VOL.
35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 481
Edu vs. Ericta
No. L-32096. October 24, 1970.
ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner,
petitioner, vs. HON.VICENTE G. ERICTA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
482
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
Instance of Rizal, Br. XVIII, Quezon City, and TEDDY C. GALO,respondents.
Constitutional Law;  Police Power;  State has inherent power enabling it to prohibit all things hurtful
to comfort, safety and welfare of society.—The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far
from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the State and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen
or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure
communal peace, safety, good order and welfare.
Same; Same; Valid Delegation of Legislative Power; Standard must be set to avoid the taint of
unlawful delegation.—What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to
alter and repeal them. The test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leaves
the hands cf the legislature. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard which implies
at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Hector C.
Fule and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for petitioner.
     Teddy C. Galo in his own behalf.
     Judge Vicente Ericta in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:
Petitioner Romeo F. Edu, the Land Transportation Commissioner, would have us rule squarely on
the constitutionality of the Reflector Law  in this proceeding for certiorari and prohibition against
1
respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance
_______________
 Republic Act No. 5715 (1969).
1
483
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 483
Edu vs. Ericta
of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, to annul and set aside his order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction directed against Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner for the
enforcement of the aforesaid statute, in a pending suit in his court for certiorari and prohibition,
filed by the other respondent Teddy C. Galo assailing the validity of such enactment as well as
such administrative order. Respondent Judge, in his answer, would join such a plea asking that the
constitutional and legal questions raised be decided “once and for all.” Respondent Teddy C. Galo
who was quite categorical in his assertion that both the challenged legislation and the
administrative order transgress the constitutional requirements of due process and nondelegation,
is not averse either to such a definitive ruling. Considering the great public interest involved and
the reliance by respondent Galo on the allegation that the repugnancy to the fundamental law
could be discerned on the face of the statute as enacted and the executive order as promulgated,
this Court sees no obstacle to the determination in this proceeding of the constitutional questions
raised. For reasons to be hereafter stated, we sustain the validity of the Reflector Law and
Administrative Order No. 2 issued in the implementation thereof, the imputation of constitutional
infirmity being at best flimsy and insubstantial.
As noted in the answer of respondent Judge, respondent Galo on his behalf and that of other
motorists filed on May 20, 1970 a suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
assailing the validity of the challenged Act as an invalid exercise of the police power, for being
violative of the due process clause. This he followed on May 28, 1970 with a manifestation
wherein he sought as an alternative remedy that, in the event that respondent Judge would hold
said statute constitutional, Administrative Order No. 2 of the Land Transportation Commissioner,
now petitioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative
power. There was a hearing on the plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction held on
May 27, 1970
484
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
where both parties were duly represented, but no evidence was presented. The next day, on May
28, 1970, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a preliminary injunction directed against the
enforcement of such administrative order. There was, the day after, a motion for its
reconsideration filed by the Solicitor General representing petitioner. In the meanwhile, the clerk
of court of respondent Judge issued on June 1, 1970 the writ of preliminary injunction upon the
filing of the required bond. The answer before the lower court was filed by petitioner Edu on June
4, 1970. Thereafter, on June 9, 1970, respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration of
the order of injunction. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed with this Court on
June 18, 1970.
In a resolution of June 22, 1970, this Court required respondents to file an answer to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition. Respondent Judge, the Honorable Vicente G. Ericta, did file
his answer on June 30, 1970 explaining why he restrained the enforcement of Administrative
Order No. 2 and, as noted at the outset, joining the Solicitor General in seeking that the legal
questions raised, namely the constitutionality of the Reflector Law and secondly the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2 alleged to be in excess of the authority conferred on petitioner and
therefore violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power, be definitely decided. It
was not until July 6, 1970 that respondent Galo filed his answer seeking the dismissal of this
petition concentrating on what he considered to be the patent invalidity of Administrative Order
No. 2 as it went beyond the authority granted by the Reflector Law, even assuming that it is
constitutional. In the meanwhile, on July 2, 1970, the petition was called for hearing with Solicitor
Vicente Torres appearing for petitioner and respondent Galo for himself. It was made clear during
the course of such argumentation that the matter of the constitutionality of the Reflector Law was
likewise under consideration by this Court. The case is thus ripe for decision.
We repeat that we find for petitioner and sustain the
485
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 485
Edu vs. Ericta
constitutionality of the Reflector Law as well as the validity of Administrative Order No. 2.
1. The threshold question is whether on the basis of the petition, the answers, and the oral
argument, it would be proper for this Court to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of the
Reflector Law. Our answer, as indicated, is in the affirmative. It is to be noted that the main thrust
of the petition before us is to demonstrate in a rather convincing fashion that the challenged
legislation does not suffer from the alleged constitutional infirmity imputed to it by the respondent
Galo. Since the special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by him before respondent
Judge would seek a declaration of nullity of such enactment by the attribution of the violation on
the face thereof of the due process guarantee in the deprivation of property rights, it would follow
that there is sufficient basis for us to determine which view should prevail. Moreover, any further
hearing by respondent Judge would likewise be limited to a discussion of the constitutional issue’s
raised, no allegations of facts having been made. This is one case then where the question of
validity is ripe for determination. If we do so, further effort need not be wasted and time is saved.
Moreover, the officials concerned as well as the public, both vitally concerned with a final
resolution of this question of validity, could know the definitive answer and could act accordingly.
There is a great public interest, as was mentioned, to be served by the final disposition of such
crucial issue, petitioner praying that respondent Galo be declared as having no cause of action with
respondent Judge being accordingly directed to dismiss his suit.
There is another reinforcement to this avenue of approach. We have done so before in a suit,
Climaco v. Macadaeg,  involving the legality of a presidential directive. That was a petition for the
2
review and reversal of a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the then Judge Macadaeg. We
there announced that we “have de-
_______________
 L-19440, April 18, 1962, 4 SCRA 930.
2 inhabitants, U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218, 225 (1915); to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state
486
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
cided to pass upon the question of the validity of the presidential directive ourselves, believing that
by doing so we would be putting an end to a dispute, a delay in the disposition of which has
caused considerable damage and injury to the Government and to the tobacco planters
themselves.”
There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars this Court from similarly passing
upon the question of the validity of a legislative enactment in a proceeding before it to test the
propriety of the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The same felt need for resolving once and for
all the vexing question as to the constitutionality of a challenged enactment and thus serve public
interest exists. What we have done in the case of an order proceeding from one of the coordinate
branches, the executive, we can very well do in the matter before us involving the alleged nullity
of a legislative act. Accordingly, there is nothing to preclude the grant of the writs prayed for, the
burden of showing the unconstitutionality of the act having proved to be as will now be shown, too
much for respondent Galo.
2. The Reflector Law reads in full: "(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled.—
Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner
of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted
or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall
be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted,
painted or attached at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at night at least one
hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of the requirements mentioned in this
subsection shall be registered."  It is thus obvious that the challenged statute is a legislation enacted
3  Cf. United States v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910); United States v. Villareal, 28 Phil. 390 (1914); United States v. Gomez
under the police power to promote public safety.
_______________
 Sec. 1 of Republic Act No. 5715 enacted on June 21, 1969 amends subsection (g) of Sec. 34 of Republic Act No. 4136
3
(1964).
487
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970
Edu vs. Ericta
Justice Laurel, in the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v.
Williams, identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
4
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could
thus “be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of the state.” Shortly after independence in 1948,  Primicias v.
Fugoso,  reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as “the power to prescribe
5
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people.” The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-
Commonwealth decision as “that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to
prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society."  In that sense it could be
6
hardly distinguishable as noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc  with the totality of legislative
7
power.
It is in the above sense the greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is to quote
Justice Malcolm anew “the most essential, insistent, and at least illimit-able of powers,"  extending 8
as Justice Holmes aptly pointed
_______________
4
 70 Phil. 726 (1940).
 80 Phil 71. Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).
5
6
 Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919). Earlier Philippine cases during the same era referred to police power
as the power to promote the general welfare and public interest, U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 94 (1910); to enact such laws in
relation to persons and property as may promote public health, public morals, public safety, and the general welfare of its
and to establish, for the intercourse of citizen with citizen, those rules of good manners and good neighborhood calculated to
prevent conflict of rights, U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245, 254 (1915). The term is of American origin, having been first
referred to by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibsons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 7, 208 (1824) and explicitly identified as Maryland, 12
Wheat, 419, 443.
7
 L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424.
8
 Smith Bell and Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136 (1919).
488
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
out “to all the great public needs."  Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
9
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the
language of Justice Cardozo: “Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven
in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the
time."  The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined,
10
rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen
or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated
to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
It would then be to overturn a host of decisions impressive for their number and unanimity
were this Court to sustain respondent Galo.  That we are not disposed to
11
_______________
 Noble State Bank v. Haske, 219 US 112 (1911).
9
 Helvering v. Davis, 301 US 619 (1937).
10
11
Jesus, 31 Phil. 218(1915); Churchill and Tait v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580 (1915); Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil.
660 (1919); Smith BeIIand Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136 (1919) ; Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil. 595 (1927); People
v. Abad Lopez, 62 Phil. 835 (1936); People v. Lagman, 66 Phil. 13 (1938); People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12 (1939) ; People v.
Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328(1939); Pampanga Bus Co. v. Pambusco Employees Union, 68 Phil. 541(1939); Manila Trading and
Supply Co. v. Zulueta, 69 Phil. 485 (1940); Pangasinan Trans. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil.
221 (1940); Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 70 Phil. 340 (1940); International Hardwood and
Veneer Co. v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602 (1940); Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940); Tapang v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 72 Phil. 79 (1941); Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946); People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535 (1947); Primicias
487 v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 (1948); Co Chiong v. Cuaderno, 83 Phil. 242 (1949); People v. Isnain, 85 Phil. 648 (1950); Ongsiako
489
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 489
Edu vs. Ericta
do, especially so as the attack on the challenged statute ostensibly for disregarding the due process
safeguard is singularly unpersuasive. It would be to close one’s eyes to the hazards of traffic in the
evening to condemn a statute of this character. Such an attitude betrays lack of concern for public
safety. How can it be plausibly alleged then that there was no observance of due process equated
as it has always been with what is reasonable? The statute assailed is not infected with
arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or caprice. It is far from oppressive. It is a legitimate
response to a felt public need. It can stand the test of the most unsympathetic appraisal.
Respondent Galo is of a different mind, having been tumble to resist the teaching of many
American State Court decisions referred to in the secondary source, American Jurisprudence,
principally relied upon by him. He ought to have been cautioned against an indiscriminate
acceptance of such doctrines predicated on what was once a fundamental postulate in American
public law, laissezfaire.
It is to be admitted that there was a period when such a concept did influence American court
decisions on constitutional law. As was explicitly stated by Justice Car-
_______________
v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950); Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phil. 83 (1951); People v. De la Cruz, 92 Phil.
906 (1953); People v. Chu Chi, 92 Phil. 977 (1953); Rutter v. Esteban, 93 Phil. 68 (1953); Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil.
1155 (1957); King v. Hernaez, L-14859, March 31, 1962, 4 SCRA 792; De Ramas v. Court of Agrarian Relations, L-19555,
May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 171; Vda. de Macasaet v. Court of Agrarian Relations, L-19750, July 17, 1964, 11 SCRA
521; Uichanco v. Gutierrez, L-20275–79, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 231; Gamboa v. Pallarca, L-20407, March 31, 1966, 16
SCRA 490; Ilusorio v. Court of Agrarian Relations, L-20344, May 16, 1966, 17 SCRA 25; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel
Control and Inspection Board, L-19978, Sept. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 336; Phil. American Life Ins. Co, v. Auditor General, L-
19255, Jan. 18, 1968, 22 SCRA 135; Morfe v. Mutuc, L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424; Alalayan v. National Power
Corp., L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.
490
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
dozo, speaking of that era: “Laissez-faire was not only a counsel of caution which would do well
to heed. It was a categorical imperative which statesmen as well as judges, must obey."  For a long 12
time, legislation tending to reduce economic inequality foundered on the rock that was the due
process clause, enshrining as it did the liberty of contract, based on such a basic assumption.
The New Deal administration of President Roosevelt more responsive to the social and
economic forces at work changed matters greatly. By 1937, there was a greater receptivity by the
American Supreme Court to an approach not too reverential of property rights. Even earlier, in
1935, Professor Coker of Yale, speaking as a historian, could already discern a contrary drift. He
did note the expending range of governmental activity in the United States.  What is undeniable is
13
that by 1913, laissez-faire was no longer the dominant theory. In the language of Justice Jackson
in the leading case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette:  ''We must transplant 14
these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or non-interference has withered at least as
to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer integration of
society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls.”
While authoritative precedents from the United States federal and state jurisdictions were
deferred to when the Philippines was still under American rule, it cannot be said that the  laissez-
faire principle was invariably adhered to by us even then. As early as 1919, in the leading case of
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro,  Justice Malcolm already had occasion to affirm: “The
15
doctrines of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economic and
political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the
_______________
 Cardozo, The Nature of Judicial Process, p. 77 (1921).
12
 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law, p. 27 (1938).
13
 319 US 624.
14
 39 Phil. 660, 717–718.
15
491
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 491
Edu vs. Ericta
amplest possible demonstration of government activity. The Courts unfortunately have sometimes
seemed to trail after the other two branches of the Government in this progressive march.” People
v. Pomar,  a 1924 decision, which held invalid under the due process clause a provision providing
16
for maternity leave with pay thirty days before and thirty days after confinement could be cited to
show that such a principle did have its day. It is to be remembered though that our Supreme Court
had no other choice as the Philippines was then under the United States, and only recently the year
before, the American Supreme Court in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital,  in line with the laissez-
17
faire theory, did hold that a statute providing for minimum wages was constitutionally infirm.
What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the concept
of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government the responsibility of coping with
social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over economic affairs.
Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state action. No
constitutional objection to regulatory measures adversely affecting property rights, especially so
when public safety is the aim, is likely to be heeded, unless of course on the clearest and most
satisfactory proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by the Constitution. On such a showing, there
may be a declaration of nullity, but not because, the laissez-faireprinciple was disregarded but
because the due process, equal protection, or non-impairment guarantees would call for
vindication.
To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased whatever doubts there might be
on that score. Its philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading members of the
Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first President of the Republic,
_______________
 46 Phil. 440.
16
 261 US 525 (1923). The Adkins case was itself over-ruled in 1937 in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937).
17
492
492 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
made it clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted
the “vast extensions in the sphere of governmental functions” and the “almost unlimited power to
interfere in the affairs of industry and agriculture as well as to compete with existing business” as
“reflections of the fascination exerted by [the then] current tendencies” in other jurisdictions.  He
18
spoke thus: “My answer is that this constitution has a definite and well defined philosophy, not
only political but social and economic. If in this Constitution the gentleman will find declarations
of economic policy they are there because they are necessary to safeguard the interests and welfare
of the Filipino people because we believe that the days have come when in self-defense, a nation
may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom
to develop national aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial
boundaries which a constitutional provision automatically imposes.
19
It was not expected then when in a concurring opinion, Justice Laurel who likewise sat in the
Constitutional Convention and was one of its leading lights, explicitly affirmed in a concurring
opinion, later quoted with approval in the leading case of Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v.
Court of Industrial Relations,  that the Constitution did away with the laissez-faire doctrine. In the
20
course of such concurring opinion and after noting the changes that have taken place calling for a
more affirmative role by the government and its undeniable power to curtail property rights, he
categorically declared the doctrine in People v. Pomar no longer retains “its virtuality as a living
principle." 21
It is in the light of such rejection of the laissez-faire
_______________
 III Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Laurel ed., pp. 173–174 (1966).
18
 Ibid., pp. 177–178.
19
 70 Phil. 340 (1940).
20
 Ibid., p. 360. Cf. Leyte Land Trans. Co. v. Leyte Farmers and Laborers’ Union, 80 Phil. 842 (1948).
21
493
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 493
Edu vs. Ericta
principle that during the Commonwealth era, no constitutional infirmity was found to have VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 495
attached to legislation covering such subjects as collective bargaining, security of 22

tenure,  minimum wages,  compulsory arbitration,  the regulation of tenancy  as well as the
23 24 25 26 Edu vs. Ericta
issuance of securities,  and control of public services.  So it is likewise under the Republic this
27 28 quirement that in addition to such reflectors there shall be installed, pasted or painted four
Court having given the seal of approval to more favorable tenancy laws, nationalization of the 29 reflectors on each side of the motor vehicle parallel to those installed, pasted or painted in front
retail trade,  limitation of the hours of labor,  imposition of price control,  requirement of
30 31 32 and those in the rear end of the body thereof.  The color required of each reflectors, whether built-
38

separation pay for one month,  and social security scheme.

33 34 in, commercial glass, reflectorized tape or reflectorized paint placed in the front part of any motor
Respondent Galo thus could have profited by a little more diligence in the scrutiny of vehicle shall be amber or yellow and those placed on the sides and in the rear shall all be red. 39

Philippine decisions rendered with not unexpected regularity, during all the while our Constitution _______________
has been in force, attesting to the demise of such a shibboleth as laissez-faire. It was one of those
fighting faiths that time and circumstances had upset, to the outer-most side of the rear end of the body. (4) For Trailers with Stake or Van Body irrespective of size—Two in
front to be installed, pasted or painted 5 inches below the two upper corners of the body; and four at the rear end of the trailer,
_______________
two of which shall be installed, pasted or painted 5 inches below the upper two corners of the rear end of the body and the
other two to be installed, pasted or painted 5 inches above the two lower corners of the rear end of the body. (5) For Four-
 Pampanga Bus Co. v. Pambusco’s Employees’ Union, 68 Phil. 541(1939).
22
wheeled motor vehicles 2 1/2 meter high or lower irrespective of weight—Two in front to be installed at the outer-most side of
 Manila Trading and Supply Co. v. Zulueta, 69 Phil. 485 (1940).
23
the vehicle preferably at the outer-tip of the front bumper or at the lower tip of the front fender; and two at the rear to be
 International Hardwood and Veneer Company v. The Pangil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602 (1940).
24
installed, pasted or painted on the outer-most side of the rear end of the body of the vehicle preferably at the outer tip of the
 Antamok Goldfields Mining Company v. Court of Industrial Relations, 70 Phil. 340 (1940).
25
rear fender or bumper. (6) For four-wheeled motor vehicles 4 meters high but not lower than 2 1/2 meters irrespective of
 Tapang v. Court of Industrial Relations, 72 Phil. 79 (1941).
26
weight:—Four in front, two of which to be installed, pasted or painted at the outer-most front end of the vehicle preferably on
 People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 (1939).
27
the outer tip of the front bumper or fender and another two to be installed, pasted or painted, 5 inches below the upper two
 Pangasinan Trans. Co., Inc. v. Public Service Com., 70 Phil. 221(1940).
28
corners of the front end of the body of the motor vehicles; and four in the rear, two of which to be installed, pasted or painted 5
 Camacho v. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil. 848 (1948); Ongsiaco v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950); De Ramas v.
29
inches below the upper two corner of the rear end of the body and the other two to be installed, pasted or painted 5 inches
Court of Agrarian Relations, L-19555, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 171; Del Rosario v. De los Santos, L-20589, March 21, above the outer-most rear end of the body of the motor vehicle.”
1968, 22 SCRA 1196.  Sec. 3, par. (a), clause 7, Ibid. The next clause reads as follows: “Furthermore, whenever the load of any vehicle is
38

 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).

30
indivisible such that a portion thereof extends beyond the projected width or length of the vehicle, the owner or driver of such
 Phil. Air Lines Employees’ Asso. v. Phil. Air Lines, Inc., L-18559, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 387.
31
vehicle is hereby required to place reflectors described in Section 3(a) hereof nailed securely on the outer-most tip of such load
 People v. Chu Chi, 92 Phil. 977 (1953).
32
extending beyond both sides of the vehicle and/or two such reflectors likewise nailed securely on the outer-most rear end of
 Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corp., L-14785, Nov. 29, 1960.
33
such load.”
 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security Com., L-15045, Jan. 20, 1961, 1 SCRA 10, Cf. Director of
34
 Sec. 3, par. (c), Ibid.
39

Forestry v. Muñoz, L-24746, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183. 496

494
494 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
paraphrase Holmes. Yet respondent Galo would seek to vivify and resurrect it. That, it would
appear, is a vain quest, a futile undertaking. The Reflector Law is thus immune from the attack so
recklessly hurled against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the constitutional test.
3. The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of
Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the
496 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
Penalties resulting from a violation thereof could be imposed. Thus: “Non-compliance with the
requirements contained in this Order shall be sufficient cause to refuse registration of the motor
vehicle affected and if already registered, its registration may be suspended in pursuance of the
provisions of Section 16 of RA 4136; [Provided], However, that in the case of the violation of
Section 1(a) and (b) and paragraph (8) of Section 8 hereof, a fine of not less than ten nor more than
fifty pesos shall be imposed. It is not to be lost sight of that under Republic Act No. 4136, of
40

Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary to the principle of non- which the Reflector Law is an amendment, petitioner, as the Land Transportation Commissioner,
delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took effect on April 17, 1970, may, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, issue rules and
has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act. Thus: “No motor regulations for its implementation as long as they do not conflict with its provisions.  It is likewise 41

vehicles of whatever style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be registered if not equipped an express provision of the above statute that for a violation of any of its provisions or regulations
with reflectors. Such reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector, commercial glass promulgated pursuant thereto, a fine of not less than P10 nor more than P50 could be imposed. 42

reflectors, reflectionized tape or luminous paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress
maintained visible and clean at all times such that if struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 may not delegate its legislaiive power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the
meters away at night."  Then came a section on dimensions, placement and color. As to
35

exception that local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be
dimensions, the following is provided for: “Glass reflectors—Not less than 3 inches in diameter or delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test
not less than 3 inches square; Reflectorized Tape—At least 3 inches wide and 12 inches long. The is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
painted or taped area may be bigger at the discretion of the vehicle owner."  Provision is then made 36

legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the
as to how such reflectors are to be “placed, installed, pasted or painted."  There is the further re-
37

inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does
_______________
not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the
scope of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which (the
 Sec. 2, Administrative Order No. 2.
35

 Sec. 3, par. (a), Ibid.

36
legislative process can go for-
 Sec. 3, par. (b) of the order specifies the matter thus "(1) For two wheeled motorcycles—One in front and another at the
37 _______________
rear which shall be installed, pasted or painted on the lowest tip of both fenders. (2) For three-wheeled motorcycles One in
front to be installed, pasted or painted on the lowest tip of the fender and, two at the rear to be installed, pasted or painted at the  Sec. 4, Ibid.
40

outer-most side of the rear end of the body of the vehicle. (3) For Trailers with platform body irrespective of size, two at the  Sec. 4, par. 1, Republic Act No. 4136 (1964).
41

rear to be installed, pasted or painted on  Sec. 56, par. 1, Ibid.

42

495 497

VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970
Edu vs. Ericta
ward. A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done,
and delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law, to which no valid objection can be made. The Constitution is thus not to be regarded as
denying the legislature the necessary resources of flexibility and practicability.
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very
least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy.
Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is
the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or
administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate
supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is
“safe transit upon the roads." 43
This is to adhere to the recognition given expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced
not-too-long after
_______________
 70 Phil. 726 (1940). This Court has considered as sufficient standards, “public welfare,” Mun. of Cardona v.
43
Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547(1917); “necessary in the interest of law and order,” Rubi v. Prov. Board, 39 Phil. 660 (1919);
“public interest,” People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328(1939); and “justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,” Int.
Hardwood v. Pañgil Fed. of Labor, 70 Phil. 602 (1940).
498
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
the Constitution came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation “has been made to
adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain
limits, of the principle of ‘subordinate legislation’ not only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments."  He continued: “Accordingly, with the growing complexity
44
of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased
difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation
of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by the
courts."  Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is delegated is
45
authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it leaves the hands of
Congress being assumed.
Our later decisions speak to the same effect. Thus from Justice J.B.L. Reyes in  People vs.
Exconde:  “It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-
46
delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may
constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable
(if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may
be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it; but
conform to the standards that the law prescribes x x x." 47
An even more explicit formulation of the controlling principle comes from the pen of the then
Justice, now Chief Justice, Concepcion: “Lastly, the legality of Cir-
_______________
 Pangasinan Transportation v. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil. 221, 229 (1940).
44
497  Ibid.
45
 101 Phil. 1125 (1957).
46
 Ibid., p. 1129.
47
499
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 499
Edu vs. Ericta
cular No. 21 is assailed upon the ground that the grant of authority to issue the same constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power. It is true that, under our system of government, said power
may not be delegated except to local governments. However, one thing is to delegate the power to
determine what the law shall be, and another thing to delegate the authority to fix the details in
the execution of enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Briefly stated, the rule is that the
delegated powers fall under the second category, if the law authorizing the delegation furnishes a
reasonable standard which ‘sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so
that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will.’ (Yakus
vs. United States, 88 L. ed. 848) * * * It should be noted, furthermore, that these powers must be
construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central Bank, which
are, among others, ‘to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines,’ and ‘to promote a rising
level of production, employment and real income in the Philippines.’ (Section 2, Rep. Act No.
265). These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority, the
character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant of said
authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers * * *." 48
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation
Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and
emphasis on public safety which is the prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is
likewise a categorical affirmation of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner
to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental
purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No. 2 can easily
survive the attack, far-from-for-midable, launched against it by respondent Galo.
_______________
 People v. Jolliffe, 105 Phil. 677, 686–688 (1959).
48
500
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are granted, the orders of May
28, 1970 of respondent Judge for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the writ of
preliminary injunction of June 1, 1970 and his order of June 9, 1970 denying reconsideration are
annulled and set aside. Respondent Judge is likewise directed to dismiss the petition for certiorari
and prohibition filed by respondent Teddy C. Galo, there being no cause of action as the Reflector
Law and Administrative Order No. 2 of petitioner have not been shown to be tainted by invalidity.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
     Reyes, J.B.L., Actg.
C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ.,concur.
     Villamor, J., took no part.
     Concepcion, C.J., did not take part.
Orders annulled and set aside.
A N N O T A T I O N POLICE POWER, DUE PROCESS AND THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE
DOCTRINE
The decision in the case of Romeo F. Edu, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner
vs. Hon. Vicente Erictain his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII and Teddy Galo, L-32096, Oct. 24, 1970 reiterates the settled rule in this
jurisdiction of the preference of the principle of police power due process clause over the doctrine
of Laissez fairein matters where the promotion of general welfare is concerned.
Police Power Defined
Police power has been defined as the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people (Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil.
71; Ignacio vs. Elas, 55 OG 2162) see also People vs. Pomas, 46 Phil. 440 (Ermita-Malate
501
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 501
Edu vs. Ericta
Hotel vs. Mayor of Manila, L-24693, July 31, 1967; Rubi vs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 600).
Origin of Police Power
The phrase was born out of the early conflict between the Federal government and the several
states of the United States in the exercise of their respective powers under the United States
Constitution. The term came to be associated with the residuary sovereignty of the several states to
enact legislation on matters of domestic concern, not pertaining to national affairs. Gradually,
statutes and regulations were promulgated for the protection of health, morals or general welfare
of their respective citizens. The term became understood to be the right of the State to provide
regulations to promote the morals, safety, and convenience of the inhabitants
(Willoughby, Constitution of the United States, pp. 1766–1767).
Other Definitions
Power of the government inherent in every sovereign body or power to govern men and things
(License Cases, p. 583.) Police power in a sense in another name of the power of government
(Mutual Loan Co. vs. Martell, 222 U.S. 225).
Police power is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the State and subject the same (Commonwealth vs. Alger, 61 Mass. 53).
Basis of Justification of Police Power
Police power may be justified under two fundamental maxims; Sic utere tuo, ut alienum non
laedas (Use your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another, [9 Coke 59])
and Salus populi suprema est lex (The welfare of the people is the supreme law [Coke 139]).
502
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
Its source is the social compact by which an individual part with some rights and privileges for the
common good. Every citizen of every community in civilized society must bear certain burdens
imposed for the good of all (Barbier vs. Connally, 133 U.S. 28, Malcolm, Philippine
Constitutional Law, p. 338).
Republic Act No. 4880 was enacted as a police power legislation. It was enacted by virtue of
inherent power of Congress to legislate on matters affecting public interest and welfare, as well as
in pursuance of the constitutional policy of insuring free, honest and orderly elections ( Gonzales
vs. Comelec, 27 SCRA 835).
The Laissez Faire Doctrine and Police Power
It is a doctrine that government should not interfere with commerce. The principle arose during the
Industrial Revolution as an economic doctrine emphasized in the Wealth of Nations and Herbert
Spencer’s Social Statics.
In one way, the American Bar Association was responsible for the writing of the doctrine in
the American Constitution (Corwin, Constitutional Revolution, p. 85). It was in the Slaughter
House cases (16 Wall. 36, L. ed. 915) when the doctrine became more recognized. The Supreme
Court following the urging of the influential matters of the American Bar and the lead given by
certain State Courts adopted the view that the word “liberty,” as used in the 14th Amendment
intended to protect the freedom of contract of adults in the ordinary employment, especially when
viewed from would be employers (Allegeyer vs. La.,165 U.S. 578 [1897]; Holden vs. Hardy, 169
U.S. 366 [1898] Twiss, Lawyers and the Constitution; How Laissez Faire Came to the Supreme
Court [1942] cited in Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means Today, pp. 168–169).
The police power is the power of the State to promote public health, safety, moral and general
welfare. It has been simply described as the power to govern men and
503
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 503
Edu vs. Ericta
things (Charles River Bridge Co. vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420; Slaughter House Cases, 316
Wall. 36).
Under the present day interpretation of liberty, property and due process of law, this power is
now confronted at every turn by the court’s power of judicial review. The Laissez Faire doctrine
was translated by the American Bar into the phraseology of Constitutional Law and gradually
embodied in the decisions of the court. In later cases, the “due process of law” clause was invoked.
For a review of the U.S. decisions on the subject of laissez faire, see Pacifico Agabin,
“Laissez, Faire and the Due Process Clause; How Economic Ideology Affects Constitutional
Development,” VLIV, Philippine Law Journal, 709 (1969).
Laissez Faire and the Police Power Before the Philippine Constitution
It has been said that the State cannot be deprived of its right to exercise this power. The police
power and the right to exercise this power constitutes the very foundation, or is at least one of the
corner stones of the State. For the State to deprive itself or permit itself to be deprived of the right
to enact laws to promote the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants, and to promote
public health, public safety, or the public morals would be to destroy the very purpose and objects
of the State. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their servants. Governments are
organized with view to the preservation of these things. They cannot deprive themselves of the
power to provide for them. (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218 [1915]).
Act No. 2868 enacted by the Philippine Legislature in 1922 authorized the Governor General,
with the consent of the Council of State, or any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price
of palay, rice or corn to issue rules and emergency measures was held unconstitutional and void by
the Supreme Court. According to the Court the Constitution is something solid, permanent and
substantial. Its stability protects the life, liberty and prop-
504
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
erty rights of the rich and the poor alike. The Court thus emphasized the private nature of the
property whose price was sought to be regulated (U.S. vs. Ang Tan Ho, 43 Phil. 1[1932]).
The doctrine of protecting private property was later enunciated in People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil.
440. Act No. 3071 passed in 1916 required employers to give maternity pay to women employees.
In declaring the law unconstitutional the Supreme Court ruled that the Statute has deprived every
person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor of his right to
enter contracts of employment upon such terms as he and the employee may agree upon. The law
creates a term in every such contract, without the consent of the parties. Such persons are,
therefore, deprived of their liberty to contract (Id., at p. 454, citing Adkins vs. Children’s
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525; Adair vs. U.S., 208 U.S. 161, 28 S. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436 and Coppage
vs. Kansas, 265 U.S. 1 [1915]).
The Chinese Bookkeeping Act enacted by the Philippine Legislature (Act No. 2972 [1920])
prohibiting merchants from keeping in any language other than English, Spanish, or any Philippine
dialect was also held unconstitutional and invalid. Resolving the appeal from the Philippine
Supreme Court decision, the United States Supreme Court held that the law was oppressive and
arbitrary. The Court then took judicial notice that majority of the Chinese merchants in the
Philippines did not speak or write English, Spanish or any of the local dialect. The U.S. Supreme
Court then ruled that this law would curtail their liberty of action, and oppressive and damaging in
the preservation of their property. To the Chinese merchants who brought the case, “the laws
deprives them of something indispensable to the carrying of their business and is obviously
intended chiefly to affect them as distinguished from the rest of the community (Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 [1926]).
505
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 505
Edu vs. Ericta
The Supremacy of the Police Power over Property Rights
U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. 104 (1910) was the first case held by the Philippine Supreme Court.
It was held that the State not only has the authority under its police power to make such rules for
the protection of its citizens but it may also regulate private business in such a way that the
business of one man shall not be a nuisance (Affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ling Su Fan
vs. U.S., 218 U.S. 302 [1910]).
In the same year a statute passed by the Philippine Legislature prohibiting the slaughtering of
carabaos for human consumption without a permit from the municipal treasurer was held valid for
reasons of public interest (U.S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. 1910).
The Supreme Court also sustained the principle that there is no deprivation of property
without due process to shipping companies which are given additional burden of carrying mail
free of charge (De Villata vs. Stanley, 32 Phil. 541 [1915]; Board of Public Utility Commissioners
vs. Ynchausti, 251 U.S. 401, 40 S. Ct. 2773).
An ordinance authorizing the suppression of animal disease was held valid. The quarantine,
isolation and even slaughter of cattle suffering from infectious disease have been recognized under
the general welfare clause (PunzaIan vs. Ferriols, 19 Phil. 214).
An ordinance of the City of Manila compelling owners of buildings to make connections with
the new sewer system was held valid for reasons of public health and safety (Case vs. Board of
Health, 24 Phil. 250).
A law limiting the sale of meat outside the town public market and the sale of the fish in the
streets of the town, was held valid as a measure of protecting public health ( People vs. Sabarre, 65
Phil. 684). In the same manner, the ordinance limiting the sale of tickets of theaters while
exhibiting moving pictures for the first time and excluding from operation those not falling within
the classification,
506
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
was valid. It was held that too much crowding in theaters is undoubtedly dangerous to public
health and inimical to public convenience (People vs. Chan, 65 Phil. 611).
The law prohibiting paying the sale of clandestinely manufactured whisky and without paying
the corresponding tax was held valid. The aim of the law is to protect public safety and health and
the promotion of the common welfare, and in the interest of the State (People vs. Fernandez, 43
O.G. 2181).
The legislature may also prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades
which affect the public welfare, public health, public morals, and the public safety and to a point
of revoking such right (U.S. vs. Gomez, 31 Phil. 218). The State may require drugless healers to
pass an examination in order to protect the general welfare of the people, to protect them against
the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as the deception and fraud (People vs.
Ventura, 4 SCRA 208).
An ordinance requiring that buildings for theatrical or cinematographic performances must be
built of reinforced steel and under such specifications of the City Engineer or the Director of
Public Works, was held valid for reasons of public safety (Batisda vs. City of Baguio, 53 Phil.
553).
Effect of Police Power and Freedom of Contract and Commerce
Laws passed in exercise of police power may often affect commerce incidentally, but if the
resultant burden is found by the court to be on the whole justified by the local interest involved,
such laws shall be sustained. In other words the court’s function in handling this type of case is
that of an arbitral body rather than of a strictly judicial body (Parker vs. Brown, 317 U.S. 341).
The problem of reconciling the commercial and local interest has frequently arisen in the field of
motor transpor-
507
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 507
Edu vs. Ericta
tation (California vs. Thompson, 313 U.S. 115). The State may require all engineers operating
within its borders, to be tested for color blindness (Smith vs. Alabama, 121 U.S. 465).
Abandonment of the Laissez Faire Doctrine in the Philippines
Several provisions of the Philippine Constitution have in effect rejected the doctrine of the laissez
faire. See Art. II, Section 5 on the promotion of social justice; Art. XIV, Section 6 on the
regulation of the relations between landowner and tenant, labor and capital in industry and
agriculture; Art. VIII, Section 26 on the emergency powers of the President in times of war and
national emergency; and Art. VII, Section 2 on the power of the State to operate industrial and
means of transportation and communication in the interest of national welfare and defense.
In applying the aforesaid provisions, the Supreme Court-of the Philippines reversed a Court of
Appeals decision denying compensation to a laborer who was drowned in trying to save a piece of
lumber belonging to the company (Cuevo vs. Barredo, G.R. 1278, July 19, 1937, 5 Lawyers
Journal, 791 [1937]).
President Manuel L. Quezon who criticized the lower Court’s decision declared in a speech
that the philosophy of laissez faire in the Philippines has been dead. It has been substituted by the
philosophy of government intervention whenever the needs of the country require it (III Messages
of Manuel L. Quezon, 67 [1937]).
In Ang Tibay vs. CIR, G.R. No. 46496, 7 Lawyers Journal 487) Mr. Justice Jose P. Laurel
declared that the provisions of the Constitution “all evince and express the need of shifting
emphasis to community interest with a view to affirmative enhancement of human values.” In
reiterating the objectives of the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 103, Justice Laurel added
that “the policy of laissez faire has to some extent given way to the assump-
508
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
tion by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with
public interest.” In 1940, the Supreme Court reiterated Justice Laurel’s opinion in the  Ang
Tibay case and sustained the validity and legality of the creation of the Court of Industrial
Relations (Antamok Goldfields vs. CIR, 70 Phil. 340[1940]). In the same year, the Court ruled that
the right of the employer to select and discharge his employees is subject to the regulation of the
State in the exercise of its police power (Manila Electric Company vs. National Labor Union, 70
Phil. 617 [1940]).
Laissez Faire as Bar to Regulatory Measures may not be Invoked
The contention that the laissez faire concept is a bar to the enactment of regulatory measures
which undoubtedly would result in the diminution of income and loss of business does not
occasion any misgiving as to the conformity of the decision arrived at by the court with controlling
constitutional law principles. The policy of laissez faire to a certain extent has given way to the
assumption by the government by the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected
with public interest. The State may in order to promote general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State (Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. City Mayor of Manila, 21
SCRA 449; Co Kiam vs. City of Manila, 96 Phil. 649; Ermita-Malate Hotel vs. City of Manila, 20
SCRA 849).
Police Power to Regulate Business with Public Interest and Useful Occupations
For cases affected with public interest, see Dee C. Chuan and Sons vs. CIR, L-2216, Jan. 31,
1950; Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil.
509
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 509
Edu vs. Ericta
221 (1940); Government vs. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp., 66 Phil. 483 (1938); Luzon
Stevedoring Co. vs. Public Service Commission, L-5458, Sept. 16, 1953; Manila Trading Supply
vs. Manila Trading Labor Association, L-5783, May 29, 1953; U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus,31 Phil.
103 (1920); People vs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328(1939); Tolentino vs. Board of Accountancy, L-
3062, Sept. 28, 1951; Physical Therapy Organization vs. Municipal Board, 101 Phil.
1142 (1957); Co Kiam vs. City of Manila,96 Phil. 649 (1955).
See Case vs. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 250 (1940); Fabie vs. City of Manila, 21 Phil.
486 (1912); U.S. vs. Wayne Shoup, 35 Phil. 56 (1916); U.S. vs. Lim Sing, 23 Phil.
424(1912); Punzalan vs. Ferriols, 19 Phil. 214 (1911). See however, Viray vs. City of
Caloocan, L-23118, July 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 791.
The Promotion of the Esthetic Sense
Following the principle in a 1911 case in the United States (Noble State Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U.S.
104 [1911]) to the effect that police power may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage,
or held by prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately
necessary to the public welfare, the Philippine Supreme Court sustained the legality a statute
authorizing the summary removal of any billboard offensive to sight (Churchill vs. Rafferty, 32
Phil. 580 [1915]).
Police Power for Public Safety and Order
Commonwealth Act No. 548 enacted by legislature authorizing the regulation and control of the
use of traffic on national roads and streets was sustained by the Supreme Court as valid ( Calalang
vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 [1940]). The law was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of
traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety.
Ordinance No. 4986 of the City of Manila and Commissioner Medina’s Administrative Orders
of 1946 allowing inter-urban buses to enter Manila which is a privilege not given to provincial
buses are valid exercise of police power (Luque vs. Villegas, 30 SCRA 408).
510
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Edu vs. Ericta
See also Lagman vs. Medina, 26 SCRA 442 and Lagman vs. City of Manila, 17 SCRA 579).
Police power is broad enough to be exercised on the basis of the economic need for the public
welfare (Vda. de Genuino vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, 22 SCRA 792). In same case, the
Agricultural Land Reform Code was held to be justified by the right of the State to exercise its
police powers. Individual rights to contract and to property have to give way to police power for
the public welfare.
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 849
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL
MAR, INC. and Go CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA, respondent-appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Police power may also be invoked by the State to promote morality in public service. The
Supreme Court thus upheld the validity of the Anti-Graft Law (Rep. Act No. 3019 [Morfe vs.
Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424]).
The privilege of operating a market stall under license is always subject to police power for
reasons of public policy and public administration. Such privilege is not absolute but revocable
under an implied lease contract subject to the general welfare clause ( Aprueba vs. Ganzon, 18
SCRA 8).—JUDGE JORGE R. COQUIA
Notes.—Delegation of legislative power.—As a general rule, the functions of legislation may
not be delegated by the legislative to the executive department or to any executive or
administrative officer, board or commission (Chinese Flour Importers’ Association vs. Price
Stabilization Board, L-4465, July 12, 1951). The exception is when the Constitution itself
authorizes delegation (Marc Donnelly & Associates, Inc. vs. Agregado, L-4510, May 31, 1954, 50
O.G. 4269; Chinese Flour Importers’ Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, supra).
But while the legislative cannot delegate power to make the law, in the sense of exercising
discretion as to what it shall be, it can confer authority or discretion as to its execution ( People vs.
Arnault, L-4288, Nov. 20, 1952, 48 O.G. 4805; Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, L-8895, April 30, 1957).
Congress may thus constitutionally delegate authority to
511
VOL. 35, OCTOBER 24, 1970 511
Edu vs. Ericta
promulgate rules and regulations to implement legislation and to effectuate its policies, and it may
impose a penalty for violation of such rules and regulations, punishable as provided in the statute
(People vs. Exconde, L-9820, Aug. 30, 1957).
Unlimited and undefined delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful is,
however, invalid (People vs. Fajardo, L-12172, Aug. 29, 1958). A statute which vests arbitrary
discretion in administrative officers with respect to an ordinary lawful business, profession or
“appliance, or fails (to prescribe a uniform rule of action or guide or standard for exercise of
discretion, is void and unconstitutional (Chinese Flour Importers’ Association vs. Price
Stabilization Board, supra).
There is no undue delegation of powers of legislative powers as long as the legislature lays
down a policy and a standard is established by the statute in question to be followed in its
administration (Cervantes vs. Auditor General, L-4043, May 26, 1952). This has been held to be
the case with respect to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code providing that gains and
profits shall be taxable as income to the owner or to the person having custody thereof, as the law
is clear and the only discretion reposed in the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is to determine
which of the two, the owner or his agent, should and could have paid the tax ( People vs. Arnault,
supra).
Republic Act No. 5, authorizing the President, among other things, to reorganize and make
changes in government-controlled corporations, and authorizing such changes to promote
simplicity, economy, and efficiency in their operation, was held to have sufficiently fixed the
legislative standards and policy and did not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power
(Cervantes vs. Auditor General, supra).
512
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Constitutional Law; Municipal Corporations;  Presumption as to constitutionality of
ordinance;  Evidence is necessary to show invalidity.—An ordinance, having been enacted by coun-cilors who
must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality or city and
with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action, must be presumed to be
valid and should not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise
of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for evidence to rebut its
validity is unavoidable. Where there was no factual foundation laid for overthrowing an ordinance which is not
void on its face, the presumption of constitution-ality must prevail.
 Same; Police power; Ordinance regulating hotels, motels, etc.—A Manila ordinance regulating the
operation of hotels, motels and lodging-houses is a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals. As such, it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs".
Same; Nature of police power; Judicial inquiry.—On the legislative organs of the government, whether
national or local, primarily rests the exercise of the police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of certain constitutional guarantees,
850
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
50
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
the exercise of such police power, however, insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
person, is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee may call for correction by the courts.
Municipal Corporations;  Municipal license fees.—Municipal license fees can be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. Licenses for non-useful occupations are incidental to
the police power, and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in
fixing the amount of license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion in this class of
cases. Aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in
non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this
kind of license fee.
Same; Discretion in fixing license fees.—Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some individuals in the
community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent
the exercise of the police power. Persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and
interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in those occupations subject to the
disadvantages which may result from the exercise of that power.
Constitutional Law; Due process; Standards of legal infirmity.—There is no controlling and precise
definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order
that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity, is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason. obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted
precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious pro portions as an
arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount
851
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 851
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state
of public morals.
Same; Reasonableness of ordinance regulating hotels, etc.—The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of
the City of Manila, making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any
hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more
than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a
transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary,
because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the
legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty,
which cannot be absolute.
Same; Public interest; Government interference.—The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given
way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected
with public interest. If the liberty invoked were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity
of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most
rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.
Statutes;  When statute is void because of ambiguity.— What makes a statute susceptible to a charge
that it is void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the
doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and diff er as to its
application.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Panganiban, Abad & Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
     J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez & Associates for intervenorappellee.
FERNANDO, J,:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for
prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process
clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and
void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such
852
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack
against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the
petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del
Mar, Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second
petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as
such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to
give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1).
It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and
protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels, characterized
as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly paying taxes,
employing and giving livelihood, to not less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of
more than P3 million."  (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of
1
the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then
ViceMayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was
the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact
insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila
or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due procfess insofar as it would
impose ?6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;
_______________
 The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel Monte Carlo, Golden Gate Motel, Miami Hotel, Palm Spring Hotel,
1
Flamingo Motel, Holiday Motel, Rainbow Motel, Palo Alto Hotel, Paradise Hotel, Mayfair Hotel, Siesta Court, Sun Valley
Hotel, Springfield Hotel, New Palace Hotel, Hotel del Mar, Longbeach Hotel and Ritz Motel.
853
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 853
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila,
that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or
accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons
without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his
presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the
occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room,
if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his
residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that a
person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of
such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and
records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such
hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the
Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due
process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague,
indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels
into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in f irst class motels
such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends
against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion
which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room;
that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years
old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless
accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion
854
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of
certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the
penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would
cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the
destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the
due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring
the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a
writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance
No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances
regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel
or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its
alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After setting forth that the petition
did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a
proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and
that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the
right to privacy and the guaranty against selfincrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of
the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed f or its
dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts
dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar, Inc. are
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila, while the
petitioner Go Chiu is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and
855
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 855
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
"2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the
City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to
give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
"3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in
Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
"4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which
was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in
the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the
compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This
ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th
Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
"5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the
proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex
C;
"6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by
the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila."
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on
the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conf
ormity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but
likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the
arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on February
4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the
petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying
for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.
856
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and
referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The
only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court,
agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court." It does
appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon
the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is
undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of
Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of
the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void." It made permanent
the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from
enforcing the ordinance in question.''" Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional
doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a
sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand,
consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in
both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset
the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity. x x x The action of
the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the
very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all
the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative
body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the
wellbeing of the people. x x x The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when
there is not a clear invasion
857
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 857
 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation." 2

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its f ace, which is not
the case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case
of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,  where the American Supreme Court
3

through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: "The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to
declare it void on the ground that the specif ic method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and
hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition
the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such
factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the
pleadings and the stipulation of f acts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as
being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated
with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police
power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such
imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To
hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been
properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the
_______________

 US. v. Salaveria (1918), 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the presumption of validity of municipal
2

ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in Eboña v. Daet, (1950) 85 Phil. 369.
 282 US 251, 328, January 5, 1931.
3

858

858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
least limitable of powers,  extending as it does "to all the great public needs."  It would be, to
4 5

paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived
or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public
safety and the general welfare.  Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in
6

the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of
society." 7

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor Herminio
Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of
prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels,
which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become
the "ideal haven for prostitutes and
________________

