capacity of the features in their natural condition.

On Whether China unlawfully interfered with the Philippines’ rights and freedoms within its
EEZs
Ruling: China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its EEZ. It did so by interfering with
Philippine fishing and hydrocarbon exploration; constructing artificial islands; and failing to
prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing in the Philippines’ EEZ. China also interfered with
Philippine fishermen’s traditional fishing rights near Scarborough Shoal. China’s construction of
artificial islands, as well as illegal fishing and harvesting by Chinese nationals, violate UNCLOS
obligations to protect the marine environment. Finally, Chinese law enforcement vessels
unlawfully created a serious risk of collision by physically obstructing Philippine vessels at
Scarborough Shoal in 2012.

On Whether China unlawfully interfered with the Philippines’ rights and freedoms within its
EEZs
Ratio: The Tribunal found that certain areas are within the Philippines’ EEZ and not subject to
possible overlapping Chinese entitlements. It was also found that activities such as island
construction are, in accordance with China’s own public statements, not “military activities” and
therefore not excluded from jurisdiction under UNCLOS. The Tribunal considered Chinese
activities in the relevant areas and found that China had (a) interfered with Philippine
petroleum exploration at Reed Bank, (b) purported to prohibit fishing by Philippine vessels
within the Philippine EEZ, (c) protected and failed to prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing
within the Philippine EEZ at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, and (d) constructed
artificial islands/installations at Mischief Reef without the Philippines’ authorization.

On Whether China unlawfully interfered with the Philippines’ rights and freedoms within its
EEZs

As for Scarborough Shoal, regardless of who has sovereignty, both Philippine and Chinese
fishermen have “traditional fishing rights” at the Shoal that were not extinguished by UNCLOS,
and China violated the Philippines’ rights by entirely preventing Filipino fishermen from fishing
near Scarborough Shoal after May 2012. In addition, Chinese artificial island construction has
caused “severe harm to the coral reef environment” and China has failed to stop its nationals
from engaging in “harmful” and “destructive” harvesting and fishing of endangered sea turtles,
coral, and giant clams in violation of UNCLOS.
On China’s land reclamation and construction of artificial islands

The Philippines sought a declaration that China’s recent actions, specifically its land reclamation
and construction of artificial islands in the Spratly Islands after the arbitration was commenced,
violated the obligations UNCLOS places on states to refrain from conduct that “aggravates and
extends” a dispute while dispute resolution proceedings are pending.

On China’s land reclamation and construction of artificial islands

Ruling: China has aggravated and extended the disputes through its dredging, artificial island-
building, and construction activities.
Ratio: While the proceedings were pending, China has built a large island on Mischief Reed, an
LTE within the Philippines’ EEZ; caused irreparable harm to the marine ecosystem; and
permanently destroyed evidence of the natural condition of the features at issue.

Table of Philippine Claims and Tribunal Rulings

 Philippines’ Claim Ruling

1 China’s maritime Yes. UNCLOS

entitlements in South comprehensively
China Sea may not allocates rights to
exceed those maritime areas.
established by UNCLOS.

2 China’s “nine-dash line” Yes. China’s “nine-dash

claim is invalid to the line” claim is invalid to
extent it exceeds the the extent it exceeds the
limits established by geographic and
UNCLOS. substantive limits
permitted by UNCLOS.

3 Scarborough Shoal Yes. Scarborough Shoal is

generates no EEZ or a rock that generates no
continental shelf. EEZ.

Philippines’ Claim Ruling

4 Mischief Reef, Second Yes. Mischief Reef,

Thomas Shoal, and Subi Second Thomas Shoal,
Reef are all low tide and Subi Reef are LTEs.
elevations (LTEs) that do
not generate territorial
seas, EEZs, and are not
subject to appropriation.

5 Mischief Reef and Yes. Mischief Reef and

Second Thomas Shoal Second Thomas Shoal are
are part of the part of the EEZ and
Philippines’ EEZ and continental shelf of the
continental shelf. Philippines.

6 Gaven Reef and No. Both Gaven and

McKennan Reef McKennan Reef are
(including Hughes Reef) above water at high tide;
are LTEs that generate they are rocks that
 no maritime generate territorial seas
entitlements, but may but no EEZ or continental
be used to determine shelf.
baselines to measure
territorial sea.

Philippines’ Claim Ruling

7 Johnson Reef, Yes. Johnson Reef,

Cuarterton Reef, and Cuarterton Reef, and
Fiery Cross Reef Fiery Cross Reef are rocks
generate no that generate no EEZ or
entitlements to EEZ or continental shelf.
continental shelf.

8 China has interfered Yes. China has unlawfully

with the Philippines’ interfered with the
exercise of sovereign Philippines’ exercise of
rights over living and sovereign rights over
non-living resources living and non-living
within its EEZ and resources within its EEZ
continental shelf. and continental shelf.

9 China has failed to Yes. China has unlawfully

prevent its nationals and failed to prevent Chinese
vessels from exploiting fishermen from fishing
the living resources in within the Philippine EEZ.
the Philippines’ EEZ

Philippine Claim Ruling

1 China has prevented Yes. China violated the

0 Philippine fishermen Philippines’ traditional
from pursuing their fishing rights at
livelihoods. Scarborough Shoal

1 China has violated Yes. China engaged in

1 UNCLOS’s environmentally harmful
environmental fishing/harvesting
 protection obligations at practices at Scarborough
Scarborough Shoal and Shoal and Second
Second Thomas Shoal. Thomas Shoal.

1 China’s occupation and Yes. Environmental

2 construction on Mischief protection provisions
Reef violate UNCLOS were violated at Mischief
provisions on artificial Reef; artificial island
islands and construction violated
environmental Philippine sovereign
protection, and are rights within its EEZ; the
unlawful acts of “appropriation” claim is
attempted moot because Mischief
appropriation. Reef is an LTE not
capable of appropriation

Philippines’ Claim Ruling

1 China has violated Yes. China violated

3 UNCLOS by dangerously UNCLOS and other treaty
operating law provisions on maritime
enforcement vessels safety.
creating serious risk of
collision near
Scarborough Shoal.

1 China has unlawfully Yes. Although there is no

4 aggravated and jurisdiction over disputes
extended the dispute by involving military
interfering with the activities such as the
Philippines’ rights of Second Thomas Shoal
navigation near standoff, China has
Scarborough Shoal, aggravated/extended the
preventing the rotation disputes through recent
and resupply of large-scale land
Philippine personnel reclamation and artificial
stationed at Second island construction in the
Thomas Shoal, and Philippine EEZ.
endangering the health
 of the personnel there.

Philippines’ Claim Ruling

1 China shall respect the Yes. China shall respect

5 rights and freedoms of the rights and freedoms
the Philippines under of the Philippines under
UNCLOS and comply the Convention, shall
with its duties under comply with its duties
UNCLOS. under the Convention,
including those relevant
to the protection and
preservation of the
marine environment in
the South China Sea, and
shall exercise its rights
and freedoms in the
South China Sea with due
regard to those of the
Philippines under the
Convention.