4
 Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163. AIso: 'To Frankfurter the police power, true to its
etymology, is the power to shape policy. It def ies legal definition; as a response to the dynamic aspects of society, it cannot be
reduced to a constitutional formula. The law must be sensitive to life; in resolving cases. it must not fall back upon
sterile claims; its judgments are not derived from an abstract duel between liberty and the police power. Instead, in a world of
trusts and unions and large-scale industry, it must meet the challenge of drastic social change. For him as for Holmes, 'society
is more than bargain and business' and the jurist's art rises to no higher peak than in vindicating interests not represented by the
items in a balance-sheet. In a progressive society, new interests emerge, new attitudes appear, social consciousness quickens.
In the face of the unknown one cannot choose with certainty. Nor as yet, has the whole of truth been brought up from its
bottomless well and how f ragile in scientif ic proof is the ultimate validity of any particular economic adjustment. Social
development is a process of trial and error; in the making of policy the f ullest possible opportunity must be given for the play
of the human mind. If Congress or legislature does not regulate, laissez faire—not the individual—must be the regulator.
(Hamilton, Pre view of a Justice (1939) 48 Yale Law Journal, 819).
5
 Noble state Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 412.
  U.S. v. Gomez-Jesus, (1915) 31 Phil. 218.
6
 Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1918) 39 Phil. 660.
7
859
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs, City Mayor of Manila
thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by
introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes
the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended
to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other -than legal" and at the
same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that the
stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues
eloquently for it,
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval,
ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant; providing a license 8
tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of public dance halls;  prohibiting
gambling; prohibiting jueteng;  and monte,  prohibiting playing of panguingui on days other than
10 11 12
Sundays or legal holidays; prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;  and, prohibiting any
13 14
person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is,
smoked or otherwise used,  all of which are intended ,to protect public morals. ,
15
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the
________________
 U.S. vs. Giner Cruz, (1918) 38 Phil. 677.
8
 U.S. vs. Rodriguez, (1918) 38 Phil. 759. See also Sarmiento v. Belderol, L-15719, May 31, 1961; Lapera v. Vicente, L-
9
18102, June 30, 1962.
 U.S. v. Pacis, (1915) 31 Phil. 524.
10
 U.S. vs. Espiritu-Santo, (1912) 23 Phil. 610; U.S. vs. Joson, (1913) 26 Phil. 1; People vs. Chan Hong, (1938) 65 Phil.
11
625
 U.S. v. Tamparong, (1915) 31 Phil. 321.
12
 U.S. v. Salaveria, (1918) 39 Phil. 102.
13
 Uy Ha v. The City Mayor, L-14149, May 30, 1969; Miranda v. City of Manila, L-17252, May 31, 1961.
14
 U.S. v. Ten Yu, (1912) 24 Phil. 1.
15
860
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other
applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may
affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise
of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a
denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for
correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised
to the question of due process.  There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It
16
furnishes though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate. case, be valid. What then is the
standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free
the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal
infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to
the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy
the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by
lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the
embodiment of
_______________
859
 There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the alleged invasion of the right of privacy or the prohibition against
16
self-incrimination. Petitioners obviously are not the proper parties to do so. Nor may such an incurable defect be remedied by
an accommodating intervenor "who has always taken advantage of, as he exclusively relies on, the facilities, services and
accommodations offered by petitioner-motels. A general merchant, doing business not only in Baguio City but in the City of
Manila, has no legitimate cause for complaint. At least, not according to the case as it has been developed.
861
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 861
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
the sporting idea of fair play.  It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of
17
officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that
reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought."  It is not a narrow or "technical
18
conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances,"  decisions based on 19
such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our
9
society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form
20
or phrases. 21
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what
a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and
capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable and what
would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted
deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged
ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even
attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure
to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance even of deceptive plausibility
to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such
features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to
contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the
challenged ordinance for
________________
 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, (1938) pp. 32-33.
17
 Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche, (1960) 363 U.S. 420, at 487.
18
 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, (1961) 367 U.S. 1230.
19
 Bartkus v. Illinois, (1959) 359 U.S. 121.
20
 Pearson v. McGraw, (1939) 308 U.S. 313.
21
862
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, f irst-class motels being
required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled
law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-
useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only.  As was explained more in detail
22
in the above Cu Unjieng case: "(2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the
police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate,
but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts
have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing
restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise engage in non-usef ul enterprises is, of
course, generally an important factor in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee.
Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld,
especially in cases of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely
been declared unreasonable." 23
________________
 Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, (1922) 42 Phil. 818, 828.
22
 Citing Swarth v. People, 109 111. 621; Dennehy v. City of Chicago, 120 111. 627; 12 N.E., 227; United States
23
Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago, 112 111. 19; Drew County v. Bennet, 43 Ark. 364; Merced County v. Fleming, 111 Cal. 46;
43 Pac. 392; Williams v. City Council of West Point, 68 Ga. 816; Cheny v. Shellbyville, 19 Ind. 84; Wiley v. Owens, 39 Ind.
429; Sweet v. City of Wabash, 41 Ind. 7; Jones v. Grady, 25 La. Ann. 586; Goldsmith v. City of New Orleans, 31 La. Ann.
646; People ex rel., Cramer v. Medberry, 39 N.Y.S. 207; 17 Misc. Rep., 8; McGuigan v. Town of Belmont, 89 Wis. 637; 62
N.W., 421; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala., 728, and Muhlenbrinck v. Long Branch Commissioner, 42
N.J.L. 364; 36 Am. Rep., 518. At pp. 829-830.
863
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 863
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier
24
announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's
police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority
conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is sufficiently plenary to
cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for public purposes,
just and uniform. 25
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila
in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is
given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of
a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.  The discussion of this
26
particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of significance:
"It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could
deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in
the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage
meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain conditions is permitted. x x x And
surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present
business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power.
As was said in a case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and
interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in these occupations
________________
 98 Phil. 148 (1955), citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. v. Butler, 297
24
U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed 477; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579. The Lutz decision was followed in Republic v.
BacolodMurcia Milling, L-19824, July 9, 1966.
 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, L-24322, July 21, 1967.
25
 Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board, (1957) 101 Phil. 1142.
26
864
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power." 27
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes
it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel,
lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more
than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, call for a
different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb
the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and,
according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive
when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation
and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every
regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm
cannot be absolute. Thus: "One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of
liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and
for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general wellbeing. No man can do
exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. x x x The liberty
of the citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and
safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power." 28
_______________
 Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila, (1955) 96 Phil. 649, 654, citing City of New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 L. Ann. 417.
27
 Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones (1916), 242 U.S. 539; Hardie-Tynes
28
Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz (1914), 189 Ala. 66.
865
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 865
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila,
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the
enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state x x x. To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should
not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should
authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind through education
and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means
peace and order and happiness for all." 29
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue
deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar,  no longer "retains its virtuality as a living
30
principle. The policy of laissez fairehas to some extent given way to the assumption by the
government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interest."  What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the
31
mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory
________________
 Calalang v. Williams (1940), 70 Phil. 726, at 733-734
29
 46 Phil 440 (1924). The Philippines was then under American sovereignty, American Supreme Court decisions hav-ing
30
thus an obligatory effect. No alternative was left to this Court except to follow the then controlling decision in  Adkins v.
Children's Hospital (1924), 261 U.S. 525, which subsequently was overruled in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish(1937), 300 U.S.
379
 Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court (1940) 70 Phil. 340, at 360, quoting a concurring opinion of Justice Laurel
31
in Ang Tibay v. Court, G.R. No. 46496.
866
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
measure is wider.  How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
32
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by
invoking the principle of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear/from a recital in the petition
itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the provisions are too
detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however, point to the requirement
that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as
indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or
companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or
entering the room with him at about the same time or coming at any indefinite time later to join
him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant
in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which from
their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for
every such lease thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these
allegations suffice to render the
_______________
32
 Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment and those cases in which it is applied for
its own sake. The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it also collides with the principles
of the First, is much more definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved. Much of the vagueness of the due
process clause disappears when the specific prohibition of the First become its standard. The right of a State to regulate, for
example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions
which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship
may well be infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only to prevent an immediate danger to
interests which the state may lawfully protect." (West Virginia State Bd. of Edu. v. Barnette, (1942), 319 U.S. 624, at 639).
867
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 867
Acuña vs. Yatco
ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer
it. From Connally v. General Construction Co.  to Adderley v. Florida,  the principle has been
33 34
consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either
G.R. No. 122846. January 20, 2009.*
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR
ALFREDO S. LIM, respondent.
Judicial Review; Parties; Locus Standi; Separation of Powers; Words and Phrases; Standing or locus
standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or
action challenged to support that party’s participation in the case.—Standing or locus standi is the ability of a
party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to
support that party’s participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the
principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial
branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
Same; Same; Same; The general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth
doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental
importance.—The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the
Constitution. The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are
not susceptible of precise definition. In this jurisdiction, the extancy of “a direct and personal interest” presents
the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner’s standing. In a similar vein, the United
States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing
requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). Nonetheless, the
general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third
party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.
Same; Same; Same; Third-Party Standing; American jurisprudence is replete with examples where
parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal
protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action.—The concept of third party
standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appro-
_______________
* EN BANC.
417priate.In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the United States Supreme Court wrote that: “We
have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important
criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a “sufficiently
concrete interest” in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third
party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interests.”
Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely
forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation from
Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying
criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." 35
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments
pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged
ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional law principles so
uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a reversal of the appealed
decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted
forthwith. With costs.
     Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles,
JJ., concur.
     Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., are on official leave.
Judgment reversed.
___________
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the
enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in
our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a
hindrance for customers to bring suit. American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-
interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of
other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
the United States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute
that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available to their
patients. The Court held that: “The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or
adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of
confidential relation to them.”
Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action
are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties—generally applied to statutes infringing on the
freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally
guaranteed rights; Motel operators have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize
their establishments for a “wash-rate” time frame.—Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a
relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes
into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights
of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine
applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. In this case, the petitioners
claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that
based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth. We thus recognize that the
petitioners418have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for
a “wash-rate” time frame.
Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Ordinances; Requisites for Validity.—The test of a valid
ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Police Power; Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in
general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an
efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant.—Police power, while incapable of an exact
definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police
power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. These range
from the regulation of dance halls, movie theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of police
power is best demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system,
its use has rarely been denied.
Bill of Rights; The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Machiavelli, and,
sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.—The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to
minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the
State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means
must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. The
Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Machiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political
majorities animated by his cynicism.
Judicial Review; Courts; If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions
that motivate many political decisions, 419judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the
judiciary is merely the third political branch of government.—Even as we design the precedents that establish
the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a
due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political functions. But when we
are compelled to nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were
animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions, judicial
integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of
government. We derive our respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and
neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than through the development of
rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-
reaching constitutional questions of the day.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Due Process; The purpose of due process guaranty is to prevent
arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals.—The primary
constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary
governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of individuals. The due process guaranty
serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected
by the guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
Same; Same; Same; Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow
before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property; Substantive due process completes the protection
envisioned by the due process clause—it inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.—The due pro-cess guaranty has traditionally been interpreted
as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, “procedural due process” and “substantive due
process.” Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to
the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of
notice given to the level of formality of a hearing. If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects,
there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed.
Substantive due process completes the protection 420envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether
the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.
Same; Same; Same; The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has
reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms;
The due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to
determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.—The question of substantive due process, moreso
than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded
acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted
with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process
has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all,
the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has
acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes
and bounds for its application.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; Words and Phrases; “Strict Scrutiny,” “Rational Basis,” and,
“Intermediate Review,” Explained.—The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due
process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme
Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case
acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a
“discrete and insular” minority or infringement of a “fundamental right.” Consequently, two standards of
judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the
political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation. A third standard,
denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating
classifications based on gender and legitimacy. Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been
applied in all substantive due process cases as well. We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test
mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are
upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental
interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict
scrutiny, the focus is on the 421presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on
the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest. In terms of judicial review of statutes or
ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental
interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the
validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. The United States Supreme Court has expanded the
scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access and interstate travel.
Same; Same; Liberty; Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is
not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done, but rather an atmosphere
of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each
other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or
injury to others.—One might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they seem
shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed,
would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter gravitasalone. Indeed,
it is those “trivial” yet fundamental freedoms—which the people reflexively exercise any day without the
impairing awareness of their constitutional consequence—that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed
by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten
Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom
where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their
society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to
others.
Same; Same; Police Power; A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police power
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public
interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.—That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance
as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of422private rights. It must also
be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can
work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and
those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of
these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held
in Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968),the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life,
liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State
police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.
Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice
is a common problem  confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world—the solution to such
perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product, rather, cities revive
themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals
that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.—The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of
the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home, and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city—the
Pearl of the Orient—as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick
Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will
have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a common problem
confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to
prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering
incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new
grandeur to Manila. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could
in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the
proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole
day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can
in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel
rooms and even apartments.423
Same; Same; Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare—the State is a leviathan that must be restrained
from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.—We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public
welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the
rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The
Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions. The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens
deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is
sworn to protect. The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as
Aristotle. The advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of
morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable
that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the pursuit
of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests.
Same; Same; Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive
elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to
make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State.—The oft-quoted American maxim that “you
cannot legislate morality” is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that
phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at
variance with public attitudes about right and wrong. Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral
traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong, they will remain so
oriented. Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-
wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest.
Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of
what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives
is innate, and protected by the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to
uphold the Constitution as the em- 424bodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to
do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Sobrevinas, Diaz, Hayudini & Bodegon for petitioners.
  The City Legal Officer for respondent City of Manila.
TINGA, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject,
the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash between government power and individual
liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,  the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance
1
barring the operation of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate
area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same
establishments from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or “wash up” rates for
such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against our sacred
constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters
apply to the present petition.
This Petition  under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal
2
of the Decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court of Appeals, challenges the validity of
3
Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission,
Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes
_______________
1 G.R. 118127, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 308.
2 See Rollo, pp. 4-41.
3 Id., at pp. 42-59. Penned by Associate Justice Jaime M. Lantin, concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo P. Galvez
(later, Solicitor-General) and Antonio P. Solano.
425in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the
City of Manila” (the Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the
Ordinance.  The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
4
“SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to
protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in
particular.
SEC. 2. Title.—This ordinance shall be known as “An Ordinance” prohibiting short time admission in
hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other
similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s].—Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate
for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other
term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would
bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause.—Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance
shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a
period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the
operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense,
the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause.—Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to
this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed repealed.
_______________
4  Id., at p. 46.
426SEC. 7. Effectivity.—This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a
complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO)  with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as
5
defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim.  MTDC prayed 6
that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments,
be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the
Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit
customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three
hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation
(TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and
to admit attached complaint-in-intervention  on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their
7
business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.  The three companies are
8
components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels
in Metro Manila. 9
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene.  The RTC also notified the
10
Solicitor General of the proceedings pursu-
_______________
5  Id., at pp. 62-69.
6 Id., at pp. 45-46.
 7 Id., at pp. 70-77. 20 Rollo, pp. 129-145.
8  Id., at p. 47. 21 Id., at p. 158.
9  Id. 22 Id., at p. 53.
10 Id. 23 Id.
427ant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to 429Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right
withdraw as plaintiff. 11
to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC’s motion to withdraw.  The RTC issued a 12
unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of
Ordinance.  The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a
13
the Ordinance.  First, it held that the Ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom
24

legitimate exercise of police power. 14

On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to
desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance.  A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor
15
General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.
During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for
decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question.  On October 20, 1993, the RTC
16
rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals
for short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by
having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments
are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-
being of its constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel Operators Association
v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated by law.
TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari.  In their petition 25

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby and Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the Court of
declared null and void. Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.” 17

The RTC noted that the ordinance “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed II.
and jealously guarded by the Constitution.”  Reference was made to the provisions of the
18

Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the We must address the threshold issue of petitioners’ standing. Petitioners allege that as owners
right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the of establishments offering “wash-up” rates, their business is being unlawfully interfered with by
_______________ the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are
also being interfered with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have
11 Id., at p. 48. the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons’ equal protection rights.
12 Id., at p. 81. _______________
13 Id., at pp. 82-83.
14 Id., at pp. 84-99.
24 Id., at pp. 43-59.
15 Id., at pp. 104-105.
25 Id., at pp. 4-40.
16 Id., at p. 49.
17 Id., at p. 52. 430
18 Id., at p. 120. Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient
428observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party’s participation in
consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of
annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court,  where the legitimate purpose of preventing
19 powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the
26

indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-province ban on
the transport of carabaos and carabeef.
The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.  The petition
20
actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from
the Constitution. The constitutional component of standing doctrine incorporates concepts which
27

was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution dated January 26, 1994, the Court concededly are not susceptible of precise definition.  In this jurisdiction, the extancy of “a direct
28

treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. 21 and personal interest” presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police petitioner’s standing.  In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and elaborated
29

power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities, on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and
among other local government units, the power: redressability in Allen v. Wright. 30

“[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of
transports.”22
transcendental importance. 31

The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the
Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus: overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,  the United States Supreme Court wrote
32

“to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of that: “We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided
the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare
three important criteria are satisfied: the
of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and _______________
duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two
hundred pesos fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.” 23

_______________ 26 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).

27 Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482; 421 SCRA 656 (2004).
28 Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979).
19 No. L-74457, 20 March 1987, 148 SCRA 659.
 29 See Domingo v. Carague, G.R. No. 161065, 15 April 2005, 456 SCRA 450. See also Macasiano v. National Housing
Authority, G.R. No. 107921, 1 July 1993, 224 SCRA 236.
30 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
31 Supra note 29.
32 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
431litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a “sufficiently concrete
interest” in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third
party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own
interests.”  Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by
33
the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their customers for their continued viability which
appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in
constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil
Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for customers to bring
suit.34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed
standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or equal protection claims of other
persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,  the United 35
States Supreme Court held that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute
that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional protections available
to their patients. The Court held that:
“The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those
rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of confidential relation to them.” 36
An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,  wherein the United States
37
Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has standing to raise the equal protection
claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males
under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18. The
_______________
33 Id., at pp. 410-411.
34 See Kelsey McCowan Heilman, The Rights of Others: Protection and Advocacy Organizations Associational Standing
to Sue, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 237, for a general discussion on advocacy groups.
35 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
36 Id., at p. 481.
37 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
432United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing “by acting as advocates of
the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function.” 38
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the
former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine comes into play. In overbreadth
analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third
parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine
applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.  In this case, 39
the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their
clients. We can see that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from
overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their
clients to patronize their establishments for a “wash-rate” time frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City
of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
Inc. v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons
40
to fill up a prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age,
address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This
earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public
morals. A purpose similar to the annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban
on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area.  _______________
_______________
38 Id., at p. 194.
39 Chavez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 162777, 31 August 2004, 437 SCRA 415; Adiong v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 103956, 31 March 1992, 207 SCRA 712.
40 127 Phil. 306; 20 SCRA 849 (1967).
433However, the constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the
singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were
enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient
lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale
ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely
restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and
regulate the lives of its citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of
Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers
of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. 41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted
in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code
through such implements as the general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to
_______________
41 City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1; Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, 11 March 1992, 207
SCRA 157, 161; Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, 11 December 1991, 204 SCRA 837,
845; Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., G.R. No. 111097, 20 July 1994, 234 SCRA 255, 268-267.
434meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the
conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its
42
corresponding right to protect itself and its people.  Police power has been used as justification for
43
numerous and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls,  movie 44
theaters,  gas stations  and cockpits.  The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated by
45 46 47
the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system, its use has rarely
been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are
unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means
must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the
people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Machiavelli, and,
sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or
equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited by a due deference to the co-equal
branches of government as they exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to
nullify executive or legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were
animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many political decisions,
judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the
 42 Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil. 306; 20 SCRA 849
(1967).
43 JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, 94; 260 SCRA 319, 325 (1996), citing Rubi
v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 (1919).
44 U.S. v. Rodriguez, 38 Phil. 759 (1918).
45 People v. Chan, 65 Phil. 611 (1938).
46 Javier v. Earnshaw, 64 Phil. 626 (1937).
47 Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal, 56 Phil. 123 (1931).
435judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our respect and good
standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and
there is no surer way to that end than through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal
standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching constitutional
questions of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed
under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process evades a precise definition.  The
purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty
and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary
regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as
their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but
distinct restrictions on government, “procedural due process” and “substantive due process.”
Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives
a person of life, liberty, or property.  Procedural due process concerns itself with government
49
action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere.
Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd
situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed. Substantive
due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires
_______________
48 See U.S. v. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil. 104 (1908); Insular Government v. Ling Su Fan, 15 Phil. 58 (1910).
49 Lopez v. Director of Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32 (1924).
436whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or
property. 50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected
dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of fundamental
freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more
rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality thought of constitutional due
process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a
liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the
State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated
methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best
tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court
in U.S. v. Carolene Products. Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the
51
judiciary would defer to the legislature unless there is a discrimination against a “discrete and
insular” minority or infringement of a “fundamental right.” Consequently, two standards of
52
judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or
restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the
U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender  and legitimacy.  Immediate
53 54
scrutiny
_______________
50 See City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at p. 330, citing Chemerinsky, Erwin, Constitutional Law
Principles and Policies, 2nd Ed. 523 (2002).
51 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
52 Id,, at p. 152.
53 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
54 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
437was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig,55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v.
Reed.  While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the
56
United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection
challenges.  Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally
57
further a legitimate governmental interest.  Under intermediate review, governmental interest is
58
48
extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.  Applying 59
strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for
determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify the regulation
of fundamental freedoms.  Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the
60
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its
earlier applications to equal protection.  The United States Supreme Court has expanded the
61
_______________
55 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
56 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
57 Central Bank Employee’s Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531; 446 SCRA 299
(2004); Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744,
and 79777, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343; In Ermita-Malate, supranote 1 at p. 324, the Court in fact noted: “if the liberty
involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of government acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects what are at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is wider.”
58 Central Bank Employee’s Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas,supra note 57.
59 Id.
60 Mendoza, J., Concurring Opinion in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, 19 November 2001, 369 SCRA
394.
61 Id.
438scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, 62 judicial access63 and
interstate travel. 64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its
effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law
which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an
injury that would warrant the application of the most deferential standard—the rational basis test.
Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the
constitutional rights of their patrons—those persons who would be deprived of availing short time
access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial
since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly, these are not the sort of cherished
rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of
Rights does not shelter gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those “trivial” yet fundamental freedoms—
which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of their
constitutional consequence that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people.
Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental right in the Constitution, is not a Ten
Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but rather an
atmosphere of freedom where the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they
interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by them as
inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
_______________
62 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
63 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
64 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). It has been opined by Chemerinsky that the use of the equal protection
clause was to avoid the use of substantive due process since the latter fell into disfavor in the United States.  See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies (2nd ed. 2002).
439
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld
in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most primordial of rights, thus:
“Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist
and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom
from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the
common welfare.”[ ] In accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all
65
lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any
avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.[ ] 66
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of
“liberty.” It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free
people, there can be no doubt that the meaning of “liberty” must be broad indeed.”  [Citations 67
omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual
behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments “have gained notoriety
as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for
prostitutes and thrill-
_______________
65 Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415; 22 SCRA 424, 439-440 (1968).
66 Id., at p. 440; p. 440.
67 City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at pp. 336-337.
440seekers.’ ”68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be
denied that legitimate sexual behavior among consenting married or consenting single adults
which is constitutionally protected  will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case.
69
Our holding therein retains significance for our purposes:
“The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc, borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation,
are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they are the basis on which his civic obligations
are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his
experience is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his
will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will of others, he ceases to be a master of
himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be
justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its
_______________
68  Rollo, p. 258.
69 “Motel patrons who are single and unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate their bonds in intimate sexual conduct
within the motel’s premises—be it stressed that their consensual sexual behavior does not contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in
the Constitution. (See Concerned Employee v. Glenda Espiritu Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564, 23 November 2004) Adults have a right to choose to
forge such relationships with others in the confines of their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. The liberty protected by
the Constitution allows persons the right to make this choice. Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to engage
in their conduct without intervention of the government, as long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the rule and restraint the
exception.
Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a
repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom—it is the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.” City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at pp. 337-338.
441identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental powers
should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.” 70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair.
There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day.
Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is
momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips
have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of
persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than
having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a
convenient alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and
the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy
of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive of private rights.  It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
71
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a
reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and
those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. 72
_______________
70 City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1 at pp. 338-339.
71 Metro Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., G.R. Nos. 170656 and 170657, 15 August 2007,
530 SCRA 341.
72 U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910).
442
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is
subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected.  However, this is not in any 73
way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the
presumption of validity. 74
Similar to the COMELEC resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to
candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument.  The Ordinance makes no distinction
75
between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate
actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard
of. A plain reading of Section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of
lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to
the unjustified prohibition.
The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its
longtime home, and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict our capital city—the Pearl of the
76
Orient—as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick
Joaquin-dreams of the grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big
cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as Manila, and vice is a
common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to
such perceived decay is not to prevent legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product.
Rather, cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus
attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.
_______________
 73 130 Phil. 415; 22 SCRA 424 (1968).
74 Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 166494, June 29, 2007, 526
SCRA 130; Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, 24 SCRA 172 (1968); U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102 (1918).
75 Philippine Press Institute, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 314 Phil. 131; 244 SCRA 272 (1995).
76 Supra note 1.
443
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in
fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the
proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in
easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing
prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the
petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in
illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their
clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly
be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan
that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-
intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights
of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of
the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a
day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn
to protect.  The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the
77
_______________
77 City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., supra note 1; De La Cruz, et al. v. Hon. Paras, et al., 208 Phil. 490; 123 SCRA
569 (1983); Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, supranote 42.
444State is as old as Aristotle. 78 The advancement of moral relativism as a school of
philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on
which particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared
morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the pursuit of sharply variant moral
perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests. 79
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that “you cannot legislate morality” is
ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained by Calabresi, that phrase is more
accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at
variance with public attitudes about right and wrong.  Our penal laws, for one, are founded on
80
age-old moral tradi-
_______________
78 “The end of the state is not mere life; it is, rather, a good quality of life.” Therefore any state “which is truly so called,
and is not merely one in name, must devote itself to the end of encouraging goodness. Otherwise, a political association sinks
into a mere alliance. . .” The law “should be a rule of life such as will make the members of a [state] good and just.” Otherwise
it “becomes a mere covenant—or (in the phrase of the Sophist Lycophron) ‘a guarantor of men’s rights against one
another.’ ” PoliticsII.9.6-8.1280 31-1280bii; cited in Hamburger, M., Morals and Law: The Growth of Aristotle’s Legal
Theory (1951 ed.), p. 178.
79 Greenwalt, K., Conflicts of Law and Morality (1989 ed.), at p. 38.
80  Steven G., Render Unto Caesar that which is Caesars, and unto God that which is God’s, 31 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
495. He cites the example of the failed Twentieth (?) Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibited the sale and
consumption of liquor, where it was clear that the State cannot justly and successfully regulate consumption of alcohol, when
huge portions of the population engage in its consumption.
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
See also Posner, Richard H., The Problematics of Moral And Legal Theory, The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press (2002). He writes:
. . . Holmes warned long ago of the pitfalls of misunderstanding law by taking its moral vocabulary too
seriously. A big part of legal education consists of showing students how to skirt those pitfalls. The law uses moral
terms in part because of its origin, in part to be impressive, in part to speak a language that the laity, to whom the
commands of the law are addressed, is more likely to understand—and in part, because there is a considerable
overlap between law and morality. The
445tions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions between right and wrong, they will
remain so oriented.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the
right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the key to the enjoyment of
life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more
extensive elaboration on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the
individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State.
Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution
as the embodiment of the rule of law, by reason of their expression of consent to do so when they
take the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law. 81
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to
governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face of the norms of due process
of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the
government to avoid the constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to
promote morality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No.
_______________
overlap, however, is too limited to justify trying to align these two systems of social control (the sort of project that
Islamic nations such as Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have been engaged in of late). It is not a scandal when the
law to pronounce it out of phase with current moral feeling. If often is, and for good practical reasons (in particular,
the law is a flywheel, limiting the effects of wide swings in public opinion). When people make that criticism—as
many do of the laws, still found on the statute books of many states, punishing homosexual relations—what they
mean is that the law neither is supported by public opinion nor serves any temporal purpose, even that of stability,
that it is merely a vestige, an empty symbol.
81 See Burton, S., Judging in Good Faith, (1992 ed.), at p. 218.
4467774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (C.J.), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.
Carpio and Peralta, JJ., On Official Leave.
Brion, J., On Sick Leave.
Petition granted, judgment reversed. That of Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 9 reinstated.
Note.—Unless the creeping interference of the government in essentially private matters is
moderated, it is likely to destroy that prized and peculiar virtue of the free society: individualism.
Every member of society, while paying proper deference to the general welfare, must not be
deprived of the right to be left alone or, in the idiom of the day, ‘to do his thing.’ As long as he
does not prejudice others, his freedom as an individual must not be unduly curtailed. Proper care
should attend the exercise of the police power lest it deteriorate into an unreasonable intrusion into
the purely private affairs of the individual. The so-called ‘general welfare’ is too amorphous and
convenient an excuse for official arbitrariness. Let it always be remembered that in the truly
democratic state, protecting the rights of the individual is as important as, if not more so than,
protecting the rights of the public. (Villacorta vs. Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480 [1986])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres
 G.R. No. 101279. August 6, 1992. *
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN
D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N.
SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.
Political Law; Administrative Law;  Quasi-legislative and quasijudicial powers;  The vesture of quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and
oppressive. It has been necessitated by “the growing complexity of the modern society.”—The vesture of
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and
oppressive. It has been necessitated by “the growing complexity of the modern society” (Solid Homes, Inc. vs.
Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of
society’s ramified activities. “Specialized in
____________
* EN BANC.
299
VOL. 212, AUGUST 6, 1992 299
Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres
the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and
dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice” (Ibid.).
Same; Labor Law;  Police power;  The power to restrict and regulate conferred by Art. 36 of the Labor
Code involves a grant of police power.—It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the
petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas
employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within
the “administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred” upon the respondents
(People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to “restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor
Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To “restrict” means
“to confine, limit or stop” (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas the power to “regulate” means “the power to protect,
foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of
the utility and of its patrons” (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).
Same; Same; Administrative Circulars;  Publication; Administrative rules and regulations must be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.—Once more,
we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that: “x x x Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.” (p. 447.) “Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.” (p. 448.) “We agree that
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the laws.” (p. 448.) For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced
and implemented.
PETITION for prohibition to review the order of the Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
300
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres
     De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for petitioner.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine
Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department
Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991,
temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic
helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of
processing and deploying such workers.
PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies
duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas
employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers.
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino
housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order
No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of
“Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong” (p. 30, Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the
POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.
“In view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for Filipino domestic helpers
going to Hong Kong,the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies is hereby temporarily
suspended effective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers bound for
Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose.
“In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment’s regional
offices are likewise directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower pool of pro-F
301
VOL. 212, AUGUST 6, 1992 301
Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres
spective domestic helpers to Hong Kong on a regional basis. “For compliance.” (Italics ours; p. 30, Rollo.)
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of
1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and
deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong
recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.
“Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and Deployment of Domestic Helpers to Hong
Kong
“Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in order to operationalize the temporary
government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong resulting from the temporary
suspension of recruitment by private employment agencies for said skill and host market, the following
guidelines and mechanisms shall govern the implementation of said policy:
“I. Creation of a joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit (HWPU)
“An ad hoc, one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or HWPU] under the supervision of the POEA
shall take charge of the various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry segment:
“The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination with appropriate units and other entities
concerned:
1. “1.Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies
2. “2.Manpower Pooling
3. “3.Worker Training and Briefing
4. “4.Processing and Deployment
5. “5.Welfare Programs
“II. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment
Agencies or Principals
“Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs for their employers may negotiate
with the HWPU in Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache’s Office in Hong Kong.
“xxx     xxx     xxx
“X. Interim Arrangement
302
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres
 “All contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall continue to be processed by POEA until 31 July
1991 under the name of the Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all contracts shall be processed with the
HWPU.
“Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Philippine Consulate General in Hong Kong a
list of their accepted applicants in their pool within the last week of July. The last day of acceptance shall be
July 31 which shall then be the basis of HWPU in accepting contracts for processing. After the exhaustion of
their respective pools the only source of applicants will be the POEA manpower pool.
“For strict compliance of all concerned.” (pp. 31-35, Rollo.)
On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of
1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.
“TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the recruitment of Domestic helpers for Hong Kong
“Further to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991 pertaining to the government processing and
deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong, processing of employment contracts which have been
attested by the Hong Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30 June 1991 shall be processed by the POEA
Employment Contracts Processing Branch up to 15 August 1991 only.
“Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall
recruit under the new scheme which requires prior accreditation with the POEA.
“Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at the Office of the Labor Attache,
Philippine Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991. Thereafter, those who failed
to have themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the POEA-OWWA Household Workers
Placement Unit in Manila for accreditation before their recruitment and processing of DHs shall be allowed.
“Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the cut-off
period shall submit this list of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list will be allowed
processing outside of the HWPU manpower pool.
“For strict compliance of all concerned.” (Emphasis supplied, p. 36, Rollo.)
303
VOL. 212, AUGUST 6, 1992 303
Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres
On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the
aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following
reasons:
1. 1.that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-
making authority in issuing said circulars;
2. 2.that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are
unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3. 3.that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National
Administrative Register were not complied with.
There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.
Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate
recruitment and placement activities.
“Art. 36. Regulatory Power.—The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the
recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment
and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to isssue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title.” (Italics ours.)
On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by
Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment
Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the
Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for:
1. 1.Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment
Services was the power and duty:
1. “ ‘2.To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing system to regulate private
sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and
overseas, x x x.’ (Art. 15, Labor Code, italics supplied).” (p. 13, Rollo.)
304
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres
1. 2.It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and
duty:
1. “ ‘3.To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers
on a government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may
dictate x x x.’ (Art. 17, Labor Code.)” (p. 13, Rollo.)
1. 3.From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over:
1. “2.To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping
companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best
possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance
therewith.” (Art. 20, Labor Code.)
The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not
unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by “the growing
complexity of the modern society” (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and
more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society’s ramified activities.
“Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with
more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice”
(Ibid.).
It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the
recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful
reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the
“administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred” upon the
respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to “restrict and regulate conferred by
Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Court of
Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To “restrict” means “to confine, limit or stop” (p. 62, Rollo) and whereas
the power to “regulate” means “the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with
due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons”
(Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).
305
VOL. 212, AUGUST 6, 1992 305
Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:
“x x x Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the scope or area
of petitioner’s business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for
Hong Kong till after the establishment of the ‘mechanisms’ that will enhance the protection of Filipino
domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine, other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic
helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may still deploy other class of Filipino workers either for Hongkong and
other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries.
“Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against
excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by private
employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hongkong. [They are reasonable, valid
and justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment
business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest.
“xxx     xxx     xxx
“The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is
merely a remedial measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been attained. This is evident from the
tenor of Administrative Order No. 16 that recruitment of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hongkong by
private employment agencies are hereby ‘temporarily suspendedeffective July 1, 1991.’
“The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going to
Hongkong only.
“xxx     xxx     xxx
“x x x the justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for Hongkong
resulting from the restriction of the scope of petitioner’s business is confined solely to the unscrupulous
practice of private employment agencies victimizing applicants for employment as domestic helpers for
Hongkong and not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines.” (pp. 62-65, Rollo.)
The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the
executive branch of Government.
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper
publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2
of
306
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres
the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
“Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. x x x.” (Civil Code.)
“Art. 5. Rules and Regulations.—The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the
administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing
rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement
of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation.” (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)
Section 3. Filing.—(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three
(3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are
not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.”
(Italics supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)
“Section 4. Effectivity.—In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent
with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above
provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public
VOL. 260, AUGUST 5, 1996 319
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120095. August 5, 1996. *
JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, INC., and KARY INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MA. NIEVES CONFESOR, then Secretary of
the Department of Labor and Employment, HON. JOSE BRILLANTES, in his capacity as acting
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment and HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, in his
capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Police Power;  The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the
character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the
State’s police power.—The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire
spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State’s police power.
As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually “extends to all public needs,” this “least limitable” of
governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as parens patriae gives
effect to a host of its regulatory powers.
Same; Same; Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good.—Thus, police power
concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed
health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The
agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by
them.” (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).
Once more, we advert to our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:
“x x x Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.” (p. 447.)
“Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.” (p. 448.)
“We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication
307
VOL. 212, AUGUST 6, 1992 307
Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections
at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.” (p. 448.)
For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and
implemented.
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE
Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37,
Series of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with the
statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J.), Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Writ granted.
Note.—A legislative act based on the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method (National Development Company vs. Philippine Veterans Bank, 192
SCRA 257).
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its
ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
Same;  Same; The Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its
issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power. —A thorough
review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issu-
______________
 FIRST DIVISION.
*
320
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
20
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
ance of the assailed orders compels us to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the
questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid
exercise of the police power.
Same;  Same; The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the
issuance of Department Order No. 3.—Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the
women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the
deployment of performing artists to “high-risk” destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment
further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists
by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those
individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be
gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Same; Same; Apart from the State’s police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to
extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers.—In any event, apart from the State’s police power, the
Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic
constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides: Sec. 18.
The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare. More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first
paragraph states: The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Same; Same; Protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone.—Obviously,
protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice
provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the
government’s constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas.
321
VOL. 260, AUGUST 5, 1996 321
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional
guarantees.—A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional
guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are
property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.
Same; Same; No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade
has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state.
— Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly
when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the
State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in
which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.
Same; Same; So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no
such deprivation exists.—Locally, the Professional Regulation Commission has begun to require previously
licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had
undertaken continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that
these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long
as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.
Same; Same; The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long
as such classification is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject
of the particular legislation.—The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and
individual or class privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it
is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but merely that all
persons be treated alike under like conditions both
322
3 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
22
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
as to privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. We have held, time and again, that the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classification is based on
real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. If
classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to
present and future conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The limits of government regulation under the State’s police power are once again at the vortex of
the instant controversy. Assailed is the government’s power to control deployment of female
entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the
processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment. By contending that the right to
overseas employment is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution, petitioners
vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous requirement of an ARB
violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power.
The factual antecedents are undisputed.
Following the much-publicized death of Maricris Sioson in 1991, former President Corazon
C. Aquino ordered a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other
foreign destinations. The ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment
industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of
deployment. In its place, the government, through the Secretary of Labor and Employment,
subsequently issued Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory
Council (EIAC), which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certifi-
323
VOL. 260, AUGUST 5, 1996 323
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
cation and deployment of performing artists abroad.
Pursuant to the EIAC’s recommendations,  the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued
1
Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening
performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the
former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement
were to be issued an Artist’s Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any
contract of employment by the POEA. Upon request of the industry, implementation of the
process, originally scheduled for April 1, 1994, was moved to October 1, 1994.
Thereafter, the Department of Labor, following the EIAC’s recommendation, issued a series
of orders fine-tuning and implementing the new system. Prominent among these orders were the
following issuances:
1. Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing, certification and
deployment of performing artists.
2. Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which could be
processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has passed the required
tests.
3. Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to receive (not less
than US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom.
4. Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the ARB by
returning performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special Orientation Program (shorter
than the basic program) although they must pass the academic test.
In Civil Case No. 95-72750, the Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines
(FETMOP), on January 27, 1995 filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally
contending that said orders 1) violated the
_______________
 EIAC, Res. No. 1.
1
324
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived
individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the
issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and “in gross violation
of the constitutional right . . . to life, liberty and property.” Said Federation consequently prayed
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders.
On February 2, 1992, JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. and Kary International, Inc.,
herein petitioners, filed a Motion for Intervention in said civil case, which was granted by the trial
court in an Order dated 15 February, 1995.
However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an Order denying petitioners’ prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the complaint.
On appeal from the trial court’s Order, respondent court, in CA G.R. SP No. 36713 dismissed
the same. Tracing the circumstances which led to the issuance of the ARB requirement and the
assailed Department Order, respondent court concluded that the issuances constituted a valid
exercise by the state of the police power.
We agree.
The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum of
public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State’s police power.
As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually “extends to all public needs,” this “least 2
limitable”  of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state,
3
as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.
Describing the nature and scope of the police power, Justice Malcolm, in the early case
of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro   wrote: 4
__________________
 Noble State Bank v. Haskel, 219 US 112 (1911).
2
 Smith, Bell and Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136 (1919).
3
 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919).
4
325
VOL. 260, AUGUST 5, 1996 325
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
“The police power of the State,” one court has said . . . “is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not
inaptly termed the ‘law of overriding necessity.’ It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.” Carried
onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative
discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the
public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.”
5
Thus, police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed
Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to
demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public
welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of the assailed orders
compels us to rule that the Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order
related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the
police power.
In 1984, the Philippines emerged as the largest labor sending country in Asia dwarfing the
labor export of countries with mammoth populations such as India and China. According to the
National Statistics Office, this diaspora was augmented annually by over 450,000 documented and
clandestine or illegal (undocumented) workers who left the country for various destinations
abroad, lured by higher salaries, better work opportunities and sometimes better living conditions.
Of the hundreds of thousands of workers who left the country for greener pastures in the last
few years, women composed slightly close to half of those deployed, constituting 47%
____________
 Id., at 708-709.
5
326
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
between 1987-1991, exceeding this proportion (58%) by the end of 1991,  the year former 6
President Aquino instituted the ban on deployment of performing artists to Japan and other
countries as a result of the gruesome death of Filipino entertainer Maricris Sioson.
It was during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not only of the trend, but also
of the fact that most of our women, a large number employed as domestic helpers and entertainers,
worked under exploitative conditions “marked by physical and personal abuse.”  Even then, we 7
noted that “[t]he sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and
various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers” compelled “urgent
government action.” 8
Pursuant to the alarming number of reports that a significant number of Filipina performing
artists ended up as prostitutes abroad (many of whom were beaten, drugged and forced into
prostitution), and following the deaths of a number of these women, the government began
instituting measures aimed at deploying only those individuals who met set standards which would
qualify them as legitimate performing artists. In spite of these measures, however, a number of our
countrymen have nonetheless fallen victim to unscrupulous recruiters, ending up as virtual slaves
controlled by foreign crime syndicates and forced into jobs other than those indicated in their
employment contracts. Worse, some of our women have been forced into prostitution.
Thus, after a number of inadequate and failed accreditation schemes, the Secretary of Labor
issued on August 16, 1993, D.O. No. 28, establishing the Entertainment Industry Advisory
Council (EIAC), the policy advisory body of DOLE on entertainment industry matters.  Acting on 9
the recommenda-
_______________
 Source: National Statistics Office, 1992.
6
 Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386, 392 (1988).
7
 Id.
8
 Department Order No. 28 vests the EIAC with the following
9
327
VOL. 260, AUGUST 5, 1996 327
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
tions of the said body, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued the assailed orders.
These orders embodied EIAC’s Resolution No. 1, which called for guidelines on screening, testing
and accrediting performing overseas Filipino artists. Significantly, as the respondent court noted,
petitioners were duly represented in the EIAC, which gave the recommendations on which the
10
ARB and other requirements were based.
Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in
the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment
of performing artists to “high-risk” destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment
further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes
__________________
principal functions:
1. a)recommend to the DOLE policies, plans and programs for the development of the entertainment industry, local
and overseas, including but not limited to talent training and upgrading, employment standards and other
internationally acceptable trade practices;
2. b)promote ethical business standards and dignified workplaces;
3. c)act as the coordinating body for all training programs and technical assistance to the entertainment industry;
4. d)advise the DOLE on the institutionalization of an internationally acceptable system of manpower development,
talent protection and welfare;
5. e)assist the appropriate agencies, private or public in the implementation of a trainors training and upgrading
program;
6. f)review existing issuances on the industry including the system of training, testing and accreditation of
performing artists/talents and recommend to the Secretary such measures or schemes as are deemed necessary
for its proper compliance 
x x x      x x x.
  The EIAC is chaired by an Undersecretary of Labor and is composed of 3 representatives from the government, 2
10
representatives from the employers’ sector, one representative from the talent developers, 2 representatives from the workers’
sector and one representative from the Non-government Organizations.
328
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills
from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the
unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at
least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Moreover, here or abroad, selection of performing artists is usually accomplished by
auditions, where those deemed unfit are usually weeded out through a process which is inherently
subjective and vulnerable to bias and differences in taste. The ARB requirement goes one step
further, however, attempting to minimize the subjectivity of the process by defining the minimum
skills required from entertainers and performing artists. As the Solicitor General observed, this
should be easily met by experienced artists possessing merely basic skills. The tests are aimed at
segregating real artists or performers from those passing themselves off as such, eager to accept
any available job and therefore exposing themselves to possible exploitation.
As to the other provisions of Department Order No. 3 questioned by petitioners, we see
nothing wrong with the requirement for document and booking confirmation (D.O. 3-C), a
minimum salary scale (D.O. 3-E), or the requirement for registration of returning performers. The
requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and nature of work
allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep our entertainers
away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or
exploitative practices. Parenthetically, none of these issuances appear to us, by any stretch of the
imagination, even remotely unreasonable or arbitrary. They address a felt need of according
greater protection for an oft-exploited segment of our OCW’s. They respond to the industry’s
demand for clearer and more practicable rules and guidelines. Many of these provisions were
fleshed out following recommendations by, and after consultations with, the affected sectors and
non-government organizations. On the
329
VOL. 260, AUGUST 5, 1996
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
whole, they are aimed at enhancing the safety and security of entertainers and artists bound for
Japan and other destinations, without stifling the industry’s concerns for expansion and growth.
In any event, apart from the State’s police power, the Constitution itself mandates government
to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic constitutional statement on
labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare.
More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first
paragraph states:
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the
welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while
desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government’s constitutional duty to provide mechanisms
for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas. As this Court explained in Philippine
Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) v. Drilon,  in reference to the recurring problems
11
faced by our overseas workers:
What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and
humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot
satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure
that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from home.
_____________
 Id.
11
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
We now go to petitioners’ assertion that the police power cannot, nevertheless, abridge the right of
our performing workers to return to work abroad after having earlier qualified under the old
process, because, having previously been accredited, their accreditation became a “property right,”
protected by the due process clause. We find this contention untenable.
A profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional
guarantees. One cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because
these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally
constitutes an actionable wrong. 12
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business
or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by
the state particularly when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental
functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals.
According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, it must of course be within the
legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which every one may so
use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others. 13
In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measures is certainly much wider.  To pretend that licensing or accreditation
14
requirements violates the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of
the police power, of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions. Professionals
leaving for abroad are required to
________________
 Phil. Movie Workers’ Assn. v. Premier Productions, Inc., 92 Phil. 8423 (1953); National Labor Union vs. Court of
12
Industrial Relations, 68 Phil. 732 (1939).
 Case vs. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 250, 280 (1913).
13
 Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators vs. City of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 (1967).
14
331
VOL. 260, AUGUST 5, 1996 331
329
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. Seamen
are required to take tests determining their seamanship. Locally, the Professional Regulation
Commission has begun to require previously licensed doctors and other professionals to furnish
documentary proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken continuing education courses
as a requirement for renewal of their licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements pose an
unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due process clause. So long as professionals
and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such deprivation exists.
Finally, it is a futile gesture on the part of petitioners to invoke the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution to support their argument that the government cannot enact the assailed regulatory
measures because they abridge the freedom to contract. In Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. vs. Drilon, we held that “[t]he non-impairment clause of the Constitution . . . must
yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government.”  Equally important, into every contract is
15
read provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the
agreement deals with a subject impressed with the public welfare.
A last point. Petitioners suggest that the singling out of entertainers and performing artists
under the assailed department orders constitutes class legislation which violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. We do not agree.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class
privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited to the object to which it is
directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but
merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities imposed.  We have held, time and again, that the equal protection clause of the
16
Constitution does not forbid classification for so long as such classifi-
_________________
 Supra, note 6, at 397.
15
 Itchong, etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).
16
332
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
cation is based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation.  If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns all members
17
of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not violate
the equal protection guarantee.
In the case at bar, the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists
and entertainers destined for jobs abroad. These orders, we stressed hereinbefore, further the
Constitutional mandate requiring government to protect our workforce, particularly those who
may be prone to abuse and exploitation as they are beyond the physical reach of government
regulatory agencies. The tragic incidents must somehow stop, but short of absolutely curtailing the
 
G.R. No. 189185. August 16, 2016. * the Local Government Code embodies the legislative grant that enables the local government unit to effectively
 
WILFREDO MOSQUEDA, MARCELO VILLAGANES, JULIETA LAWAGON, CRISPIN
ALCOMENDRAS, CORAZON SABINADA, VIRGINIA CATA-AG, FLORENCIA
SABANDON, and LEDEVINA ADLAWAN, petitioners, vs. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS
& EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, and LAPANDAY
AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 189305. August 16, 2016. * Same; Same; Same; A local government unit (LGU) is considered to have properly exercised its police
 
CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PILIPINO
BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION (PBGEA), DAVAO FRUITS
CORPORATION, and LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
Local Government Units; Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Ordinances; To be considered as a
valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two (2)-pronged test: the formal and the substantive.—
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-pronged test: the formal (i.e.,
whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of the local government unit, and whether it is
passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit,
like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with
the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
Same; Same; The corporate powers of the local government units (LGUs) confer the basic authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in order
to promote general welfare.—The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to
enact
_______________
*  EN BANC.
 
 
314
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in order
to promote the general welfare. Such legislative powers spring from the delegation thereof by Congress
right of these performers and entertainers to work abroad, the assailed measures enable our
government to assume a measure of control.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, petition is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
     Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Note.—Police power subordinates the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. (Philippine
National Bank vs. Remigio, 231 SCRA 362 [1994])
——o0o——
_______________
 Villegas vs. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 272 (1978).
17
333
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
through either the Local Government Code or a special law. The General Welfare Clause in Section 16 of
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote and maintain local autonomy.
Same; Same; Police Power; Ordinances; A valid ordinance must be enacted within the corporate
powers of the local government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law .—A valid ordinance
must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law. In order to declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with
the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.
powers if it satisfies the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution. —A local government
unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to
wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Ordinances; In exercising its police power the local government unit (LGU) must
not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. —
Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the
Government’s action. This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not
arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the
ordinance realistically serves a
 
 
315
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 315
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose
without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; The constitutional right to equal protection requires
that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.—The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal
protection secures every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State’s duly
constituted authorities.
 Same; Same; Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things
without distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate.—Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons
or things without distinction, nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or
by the territory in which it is to operate. The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals
determined according to a valid classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another.
Same; Same; To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to three (3) levels of
scrutiny, viz.: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.—To determine the propriety of
the classification, courts resort to three levels of scrutiny, viz.: the rational scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny andstrict scrutiny.
Same; Same; The rational basis scrutiny demands that the classification reasonably relate to the
legislative purpose.—The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational basis test)
demands that the classification reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. The rational basis test often applies
in
 
 
316
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
cases involving economics or social welfare, or to any other case not involving a suspect class.
Same; Same; To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important
governmental interest but the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad
generalizations.—Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny. To survive
intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be substantially
related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad
generalizations.
Same; Same; The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect
class.—The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The
Government carries the burden to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest, and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
Same; Same; Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be overinclusive
because its impending implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the accomplishment of the
legislative purpose.—Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be
“overinclusive” because its impending implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the
accomplishment of the legislative purpose. Its implementation will unnecessarily impose a burden on a wider
range of individuals than those included in the intended class based on the purpose of the law.
Same; Same; A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to undercut the
governmental claim that the classification serves legitimate political ends.—A substantially overinclusive or
underinclusive classification tends to undercut the governmental claim that the classification serves legitimate
political ends. Where overinclusiveness is the problem, the vice is that the law has a greater discriminatory or
burdensome effect than necessary. In this light, we strike down Section 5 and Section 6 of Ordi-
 
 
317
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 317
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
nance No. 0309-07 for carrying an invidious classification, and for thereby violating the Equal
Protection Clause.
Precautionary Principle; The principle of precaution involves matters of evidence in cases where there
is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect.
—The principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-
SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal
link between human activity and environmental effect. In such an event, the courts may construe a set of facts
as warranting either judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving and protecting the environment.
Same; The precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is concurrence of three (3) elements,
namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and serious or irreversible harm.—The precautionary
principle shall only be relevant if there is concurrence of three elements, namely: uncertainty, threat of
environmental damage and serious or irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is relatively certain, or
that the causal link between an action and environmental damage can be established, or the probability of
occurrence can be calculated, only preventive, not precautionary measures, may be taken.
Same; The precautionary approach in sustaining the ban against aerial spraying should not apply if
little or nothing is known of the exact or potential dangers that aerial spraying may bring to the health of the
residents within and near the plantations.—We should not apply the precautionary approach in sustaining the
ban against aerial spraying if little or nothing is known of the exact or potential dangers that aerial spraying
may bring to the health of the residents within and near the plantations and to the integrity and balance of the
environment. It is dangerous to quickly presume that the effects of aerial spraying would be adverse even in
the absence of evidence.
Local Government Code; Police Power; Section 5(c) of the Local Government Code (LGC) accords a
liberal interpretation to its general welfare provisions.—Section 5(c) of the Local Government Code accords a
liberal interpretation to its general welfare provisions. The policy of liberal construction is consistent with the
spirit of local autonomy that endows local government units with sufficient power
 
318
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
and discretion to accelerate their economic development and uplift the quality of life for their
constituents.
Same; Same; Local Government Units; Because the police power of the local government units (LGUs)
flows from the express delegation of the power by Congress, its exercise is to be construed in strictissimi juris.
—Because the police power of the local government units flows from the express delegation of the power by
Congress, its exercise is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms
used in granting the power should be construed against the local legislative units.
Same; Same; Same; Municipal Corporations; Ordinances; Municipal corporations have no right to
enact ordinances dissonant with the State’s laws and policy.—Although the Local Government Code vests the
municipal corporations with sufficient power to govern themselves and manage their affairs and activities, they
definitely have no right to enact ordinances dissonant with the State’s laws and policy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Local Government Code (LGC) is not intended to vest in the
local government unit (LGU) the blanket authority to legislate upon any subject that it finds proper to legislate
upon in the guise of serving the common good.—The Local Government Code has been fashioned to delineate
the specific parameters and limitations to guide each local government unit in exercising its delegated powers
with the view of making the local government unit a fully functioning subdivision of the State within the
constitutional and statutory restraints. The Local Government Code is not intended to vest in the local
government unit the blanket authority to legislate upon any subject that it finds proper to legislate upon in the
guise of serving the common good.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The devolved functions to the local government units (LGUs) do not
include the regulation and control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.—The enumerated devolved
functions to the local government units do not include the regulation and control of pesticides and other
agricultural chemicals. The noninclusion should preclude the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City from enacting
Ordinance No. 0309-07, for otherwise it would be arrogating unto itself the authority to prohibit the aerial
application of pesticides in derogation of the authority expressly vested in the FPA by Presidential Decree No.
1144.
 
 
319
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 319
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Every local government unit (LGU) only derives its legislative
authority from Congress.—For sure, every local government unit only derives its legislative authority from
Congress. In no instance can the local government unit rise above its source of authority. As such, its
ordinance cannot run against or contravene existing laws, precisely because its authority is only by virtue of
the valid delegation from Congress.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Devoid of the specific delegation to its legislative body, the City of
Davao exceeded its delegated authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07.—Devoid of the specific delegation
to its local legislative body, the City of Davao exceeded its delegated authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-
07. Hence, Ordinance No. 0309-07 must be struck down also for being an ultra vires act on the part of
the Sangguniang Bayanof Davao City.
 
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Local Government Units; Municipal Corporations; Police Power; Ordinances; View that Ordinance
No. 0309-07, Series of 2007 passed by Davao City is too broad in that it prohibits aerial spraying in
agriculture regardless of the substance and the method of aerial spraying involved.—I concur in the result.
Ordinance No. 0309-07, Series of 2007 passed by Davao City is too broad in that it prohibits aerial spraying in
agriculture regardless of the substance and the method of aerial spraying involved. This Court’s Decision
should be read in this narrow sense.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panligal (SALIGAN)for petitioners Wilfredo Mosqueda, et
al.
   Cruz, Marcelo & Tenefrancia for Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association,
Inc., et al.
 
BERSAMIN, J.:
 
This appeal through the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assails the decision
promulgated on January 9,
 
 
320
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
2009,  whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the judgment rendered on
1 and workplaces.
September 22, 2007 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, in Davao City upholding the
validity and constitutionality of Davao City Ordinance No. 0309-07, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2007
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 11th Judicial Region, Branch 17, Davao City, upholding the
validity and constitutionality of Davao City Ordinance No. 0309-07, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
FURTHER, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 28 January 2008 enjoining the City Government of
Davao, and any other person or entity acting in its behalf, from enforcing and implementing City Ordinance
No. 0309-07, is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
 
Antecedents
 
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to
impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within
Davao City, viz.:
ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07
Series of 2007
 
AN ORDINANCE BANNING AERIAL SPRAYING AS AN AGRICULTURAL PRACTICE IN ALL
AGRICUL-
_______________
1  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. I), pp. 72-115; penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. (retired), Normandie B. Pizarro, and Michael P. Elbinias (deceased);
while Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja dissented.
 
 
321
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 321
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
TURAL ACTIVITIES BY ALL AGRICULTURAL ENTITIES IN DAVAO CITY.
 
Be it enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City in session assembled that:
 
SECTION 1. TITLE.—This Ordinance shall be known as “An Ordinance Banning Aerial Spraying as
an Agricultural Practice in all Agricultural Activities by all Agricultural Entities in Davao City”;
SECTION 2. POLICY OF THE CITY.—It shall be the policy of the City of Davao to eliminate the
method of aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all entities within Davao
City;
SECTION 3. DEFINITION OF TERMS:
 
a. Aerial Spraying – refers to application of substances through the use of aircraft of any form which
dispenses the substances in the air;
b. Agricultural Practices – refer to the practices conducted by agricultural entities in relation to their
agricultural activities;
c. Agricultural Activities – refer to activities that include, but not limited to, land preparation, seeding,
planting, cultivation, harvesting and bagging;
d. Agricultural Entities – refer to persons, natural or juridical, involved in agricultural activities;
e. Buffer Zone – is an identified 30-meter zone within and around the boundaries of agricultural farms/
plantations that need special monitoring to avoid or minimize harm to the environment and inhabitants
pursuant to policies and guidelines set forth in this Ordinance and other government regulations. It is an area of
land that must lie within the property which does not include public lands, public thoroughfares or adjacent
private properties. It must be planted with diversified trees that grow taller than what are usually planted and
grown in the plantation to protect those within the adjacent fields, neighboring farms, residential area, schools
 
 
322
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
SECTION 4. SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY.—The provisions of this Ordinance shall apply to all
agricultural entities within the territorial jurisdiction of Davao City;
SECTION 5. BAN OF AERIAL SPRAYING.—A ban on aerial spraying shall be strictly enforced in the
territorial jurisdiction of Davao City three (3) months after the effectivity of this Ordinance.
SECTION 6. BUFFER ZONE.—Consistent with national legislation and government regulations, all
agricultural entities must provide for a thirty (30) meter buffer zone within the boundaries of their agricultural
farms/plantations. This buffer zone must be properly identified through Global Positioning System (GPS)
survey. A survey plan showing the metes and bounds of each agricultural farm/plantation must be submitted to
the City Mayor’s Office, with the buffer zone clearly identified therein;
SECTION 7. PENAL PROVISION.—Violation of any provision of this Ordinance shall be punished as
follows:
a. First Offense: Fine of P5,000.00 and imprisonment of not less than one (1) month but not more than
three (3) months;
b. Second Offense: Fine of P5,000.00 and imprisonment of not less than three (3) months but not more
than six (6) months and suspension of City-issued permits and licenses for one (1) year;
c. Third Offense: Fine of P5,000.00 and imprisonment of not less than six (6) months but not more than
one (1) year and perpetual cancellation of City-issued permits and licenses;
Provided, that in case the violation has been committed by a juridical person, the person in charge of the
management thereof shall be held liable;
 SECTION 8. REPEALING CLAUSE.—Any Ordinance that is contrary to or inconsistent with any of
the provisions of this Ordinance shall be deemed amended or repealed accordingly.
 
 
323
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
SECTION 9. EFFECTIVITY.—This Ordinance shall take effect thirty (30) days from its publication in
a newspaper of general circulation in Davao City;
ENACTED, January 23, 2007 by a majority vote of all the Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
 (c) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall transmit official copies of such ordinances to the chief executive
officer of the Official Gazette within seven (7) days following the approval of the said ordinance for publication purposes. The
Official Gazette may publish ordinances with penal sanctions for archival and reference purposes.
7 Namely: Wilfredo Mosqueda, Marcelo Villaganes, Crispin Alcomendras, Corazon Sabinada, Rebecca Saligumba,
Carolina Pilongo, Alejandra Bentoy, Ledevina Adlawan, and Virginia Cata-ag.
8 Namely: Geraldine Catalan, Julieta Lawagon and Florencia Sabandon.
9 Records No. 1, pp. 228-245.
323 10 Records No. 4, pp. 1115-1120.
11 Records No. 5, pp. 1422-1430. (The RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction on June 25, 2007 after the PBGEA
posted a P1,000,000.00 bond).
 
2

325
 
City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance on February 9, 2007.  The ordinance took 3 VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 325
effect on March 23, 2007 after its publication in the newspaper Mindanao Pioneer.  Pursuant to 4
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
Section 5 of the ordinance, the ban against aerial spraying would be strictly enforced three months WHEREFORE, finding the subject [O]rdinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional in all aspect of the
thereafter. grounds assailed by the petitioner, said [C]ity [O]rdinance No. 0309-07, is sustained of its validity and
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its constitutionality.
members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Accordingly, the order of this court dated June 20, 2007, granting the writ of preliminary injunction as
Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of prayed for by petitioner is ordered cancelled and set aside as a result of this decision.
the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of provisional reliefs through a temporary restraining order SO ORDERED. 12

(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.  They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the
5  
unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power  under the General 13

confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to Section Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code;  that the ordinance, being based on a valid
14

511  of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code).

6 classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct
_______________ from other methods of pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of
health risk caused by aerial drift;  and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of
15

2  Records No. 1, pp. 67-69. constitutionality, and could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the
3  Id., at p. 69. Constitution. 16

4  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. I), p. 74.

5  Records No. 1, pp. 2-60, entitled “Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc., Davao Fruits
However, the RTC, recognizing the impracticability of the 3-month transition period under
Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation, petitioners, versus City of Davao, respondent,” Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07, recommended the parties to agree on an extended transition
docketed as Civil Case No. 31, 837-07. period. 17

6  Section 511. Posting and Publication of Ordinances with Penal Sanctions.—(a) Ordinances with penal sanctions  
shall be posted at prominent places in the provincial capitol, city, municipal or barangayhall, as the case may be, for a
minimum period of three (3) consecutive weeks. Such ordinances shall also be published in a Decision of the CA
   
  PBGEA, et al. appealed,  and applied for injunctive relief
18

324 _______________

324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 12  Records No. 10, p. 2928.

13  Id., at pp. 2914-2918.
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc. 14  Id., at p. 2912.
On May 8, 2007, the residents living within and adjacent to banana plantations in Davao City 15  Id., at pp. 2919-2920.
led by Wilfredo Mosqueda,  joined by other residents of Davao City,  (Mosqueda, et al.) submitted
7 8 16  Id., at p. 2921.
17  Id., at pp. 2926-2927.
their Motion for Leave to Intervene and Opposition to the Issuance of a Preliminary 18  Id., at pp. 2947-2948.
Injunction.  The RTC granted their motion on June 4, 2007.
9 10
 
On June 20, 2007, the RTC granted the prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary  
injunction, and subsequently issued the writ. 11
326
 
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Judgment of the RTC
  Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. from the CA,  which granted the application  and consequently issued a TRO to meanwhile enjoin
19 20

0309-07 valid and constitutional, decreeing thusly: the effectivity of the ordinance. 21

_______________ On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the
RTC.  It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being
22

newspaper of general circulation, where available, within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned,
except in the case of barangay ordinances. Unless otherwise provided therein, said ordinances shall take effect on the day
following its publication, or at the end of the period of posting, whichever occurs later.
 (b) x x x
unreasonable and oppressive; found the three-month transition period impractical and oppressive
in view of the engineering and technical requirements of switching from aerial spraying to truck-
mounted boom spraying; and opined that the ban ran afoul with the Equal Protection Clause
inasmuch as Section 3(a) of the ordinance — which defined the term aerial spraying— did not
make reasonable distinction between the hazards, safety and beneficial effects of liquid substances
that were being applied aerially; the different classes of pesticides or fungicides; and the levels of
concentration of these substances that could be beneficial and could enhance agricultural
production.
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and
the environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of
the ban against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other. It ruled that the
maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone within and around the agricultural plantations under
Section 6 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 constituted taking of property without due process because
the landowners were thereby compelled to cede portions of their property without just
compensation; that the exercise of police power to require the buffer zone was invalid because
there was no finding that the 30-meter surrounding belt was obnoxious to the public welfare; and
that, accordingly, Ordinance No. 0309-07
_______________
19  CA Rollo (Vol. I), pp. 10-92.
20  Id., at pp. 297-299.
21  Id., at pp. 573-574.
22  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. I), pp. 72-115.
 
 
327
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 327
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
was unconstitutional because of the absence of a separability clause.
The City of Davao and the intervenors filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but
the CA denied the motions on August 7, 2009. 23
Hence, the separate, but now consolidated, appeals by petition for review on certiorari.
 
Issues
In G.R. No. 189185, petitioners Mosqueda, et al. rely on the following grounds, namely:
 
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED FUNDAMENTAL PRECEPTS AND CONCEPTS OF LAW
WHICH, PROPERLY CONSIDERED, NECESSARILY LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
DAVAO ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND VALID.
 
II
THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
 
III
THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS MORE THAN REASONABLY RELATED
TO THE PURPOSE IT SEEKS TO ACHIEVE.
 
IV
THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS VALID, BEING DEMONSTRABLY REASONABLE AND FAIR.
 
V
THE REQUIREMENT RELATING TO THE 30-METER BUFFER ZONE ARE [SIC] CONSISTENT WITH
DUE
_______________
23  Id., at pp. 209-227.
 
328
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
PROCESS OF LAW, BEING A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER.
 
Mosqueda, et al. state that the CA ignored well-established precepts like the primacy of
human rights over property rights and the presumption of validity in favor of the ordinance; that
the CA preferred the preservation of the profits of respondents PBGEA, et al. to the residents’
right to life, health and ecology,  thereby disregarding the benevolent purpose of the ordinance;
24
that the CA assumed the functions of the lawmaker when it set aside the wisdom behind the
enactment of the ordinance; that the CA failed to apply the precautionary principle, by which the
State was allowed to take positive actions to prevent harm to the environment and to human health
despite the lack of scientific certainty; that the CA erred in applying the “strict scrutiny method” in
holding that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it only thereby applied in
reviewing classifications that affected fundamental rights; that there was nothing wrong with
prohibiting aerial spraying per se considering that even the aerial spraying of water produced drift
that could affect unwilling neighbors whose constitutional right to a clean and healthy
environment might be impinged;  that as far as the three-month period was concerned, the CA
25
should have considered that manual spraying could be conducted while the PBGEA, et al. laid
down the preparations for the conduct of boom spraying;  that “reasonableness” could be more
26
appropriately weighed by balancing the interests of the parties against the protection of basic
rights, like the right to life, to health, and to a balanced and healthful ecology;  that PBGEA, et
27
al. did not substantiate their claim of potential profit losses that would result from the shift; that
business
_______________
24  Id., at pp. 39-42.
25  Id., at pp. 49-50.
26  Id., at pp. 54-55.
27  Id., at pp. 56-57.
 
329
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 329
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
profits should remain inferior and subordinate to their fundamental rights as residents of Davao
City, which were the rights that the assailed ordinance has sought to protect;  that PBGEA, et
28
al. did not explore other modes of pesticide treatment either as a stop-gap or as a temporary
measure while shifting to truck mounted boom spraying; that the imposition of the 30-meter
29
buffer zone was a valid exercise of police power that necessarily flowed from the protection
afforded by the ordinance from the unwanted effects of ground spraying; that the imposition of the
buffer zone did not constitute compensable taking under police power, pursuant to the
pronouncements in Seng Kee & Co. v. Earnshaw and Piatt,  Patalinghug v. Court of
30
Appeals, and Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.;  and that the 30-meter buffer zone
31 32
conformed with the ISO 14000 and the DENR Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC)
33
requirement. 34
In G.R. No. 189305, petitioner City of Davao submits the following as the issues to be
considered and resolved, to wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION
5 OF ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07, SERIES OF 2007 IS OP-
_______________
28  Id., at pp. 51-54.
29  Id., at p. 56.
 30  56 Phil. 204 (1931).
31  G.R. No. 104786, January 27, 1994, 229 SCRA 554, 559.
32  G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 92, 142.
33  The ISO 14000 family of international standards provides practical management tools for companies and
organizations in the management of environmental aspects and assessment of their environmental performance.
(See International Organization for Standardization, “Environmental Management: The ISO 14000 family of International
Standards” [wnd ed., 2010], available at <www.iso.org/iso/home/store/publication_item.htm?pid=PUB100238>, last opened
on July 14, 2016 at 9:00 a.m.)
34  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. I), p. 62.
 
 
330
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
PRESSIVE AND AN UNREASONABLE EXERCISE OF DELEGATED POLICE POWER.
 
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07 IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07 CONSTITUTES TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION,
THUS, VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
 
IV
WHETHER OR NOT AERIAL SPRAYING OF FUNGICIDES IS SAFE TO THE PEOPLE AND THE
ENVIRONMENT.
 
The City of Davao explains that it had the authority to enact the assailed ordinance because it
would thereby protect the environment and regulate property and business in the interest of the
general welfare pursuant to Section 458 of the Local Government Code;  that the ordinance was
35
enacted to carry out its mandate of promoting the public welfare under the General Welfare Clause
(Section 16 of the Local Government Code); that the ordinance did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause because the distinction lies in aerial spray as a method of application being more
deleterious than other modes; that aerial spraying produces more drift that causes discomfort, and
an extremely offensive and obnoxious experience the part of the residents; that spray drift cannot
be controlled even with use by the respondents of highly advanced apparatus, such as the
Differential Global Positioning Sys-
_______________
35  Rollo (G.R. No. 189305, Vol. I), pp. 82-83.
331
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 331
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
tem, Micronair Rotary Drift Control Atomizers, Intellimap, Intelliflow Spray Valve System,
Control and Display Unit and the Target Flow Spray Valve Switch System;  that because of the36
inherent toxicity of Mancozeb (the fungicide aerially applied by the respondents), there is no need
to provide for a substantial distinction based on the level of concentration;  that as soon as 37
fungicides are released in the air, they become air pollutants pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 8749 (Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999), and the activity thus falls under the authority of the
38
local government units to ban; and that the ordinance does not only seek to protect and promote
human health but also serves as a measure against air pollution.
The City of Davao insists that it validly exercised police power because it does not thereby
oblige the shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying; that the respondents only choose
boom spraying to justify the alleged impracticability of the transition period by erroneously adding
the months required for each of the stages without considering other steps that may be
simultaneously undertaken;  that the Court should apply its ruling in Social Justice Society v.
39
Atienza, Jr.,  by which the six-month period for the folding up of business operations was declared
40
a legitimate exercise of police power; that the respondents did not present any documentary
evidence on the feasibility of adopting other methods;  that only 1,800 hectares out of 5,200
41
hectares of plantations owned and operated by PBGEA’s members use aerial spraying, hence, the
perceived ominous consequence of imposing a ban on aerial spray to the banana industry is
entirely mislead-
_______________
36  Id., at pp. 88-89.
37  Id., at pp. 89-90.
38  Id., at pp. 68-89.
39  Id., at pp. 45-49.
40  Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., supra note 32.
41  Rollo (G.R. No. 189305, Vol. I), pp. 61-64.
 
332
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
ing;  that the urgency of prohibiting aerial spray justifies the three-month transition period; that
42
the complaints of the community residents — ranging from skin itchiness, contraction and/or
tightening in the chest, nausea, appetite loss and difficulty in breathing after exposure to spray mist
— only prove that aerial spraying brings discomfort and harm to the residents; that considering
that the testimony of Dr. Lynn Crisanta R. Panganiban, a pharmacologist and toxicologist,
established that fungicides could cause debilitating effects on the human body once inhaled or
digested, the CA erred in holding that there was no correlation between aerial application and the
complaints of the residents; that given that aerial spray produces more drift and is uncontrollable
compared to the other methods of applying fungicides, the ordinance becomes reasonable; and 43
that the medical-related complaints of the residents need not be proven by medical records
considering that these were based on personal knowledge. 44
The City of Davao contends that the imposition of the 30-meter buffer zone is a valid exercise
of police power, rendering the claim for just compensation untenable; that the maintenance of the
buffer zone does not require the respondents to cede a portion of their landholdings; that the
planting of diversified trees within the buffer zone will serve to insulate the residents from spray
drift; that such buffer zone does not deprive the landowners of the lawful and beneficial use of
their property;  and that the buffer zone is consistent with the Constitution, which reminds
45
property owners that the use of property bears a social function. 46
In their comment, the respondents posit that the petition of the City; of Davao should be
dismissed for failure to attach material portions of the records, and for raising factual errors
_______________
42  Id., at p. 66.
43  Id., at pp. 71-73.
44  Id., at p. 77.
45  Id., at pp. 107-108.
46  Section 6, Article XII, 1987 CONSTITUTION.
 
 
333
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 333
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
 that are not within the realm of this appeal by petition for review on certiorari;  that the CA
correctly declared the ordinance as unreasonable due to the impossibility of complying with the
three-month transition period; that shifting from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying will take
at least three years and entails careful planning, equipment and machineries, civil works, and
capital funding of at least P400,000,000.00;  that the Court could rely on its ruling in City of
48
Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,  where an ordinance directing an existing establishment to wind up or to
49
transfer its business was declared as confiscatory in nature, and, therefore, unconstitutional;  that
the total ban against aerial spraying, coupled with the inadequate time to shift to truck-mounted
boom spraying, effectively deprives the respondents with an efficient means to control the spread
of the Black Sigatoka disease that threatens the banana plantations; that the ordinance will only
expose the plantations to the virulent disease that is capable of infecting 60% of the plantations on
a single cycle missed;  that compared with other modes of application, aerial spraying is more
51 52
cost-efficient, safe and accurate; that truck-mounted boom spraying, for instance, requires 80-200
liters of solution per hectare,  while manual spraying uses 200-300 liters of solution per hectare;
53
that aerial spraying oily requires 30 liters per hectare; that in terms of safety and accuracy, manual
spraying is the least safe and accurate,  and produces more drift than aerial spraying;  that
54
_______________
47  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. I), p. 375.
48  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. II), pp. 1244-1251.
49  G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308, 342.
50  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. II), pp. 1265-1266.
51  A period of four (4) to twelve (12) days.
52  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. II), pp. 1266-1267.
53  Id., at p. 1331.
54  Id., at p. 1256.
55  Id., at pp. 1257-1258; according to the respondents’ witness, Mr. Richard Billington, the drift at the edge of an area
sprayed from the air results to approximately half of the corresponding value for
334
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
due to the 300-liter solution required, the workers will be more exposed to the solution during
manual application and such application will thus be more in conflict with the purpose of the
ordinance to prevent human exposure; that the respondents also find the irrigation sprinklers
56
suggested by the City of Davao as wasteful, unsafe and impractical because it cannot provide the
needed coverage for application of the solution to effectively control the Black Sigatoka disease;
that in contrast, aerial application, coupled with the latest state of the art technology and
equipment, ensures accuracy, effectiveness, efficiency and safety compared to the other methods
of application; that the respondents vouch for the safety of the fungicides they use by virtue of
such fungicides having been registered with the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) and
classified as Category IV,  and found to be mild; and that
57
_______________
ground application. This observation was based on the AgDrift Model, developed under a Cooperative Research and
Development Agreement (CRADA) between the Spray Drift Task Force (SDTF) of the US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and the US Department of Agriculture-Agricultural Research Service (USDA-ARS).
56  Id., at p. 1255.
57
Category and Signal      Color           Acute Toxicity to Rat
          Words                  Band       Oral LD50     Dermal LD50
                                     Symbol    (mg/kg BW)      (mg/kg BW)
                                                    Solid  Liquid     Solid  Liquid
     200         100
CATEGORY I               RED       50 or     or            or    400 or
DANGER: POISON                     less     less         less     less
CATEGORY II                                        201         101
WARNING:              YELLOW   51 to     to            to     401 to
47 HARMFUL                                  500     200        1000    4000
                                                              2001
CATEGORY III         BLUE      501 to    to         Over     Over
CAUTION                                 20000  3000       1000     4000
Over   Over
CATEGORY IV        GREEN      2000    3000        N/A      N/A
 
50  
335
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 335
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
oral ingestion in large doses is required before any adverse effects to humans may result. 58
The respondents lament that the ban was imposed without any scientific basis; that the
report  prepared by a fact-finding team (composed of the Vice Mayor, the City Health Officer,
59
The City Planning and Development Coordinator and the Assistance City Planning and
Development Coordinator) organized by the City of Davao revealed that there was no scientific
55
evidence to support the clamor for the ban against aerial spraying; that furthermore, national
government agencies like the Department of Agriculture (DA), Department of Health (DOH) and
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) similarly concluded that there was no scientific
evidence to support the ban;  that for four decades since the adoption of aerial spraying, there has
60
been no reported outbreak or any predisposition to ailment connected with the pesticides applied;
that the testimonies of the residents during the trial were mere “emotional anecdotal evidence” that
did not establish any scientific or medical bases of any causal connection between the alleged
health conditions complained of and the fungicides applied during aerial spraying;  that the 61
allegations of health and environmental harm brought by the pesticides used to treat the banana
plantations were un-
_______________
FPA Classification Table of pesticides adopted from the World Health Organization (WHO) Classification by Hazards
(RTC Records, No. 1, p. 41).
58  According to the respondents’ witness, Anacleto M. Pedrosa, Jr., Ph.D, acute toxicity to rats of Category IV
fungicides require oral ingestion of over 2000 milligrams in solid form per kilogram of body weight and over 3000 milligrams
of such fungicide in liquid form per kilogram of body weight to have any Adverse effect. ( See RTC Records, No. 4, pp. 1095-
1096).
59  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. III), pp. 1545-1554; entitled “Summary Report on the Assessment and Fact-finding
Activities on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations.”
60  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. II), pp. 1271-1273.
61  Id., at pp. 1278-1284.
 
 
336
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
founded; that the 2001 study of the International Agency for Research on Cancer showed that,
contrary to the claim of Dra. Panganiban, the by-product of Mancozeb (Ethylenethiourea or ETU)
was “non-genotoxic” and not expected to produce thyroid cancer;  that Carlos Mendoza, a geo-
62
hydrologist and geophysicist, testified that underground water contamination through aerial
spraying would be impossible because of the presence of latex, thick layers of clay and underlying
rock formations;  that even the study conducted by the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA)
63
showed that the rhinoceros beetle infestation in coconut plantations adjacent to the banana
plantations was due to the farmer’s failure to observe phyto-sanitary measures, not to aerial
spraying;  that furthermore, aerial spraying is internationally accepted as a “Good Agricultural
64
Practice” (GAP)  under the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of
65
Pesticides by the United Nations-Food and Agricultural Organization (UN-FAO); that as such,
they observe the standards laid down by the UN-FAO, and utilize aerial spraying equipment that
will ensure accuracy, safety and efficiency in applying the substances, and which more than
complies with the requirement under
_______________
62  Id., at pp. 1285-1286.
63  Id., at p. 1291.
64  Id., at pp. 1293-1296.
65  “Good agricultural practice” is broadly defined as applying knowledge to addressing environmental, economic and
social sustainability for on-farm production and post-production processes resulting in safe and healthy food and nonfood
agricultural products. The use of pesticides includes the officially recommended or nationally authorized uses of pesticides
under actual conditions necessary for effective and reliable pest control. It encompasses a range of levels of pesticide
applications up to the highest authorized use, applied in a manner that leaves a residue which is the smallest amount
practicable. See FAO-Committee on Agriculture, “Development of a Framework for Good Agricultural Practices” (Rome,
March 31-April 4, 2003), http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/006/y8704e.htm>, last accessed July 14, 2016 at 9:40 a.m.
337
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 337
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
the Guidelines on Good Practice for Aerial Application of Pesticides (Rome, 2001);  that in 66
addition, they strictly observe standard operating procedures prior to take-off, in-flight  and post- 67 68
flight;  that they substantially invested in
69
_______________
66  The Guide offers practical help and guidance to individuals and entities involved in rising pesticides for food and
fibre production as well as in Public Health programmes. They cover the main terrestrial and aerial spray application
techniques. The guide also identifies some of the problems and suggest means of addressing them.  See FAO-Committee on
Agriculture and Consumer Protection, “Guidelines on Good Practice for Aerial Application of Pesticides” (Rome, 2001),
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y2766e/y2766e00.htm>, last accessed July 14, 2016 at 9:42 a.m.
67  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. II), pp. 1300-1301; this includes: (a) notice to the community through the advisory
board at least three (3) days before the scheduled date of spraying; (b) determining the flight pattern for the aircraft applicator
using the Differential Global Positioning system (DGPS) to establish precise swath patterns and determine specific points
during the flight for the spray valve to be turned on and shut off; (c) pre-inflight inspection of the aircraft, including the
cleaning and checking of the spray valves in the Micronair Rotary Drift Control Atomizers (AU 5000 Low-Drift model) that
disperses the solution being sprayed for a consistent droplet-size of 200 to 250 microns to control drift; (d) monitoring by the
Spray Supervisor of the weather and environmental conditions in the weather station; and (e) sounding of alarms for fifteen
(15) minutes prior to take-off.
68  Id., at p. 1301; the following are observed: (a) monitoring of wind speed and direction, and weather conditions, and
maintaining radio contact with the pilot during aerial spraying operations; (b) diverting road traffic to prevent people from
traversing in areas near the plantations; (c) maintaining a flying height clearance of about 3.5 meters above the leaf canopy; (d)
ensuring that spraying valves are shut-off at least 50 meters before the edge of the perimeter and before the 30 meter buffer
zone.
69  Id., at p. 1302; includes: (a) DGPS data card recording the swath pattern submitted to the Spray Supervisor; and (b)
cleaning of aircraft including the Micronair Rotary Drift Control Atomizers which is being calibrated monthly.
 
 
338
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
state-of-the-art technology and equipment designed to ensure safety, accuracy, and effectiveness
of aerial spraying operations, to avoid aerial drift;  that their equipment include: wind meters (to
70
measure the wind velocity in a specific area), wind cones (to determine the wind direction, and
whether the wind is a headwind, tailwind or a crosswind); central weather station (to measure
wind speed, the temperature and relative humidity), Differential Global Positioning System
(DGPS),  Intellimap,  Control and Display Unit, Micronair Rotary Drift Control Atomizers (AU
71 72 73
5000 Low-Drift model),  Intelliflow Spray Valve System,  and Target Flow Spray Valve Switch
74 75
System;  and that they want to minimize, if not,
76
_______________
70  Id., at pp. 1302-1303; respondents allegedly invested in sensors, wind meters, wind cones, field thermometers and a
central weather station.
71  Id., at p. 1330; a precision satellite-based navigational system that accurately plots the plantation and guides the pilot
in conducting aerial spraying.
72  Id.; an instrument that depicts an accurate map of the plantation, indicating the turn on and shut off spray valve points
during the flight, and records swath patterns while the aerial spraying is being conducted.
73  Id.; allows the pilot to program the grid coordinates of a particular plantation on the DGPS, retrieve navigational
guidance for the pilot, monitor ground speed (tailwind and headwind), program and retrieve date to record the actual spraying
operation.
74  Id.; ensures that the droplets of solution released for aerials praying are consistently delivered with each droplet with
a size of 250 microns to control drift. It controls the flow and the drift of the solution released for aerial spraying even when
the aircraft applicator is operating at 145-240 kilometers per hour.
75  Id.; controls the rate of application of the solution for aerial application to ensure that the substance being aerially
sprayed is consistently and equally applied throughout the entire banana plantation.
76  Id.; a device that will automatically turn on and shut off the spray valves on precise points within the target area as
programmed in the GPS.
339
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 339
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
eliminate the occurrence of spray drift in order to minimize wastage of resources and reduced
efficiency of spraying programs implemented to control the Black Sigatoka disease. 77
The respondents maintain that Ordinance No. 0309-07 will regulate aerial spraying as a
method of application, instead of the substances being used therein; that the prohibition is
overbroad in light of other available reasonable measures that may be resorted to by the local
government; that the ordinance is unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, and tantamount to a restriction
or prohibition of trade;  that the ordinance will effectively impose a prohibition against all
78
pesticides, including fungicides that fall under the mildest type of substance; that as such, the
petitioner has disregarded existing valid and substantive classifications established and recognized
by the World Health Organization (WHO) that are adopted by the FPA; that the FPA is the
national agency armed with the professional competence, technical expertise, and legal mandate to
deal with the issue of use and application of pesticides in our country; that the fungicides they
administer are duly registered with the FPA, and with other more developed countries that have
observed a stricter environmental and public health regulation such as the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the European Union (EU); that as such, the City of
Davao has disregarded valid, substantial and significant distinctions between levels of
concentration of the fungicides in the water solution aerially sprayed; that it is the FPA that
regulates the level of concentration of agricultural chemicals prior to commercial distribution and
use in the country; that the members of PBGEA only spray a water solution (water cocktail)
containing 0.1 liter to 1.5 liters of the active ingredient of fungicide in a 30-liter water solution per
hectare that has undergone rigorous testing and evaluation prior to registration by the FPA; that the
active ingredients of the fungicide are so diluted that no harm
_______________
77  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. II), p. 1331.
78  Id., at pp. 1307-1311.
 
 
340
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
may be posed to public health or to the environment through aerial application;  that the ordinance 79
was so broad that it prohibits aerial application of any substance, including water;  and that aside 80
from fungicides, the respondents also aerially apply vitamins, minerals and organic fertilizers. 81
The respondents submit that the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 5 of
the ordinance constitutes an improper exercise of police power; that the ordinance will require all
landholdings to maintain the buffer zone, thereby diminishing to a mere 1,600 square meters of
usable and productive land for every hectare of the plantation bounding residential areas, with the
zone being reserved for planting “diversified trees”; that this requirement amounts to taking
without just compensation or due process; and that the imposition of the buffer zone unduly 342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
deprives all landowners within the City of Davao the beneficial use of their property;  that the 82

precautionary principle cannot be applied blindly, because its application still requires some Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
scientific basis; that the principle is also based on a mere declaration that has not even reached the close second to coconut oil with 18%.  The Davao Region (Region XI)  was the top banana
87 88

level of customary international law, not on a treaty binding on the Government. 83 producing region in 2013, with a production growth rate of 16.4%, and 33.76% share in the total
The respondents argue that the illegality of the transition period results in the invalidity of the agricultural output of the Region. 89

ordinance as it does not carry a separability clause; and that the absence of such clause signifies
the intention of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of City of Davao to make the ordinance effective as
a whole. 84
The main issue is whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process
and equal protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exer-
_______________
Despite these optimistic statistics, the banana industry players struggle to keep up with the
demands of the trade by combatting the main threat to production posed by two major fungal
diseases: the Panama Disease Tropical Race 4 (Fusarium oxysprum f.sp. cubense) and the Black
Sigatoka leaf spot disease (Mycosphaerella fjiensis morelet). Pesticides have proven to be
effective only against the Black Sigatoka disease. There is yet no known cure for the Panama
disease. 90

The menace of the Black Sigatoka disease cannot be taken lightly. The disease causes
79  Id., at p. 1322. destruction of the plant by significantly reducing the leaf area, leading to premature ripening
80  Id., at pp. 1316-1317. _______________
81  Id., at pp. 1297-1298.
82  Id., at pp. 1340-1342.
83  Id., at pp. 1318-1319. 87  Philippine Statistics Authority, “Philippine Agriculture in Figures, 2013,” <http://countrystat.psa.gov.ph/?cont=3>,
84  Id., at p. 1264. last accessed July 14, 2016 at 9:50 a.m.
88  Includes Davao del Norte, Davao City, Compostela Valley, Davao Oriental and Davao del Sur, Panabo City, Tagum,
  Digos, Island Garden City of Samal.
  89  Philippine Satistics Authority, “Regional Profile: Davao,” <http://countrystat.psa.gov.ph/?cont=16&r=11>, last
341 accessed July 14, 2016 at 9:55 a.m.
90  Farms infested by Panama disease are abandoned and left idle for about five years before recultivation. In Davao
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 341 City, only 1,800 hectares of the original 5,200 hectares planted to bananas have remained due to the infection.
<http://www.ugnayan.com/ph/DavaodelSur/Davao/article/YCL>, last accessed April 4, 2015 at 1:57 p.m.) Only two (2)
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc. varieties of Cavendish banana are recommended for planting in Effected soil. Otherwise, new crops such as corn, cacao and oil
cise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao palm are recommended for cultivation. See Manuel Cayon, “DA allots P102 million for Panama-disease control among
City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition period to shift to other modes of banana growers,” Business Mirror (28 April 2015), <www.businessmirror.com.ph/2015/04/28/da-allots-p102million-for-
pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer panama-disease-control-among-banana-growers>.
zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao City.  
   
343
Ruling of the Court
  VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 343
We deny the petitions for review for their lack of merit. Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
  of the produce and resulting in yield losses of at least 50%.  Due to its effects on banana export
91

I trading, the disease has emerged as a global concern that has correspondingly forced banana
Preliminary considerations: producers to increase the use of chemical pesticides.  Protectant fungicides such as Mancozeb,
92

The significant role of the banana industry chlorothalonil and Propiconazole are applied to combat the disease.  These agricultural chemicals
93

in ensuring economic stability and food security
 
There is no question that the implementation of Ordinance No. 0309-07, although the
ordinance concerns the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying in all agricultural lands within
Davao City, will inevitably have a considerable impact on the country’s banana industry,
particularly on export trading.
are aerially applied by the respondents in the banana plantations within the jurisdiction of Davao
City to arrest the proliferation of the disease.
Considering that banana export plantations exist in vast monocultures, effective treatment of
the Black Sigatoka disease is done by frequent aerial application of fungicides. This is an
expensive practice because it requires permanent landing strips, facilities for the mixing and
loading of fungicides, and high recurring expense of spray materials.  The cost of aerial spraying
94

Banana exportation plays a significant role in the maintenance of the country’s economic, accounts to 15-20% of the final retail price of the crop, making the technology essentially
stability and food security. Banana is a consistent dollar earner and the fourth largest produced unavailable to small landholdings that are more vulnerable to the disease. 95

commodity in the Philippines.  In 2010, the Philippines figured among the top three banana
85
Aerial spraying has become an agricultural practice in Davao City since the establishment of
producing countries in the world.  In 2014, fresh bananas accounted for 17% of the country’s top
86
the banana plantations in
agricultural export commodities, gaining a _______________
_______________
91  Ploetz, Randy, “Black Sigatoka of Banana: The Most Important Disease of a Most Important Fruit ,” APS, 2001,
85  Philippine Center for Postharvest Development and Mechanization (PhilMech), “Banana Post-harvest Situationer,” <http://www.apsnet.org/publications/apsnetfeatures/Pages/blacksigatoka.aspx>, last accessed July 14, 2016 at 10:08 a.m.
<http://www.philmech.gov.ph/phindustry/banana.htm>, last accessed July 14, 2016 at 9:44 a.m. 92  <https://www.wageningenur.nl/en/show/Another-major-step-in-better-disease-management-in-the-global-banana-
86  DA High Value Crops Development Program, <http://hvcc.da.gov.ph/banana.htm>, last accessed July 14, 2016 at sector.htm>, last accessed July 14, 2016 at 10:11 a.m.
9:46 a.m. 93  Banana: Diseases, <http://nhb.gov.in/fruits/banana/ban002.pdf>, last accessed July 14, 2016 at 10:15 a.m.
  94  Ploetz, Randy, Black Sigatoka in Pesticide Outlook, Vol. 11, Issue (2000),
  <www.researchinformation.co.uk/pest/2000/B006308H/
.pdf>, last accessed July 14, 2016 at 10:21 a.m.
342
95  Ploetz, supra.
  
 
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344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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1960.  Out of the 5,205 hectares of commercial plantations devoted to Cavendish banana being
96
operated by the respondents in Davao City,  around 1,800 hectares receive treatment through
97
aerial application. These plantations are situated in Barangays Sirib, Manuel Guianga, Tamayong,
Subasta Dacudao, Lasang, Mandug, Waan, Tigatto and Callawa,  and are affected by the ban
98
imposed by Ordinance No. 0309-07. The DTI has issued a statement to the effect that the ban
against aerial spraying in banana plantations “is expected to kill the banana industry,” affects the
socio-economic development of the barangayshosting the affected plantations, and has a
disastrous impact on export trading. The DTI has forecasted that the ban would discourage the
entry of new players in the locality, which would have a potential drawback in employment
generation. 99
 
II
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City
enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07
under its corporate powers
 
The petitioners assert that Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid act of the  Sangguniang Bayan of
Davao City pursuant to its delegated authority to exercise police power in the furtherance of public
welfare and in ensuring a sound and balanced environment for its constituents. The respondents
negate this assertion, describing the ordinance as unreasonable, discriminatory and oppressive.
_______________
96  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. III), p. 1548; Summary Report on the Assessment and Fact-finding Activities on the
Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations.
97  Id., at p. 1547.
98  Id., at p. 1549.
99  Id., at pp. 1568-1569.
 
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The petitioners’ assertion of its authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07 is upheld.
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-pronged test:
the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law);
and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the
limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and
reason, and its consistency with public policy). 100
The formalities in enacting an ordinance are laid down in Section 53  and Section 54  of 101
The Local Government Code. These provisions require the ordinance to be passed by the majority
of the members of the sanggunianconcerned, and to be presented to the mayor for approval. With
no issues regarding quorum during its deliberation having been raised, and with its approval of by
City Mayor Duterte not being disputed, we see no reason to strike down Ordinance No. 0309-07
for noncompliance with the formal requisites under the Local Government Code.
We next ascertain whether the City of Davao acted within the limits of its corporate powers in
enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07.
_______________
100  Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013, 711 SCRA 771, 785.
101  Section 53. Quorum.—(a) A majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have been elected and
qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business. x x x
102  Section 54. Approval of Ordinances.—(a) Every ordinance enacted by the x x x sangguniang panlungsod x x x
shall be presented to the x x x city or municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the
same, he shall affix his signature on each and every page thereof. x x x.
 
 
346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in
order to promote the general welfare. Such legislative powers spring from the delegation thereof
103
by Congress through either the Local Government Code or a special law. The General Welfare
Clause in Section 16 of the Local Government Code embodies the legislative grant that enables the
local government unit to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of its creation,
and to promote and maintain local autonomy. Section 16 reads:
104
Sec. 16. General Welfare.—Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of
their inhabitants.
 
Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely: the general legislative
power and the police power proper. General legislative power refers to the power delegated by
Congress to the local legislative body, or the Sang-
_______________
103  Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., supra note 32 at pp. 139-140.
104  Rural Bank of Makati, Inc. v. Municipality of Makati, G.R. No. 150763, July 2, 2004, 433 SCRA 362, 371.
345 347
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 347
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
guniang Panlungsod in the case of Davao City,  to enable the local legislative body to enact
105
ordinances and make regulations. This power is limited in that the enacted ordinances must not be
repugnant to law, and the power must be exercised to effectuate and discharge the powers and
duties legally conferred to the local legislative body. The police power proper, on the other hand,
authorizes the local government unit to enact ordinances necessary and proper for the health and
safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the local government
102
unit and its constituents, and for the protection of their property. 106
Section 458 of the Local Government Code explicitly vests the local government unit with the
authority to enact legislation aimed at promoting the general welfare, viz.:
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.—(a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as
the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of
the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code. x x x
 
In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology, the local
government unit takes its cue from Section 15 and Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
Following the provisions of the Local Government Code and the Constitution, the acts of the local
government unit designed to ensure the health and lives of its constituents and to promote a
balanced and healthful ecology are well within the corporate powers vested in the local govern-
_______________
105  Sec. 458, Article III, Title III, Book III, R.A. No. 7160.
106  Rural Bank of Makati, Inc. v. Municipality of Makati, supra note 104 at pp. 371-372; United States v. Salaveria, 39
Phil. 102, 110 (1918).
 
 
348
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
ment unit. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City is vested with the requisite
authority to enact an ordinance that seeks to protect the health and well-being of its constituents.
The respondents pose a challenge against Ordinance No. 0309-07 on the ground that
the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City has disregarded the health of the plantation workers,
contending that by imposing the ban against aerial spraying the ordinance would place the
plantation workers at a higher health risk because the alternatives of either manual or truck-boom
spraying method would be adopted; and that exposing the workers to the same risk sought to be
prevented by the ordinance would defeat its purported purpose.
We disagree with the respondents.
With or without the ban against aerial spraying, the health and safety of plantation workers are
secured by existing state policies, rules and regulations implemented by the FPA, among others,
which the respondents are lawfully bound to comply with. The respondents even manifested their
strict compliance with these rules, including those in the UN-FAO Guidelines on Good Practice
for Aerial Application of Pesticides (Rome, 2001). We should note that the Rome, 2001 guidelines
require the pesticide applicators to observe the standards provided therein to ensure the health and
safety of plantation workers. As such, there cannot be any imbalance between the right to health of
the residents vis-à-vis the workers even if a ban will be imposed against aerial spraying and the
consequent adoption of other modes of pesticide treatment.
Furthermore, the constitutional right to health and maintaining environmental integrity are
privileges that do not only advance the interests of a group of individuals. The benefits of
protecting human health and the environment transcend geographical locations and even
generations. This is the
 
 
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essence of Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution. In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,  we
declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the
questioned ordinance should be appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to
their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The
City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general welfare,
specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a
valid license for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A
thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact legislations from the method of
accomplishing the same.
By distinguishing authority from method we face this question: Is a prohibition against aerial
spraying a lawfully permissible method that the local government unit of Davao City may adopt to
prevent the purported effects of aerial drift? To resolve this question, the Court must dig deeper
into the intricate issues arising from these petitions.
 
III
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates
the Due Process Clause
 
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.  In order to declare it as
108
_______________
107  G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, 805.
108  Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013, 693 SCRA 141, 157, citing White Light
Corporation v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009, 576 SCRA 416, 433.
 
 
350
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements,
namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not
oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) it must not be
unreasonable. 109
In the State’s exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the Government.  A local government 110
unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following
requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive.  The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution;
111
the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. 112
Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for
the Government’s action.  This means that in exercising police power the local government unit
113
must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary
purpose. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs
means that are reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the
_______________
349
109  Legaspi v. City of Cebu, supra note 100 at pp. 784-785; citing City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 49 at p. 326.
110  Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., supra note 32 at p. 139.
111  Id., at p. 138.
107
112  Parayno v. Jovellanos, G.R. No. 148408, July 14, 2006, 495 SCRA 85, 93.
113  City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 49 at p. 330.
 
 
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Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge. 114
The respondents challenge Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for being unreasonable and
oppressive in that it sets the effectivity of the ban at three months after publication of the
ordinance. They allege that three months will be inadequate time to shift from aerial to truck-
mounted boom spraying, and effectively deprives them of efficient means to combat the Black
Sigatoka disease.
 The petitioners counter that the period is justified considering the urgency of protecting the
health of the residents.
We find for the respondents.
The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application within three
months can readily be appreciated given the vast area of the affected plantations and the
corresponding resources required therefor. To recall, even the RTC recognized the impracticality
of attaining a full shift to other modes of spraying within three months in view of the costly
financial and civil works required for the conversion.  In the assailed decision, the CA
115
appropriately observed:
There appears to be three (3) forms of ground spraying, as distinguished from aerial spraying, which are:
1. “Truck-mounted boom spraying”; 2. “manual or backpack spraying”; and 3. “sprinkler spraying.”
Petitioners-appellants claim that it was physically impossible for them to shift to “truck-mounted boom
spraying” within three (3) months before the aerial spraying ban is actually enforced. They cited the testimony
of Dr. Maria Emilia Rita G. Fabregar, Ph.D, PBGEA Chairperson, to the effect that since banana plantations in
Davao City were configured for aerial spraying, the same lack the road network to make “truck-mounted boom
spraying” possible. According to Dr. Fabregar, it was impossible to
_______________
114  State v. Old South Amusements, Inc., 564 S.E.2d 710 (2002).
115  See RTC Decision, RTC Records No. 10, pp. 2926-2927.
 
 
352
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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construct such road networks in a span of three (3) months. Engr. Magno P. Porticos, Jr., confirmed that the
shift demands the construction of three hundred sixty (360) linear kilometers of road which cannot be
completed in three (3) months.
In their separate testimonies, Dr. Fabregar and Engr. Porticos explained that a shift to “truck-mounted
boom spraying” requires the following steps which may be completed in three (3) years:
1. six (6) months for planning the reconfiguration of banana plantations to ensure effective
truck-mounted boom spraying for the adequate protections of the plantations from the Black Sigatoka
fungus and other diseases, while maximizing land use;
2. two (2) months to secure government permits for infrastructure works to be undertaken
thereon;
3. clearing banana plants and dismantling or reconstructing fixed infrastructures, such as roads,
drains, cable ways, and irrigation facilities, which phase may be completed in eighteen (18) months;
4. importation and purchase of trucks mounted with boom spraying, nurse trucks and
protective gears. The placing of orders and delivery of these equipments, including the training [of]
the personnel who would man the same, would take six (6) months; and
5. securing the needed capitalization to finance these undertakings would take six (6) months
to a year.
Ms. Maria Victoria E. Sembrano, CPA, Chairperson of the PBGEA Finance Committee, testified that her
committee and the Technical Committee and Engineering Group of PBGEA conducted a feasibility study to
de-
 
353
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Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
termine the cost in undertaking the shift to ground spraying. Their findings fixed the estimated cost for the
purpose at Php400 Million.
x x x x
Both appellees failed to rebut the foregoing testimonies with empirical findings to the contrary.
x x x x
Thus, in view of the infrastructural requirements as methodically explained, We are convinced that it was
physically impossible for petitioners-appellants to carry out a carefully planned configuration of vast hectares
of banana plantations and be able to actually adopt “truck-mounted boom spraying” within three (3) months.
To compel petitioners-appellants to abandon aerial spraying in favor of “manual or backpack spraying” or
“sprinkler spraying” within 3 months puts petitioners-appellants in a vicious dilemma between protecting its
investments and the health of its workers, on the one hand, and the threat of prosecution if they refuse to
comply with the imposition. We even find the 3-month transition period insufficient, not only in acquiring and
gearing up the plantation workers of safety appurtenances, but more importantly in reviewing safety
procedures for “manual or backpack spraying” and in training such workers for the purpose. Additionally, the
engineering works for a sprinkler system in vast hectares of banana plantations could not possibly be
completed within such period, considering that safety and efficiency factors need to be considered in its
structural redesigning.
x x x x
Respondent-appellee argues that the Ordinance merely banned an agricultural practice and did not
actually prohibit the operation of banana plantations; hence, it is not oppressive. While We agree that the
measure did not impose a closure of a lawful enterprise, the proviso in Section 5, however, compels
petitioners-appellants to abandon aerial spraying without affording them enough time to convert and adopt
other spraying practices. This would preclude petitioners-appellants from being able to
 
 
354
354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
fertilize their plantations with essential vitamins and minerals substances, aside from applying thereon the
needed fungicides or pesticides to control, if not eliminate the threat of, plant diseases. Such an apparent
eventuality would prejudice the operation of the plantations, and the economic repercussions thereof would
just be akin to shutting down the venture.
This Court, therefore, finds Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 an invalid provision because the
compulsion thereunder to abandon aerial spraying within an impracticable period of “three (3) months after the
effectivity of this Ordinance” is “unreasonable, oppressive and impossible to comply with.” 116
 
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will
consume considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features
of the plantations.  As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of
117
three months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the
consequences of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine,
imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to
constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners within Davao City of the
_______________
116  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. I), pp. 86-91.
117  Id., at pp. 1542-2543; based on the report submitted by Engr. Magno Porticos, Jr., the cost and time frame estimate
submitted to the PBGEA was based on the requirements of lowland and relatively flat lands where road and drainage system to
be constructed will be uniformly straight and equidistant. The cost for plantations consisting of slope terrains and gullies, will
vary. See Engineering Committee Report on the Main Engineering Works Needed to Comply with the Ordinance Banning
Aerial Spray.
 
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beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking without just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,  we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes
118
confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property, viz.:
 An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable
purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.
It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that “private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.” The provision is the most important protection of property rights in the
Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The constitutional
provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some to give it to others. In
part too, it is about loss spreading. If the government takes away a person’s property to benefit society, then
society should pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee is to bar the Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the government’s
regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, it was held that a taking also could be found if
_______________
118  City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 49 at pp. 339-342.
 
356
356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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government regulation of the use of property went “too far.” When regulation reaches a certain magnitude, in
most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to support the act.
While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation becomes
a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was “a question of degree and therefore cannot be
disposed of by general propositions.” On many other occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that
the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts in each case. The Court
asks whether justice and fairness require that the economic loss caused by public action must be compensated
by the government and thus borne by the public as a whole, or whether the loss should remain concentrated on
those few persons subject to the public action.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it
leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use. A regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use of
land is, from the owner’s point of view, equivalent to a “taking” unless principles of nuisance or property law
that existed when the owner acquired the land make the use prohibitable. When the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave
his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require compensation
under the takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all
economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors
including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with
reasonable in-
 
 
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Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
vestment-backed expectations and the character of government action. These inquiries are informed by the
purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the government from forcing some people alone to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
A restriction on use of property may also constitute a “taking” if not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-
backed expectations of the owner. (bold emphasis supplied)
 
The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the effects of
aerial spraying within and near the plantations. Although Section 3(e) of the ordinance requires the
planting of diversified trees within the identified buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed
and deemed as confiscatory requiring payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be
entitled to compensation if the taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial
or productive uses of the land. The respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely
deprived of their landholdings because they can still cultivate or make other productive uses of the
areas to be identified as the buffer zones.
 
IV
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates
the Equal Protection Clause
 
A serious challenge being posed against Ordinance No. 0309-07 rests on its supposed
collision with the Equal Protection Clause. The respondents submit that the ordinance transgresses
this constitutional guaranty on two counts, to wit: (1) by prohibiting aerial spraying per se,
regardless of the substance or the level of concentration of the chemicals to be applied; and (2) by
imposing the 30-meter buffer zone in all
 
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358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the sizes of the landholding.
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty
equal protection secures every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the State’s duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the
law demands that the State governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective. 119
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction,  nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by
120
the territory in which it is to operate.  The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among
121
equals determined according to a valid classification.  If the groupings are characterized by
122
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another.  In other words, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial
123
distinctions; (2) germane to
_______________
119  Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 167.
120  Bartolome v. Social Security System, G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014, 740 SCRA 78; Garcia v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012, 677 SCRA 750, 778.
121  JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, August 5, 1996, 260 SCRA 319,
331.
122  Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010, 613 SCRA 385, 414.
123  Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 278, 288.
 
 
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the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to
all members of the class. 124
Based on these parameters, we find for the respondents.
 The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the justification given by the Government
for its conduct is gauged by using the means-end test.  This test requires analysis of: (1) the
125
interests of the public that generally require its exercise, as distinguished from those of a particular
class; and (2) the means employed that are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and are not unduly oppressive upon individuals. To determine the propriety of the
126
classification, courts resort to three levels of scrutiny, viz.: the rational scrutiny,intermediate
scrutiny and strict scrutiny.
The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational basis test)
demands that the classification reasonably relate to the legislative purpose.  The rational basis test
127
often applies in cases involving economics or social welfare,  or to any other case not involving a
128
suspect class. 129
When the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be treated under
intermediate or heightened review. Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy
_______________
124  City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 49 at pp. 348-349.
125  Galloway, Russell W., “Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review, Vol. 21,p. 449, available at http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1557&context=llr, last
accessed August 16, 2016.
126  Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., supra note 32 at p. 138.
127  See the Concurring Opinion of Justice Teresita J. De Castro in Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013,
699 SCRA 352, 447.
128  Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971).
129  Id. Suspect class refers to alienage such as that based on nationality or race.
 
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receives intermediate scrutiny.  To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an
130
important governmental interest and be substantially related to that interest, but the justification
for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations. 131
The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect
class. The Government carries the burden to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest, and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest. 132
The petitioners advocate the rational basis test. In particular, the petitioning residents of
Davao City argue that the CA erroneously applied the strict scrutiny approach when it declared
that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because the ban included all substances
including water and vitamins. The respondents agree with the CA, however, and add that the
ordinance does not rest on a valid distinction because it has lacked scientific basis and has ignored
the classifications of pesticides observed by the FPA.
We partly agree with both parties.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately
applies herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable rela-
_______________
130  Strauss, Marcy, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, Seattle University Law Review, Vol. 35:135, p. 146, available
at <http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2059&context=sulr >, last accessed August 16,
2016; White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra note 108 at pp. 436-437.
131  See Separate Concurring Opinion of J. Puno (ret.) in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
190582, April 8, 2010, 618 SCRA 32, 94.
132  Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014, 716 SCRA 237, 301.
 
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tionship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means
or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A
reasonable classification includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the law. 133
Applying the test, the established classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 is to be viewed
in relation to the group of individuals similarly situated with respect to the avowed purpose. This
gives rise to two classes, namely: (1) the classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 (legislative
classification); and (2) the classification based on purpose (elimination of the mischief). The
legislative classification found in Section 4 of the ordinance refers to “all agricultural entities”
within Davao City. Meanwhile, the classification based on the purpose of the ordinance cannot be
easily discerned because the ordinance does not make any express or implied reference to it. We
have to search the voluminous records of this case to divine the animusbehind the action of
the Sangguniang Panglungsod in prohibiting aerial spraying as an agricultural activity. The effort
has led us to the following proposed resolution of the Sangguniang Panglungsod,  viz.: 134
_______________
133  In determining the reasonableness of a classification, one must look beyond the classification to the purpose of the
law which is the elimination of a mischief. This gives rise to two (2) classes: the  firstconsists of all individuals possessing the
defining character or characteristics of the legislative classification (“Trait”); the second would consist of all individuals
possessing or tainted by the mischief at which the law aims.  See Tussman, Joseph and tenBroek, Jacobus, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341 (1949), available at <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=3493econtext=californialawreview>, last accessed August 16, 2016.
134  RTC Records No. 8, pp. 2361-2362 (Submitted as Exhibit “10” of the petitioners-intervenors).
 
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RESOLUTION NO. ____
Series of 2007
A RESOLUTION TO ENACT AN ORDINANCE BANNING AERIAL SPRAYING AS AN
AGRICULTURAL PRACTICE IN ALL AGRICULTURAL ENTITIES IN DAVAO CITY
WHEREAS, the City of Davao, with fertile lands and ideal climactic condition, hosts various large farms
planted with different crops;
WHEREAS, these farms, lay adjacent to other agricultural businesses and that residential areas abuts
these farm boundaries;
WHEREAS, aerial spraying as a mode of applying chemical substances such as fungicides and pesticides
is being used by investors/companies over large agricultural plantations in Davao City;
WHEREAS, the Davao City watersheds and ground water sources, located within and adjacent to Mount
Apo may be affected by the aerial spraying of chemical substances on the agricultural farms and plantations
therein;
WHEREAS, the effects of aerial spraying are found to be detrimental to the health of the residents of
Davao City most especially the inhabitants nearby agricultural plantations practicing aerials spraying;
WHEREAS, the unstable wind direction during the conduct of aerial spray application of these chemical
substances pose health hazards to people, animals, other crops and ground water sources;
WHEREAS, in order to achieve sustainable development, politics must be based on the Precautionary
Principle. Environment measures must anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of environmental degradation.
Where there are threats of serious, irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a
reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation;
 
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 WHEREAS, it is the policy of the City of Davao to ensure the safety of its inhabitants from all forms of
hazards, especially if such hazards come from development activities that are supposed to be beneficial to
everybody;
WHEREAS, pesticides are by its nature poisonous, it is all the more dangerous when dispensed aerially
through aircraft because of unstable wind conditions which in turn makes aerial spray drifting to unintended
targets a commonplace;
WHEREAS, aerial spraying of pesticides is undeniably a nuisance;
WHEREAS, looking at the plight of the complainants and other stakeholders opposed to aerial spraying,
the issue of aerial spraying of pesticides is in all fours a nuisance. Given the vastness of the reach of aerial
spraying, the said form of dispensation falls into the category of a public nuisance. Public nuisance is defined
by the New Civil Code as one which affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal;
WHEREAS, the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code empowers Local Government
Units to enact ordinances that provide for the health and safety, promote the comfort and convenience of the
City and the inhabitants thereof;
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that for the health,
safety and peace of mind of all the inhabitants of Davao City, let an ordinance be enacted banning aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural entities in Davao City.
x x x x
 
The proposed resolution identified aerial spraying of pesticides as a nuisance because of the
unstable wind direction during the aerial application, which (1) could potentially contaminate the
Davao City watersheds and ground water
 
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sources; (2) was detrimental to the health of Davao City residents, most especially those living in
the nearby plantations; and (3) posed a hazard to animals and other crops. Plainly, the mischief
that the prohibition sought to address was the fungicide drift resulting from the aerial application;
hence, the classification based on the intent of the proposed ordinance covered all agricultural
entities conducting aerial spraying of fungicides that caused drift.
The assailed ordinance thus becomes riddled with several distinction issues.
A brief discussion on the occurrence of the drift that the ordinance seeks to address is
necessary.
Pesticide treatment is based on the use of different methods of application and
equipment,  the choice of which methods depend largely on the objective of distributing the
135
correct dose to a defined target with the minimum of wastage due to “drift.”  The term “drift” 136
refers to the movement of airborne spray droplets, vapors, or dust particles away from the target
area during pesticide application.  Inevitably, any method of
137
_______________
135  This includes Hand sprayers and atomizers, Hand compressed sprayers, Knapsack sprayers, Tractor-mounted
sprayer, Motorized knapsack mist blowers, Ultra low volume or controlled-droplet applicators (ULV/CDA), Fogging
machines/fogair sprayers, Hand-carried dusters, Hand-carried granule applicators, Power dusters, Aerial application (Aircraft
sprayers), and Injectors and fumigation equipment (S.K. Pal and S.K. Das Gupta, “Pesticide Application,” Skill Development
Series No. 17, ICRISAT Training and Fellowship Program, International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics,
available at <http://oar.icrisat.org/2430/1/Pesticide-Application.pdf>, accessed August 16, 2016, 1:52 p.m.
136  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States, Guidelines on Good Agricultural Practice for Ground
Application of Pesticides, Rome, 2001.
137  Cordell, Susan and Baker, Paul B., Pesticide Drift, available
<http://extension.arizona.edu/sites/extension.arizona.edu/files/pubs/az1050.pdf>, last accessed August 16, 2016.
 
 
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application causes drift, which may either be primary or secondary. As fittingly described by
scholars: 138
Primary drift is the off-site movement of spray droplets at, or very close to, the time of application. For
example, a field application using a boom in a gusty wind situation could easily lead to a primary
drift. Primary spray drift is not product specific, and the active ingredients do not differ in their potential to
drift. However, the type of formulation, surfactant, or other adjuvant may affect spray drift potential.
Secondary drift is associated with pesticide vapor. Pesticide vapor drift is the movement of the gas that
forms when an active ingredient evaporates from plants, soil, or other surfaces. And while vapor drift is an
important issue, it only pertains to certain volatile products. Vapor drift and other forms
of secondary drift are product specific. Water-based sprays will volatize more quickly than oil-based sprays.
However, oil-based sprays can drift farther, especially above 95°F, because they are lighter.
 
Understandably, aerial drift occurs using any method of application, be it through airplanes,
ground sprayers, airblast sprayers or irrigation systems.  Several factors contribute to the
139
occurrence of drift depending on the method of application, viz.:
_______________
138  Id.
139  Fishel, F.M. and Ferrell, J.A., Managing Pesticide Drift, available at <http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pi232>, last accessed
August 16, 2016.
 
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Wind speed Wind speed Wind speed                
Swath adjustment      
Canopy      
Boom length      
Tank mix physical properties      
Source: F.M. Fishel and J.A. Ferrell, “Managing Pesticide Drift,” available at
<http://edis.ifas.edu/pi232>, citing Pesticide Notes, MSU Extension.
 
The four most common pesticide treatment methods adopted in Davao City are aerial, truck-
mounted boom, truck-mounted mechanical, and manual spraying. However, Ordinance No. 0309-
140
07 imposes the prohibition only against aerial spraying.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of
drift causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this
justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on
substantial distinction?
We answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct
of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying
produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to
the community and to the environment.  A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm
141
that the ordinance seeks to achieve.  In the process, the ordinance suffers from being
142
_______________
at
140  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. III), p. 1548; Summary Report on the Assessment and Fact-finding Activities on the
Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations.
141  Id., at p. 1549.
142  Id., at p. 1566; according to Regional Health Director of the Department of Health (DOH) Paulyn Jean B. Rosell-
Ubial (now the
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“underinclusive” because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same
mischief that the law seeks to eliminate.  A classification that is drastically underinclusive with
143
respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly
serves the intended purpose of the law. 144
The claim that aerial spraying produces more aerial drift cannot likewise be sustained in view
of the petitioners’ failure to substantiate the same. The respondents have refuted this claim, and
have maintained that on the contrary, manual spraying produces more drift than aerial
treatment.  As such, the decision of prohibiting only aerial spraying is tainted with arbitrariness.
145
Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be “overinclusive”
because its impending implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the
accomplishment of the legislative purpose. Its implementation will unnecessarily impose a burden
on a wider range of indi-
_______________
Secretary of Health), the ban against aerial spraying and adoption of ground spraying would not eliminate the hazards of the
pesticides to which workers and residents within and around banana plantations might be exposed.
143  Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 133.
144  Treiman, David M., Equal Protection and Fundamental Rights — A Judicial Shell Game, 15 Tulsa L. J. 183, 191
(1979), available at: <http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/cgi/reviewcontent.cgi?article=1510&context=/tlr>, last accessed
August 16, 2016.
145  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. II), pp. 1257-1258, according to respondents’ witness, Mr. Richard Billington, the
drift at the edge of an area sprayed from the air results to approximately half of the corresponding value for ground application.
This observation was based on the AgDrift Model, developed under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement
(CRADA) between the Spray Drift Task Force (SDTF) of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the US
Department of Agriculture-Agricultural Research Service (USDA-ARS).
 
 
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viduals than those included in the intended class based on the purpose of the law. 146
It can be noted that the imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies
irrespective of the substance to be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be
conducted. The respondents admit that they aerially treat their plantations not only with pesticides
but also vitamins and other substances. The imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of
substances other than fungicides and regardless of the agricultural activity being performed
becomes unreasonable inasmuch as it patently bears no relation to the purported inconvenience,
discomfort, health risk and environmental danger which the ordinance, seeks to address. The
burden now will become more onerous to various entities including the respondents and even
others with no connection whatsoever to the intended purpose of the ordinance.
In this respect, the CA correctly observed:
Ordinance No. 0309-07 defines “aerial spraying” as the “application of substances through the use of
aircraft of any form which dispenses the substances in the air.” Inevitably, the ban imposed therein
encompasses aerial application of practically all substances, not only pesticides or fungicides but including
water and all forms of chemicals, regardless of its elements, composition, or degree of safety.
Going along with respondent-appellee’s ratiocination that the prohibition in the Ordinance refers to aerial
spraying as a method of spraying pesticides or fungicides, there appears to be a need to single out pesticides or
fungicides in imposing such a ban because there is a striking distinction between such chemicals and other
substances (including water), particularly with respect to its safety implications to the public welfare and
ecology.
x x x x
_______________
146  Tussman and tenBroek, supra note 133.
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We are, therefore, convinced that the total ban on aerial spraying runs afoul with the equal protection
clause because it does not classify which substances are prohibited from being applied aerially even as
reasonable distinctions should be made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of liquid substances
to the public health, livelihood and the environment. 147
 
We clarify that the CA did not thereby apply the strict scrutiny approach but only evaluated
the classification established by the ordinance in relation to the purpose. This is the essence of the
rational basis approach. The petitioners should be made aware that the rational basis scrutiny is not
based on a simple means-purpose correlation; nor does the rational basis scrutiny automatically
result in a presumption of validity of the ordinance or deference to the wisdom of the local
legislature.  To reiterate, aside from ascertaining that the means and purpose of the ordinance are
148
reasonably related, the classification should be based on a substantial distinction.
However, we do not subscribe to the respondents’ position that there must be a distinction
based on the level of concentration or the classification imposed by the FPA on pesticides. This
strenuous requirement cannot be expected from a local
_______________
147  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. I), pp. 102-103.
148  The rational basis approach partakes of two (2) forms: the deferential and the nondeferential rational relation test. In
deferential rational basis test, the government action is always deemed constitutional if it has any conceivable valid purpose
and if the means chosen are arguably rational. In contrast, the nondeferential rational basis test requires a determination that
the government action serves an actual valid interest, hence (1) the government actually has a valid purpose and (2) the means
chosen are demonstrably rational (effective), see Galloway, Russell W., Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law,
Loyola of Los Angeles Review, Vol. 21, pp. 451-452, available at <http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1557&context=llr>, last accessed August 16, 2016.
 
 
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government unit that should only be concerned with general policies in local administration and
should not be restricted by technical concerns that are best left to agencies vested with the
appropriate special competencies. The disregard of the pesticide classification is not an equal
protection issue but is more relevant in another aspect of delegated police power that we consider
to be more appropriate in a later discussion.
The overinclusiveness of Ordinance No. 0309-07 may also be traced to its Section 6 by virtue
of its requirement for the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone. This requirement applies
regardless of the area of the agricultural landholding, geographical location, topography, crops
grown and other distinguishing characteristics that ideally should bear a reasonable relation to the
evil sought to be avoided. As earlier discussed, only large banana plantations could rely on aerial
technology because of the financial capital required therefor.
The establishment and maintenance of the buffer zone will become more burdensome to the
small agricultural landholders because: (1) they have to reserve the 30-meter belt surrounding their
property; (2) that will have to be identified through GPS; (3) the metes and bounds of the buffer
zone will have to be plotted in a survey plan for submission to the local government unit; and (4)
will be limited as to the crops that may be cultivated therein based on the mandate that the zone
shall be devoted to “diversified trees” taller than what are being grown therein.  The arbitrariness 149
of Section 6 all the more becomes evident when the land is presently devoted to the cultivation of
root crops and vegetables, and trees or plants slightly taller than the root crops and vegetables are
then to be planted. It is seriously to be doubted whether such circumstance will prevent the
occurrence of the drift to the nearby residential areas.
 Section 6 also subjects to the 30-meter buffer zone requirement agricultural entities engaging
in organic farming,
_______________
149  Section 3(e).
 
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and do not contribute to the occurrence of pesticide drift. The classification indisputably becomes
arbitrary and whimsical.
A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to undercut the
governmental claim that the classification serves legitimate political ends. Where 150
overinclusiveness is the problem, the vice is that the law has a greater discriminatory or
burdensome effect than necessary.  In this light, we strike down Section 5 and Section 6 of
151
Ordinance No. 0309-07 for carrying an invidious classification, and for thereby violating the Equal
Protection Clause.
The discriminatory nature of the ordinance can be seen from its policy as stated in its Section
2, to wit:
Section 2. POLICY OF THE CITY.—It shall be the policy of the City of Davao to eliminate the method
of aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all entities within Davao City.
Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings that are the only ideal
venues for the investment of machineries and equipment capable of aerial spraying. It effectively
denies the affected individuals the technology aimed at efficient and cost-effective operations and
cultivation not only of banana but of other crops as well. The prohibition against aerial spraying
will seriously hamper the operations of the banana plantations that depend on aerial technology to
arrest the spread of the Black Sigatoka disease and other menaces that threaten their production
and harvest. As earlier shown, the effect of the ban will not be limited to Davao City in view of the
significant contribution of banana export trading to the country’s economy.
_______________
150  Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982), 70 L.Ed.2d 677.
151  Treiman, supra note 144.
 
 
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The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and unreasonable in light of
the existence and availability of more permissible and practical alternatives that will not
overburden the respondents and those dependent on their operations as well as those who stand to
be affected by the ordinance. In the view of Regional Director Roger C. Chio of DA Regional
Field Unit XI, the alleged harm caused by aerial spraying may be addressed by following the GAP
that the DA has been promoting among plantation operators. He explained his view thusly:
The allegation that aerial spraying is hazardous to animal and human being remains an allegation and
assumptions until otherwise scientifically proven by concerned authorities and agencies. This issue can be
addressed by following Good Agricultural Practices, which DA is promoting among fruit and vegetable
growers/plantations. Any method of agri-chemical application whether aerial or non-aerial if not properly done
in accordance with established procedures and code of good agricultural practices and if the chemical
applicators and or handlers lack of necessary competency, certainly it could be hazardous. For the assurance
that commercial applicators/aerial applicators possessed the competency and responsibility of handling agri-
chemical, such applicators are required under Article III, paragraph 2 of FPA Rules and Regulation No. 1 to
secure license from FPA.
Furthermore users and applicators of agri-chemicals are also guided by Section 6, paragraphs 2 and 3
under column of Pesticides and Other agricultural Chemicals of PD 11445 which stated: “FPA shall establish
and enforce tolerance levels and good agricultural practices in raw agricultural commodities; to restrict or ban
the use of any chemical or the formulation of certain pesticides in specific areas or during certain period upon
evidence that the pesticide is eminent [sic] hazards has caused, or is causing widespread serious damage to
crops, fish, livestock or to public health and environment.”
 
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Besides the aforecited policy, rules and regulation enforced by DA, there are other laws and regulations
protecting and preserving the environment. If the implementation and monitoring of all these laws and
regulation are closely coordinated with concerned LGUs, Gas and NGAs and other private sectors, perhaps we
can maintain a sound and health environment x x x. 152
 
Indeed, based on the Summary Report on the Assessment and Fact-finding Activities on the
Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations,  submitted by the fact-finding team organized by
153
Davao City, only three out of the 13 barangays consulted by the fact-finding team opposed the
conduct of aerial spraying; and of the three barangays, aerial spraying was conducted only
in Barangay Subasta. In fact, the fact-finding team found that the residents in
those barangays were generally in favor of the operations of the banana plantations, and did not
oppose the conduct of aerial spraying.
V
The Precautionary Principle
still requires scientific basis
 
The petitioners finally plead that the Court should look at the merits of the ordinance based on
the precautionary principle. They argue that under the precautionary principle, the City of Davao
is justified in enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 in order to prevent harm to the environment and
human health despite the lack of scientific certainty.
The petitioners’ plea and argument cannot be sustained.
The principle of precaution originated as a social planning principle in Germany. In the 1980s,
the Federal Republic of Germany used the Vorsogeprinzip (“foresight principle”) to justify the
implementation of vigorous policies to tackle acid
_______________
152  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. III), pp. 1564-1565.
153  Id., at p. 1549.
 
 
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rain, global warming and pollution of the North Sea.  It has since emerged from a need to protect
154
humans and the environment from increasingly unpredictable, uncertain, and unquantifiable but
possibly catastrophic risks such as those associated with Genetically Modified Organisms and
climate change,  among others. The oft-cited Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on
155
Environment and Development (1992 Rio Agenda), first embodied this principle, as follows:
Principle 15
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation.
  
In this jurisdiction, the principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where there is
lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and
environmental effect.  In such an event, the courts may construe a set of facts as warranting
156
_______________
154  Jordan, Andrew and O’Riordan, Timothy, “The Precautionary Principle: A Legal and Policy History,” in The
precautionary principle: Protecting Public Health, The Environment and The Future of Our Children, p. 33, available at
<http://www.euro.who.int/__
data/assets/pdf_file/0003/91173/E83079.pdf>, last accessed August 16, 2016.
155  UNESCO. The Precautionary Principle, World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology
(COMEST), p. 7, available at <http://www.eubios.info/UNESCO/precprin.pdf>, last accessed August 16, 2016.
156  Section 1, Rule 20, Part V.
 
 
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either judicial action or inaction with the goal of preserving and protecting the environment. 157
It is notable, therefore, that the precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is
concurrence of three elements, namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and serious
or irreversible harm. In situations where the threat is relatively certain, or that the causal link
between an action and environmental damage can be established, or the probability of occurrence
can be calculated, only preventive, not precautionary measures, may be taken. Neither will the
precautionary principle apply if there is no indication of a threat of environmental harm; or if the
threatened harm is trivial or easily reversible. 158
We cannot see the presence of all the elements. To begin with, there has been no scientific
study. Although the precautionary principle allows lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a
connection between the serious or irreversible harm and the human activity, its application is still
premised on empirical studies. Scientific analysis is still a necessary basis for effective policy
choices under the precautionary
principle. 159
Precaution is a risk management principle invoked after scientific inquiry takes place. This
scientific stage is often considered synonymous with risk assessment.  As such, resort
160
_______________
157  Annotation to the Rules of Procedure on Environmental Cases, p. 158.
158  IUCN, Guidelines for Applying the Precautionary Principle to Biodiversity Conservation and Natural Resource
Management, available at <http://www.cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/ln250507_
ppguidelines.pdf>, last accessed August 16, 2016.
159  Annotation to the Rules of Procedure on Environmental Cases, supra.
160  Stirling, Andrew and Tickner, Joel, “Implementing Precaution: Assessment and Application Tools for Health and
Environmental Decision-Making,” in The Precautionary Principle: Protecting Public Health, The Environment and The Future
of Our Children,
 
 
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376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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to the principle shall not be based on anxiety or emotion, but from a rational decision rule, based
in ethics.  As much as possible, a complete and objective scientific evaluation of the risk to the
161
environment or health should be conducted and made available to decision-makers for them to
choose the most appropriate course of action. Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of an
162
activity is also important in the application of the principle. The potential harm resulting from
certain activities should always be judged in view of the potential benefits they offer, while the
positive and negative effects of potential precautionary measures should be considered. 163
The only study conducted to validate the effects of aerial spraying appears to be the Summary
Report on the Assessment and Fact-Finding Activities on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana
Plantations.  Yet, the fact-finding team that generated the report was not a scientific study that
164
could justify the resort to the precautionary principle. In fact, the Sangguniang Bayan ignored the
findings and conclusions of the fact-finding team that recommended only a regulation, not a ban,
against aerial spraying. The recommendation was in line with the advocacy of judicious handling
and application of chemical pesticides by the DOH-Center for Health Development in the Davao
Region in view of the scarcity of scientific studies to support the ban against aerial spraying. 165
_______________
p. 182, available at <http://www.euro.who.int/_data/assets/pdf_file/0003/91173/E83079.pdf>, last accessed August 16, 2016.
161  Supra note 157 at p. 16.
162  European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, available at
<http://eur-lex.eurorja.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3A132042>, last accessed August 16, 2016.
163  Supra note 157 at p. 29.
164  Rollo (G.R. No. 189185, Vol. III), p. 1549.
165  Position Paper of the Department of Health-Center for Health Development, Davao Region, On the Issue of Aerial
Spraying
 
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We should not apply the precautionary approach in sustaining the ban against aerial spraying
if little or nothing is known of the exact or potential dangers that aerial spraying may bring to the
health of the residents within and near the plantations and to the integrity and balance of the
environment. It is dangerous to quickly presume that the effects of aerial spraying would be
adverse even in the absence of evidence. Accordingly, for lack of scientific data supporting a ban
on aerial spraying, Ordinance No. 0309-07 should be struck down for being unreasonable.
 
VI
Ordinance No. 0309-07 is an ultra vires act
 
The Court further holds that in addition to its unconstitutionality for carrying an unwarranted
classification that contravenes the Equal Protection Clause, Ordinance No. 0309-07 suffers from
another legal infirmity.
The petitioners represent that Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid exercise of legislative and
police powers by the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City pursuant to Section 458 in relation to
Section 16 both of the Local Government Code. The respondents counter that Davao City thereby
disregarded the regulations implemented by the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA),
including its identification and classification of safe pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.
We uphold the respondents.
An ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity on the basis that:
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in
the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessi-
_______________
in Banana Plantations Within the Jurisdiction of Davao City in Rollo(G.R. No. 189185, Vol. III), pp. 1566-1567.
 
378
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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ties of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject, and
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject,
and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well-being of the people. 166
 
Section 5(c) of the Local Government Code accords a liberal interpretation to its general
welfare provisions. The policy of liberal construction is consistent with the spirit of local
autonomy that endows local government units with sufficient power and discretion to accelerate
their economic development and uplift the quality of life for their constituents.
Verily, the Court has championed the cause of public welfare on several occasions. In so
doing, it has accorded liberality to the general welfare provisions of the Local Government
Code by upholding the validity of local ordinances enacted for the common good. For instance,
in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.,  the Court validated a zoning ordinance that
167
reclassified areas covered by a large oil depot from industrial to commercial in order to ensure the
life, health and property of the inhabitants residing within the periphery of the oil depot. Another
instance is Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City, where the Court declared as valid a city
168
ordinance ordering the construction of arcades that would ensure the health and safety of the city
and its inhabitants, improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience, as
well as the promotion of their prosperity. Even in its early years, the Court already extended
liberality towards the exercise by the local government units of their legislative powers in order to
promote the general welfare of
_______________
166  United States v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102, 111 (1918).
167  Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., supra note 32 at p. 111.
168  G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011, 658 SCRA 853, 865-866.
 
 
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their communities. This was exemplified in United States v. Salaveria,  wherein gambling was
169
characterized as “an act beyond the pale of good morals” that the local legislative council could
validly suppress to protect the well-being of its constituents; and in United States v.
Abendan,  whereby the right of the then Municipality of Cebu to enact an ordinance relating to
170
sanitation and public health was upheld.
The power to legislate under the General Welfare Clause is not meant to be an invincible
authority. In fact, Salaveria and Abendan emphasized the reasonableness and consistency of the
exercise by the local government units with the laws or policies of the State.  More importantly,
171
because the police power of the local government units flows from the express delegation of the
power by Congress, its exercise is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity
arising out of the terms used in granting the power should be construed against the local legislative
units.  Judicial scrutiny comes into play whenever the exercise of police power affects life, liberty
172
or property.  The presumption of validity and the policy of liberality are not restraints on the
173
power of judicial review in the face of questions about whether an ordinance conforms with the
Constitution, the laws or public policy, or if it is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating
or in derogation of a common right. The ordinance must pass the test of constitutionality and the
test of consistency with the prevailing laws. 174
_______________
169  Supra note 166 at p. 112.
170  24 Phil. 165, 169 (1913).
171  De la Cruz v. Paras, Nos. L-42571-72, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 569, 578.
172  City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 49 at p. 353.
173  White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra note 108 at p. 442, citing Morfe v. Mutuc, No. L-20387, January
31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424, 441.
174  City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 49 at p. 327.
 
 
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380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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Although the Local Government Code vests the municipal corporations with sufficient power
to govern themselves and manage their affairs and activities, they definitely have no right to enact
ordinances dissonant with the State’s laws and policy. The Local Government Codehas been
fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and limitations to guide each local government unit
in exercising its delegated powers with the view of making the local government unit a fully
functioning subdivision of the State within the constitutional and statutory restraints. The Local 175
Government Code is not intended to vest in the local government unit the blanket authority to
legislate upon any subject that it finds proper to legislate upon in the guise of serving the common
good.
The function of pesticides control, regulation and development is within the jurisdiction of the
FPA under Presidential Decree No. 1144.  The FPA was established in recognition of the need for
176
a technically oriented government entity  that will protect the public from the risks inherent in the
177
use of pesticides.  To perform its mandate, it was given under Section 6 of Presidential Decree
178
No. 1144 the following powers and functions with respect to pesticides and other agricultural
chemicals, viz.:
Section 6. Powers and functions.—The FPA shall have jurisdiction, on over all existing handlers of
pesticides, fertilizers and other agricultural chemical inputs. The FPA shall have the following powers and
functions:
x x x x
III. Pesticides and Other Agricultural Chemicals
1. To determine specific uses or manners of use for each pesticide or pesticide formulation;
_______________
175  Legaspi v. City of Cebu, supra note 100 at p. 785.
176 CREATING THE FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDE AUTHORITY AND ABOLISHING THE FERTILIZER INDUSTRY AUTHORITY.
177  The eighth Whereas clause.
178  Section 1, P.D. No. 1144.
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2. To establish and enforce levels and good agricultural practices for use of pesticides in raw
agricultural commodities;
3. To restrict or ban the use of any pesticide or the formulation of certain pesticides in specific areas or
during certain periods upon evidence that the pesticide is an imminent hazard, has caused, or is causing
widespread serious damage to crops, fish or livestock, or to public health and environment;
x x x x
5. To inspect the establishment and premises of pesticide handlers to insure that industrial health and
safety rules and anti-pollution regulations are followed;
6. To enter and inspect farmers’ fields to ensure that only the recommended pesticides are used in
specific crops in accordance with good agricultural practice.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the FPA was responsible for ensuring the compatibility between the usage and the
application of pesticides in agricultural activities and the demands for human health and
environmental safety. This responsibility includes not only the identification of safe and unsafe
pesticides, but also the prescription of the safe modes of application in keeping with the standard
of good agricultural practices.
On the other hand, the enumerated devolved functions to the local government units do not
include the regulation and control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.  The 179
noninclusion should preclude the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City from enacting Ordinance No. Moreover, Ordinance No. 0309-07 proposes to prohibit an activity already covered by the
0309-07, for otherwise it would be arrogating unto itself the authority to prohibit the aerial jurisdiction of the FPA, which has issued its own regulations under its Memorandum Circular No.
application of pesticides in derogation of the 02, Series of 2009, entitled Good Agricultural Practices for
_______________ _______________

179  The delivery of basic services is devolved to the local government units. Sections 22 and 458 of the Local 182  Id., at pp. 341-342.
Government Code provides for an exhaustive enumeration of the functions and duties devolved to the local government units. 183  City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., supra note 49 at p. 327.
  184  Id.
   
382  
384
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
authority expressly vested in the FPA by Presidential Decree No. 1144. Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
In enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 without the inherent and explicit authority to do so, the Aerial Spraying of Fungicide in Banana Plantations. While Ordinance No. 0309-07 prohibits
185

City of Davao performed an ultra vires act. As a local government unit, the City of Davao could aerial spraying in banana plantations within the City of Davao, Memorandum Circular No. 02
act only as an agent of Congress, and its every act should always conform to and reflect the will of seeks to regulate the conduct of aerial spraying in banana plantations pursuant to Section 6, 186

its principal.  As clarified in Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:

180 181 Presidential Decree No. 1144, and in conformity with the standard of Good Agricultural Practices
[W]here the state legislature has made provision for the regulation of conduct, it has manifested its (GAP). Memorandum Circular No. 02 covers safety procedures,  handling  and post- 187 188

intention that the subject matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality, under its general application, including the qualifications of applicators,  storing of fungicides,  safety and
189 190 191

powers, cannot regulate the same conduct. In Keller v. State, it was held that: “Where there is no express equipment of plantation personnel,  all of which are incompatible with the prohibition against
192

power in the charter of a municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are
specifically covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject
which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature, may be rendered invalid. x x  x Where the
subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its
declaration is binding throughout the State.” A reason advanced for this view is that such ordinances are in
excess of the powers granted to the municipal corporation.
aerial spraying under Ordinance No. 0309-07.
Although Memorandum Circular No. 02 and Ordinance No. 0309-07 both require the
maintenance of the buffer zone, they differ as to their treatment and maintenance of the buffer
zone. Under Memorandum Circular No. 02, a 50-meter “no-spray boundary” buffer zone should
be observed by the spray pilots,  and the observance of the zone should be recorded in the Aerial
193

Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised by Spray Final Report (ASFR) as a post-application safety measure.  On the other hand, Ordinance
194

the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law. No. 0309-07 requires the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone to be planted with diversified
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of trees. 195

the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is univer- _______________
_______________
185  Issued on August 3, 2009.
180  Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138810, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA 326, 340. 186  The memorandum provides for the safety procedures in pesticide spraying, (Paragraph II[1]), safety handling
181  Id. (Paragraph II[2]) and post-application (Paragraph II[3]), including the qualification of applicators (Paragraph III), storing of
  fungicides (Paragraph IV), safety and equipment of plantation personnel (Paragraph V).
187  Paragraph II(1).
  188  Paragraph II(2).
383 189  Paragraph II(3).
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 383 190  Paragraph III.
191  Paragraph IV.
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc. 192  Paragraph V.
193  Paragraph II(1)(b).
sally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities, 194  Paragraph II(3)(d)(8).
under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to 195  Section 3(e).
the general policy of the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied  
restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law.  (Emphasis ours)
182

 
For sure, every local government unit only derives its legislative authority from Congress. In
no instance can the local government unit rise above its source of authority. As such, its ordinance
cannot run against or contravene existing laws, precisely because its authority is only by virtue of
the valid delegation from Congress. As emphasized in City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.: 183
The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of
legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise
powers higher than those of the latter.
This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled
by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national legislature
is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. 184
 
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VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 385
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
Devoid of the specific delegation to its local legislative body, the City of Davao exceeded its
delegated authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07. Hence, Ordinance No. 0309-07 must be
struck down also for being an ultra vires act on the part of the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City.
We must emphasize that our ruling herein does not seek to deprive the LGUs their right to
regulate activities within their jurisdiction. They are empowered under Section 16 of the  Local
Government Code to promote the general welfare of the people through regulatory, not
prohibitive, ordinances that conform with the policy directions of the National Government.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 failed to pass this test as it contravenes the specific regulatory policy on
aerial spraying in banana plantations on a nationwide scale of the National Government, through
the FPA.
Finally, the unconstitutionality of the ban renders nugatory Ordinance No. 0309-07 in its
entirety. Consequently, any discussion on the lack of the separability clause becomes entirely
irrelevant.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for
their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
01389-MIN declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL; PERMANENTLY
ENJOINS respondent City of Davao, and all persons or entities acting in its behalf or under its
authority, from enforcing and implementing Ordinance No. 0309-07; and ORDERS the
petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Perez, Mendoza,
Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, Jardeleza and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., No part. Former law partners are counsels.
 
 
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386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
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Brion, J., On Leave.
Leonen, J., See separate Concurring Opinion.
 
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result. Ordinance No. 0309-07, Series of 2007 passed by Davao City is too
broad in that it prohibits aerial spraying in agriculture regardless of the substance and the method
of aerial spraying involved. This Court’s Decision should be read in this narrow sense.
I add the following points to clarify the reasons for my vote.
First, nothing in the disposition of this case should be construed as an absolute prohibition for
the banning of aerial spraying of certain chemicals. Even if the Sangguniang Panlungsod properly
appreciated the harm caused by the spraying of chemicals that addressed the problem of the Black
Sigatoka, the resulting local legislation was too broad. Justification for one case does not
necessarily always provide justification for another case.
Second, it is clear that passing a sufficiently narrow ordinance banning aerial spraying of a
pesticide may be done by a local government unit. This can be justified by Section 16  of 1 associations or individuals as may presently exist or be organized to assist the FPA in carrying out its functions; and
_______________
1  LOC. GOV. CODE, Sec. 16 provides:
SECTION 16. General Welfare.—Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate or incidental for its efficient and effective governance,
and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-
reliant scientific and technological capabilities,
 
387
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Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
the Local Government Code. The present code and the Constitution  provide sufficient basis for
2
that kind of autonomy.
Localized harm that affect specific residents and that may be unique to a certain municipality
or city should not await action from the national government. Local government units are not so
inutile as to be unable to sufficiently protect its citizens. Davao City can act. It does not need
Malacañan or the Congress to do what it already can.
I differ from the ponencia with respect to its interpretation of Presidential Decree No.
1144  creating the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority. In my view, nothing in the Decree’s grant of
3
powers  prohibits local government units from regulating
4
_______________
improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
2  CONST., Art. II, Sec. 25 provides:
SECTION 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
3  Pres. Decree No. 1144 (1977), CREATING THE FERTILIZER AND PESTICIDE AUTHORITY AND ABOLISHING THE
FERTILIZER INDUSTRY AUTHORITY.
4  Pres. Decree No. 1144 (1977), Sec. 6 provides:
SECTION 6. Powers and Functions.—The FPA shall have jurisdiction, on over all existing handlers of pesticides,
fertilizers and other agricultural chemical inputs. The FPA shall have the following powers and functions:
I. Common to Fertilizers, Pesticides and other Agricultural Chemicals
1. To conduct an information campaign regarding the safe and effective use of these products;
2. To promote and coordinate all fertilizer and pesticides research in cooperation with the Philippine Council for
Agriculture and Resources Research and other appropriate agencies to ensure scientific pest control in the public
interest, safety in the use and handling of pesticides, higher standards and quality of products and better application
methods;
 
 
388
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
_______________
3. To call upon any department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned or -controlled corporations, or any officer or employee thereof and on the private sector, for such
information or assistance as it may need in the exercise of its powers and in the performance of its functions and
duties;
4. To promulgate rules and regulations for the registration and licensing of handlers of these products, collect fees
pertaining thereto, as well as the renewal, suspension, revocation, or cancellation of such registration or licenses and
such other rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement this Decree;
5. To establish and impose appropriate penalties on handlers of these products for violations of any rules and
regulations established by the FPA;
6. To institute proceedings against any person violating any provisions of this Decree and/or such rules and
regulations as may be promulgated to implement the provisions of this Decree after due notice and hearing;
7. To delegate such selected privileges, powers or authority as may be allowed by law to corporation, cooperatives,
8. To do any and all acts not contrary to law or existing decrees and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
functions of the FPA.
II. Fertilizers
1. To make a continuous assessment of the fertilizer supply and demand situation, both domestic and worldwide;
2. To establish and enforce sales quotas, production schedules, distributions areas and such other marketing
regulations as may be necessary to assure market stability and viable operations in the industry;
3. To determine and set the volume and prices both wholesale and retail of fertilizer and fertilizer inputs;
4. To establish and implement regulations governing the import and export of fertilizer and fertilizer inputs, and
when necessary, to itself import and/or export such items,
 
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Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
_______________
including the negotiating and contracting of such imports and exports;
 5. To import fertilizer and fertilizer inputs exempt from customs duties, compensating and sales taxes and all other
taxes, and to purchase naptha locally free from specific taxes and the corresponding duty on the imported crude, and
to sell or convey such fertilizer or fertilizer input to any individual association, or corporation likewise exempt from
the payment of customs duties and all other taxes;
6. To control and regulate all marketing companies, whether importer, indentor, wholesaler or retailer; by
controlling and regulating prices, terms, mark-ups, distribution channels, promotion, storage and other marketing
factors in the domestic fertilizer market;
7. To regulate and control quality of the different grades of fertilizer and to set new grades when necessary;
8. To control and regulate all aspects of domestic fertilizer production, including the utilization of idle capacity and
the orderly expansion of the industry and to compel the utilization of unused or underutilized capacities of fertilizer
companies and to direct any improvements, modifications or repairs as may be necessary to accomplish this;
9. To approve or to reject the establishment of new fertilizer or fertilizer input plants and the expansion or
contraction of existing capacities;
10. To obtain complete assess to all pertinent information on the operations of the industry, including audited and/or
unaudited financial statements, marketing, production, and inventory data;
11. To control and assist in the financing of the importation of fertilizer and fertilizers inputs of production, of
inventory and working capital, and of the expansion of the industry;
12. To do all such things as may be necessary to maintain an adequate supply of fertilizers to the domestic market at
reasonable prices while maintaining the long-term viability of the industry.
III. Pesticides and Other Agricultural Chemicals
1. To determine specific uses or manners of use for each pesticide or pesticide formulation;
 
 
390
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
the mode of delivery of certain allowed chemicals should there be clear harm caused to the
residents of a municipality or city. Certifying that a pesticide can be used is different from
preventing the harm it can do when applied in a certain way.
_______________
2. To establish and enforce tolerance levels and good agricultural practices for use of pesticides in raw agricultural
commodities;
3. To restrict or ban the use of any pesticide or the formulation of certain pesticides in specific areas or during
certain periods upon evidence that the pesticide is an imminent hazard, has caused, or is causing widespread serious
damage to crops, fish or livestock, or to public health and the environment;
4. To prevent the importation of agricultural commodities containing pesticide residues above the accepted
tolerance levels and to regulate the exportation of agricultural products containing pesticide residue above accepted
tolerance levels;
5. To inspect the establishment and premises of pesticide handlers to insure that industrial health and safety rules
and anti-pollution regulations are followed;
6. To enter and inspect farmers’ fields to ensure that only the recommended pesticides are used in specific crops in
accordance with good agricultural practice;
7. To require if and when necessary, of every handler of these products, the submission to the FPA of a report
stating the quantity, value of each kind of product exported, imported, manufactured, produced, formulated,
repacked, stored, delivered, distributed, or sold;
8. Should there by any extraordinary and unreasonable increases in prices or a severe shortage in supply of
pesticides, or imminent dangers or either occurrences, the FPA is empowered to impose such controls as may be
necessary in the public interest, including but not limited to such restrictions and controls as the imposition of price
ceilings, controls on inventories, distribution and transport, and tax-free importations of such pesticides or raw
materials thereof as may be in short supply.
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
G.R. No. 133640. November 25, 2005. *
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA
BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER
SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE’S BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO,
M.D., doing business under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA,
M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT
L. LAPITAN, doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD TRANSFUSION
 
391
VOL. 800, AUGUST 16, 2016 391
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
Davao City did not intend to prohibit the pesticide, but merely the method of its application.
Third, the precautionary principle embedded both in Article II, Section 16  and Article III, 5
Section 1  of the Constitution applies in this case.
6
There was science, but it was uncertain.
The precautionary principle should also be qualified by transience as science-progressive and
must be cost-effective. Environmental measures must “ensure . . . benefits at the lowest possible
cost.” 7
However, I agree that the precautionary principle does not make sense if there is absolutely no
proof of causation.
Fourth, I do not see the application of the equal protection clause. The discrimination against
large plantation owners enjoying huge economies of scale is, at this point, speculative.
Lastly, nothing in this Decision should, in my view, be construed as a negation of the findings
of fact of the trial court. This is especially with regard to the testimony of the persons affected by
the aerial spray.
The broad construction of the prohibition in the Ordinance should not be viewed as erasing
the experience of the residents of Davao City. In other words, government still needs to address
their problems with the most urgent dispatch.
_______________
5  CONST., Art. II, Sec. 16 provides:
SECTION 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
6  CONST., Art. III, Sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of laws.
7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 3(3).
 
 
392
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mosqueda vs. Pilipino Banana Growers ###amp### Exporters Association, Inc.
Petitions denied, judgment affirmed. Ordinance No. 0309-07 declared unconstitutional.
Note.—Police power legislation, adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people prevail not only over future
contracts but even over those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to the
superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare. (Surigao del Norte
Electric Cooperative, Inc. [SURNECO] vs. Energy Regulatory Commission, 632 SCRA 96 [2010])
 
——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and style, RECORD
BLOOD BANK, in their individual capacities and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH,
respondent.
G.R. No. 133661. November 25, 2005. *
DOCTORS’ BLOOD CENTER, petitioner, vs.DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, respondent.
G.R. No. 139147. November 25, 2005. *
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA
BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER
SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE’S BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO,
M.D., doing business under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA,
M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT
L. LAPITAN, doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD TRANSFUSION
SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and style,
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
169
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 169
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their Individual capacities and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH,
respondent.
Health; Blood Banks; The National Blood Services Act of 1994 (R.A. No. 7719); Delegation of
Powers; In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or
delegate of the Legislature; The National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself—it is clear from the
provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has
mandated several measures to attain this objective; Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies
the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.
—In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that
nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the
Legislature. Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted
or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative
board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. Republic Act No. 7719 or the
National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the
Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to
attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has
sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its
provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through
voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health
as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Congress may validly delegate to
administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules
170
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
70
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. The Secretary of Health has
been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The true distinction between the power to make laws and discretion as to
its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves
a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law—the first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. —
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall
be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 “based on the result of a careful study and review of the
blood supply and demand and public safety.” This power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions
upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress.
The true distinction between the power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact
that the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
Same; Same; Same; Equal Protection Clause; Requisites;  Class Legislation;  What may be regarded
as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will
cover every case can be formulated.—What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a
question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not
made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c)
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; The classification made by the National Blood Services Act of 1994
between nonprofit blood banks or centers and commercial blood banks is valid and reasonable.—Based on the
foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create
171
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 171
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its
policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers and commercial blood banks. We
deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons: One, it was based on substantial
distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the latter is
motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood
as a sale of commodity. Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is
germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather
than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that
they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are
considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the
Philippine blood banking system. Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its
enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply
only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without
exception.
Same;  Same; Same;  Police Power; Requisites; The promotion of public health is a fundamental
obligation of the State—the health of the people is a primordial governmental concern; In serving the interest
of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out
commercial blood banks—this action may seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees,
of commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public.
—The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a
primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of
the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. Police power of the state is
validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment
of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly
172
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
72
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
oppressive upon individuals. In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of
the law for the protection of public health by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through
voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective requires the interference of the State given the disturbing
condition of the Philippine blood banking system. In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to
the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This action
may seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but their
interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public.
Same;  Same; Same;  Non-Impairment Clause; Settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government—the right granted by this provision
must submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s power of regulation; The concern of the Government
in this case, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms—in the ordinary sequence of
events, it is profits that suffer as a result of government regulation.—The State, in order to promote the general
welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons
may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State
and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. Moreover, in the
case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, settled is the rule that the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. The right granted by
this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s power of regulation. While the Court
understands the grave implications of Section 7 of the law in question, the concern of the Government in this
case, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is
profits that suffer as a result of government regulation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The freedom to contract is not absolute—all contracts and all rights are
subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the
State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the
community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
—The freedom to contract is not absolute; all
173
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 173
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which
affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as
the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience
may demonstrate the necessity. This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of
Agrarian Relations where the Court held that individual rights to contract and to property have to give way to
police power exercised for public welfare.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review;The wisdom of the Legislature in the
lawful exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be inquired into by the Court—doing so would be in
derogation of the principle of separation of powers; Between “is” and “ought” there is a far cry.—As for
determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly serve the general public
considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as proffered by petitioners, we maintain that the
wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be inquired into by the
Court. Doing so would be in derogation of the principle of separation of powers. That, under the
circumstances, proper regulation of all blood banks without distinction in order to achieve the objective of the
law as contended by petitioners is, of course, possible; but, this would be arguing on what the law  may
be or should be and not what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of
legislation is not for this Court to pass upon.
Courts; Contempt; Words and Phrases; Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a
flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court.—With regard to the petition for contempt in G.R.
No. 139147, on the other hand, the Court finds respondent Secretary of Health’s explanation satisfactory. The
statements in the flyers and posters were not aimed at influencing or threatening the Court in deciding in favor
of the constitutionality of the law. Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or
arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court. There is nothing contemptuous about the statements and
information contained in the health advisory that were distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this
Court ordering the former to cease and desist from distributing the same.
174
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
74
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
Same; Judicial Review;  Separation of Powers; Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality—for a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, and the ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.—The fundamental
criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law
has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish
the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the
Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to
whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for
Congress to determine.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Mandamus and Contempt.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Justinian E. Adviento and Oscar C. Maglaque for petitioners.
     Morales, Sayson & Rojas for Doctors’ Blood Bank Center.
     The Solicitor General for respondents Secretary of Health and Department of Health.
     Jimenea and Associates Law Office for intervenors.
AZCUNA, J.:
Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the “National Blood Services Act of 1994,” and the validity of
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Republic Act No. 7719.
175
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 175
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
G.R. No. 133640,  entitled “Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our
1
Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health” and G.R. No. 133661,  entitled 2
“Doctors Blood Bank Center vs. Department of Health” are petitions for certiorari and mandamus,
respectively, seeking the annulment of the following: (1) Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719; and,
(2) Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995. Both petitions likewise pray for the
issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health from implementing
and enforcing the aforementioned law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations; and, for a
mandatory injunction ordering and commanding the Secretary of Health to grant, issue or renew
petitioners’ license to operate free standing blood banks (FSBB).
The above cases were consolidated in a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 2, 1998. 3
G.R. No. 139147,  entitled “Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our
4
Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health,” on the other hand, is a petition to
show cause why respondent Secretary of Health should not be held in contempt of court.
This case was originally assigned to the Third Division of this Court and later consolidated
with G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661 in a resolution dated August 4, 1999. 5
Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of
Blood Banks, a duly regis-
_______________
 Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction or Temporary
1
Restraining Order, dated May 20, 1998, and later an Amended Petition, dated June 1, 1998 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
 Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Prohibitory and
2
Mandatory Injunction, dated May 22, 1998.
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 106; Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), p. 69.
3
 Petition, dated July 15, 1999.
4
 Rollo (G.R. No. 139147), p. 34.
5
176
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
tered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks.
Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official
directly involved and charged with the enforcement and implementation of the law in question.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on
April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary
blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President
Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on
August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of
Health (DOH). 6
 Section 7 of R.A. 7719  provides:
7
“Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks.—All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the
Secretary.”
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides:
“Section 23. Process of Phasing Out.—The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood
banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of
R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood
supply and demand and public safety.” 8
_______________
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), pp. 7-8.
6
 Annex “G” of Petition, Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 79.
7
 Annex “H” of Petition, Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 86.
8
177
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country have been arranged in four (4)
categories: blood centers run by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), government-run
blood services, private hospital blood banks, and commercial blood services.
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have
already been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled “An Act
Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and
Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories.” The law, which was enacted on
June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and
blood processing laboratories. The Bureau of Research and Laboratories (BRL) was created in
1958 and was given the power to regulate clinical laboratories in 1966 under Republic Act No.
4688. In 1971, the Licensure Section was created within the BRL. It was given the duty to enforce
the licensure requirements for blood banks as well as clinical laboratories. Due to this
development, Administrative Order No. 156, Series of 1971, was issued. The new rules and
regulations triggered a stricter enforcement of the Blood Banking Law, which was characterized
by frequent spot checks, immediate suspension and communication of such suspensions to
hospitals, a more systematic record-keeping and frequent communication with blood banks
through monthly information bulletins. Unfortunately, by the 1980’s, financial difficulties
constrained the BRL to reduce the frequency of its supervisory visits to the blood banks.
Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the safety of blood and blood products
intensified when the dreaded disease Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first
described in 1979. In 1980, the International Society of Blood Transfusion (ISBT) formulated the
Code of
_______________
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), pp. 42-43.
9
178
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
Ethics for Blood Donation and Transfusion. In 1982, the first case of transfusion-associated AIDS
was described in an infant. Hence, the ISBT drafted in 1984, a model for a national blood policy
outlining certain principles that should be taken into consideration. By 1985, the ISBT had
disseminated guidelines requiring AIDS testing of blood and blood products for transfusion.
In 1989, another revision of the Blood Banking Guidelines was made. The DOH issued
Administrative Order No. 57, Series of 1989, which classified banks into primary, secondary and
tertiary depending on the services they provided. The standards were adjusted according to this
classification. For instance, floor area requirements varied according to classification level. The
new guidelines likewise required Hepatitis B and HIV testing, and that the blood bank be headed
by a pathologist or a hematologist. 11
In 1992, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 118-A institutionalizing the National
Blood Services Program (NBSP). The BRL was designated as the central office primarily
responsible for the NBSP. The program paved the way for the creation of a committee that will
implement the policies of the program and the formation of the Regional Blood Councils.
In August 1992, Senate Bill No. 1011, entitled “An Act Promoting Voluntary Blood
Donation, Providing for an Adequate Supply of Safe Blood, Regulating Blood Banks and
Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for other Purposes” was introduced in the Senate. 12
Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, House Bills No. 384, 546, 780 and 1978 were
being deliberated to address the issue of safety of the Philippine blood bank system. Sub-
_______________
 Id., at pp. 46-47.
10
 Id., at p. 43.
11
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), p. 99.
12
179
177
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 179
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
sequently, the Senate and House Bills were referred to the appropriate committees and
subsequently consolidated. 13
In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the
Philippine blood banking system entitled “Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood
Banking System.” It was revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4% were supplied
by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based blood
banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood banks. During the time the study was made, there
were only twenty-four (24) registered or licensed free-standing or commercial blood banks in the
country. Hence, with these numbers in mind, the study deduced that each commercial blood bank
produces five times more blood than the Red Cross and fifteen times more than the government-
run blood banks. The study, therefore, showed that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial
sources of blood. The study likewise revealed that 99.6% of the donors of commercial blood banks
and 77.0% of the donors of private-hospital based blood banks are paid donors. Paid donors are
those who receive remuneration for donating their blood. Blood donors of the PNRC and
government-run hospitals, on the other hand, are mostly voluntary. 14
9
It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial
banks are three times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion
transmissible diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC. 15
Commercial blood banks give paid donors varying rates around P50 to P150, and because of
this arrangement, many
_______________
 Id., at p. 100.
13
 Id., at pp. 49-51.
14
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 59.
15
180
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
of these donors are poor, and often they are students, who need cash immediately. Since they need
10
the money, these donors are not usually honest about their medical or social history. Thus, blood
from healthy, voluntary donors who give their true medical and social history are about three times
much safer than blood from paid donors. 16
What the study also found alarming is that many Filipino doctors are not yet fully trained on
the specific indications for blood component transfusion. They are not aware of the lack of blood
supply and do not feel the need to adjust their practices and use of blood and blood products. It
also does not matter to them where the blood comes from. 17
On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of
commercial blood banks took effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH.
The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH pursuant to Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Pursuant to
said Act, all commercial blood banks should have been phased out by May 28, 1998. Hence,
petitioners were granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood bank
only until May 27, 1998.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a
petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and
validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The case was
entitled “Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood
Bank,” docketed as G.R. No. 133640.
_______________
 Id.
16
 Id.
17
181
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 181
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order, writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or status quo
ante order. 18
In the aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the constitutionality of the questioned legal
provisions, namely, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of Administrative Order
No. 9, Series of 1995, on the following grounds: 19
1. 1.The questioned legal provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its
Implementing Rules violate the equal protection clause for irrationally discriminating
against free standing blood banks in a manner which is not germane to the purpose of
the law;
2. 2.The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing
Rules represent undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the
state; and,
3. 3.The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing
Rules are unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.
On May 22, 1998, the Doctors Blood Center filed a similar petition for mandamus with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction before this Court entitled “Doctors Blood Center vs. Department of Health,” docketed
as G.R. No. 133661.  This was consolidated with G.R. No. 133640.
20 21
Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7719 and its
implementing rules and regulations, thus, praying for the issuance of a license to operate
commercial blood banks beyond May 27, 1998. Specifically, with regard to Republic Act No.
7719, the petition submitted the following questions  for resolution:
22
_______________
18
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 112.
19
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 120.
20
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), p. 3.
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 106.
21
22
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), pp. 7-8.
182
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
1. 1.Was it passed in the exercise of police power, and was it a valid exercise of such
power?
2. 2.Does it not amount to deprivation of property without due process?
3. 3.Does it not unlawfully impair the obligation of contracts?
4. 4.With the commercial blood banks being abolished and with no ready machinery to
deliver the same supply and services, does R.A. 7719 truly serve the public welfare?
On June 2, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution directing respondent DOH to file a consolidated
comment. In the same Resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) for
respondent to cease and desist from implementing and enforcing Section 7 of Republic Act No.
7719 and its implementing rules and regulations until further orders from the Court. 23
On August 26, 1998, respondent Secretary of Health filed a Consolidated Comment on the
petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, with opposition to the
issuance of a temporary restraining order. 24
In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of Health submitted that blood from
commercial blood banks is unsafe and therefore the State, in the exercise of its police power, can
close down commercial blood banks to protect the public. He cited the record of deliberations on
Senate Bill No. 1101 which later became Republic Act No. 7719, and the sponsorship speech of
Senator Orlando Mercado.
The rationale for the closure of these commercial blood banks can be found in the
deliberations of Senate Bill No. 1011, excerpts of which are quoted below:
Senator Mercado: I am providing over a period of two years to phase out all commercial blood
banks. So that in the end, the new section would have a provision that states:
_______________
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), pp. 107-108.
23
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), p. 98.
24
183
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 183
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
“ALL COMMERCIAL BLOOD BANKS SHALL BE PHASED OUT OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS
AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT. BLOOD SHALL BE COLLECTED FROM VOLUNTARY
DONORS ONLY AND THE SERVICE FEE TO BE CHARGED FOR EVERY BLOOD PRODUCT ISSUED
SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE NECESSARY EXPENSES ENTAILED IN COLLECTING AND
PROCESSING OF BLOOD. THE SERVICE FEE SHALL BE MADE UNIFORM THROUGH
GUIDELINES TO BE SET BY THE DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH.”
I am supporting Mr. President, the finding of a study called “Project to Evaluate the Safety of the
Philippine Blood Banking System.” This has been taken note of. This is a study done with the assistance of the
USAID by doctors under the New Tropical Medicine Foundation in Alabang.
Part of the long-term measures proposed by this particular study is to improve laws, outlaw buying and
selling of blood and legally define good manufacturing processes for blood. This goes to the very heart of my
amendment which seeks to put into law the principle that blood should not be subject of commerce of man.
...
The Presiding Officer Senator Aquino: What does the sponsor say?
Senator Webb: Mr. President, just for clarity, I would like to find out how the Gentleman defines a
commercial blood bank. I am at a loss at times what a commercial blood bank really is.
Senator Mercado: We have a definition, I believe, in the measure, Mr. President.
The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: It is a business where profit is considered.
Senator Mercado: If the Chairman of the Committee would accept it, we can put a provision on Section
3, a definition of a commercial blood bank, which, as defined in this law, exists for profit and engages in the
buying and selling of blood or its components.
 Senator Webb: That is a good description, Mr. President.
...
Senator Mercado: I refer, Mr. President, to a letter written by Dr. Jaime Galvez-Tan, the Chief of Staff,
Undersecretary of Health, to the good Chairperson of the Committee on Health.
184
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
In recommendation No. 4, he says:
“The need to phase out all commercial blood banks within a two-year period will give the Department of
Health enough time to build up government’s capability to provide an adequate supply of blood for the needs
of the nation. . .the use of blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of commodity.”
Taking into consideration the experience of the National Kidney Institute, which has succeeded in making
the hospital 100 percent dependent on voluntary blood donation, here is a success story of a hospital that does
not buy blood. All those who are operated on and need blood have to convince their relatives or have to get
volunteers who would donate blood. . .
If we give the responsibility of the testing of blood to those commercial blood banks, they will cut corners
because it will protect their profit.
In the first place, the people who sell their blood are the people who are normally in the high-risk
category. So we should stop the system of selling and buying blood so that we can go into a national voluntary
blood program.
It has been said here in this report, and I quote:
“Why is buying and selling of blood not safe? This is not safe because a donor who expects payment for
his blood will not tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny any risky social behavior such as sexual
promiscuity which increases the risk of having syphilis or AIDS or abuse of intravenous addictive drugs.
Laboratory tests are of limited value and will not detect early infections. Laboratory tests are required only for
four diseases in the Philippines. There are other blood transmissible diseases we do not yet screen for and there
could be others where there are no tests available yet.
A blood bank owner expecting to gain profit from selling blood will also try his best to limit his expenses.
Usually he tries to increase his profit by buying cheaper reagents or test kits, hiring cheaper manpower or
skipping some tests altogether. He may also try to sell blood even though these have infections in them.
Because there is no existing system of counterchecking these, the blood bank owner can usually get away with
many unethical practices.
The experience of Germany, Mr. President is illustrative of this issue. The reason why contaminated
blood was sold was that there
185
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 185
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
were corners cut by commercial blood banks in the testing process. They were protecting their profits. 25
The sponsorship speech of Senator Mercado further elucidated his stand on the issue:
...
Senator Mercado: Today, across the country, hundreds of poverty-stricken, sickly and weak Filipinos,
who, unemployed, without hope and without money to buy the next meal, will walk into a commercial blood
bank, extend their arms and plead that their blood be bought. They will lie about their age, their medical
history. They will lie about when they last sold their blood. For doing this, they will receive close to a hundred
pesos. This may tide them over for the next few days. Of course, until the next bloodletting.
This same blood will travel to the posh city hospitals and urbane medical centers. This same blood will
now be bought by the rich at a price over 500% of the value for which it was sold. Between this buying and
selling, obviously, someone has made a very fast buck.
Every doctor has handled at least one transfusion-related disease in an otherwise normal patient. Patients
come in for minor surgery of the hand or whatever and they leave with hepatitis B. A patient comes in for an
appendectomy and he leaves with malaria. The worst nightmare: A patient comes in for a Caesarian section
and leaves with AIDS.
We do not expect good blood from donors who sell their blood because of poverty. The humane
dimension of blood transfusion is not in the act of receiving blood, but in the act of giving it. . .
For years, our people have been at the mercy of commercial blood banks that lobby their interests among
medical technologists, hospital administrators and sometimes even physicians so that a proactive system for
collection of blood from healthy donors becomes difficult, tedious and unrewarding.
The Department of Health has never institutionalized a comprehensive national program for safe blood
and for voluntary blood donation even if this is a serious public health concern and has fallen
_______________
25
 Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 59, pp. 286-287; Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), pp. 115-120.
186
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
for the linen of commercial blood bankers, hook, line and sinker because it is more convenient to tell the
patient to buy blood.
Commercial blood banks hold us hostage to their threat that if we are to close them down, there will be no
blood supply. This is true if the Government does not step in to ensure that safe supply of blood. We cannot
allow commercial interest groups to dictate policy on what is and what should be a humanitarian effort. This
cannot and will never work because their interest in blood donation is merely monetary. We cannot expect
commercial blood banks to take the lead in voluntary blood donation. Only the Government can do it, and the
Government must do it.” 26
On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Expanded Temporary Restraining
Order for the Court to order respondent Secretary of Health to cease and desist from announcing
the closure of commercial blood banks, compelling the public to source the needed blood from
voluntary donors only, and committing similar acts “that will ultimately cause the shutdown of
petitioners’ blood banks.” 27
On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment and/or Opposition to the above
motion stating that he has not ordered the closure of commercial blood banks on account of the
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued on June 2, 1998 by the Court. In compliance with the
TRO, DOH had likewise ceased to distribute the health advisory leaflets, posters and flyers to the
public which state that “blood banks are closed or will be closed.” According to respondent
Secretary, the same were printed and circulated in anticipation of the closure of the commercial
blood banks in accordance with R.A. No. 7719, and were printed and circulated prior to the
issuance of the TRO. 28
On July 15, 1999, petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 filed a Petition to Show Cause Why Public
Respondent Should Not be
_______________
 Record of the Senate, Volume 1, No. 13, pp. 434-436; Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), pp. 121-123.
26
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), pp. 227-232.
27
 Id., at pp. 406-408.
28
187
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 187
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
Held in Contempt of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 139147, citing public respondent’s willful
disobedience of or resistance to the restraining order issued by the Court in the said case.
Petitioners alleged that respondent’s act constitutes circumvention of the temporary restraining
order and a mockery of the authority of the Court and the orderly administration of
justice.  Petitioners added that despite the issuance of the temporary restraining order in G.R. No.
29
133640, respondent, in his effort to strike down the existence of commercial blood banks,
disseminated misleading information under the guise of health advisories, press releases, leaflets,
brochures and flyers stating, among others, that “this year [1998] all commercial blood banks will
be closed by 27 May. Those who need blood will have to rely on government blood
banks.” Petitioners further claimed that respondent Secretary of Health announced in a press
30
conference during the Blood Donor’s Week that commercial blood banks are “illegal and
dangerous” and that they “are at the moment protected by a restraining order on the basis that their
commercial interest is more important than the lives of the people.” These were all posted in
bulletin boards and other conspicuous places in all government hospitals as well as other medical
and health centers. 31
In respondent Secretary’s Comment to the Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent
Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court, dated January 3, 2000, it was explained that nothing
was issued by the department ordering the closure of commercial blood banks. The subject health
advisory leaflets pertaining to said closure pursuant to Republic Act No. 7719 were printed and WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF
circulated prior to the Court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order on June 21, 1998. 32 LEGISLATIVE POWER;
_______________
II
 Rollo (G.R. No. 139147), p. 9.
29

 Rollo (G.R. No. 139147), pp. 5-6; Annexes “A” to “C-3,” pp. 14-33.
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
30

 Rollo (G.R. No. 139147), p. 6.

31

 Id., at pp. 49-50.

32
REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;
188 _______________

188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED  Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), pp. 467-468.
36

 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), pp. 685-686.

37

Beltran vs. Secretary of Health 190

Public respondent further claimed that the primary purpose of the information campaign was “to
promote the importance and safety of voluntary blood donation and to educate the public about the 190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
hazards of patronizing blood supplies from commercial blood banks.”  In doing so, he was merely
33
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
performing his regular functions and duties as the Secretary of Health to protect the health and III
welfare of the public. Moreover, the DOH is the main proponent of the voluntary blood donation
program espoused by Republic Act No. 7719, particularly Section 4 thereof which provides that, WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
in order to ensure the adequate supply of human blood, voluntary blood donation shall be REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;
promoted through public education, promotion in schools, professional education, establishment of
blood services network, and walking blood donors. IV
Hence, by authority of the law, respondent Secretary contends that he has the duty to promote
the program of voluntary blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging the public to donate WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
blood voluntarily and educating the people on the risks associated with blood coming from a paid REGULATIONS CONSTITUTE DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY;
donor promotes general health and welfare and which should be given more importance than the
commercial businesses of petitioners. 34
V
On July 29, 1999, interposing personal and substantial interest in the case as taxpayers and
citizens, a Petition-in-Intervention was filed interjecting the same arguments and issues as laid WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; and,
down by petitioners in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, namely, the unconstitutionality of the Acts,
and, the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction. The intervenors are the immediate relatives of VI
individuals who had died allegedly because of shortage of blood supply at a critical time.35

_______________
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS TRULY SERVE PUBLIC WELFARE.
 Id., at p. 50.
As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the Act is being challenged, it is the
33

 Id., at pp. 50-51.

34

 Id., at pp. 435-495.

35
189
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 189
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
The intervenors contended that Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative
powers and unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty. 36
In a resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without giving due course to the aforementioned
petition, the Court granted the Motion for Intervention that was filed by the above intervenors on
August 9, 1999.
In his Comment to the petition-in-intervention, respondent Secretary of Health stated that the
sale of blood is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Act that “blood donation is a humanitarian
act” and “blood transfusion is a professional medical service and not a sale of commodity (Section
2[a] and [b] of Republic Act No. 7719). The act of selling blood or charging fees other than those
allowed by law is even penalized under Section 12.” 37
Thus, in view of these, the Court is now tasked to pass upon the constitutionality of Section 7
contention of petitioners that the phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is
unconstitutional because it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power.
According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the
latter failed to fix a standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of
his functions. Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period that may be granted by
the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the
Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power.
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is
usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the
hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any
other ap-
191
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 191
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
pointee or delegate of the Legislature.  Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in
38

of Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative
and Regulations. boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not
In resolving the controversy, this Court deems it necessary to address the issues and/or lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the
questions raised by petitioners concerning the constitutionality of the aforesaid Act in G.R. No. exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. 39

133640 and 133661 as summarized hereunder: Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is
I clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health
of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase
out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite
standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the
promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary
blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of
Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules
and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.  The Secretary of 40
Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of
said Act. Section 11 of the Act states:
“SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations.—The implementation of the provisions of the Act shall be in accordance
with the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within sixty (60) days from the approval
hereof. . .”
_______________
 See United States v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 (1922).
38
 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
39
 Vda. de Pineda v. Peña, G.R. No. 57665, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 22.
40
192
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by virtue of the administrative body’s
authority and expertise in the matter, came out with Administrative Order No. 9, series of 1995 or
the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. Administrative Order No. 9
effectively filled in the details of the law for its proper implementation.
Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for
commercial blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 “based on the
result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.” This
power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a
period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between
the power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when
said phase-out period was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2 thereof:
“SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.—In order to promote public health, it is hereby declared the policy of the
state:
1. a)to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by the citizenry and to instill public
consciousness of the principle that blood donation is a humanitarian act;
_______________
 Id., citing Cincinnati, W. & Z.R. Co. v. Clinton County Comrs, 1 Ohio St., 77, 88 (1852); Cruz v. Youngberg, 56 Phil.
41
234 (1931).
193
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
1. b)to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood for transfusion is a medical
service and not a sale of commodity;
2. c)to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable distribution of blood supply and
blood products; d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood donation to
curb the hazards caused by the commercial sale of blood;
3. e)to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary blood donation in the existing health
subjects of the formal education system in all public and private schools as well as the
non-formal system;
4. f)to mobilize all sectors of the community to participate in mechanisms for voluntary
and non-profit collection of blood;
5. g)to mandate the Department of Health to establish and organize a National Blood
Transfusion Service Network in order to rationalize and improve the provision of
adequate and safe supply of blood;
6. h)to provide for adequate assistance to institutions promoting voluntary blood donation
and providing non-profit blood services, either through a system of reimbursement for
costs from patients who can afford to pay, or donations from governmental and non-
governmental entities;
7. i)to require all blood collection units and blood banks/centers to operate on a non-profit
basis;
8. j)to establish scientific and professional standards for the operation of blood collection
units and blood banks/ centers in the Philippines;
9. k)to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities related to the collection, storage and
banking of blood; and,
10.l)to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to include preventive services and
education to control spread of blood transfusion transmissible diseases.”
Petitioners also assert that the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal
protection clause enshrined in the Constitution because it unduly discriminates
194
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
against commercial or free standing blood banks in a manner that is not germane to the purpose of
the law. 42
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always
41
easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable
basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be
reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d)
must apply equally to each member of the class. 43
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the
promotion of public health and welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New
Tropical Medicine Foundation, it was revealed that the Philippine blood banking system is
disturbingly primitive and unsafe, and with its current condition, the spread of infectious diseases
such as malaria, AIDS, Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly from blood transfusion is unavoidable. The
situation becomes more distressing as the study showed that almost 70% of the blood supply in the
country is sourced from paid blood donors who are three times riskier than voluntary blood donors
because they are unlikely to disclose their medical or social history during the blood screening. 44
193
The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No. 7719, to instill public consciousness
of the importance and benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply and proper blood
collection from healthy donors. To do this, the
_______________
42
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 120; Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), p. 105.
43
 People v. Vera, supra.
  A Final Report on the Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System conducted on September
44
28, 1993– January 15, 1994, Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), Annex “A,” p. 41.
195
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
Legislature decided to order the phase out of commercial blood banks to improve the Philippine
blood banking system, to regulate the supply and proper collection of safe blood, and so as not to
derail the implementation of the voluntary blood donation program of the government. In lieu of
commercial blood banks, non-profit blood banks or blood centers, in strict adherence to
professional and scientific standards to be established by the DOH, shall be set in place.
Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in
which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a
classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/ centers and commercial blood banks. We
deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:
One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian
reasons and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former
wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity.
Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane
to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical
service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood
banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood
supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as
shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not
solely to address the pecu-
_______________
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), pp. 115-124.
45
196
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
liar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions.
Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether or not Republic Act No. 7719
constitutes a valid exercise of police power.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the
people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was
enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health
and safety.
Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 46
In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the
protection of public health by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through
voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective requires the interference of the State given the
disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the
Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This action may seriously
affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but their
interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public.
_______________
 Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and Director of Center for Educational Measurement v. Roberto
46
Rey C. San Diego and Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 533.
197
195 VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 197
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the State’s police
power. Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both
necessary and reasonable for the common good. Police power is the State authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
45
welfare. 47
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners,
namely, deprivation of personal liberty and property, and violation of the non-impairment clause,
to be unmeritorious.
Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional and void because it infringes on
the freedom of choice of an individual in connection to what he wants to do with his blood which
should be outside the domain of State intervention. Additionally, and in relation to the issue of
classification, petitioners asseverate that, indeed, under the Civil Code, the human body and its
organs like the heart, the kidney and the liver are outside the commerce of man but this cannot be
made to apply to human blood because the latter can be replenished by the body. To treat human
blood equally as the human organs would constitute invalid classification. 48
Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the commercial blood banks will be
disadvantageous to them as it will affect their businesses and existing contracts with hospitals and
other health institutions, hence Section 7 of the Act should be struck down because it violates the
non-impairment clause provided by the Constitution.
As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be
subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order
_______________
 Pita v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989, 178 SCRA 362.
47
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), p. 12.
48
198
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
to secure the general welfare of the State and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of
the individual may be subordinated. 49
Moreover, in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,  settled is 50
the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes
targeted by the government. The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and
necessities of the State’s power of regulation. While the Court understands the grave implications
of Section 7 of the law in question, the concern of the Government in this case, however, is not
necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits
that suffer as a result of government regulation.
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to
the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the
State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-
being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may
demonstrate the necessity.  This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of
51
Agrarian Relations where the Court held that individual rights to contract and to property have to
52
give way to police power exercised for public welfare.
As for determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly serve
the general public considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as proffered by
petitioners, we maintain that the wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to
enact laws can-
_______________ 1. 1.In G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, the Court UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY of Section 7
of Republic Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of
 Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104786, January 27, 1994, 229 SCRA 554.
49
1994, and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations
 No. L-81958, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 386.
Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. The petitions are DISMISSED. Consequently,
50

 Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950).

51

 No. L-25035, February 26, 1968, 22 SCRA 792.

52 the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on June 2, 1998, is LIFTED.
199 2. 2.In G.R. No. 139147, the petition seeking to cite the Secretary of Health in contempt of
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 199 court is DENIED for lack of merit.

Beltran vs. Secretary of Health

No costs.
not be inquired into by the Court. Doing so would be in derogation of the principle of separation of
SO ORDERED.
powers. 53

That, under the circumstances, proper regulation of all blood banks without distinction in
order to achieve the objective of the law as contended by petitioners is, of course, possible; but,
this would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not what the law is. Between is
and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for this Court to pass
upon. 54
Finally, with regard to the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 139147, on the other hand, the
Court finds respondent Secretary of Health’s explanation satisfactory. The statements in the flyers
and posters were not aimed at influencing or threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the
constitutionality of the law.
Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence in
defiance of the court. There is nothing contemptuous about the statements and information
55
contained in the health advisory that were distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this
Court ordering the former to cease and desist from distributing the same.
In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned
provisions of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a
law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution.
_______________
 Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 648.
53
 People v. Vera, supra.
54
 People v. Maceda, G.R. Nos. 89591-96, August 13, 1990, 188 SCRA 532.
55
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing,Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Marti-
_______________
56
 Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA
52, citing Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30 (1978); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387.
57
 Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, supra.
201
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 201
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
nez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Garcia, JJ., concur.
     Chico-Nazario, J.,On Leave.
Petitions in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661 dismissed, validity of Section 7, National Blood
Service Act of 1994 (RA No. 7719) and Rules and Regulations Implementing RA No. 7719
(Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995) upheld. Petition in G.R. No. 139147 denied.
Notes.—The constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts is subject to the police
power of the state and to reasonable legislative regulations promoting public health, morals, safety
and welfare. (Bogo-Medellin Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 296 SCRA 108 [1998])
The phrase “affected with public interest” means that an industry is subject to control for the
public good, and has been considered as the equivalent of “subject to the exercise of the police
power.” Constitutions are widely understood to withhold from legislatures any authority to bargain
away their police power for the power to protect the public interest is beyond abnegation. (Del
Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 346 SCRA 485[2000])

When the government temporarily takes over a business affected with public interest pursuant
200
to Article XII, Section 17 of the Constitution, it is not required to compensate the private entity-
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED owner of the said business as there is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary,
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
and the private entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just
compensation for the use of said business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the
The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.  Those who petition this Court
56

government is in the exercise of its police power and not of its power of eminent domain. (Agan,
to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor.
Jr. vs. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 402 SCRA 612 [2003])
Otherwise, the petition must fail.
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National
Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that ——o0o——
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether
the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for 202
Congress to determine. 57
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment as follows:

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
G.R. No. 133640. November 25, 2005.
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA
BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER
SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE’S BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO,
*
M.D., doing business under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA,
M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT
L. LAPITAN, doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD TRANSFUSION
SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and style, RECORD
BLOOD BANK, in their individual capacities and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH,
respondent.
G.R. No. 133661. November 25, 2005. *
DOCTORS’ BLOOD CENTER, petitioner, vs.DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, respondent.
G.R. No. 139147. November 25, 2005. *
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN, doing business under the name and style, OUR LADY OF FATIMA
BLOOD BANK, FELY G. MOSALE, doing business under the name and style, MOTHER
SEATON BLOOD BANK; PEOPLE’S BLOOD BANK, INC.; MARIA VICTORIA T. VITO,
M.D., doing business under the name and style, AVENUE BLOOD BANK; JESUS M. GARCIA,
M.D., doing business under the name and style, HOLY REDEEMER BLOOD BANK, ALBERT
L. LAPITAN, doing business under the name and style, BLUE CROSS BLOOD TRANSFUSION
SERVICES; EDGARDO R. RODAS, M.D., doing business under the name and style,
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
169
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 169
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
RECORD BLOOD BANK, in their Individual capacities and for and in behalf of PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF BLOOD BANKS, petitioners, vs. THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH,
respondent.
Health; Blood Banks; The National Blood Services Act of 1994 (R.A. No. 7719); Delegation of
Powers; In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to
inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or
delegate of the Legislature; The National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself—it is clear from the
provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has
mandated several measures to attain this objective; Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies
the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.
—In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that
nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the
Legislature. Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted
or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is
incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative
board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. Republic Act No. 7719 or the
National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the
Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to
attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has
sufficiently provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its
provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through
voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health
as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Congress may validly delegate to
administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules
170
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
70
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. The Secretary of Health has
been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The true distinction between the power to make laws and discretion as to
its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves
a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law—the first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. —
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall
be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 “based on the result of a careful study and review of the
blood supply and demand and public safety.” This power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions
upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress.
The true distinction between the power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact
that the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
Same;  Same; Same;  Equal Protection Clause; Requisites;  Class Legislation; What may be regarded
as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will
cover every case can be formulated.—What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a
question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not
made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c)
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; The classification made by the National Blood Services Act of 1994
between nonprofit blood banks or centers and commercial blood banks is valid and reasonable.—Based on the
foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create
171
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 171
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
a situation in which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its
policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers and commercial blood banks. We
deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons: One, it was based on substantial
distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the latter is
motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood
as a sale of commodity. Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is
germane to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather
than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that
they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are
considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the
Philippine blood banking system. Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its
enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply
only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without
exception.
Same;  Same; Same;  Police Power; Requisites; The promotion of public health is a fundamental
obligation of the State—the health of the people is a primordial governmental concern; In serving the interest
of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out
commercial blood banks—this action may seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees,
of commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public.
—The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a
primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of
the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health and safety. Police power of the state is
validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment
of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly
172
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
72
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
oppressive upon individuals. In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of
the law for the protection of public health by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through
voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective requires the interference of the State given the disturbing
condition of the Philippine blood banking system. In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to
the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This action
may seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but their
interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public.
Same; Same; Same; Non-Impairment Clause; Settled is the rule that the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government—the right granted by this provision
must submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s power of regulation; The concern of the Government
in this case, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms—in the ordinary sequence of
events, it is profits that suffer as a result of government regulation.—The State, in order to promote the general
welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons
may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State
and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. Moreover, in the
case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, settled is the rule that the non-impairment
clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. The right granted by
this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s power of regulation. While the Court
understands the grave implications of Section 7 of the law in question, the concern of the Government in this
case, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is
profits that suffer as a result of government regulation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The freedom to contract is not absolute—all contracts and all rights are
subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the
State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the
community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
—The freedom to contract is not absolute; all
173
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 173
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which
affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as
the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience
may demonstrate the necessity. This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of
Agrarian Relations where the Court held that individual rights to contract and to property have to give way to
police power exercised for public welfare.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review;The wisdom of the Legislature in the
lawful exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be inquired into by the Court—doing so would be in
derogation of the principle of separation of powers; Between “is” and “ought” there is a far cry.—As for
determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly serve the general public
considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as proffered by petitioners, we maintain that the
wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be inquired into by the
Court. Doing so would be in derogation of the principle of separation of powers. That, under the
circumstances, proper regulation of all blood banks without distinction in order to achieve the objective of the
law as contended by petitioners is, of course, possible; but, this would be arguing on what the law  may
be or should be and not what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of
legislation is not for this Court to pass upon.
Courts; Contempt; Words and Phrases; Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a
flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court.—With regard to the petition for contempt in G.R.
No. 139147, on the other hand, the Court finds respondent Secretary of Health’s explanation satisfactory. The
statements in the flyers and posters were not aimed at influencing or threatening the Court in deciding in favor
of the constitutionality of the law. Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or
arrogant belligerence in defiance of the court. There is nothing contemptuous about the statements and
information contained in the health advisory that were distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this
Court ordering the former to cease and desist from distributing the same.
174
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
74
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
Same; Judicial Review;  Separation of Powers; Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality—for a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, and the ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.—The fundamental
criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law
has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish
the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the
Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to
whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for
Congress to determine.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Mandamus and Contempt.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Justinian E. Adviento and Oscar C. Maglaque for petitioners.
     Morales, Sayson & Rojas for Doctors’ Blood Bank Center.
     The Solicitor General for respondents Secretary of Health and Department of Health.
     Jimenea and Associates Law Office for intervenors.
AZCUNA, J.:
Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the “National Blood Services Act of 1994,” and the validity of
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Republic Act No. 7719.
175
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 175
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
G.R. No. 133640,  entitled “Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our
1
Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health” and G.R. No. 133661,  entitled 2
“Doctors Blood Bank Center vs. Department of Health” are petitions for certiorari and mandamus,
respectively, seeking the annulment of the following: (1) Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719; and,
(2) Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995. Both petitions likewise pray for the
issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health from implementing
and enforcing the aforementioned law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations; and, for a
mandatory injunction ordering and commanding the Secretary of Health to grant, issue or renew
petitioners’ license to operate free standing blood banks (FSBB).
The above cases were consolidated in a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 2, 1998. 3
G.R. No. 139147,  entitled “Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our
4
Lady of Fatima Blood Bank, et al., vs. The Secretary of Health,” on the other hand, is a petition to
show cause why respondent Secretary of Health should not be held in contempt of court.
This case was originally assigned to the Third Division of this Court and later consolidated
with G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661 in a resolution dated August 4, 1999. 5
Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of
Blood Banks, a duly regis-
_______________
 Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction or Temporary
1
Restraining Order, dated May 20, 1998, and later an Amended Petition, dated June 1, 1998 under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
 Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Prohibitory and
2
Mandatory Injunction, dated May 22, 1998.
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 106; Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), p. 69.
3
 Petition, dated July 15, 1999.
4
 Rollo (G.R. No. 139147), p. 34.
5
176
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
tered non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks.
 Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official
directly involved and charged with the enforcement and implementation of the law in question.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on
April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary
blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was approved by then President
Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on
August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of
Health (DOH). 6
Section 7 of R.A. 7719  provides:
“Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks.—All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a
period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the
Secretary.”
Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides:
“Section 23. Process of Phasing Out.—The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood
banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of
R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood
supply and demand and public safety.” 8
_______________
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), pp. 7-8.
6
 Annex “G” of Petition, Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 79.
7
 Annex “H” of Petition, Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 86.
8
177
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 177
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country have been arranged in four (4)
categories: blood centers run by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), government-run
blood services, private hospital blood banks, and commercial blood services.
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have
already been operating commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled “An Act
Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and
Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories.” The law, which was enacted on
June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and
blood processing laboratories. The Bureau of Research and Laboratories (BRL) was created in
1958 and was given the power to regulate clinical laboratories in 1966 under Republic Act No.
4688. In 1971, the Licensure Section was created within the BRL. It was given the duty to enforce
the licensure requirements for blood banks as well as clinical laboratories. Due to this
development, Administrative Order No. 156, Series of 1971, was issued. The new rules and
regulations triggered a stricter enforcement of the Blood Banking Law, which was characterized
by frequent spot checks, immediate suspension and communication of such suspensions to
hospitals, a more systematic record-keeping and frequent communication with blood banks
through monthly information bulletins. Unfortunately, by the 1980’s, financial difficulties
constrained the BRL to reduce the frequency of its supervisory visits to the blood banks. 9
Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the safety of blood and blood products
intensified when the dreaded disease Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first
described in 1979. In 1980, the International Society of Blood Transfusion (ISBT) formulated the
Code of
_______________
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), pp. 42-43.
9
178
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
Ethics for Blood Donation and Transfusion. In 1982, the first case of transfusion-associated AIDS
was described in an infant. Hence, the ISBT drafted in 1984, a model for a national blood policy
outlining certain principles that should be taken into consideration. By 1985, the ISBT had
disseminated guidelines requiring AIDS testing of blood and blood products for transfusion.
10
In 1989, another revision of the Blood Banking Guidelines was made. The DOH issued
Administrative Order No. 57, Series of 1989, which classified banks into primary, secondary and
tertiary depending on the services they provided. The standards were adjusted according to this
classification. For instance, floor area requirements varied according to classification level. The
new guidelines likewise required Hepatitis B and HIV testing, and that the blood bank be headed
by a pathologist or a hematologist.
11
In 1992, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 118-A institutionalizing the National
Blood Services Program (NBSP). The BRL was designated as the central office primarily
responsible for the NBSP. The program paved the way for the creation of a committee that will
implement the policies of the program and the formation of the Regional Blood Councils.
In August 1992, Senate Bill No. 1011, entitled “An Act Promoting Voluntary Blood
Donation, Providing for an Adequate Supply of Safe Blood, Regulating Blood Banks and
Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for other Purposes” was introduced in the Senate. 12
Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, House Bills No. 384, 546, 780 and 1978 were
being deliberated to address the issue of safety of the Philippine blood bank system. Sub-
_______________
 Id., at pp. 46-47.
10
 Id., at p. 43.
11
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), p. 99.
12
179
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 179
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
sequently, the Senate and House Bills were referred to the appropriate committees and
subsequently consolidated. 13
In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the
Philippine blood banking system entitled “Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood
Banking System.” It was revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4% were supplied
by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based blood
banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood banks. During the time the study was made, there
were only twenty-four (24) registered or licensed free-standing or commercial blood banks in the
country. Hence, with these numbers in mind, the study deduced that each commercial blood bank
produces five times more blood than the Red Cross and fifteen times more than the government-
run blood banks. The study, therefore, showed that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial
sources of blood. The study likewise revealed that 99.6% of the donors of commercial blood banks
and 77.0% of the donors of private-hospital based blood banks are paid donors. Paid donors are
those who receive remuneration for donating their blood. Blood donors of the PNRC and
government-run hospitals, on the other hand, are mostly voluntary. 14
It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial
banks are three times more likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion
transmissible diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC. 15
Commercial blood banks give paid donors varying rates around P50 to P150, and because of
this arrangement, many
_______________
13
 Id., at p. 100.
14
 Id., at pp. 49-51.
15
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 59.
 180
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
of these donors are poor, and often they are students, who need cash immediately. Since they need
the money, these donors are not usually honest about their medical or social history. Thus, blood
from healthy, voluntary donors who give their true medical and social history are about three times
much safer than blood from paid donors. 16
What the study also found alarming is that many Filipino doctors are not yet fully trained on
the specific indications for blood component transfusion. They are not aware of the lack of blood
supply and do not feel the need to adjust their practices and use of blood and blood products. It
also does not matter to them where the blood comes from. 17
On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of
commercial blood banks took effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH.
The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH pursuant to Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Pursuant to
said Act, all commercial blood banks should have been phased out by May 28, 1998. Hence,
petitioners were granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood bank
only until May 27, 1998.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a
petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and
validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The case was
entitled “Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood
Bank,” docketed as G.R. No. 133640.
_______________
 Id.
16
 Id.
17
181
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Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order, writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or status quo
ante order. 18
In the aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the constitutionality of the questioned legal
provisions, namely, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of Administrative Order
No. 9, Series of 1995, on the following grounds: 19
4. 1.The questioned legal provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its
Implementing Rules violate the equal protection clause for irrationally discriminating
against free standing blood banks in a manner which is not germane to the purpose of
the law;
5. 2.The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing
Rules represent undue delegation if not outright abdication of the police power of the
state; and,
6. 3.The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing
Rules are unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.
On May 22, 1998, the Doctors Blood Center filed a similar petition for mandamus with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction before this Court entitled “Doctors Blood Center vs. Department of Health,” docketed
as G.R. No. 133661.  This was consolidated with G.R. No. 133640.
20 21
Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7719 and its
implementing rules and regulations, thus, praying for the issuance of a license to operate
commercial blood banks beyond May 27, 1998. Specifically, with regard to Republic Act No.
7719, the petition submitted the following questions  for resolution:
22
_______________
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 112.
18
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 120.
19
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), p. 3.
20
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 106.
21
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), pp. 7-8.
22
182
182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
5. 1.Was it passed in the exercise of police power, and was it a valid exercise of such
power?
6. 2.Does it not amount to deprivation of property without due process?
7. 3.Does it not unlawfully impair the obligation of contracts?
8. 4.With the commercial blood banks being abolished and with no ready machinery to
deliver the same supply and services, does R.A. 7719 truly serve the public welfare?
On June 2, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution directing respondent DOH to file a consolidated
comment. In the same Resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) for
respondent to cease and desist from implementing and enforcing Section 7 of Republic Act No.
7719 and its implementing rules and regulations until further orders from the Court. 23
On August 26, 1998, respondent Secretary of Health filed a Consolidated Comment on the
petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, with opposition to the
issuance of a temporary restraining order. 24
In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of Health submitted that blood from
commercial blood banks is unsafe and therefore the State, in the exercise of its police power, can
close down commercial blood banks to protect the public. He cited the record of deliberations on
Senate Bill No. 1101 which later became Republic Act No. 7719, and the sponsorship speech of
Senator Orlando Mercado.
The rationale for the closure of these commercial blood banks can be found in the
deliberations of Senate Bill No. 1011, excerpts of which are quoted below:
Senator Mercado: I am providing over a period of two years to phase out all commercial blood
banks. So that in the end, the new section would have a provision that states:
_______________
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), pp. 107-108.
23
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), p. 98.
24
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VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 183
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
“ALL COMMERCIAL BLOOD BANKS SHALL BE PHASED OUT OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS
AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT. BLOOD SHALL BE COLLECTED FROM VOLUNTARY
DONORS ONLY AND THE SERVICE FEE TO BE CHARGED FOR EVERY BLOOD PRODUCT ISSUED
SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE NECESSARY EXPENSES ENTAILED IN COLLECTING AND
PROCESSING OF BLOOD. THE SERVICE FEE SHALL BE MADE UNIFORM THROUGH
GUIDELINES TO BE SET BY THE DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH.”
I am supporting Mr. President, the finding of a study called “Project to Evaluate the Safety of the
Philippine Blood Banking System.” This has been taken note of. This is a study done with the assistance of the
USAID by doctors under the New Tropical Medicine Foundation in Alabang.
 Part of the long-term measures proposed by this particular study is to improve laws, outlaw buying and
selling of blood and legally define good manufacturing processes for blood. This goes to the very heart of my
amendment which seeks to put into law the principle that blood should not be subject of commerce of man.
...
The Presiding Officer Senator Aquino: What does the sponsor say?
Senator Webb: Mr. President, just for clarity, I would like to find out how the Gentleman defines a
commercial blood bank. I am at a loss at times what a commercial blood bank really is.
Senator Mercado: We have a definition, I believe, in the measure, Mr. President.
The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: It is a business where profit is considered.
Senator Mercado: If the Chairman of the Committee would accept it, we can put a provision on Section
3, a definition of a commercial blood bank, which, as defined in this law, exists for profit and engages in the
buying and selling of blood or its components.
Senator Webb: That is a good description, Mr. President.
...
Senator Mercado: I refer, Mr. President, to a letter written by Dr. Jaime Galvez-Tan, the Chief of Staff,
Undersecretary of Health, to the good Chairperson of the Committee on Health.
184
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
In recommendation No. 4, he says:
“The need to phase out all commercial blood banks within a two-year period will give the Department of
Health enough time to build up government’s capability to provide an adequate supply of blood for the needs
of the nation. . .the use of blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of commodity.”
Taking into consideration the experience of the National Kidney Institute, which has succeeded in making
the hospital 100 percent dependent on voluntary blood donation, here is a success story of a hospital that does
not buy blood. All those who are operated on and need blood have to convince their relatives or have to get
volunteers who would donate blood. . .
If we give the responsibility of the testing of blood to those commercial blood banks, they will cut corners
because it will protect their profit.
In the first place, the people who sell their blood are the people who are normally in the high-risk
category. So we should stop the system of selling and buying blood so that we can go into a national voluntary
blood program.
It has been said here in this report, and I quote:
“Why is buying and selling of blood not safe? This is not safe because a donor who expects payment for
his blood will not tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny any risky social behavior such as sexual
promiscuity which increases the risk of having syphilis or AIDS or abuse of intravenous addictive drugs.
Laboratory tests are of limited value and will not detect early infections. Laboratory tests are required only for
four diseases in the Philippines. There are other blood transmissible diseases we do not yet screen for and there
could be others where there are no tests available yet.
A blood bank owner expecting to gain profit from selling blood will also try his best to limit his expenses.
Usually he tries to increase his profit by buying cheaper reagents or test kits, hiring cheaper manpower or
skipping some tests altogether. He may also try to sell blood even though these have infections in them.
Because there is no existing system of counterchecking these, the blood bank owner can usually get away with
many unethical practices.
The experience of Germany, Mr. President is illustrative of this issue. The reason why contaminated
blood was sold was that there
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Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
were corners cut by commercial blood banks in the testing process. They were protecting their profits. 25
The sponsorship speech of Senator Mercado further elucidated his stand on the issue:
...
Senator Mercado: Today, across the country, hundreds of poverty-stricken, sickly and weak Filipinos,
who, unemployed, without hope and without money to buy the next meal, will walk into a commercial blood
bank, extend their arms and plead that their blood be bought. They will lie about their age, their medical
history. They will lie about when they last sold their blood. For doing this, they will receive close to a hundred
pesos. This may tide them over for the next few days. Of course, until the next bloodletting.
This same blood will travel to the posh city hospitals and urbane medical centers. This same blood will
now be bought by the rich at a price over 500% of the value for which it was sold. Between this buying and
selling, obviously, someone has made a very fast buck.
Every doctor has handled at least one transfusion-related disease in an otherwise normal patient. Patients
come in for minor surgery of the hand or whatever and they leave with hepatitis B. A patient comes in for an
appendectomy and he leaves with malaria. The worst nightmare: A patient comes in for a Caesarian section
and leaves with AIDS.
We do not expect good blood from donors who sell their blood because of poverty. The humane
dimension of blood transfusion is not in the act of receiving blood, but in the act of giving it. . .
For years, our people have been at the mercy of commercial blood banks that lobby their interests among
medical technologists, hospital administrators and sometimes even physicians so that a proactive system for
collection of blood from healthy donors becomes difficult, tedious and unrewarding.
The Department of Health has never institutionalized a comprehensive national program for safe blood
and for voluntary blood donation even if this is a serious public health concern and has fallen
_______________
25
 Record of the Senate, Vol. IV, No. 59, pp. 286-287; Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), pp. 115-120.
186
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
for the linen of commercial blood bankers, hook, line and sinker because it is more convenient to tell the
patient to buy blood.
Commercial blood banks hold us hostage to their threat that if we are to close them down, there will be no
blood supply. This is true if the Government does not step in to ensure that safe supply of blood. We cannot
allow commercial interest groups to dictate policy on what is and what should be a humanitarian effort. This
cannot and will never work because their interest in blood donation is merely monetary. We cannot expect
commercial blood banks to take the lead in voluntary blood donation. Only the Government can do it, and the
Government must do it.” 26
On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Expanded Temporary Restraining
Order for the Court to order respondent Secretary of Health to cease and desist from announcing
the closure of commercial blood banks, compelling the public to source the needed blood from
voluntary donors only, and committing similar acts “that will ultimately cause the shutdown of
petitioners’ blood banks.” 27
On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment and/or Opposition to the above
motion stating that he has not ordered the closure of commercial blood banks on account of the
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued on June 2, 1998 by the Court. In compliance with the
TRO, DOH had likewise ceased to distribute the health advisory leaflets, posters and flyers to the
public which state that “blood banks are closed or will be closed.” According to respondent
Secretary, the same were printed and circulated in anticipation of the closure of the commercial
blood banks in accordance with R.A. No. 7719, and were printed and circulated prior to the
issuance of the TRO. 28
On July 15, 1999, petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 filed a Petition to Show Cause Why Public
Respondent Should Not be
_______________
 Record of the Senate, Volume 1, No. 13, pp. 434-436; Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), pp. 121-123.
26
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), pp. 227-232.
27
 Id., at pp. 406-408.
28
187
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 187
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
Held in Contempt of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 139147, citing public respondent’s willful
disobedience of or resistance to the restraining order issued by the Court in the said case.
Petitioners alleged that respondent’s act constitutes circumvention of the temporary restraining
order and a mockery of the authority of the Court and the orderly administration of
justice.  Petitioners added that despite the issuance of the temporary restraining order in G.R. No.
29
133640, respondent, in his effort to strike down the existence of commercial blood banks,
disseminated misleading information under the guise of health advisories, press releases, leaflets,
brochures and flyers stating, among others, that “this year [1998] all commercial blood banks will
be closed by 27 May. Those who need blood will have to rely on government blood
banks.” Petitioners further claimed that respondent Secretary of Health announced in a press
30
conference during the Blood Donor’s Week that commercial blood banks are “illegal and
In his Comment to the petition-in-intervention, respondent Secretary of Health stated that the
sale of blood is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Act that “blood donation is a humanitarian
act” and “blood transfusion is a professional medical service and not a sale of commodity (Section
2[a] and [b] of Republic Act No. 7719). The act of selling blood or charging fees other than those
allowed by law is even penalized under Section 12.” 37

dangerous” and that they “are at the moment protected by a restraining order on the basis that their
commercial interest is more important than the lives of the people.” These were all posted in
bulletin boards and other conspicuous places in all government hospitals as well as other medical
and health centers. 31
In respondent Secretary’s Comment to the Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent
Should Not Be Held in Contempt of Court, dated January 3, 2000, it was explained that nothing
was issued by the department ordering the closure of commercial blood banks. The subject health
advisory leaflets pertaining to said closure pursuant to Republic Act No. 7719 were printed and
circulated prior to the Court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order on June 21, 1998. 32
_______________
Thus, in view of these, the Court is now tasked to pass upon the constitutionality of Section 7
of Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations.
In resolving the controversy, this Court deems it necessary to address the issues and/or
questions raised by petitioners concerning the constitutionality of the aforesaid Act in G.R. No.
133640 and 133661 as summarized hereunder:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER;

 Rollo (G.R. No. 139147), p. 9.

29
II
 Rollo (G.R. No. 139147), pp. 5-6; Annexes “A” to “C-3,” pp. 14-33.
30

 Rollo (G.R. No. 139147), p. 6.

31

 Id., at pp. 49-50.

32 WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
188 REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;
_______________
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health  Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), pp. 467-468.
36

 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), pp. 685-686.

Public respondent further claimed that the primary purpose of the information campaign was “to
37

190
promote the importance and safety of voluntary blood donation and to educate the public about the
hazards of patronizing blood supplies from commercial blood banks.”  In doing so, he was merely
33
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
performing his regular functions and duties as the Secretary of Health to protect the health and Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
welfare of the public. Moreover, the DOH is the main proponent of the voluntary blood donation III
program espoused by Republic Act No. 7719, particularly Section 4 thereof which provides that,
in order to ensure the adequate supply of human blood, voluntary blood donation shall be WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
promoted through public education, promotion in schools, professional education, establishment of REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;
blood services network, and walking blood donors.
Hence, by authority of the law, respondent Secretary contends that he has the duty to promote IV
the program of voluntary blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging the public to donate
blood voluntarily and educating the people on the risks associated with blood coming from a paid WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
donor promotes general health and welfare and which should be given more importance than the REGULATIONS CONSTITUTE DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY;
commercial businesses of petitioners. 34

On July 29, 1999, interposing personal and substantial interest in the case as taxpayers and V
citizens, a Petition-in-Intervention was filed interjecting the same arguments and issues as laid
down by petitioners in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, namely, the unconstitutionality of the Acts, WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; and,
and, the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction. The intervenors are the immediate relatives of
individuals who had died allegedly because of shortage of blood supply at a critical time.35

VI
_______________

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
 Id., at p. 50.
33

 Id., at pp. 50-51.

34
REGULATIONS TRULY SERVE PUBLIC WELFARE.
 Id., at pp. 435-495.
35 As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the Act is being challenged, it is the
189 contention of petitioners that the phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 189 unconstitutional because it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of legislative power.
According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature, and the
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health latter failed to fix a standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of
The intervenors contended that Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative his functions. Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period that may be granted by
powers and unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty. 36
the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the
In a resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without giving due course to the aforementioned Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power.
petition, the Court granted the Motion for Intervention that was filed by the above intervenors on In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is
August 9, 1999. usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the
hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any
other ap-
191
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 191
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
pointee or delegate of the Legislature.  Except as to matters of detail that may be left to be filled in
38
by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative
boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not
lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the
exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. 39
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is
clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health
of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase
out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a definite
standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the
promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary
blood donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of
Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules
and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies.  The Secretary of
40
Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of
said Act. Section 11 of the Act states:
“SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations.—The implementation of the provisions of the Act shall be in accordance
with the rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within sixty (60) days from the approval
hereof. . .”
_______________
 See United States v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 (1922).
38
 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
39
 Vda. de Pineda v. Peña, G.R. No. 57665, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 22.
40
192
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by virtue of the administrative body’s
authority and expertise in the matter, came out with Administrative Order No. 9, series of 1995 or
the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. Administrative Order No. 9
effectively filled in the details of the law for its proper implementation.
Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for
commercial blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 “based on the
result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.” This
power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a
period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between
the power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the
delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. 41
In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when
said phase-out period was extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2 thereof:
“SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.—In order to promote public health, it is hereby declared the policy of the
state:
2. a)to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by the citizenry and to instill public
consciousness of the principle that blood donation is a humanitarian act;
_______________
 Id., citing Cincinnati, W. & Z.R. Co. v. Clinton County Comrs, 1 Ohio St., 77, 88 (1852); Cruz v. Youngberg, 56 Phil.
41
234 (1931).
193
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 193
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
11.b)to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood for transfusion is a medical
service and not a sale of commodity;
12.c)to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable distribution of blood supply and
blood products; d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood donation to
curb the hazards caused by the commercial sale of blood;
13.e)to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary blood donation in the existing health
subjects of the formal education system in all public and private schools as well as the
non-formal system;
14.f)to mobilize all sectors of the community to participate in mechanisms for voluntary
and non-profit collection of blood;
15.g)to mandate the Department of Health to establish and organize a National Blood
Transfusion Service Network in order to rationalize and improve the provision of
adequate and safe supply of blood;
16.h)to provide for adequate assistance to institutions promoting voluntary blood donation
and providing non-profit blood services, either through a system of reimbursement for
costs from patients who can afford to pay, or donations from governmental and non-
governmental entities;
17.i)to require all blood collection units and blood banks/centers to operate on a non-profit
basis;
18.j)to establish scientific and professional standards for the operation of blood collection
units and blood banks/ centers in the Philippines;
19.k)to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities related to the collection, storage and
banking of blood; and,
20.l)to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to include preventive services and
education to control spread of blood transfusion transmissible diseases.”
Petitioners also assert that the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal
protection clause enshrined in the Constitution because it unduly discriminates
194
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
against commercial or free standing blood banks in a manner that is not germane to the purpose of
the law. 42
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always
easily determined. No rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation,
discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but classification on a reasonable
basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be
reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d)
must apply equally to each member of the class. 43
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the
promotion of public health and welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New
Tropical Medicine Foundation, it was revealed that the Philippine blood banking system is
disturbingly primitive and unsafe, and with its current condition, the spread of infectious diseases
such as malaria, AIDS, Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly from blood transfusion is unavoidable. The
situation becomes more distressing as the study showed that almost 70% of the blood supply in the
country is sourced from paid blood donors who are three times riskier than voluntary blood donors
because they are unlikely to disclose their medical or social history during the blood screening.
The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No. 7719, to instill public consciousness
of the importance and benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply and proper blood
collection from healthy donors. To do this, the
_______________
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), p. 120; Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), p. 105.
42
 People v. Vera, supra.
43
 A Final Report on the Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System conducted on September
44
28, 1993– January 15, 1994, Rollo (G.R. No. 133640), Annex “A,” p. 41.
195
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
Legislature decided to order the phase out of commercial blood banks to improve the Philippine
blood banking system, to regulate the supply and proper collection of safe blood, and so as not to
derail the implementation of the voluntary blood donation program of the government. In lieu of
commercial blood banks, non-profit blood banks or blood centers, in strict adherence to
professional and scientific standards to be established by the DOH, shall be set in place.
45
Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in
which unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a
classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/ centers and commercial blood banks. We
deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:
One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian
reasons and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former
wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity.
Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane
to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by
promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical
service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood
banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood
supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as
shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not
solely to address the pecu-
_______________
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), pp. 115-124.
45
196
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
liar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions.
Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether or not Republic Act No. 7719
constitutes a valid exercise of police power.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the
people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was
enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote and preserve public health
and safety.
Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the
means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 46
In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the
protection of public health by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through
44
voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective requires the interference of the State given the
disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the
Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This action may seriously
affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood banks but their
interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public.
_______________
 Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and Director of Center for Educational Measurement v. Roberto
46
Rey C. San Diego and Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 533.
197
195
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 197
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the State’s police
power. Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both
necessary and reasonable for the common good. Police power is the State authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare.
47
It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners,
namely, deprivation of personal liberty and property, and violation of the non-impairment clause,
to be unmeritorious.
Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional and void because it infringes on
the freedom of choice of an individual in connection to what he wants to do with his blood which
should be outside the domain of State intervention. Additionally, and in relation to the issue of
classification, petitioners asseverate that, indeed, under the Civil Code, the human body and its
organs like the heart, the kidney and the liver are outside the commerce of man but this cannot be
made to apply to human blood because the latter can be replenished by the body. To treat human
blood equally as the human organs would constitute invalid classification. 48
Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the commercial blood banks will be
disadvantageous to them as it will affect their businesses and existing contracts with hospitals and
other health institutions, hence Section 7 of the Act should be struck down because it violates the
non-impairment clause provided by the Constitution.
As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be
subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order
_______________
 Pita v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80806, October 5, 1989, 178 SCRA 362.
47
 Rollo (G.R. No. 133661), p. 12.
48
198
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
to secure the general welfare of the State and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of
the individual may be subordinated. 49
Moreover, in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,  settled is 50
the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes
targeted by the government. The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and
necessities of the State’s power of regulation. While the Court understands the grave implications
of Section 7 of the law in question, the concern of the Government in this case, however, is not
necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits
that suffer as a result of government regulation.
 Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether
the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for
State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well- Congress to determine. 57

being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment as follows:
demonstrate the necessity.  This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v. Court of
51

Agrarian Relations where the Court held that individual rights to contract and to property have to
52

give way to police power exercised for public welfare.
As for determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly serve
the general public considering the shortage of blood supply in the country as proffered by
petitioners, we maintain that the wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power to
enact laws can-
_______________
 Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104786, January 27, 1994, 229 SCRA 554.
49
3. 1.In G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, the Court UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY of Section 7
of Republic Act No. 7719, otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of
1994, and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. The petitions are DISMISSED. Consequently,
the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on June 2, 1998, is LIFTED.
4. 2.In G.R. No. 139147, the petition seeking to cite the Secretary of Health in contempt of
court is DENIED for lack of merit.

 No. L-81958, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 386.

50
No costs.
 Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 (1950).
SO ORDERED.
51

 No. L-25035, February 26, 1968, 22 SCRA 792.

52

199      Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing,Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 199
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
not be inquired into by the Court. Doing so would be in derogation of the principle of separation of
powers. 53
That, under the circumstances, proper regulation of all blood banks without distinction in
order to achieve the objective of the law as contended by petitioners is, of course, possible; but,
this would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and not what the law is. Between is
and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for this Court to pass
upon. 54
Finally, with regard to the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 139147, on the other hand, the
Court finds respondent Secretary of Health’s explanation satisfactory. The statements in the flyers
and posters were not aimed at influencing or threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the
constitutionality of the law.
Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence in
defiance of the court. There is nothing contemptuous about the statements and information
55
contained in the health advisory that were distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this
Court ordering the former to cease and desist from distributing the same.
In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned
provisions of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a
law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution.
_______________
 Misolas v. Panga, G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 648.
53
 People v. Vera, supra.
54
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Marti-
_______________
56
 Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA
52, citing Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30 (1978); Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387.
57
 Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, supra.
201
VOL. 476, NOVEMBER 25, 2005 201
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
nez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Garcia, JJ., concur.
     Chico-Nazario, J.,On Leave.
Petitions in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661 dismissed, validity of Section 7, National Blood
Service Act of 1994 (RA No. 7719) and Rules and Regulations Implementing RA No. 7719
(Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995) upheld. Petition in G.R. No. 139147 denied.
Notes.—The constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contracts is subject to the police
power of the state and to reasonable legislative regulations promoting public health, morals, safety
and welfare. (Bogo-Medellin Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, 296 SCRA 108 [1998])
The phrase “affected with public interest” means that an industry is subject to control for the
public good, and has been considered as the equivalent of “subject to the exercise of the police
power.” Constitutions are widely understood to withhold from legislatures any authority to bargain
away their police power for the power to protect the public interest is beyond abnegation. (Del
Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 346 SCRA 485[2000])
When the government temporarily takes over a business affected with public interest pursuant
to Article XII, Section 17 of the Constitution, it is not required to compensate the private entity-
owner of the said business as there is no transfer of ownership, whether permanent or temporary,
and the private entity-owner affected by the temporary takeover cannot, likewise, claim just
compensation for the use of said business and its properties as the temporary takeover by the
government is in the exercise of its police power and not of its power of eminent domain. (Agan,

 People v. Maceda, G.R. Nos. 89591-96, August 13, 1990, 188 SCRA 532.

55

200 Jr. vs. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., 402 SCRA 612 [2003])
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
——o0o——
Beltran vs. Secretary of Health
The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.  Those who petition this Court
56
202
to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Otherwise, the petition must fail.
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National
Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that

G.R. No. 194561. September 14, 2016. * 27
 
DRUGSTORES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. and NORTHERN LUZON
DRUG CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY AFFAIRS;
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE; DEPARMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT; and
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, respondents.
Political Law; Police Power; Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.—Police power is the power of the state to promote
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. On the other hand, the power of
eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully
delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation. In the exercise of
police power, property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state. A legislative act based on the police power requires the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. In more familiar words, (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify the interference of the state; and (b)
that means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
Persons with Disability; Magna Carta for Disabled Persons; Republic Act (RA) No. 9442 which
amended RA No. 7277 grants incentives and benefits including a twenty percent (20%) discount to Persons
with Disabilities (PWDs) in the purchase of medicines; fares for domestic air, sea and land travels including
public railways and skyways; recreation and amusement centers including theaters, food chains and
restaurants.—R.A. No. 9442 which amended R.A. No. 7277
_______________
*  THIRD DIVISION.
 
26
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
grants incentives and benefits including a twenty percent (20%) discount to PWDs in the purchase of
medicines; fares for domestic air, sea and land travels including public railways and skyways; recreation and
amusement centers including theaters, food chains and restaurants. This is specifically stated in Section 4 of
the IRR of R.A. No. 9442: Section 4. Policies and Objectives.—It is the objective of Republic Act No. 9442 to
provide persons with disability, the opportunity to participate fully into the mainstream of society by
granting them at least twenty percent (20%) discount in all basic services. It is a declared policy of R.A.
7277 that persons with disability are part of Philippine society, and thus the State shall give full support to the
improvement of their total well-being and their integration into the mainstream of society. They have the
same rights as other people to take their proper place in society. They should be able to live freely and as
independently as possible. This must be the concern of everyone the family, community and all government
and nongovernment organizations. Rights of persons with disability must never be perceived as welfare
services. Prohibitions on verbal, nonverbal ridicule and vilification against persons with disability shall always
be observed at all times.
Public Use; The concept of public use is no longer confined to the traditional notion of use by the
public, but held synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience.—The
PWD mandatory discount on the purchase of medicine is supported by a valid objective or purpose as
aforementioned. It has a valid subject considering that the concept of public use is no longer confined to the
traditional notion of use by the public, but held synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare,
and public convenience. As in the case of senior citizens, the discount privilege to which the PWDs are entitled
is actually a benefit enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens belong. The means employed in
invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is
reasonably and directly related. Also, the means employed to provide a fair, just and quality health care to
PWDs are reasonably related to its accomplishment, and are not oppressive, considering that as a form of
reimbursement, the discount extended to PWDs in the purchase of medicine can be claimed by the
establishments as allowable tax deductions pursuant to Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 as implemented in Section
4 of DOF Revenue Regulations No.1-2009. Other-
 
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 27
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
wise stated, the discount reduces taxable income upon which the tax liability of the establishments is
computed.
Persons with Disability; Before an Identification Card (IDC) is issued by the city or municipal mayor
or the barangay captain, or the Chairman of the National Council on Disability Affairs (NCDA), the applicant
must first secure a medical certificate issued by a licensed private or government physician that will confirm
his medical or disability condition.—As stated in NCDA A.O. No. 1, before an IDC is issued by the city or
municipal mayor or the barangay captain, or the Chairman of the NCDA, the applicant must first secure a
medical certificate issued by a licensed private or government physician that will confirm his medical or
disability condition. If an applicant is an employee with apparent disability, a “certificate of disability” issued
by the head of the business establishment or the head of the nongovernmental organization is needed for him to
be issued a PWD-IDC. For a student with apparent disability, the “school assessment” issued by the teacher
and signed by the school principal should be presented to avail of a PWD-ID.
Statutory Construction; Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, when the law is
unambiguous and unequivocal, application not interpretation thereof is imperative.—Elementary is the rule
that when laws or rules are clear, when the law is unambiguous and unequivocal, application not interpretation
thereof is imperative. However, where the language of a statute is vague and ambiguous, an interpretation
thereof is resorted to. A law is deemed ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in either of two or more senses. The fact that a law admits of different interpretations is the
best evidence that it is vague and ambiguous.
Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; Under the equal protection clause, all persons or
things similarly situated must be treated alike, both in the privileges conferred and the obligations imposed.
Conversely, all persons or things differently situated should be treated differently.—Under the equal protection
clause, all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike, both in the privileges conferred and the
obligations imposed. Conversely, all persons or things differently situated should be treated differently.
 
28
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
Same; Same; Persons with Disability; Persons with disability (PWD) form a class separate and
distinct from the other citizens of the country.—The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification,
that is, a classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to R.A.
No. 9442, its expressed public policy is the rehabilitation, self-development and self-reliance of PWDs.
Persons with disability form a class separate and distinct from the other citizens of the country. Indubitably,
such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
classification and treatment accorded to the PWDs fully satisfy the demands of equal protection. Thus,
Congress may pass a law providing for a different treatment to persons with disability apart from the other
citizens of the country.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles for petitioners.
   Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
 
PERALTA, J.:
 
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari  with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
1
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction which seeks to annul and set aside the Decision  dated 2
July 26, 2010, and the Resolution dated November 19, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-
3
G.R. S.P. No. 109903. The CA dismissed petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition  and upheld the 4
constitutionality of the manda-
_______________
1  Rollo, pp. 11-86.
 2  Penned by Associate Justice Noel G. Tijam, with Associate Justices Marlene Gonzales-Sison and Danton Q. Bueser, (i) An identification card issued by the city or municipal mayor or the barangay captain of the place where the
concurring; id., at pp. 88-107. person with disability resides;
3  Id., at pp. 109-112.  
4  Id., at pp. 144-204.
(ii) The passport of the person with disability concerned; or
   
  (iii) Transportation discount fare Identification Card (ID) issued by the National Council for the Welfare of
29 Disabled Persons (NCWDP).
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 29  
x x x x
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs  
tory twenty percent (20%) discount on the purchase of medicine by persons with disability (PWD). The establishments may claim the discounts granted in subsections (a), (b), (c), (f) and (g) as tax
The antecedents are as follows: deductions based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, however, That the cost of
On March 24, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7277, entitled “An Act Providing for the the
_______________
Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Disabled Persons and their Integration into
the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes,” otherwise known as the “Magna Carta for
8  Section 4 of R.A. No. 9442.
Disabled Persons,” was passed into law.  The law defines “disabled persons,” “impairment” and
5
 
“disability” as follows:  
SECTION 4. Definition of Terms.—For purposes of this Act, these terms are defined as follows: 31
(a) Disabled Persons are those suffering from restrictions of different abilities, as a result of a mental,
physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 31
a human being;
(b) Impairment is any loss, diminution or aberration of psychological, physiological, or anatomical Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
structure of function; discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is
(c) Disability shall mean (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more granted: Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value-added tax if
psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an individual or activities of such individual; (2) a applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper
record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. 6 documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended. 9

   
On April 30, 2007, Republic Act No. 9442  was enacted amending R.A. No. 7277. The Title
7 The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9442  was jointly promulgated
10

of R.A. No. 7277 was amended to read as “Magna Carta for Persons with Disabil- by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Department of Education,
_______________ Department of Finance (DOF), Department of Tourism, Department of Transportation and
Communication, Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and Department of
5  Id., at p. 90. Agriculture. Insofar as pertinent to this petition, the salient portions of the IRR are hereunder
6  Id., at pp. 17 and 979. quoted: 11

7  AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7277, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE MAGNA CARTA FOR PERSONS WITH
RULE III. DEFINITION OF TERMS
DISABILITY AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES ; id., at p. 90.
 
  Section 5. Definition of Terms.—For purposes of these Rules and Regulations, these terms are defined
  as follows:
30 5.1. Persons with Disability  — are those individuals defined under Section 4 of RA 7277 “An Act
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Providing for the Rehabilitation, SelfDevelopment and Self-Reliance of Persons with Disability as amended
and their integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes.” This is defined as a person
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or sensory impairment, to
ity” and all references on the law to “disabled persons” were amended to read as “persons with perform an activity in a manner or within the range considered normal for human being. Disability shall mean
disability” (PWD). Specifically, R.A. No. 9442 granted the PWDs a twenty (20) percent discount
8 (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more psycho-
_______________
on the purchase of medicine, and a tax deduction scheme was adopted wherein covered
establishments may deduct the discount granted from gross income based on the net cost of goods
9   Rollo, pp. 20 and 980.
sold or services rendered: 10  Published on January 21, 2009 in the Manila Standard Today, and filed with the Office of the National
CHAPTER 8. Other Privileges and Incentives.— Administration Register, U.P. Law Center on January 31, 2008; id., at pp. 90 and 982.
  11  Id., at p. 981.
SEC. 32. Persons with disability shall be entitled to the following:  
x x x x  
  32
(d) At least twenty percent (20%) discount for the purchase of medicines in all drugstores for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of persons with disability. 32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
x x x x
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
 
logical, physiological or anatomical function of an individual or activities of such individual; (2) a record of
The above mentioned privileges are available only to persons with disability who are Filipino citizens
such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.
upon submission of any of the following as proof of his/her entitlement thereto:
 
 
x x x x
 
 RULE IV. PRIVILEGES AND INCENTIVES FOR THE PERSONS WITH DISABILITY
Section 6. Other Privileges and incentives.—Persons with disability shall be entitled to the following:
 
x x x x
 
6.1.d. Purchase of Medicine — at least twenty percent (20%) discount on the purchase of medicine for
the exclusive use and enjoyment of persons with disability. All drugstores, hospital, pharmacies, clinics and
other similar establishments selling medicines are required to provide at least twenty percent (20%)
discount subject to the guidelines issued by DOH and PHILHEALTH. 12
x x x x
 
6.11 The above mentioned privileges are available only to persons with disability who are Filipino
citizens upon submission of any of the following as proof of his/her entitlement thereto subject to the
guidelines issued by the NCWDP in coordination with DSWD, DOH and DILG.
6.11.1 An identification card issued by the city or municipal mayor or the barangay captain of
the place where the person with disability resides;
6.11.2 The passport of the persons with disability concerned; or
6.11.3 Transportation discount fare Identification Card (IDC) issued by the National Council
for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP). However, upon effectivity of this Implementing
Rules and Regulations,
_______________
12  Underscoring supplied.
 
 
33
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 33
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
NCWDP will already adopt the Identification Card issued by the Local Government Unit for
purposes of uniformity in the implementation. NCWDP will provide the design and specification of
the identification card that will be issued by the Local Government Units. 13
6.14. Availment of Tax Deductions by Establishment Granting Twenty Percent 20% Discount  — The
establishments may claim the discounts granted in sub-sections (6.1), (6.2), (6.4), (6.5) and (6.6) as tax
deductions based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, however, that the cost of the
discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is
granted: Provided, further, that the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value-added tax if
applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper
documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
 
On April 23, 2008, the National Council on Disability Affairs (NCDA)  issued Administrative
14
Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2008,  prescribing guidelines which should serve as a mechanism for
15
the issuance of a PWD Identification Card (IDC) which shall be the basis for providing privileges
and discounts to bona fide PWDs in accordance with R.A. 9442:
IV. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
 
A. The Local Government Unit of the City or Municipal Office shall implement these guidelines in the
issuance of the PWD-IDC.
_______________
13  Underscoring supplied.
14  Formerly National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP).
15  GUIDELINES ON THE ISSUANCE OF IDENTIFICATION CARD RELATIVE TO REPUBLIC ACT 9442; Rollo, pp. 117-119.
 
34
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
x x x x
 
D. Issuance of the appropriate document to confirm the medical condition of the applicant is as follows:
E. PWD Registration Forms and ID Cards shall be issued and signed by the City or Municipal Mayor,
or Barangay Captain.
 
x x x x
 
V. IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES
Any bona fide person with permanent disability can apply for the issuance of the PWD-IDC. His/her
caregiver can assist in the application process. Procedures for the issuance of the ID Cards are as follows:
 
A. Completion of the Requirements.—Complete and/or make available the following requirements:
1. Two “1 x 1” recent ID pictures with the names, and signatures or thumbmarks at the back
of the picture,
 
 
35
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Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
2. One (1) Valid ID,
3. Document to confirm the medical or disability condition (see Section IV, D for the
required document).
On December 9, 2008, the DOF issued Revenue Regulations No. 1-2009  prescribing rules and 16
regulations to implement R.A. 9442 relative to the tax privileges of PWDs and tax incentives for
establishments granting the discount. Section 4 of Revenue Regulations No. 001-09 states that drugstores can
only deduct the 20% discount from their gross income subject to some conditions. 17
_______________
16  Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 9442, entitled “AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT 7227,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE MAGNA CARTA FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITY ” Relative to the Tax Privileges of Persons with
Disability and Tax Incentives for Establishments Granting Sales Discounts; Id., at pp. 120-126.
17  Section 4. Availment by Establishments of Sales Discounts as Deduction from Gross Income.—Establishments
granting sales discounts to persons with disability on their sale of goods and/or services specified under Section 3 above shall
be entitled to deduct the said sales discount from their gross income subject to the following conditions:
1. The sales discounts shall be deducted from gross income after deducting the cost of goods sold or the cost of
service;
2. The cost of the sales discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted;
3. Only that portion of the gross sales exclusively used, consumed or enjoyed by the person with disability shall be
eligible for the deductible sales discount;
4. The gross selling price and the sales discount must be separately indicated in the sales invoice or official receipt
issued by the establishment for the sale of goods or services to the person with disability;
 
 
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36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
On May 20, 2009, the DOH issued A.O. No. 2009-0011 specifically stating that the grant of
18
20% discount shall be provided in the purchase of branded medicines and unbranded generic
medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the PWDs. It also 19
detailed
_______________
 5. Only the actual amount of the sales discount granted or a sales discount not exceeding 20% of the gross selling
price or gross receipt can be deducted from the gross income, net of value-added tax, if applicable, for income tax
purposes, and from gross sales or gross receipts of the business enterprise concerned, for VAT or other percentage
tax purposes; and shall be subject to proper documentation under pertinent provisions of the Tax Code of 1997, as
amended;
6. The business establishment giving sales discount to qualified person with disability is required to keep separate
and accurate record of sales, which shall include the name of the person with disability, ID Number, gross
sales/receipts, sales discount granted, date of transactions and invoice number for every sale transaction to person
with disability; and
7. All establishments mentioned in Section 3 above which granted sales discount to persons with disability on their
sale of goods and/or services may claim the said discount as deduction from gross income.
18  GUIDELINES TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT 9442, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “AN ACT AMENDING
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7227, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “MAGNA CARTA FOR DISABLED PERSONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”
FOR THE PROVISION OF MEDICAL AND RELATED DISCOUNTS AND SPECIAL PRIVILEGES ; published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer on May 13, 2009, and filed in the Office of the National Administrative Register, U.P. Law Center on July 9,
2009; Rollo, pp. 127-142.
19  Title V, No. 3, DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011.
 
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Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
the guidelines for the provision of medical and related discounts and special privileges to PWDs
pursuant to R.A. 9442. 20
On July 28, 2009, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition with application for a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction  before the Court of Appeals to annul
21
and enjoin the implementation of the following laws:
1) Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A. No. 9442;
2) Section 6, Rule IV of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9442;
3) NCDA A.O. No. 1;
4) DOF Revenue Regulation No 1-2009;
5) DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011.
On July 26, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision upholding the constitutionality of R.A. 7277 as
amended, as well as the assailed administrative issuances. However, the CA suspended the
effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1 pending proof of respondent NCDA’s compliance with filing of
said administrative order with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) and its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The effectivity of NCDA Administrative Order No.
1 is hereby SUSPENDED pending. Respondent’s compliance with the proof of filing of NCDA Administrative
Order No. 1 with the Office of the National Administrative Register and its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.
_______________
20  Number 4 of DOH issued Administrative Order No. 2009-0011.
21  Rollo, pp. 144-204.
 
 
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38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
Respondent NCDA filed a motion for reconsideration before the CA to lift the suspension of
the implementation of NCDA A.O. No. 1 attaching thereto proof of its publication in
the Philippine Star and Daily Tribune on August 12, 2010, as well as a certification from the
ONAR showing that the same was filed with the said office on October 22, 2009.  Likewise, 22
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision.
In a Resolution dated November 19, 2010, the CA dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration and lifted the suspension of the effectivity of NCDA A.O. No. 1 considering the
filing of the same with ONAR and its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
MANDATED PWD DISCOUNT IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. ON THE CONTRARY, IT
IS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN BECAUSE IT FAILS TO
PROVIDE JUST COMPENSATION TO PETITIONERS AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED
DRUGSTORES;
 
II. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT SECTION 32 OF RA 7277 AS AMENDED
BY RA 9442, NCDA AO 1 AND THE OTHER IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS DID NOT VIOLATE
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE;
 
III. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE DEFINITIONS OF DISABILITIES
UNDER SECTION 4(A), SECTION 4(B) AND SECTION 4(C) OF RA 7277 AS AMENDED BY RA 9442,
RULE 1 OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS  OF RA 7277, SECTION 5.1 OF THE
23
IMPLEMENTING
_______________
22  Id., at pp. 110-111 and 988.
23  Rule I. Title, Purpose, and Construction.
 
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Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF RA 9442, NCDA AO 1 AND DOH AO 2009-11 ARE NOT VAGUE,
AMBIGUOUS AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
 
IV. THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE MANDATED PWD DISCOUNT
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
 
We deny the petition.
The CA is correct when it applied by analogy the case of Carlos Superdrug Corporation, et
al. v. DSWD, et al., wherein We pronounced that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9257 which grants 20%
24
discount on the purchase of medicine of senior citizens is a legitimate exercise of police power:
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled
in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits.  Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
25
extending as it does to all the great public needs.  It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution
26
to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for
_______________
24  553 Phil. 120, 132-133; 526 SCRA 130, 143 (2007).
25  Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 257 Phil. 930; 176 SCRA 719 (1989).
26  Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20
SCRA 849, citing Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 412 (1911).
 
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40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same. 27
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow
to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
welfare. 28
 Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere
plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated.
Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the provision in
question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its
favor. 29
 
Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property. On the other hand, the power of eminent domain is the inherent
right of the state (and of those entities to which the power has been lawfully delegated) to
condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation. In the exercise of
police power, property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.  A legislative act based on the
30
police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. In more familiar
words, (a) the interests of the public generally,
_______________
27  U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 (1910), citing Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush., 53 (Mass. 1851); U.S. v. Pompeya, 31
Phil. 245, 253-254 (1915).
28  Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, No. L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.
29  Id.
30  Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated (DESAMA) v. Gozun, 520 Phil. 457, 476; 485 SCRA
586, 604 (2006).
 
 
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Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
as distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify the interference of the state; and (b)
that means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. 31
 
R.A. No. 7277 was enacted primarily to provide full support to the improvement of the total
well-being of PWDs and their integration into the mainstream of society. The priority given to
PWDs finds its basis in the Constitution:
ARTICLE XII
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
x x x x
Section 6. The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the
common good. Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective
organizations, shall have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of
the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands. 32
ARTICLE XIII
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
 
x x x x
 
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which
shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable
cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.
_______________
31  National Development Company v. Philippine Veterans Bank, 270 Phil. 349, 356; 192 SCRA 257, 262
(1990); Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 810; 175
SCRA 343, 375 (1989).
32  Underscoring supplied.
 
 
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42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. 33
 
Thus, R.A. No. 7277 provides:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.—The grant of the rights and privileges for disabled persons shall be
guided by the following principles:
 
(a) Disabled persons are part of the Philippine society, thus the Senate shall give full support to the
improvement of the total well-being of disabled persons and their integration into the mainstream of society.
 
Toward this end, the State shall adopt policies ensuring the rehabilitation, self-development and self-reliance
of disabled persons.
 
It shall develop their skills and potentials to enable them to compete favorably for available opportunities.
 
(b) Disabled persons have the same rights as other people to take their proper place in society. They should
be able to live freely and as independently as possible. This must be the concern of everyone — the family,
community and all government and nongovernment organizations. Disabled person’s rights must never be
perceived as welfare services by the Government.
x x x x
(d) The State also recognizes the role of the private sector in promoting the welfare of disabled
persons and shall encourage partnership in programs that address their needs and concerns. 34
 
To implement the above policies, R.A. No. 9442 which amended R.A. No. 7277 grants
incentives and benefits including a twenty percent (20%) discount to PWDs in the purchase of
medicines; fares for domestic air, sea and land travels in-
_______________
33  Underscoring supplied.
34  Underscoring supplied.
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Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
cluding public railways and skyways; recreation and amusement centers including theaters, food
chains and restaurants.  This is specifically stated in Section 4 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9442:
35
_______________
35  SEC. 32. Persons with disability shall be entitled to the following:
(a) At least twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of all services in
hotels and similar lodging establishments; restaurants and recreation centers for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
persons with disability;
(b) A minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees charged by theaters, cinema houses, concert
halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement for the exclusive use of
enjoyment of persons with disability;
(c) At least twenty percent (20%) discount for the purchase of medicines in all drugstores for the exclusive use or
enjoyment of persons with disability;
(d) At least twenty percent (20%) discount on medical and dental services including diagnostic and laboratory fees
such as, but not limited to, x-rays, computerized tomography scans and blood tests, in all government facilities,
subject to guidelines to be issued by the Department of Health (DOH), in coordination with the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (PHILHEALTH);
 (e) At least twenty percent (20%) discount on medical and dental services including diagnostic and laboratory
fees, and professional fees of attending doctors in all private hospitals and medical facilities, in accordance with the
rules and regulations to be issued by the DOH, in coordination with the PHILHEALTH;
(f) At least twenty percent (20%) discount on fare for domestic air and sea travel for the exclusive use or
enjoyment of persons with disability;
(g) At least twenty percent (20%) discount in public railways, skyways and bus fare for the exclusive use and
enjoyment of person with disability;
 
 
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44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
Section 4. Policies and Objectives.—It is the objective of Republic Act No. 9442 to provide persons
with disability, the opportunity to participate fully into the mainstream of society by granting them at
least twenty percent (20%) discount in all basic services. It is a declared policy of RA 7277 that persons
with disability are part of Philippine society, and thus the State shall give full support to the improvement of
their total well-being and their integration into the mainstream of society. They have the same rights as
other people to take their proper place in society. They should be able to live freely and as independently as
possible. This must be the concern of everyone the family, community and all government and nongovernment
organizations. Rights of persons with disability must never be perceived as welfare services. Prohibitions on
verbal,
_______________
(h) Educational assistance to persons with disability, for them to pursue primary, secondary, tertiary, post-tertiary,
as well as vocational or technical education, in both public and private schools, through the provision of
scholarships, grants, financial aids, subsidies and other incentives to qualified persons with disability, including
support for books, learning material, and uniform allowance to the extent feasible:  Provided, That persons with
disability shall meet minimum admission requirements;
(i) To the extent practicable and feasible, the continuance of the same benefits and privileges given by the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS), and PAGIBIG, as the case may be, as
are enjoyed by those in actual service;
(j) To the extent possible, the government may grant special discounts in special programs for persons with
disability on purchase of basic commodities, subject to guidelines to be issued for the purpose by the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) and the Department of Agriculture (DA); and
(k) Provision of express lanes for persons with disability in all commercial and government establishments; in the
absence thereof, priority shall be given to them.
 
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Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
nonverbal ridicule and vilification against persons with disability shall always be observed at all times. 36
Hence, the PWD mandatory discount on the purchase of medicine is supported by a valid
objective or purpose as aforementioned. It has a valid subject considering that the concept
of public use is no longer confined to the traditional notion of use by the public, but held
synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience. As in the
case of senior citizens,  the discount privilege to which the PWDs are entitled is actually a benefit
37
enjoyed by the general public to which these citizens belong. The means employed in invoking the
active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective of the law, is
reasonably and directly related.  Also, the means employed to provide a fair, just and quality
38
health care to PWDs are reasonably related to its accomplishment, and are not oppressive,
considering that as a form of reimbursement, the discount extended to PWDs in the purchase of
medicine can be claimed by the establishments as allowable tax deductions pursuant to Section 32
of R.A. No. 9442 as implemented in Section 4 of DOF Revenue Regulations No. 1-2009.
Otherwise stated, the discount reduces taxable income upon which the tax liability of the
establishments is computed.
Further, petitioners aver that Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A. No. 9442 is
unconstitutional and void for violating the due process clause of the Constitution since entitlement
to the 20% discount is allegedly merely based on any of the three documents mentioned in the
provision, namely: (i) an identification card issued by the city or municipal mayor or
the barangay captain of the place where the
_______________
36  Emphasis supplied.
37  Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, 496 Phil. 307, 335; 456 SCRA 414, 444
(2005).
38  Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), supra note 24 at p. 135; p. 147.
 
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46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
PWD resides; (ii) the passport of the PWD; or (iii) transportation discount fare identification card
issued by NCDA. Petitioners, thus, maintain that none of the said documents has any relation to a
medical finding of disability, and the grant of the discount is allegedly without any process for the
determination of a PWD in accordance with law.
Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277, as amended by R.A. No. 9442, must be read with its IRR which
stated that upon its effectivity, NCWDP (which is the government agency tasked to ensure the
implementation of RA 7277), would adopt the IDC issued by the local government units for
purposes of uniformity in the implementation.  Thus, NCDA A.O. No. 1 provides the reasonable
39
guidelines in the issuance of IDCs to PWDs as proof of their entitlement to the privileges and
incentives under the law  and fills the details in the implementation of the law.
40
As stated in NCDA A.O. No. 1, before an IDC is issued by the city or municipal mayor or
the barangay captain, or the Chairman of the NCDA,  the applicant must first secure a medical
41 42
certificate issued by a licensed private or government physician that will confirm his medical or
disability condition. If an applicant is an employee with apparent disability, a “certificate of
disability” issued by the head of the business establishment or the head of the nongovernmental
organization is needed for him to be issued a PWD-IDC. For a student with apparent disability, the
“school assessment” issued by the teacher and signed by the school principal should be presented
to avail of a PWD-ID.
_______________
39  Section 6.11.3 of IRR of R.A. No. 9442.
40  Part I, Nos. 4 and 5, NCDA Administrative Order No. 1; Rollo, p. 111.
41  Only for the first three (3) years as provided in DOH Administrative Order No. 2009-001; id., at p. 131.
42  After three (3) years, the signatory to the IDC shall be the Chairperson of the NCDA as provided in DOH
Administrative Order No. 2009-001; id.
 
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Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
Petitioners’ insistence that Part IV(D) of NCDA Administrative Order No. 1 is void because it
allows allegedly non-competent persons like teachers, head of establishments and heads of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to confirm the medical condition of the applicant is
misplaced. It must be stressed that only for apparent disabilities can the teacher or head of a
business establishment validly issue the mentioned required document because, obviously, the
disability is easily seen or clearly visible. It is, therefore, not an unqualified grant of authority for
the said nonmedical persons as it is simply limited to apparent disabilities. For a non apparent
disability or a disability condition that is not easily seen or clearly visible, the disability can only
be validated by a licensed private or government physician, and a medical certificate has to be
presented in the procurement of an IDC. Relative to this issue, the CA validly ruled, thus:
 We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General’s (OSG) ratiocination that teachers, heads of business
establishments and heads of NGOs can validly confirm the medical condition of their students/employees with
apparent disability for obvious reasons as compared to non-apparent disability which can only be determined
by licensed physicians. Under the Labor Code, disabled persons are eligible as apprentices or
learnersprovided that their handicap are not as much as to effectively impede the performance of their job. We
find that heads of business establishments can validly issue certificates of disability of their employees because
aside from the fact that they can obviously validate the disability, they also have medical recordsof the
employees as a prerequisite in the hiring of employees. Hence, Part IV(D) of NCDA AO No. 1 is logical and
valid. 43
 
Furthermore, DOH A.O. No. 2009-11 prescribes additional guidelines for the 20% discount in
the purchase of all medi-
_______________
43  Emphasis supplied.
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48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
cines for the exclusive use of PWD.  To avail of the discount,
44
_______________
44  Guidelines for the twenty percent (20%) discount in the purchase of all medicines for the exclusive use of PWD:
a) All establishments through their registered pharmacist must have full disclosure and responsibility in dispensing all
medicines for exclusive use of PWD.
b) Discounts shall be granted to PWDs on all the purchase of all medicines provided that it is supported by the following:
i. PWD Identification Card as stated in the Definition of Terms;
ii. Doctor’s prescription stating the name of the PWD, age, sex, address, date, generic name of the medicine,
dosage form, dosage strength, quantity, signature over printed name of physician, physician’s address, contact
number of physician or dentist, professional license number, professional tax receipt number and narcotic license
number, if applicable. To safeguard the health of PWDs and to prevent abuse of RA 9257, a doctor’s prescription is
required in the purchase of over-the-counter medicines. Only prescriptions that contain the above information shall
be honored.
iii. Purchase booklet issued by the local social/health office to PWDs for free containing the following basic
information:
a) PWD ID Number
b) Booklet control number
i.4 License Number
i.5 Servicing drug store name
i.6 Name of dispensing pharmacist
j) Authorization letter of the PWD who is residing in the Philippines at the time of purchase, currently dated and the
identification card of the authorized person or representative, in case the medicine is bought by the representative or
caregiver of the PWD. (Emphasis supplied)
c) As a general rule, any single dispensing of medicine must be in accordance with the prescription issued by a physician and
should not exceed a one (1) month supply.
Drug stores are required to maintain a special record book for PWD subject to inspection by the BFAD and BIR.
d) For partial filling, the establishment’s pharmacists will indicate the quantity partially filled in the special record book and
the unfilled balance on the prescription. The PWD shall retain the partially filled prescription and present the same later to
complete the prescribed quantity.
e) Drugstores offering special discounted prices less than 20% of the regular retail price can deduct the percentage discount on
their promotional campaign from the total of 20% discount as required by RA 9442. Thus, a total discount of 20% for PWD
will still be observed.
These discount privileges shall be nontransferable and exclusive for the benefits of the PWD.
All establishments as defined above are enjoined to comply with above cited guidelines.
x x x x
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50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
scription issued by the physician and should not exceed a one (1) month supply. Therefore, as
correctly argued by the respondents, Section 32 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A. No. 9442
complies with the standards of substantive due process.
We are likewise not persuaded by the argument of petitioners that the definition of
“disabilities” under the subject laws is vague and ambiguous because it is allegedly so general and
broad that the person tasked with implementing the law will undoubtedly arrive at different
interpretations and applications of the law. Aside from the definitions of a “person with disability”
or “disabled persons” under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7277 as amended by R.A. No. 9442 and in the
IRR of RA 9442, NCDA A.O. No. 1 also provides:
4. Identification Cards shall be issued to any bona fide PWD with permanent disabilities due to any one or
more of the following conditions: psychosocial, chronic illness, learning, mental, visual, orthopedic, speech
and hearing conditions. This includes persons suffering from disabling diseases resulting to the person’s
limitations to do day to day activities as normally as possible such as but not limited to those undergoing
dialysis, heart disorders, severe cancer cases and such other similar cases resulting to temporary or permanent
disability. 45

c) Name of PWD  
d) Sex
e) Address
Similarly, DOH A.O. No. 2009-0011 defines the different categories of disability as follows:
f) Date of Birth Rule IV, Section 4, Paragraph B of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of this Act required
g) Picture the Department of Health to address the health concerns of seven (7) different categories of disability, which
h) Signature of PWD include the following: (1) Psychological and behavioral disabili-
i) Information of medicine purchased: _______________
i.1 Name of medicine
i.2 Quantity
45  No. 3, Part I of NCDA AO 1.
i.3 Attending Physician
   
   
51
49

VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 49 VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 51
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
ties, (2) Chronic illness with disabilities, (3) Learning (cognitive or intellectual) disabilities, (4) Mental
the PWD must not only present his I.D. but also the doctor’s prescription stating, among others, disabilities, (5) Visual/seeing disabilities, (6) Orthopedic/moving, and (7) communication deficits. 46

the generic name of the medicine, the physician’s address, contact number and professional license _______________
number, professional tax receipt number and narcotic license number, if applicable. A purchase
booklet issued by the local social/health office is also required in the purchase of over-the-counter 46  Rollo, pp. 102-103.
medicines. Likewise, any single dispensing of medicine must be in accordance with the pre- Disability Types – the 7 types of disabilities mentioned in RA No. 7277 are psychosocial disability, disability due
_______________ to chronic illness, learning disability, mental disability, visual disability, orthopaedic disability, and communication
disability.
 Communication Disability – an impairment in the process of speech, language or hearing: a) hearing impairment is
a total or partial loss of hearing function which impede the communication process essential to language,
educational, social and/or cultural interaction; Speech and Language Impairment means one or more
speech/language disorders of voice, articulation, rhythm and/or the receptive or and expressive processes of
language.
Learning Disability – any disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes (perception,
comprehension, thinking, etc.) involved in understanding or in using spoken or written language.
Mental Disability – disability resulting from organic brain syndrome (i.e., Mental retardation, acquired lesions of
the central nervous system, or dementia) and/or mental illness (psychotic or non-psychotic disorder)
Orthopedic Disability – disability in the normal functioning of the joints, muscles or limbs.
Psychosocial Disability – any acquired behavioural, cognitive, emotional, social impairment that limits one or more
activities necessary for effective interpersonal transactions and other civilizing process or activities for daily living
such as but not limited to deviancy or anti-social behaviour.
Visual Disability – a person with visual disability (impairment) is one who has impairment of visual functioning
even after treatment and/or standard refractive correction, and has visual acuity in the better eye of less than (6/18
for low vision and 3/60 for blind, or a visual field of less than 10 degrees from the point of fixation. A certain level
of visual impairment is de-
 
52
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
Elementary is the rule that when laws or rules are clear, when the law is unambiguous and
unequivocal, application not interpretation thereof is imperative. However, where the language of
a statute is vague and ambiguous, an interpretation thereof is resorted to. A law is deemed
ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably wellinformed persons in either of
two or more senses. The fact that a law admits of different interpretations is the best evidence that
it is vague and ambiguous. 47
In the instant case, We do not find the aforestated definition of terms as vague and ambiguous.
Settled is the rule that courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of the government agency entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special and technical training and knowledge of such agency.  As a matter of policy, We accord
48
great respect to the decisions and/or actions of administrative authorities not only because of the
doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledge, ability, and expertise in
the enforcement of laws and regulations entrusted to their jurisdiction. The rationale for this rule
relates not only to the emergence of the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society
and the establish-
_______________
fined as legal blindness. One is legally blind when your best corrected central visual acuity in your better eye is 6/60
or worse or your side vision is 20 degrees or less in the better eye.
Chronic Illness – words to describe a group of health conditions that last a long time. It may get slowly worse over
time or may become permanent or it may lead to death. It may cause permanent change to the body and it will
certainly affect the person’s quality of life.
47  Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection, 565 Phil. 193, 208; 540 SCRA 456, 471 (2007).
48  Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) v. Pearl City Manufacturing Corporation, 623 Phil. 191, 207; 608
SCRA 280, 295 (2009); Department of Agrarian Reform v. Samson, 577 Phil. 370, 381; 554 SCRA 500, 510-511 (2008).
 
53
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 53
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
ment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs; it also relates to
the accumulation of experience and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative
agency charged with implementing a particular statute. 49
Lastly, petitioners contend that R.A. No. 7227, as amended by R.A. No. 9442, violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because it fairly singles out drugstores to bear the
burden of the discount, and that it can hardly be said to “rationally” meet a legitimate government
objective which is the purpose of the law. The law allegedly targets only retailers such as
petitioners, and that the other enterprises in the drug industry are not imposed with similar burden.
This same argument had been raised in the case of Carlos Superdrug Corp., et al. v. DSWD, et
al.,  and We reaffirm and apply the ruling therein in the case at bar:
50
The Court is not oblivious of the retail side of the pharmaceutical industry and the competitive pricing
component of the business. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities
of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which
may result in an impairment of property rights in the process.
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides the
precept for the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and the
regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the right to property can be re-
_______________
49  Public Schools District Supervisors Association (PSDSA) v. De Jesus, 524 Phil. 366, 386-387; 491 SCRA 55, 71-72
(2006).
50  Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), supra note 24 at pp. 146-147;
pp. 146-147.
 
53
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 53
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
linquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of public good. 51
 
Under the equal protection clause, all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike, both in the privileges conferred and the obligations imposed. Conversely, all persons or
things differently situated should be treated differently.  In the case of ABAKADA Guro Party
52
List, et al. v. Hon. Purisima, et al.,  We held:
53
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and among
persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified
based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When things or persons are
different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers’ Union, this Court declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of
the laws upon all citizens of the State. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a stat-
_______________
51  By the general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in
order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which, no
question ever was, or, upon acknowledged and general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned.
(U.S. v. Toribio, supra note 27 at pp. 98-99, citing Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R. Co. [27 Vt., 140, 149]).
52  National Development Company v. Philippine Veterans Bank, supranote 31 at p. 357; p. 263.
53  584 Phil. 246, 269-270; 562 SCRA 251, 273-275 (2008). (Emphasis in the original)
 
 
55
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 55
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
ute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as
such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not
identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in
law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
 simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis
and is not palpably arbitrary.
 
 
56
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters
within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not
necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their
relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence,
legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal
protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and
legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.
 
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.  With respect to R.A. No. 9442, its
54
expressed public policy is the rehabilitation, self-development and self-reliance of PWDs. Persons
with disability form a class separate and distinct from the other citizens of the country.
Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the
law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the PWDs fully satisfy the demands of
equal protection. Thus, Congress may pass a law providing for a different treatment to persons
with disability apart from the other citizens of the country.
Subject to the determination of the courts as to what is a proper exercise of police power using
the due process clause and the equal protection clause as yardsticks, the State may interfere
wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular, a large discretion is necessarily
vested in the legislature to determine, not only what interests of the public require, but what
measures are necessary for the protection of
G.R. No. 199669
SOUTHERN LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
FOR THE WELFARE OF DISABLED PERSONS, THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, and THE
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
1
the Decision dated June 17, 2011, and Resolution  dated November 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
2 3
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102486, which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by Southern Luzon
Drug Corporation (petitioner) against the Department of1 Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP) (now National Council on
Disability Affairs or NCDA), the Department of Finance (DOF) and the Bureau of: Internal Revenue
(collectively, the respondents), which sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and
_______________
54  Id., at p. 270; p. 275.
 
 
57
VOL. 803, SEPTEMBER 14, 2016 57
Drugstores Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. National Council on Disability Affairs
such interests.  Thus, We are mindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all
55
reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.  The burden of 56
proof is on him who claims that a statute is unconstitutional. Petitioners failed to discharge such
burden of proof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July
26, 2010, and the Resolution dated November 19, 2010, in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 109903
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Perez, Reyes and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of the equal protection of the law. (Social Justice Society [SJS] vs. Atienza, Jr., 545
SCRA 92 [2008])
Police power is the power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare, while the power of taxation is the
power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. (Planters Products, Inc. vs. Fertiphil
Corporation, 548 SCRA 485 [2008])
 
——o0o——
_______________
55  U.S. v. Toribio, supra note 27 at p. 98, citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136; Barbier v. Connoly, 113 U.S.
27; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1.
56  People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 199 (1937).
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," particularly the
granting of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by senior citizens and persons with disability
(PWD),: respectively, and treating them as tax deduction.
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of: drugstore operation in the
Philippines while the respondents are government' agencies, office and bureau tasked to monitor
compliance with R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, promulgate implementing rules and regulations for their
effective implementation, as well as prosecute and revoke licenses of erring1 establishments.
Factual Antecedents
On April 23, 1992, R.A. No. 7432, entitled "An Act to Maximize the Contribution of Senior Citizens to
Nation-Building, Grant Benefits and Special Privileges and For Other Purposes," was enacted.
Under the said law, a senior citizen, who must be at least 60 years old and has an annual income of
not more than P60,000.00,  may avail of the privileges provided in Section 4 thereof, one of which is
4
20% discount on the purchase of medicines. The said provision states:
Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizen. - x x x:
a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of
transportation services, hotels and similar lodging establishment, restaurants and recreation centers
and purchase of medicine anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments may
claim the cost as tax credit[.]
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
To recoup the amount given as discount to qualified senior citizens, covered establishments can
claim an equal amount as tax credit which can be applied against the income tax due from them.
On February 26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed R.A. No. 9257, amending
some provisions of R.A. No. 7432. The new law retained the 20% discount on the purchase of
medicines but removed the annual income ceiling thereby qualifying all senior citizens to the
privileges under the law. Further, R.A. No. 9257 modified the tax treatment of the discount granted to
senior citizens, from tax credit to tax deduction from gross income, computed based on the net cost
of goods sold or services rendered. The pertinent provision, as amended by R.A. No. 9257, reads as
follows:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. - The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of
services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and
purchase of medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens,
including funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens;
xxxx
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction
based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the
discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of
value-added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and
shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended. (Emphasis ours)
On May 28, 2004, the DSWD issued the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9257. Article 8 of Rule VI of the said IRR provides:
Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments. - The establishment may claim the discounts granted
under Rule V, Section 4 - Discounts for Establishments; Section 9, Medical and Dental Services in
Private Facilities and Sections 10 and 11 -Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax deduction based
on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered. Provided, That the cost of the discount
shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount
is granted; Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value-added
tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject
to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended;
Provided, finally, that the implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue
Regulations to be issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and approved by the Department
of Finance (DOF). (Emphasis ours)
The change in the tax treatment of the discount given to senior citizens did not sit well with some
drug store owners and corporations, claiming it affected the profitability of their business. Thus, on
January 13, 2005, I Carlos Superdrug Corporation (Carlos Superdrug), together with other.
corporation and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, filed a Petition for Prohibition
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) I and/or Preliminary Injunction before this Court,
entitled Carlos Superdrug I Corporation v. DSWD, docketed as G.R. No. 166494, assailing the
5
constitutionality of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 primarily on the ground that it amounts to taking of
private property without payment of just compensation. In a Decision dated June 29, 2007, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the assailed provision, holding that the same is a legitimate exercise of
police power. The relevant portions of the decision read, thus:
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent
and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights
must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare.
xxxx
Moreover, the right to property has a social dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides
the precept for the protection of property, various laws and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian
reform and the regulation of contracts and public utilities, continuously serve as a reminder that the
right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of public
good. Undeniably, the success of the senior citizens program rests largely on the support imparted
by petitioners and the other private establishments concerned. This being the case, the means
employed in invoking the active participation of the private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or
objective of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Without sufficient proof that Section 4(a) of
RA. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the continued implementation of the same would be
unconscionably detrimental to petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.  (Citations omitted)
6
On August 1, 2007, Carlos Superdrug filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision.
Subsequently, the Court issued Resolution dated August 21, 2007, denying the said motion with
finality. 
7
Meanwhile, on March 24, 1992, R.A. No. 7277 pertaining to the "Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons" was enacted, codifying the rights and privileges of PWDs. Thereafter, on April 30, 2007,
R.A. No. 9442 was enacted, amending R.A. No. 7277. One of the salient amendments in the law is
the insertion of Chapter 8 in Title 2 thereof, which enumerates the other privileges and incentives of
PWDs, including the grant of 20% discount on the purchase of medicines. Similar to R.A. No. 9257,
covered establishments shall claim the discounts given to PWDs as tax deductions from the gross
income, based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. Section 32 ofR.A. No. 9442
reads:
CHAPTER 8. Other Privileges and Incentives
SEC. 32. Persons with disability shall be entitled to the following:
xxxx
(c) At least twenty percent (20%) discount for the purchase of medicines in all drugstores for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of persons with disability;
 xxxx prohibition will not lie to restrain the actions of the respondents for the simple reason that they do not
exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial duties relative to the issuance or implementation of the
questioned provisions. Also, the petition was wanting of the allegations of the specific acts
The establishments may claim the discounts granted in subsections (a), (b), (c), (e), (t) and (g)
committed by the respondents that demonstrate the exercise of these powers which may be properly
as taxdeductions based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided,
challenged in a petition for prohibition.13

however, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the
same taxable year that the discount is granted: Provided, further, That the total amount of the
claimed tax deduction net of value-added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales The petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration   of the Decision dated June 17, 2011 of the CA,
14

receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the but the same was denied in a Resolution   dated November 25, 2011.
15

National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended. (Emphasis ours)

Unyielding, the petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the following assignment of errors, to wit:
Pursuant to the foregoing, the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 was promulgated by the DSWD, Department of
Education, DOF, Department of Tourism and the Department of Transportation and
I
Communications. Sections 5 .1 and 6.1.d thereof provide:
8

THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION FILED
Sec. 5. Definition of Terms. For purposes of these Rules and Regulations, these terms are defined
WITH THE CA IS AN IMPROPER REMEDY TO ASSAIL THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
as follows:
20%, SALES DISCOUNT FOR SENIOR CITIZENS AND PWDs;

5.1. Persons with Disability are those individuals defined under Section 4 of

II
RA 7277, "An Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-
Reliance of Persons with Disability as amended and their integration into the
Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes." This is defined as a person THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING
suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or IN CARLOS SUPERDRUG CONSTITUTES STARE DECISIS;
sensory impairment, to perform an activity in a manner or within the range
considered normal for human being. Disability shall mean: (1) a physical or
III
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more psychological,
physiological or anatomical function of an individual or activities of such
individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
such an impairment. 20%, SALES DISCOUNT FOR SENIOR CITIZENS AND PWDs IS A VALID EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER. ON THE CONTRARY, IT IS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN BECAUSE IT FAILS TO PROVIDE JUST COMPENSATION TO THE
xxxx
PETITIONER AND OTHER SIMILARLY SITUATED DRUGSTORES;

6.1.d Purchase of Medicine - At least twenty percent (20%) discount on the

IV
purchase of medicine for the exclusive use and enjoyment of persons with
disability. All drug stores, hospital, pharmacies, clinics and other similar
establishments selling medicines are required to provide at least twenty percent THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
(20%) discount subject to the guidelines issued by DOH and PHILHEALTH. 20°/o SALES DISCOUNT FOR SENIOR CITIZENS AND PWDs DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW; and
On February 26, 2008, the petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition with Application for TRO and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction9 with the CA, seeking to declare as unconstitutional (a) Section 4(a) of V
R.A. No. 9257, and (b) Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 and Section 5.1 of its IRR, insofar as these
provisions only allow tax deduction on the gross income based on the net cost of goods sold or
services rendered as compensation to private establishments for the 20% discount that they are THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
required to grant to senior citizens and PWDs. Further, the petitioner prayed that the respondents be DEFINITIONS OF DISABILITIES AND PWDs ARE NOT VAGUE AND DO NOT VIOLATE THE
permanently enjoined from implementing the assailed provisions. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 16

Ruling of the CA Ruling of the Court

On June 17, 2011, the CA dismissed the petition, reiterating the ruling of the Court in Carlos Prohibition may be filed to question
Superdrug particularly that Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 was a valid exercise of police power.
10
the constitutionality of a law
Moreover, the CA held that considering that the same question had been raised by parties similarly
situated and was resolved in Carlos Superdrug, the rule of stare decisis stood as a hindrance to any In the assailed decision, the CA noted that the action, although denominated as one for prohibition,
further attempt to relitigate the same issue. It further noted that jurisdictional considerations also seeks the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9257 and Section 32 of
compel the dismissal of the action. It particularly emphasized that it has no original or appellate R.A. No.9442. It held that in such a case, the proper remedy is not a special civil 1 action but a
jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality of the assailed laws,   the same pertaining to the
11
petition for declaratory relief, which falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Even assuming that it had concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC, the first instance, and of the Supreme Court, on appeal.  17

principle of hierarchy of courts mandates that the case be commenced and heard by the lower
court.   The CA further ruled that the petitioner resorted to the wrong remedy as a petition for
12
The Court clarifies. Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important reasons,
such as when dictated by public welfare and ' the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the
broader interest of justice. Thus, when based on the good judgment of the court, the urgency and
29

Generally, the office of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and
significance of the issues presented calls for its intervention, it should not hesitate to exercise its
is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
duty to resolve.
of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. It is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from
usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law.   This is,
18
The instant petition presents an exception to the principle as it basically raises a legal question on
however, not the lone office of an action for prohibition. In Diaz, et al. v. The Secretary of Finance, et the constitutionality of the mandatory discount and the breadth of its rightful beneficiaries. More
al.,   prohibition was also recognized as a proper remedy to prohibit or nullify acts of executive
19
importantly, the resolution of the issues will redound to the benefit of the public as it will put to rest
officials that amount to usurpation of legislative authority.   And, in a number of jurisprudence,
20
the questions on the propriety of the granting of discounts to senior citizens and PWDs amid the
prohibition was allowed as a proper action to assail the constitutionality of a law or prohibit its fervent insistence of affected establishments that the measure transgresses their property rights.
implementation. The Court, therefore, finds it to the best interest of justice that the instant petition be resolved.

In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, therein petitioner filed a petition for
21
The instant case is not barred by
prohibition to assail the constitutionality of Section 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006, or the "Fair Elections stare decisis
Act," which prohibited the publication of surveys within 15 days before an election for national
candidates, and seven days for local candidates. Included in the petition is a prayer to prohibit the
The petitioner contends that the CA erred in holding that the ruling in Carlos Superdrug constitutes
Commission on Elections from enforcing the said provision. The Court granted the Petition and
as stare decisis or law of the case which bars the relitigation of the issues that had been resolved
struck down the assailed provision for being unconstitutional.  22

In Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board, et al.,  therein petitioner assailed the
23
constitutionality of paragraphs (c ), (d), (f) and (g) of Section 36 of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," on the ground that they constitute undue
delegation of legislative power for granting unbridled discretion to schools and private employers in
determining the manner of drug 'testing of their employees, and that the law constitutes a violation of
therein and had been raised anew in the instant petition. It argues that there are substantial
differences between Carlos Superdrug and the circumstances in the instant case which take it out
from the operation of the doctrine of stare decisis. It cites that in Carlos Superdrug, the Court denied
the petition because the petitioner therein failed to prove the confiscatory effect of the tax deduction
scheme as no proof of actual loss was submitted. It believes that its submission of financial
statements for the years 2006 and 2007 to prove the confiscatory effect of the law is a material fact
that distinguishes the instant case from that of Carlos Superdrug.  30

the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. It also sought to enjoin the Dangerous Drugs
Board and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency from enforcing the challenged provision. The 24

The Court agrees that the ruling in Carlos Superdrug does not constitute stare decisis to the instant
Court partially granted the petition by declaring Section 36(f) and (g) of R.A. No. 9165
case, not because of the petitioner's submission of financial statements which were wanting in the
unconstitutional, and permanently enjoined the concerned agencies from implementing them.  25

first case, but because it had the good sense of including questions that had not been raised or
deliberated in the former case of Carlos Superdrug, i.e., validity of the 20% discount granted to
In another instance, consolidated petitions for prohibitions  questioning the constitutionality of the
26
PWDs, the supposed vagueness of the provisions of R.A. No. 9442 and violation of the equal
Priority Development Assistance Fund were deliberated upon by this Court which ultimately granted protection clause.
the same.
Nonetheless, the Court finds nothing in the instant case that merits a reversal of the earlier ruling of
Clearly, prohibition has been found an appropriate remedy to challenge the constitutionality of the Court in Carlos Superdrug. Contrary to the petitioner's claim, there is a very slim difference
various laws, rules, and regulations. between the issues in Carlos Superdrug and the instant case with respect to the nature of the senior
citizen discount. A perfunctory reading of the circumstances of the two cases easily discloses
marked similarities in the issues and the arguments raised by the petitioners in both cases that
There is also no question regarding the jurisdiction of the CA to hear and decide a petition for
semantics nor careful play of words can hardly obscure.
prohibition. By express provision of the law, particularly Section 9(1) of Batas Pambansa Bilang
129,  the CA was granted "original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
27

habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or I processes, whether or not in aid of its In both cases, it is apparent that what the petitioners are ultimately questioning is not the grant of the
appellate jurisdiction." This authority· the CA enjoys concurrently with RTCs and this Court. senior citizen discount per se, but the manner by which they were allowed to recoup the said
discount. In particular, they are protesting the change in the tax treatment of the senior citizen
discount from tax credit to being merely a deduction from gross income which they claimed to have
In the same manner, the supposed violation of the principle of the ·. hierarchy of courts does not
significantly reduced their profits.
pose any hindrance to the full deliberation of the issues at hand. It is well to remember that "the
judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring
factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to [refer] to the trial courts at the first This question had been settled in Carlos Superdrug, where the Court ruled that the change in the tax
instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence treatment of the discount was a valid exercise of police power, thus:
of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately
before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of
Theoretically, the treatment of the discount as a deduction reduces the net income of the private
hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not
establishments concerned. The discounts given would have entered the coffers and formed part of
involve factual but legal questions."28

the gross sales of the private establishments, were it not for R.A. No. 9257.

xxxx
A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it would not
meet the definition of just compensation.
Having said that, this raises the question of whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of
a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing
a government program.
The Court believes so.
The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to
nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well-being as
the State considers them an integral part of our society.
The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in the law itself.
Thus, the Act provides:
SEC. 2. [R.A.] No. 7432 is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 1. Declaration of Policies and Objectives.- Pursuant to Article XV, Section 4 of the
Constitution, it is the duty of the family to take care of its elderly members while the State may
design programs of social security for them. In addition to this, Section 10 in the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies provides: "The State shall provide social justice in all phases of national
development." Further, Article XIII, Section 11, provides: "The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods,
health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority
for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women and children." Consonant with
these constitutional principles the following are the declared policies of this Act:
xxxx
(f) To recognize the important role of the private sector in the improvement of the welfare of
senior citizens and to actively seek their partnership.
To implement the above policy, the law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for
medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees; admission fees charged by
theaters, concert halls, circuses, carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and
amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization of services in hotels and similar
lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicines for the
exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that
business establishments extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the
discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus
assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the most essential, insistent
and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs." It is "[t]he power
vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome
and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the
subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights
must bow to the primacy of police power because proper rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare.   (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
31
Verily, it is the bounden duty of the State to care for the elderly as they reach the point in their lives
when the vigor of their youth has diminished and resources have become scarce. Not much because
of choice, they become needing of support from the society for whom they presumably spent their
productive days and for whose betterment they' exhausted their energy, know-how and experience
to make our days better to live.
In the same way, providing aid for the disabled persons is an equally important State responsibility.
Thus, the State is obliged to give full support to the improvement of the total well-being of disabled
persons and their integration into the mainstream of society.  This entails the creation of
32
opportunities for them and according them privileges if only to balance the playing field which had
been unduly tilted against them because of their limitations.
The duty to care for the elderly and the disabled lies not only upon the State, but also on the
community and even private entities. As to the State, the duty emanates from its role as parens
patriae which holds it under obligation to provide protection and look after the welfare of its people
especially those who cannot tend to themselves. Parens patriae means parent of his or her country,
and refers to the State in its role as "sovereign", or the State in its capacity as a provider of
protection to those unable to care for themselves.   In fulfilling this duty, the State may resort to the
33
exercise of its inherent powers: police power, eminent domain and power of taxation.
In Gerochi v. Department of Energy, the Court passed upon one of the inherent powers of the state,
34
the police power, where it emphasized, thus:
[P]olice power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property. It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of
the three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in the Latin maxim salus populi
est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of
sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of
instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory
powers. We have held that the power to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote,
preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the
utility and of its patrons.   (Citations omitted)
35
It is in the exercise of its police power that the Congress enacted R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, the laws
mandating a 20% discount on purchases of medicines made by senior citizens and PWDs. It is also
in further exercise of this power that the legislature opted that the said discount be claimed as tax
deduction, rather than tax credit, by covered establishments.
The petitioner, however, claims that the change in the tax treatment of the discount is illegal as it
constitutes taking without just compensation. It even submitted financial statements for the years
2006 and 2007 to support its claim of declining profits when the change in the policy was
implemented.
The Court is not swayed.
To begin with, the issue of just compensation finds no relevance in the instant case as it had already
been made clear in Carlos Superdrug that the power being exercised by the State in the imposition
of senior citizen discount was its police power. Unlike in the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, just compensation is not required in wielding police power. This is precisely because there
is no taking involved, but only an imposition of burden.
In Manila Memorial Park, Inc., et al. v. Secretary of the DSWD, et al.,   the Court ruled that by
36
examining the nature and the effects of R.A. No. 9257, it becomes apparent that the challenged
governmental act was an exercise of police power. It was held, thus:
[W]e now look at the nature and effects of the 20% discount to determine if it constitutes an exercise
of police power or eminent domain.
The 20% discount is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens who, at their age, are less
likely to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and, thus, in need of
subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. It may not be amiss to mention also that the discount
serves to honor senior citizens who presumably spent the productive years of their lives on
contributing to the development and progress of the nation. This distinct cultural Filipino practice of
honoring the elderly is an integral part of this law.
The Court also entertains no doubt on the legality of the method taken by the legislature to
implement the declared policies of the subject laws, that is, to impose discounts on the medical
services and purchases of senior citizens and PWDs and to treat the said discounts as tax deduction
rather than tax credit. The measure is fair and reasonable and no credible proof was presented to
prove the claim that it was confiscatory. To be considered confiscatory, there must be taking of
property without just compensation.
Illuminating on this point is the discussion of the Court on the concept of taking in City of Manila v.
Hon. Laguio, Jr., viz.:
43

As to its nature and effects, the 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the
establishments to price their products and services relative to a special class of individuals, senior government confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
citizens, for which the Constitution affords preferential concern. In turn, this affects the amount of government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
profits or income/gross sales that a private establishment can derive from senior citizens. In other
words, the subject regulation affects the pricing, and, hence, the profitability of a private
xxxx
establishment. However, it does not purport to appropriate or burden specific properties, used in the
operation or conduct of the business of private establishments, for the use or benefit of the public, or
senior citizens for that matter, but merely regulates the pricing of goods and services relative to, and No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation
the amount of profits or income/gross sales that such private establishments may derive from, senior becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and
citizens. therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S.
Supreme Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of
considering the facts in each case. x x x.
The subject regulation may be said to be similar to, but with substantial distinctions from, price
control or rate of 'return on investment control laws which are traditionally regarded as police power
measures. x x x.  (Citations omitted)
37
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking
if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use. A regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or
In the exercise of police power, "property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and
productive use of land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State."  Even then, the
38

nuisance or property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the use prohibitable.
State's claim of police power cannot be arbitrary or unreasonable. After all, the overriding purpose of
When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in
the exercise of the power is to promote general welfare, public health and safety, among others. It is
the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a
a measure, which by sheer necessity, the State exercises, even to the point of interfering with
taking.
personal liberties or property rights in order to advance common good. To warrant such interference,
two requisites must concur: (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require the interference of the! State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably xxxx
necessary to the: attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of
A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the
a lawful subject and a lawful method. 39

effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct
investment-backed expectations of the owner.  (Citations omitted)
44

The subjects of R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, i.e., senior citizens and PWDs, are individuals whose
well-being is a recognized public duty. As a public duty, the responsibility for their care devolves
The petitioner herein attempts to prove its claim that the pertinent provisions of R.A. Nos. 9257 and
upon the concerted efforts of the State, the family and the community. In Article XIII, Section 1 of the
9442 amount to taking by presenting financial statements purportedly showing financial losses
Constitution, the State is mandated to give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
incurred by them due to the adoption of the tax deduction scheme.
and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power1 for the
common good. The more apparent manifestation of these social inequities is the unequal distribution For the petitioner's clarification, the presentation of the financial statement is not of compelling
or access to healthcare services. To: abet in alleviating this concern, the State is committed to adopt significance in justifying its claim for just compensation. What is imperative is for it to establish that
an integrated! and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make there was taking in the constitutional sense or that, in the imposition of the mandatory discount, the
essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost, with power exercised by the state was eminent domain.
priority for the needs of the underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. 40

According to Republic of the Philippines v. Vda. de Castellvi, five circumstances must be present in
45

In the same manner, the family and the community have equally significant duties to perform in
reducing social inequality. The family as the basic social institution has the foremost duty to care for
its elderly members.  On the other hand, the community, which include the private sector, is
41
recognized as an active partner of the State in pursuing greater causes. The private sector, being
recipients of the privilege to engage business in our land, utilize our goods as well as the services of
our people for proprietary purposes, it is only fitting to expect their support in measures that
order to qualify "taking" as an exercise of eminent domain. First, the expropriator must enter a
private property. Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period. Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.  46

contribute to common good. Moreover, their right to own, establish and operate economic
enterprises is always subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene
when the common good so demands. 42
The first requirement speaks of entry into a private property which clearly does not obtain in this
case. There is no private property that is; invaded or appropriated by the State. As it is, the petitioner
precipitately deemed future profits as private property and then proceeded to argue that the State
Sales:
took it away without full compensation. This seemed preposterous considering that the subject of
what the petitioner supposed as taking was not even earned profits but merely an expectation of
profits, which may not even occur. For obvious reasons, there cannot be taking of a contingency or 100 x ₱10.00 = ₱1,000.00
of a mere possibility because it lacks physical existence that is necessary before there could be any
taking. Further, it is impossible to quantify the compensation for the loss of supposed profits before it Profit: ₱200
is earned.

After the passage of the law, the three establishments reacted differently. Establishment 1 was
The supposed taking also lacked the characteristics of permanence   and consistency.  The
47
1âwphi1

passive and maintained the price of Drug A at ₱8.00 which understandably resulted in diminution of
presence of these characteristics is significant because they can establish that the effect of the profits.
questioned provisions is the same on all establishments and those losses are indeed its unavoidable
consequence. But apparently these indications are wanting in this case. The reason is that the
impact on the establishments varies depending on their response to the changes brought about by Establishment 1
the subject provisions. To be clear, establishments, are not prevented from adjusting their prices to
accommodate the effects of the granting of the discount and retain their profitability while being fully
compliant to the laws. It follows that losses are not inevitable because establishments are free to Drug A
take business measures to accommodate the contingency. Lacking in permanence and consistency,
there can be no taking in the constitutional sense. There cannot be taking in one establishment and Acquisition cost ₱8.00
none in another, such that the former can claim compensation but the other may not. Simply told, Selling price ;₱10.00
there is no taking to justify compensation; there is only poor business decision to blame.
Number of patrons 100
Senior Citizens/PWD 50
There is also no ousting of the owner or deprivation of ownership. Establishments are neither
divested of ownership of any of their properties nor is anything forcibly taken from them. They
remain the owner of their goods and their profit or loss still depends on the performance of their Sales
sales.
100 x ₱10.00 = ₱1,000.00

Apart from the foregoing, covered establishments are also provided with a mechanism to recoup the Deduction: ₱100.00
amount of discounts they grant the senior citizens and PWDs. It is provided in Section 4(a) of R.A.
No. 9257 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442 that establishments may claim the discounts as "tax Profit: ₱100.00
deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered." Basically, whatever amount
was given as discount, covered establishments may claim an equal amount as an expense or tax
deduction. The trouble is that the petitioner, in protesting the change in the tax treatment of the On the other hand, Establishment 2, mindful that the new law will affect the profitability of the
discounts, apparently seeks tax incentive and not merely a return of the amount given as discounts. business, made a calculated decision by increasing the mark up of Drug A to ₱3.20, instead of only
It premised its interpretation of financial losses in terms of the effect of the change in the tax ₱2.00. This brought a positive result to the earnings of the company.
treatment of the discount on its tax liability; hence, the claim that the measure was confiscatory.
However, as mentioned earlier in the discussion, loss of profits is not the inevitable result of the
change in tax treatment of the discounts; it is more appropriately a consequence of poor business Establishment 2
decision.

Drug A
It bears emphasizing that the law does not place a cap on the amount of mark up that covered
establishments may impose on their items. This rests on the discretion of the establishment which, of
Acquisition cost ;₱8.00
course, is expected to put in the price of the overhead costs, expectation of profits and other
Selling price ₱11.20
considerations into the selling price of an item. In a simple illustration, here is Drug A, with
acquisition cost of ₱8.00, and selling price of ₱10.00. Then comes a law that imposes 20% on senior
citizens and PWDs, which affected Establishments 1, 2 and 3. Let us suppose that the approximate Number of patron 100
number of patrons who purchases Drug A is 100, half of which are senior citizens and PWDs. Before Senior Citizens/PWDs 50
the passage of the law, all of the establishments are earning the same amount from profit from the
sale of Drug A, viz.: Sales

100 x ₱10.00 = ₱1,000.00

Before the passage of the law:
Deduction: ₱112.00
Drug A Profit: ₱208.00
Acquisition cost ₱8.00
Selling price ₱10.00 For its part, Establishment 3 raised the mark up on Drug A to only ₱3.00 just to even out the effect of
the law. This measure left a negligible effect on its profit, but Establishment 3 took it as a social duty:
Number of patrons 100 to share in the cause being promoted by the government while still maintaining profitability.
 Establishment 3
Drug A
Acquisition cost ₱8.00
Selling price ₱11.20
Number of patrons 100
Senior Citizens/PWD 50
Sales
100 x ₱10.00 = ₱1,000.00
Deduction: ₱110.00
Profit: ₱190.00
The foregoing demonstrates that it is not the law per se which occasioned the losses in the covered
establishments but bad business I judgment. One of the main considerations in making business
decisions is the law because its effect is widespread and inevitable. Literally, anything can be a
subject of legislation. It is therefore incumbent upon business managers to cover this contingency
and consider it in making business strategies. As shown in the illustration, the better responses were
exemplified by Establishments 2 and 3 which promptly put in the additional costs brought about by
the law into the price of Drug A. In doing so, they were able to maintain the profitability of the
business, even earning some more, while at the same time being fully compliant with the law. This is
not to mention that the illustration is even too simplistic and not' the most ideal since it dealt only with
a single drug being purchased by both regular patrons and senior citizens and PWDs. It did not
consider the accumulated profits from the other medical and non-medical products being sold by the
establishments which are expected to further curb the effect of the granting of the discounts in the
business.
It is therefore unthinkable how the petitioner could have suffered losses due to the mandated
discounts in R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, when a fractional increase in the prices of items could bring
the business standing at a balance even with the introduction of the subject laws. A level adjustment
in the pricing of items is a reasonable business measure to take in order to adapt to the contingency.
This could even make establishments earn more, as shown in the illustration, since every fractional
increase in the price of covered items translates to a wider cushion to taper off the effect of the
granting of discounts and ultimately results to additional profits gained from the purchases of the
same items by regular patrons who are not entitled to the discount. Clearly, the effect of the subject
laws in the financial standing of covered companies depends largely on how they respond and forge
a balance between profitability and their sense of social responsibility. The adaptation is entirely up
to them and they are not powerless to make adjustments to accommodate the subject legislations.
Still, the petitioner argues that the law is confiscatory in the sense that the State takes away a
portion of its supposed profits which could have gone into its coffers and utilizes it for public purpose.
The petitioner claims that the action of the State amounts to taking for which it should be
compensated.
To reiterate, the subject provisions only affect the petitioner's right to profit, and not earned profits.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, the right to profit is not a vested right or an entitlement that has
accrued on the person or entity such that its invasion or deprivation warrants compensation. Vested
rights are "fixed, unalterable, or irrevocable."48 More extensively, they are depicted as follows:
Rights which have so completely and definitely accrued to or settled in a person that they are not
subject to be defeated or cancelled by the act of any other private person, and which it is right and
equitable that the government should recognize and protect, as being lawful in themselves, and
settled according to the then current rules of law, and of which the individual could not be deprived
arbitrarily without injustice, or of which he could not justly be deprived otherwise than by the
established methods of procedure and for the public welfare. x x x A right is not 'vested' unless it is
more than a mere expectation based on the anticipated continuance of present laws; it must be an
established interest in property, not open to doubt. x x x To be vested in its accurate legal sense,
a right must be complete and consummated, and one of which the person to whom it belongs
cannot be divested without his consent.x x x.  (Emphasis ours)
49
Right to profits does not give the petitioner the cause of action to ask for just compensation, it being
only an inchoate right or one that has not fully developed  and therefore cannot be claimed as one's
50
own. An inchoate right is a mere expectation, which may or may not come into existence. It is
contingent as it only comes "into existence on an event or condition which may not happen or be
performed until some other event may prevent their vesting." Certainly, the petitioner cannot claim
51
confiscation or taking of something that has yet to exist. It cannot claim deprivation of profit before
the consummation of a sale and the purchase by a senior citizen or PWD.
Right to profit is not an accrued right; it is not fixed, absolute nor indefeasible. It does not come into
being until the occurrence or realization of a condition precedent. It is a mere "contingency that might
never eventuate into a right. It stands for a mere possibility of profit but nothing might ever be
payable under it."52
The inchoate nature of the right to profit precludes the possibility of compensation because it lacks
the quality or characteristic which is necessary before any act of taking or expropriation can be
effected. Moreover, there is no yardstick fitting to quantify a contingency or to determine
compensation for a mere possibility. Certainly, "taking" presupposes the existence of a subject that
has a quantifiable or determinable value, characteristics which a mere contingency does not
possess.
Anent the question regarding the shift from tax credit to tax deduction, suffice it is to say that it is
within the province of Congress to do so in the exercise of its legislative power. It has the authority to
choose the subject of legislation, outline the effective measures to achieve its declared policies and
even impose penalties in case of non-compliance. It has the sole discretion to decide which policies
to pursue and devise means to achieve them, and courts often do not interfere in this exercise for as
long as it does not transcend constitutional limitations. "In performing this duty, the legislature has no
guide but its judgment and discretion and the wisdom of experience."  In Carter v. Carter Coal
53
Co., legislative discretion has been described as follows:
54
Legislative congressional discretion begins with the choice of means, and ends with the adoption
of methods and details to carry the delegated powers into effect. x x x [W]hile the powers are rigidly
limited to the enumerations of the Constitution, the means which may be employed to carry the
powers into effect are not restricted, save that they must be appropriate, plainly adapted to the end,
and not prohibited by, but consistent with, the letter and spirit of the Constitution. x x x.   (Emphasis
55
ours)
Corollary, whether to treat the discount as a tax deduction or tax credit is a matter addressed to the
wisdom of the legislature. After all, it is within its prerogative to enact laws which it deems sufficient
to address a specific public concern. And, in the process of legislation, a bill goes through rigorous
tests of validity, necessity and sufficiency in both houses of Congress before enrolment. It
undergoes close scrutiny of the members of Congress and necessarily had to surpass the
arguments hurled against its passage. Thus, the presumption of validity that goes with every law as
a form of deference to the process it had gone through and also to the legislature's exercise of
discretion. Thus, in lchong, etc., et al. v. Hernandez) etc., and Sarmiento, the Court emphasized,
56
thus:
It must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional Here, the petitioner failed to show that R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442, under the guise of regulation, allow
repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by undue interference in an otherwise legitimate business.  On the contrary, it was shown that the
1avvphi1

force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and questioned laws do not meddle in the business or take anything from it but only regulate its
wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures realization of profits.
adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest.x x x.  (Emphasis ours)
57

The subject laws do not violate the

The legislature may also grant rights and impose additional burdens: It may also regulate industries, equal protection clause
in the exercise of police power, for the protection of the public. R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442 are akin to
regulatory laws, the issuance of which is within the ambit of police power. The minimum wage law,
The petitioner argues that R.A. Nos. 9257 and 9442 are violative of the equal protection clause in
zoning ordinances, price control laws, laws regulating the operation of motels and hotels, laws
that it failed to distinguish between those who have the capacity to pay and those who do not, in
limiting the working hours to eight, and the like fall under this category. 58

granting the 20% discount. R.A. No. 9257, in particular, removed the income qualification in R.A. No.
7432 of'₱60,000.00 per annum before a senior citizen may be entitled to the 20o/o discount.
Indeed, regulatory laws are within the category of police power measures from which affected
persons or entities cannot claim exclusion or compensation. For instance, private establishments
The contention lacks merit.
cannot protest that the imposition of the minimum wage is confiscatory since it eats up a
considerable chunk of its profits or that the mandated remuneration is not commensurate for the
work done. The compulsory nature of the provision for minimum wages underlies the effort of the The petitioner's argument is dismissive of the reasonable qualification on which the subject laws
State; as R.A. No. 6727  expresses it, to promote productivity-improvement and gain-sharing
59
were based. In City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,   the Court emphasized:
67

measures to ensure a decent standard of living for the workers and their families; to guarantee the
rights of labor to its just share in the fruits of production; to enhance employment generation in the
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
countryside through industry dispersal; and to allow business and industry reasonable returns on
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
investment, expansion and growth, and as the Constitution expresses it, to affirm labor as a primary
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The
social economic force.  60

guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.  (Citations omitted)
68

Similarly, the imposition of price control on staple goods in R.A. No. 7581  is likewise a valid exercise
61

of police power and affected establishments cannot argue that the law was depriving them of
"The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
supposed gains. The law seeks to ensure the availability of basic necessities and prime commodities
within a specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
at reasonable prices at all times without denying legitimate business a fair return on investment. It
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another."  For a classification to
69

likewise aims to provide effective and sufficient protection to consumers against hoarding,
be valid, (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purposes of
profiteering and cartels with respect to the supply, distribution, marketing and pricing of said goods,
the law, (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) it must apply equally to all
especially during periods of calamity, emergency, widespread illegal price manipulation and other
members of the same class.  70

similar situations.
62

To recognize all senior citizens as a group, without distinction as to income, is a valid classification.
More relevantly, in Manila Memorial Park, Inc., it was ruled that it is within the bounds of the police
63

The Constitution itself considered the elderly as a class of their own and deemed it a priority to
power of the state to impose burden on private entities, even if it may affect their profits, such as in
address their needs. When the Constitution declared its intention to prioritize the predicament of the
the imposition of price control measures. There is no compensable taking but only a recognition of
underprivileged sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children,  it did not make any reservation as to
71

the fact that they are subject to the regulation of the State and that all personal or private interests
income, race, religion or any other personal circumstances. It was a blanket privilege afforded the
must bow down to the more paramount interest of the State.
group of citizens in the enumeration in view of the vulnerability of their class.

This notwithstanding, the regulatory power of the State does not authorize the destruction of the
R.A. No. 9257 is an implementation of the avowed policy of the Constitution to enact measures that
business. While a business may be regulated, such regulation must be within the bounds of
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
reason, i.e., the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provision cannot be oppressive
political inequalities. 72 Specifically, it caters to the welfare of all senior citizens. The classification is
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful
based on age and therefore qualifies all who have attained the age of 60. Senior citizens are a class
business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by
of their own, who are in need and should be entitled to government support, and the fact that they
the exercise of police power.   After all, regulation only signifies control or restraint, it does not mean
64

may still be earning for their own sustenance should not disqualify them from the privilege.
suppression or absolute prohibition. Thus, in Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation v. Alcuaz,  the Court emphasized:
65

It is well to consider that our senior citizens have already reached the age when work opportunities
have dwindled concurrently as their physical health.  They are no longer expected to work, but there
The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power 1âwphi1

are still those who continue to work and contribute what they can to the country. Thus, to single them
to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interest, first and foremost,
out and take them out of the privileges of the law for continuing to strive and earn income to fend for
of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an
themselves is inimical to a welfare state that the Constitution envisions. It is tantamount to penalizing
effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of
them for their persistence. It is commending indolence rather than rewarding diligence. It
property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and
encourages them to become wards of the State rather than productive partners.
equal protection of the laws.   (Citation omitted)
66

Our senior citizens were the laborers, professionals and overseas contract workers of the past.
While some may be well to do or may have the capacity to support their sustenance, the discretion
to avail of the privileges of the law is up to them. But to instantly tag them. as undeserving of the
privilege would be the height of ingratitude; it is an outright discrimination.
The same ratiocination may be said of the recognition of PWDs as a class in R.A. No. 9442 and in
granting them discounts.  It needs no further explanation that PWDs have special needs which, for
1âwphi1
most,' last their entire lifetime. They constitute a class of their own, equally deserving of government
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or
sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective
participation in society on an equal basis with others. (Emphasis and italics ours)
The seemingly broad definition of the terms was not without good reasons. It recognizes that
"disability is an evolving concept"  and appreciates the "diversity of PWDs."  The terms were given
73 74

support as our elderlies. While some of them maybe willing to work and earn income for themselves,
their disability deters them from living their full potential. Thus, the need for assistance from the
government to augment the reduced income or productivity brought about by their physical or
intellectual limitations.
comprehensive definitions so as to accommodate the various forms of disabilities, and not confine it
to a particular case as this would effectively exclude other forms of physical, intellectual or
psychological impairments.
Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,   it was declared, thus:
75

There is also no question that the grant of mandatory discount is germane to the purpose of R.A.
Nos. 9257 and 9442, that is, to adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health
development and make essential goods and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost, with special priority given to the elderlies and the disabled, among others. The
privileges granted by the laws ease their concerns and allow them to live more comfortably.
The subject laws also address a continuing concern of the government for the welfare of the senior
citizens and PWDs. It is not some random predicament but an actual, continuing and pressing
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every
word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of
expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily
result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can
be gathered from the whole act x x x.  (Citation omitted)
76

concern that requires preferential attention. Also, the laws apply to all senior citizens and PWDs,
respectively, without further distinction or reservation. Without a doubt, all the elements for a valid
At any rate, the Court gathers no ambiguity in the provisions of R.A. No. 9442. As regards the
classification were met.
petitioner's claim that the law lacked reasonable standards in determining the persons entitled to the
discount, Section 32 thereof is on point as it identifies who may avail of the privilege and the manner
The definitions of "disabilities" and of its availment. It states:
"PWDs" are clear and unequivocal
Sec. 32. x x x
Undeterred, the petitioner claims that R.A. No. 9442 is ambiguous particularly in defining the terms
"disability" and "PWDs," such that it lack comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
The abovementioned privileges are available only to persons with disability who are Filipino citizens
must guess at its meaning. It likewise bewails the futility of the given safeguards to prevent abuse
upon submission of any of the following as proof of his/her entitlement thereto:
since government officials who are neither experts nor practitioners of medicine are given the
authority to issue identification cards that authorizes the granting of the privileges under the law.
(I) An identification card issued by the city or municipal mayor or the barangay
captain of the place where the persons with disability resides;
The Court disagrees.

(II) The passport of the persons with disability concerned; or

Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 7277, the precursor of R.A. No. 94421 defines "disabled persons" as
follows:
(III) Transportation discount fare Identification Card (ID) issued by the National
Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP).
(a) Disabled persons are those suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a
mental, physical or sensory impairment, to perform an activity in the manner or within the range
considered normal for a human being[.] It is, however, the petitioner's contention that the foregoing authorizes government officials who had
no medical background to exercise discretion in issuing identification cards to those claiming to be
PWDs. It argues that the provision lends to the indiscriminate availment of the privileges even by
On the other hand, the term "PWDs" is defined in Section 5.1 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9442 as follows:
those who are not qualified.

5.1. PersonswithDisability are those individuals defined under Section 4 of [R.A. No.] 7277 [or] An
The petitioner's apprehension demonstrates a superficial understanding of the law and its
Act Providing for the Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Persons with Disability
implementing rules. To be clear, the issuance of identification cards to PWDs does not depend on
as amended and their integration into the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes. This is
the authority of the city or municipal mayor, the DSWD or officials of the NCDA (formerly NCWDP). It
defined as a person suffering from restriction or different abilities, as a result of a mental, physical or
is well to remember that what entitles a person to the privileges of the law is his disability, the fact of
sensory impairment, to perform an activity in a manner or within the range considered normal for
which he must prove to qualify. Thus, in NCDA Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 001, series of
human being. Disability shall mean (1) a physical 1or mental impairment that substantially limits one
2008,   it is required that the person claiming disability must submit the following requirements before
77

or more psychological, physiological or anatomical function of an individual or activities of such

he shall be issued a PWD Identification Card:
individual; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.

1. Two "1 x l" recent ID pictures with the names, and signatures or thumb marks at the back of the
The foregoing definitions have a striking conformity with the definition of "PWDs" in Article 1 of
picture.
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which reads:

2. One (1) Valid ID

 3. Document to confirm the medical or disability condition 78
e) Address

To confirm his disability, the person must obtain a medical certificate or assessment, as the case f) Date of Birth
maybe, issued by a licensed private or government physician, licensed teacher or head of a
business establishment attesting to his impairment. The issuing entity depends on whether the
g) Picture
disability is apparent or non-apparent. NCDAA.O. No. 001 further provides: 79

h) Signature of PWD
DOCUMENT ISSUING ENTITY
i) Information of medicine purchased:
Medical  Licensed Private or 
Certificate Government Physician
i.1 Name of medicine

School  Licensed Teacher duly  i.2 Quantity

Assessment signed by the School 
Principal
i.3 Attending Physician
Certificate of   Head of the Business
Disability i.4 License Number

Establishment i.5 Servicing drug store name

 Head of Non-Government Organization i.6 Name of dispensing pharmacist

j) Authorization letter of the PWD x x x in case the medicine is bought

nt  Medical  Licensed Private or  by the representative or caregiver of the PWD.
Certificate Government Physician
To provide further safeguard, the Department of Health issued A.O. No. 2009-0011, providing
guidelines for the availment of the 20% discount on the purchase of medicines by PWDs. In making
a purchase, the individual must present the documents enumerated in Section VI(4)(b ), to wit:
i. PWD identification card x x x
ii. Doctor's prescription stating the name of the PWD, age, sex, address, date, generic
name of the medicine, dosage form, dosage strength, quantity, signature over printed
name of physician, physician's address, contact number of physician or dentist,
professional license number, professional tax receipt number and narcotic license number,
if applicable. To safeguard the health of PWDs and to prevent abuse of [R.A. No.] 9257, a
doctor's prescription is required in the purchase of over-the-counter medicines. x x x.
The PWD identification card also has a validity period of only three years which facilitate in the
monitoring of those who may need continued support and who have been relieved of their disability,
and therefore may be taken out of the coverage of the law.
At any rate, the law has penal provisions which give concerned establishments the option to file a
case against those abusing the privilege Section 46(b) of R.A. No. 9442 provides that "[a]ny person
who abuses the privileges granted herein shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than six
months or a fine of not less than Five Thousand pesos (₱5,000.00), but not more than Fifty
Thousand pesos (₱50,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court." Thus, concerned
establishments, together with the proper government agencies, must actively participate in
monitoring compliance with the law so that only the intended beneficiaries of the law can avail of the
privileges.
Indubitably, the law is clear and unequivocal, and the petitioner claim of vagueness to cast
uncertainty in the validity of the law does not stand.

iii. Purchase booklet issued by the local social/health office to PWDs for free containing
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 9257 and
the following basic information:
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9442 are hereby declared CONSTITUTIONAL.

a) PWD ID number
<<page>>

b) Booklet control number

SO ORDERED.

c) Name of PWD
BIENVENIDO L. REYES,
Associate Justice
d) Sex
WE CONCUR:
(See Separate Opinion) (No Part)
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Chief Justice

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA SAMUEL R. MARTIREZ

(See Dissenting Opinion) Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

NOEL G. TIJAM
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation,
(No Part)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

(No Part) Chief Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

EN BANC constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear their
children.
G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017
The Facts
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),  JOANNE ROSE *

SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK
LEO DELOS REYES, AND CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, MINOR, FOR
HERSELF AND AS REPRESENTED BY HER FATHER, JULIAN VILLEGAS,
JR., Petitioners, v. QUEZON CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR HERBERT
BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSEPH
ESTRADA, AND NAVOTAS CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOHN REY
TIANGCO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the
curfew ordinances issued by the local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and
Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued
ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as
Mayors of their respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from
implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending resolution of this case, and
eventually, declare the City of Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary
to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as
amended, and all curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for violating the
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a
nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to
strictly implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations
which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."3
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were
respondents: (a) Navotas City, through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02,4 dated
August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakda ng 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala
Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila,"
as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas
Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An
Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00A.M. of the Following Day
as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of
Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14,
2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP-
2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours
in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00A.M., Providing Penalties for
Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31,
2014 (Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8
Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of young adults and minors that aims to
forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and
welfare of the youth and minors10 - filed this present petition, arguing that the
Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine;
(b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right
to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural
and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.11 In
addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as
amended by RA 10630.12
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed
standards on how law enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the age
of the alleged curfew violators.13 They further argue that the law enforcer's
apprehension depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and
based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator.14
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions
indicating the activities exempted from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e.,
exemption of working students or students with evening class, they contend that
the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of legitimate
activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe
or impair the legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.15
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as
they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without
substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being
narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear no reasonable relation to
their purpose.17 They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew
hours will not per se  protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children
of the community.18
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section
419 thereof, contravenes Section 57-A20 of RA 9344, as amended, given that the
cited curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment,
reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties
contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall be imposed on
minors for curfew violations.21
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose
curfews contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of
their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if a
compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve the
same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of
CCTVs (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by
law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children and preventing crimes
at night. They further opine that the government can impose more reasonable
sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education seminars informing
the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh
a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.22
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the
Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case.
Respondents seek the dismissal of the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety
of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the
Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual
controversy and standing to warrant judicial review.23
A. Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution reads:
ARTICLE VIII 
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentalitv of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of
judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling
actual controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable."25
In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition
filed before the Court "are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the
Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach,
and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right,
undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the
second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited
above]."28
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved
Medical Centers Association, Inc.,29 it was expounded that "[m]eanwhile that no
specific procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded'
constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the commonality of 'grave
abuse of discretion' as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts'
expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules -
allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions invoking the courts'
expanded jurisdiction[.]"30
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the
legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their
delegated legislative powers on the ground that these ordinances violate the
Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors,
and the right of parents to rear their children. They also claim that the Manila
Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as
amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors for status
offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is
(1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias."31 In
light of the foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the remedies
of certiorari and prohibition, although these governmental actions were not made
pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
B. Direct Resort to the Court.
Since petitions for certiorari  and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the
constitutionality of legislative and executive enactments, the next question to be
resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is justified.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to
the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is
shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct
invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are special
and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the
petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a
law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount importance
and immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and
decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be anactual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."34 In this case,
respondents assail the existence of the first two (2) requisites.
1. Actual Case or Controversy.
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power — whether under the traditional or in the
expanded setting — is the presence of an actual case or controversy."35 "[A]n
actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.' In other
words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted
and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."'36 According
to recent jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under
the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by merely requiring
a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
governmental act."37
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement
of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of."38
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable
controversy in this case given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims,
particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and parents'
constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the
provisions of RA 9344. Based on their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be
gleaned from the substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case of
grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this Court to exercise its
expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that
the Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until the Court issued the
TRO39enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of injury is,
therefore, not merely speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.
2. Legal Standing.
"The question of  locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of
whether those assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance to
bring the matter to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that they
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that they have
sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as
a consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental
act."40 "'[I]nterest' in the question involved must be material — an interest that is
in issue and will be affected by the official act — as distinguished from being
merely incidental or general."41
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional
rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."42
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2)
constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of minors to freely travel within their
respective localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to rear their children.
Related to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as amended, and
the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa)
has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the minor's right to
travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the petition was filed before
this Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as
alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is, thus,
in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the
other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua,
Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the
petition that they are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances'
coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which
they could base any direct injury as a consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew
Ordinances violate the parents' right to rear their children as they have not shown
that they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose
constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is
represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have
properly filed the petition for himself for the alleged violation of his parental right.
But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew Ordinances based on his primary right
as a parent as he only stands as the representative of his minor child, Clarissa,
whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal
personality to bring an action in court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to
sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized by its
members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this
case on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in
the controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the
alleged violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged violation of
the parents' right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement
insofar as all the petitioners are concerned, in view of the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case. "In a number of cases, this Court
has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal standing, especially
when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the
official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance
of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that
they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act."46
This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew
ordinances is placed under judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to
determine the impact of these issuances on the right of parents to rear their
children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine the
extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in the interest of general
welfare. Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the public, which,
therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others, the
standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.
II.
A. Void for Vagueness.
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of
parents to rear their children, this Court must first tackle petitioners' contention
that the Curfew Ordinances are void for vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not
containing sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing
authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim that
the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the questioning of
petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age. They
maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew
offenders based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily.
Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance requires
enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the
said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the
child to show his age.47
The arguments are untenable.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper,
considering that they do not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew
Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning
and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act
accordingly.49The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process
considerations, which are absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was
opined that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may
involve "procedural due process uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process
uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases where the
statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give adequate warning to those
subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for adjudication.
Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly
integrates the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary
interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes
that are "void-for-vagueness."50
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide
the local authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew
offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject
ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack
of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of
the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left for the
political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing
unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness
analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled
enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows
enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not
prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due
process because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what
conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,51 it
was ratiocinated that:
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges,
and juries for resolution on  ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards
result in erratic and arbitrary application based on individual impressions and
personal predilections.52
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any
of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on
how the age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus, without any
correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken
down under the void for vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards
to identify suspected curfew violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances
do not explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to
follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing
ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be
determinedfrom the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any
other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be
based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence.
(Emphases supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances because
RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with
statutory law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA
10630,54minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at
risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.55 It is a long-standing principle that
"[c]onformity with law is one of the essential requisites for the validity of
a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary implication, ordinances should be
read and implemented in conjunction with related statutory law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who
was perceived to be a minor violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is
beyond the application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting any
competent proof of identification establishing their majority age. In the absence of
such proof, the law authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual
assessment of the suspect, which - needless to state - should be done ethically
and judiciously under the circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard these
rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate action against the erring enforcing
authority, and not to have the ordinances invalidated.
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness
is denied.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they
deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth
without substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this right includes
the right to determine whether minors will be required to go home at a certain
time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose
curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in
imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.57
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative
to the rights of parents in the rearing of their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as
the "youth") for civic efficiency and the development of their moral character are
characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means
that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their authority over their
children; they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The
duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to
ensure that the youth would eventually grow into free, independent, and well-
developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood that minors are
prepared for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child
for these [obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of moral
standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."58 "This
affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is
essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially responsible
citizens."59
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of
authority over one's children."60 In Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme Court of
the United States (US) remarked that "constitutional interpretation has
consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household
to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society."62 As in our Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their
children is not only described as "natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier
"primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the
upbringing of their children.63 The rationale for the State's deference to
parental control over their children was explained by the US Supreme Court
in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies
limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from
adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. But an additional
and more important justification for state deference to parental control
over children is that "the child is not [a] mere creature of the State; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that
"when actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or
the well-being of the child, the [S]tate may act to promote these
legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to the physical or
mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is
demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents'
qualified right to control the upbringing of their children."67
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in
the exercise of these rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not
exclusive of, but rather, complementary to parental supervision. In Nery v.
Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens patriaein protecting
minors, viz.:
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast
the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of
age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a vis other parties.
Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political
community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It
cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae  is inherent in the
supreme power of every State, x x x."69 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents
in the moral development of their children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting
role for parents to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that
"[l]egal restriction on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may
be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make
eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the
Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and others,
teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility for children's
well-being are entitled to the support of the laws designed to aid
discharge of that responsibility."71
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid
parents in their role of promoting their children's well-being. As will be later
discussed at greater length, these ordinances further compelling State interests
(particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile
crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents to rear
their children. Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of
experience, are not only more exposed to potential physical harm by criminal
elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled
as minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions during this time.72
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only
when the minors are not - whether actually or constructively (as will be later
discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit recognition
of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the
importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given
unfettered authority over their children's conduct during curfew hours when they
are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality,the only aspect of parenting
that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow
minors to remain in public places without parental accompaniment during
the curfew hours.73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-
all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force
parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors'
activities.74 As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit
reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence
children to spend more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides
parents with better opportunities to take a more active role in their children's
upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US court
observed that the city government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal
curfew would promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids
the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from the perils of the
street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those
children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children
to spend time on their studies than on the streets."77 Reason dictates that these
realities observed in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local context. Hence,
these are additional reasons which justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on
parental rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for
violating the parents' right to rear their children.
C. Right to Travel.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on
the minors' right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental
right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny test.
Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State interest, such as
the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there
are other less restrictive means for achieving the government's interest.78 In
addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by
proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.79
Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine,
considering that petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights to
free speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council (Southern Hemisphere),80 this
Court explained that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a
facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases,"81viz.:
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial
type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably
almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept
by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be
properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only
to facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an
exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her;
if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the
law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can
only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way;
challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the
overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes
it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the
normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent
effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to
bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent
effect on the speech of those third parties.82 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth
doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed
that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside
the limited context of the First Amendment,83 and that claims of facial overbreadth
have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever,
will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not
specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly
broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression."'85
In the more recent case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that
"[f]acial challenges can only be raised on the basis of overbreadth and not
on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to
violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the
basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of expression."87
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis
in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary,
however, this Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under the
strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced
within the general concept of liberty.90Liberty - a birthright of every person -
includes the power of locomotion91 and the right of citizens to be free to use their
faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where they can
best pursue the ends of life.92
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their
other rights, such as the rights to education, free expression, assembly,
association, and religion.93 The inter-relation of the right to travel with other
fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as
follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly,
and association require one to move about, such movement must necessarily be
protected under the First Amendment. Restricting movement in those
circumstances to the extent that First Amendment Rights cannot be
exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those
rights. One court has eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment to freedom of travel and movement. If, for any reason, people
cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom to worship is impaired. If, for
any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall, freedom of assembly
is effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks
or drive the streets of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are
sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved with
freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify
restrictions even if made against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom
to move from one place to another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not
absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State96 may impose
limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are
provided by law.97
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of
juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of
public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the
confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period
is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that
the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is replete with laws
emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e., RA
7610,98 as amended, RA 9775,99 RA 9262,100 RA 9851, 101 RA 9344,102 RA
10364,103RA 9211,104 RA 8980,105 RA 9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD)
603,107 as amended.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly
authorizes local government units, through their city or municipal councils, to set
curfew hours for children. It reads:
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may
prescribe such curfew hours for children as may be warranted by local
conditions. The duty to enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the parents
or guardians and the local authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as
what respondents have done in this case) and enforce the same through their local
officials. In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as required
by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are
likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that
minors do possess and enjoy constitutional rights,108but the exercise of these
rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.109 They are always subject to the
authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the
State.110 As  parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts
the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to
vote,111 the right to execute contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful
employment.113 With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by law to
obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before
they can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than
their parents.114 These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader
authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of adults,115 and
overall, reflect the State's general interest in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the
State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even though these
limitations do not generally apply to adults.
In Bellotti,117 the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the
differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These are:first, the
peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the importance of
the parental role in child rearing:118
[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are
protected by the same constitutional guarantees against governmental
deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to
account for children's vulnerabilityand their needs for 'concern, ...sympathy,
and ... paternal attention. x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition
that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack
the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices
that could be detrimental to them. x x x.
x x x x 
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their
children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly
protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions
by minors. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the
parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth
and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and
rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court acknowledged the
heightened dangers on the streets to minors, as compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded
growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may
secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of
selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of
child employment, more especially in public places, and the possible harms
arising from other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the
[streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately designed to
reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether against the parent's
claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of
highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting
adults. And in other uses, whether in work or in other things, this
difference may be magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors'
exercise of their travel rights, provided, they are singled out on reasonable
grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to
determine the reasonableness of classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies
when a classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights,
including the basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens
suspect classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification
does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened
scrutiny, such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy.124 Lastly, the
rational basis test applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system
guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable
test.127 At this juncture, it should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same
constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader authority over
minors than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower level of
scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the
fundamental rights of minors, the parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is
necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights are no less
"fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the analysis of those
rights may differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The
Court[,] indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat
broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. x x x. Thus,
minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has
a greater range of interests that justify the infringement of minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable,
warrant differential analysis of the constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x
x. The Bellottitest [however] does not establish a lower level of scrutiny
for the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a juvenile
curfew. Rather, the  Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether the
state has a compelling state interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than
on adults. x x x.
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating
minors differently than adults, we do not believe that [a] lesser degree of
scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on minors' fundamental
rights. x x x.
Accordingly, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x
x.130 (Emphases supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the
peculiar circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's
duty as parens patriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the compelling
State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny
test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the
classification (i) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and
(ii) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or the means
chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.132
a. Compelling State Interest.
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally
declared policies.133This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the
State's mandate to protect and care for them as parens patriae  constitute
compelling interests to justify regulations by the State.134 It is akin to the
paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give
way.135 As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a
compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The
limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest
of the State to protect and care for their welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective
of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of
night time off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their
exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and
influences which may even include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas
clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews
on minors, recognizes that:
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper
care and guidance, education, and moral development, which [lead] them into
exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses;
xxxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth,
unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs who
stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or other public
places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or justification;
xxxx
[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor
children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent
personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national laws;
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the
movement of minor children during night time by setting disciplinary hours,
protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a
need to put a restraint on the tendency of growing number of youth spending their
nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of
criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of society are not provided
with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]136
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,  as regards the information
137
gathered by the City Council to support its passage of the curfew ordinance
subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own treatment of the
present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the entitlement of
elected bodies to implement policies for a safer community, in relation to the
proclivity of children to make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions
when left unsupervised during the late hours of night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would
materially assist its first stated interest—that of reducing juvenile violence and
crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information from many sources,
including records from Charlottesville's police department, a survey of public
opinion, news reports, data from the United States Department of Justice, national
crime reports, and police reports from other localities. On the basis of such
evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that keeping
unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a safer
community. The same streets may have a more volatile and less
wholesome character at night than during the day. Alone on the streets at
night children face a series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping
decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs
may pressure them into membership or participation in violence. "[D]uring the
formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these criminal influences at an
early age may persist in their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we as
judges subscribe to these theories is beside the point. Those elected officials with
their finger on the pulse of their home community clearly did. In attempting to
reduce through its curfew the opportunities for children to come into contact with
criminal influences,the City was directly advancing its first objective of
reducing juvenile violence and crime.138 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon
City and Manila presented statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the
alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or
perpetrators, in their respective localities.139
Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew
ordinances pursuant to their police power under the general welfare clause.140 In
this light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not only
conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on
public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State
interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now
proceeds to determine if the restrictions set forth in the Curfew Ordinances are
narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means to address the cited
compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental
premise that citizens should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in
the exercise of their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the
restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the
purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for
governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts
with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.141
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to
regulations on minors as they are still accorded the freedom to participate in any
legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or civic.142 Thus, in the present
case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal
constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their other
constitutional rights.143
In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional
impliedly for not being narrowly drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment of
minors' rights to freely exercise their religion and to free speech.145 It observed
that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas
Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve
services at the various local Protestant Churches. It would likewise prohibit
them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the various churches.
Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters
from taking their minor relatives of any age to the above mentioned services. x x
x.
xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even
attend the city council meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently
do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly
a deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
xxxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)]
was [a] very narrowly drawn ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and
was very carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional muster. It
specifically excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment rights, travel in a
motor vehicle and returning home by a direct route from religious, school,
or voluntary association activities.(Emphases supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court
finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed
requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the
curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family members of
legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as buying of
medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the
like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are
required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those
working at night.146
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors
with night classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or
church activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling
towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the
supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority
over them; (f) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also
exempts minors from the curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve,
Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the barangay
fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good
Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their
exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the
minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to
education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or
work.148 However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a
greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable
exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to
peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others.
The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly
trample upon protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more
protective of constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still
provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders
them from engaging in legitimate non-school or non-church activities in the
streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is
effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in legitimate activities of
organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social,
emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such participation is not exempted
under the Navotas Ordinance.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during
Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending
traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without
accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.149 This legitimate
activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is
therefore effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to
engage in political rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their
concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these
activities outside curfew hours, but the Court finds no reason to prohibit them
from participating in these legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such
proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest to protect minors
from the dangers of the streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of
criminal activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered without any
reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not
narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also
not narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down
since their exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and
breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the
above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the
same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently
despite the presence150 of any separability clause.151
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances
as it sufficiently safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the
following exceptions:
Section 4.  EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall
not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance;
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation
ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular
activities of their school or organization wherein their
attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or
when such minors are out and unable to go home early
due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by
the proper authorities concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation
such as conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident,
law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity,
or going to or returning home from the same place of
employment activity without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel
accompanied by an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an
official school, religious, recreational, educational, social,
communitv or other similar private activity sponsored by
the city, barangay, school, or other similar private
civic/religious organization/group (recognized by the
community) that supervises the activity or when the minor
is going to or returning home from such activity, without
any detour or stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a
student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening
or that he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the
Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors'
rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and
of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees
the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of
association by enabling minors to attend both official and extra-curricular
activities not only of their school or church but also of other legitimate
organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression
are also covered by these items given that the minors' attendance in the
official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the
curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise of
religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting
attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In relation to
their right to travel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to
and from the places where these activities are held. Thus, with these
numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only
prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being
of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where
danger is perceivably more prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her
minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the
night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the
deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an
exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance,  i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment should be
understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court
sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this exception so as to
reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State
interference is not superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After
all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is
not only natural but primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on
these ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors who are presumed by law
to be incapable of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully
understand the import and consequences of their actions. In one case it was
observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the
rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State,
as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those
who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully.
Those of tender years deserve its protection.153
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational
capacity, and balancing the same against the State's compelling interest to
promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the
curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its
narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these
exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the
lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or
modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation,
overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised-
to further discuss the validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as
amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parentis or guardian
under Section 8 thereof,154 does not impose any penalty on the minors. For its
part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s or
guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community service either in lieu of -
should the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed -
or in addition to the fine imposed therein.155Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance
imposed various sanctions to the minor based on the age and frequency
of violations, to wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this
ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall
consist of a REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the
offender's parent, guardian or person exercising parental authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of
age, the sanction/penalty shall be:
1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and
Admonition, and a warning about the legal impostitions
in case of a third and subsequent violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT
OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten (10)
days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(Php2,000.00), or both at the discretion of the
Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by
the Punong Barangay with the office of the City
Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on
minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community service; (b) reprimand and
admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A
of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors
for status offenses such as curfew violations,  viz.:
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. — Any conduct not considered an offense or not
penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and
shall not be punished if committed by a child.
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. — Ordinances enacted by local
governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited
to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-
drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or
safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment,
drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling,
mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the
protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for said
violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any
barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their
parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in such
ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a
"child in conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also provide for intervention
programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for
the parents, attendance in parenting education seminars. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that
curtail the conduct of minors, when the similar conduct of adults are not
considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they
prohibit is the imposition of  penalties on minors for violations of these
regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without
penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.
"Penalty" 157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the
form of imprisonment or fine";158 "[p]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon
a person who commits a deliberate or negligent act."159 Punishment, in turn, is
defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property,
right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the law."160
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the
actions of the minor in violation of the regulations are without legal consequences.
Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate
intervention programs, such as community-based programs161recognized under
Section 54162 of the same law.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of
intervention program that a local government (such as Navotas City in this case)
could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors. For
one, the community service programs provide minors an alternative mode of
rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the
moral and social stigma caused by jail detention. In the same light, these
programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and legal orders.
More importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive members
of society and thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their
community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent
with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving
warnings and expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is
generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against
fault or oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n
authoritatively issued warning or censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary
defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or reminder,
[counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of authoritative advice
or warning."165 Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare
that "a warning or admonition shall not be considered a penalty."166
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and
admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and are
generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their
objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to
understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines
and/or imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is
generally defined as "a severe or formal reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary
defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's
ability to practice law";168 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public
and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by his
superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is more than just a warning or
admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement
made to denounce the error or violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke
the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual including the public
against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the
erring individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from
others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that
reprimand is a penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties
- as provided in our various criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence -
that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.
As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous.
It states that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x violations
[of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of reprimand,
fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of
the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the
impositions of community service programs and admonition on the minors are
allowed as they do not constitute penalties.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the
first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown
a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the
concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong
of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides
for the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon
City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely
exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and
therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said
ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been
construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment
and hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of
enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus,
null and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and
thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.
For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal
provisions imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that ordinances
should always conform with the law, these provisions must be struck down as
invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court hereby declares
Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local government of the City of Manila,
and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa
Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas
City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-
2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City is
declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus,VALID in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Mendoza, Jardeleza, Caguioa, Martires, Tijam, and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Leonen, J., see separate opinion. 
SEPARATE OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result. All of the assailed ordinances should have been struck down
for failing to ground themselves on demonstrated rational bases, for failing to
adopt the least restrictive means to achieve their aims, and for failing to show
narrowly tailored enforcement measures that foreclose abuse by law enforcers.
The doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify these ordinances. While this doctrine
enables state intervention for the welfare of children, its operation must not
transgress the constitutionally enshrined natural and primary right of parents to
rear their children.
However, the adoption by this Court of the interpretation of Section 4, item (a) of
the Quezon City Ordinance to the effect that parental permission in any form for
any minor is also an exception will have the effect of narrowly tailoring the
application of that curfew regulation.
The assailed ordinances are not novel. Navotas City Pambayang Ordinansa Blg.
99-021 was passed on August 26, 1999. City of Manila Ordinance No. 8046 2 was
passed on October 14, 2002. Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-23013 was passed on
July 31, 2014.
The present controversy was spurred by the revitalized, strict implementation of
these curfew ordinances as part of police operations under the broad umbrella of
"'Oplan Rody." These operations were in fulfillment of President Rodrigo Duterte's
campaign promise for a nationwide implementation of a curfew for minors.4
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), an association of youths and
minors for "the protection of the rights and welfare of youths and minors," and its
members Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan
(Baccutan), Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), and Clarissa Joyce Villegas
(Villegas) filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition alleging that the
ordinances are unconstitutional and in violation of Republic Act No. 9344.5
I Manila14 explained:
Constitutional challenges against local legislation
Petitioners submit a multi-faceted constitutional challenge against the assailed
ordinances.
They assert that the assailed ordinances should be declared unconstitutional as
the lack of expressed standards for the identification of minors facilitates arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.6
Petitioners further argue that the assailed ordinances unduly restrict a minor's
liberty, in general, and right to travel, in particular.7
Likewise, petitioners assert that, without due process, the assailed ordinances
intrude into or deprive parents of their "natural and primary right" 8 to rear their
children.
Ordinances are products of "derivative legislative power"9 in that legislative power
is delegated by the national legislature to local government units. They are
presumed constitutional and, until judicially declared invalid, retain their binding
effect. In Tano v. Hon. Gov. Socrates:10
It is of course settled that laws (including ordinances enacted by local government
units) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To overthrow this presumption,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful or argumentative contradiction. In short, the conflict with the Constitution
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Where doubt exists, even if well-
founded, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain.11
The presumption of constitutionality is rooted in the respect that the judiciary
must accord to the legislature. In  Estrada v. Sandiganbayan:12
This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is
forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and
powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the
deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch — the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the
courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges
of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and
for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the
majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with
the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with
caution and forbearance.13
The same respect is proper for acts made by local legislative bodies, whose
members are equally presumed to have acted conscientiously and with full
awareness of the constitutional and statutory bounds within which they may
operate. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City of
As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor
of validity . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be
lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with
the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject and necessitates action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well being of the people . . . The Judiciary should
not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal
or property rights under the guise of police regulation."15
The presumption of constitutionality may, of course, be challenged. Challenges,
however, shall only be sustained upon a clear and unequivocal showing of the
bases for invalidating a law. In Smart Communications v. Municipality of Malvar:16
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear
and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the
sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain
legislation because "to invalidate [a law] based on ... baseless supposition is an
affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the
executive which approved it." This presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority
may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the
challenged act must be struck down.17
Consistent with the exacting standard for invalidating ordinances, Hon. Fernando
v. St. Scholastica's College,18 outlined the test for determining the validity of an
ordinance:
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions
including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only
be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general
and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.19
The first consideration hearkens to the primacy of the Constitution, as well as to
the basic nature of ordinances as products of a power that was merely delegated
to local government units. In City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio:20
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary
to the Constitution and to the laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements:
it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency
with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the
principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the
enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative
power, a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter.21 (Citations omitted)
II
Appraising due process and equal protection challenges
At stake here is the basic constitutional guarantee that "[n]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws." 22There are two (2) dimensions
to this: first, is an enumeration of objects of protection—life, liberty and property;
second, is an identification and delimitation of the legitimate mechanism for their
modulation or abnegation—due process and equal protection. The first dimension
lists specific objects whose bounds are amorphous; the second dimension
delineates action, and therefore, requires precision.
Speaking of life and its protection does not merely entail ensuring biological
subsistence. It is not just a proscription against killing. Likewise, speaking of
liberty and its protection does not merely involve a lack of physical restraint. The
objects of the constitutional protection of due process are better understood
dynamically and from a frame of consummate human dignity. They are likewise
better understood integrally, operating in a synergistic frame that serves to secure
a person's integrity.
"Life, liberty and property" is akin to the United Nations' formulation of "life,
liberty, and security of person"23 and the American formulation of "life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness."24 As the American Declaration of Independence
postulates, they are "unalienable rights" for which "[g]overnments are instituted
among men" in order that they may be secured. 25 Securing them denotes pursuing
and obtaining them, as much as it denotes preserving them. The formulation is,
thus, an aspirational declaration, not merely operating on factual givens but
enabling the pursuit of ideals.
"Life," then, is more appropriately understood as the fullness of human potential:
not merely organic, physiological existence, but consummate self-actualization,
enabled and effected not only by freedom from bodily restraint but by facilitating
an empowering existence.26 "Life and liberty," placed in the context of a
constitutional aspiration, it then becomes the duty of the government to facilitate
this empowering existence. This is not an inventively novel understanding but one
that has been at the bedrock of our social and political conceptions. As Justice
George Malcolm, speaking for this Court in 1919, articulated:
Civil liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed
in a civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom
in others. The right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The
term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of
the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with
which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are
necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities
including epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court, liberty
includes the right of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in lawful ways; to live
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any
avocation, and for that purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper,
necessary, and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful
conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right
to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.27
It is in this sense that the constitutional listing of the objects of due process
protection admits amorphous bounds. The constitutional protection of life and
liberty encompasses a penumbra of cognate rights that is not fixed but evolves—
expanding liberty—alongside the contemporaneous reality in which the
Constitution operates. People v. Hernandez28 illustrated how the right to liberty is
multi-faceted and is not limited to its initial formulation in the due process clause:
[T]he preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system
that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of
section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted
paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17),
(18), and (21) of said section (1)29 to the protection of several aspects of
freedom.30
While the extent of the constitutional protection of life and liberty is dynamic,
evolving, and expanding with contemporaneous realities, the mechanism for
preserving life and liberty is immutable: any intrusion into it must be with due
process of law and must not run afoul of the equal protection of the laws.
Appraising the validity of government regulation in relation to the due process and
equal protection clauses invokes three (3) levels of analysis. Proceeding similarly
as we do now with the task of appraising local ordinances, White Light Corporation
v. City of Manila31 discussed:
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process
grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down
by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products. Footnote 4 of
the  Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the
legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority
or infringement of a "fundamental right". Consequently, two standards of judicial
review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind
or restricting the political process, and the rational basis standard of review for
economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on gender
and legitimacy. Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Craig, after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. While the test may
have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States
since been applied in all substantive due process cases as well.
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal
protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are
upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under
intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the
availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the
focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental
interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the
standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental interest
brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used
today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or
race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications
to equal protection. The United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of
strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access and
interstate travel.32 (Citations omitted)
An appraisal of due process and equal protection challenges against government
regulation must admit that the gravity of interests invoked by the government and
the personal liberties or classification affected are not uniform. Hence, the three
(3) levels of analysis that demand careful calibration: the rational basis test,
intermediate review, and strict scrutiny. Each level is typified by the dual
considerations of: first, the interest invoked by the government; and second, the
means employed to achieve that interest.
The rational basis test requires only that there be a legitimate government interest
and that there is a reasonable connection between it and the means employed to
achieve it.
Intermediate review requires an important government interest. Here, it would
suffice if government is able to demonstrate substantial connection between its
interest and the means it employs. In accordance with White Light, "the
availability of less restrictive measures [must have been] considered."33 This
demands a conscientious effort at devising the least restrictive means for attaining
its avowed interest. It is enough that the means employed is conceptually the
least restrictive mechanism that the government may apply.
Strict scrutiny applies when what is at stake are fundamental freedoms or what is
involved are suspect classifications. It requires that there be a compelling state
interest and that the means employed to effect it are narrowly-tailored, actually—
not only conceptually—being the least restrictive means for effecting the invoked
interest. Here, it does not suffice that the government contemplated on the means
available to it. Rather, it must show an active effort at demonstrating the
inefficacy of all possible alternatives. Here, it is required to not only explore all
possible avenues but to even debunk the viability of alternatives so as to ensure
that its chosen course of action is the sole effective means. To the extent
practicable, this must be supported by sound data gathering mechanisms.
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 34 further
explained:
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding
questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress
in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational
basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental
right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution
with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict.  A weak and
watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to
strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This
is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or
the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck
down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Cases involving strict scrutiny innately favor the preservation of fundamental
rights and the non-discrimination of protected classes. Thus, in these cases, the
burden falls upon the government to prove that it was impelled by a compelling
state interest and that there is actually no other less restrictive mechanism for
realizing the interest that it invokes:
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest, and the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.36
III
The present Petition entails fundamental rights and 
defines status offenses. Thus, strict scrutiny is proper.
By definition, a curfew restricts mobility. As effected by the assailed ordinances,
this restriction applies daily at specified times and is directed at minors, who
remain under the authority of their parents.
Thus, petitioners correctly note that at stake in the present Petition is the right to
travel. Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
While a constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right, this right is not absolute.
The Constitution itself states that the right may be "impaired" in consideration of:
national security, public safety, or public health.37 The ponencia underscores that
the avowed purpose of the assailed ordinances is "the promotion of juvenile safety
and prevention of juvenile crime."38 The assailed ordinances, therefore, seem to
find justification as a valid exercise of the State's police power, regulating—as
opposed to completely negating—the right to travel.
Given the overlap of the state's prerogatives with those of parents, equally at
stake is the right that parents hold in the rearing of their children.
There are several facets of the right to privacy. Ople v. Torres39 identified the right
of persons to be secure "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," 40 the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures,41 liberty of abode,42 the right to form
associations,43 and the right against selfincrimination44as among these facets.
While not among the rights enumerated under Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
the rights of parents with respect to the family is no less a fundamental right and
an integral aspect of liberty and privacy. Article II, Section 12 characterizes the
right of parents in the rearing of the youth to be ''natural and primary." 45 It adds
that it is a right, which shall "receive the support of the Government."46
Imbong v. Ochoa,47 affirms the natural and primary rights of parents in the rearing
of children as a facet of the right to privacy:
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental
control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on
matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family.48
This Court's 2009 Decision in White Light49 unequivocally characterized the right to
privacy as a fundamental right. Thus, alleged . statutory intrusion into it warrants
strict scrutiny.50
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly
as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only
restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to
property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant the application
of the most deferential standard - the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we
recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights
of their patrons - those persons who would be deprived of availing short time
access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
....
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which
we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that most
primordial of rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to
include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy
the faculties with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare.'' .. . In accordance with this
case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to
live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; and to
pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty ...
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the
curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject
establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of 'prostitution, adultery and
fornications' in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine
entry, presence and exit and thus became the 'ideal haven for prostitutes and
thrill-seekers"'. Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is
accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among consenting
married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will be
curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains
significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy
and interference demands respect ...
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the
invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest. Morfe
accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. Governmental
powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen.51 (Citations omitted)
In determining that the interest invoked by the State was not sufficiently
compelling to justify intrusion of the patrons' privacy rights, this Court weighed
the State's need for the "promotion of public morality" as against the individual
patrons' "liberty to make the choices in [their] lives," thus:
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves
the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample
rights this Court is sworn to protect ...
....
[T]he continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance
of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental liberties as the
key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from
non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration on our part of what is
moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make
the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by the State.52 (Citation omitted)
Apart from impinging upon fundamental rights, the assailed ordinances define
status offenses. They identify and restrict offenders, not purely on the basis of December) December) 25 (July to
prohibited acts or omissions, but on the basis of their inherent personal condition. December)
Altogether and to the restriction of all other persons, minors are exclusively
classified as potential offenders. What is potential is then made real on a passive 2015 142 142 0 51 4778
basis, as the commission of an offense relies merely on presence in public places
at given times and not on the doing of a conclusively noxious act.
The data submitted, however, is inconclusive to prove that the city is so overrun
by juvenile crime that it may as well be totally rid of the public presence of
The assailed ordinances' adoption and implementation concern a prejudicial
children at specified times. While there is a perceptively raised number of CICLs in
classification. The assailed ordinances are demonstrably incongruent with the
Quezon City, the data fails to specify the rate of these figures in relation to the
Constitution's unequivocal nurturing attitude towards the youths and whose
total number of minors and, thus, fails to establish the extent to which CICLs
mandate is to "promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual,
dominate the city. As to geographical prevalence that may justify a city-wide
and social well-being."53
prohibition, a substantial number of barangays reported not having CICLs for the
entire year. As to prevalence that stretches across the relative maturity of all who
This attitude is reflected in Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the may be considered minors (e.g., grade-schoolers as against adolescents), there
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, which takes great pains at a nuanced was also no data showing the average age of these CICLs.
approach to children. Republic Act No. 9344 meticulously defines a "child at risk"
and a "child in conflict with the law" and distinguishes them from the generic
The City of Manila's data, on the other hand, is too conflicting to be authoritative.
identification of a "child" as any "person under the age of eighteen (18)
The data reports of the Manila Police Department, as summarized in the
years."54 These concepts were adopted precisely to prevent a lackadaisical
ponencia,57 state:
reduction to a wholesale and indiscriminate concept, consistent with the protection
that is proper to a vulnerable sector. The assailed ordinances' broad and sweeping
determination of presence in the streets past defined times as delinquencies
YEAR NUMBER OF CICL
warranting the imposition of sanctions tend to run afoul of the carefully calibrated
attitude of Republic Act No. 9344 and the protection that the Constitution
mandates. For these, a strict consideration of the assailed ordinances is equally
2014 74
proper.
2015 30
IV
January to June 2016 75
The apparent factual bases for the 
assailed ordinances are tenuous at best. The Department of Social Welfare and Development of the City of Manila has
vastly different numbers. As summarized in the ponencia:58
To prove the necessity of implementing curfew ordinances, respondents City of
Manila and Quezon City provide statistical data on the number of Children in
Conflict with the Law (CICL).55 Quezon City's data is summarized as follows:56 YEAR NUMBER OF CICL

2015 845
Year No. of Barangay Barangays No. of Total
Barangay with without Barangay no. of January to June 2016 524
s submission submission s with CICL
s s Zero CICL The Department of Social Welfare of Manila submits that for January to August
2016, there was a total of 480 CICLs as part of their Zero Street Dwellers
2013 142 102 (January 40 (January Not 2677 Campaign.59 Of the 480 minors, 210 minors were apprehended for curfew
to June) to June)  provided violations, not for petty crimes.60 Again, the data fails to account for the
44 (July to 98 (July to percentage of CICLs as against the total number of minors in Manila.
December) December)
The ponencia cites Shleifer v. City of Charlottesville,61 a United States Court of
2014 142 119 (January 23 (January 32 2937 Appeals case, as basis for examining the validity of curfew ordinances in Metro
to June)  to June) (January to Manila. Far from supporting the validity of the assailed
ordinances, Shleifer discounts it. Shleifer  relies on unequivocally demonstrated
82 (July to 60 (July to June) 
scientific and empirical data on the rise of juvenile crime and the emphasis on
juvenile safety during curfew hours inCharlottesville, Virginia. Here, while local
government units adduced data, there does not appear to have been a well-
informed effort as to these data's processing, interpretation, and correlation with
avowed policy objectives.
With incomplete and inconclusive bases, the concerned local government units'
justifications of reducing crime and sweeping averments of "peace and order"
hardly sustain a rational basis for the restriction of minors' movement during
curfew hours. If at all, the assertion that curfew restrictions ipso facto equate to
the reduction of CICLs appears to be a gratuitous conclusion. It is more
sentimental than logical. Lacking in even a rational basis, it follows that there is no
support for the more arduous requirement of demonstrating that the assailed
ordinances support a compelling state interest.
V objectives reads:
It has not been demonstrated that the curfews  WHEREAS ... the children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their
effected by the assailed ordinances are the least  proper care and guidance, education, and moral development, which led them into
restrictive means for achieving their avowed purposes.
The strict scrutiny test not only requires that the challenged law be narrowly
tailored in order to achieve compelling governmental interests, it also requires that
the mechanisms it adopts are the least burdensome or least drastic means to
achieve its ends:
Fundamental rights which give rise to Strict Scrutiny include the right of
procreation, the right to marry, the right to exercise. First Amendment freedoms
such as free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and so forth, the right
to travel, and the right to vote.
Because Strict Scrutiny involves statutes which either classifies on the basis of an
inherently suspect characteristic or infringes fundamental constitutional rights, the
presumption of constitutionality is reversed; that is, such legislation is assumed to
be unconstitutional until the government demonstrates otherwise. The
government must show that the statute is supported by a compelling
governmental interest and the means chosen to accomplish that interest are
narrowly tailored. Gerald Gunther explains as follows:
... The intensive review associated with the new equal protection imposed two
demands a demand not only as to means but also as to ends. Legislation
qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between classification and
statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the
old equal protection: means had to be shown "necessary" to achieve statutory
ends, not merely "reasonably related." Moreover, equal protection became a
source of ends scrutiny as well: legislation in the areas of the new equal protection
had to be justified by "compelling" state interests, not merely the wide spectrum
of "legitimate" state ends.
Furthermore, the legislature must adopt the least burdensome or least drastic
means available for achieving the governmental objective.62 (Citations omitted)
The governmental interests to be protected must not only be reasonable. They
must be compelling. Certainly, the promotion of public safety is compelling enough
to restrict certain freedoms. It does not, however, suffice to make a generic,
sweeping averment of public safety.
To reiterate, respondents have not shown adequate data to prove that an
imposition of curfew lessens the number of CICLs. Respondents further fail to
provide data on the frequency of crimes against unattended minors during curfew
hours. Without this data, it cannot be concluded that the safety of minors is better
achieved if they are not allowed out on the streets during curfew hours.
While the ponencia holds that the Navotas and Manila Ordinances tend to restrict
minors' fundamental rights, it found that the Quezon City Ordinance is narrowly
tailored to achieve its objectives. The Quezon City Ordinance's statement of its
exploitation, drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of
committing criminal offenses;
....
WHEREAS, as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth,
unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs who
stay, roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or other public
places, whether singly or in groups, without lawful purpose or justification;
WHEREAS, to keep themselves away from the watch and supervision of the
barangay officials and other authorities, these misguided minor children preferred
to converge or flock together during the night time until the wee hours of the
morning resorting to drinking on the streets and other public places, illegal drug
use and sometimes drug peddling, engaging in troubles and other criminal
activities which often resulted to bodily injuries and loss of lives;
WHEREAS, reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that
minor children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the
frequent personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and
national laws;
WHEREAS, it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the
movement of minor children during night time by setting disciplinary hours,
protect them from neglect, abuse, cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
WHEREAS, to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children,
there is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of a growing number of the
youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the face of the
unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements in society
are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]63
In order to achieve these objectives,64 the ponencia cites the ordinances'
exemptions, which it found to be "sufficiently safeguard[ing] the minors'
constitutional rights":65
SECTION 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall
not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance:
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony,
religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of their
school or organization wherein their attendance are required or
otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable
to go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as
verified by the proper authorities concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation
such as conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident,
law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents;
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity,
or going to or returning home from the same place of
employment activity, without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in motor vehicle or other travel accompanied
by an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official
school, religious, recreational, educational, social, community or
other similar private activity sponsored by the city, barangay,
school or other similar private civic/religious organization/group
(recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or
when the minor is going to or returning home from such activity,
without any detour or stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a
student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening
or that he/she is a working student.66
The ponencia states:
[T]he Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that
hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the
locality at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent.67
The ponencia unfortunately falls into a hasty generalization. It generalizes
unattended minors out in the streets during curfew hours as potentially, if not
actually, engaging in criminal activities, merely on the basis that they are not
within the bounds of the stated exemptions. It is evident, however, that the
exemptions are hardly exhaustive.
Consider the dilemma that petitioner Villegas faces when she goes out at night to
buy food from a convenience store because the rest of her family is already
asleep.68 As a Quezon City resident, she violates the curfew merely for wanting to
buy food when she gets home from school.
It may be that a minor is out with friends or a minor was told to make a purchase
at a nearby sari-sari store. None of these is within the context of a "party,
graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of
their school and organization" or part of an "official school, religious, recreational,
educational, social, community or other similar private activity." Still, these
activities are not criminal or nefarious. To the contrary, socializing with friends,
unsavorily portrayed as mere loafing or loitering as it may be, contributes to a
person's social and psychological development. Doing one's chores is within the
scope of respecting one's elders.
Imposing a curfew on minors merely on the assumption that it can keep them safe
from crime is not the least restrictive means to achieve this objective. Petitioners
suggest street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs in street comers, and
visible police patrol.69 Public safety is better achieved by effective police work, not
by clearing streets of children en masse at night. Crimes can just as well occur in
broad daylight and children can be just as susceptible in such an environment.
Efficient law enforcement, more than sweeping, generalized measures, ensures
that children will be safe regardless of what time they are out on the streets.
The assailed ordinances' deficiencies only serve to highlight their most disturbing
aspect: the imposition of a curfew only burdens minors who are living in poverty.
For instance, the Quezon City Ordinance targets minors who are not traditionally
employed as the exemptions require that the minor be engaged in
"an authorized employment activity." Curfew violators could include minors who
scour garbage at night looking for food to eat or scraps to sell. The Department of
Social Welfare and Development of Manila reports that for 2016, 2,194 minors
were turned over as part of their Zero Street Dwellers Campaign.70 The greater
likelihood that most, if not all, curfew violators will be street children—who have
no place to even come home to—than actual CICLs. So too, those caught violating
the ordinance will most likely have no parent or guardian to fetch them from
barangay halls.
An examination of Manila Police District's data on CICLs show that for most of the
crimes committed, the motive is poverty, not a drive for nocturnal
escapades.71 Thus, to lessen the instances of juvenile crime, the government must
first alleviate poverty, not impose a curfew. Poverty alleviation programs, not
curfews, are the least restrictive means of preventing indigent children from
turning to a life of criminality.
VI
 The assailed ordinances give
unbridled discretion to law enforcers.
The assailed ordinances are deficient not only for failing to provide the least
restrictive means for achieving their avowed ends but also in failing to articulate
safeguards and define limitations that foreclose abuses.
In assailing the lack of expressed standards for identifying minor, petitioners
invoke the void for vagueness doctrine.72
The doctrine is explained in People v. Nazario:73
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application.'' It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.74
While facial challenges of a statute on the ground of vagueness is permitted only
in cases involving alleged transgressions against the right to free speech, penal
laws may nevertheless be invalidated for vagueness "as applied." In  Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan:75
[T]he doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do
service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute,
the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional
will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also
be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application
might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the
First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no
basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face
and in its entirety.76
The difference between a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge is settled.
As explained in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network v. Anti-Terrorism
Council:77
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts
affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to
the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech
or activities.78 (Citation omitted)
Thus, to invalidate a law with penal provisions, such as the assailed ordinances,
as-applied parties must assert actual violations of their rights and not prospective
violations of the rights of third persons. InImbong v. Ochoa:79
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one
can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his
own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the
statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court.
This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.80
The ponencia states that petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine
is improper. It reasons that petitioners failed to point out any ambiguous provision
in the assailed ordinances.81 It then proceeds to examine the provisions of the
ordinances, vis-a-vis their alleged defects, while discussing how these defects may
affect minors and parents who are not parties to this case. In effect, the ponencia
engaged in a facial examination of the assailed ordinances. This facial examination
is an improper exercise for the assailed ordinances, as they are penal laws that do
not ostensibly involve the right to free speech.
The more appropriate stance would have been to examine the assailed ordinances,
not in isolation, but in the context of the specific cases pleaded by petitioners.
Contrary to the ponencia's position, the lack of specific provisions in the assailed
ordinances indeed made them vague, so much so that actual transgressions into
petitioner's rights were made.
The questioned Navotas and City of Manila Ordinances do not state any guidelines
on how law enforcement agencies may determine if a person apprehended is a
minor.
For its part, Section 5(h) of the Quezon City ordinance provides:
(h) Determine the age of the child pursuant to Section 7 of this Act;82
However, the Section 7 it refers to provides no guidelines on the identification of
age. It merely states that any member of the community may call the attention of
barangay officials if they see minors during curfew hours:
SECTION 7. COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT/PARTICIPATION - Any person who has
personal knowledge of the existence of any minor during the wee hours as
provided under Section 3 hereof, must immediately call the attention of the
barangay.83
The ponencia asserts that Republic Act No. 9344, Section 784 addresses the
lacunae as it articulates measures for determining age. However, none of the
assailed ordinances actually refers law enforcers to extant statutes. Their actions
and prerogatives are not actually limited whether by the assailed ordinances'
express provisions or by implied invocation. True, Republic Act No. 9344 states its
prescriptions but the assailed ordinances' equivocation by silence reduces these
prescriptions to mere suggestions, at best, or to mere afterthoughts of a
justification, at worst.
Thus, the lack of sufficient guidelines gives law enforcers "unbridled discretion in
carrying out [the assailed ordinances'] provisions."85 The present Petition
illustrates how this has engendered abusive and even absurd situations.
Petitioner Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Delos Reyes), an 18-year-old—no longer a minor
—student, recalled that when he was apprehended for violating the curfew, he
showed the barangay tanod his registration card. Despite his presentation of an
official document, the barangay tanod refused to believe him. Delos Reyes had to
resort to showing the barangay tanod his hairy legs for the tanod to let him go.86
Petitioner Baccutan likewise alleged that he and his friends were apprehended by
10 barangay tanods for violating curfew even though he was already 19 years old
at that time. He alleged that he and his friends were told to perform 200 squats
and if they refused, they would be framed up for a crime. They were released only
when the aunt of one (1) of his friends arrived.87
These instances illustrate how predicaments engendered by enforcing the assailed
ordinances have not been resolved by "simply presenting any competent proof of
identification"88 considering that precisely, the assailed ordinances state no
mandate for law enforcers to check proof of age before apprehension. Clear and
explicit guidelines for implementation are imperative to foreclose further violations
of petitioners' due process rights. In the interim, the assailed statutes must be
invalidated on account of their vagueness.
VII
The doctrine of parens patriae  the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive
does not sustain the assailed ordinances.
The doctrine of parens patriae fails to justify the intrusions into parental
prerogatives made by the assailed ordinances. The State acts as parens patriae in
the protection of minors only when there is a clear showing of neglect, abuse, or
exploitation. It cannot, on its own, decide on how children are to be reared,
supplanting its own wisdom to that of parents.
The doctrine of parens patriae is of Anglo-American, common law origin. It was
understood to have "emanate[d] from the right of the Crown to protect those of its
subjects who were unable to protect themselves." 89 It was the King's "royal
prerogative"90 to "take responsibility for those without capacity to look after
themselves."91 At its outset, parens patriae contemplated situations where
vulnerable persons had no means to support or protect themselves. Given this, it
was the duty of the State, as the ultimate guardian of the people, to safeguard its
citizens' welfare.
The doctrine became entrenched in the United States, even as it gained
independence and developed its own legal tradition. In Late Corporation of Church
of Jesus Christ v. United States,92 the United States Supreme Court
explained parens patriae as a beneficent state power and not an arbitrary royal
prerogative:
This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every
State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has
no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible
monarch to the great detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties.
On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to be
exercised in the interest of humanity, andfor the prevention of injury to those
who cannot protect themselves.93 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the exercise
of parens patriaeapplies "to the beneficiaries of charities, who are often incapable
of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign
authority."94 It is from this reliance and expectation of the people that a state
stands as "parent of the nation."95
American colonial rule and the adoption of American legal traditions that it entailed
facilitated our own jurisdiction's adoption of the doctrine of parens
patriae.96 Originally, the doctrine was understood as "the inherent power and
authority of the state to provide protection of the person and property of a
person non sui juris."97
However, significant developments have smce calibrated our own understanding
and application of the doctrine.
Article II, Section 12 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:
Section 12.... The natural and  primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of
the support of the Government. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is only the 1987 Constitution which introduced the qualifier "primary." The
present Article II, Section 12's counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution
merely referred to "[t]he natural right and duty of parents":
Section 4.... The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the aid and
support of the Government.98
As with the 1973 Constitution, the 1935 Constitution also merely spoke of"[t]he
natural right and duty of parents":
Section 4. . . . The natural right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency should receive the aid and support of the government.99
The addition of the qualifier "primary" unequivocally attests to the constitutional
intent to afford primacy and preeminence to parental responsibility. More plainly
stated, the Constitution now recognizes the superiority of parental prerogative. It
follows, then, that state interventions, which are tantamount to deviations from
the preeminent and superior rights of parents, are permitted only in instances
where the parents themselves have failed or have become incapable of performing
their duties.
Shifts in constitutional temperament contextualize  Nery v. Lorenzo,100 the
authority cited by ponencia in explaining the State's role in the upbringing of
children.101 In Nery, this Court alluded to the State's supreme authority to
exercise parens patriae. Nery was decided in 1972, when the 1935 Constitution
was in operation.102 It stated:
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the
duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual[s] who because of age or
incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they
are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community to
look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be
recreant to such a trust.103
This outmoded temperament is similarly reflected in the 1978 case of Vasco v.
Court of Appeals,104where, without moderation or qualification, this Court asserted
that "the State is considered the parens patriae of minors.''105
In contrast,  Imbong v. Ochoa,106 a cased decided by this Court in 2014,
unequivocally characterized parents' rights as being "superior" to the state:
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution
affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the
youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more
importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by
recognizing that said role shall be "primary, " that is, that the right of parents in
upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.107 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the State acts as parens patriae only when parents cannot fulfill their role,
as in cases of neglect, abuse, or exploitation:
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated
to provide protection to those of tender years. Through its laws, the State
safeguards them from everyone, even their own parents, to the end that their
eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be
impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony.108
As it stands, the doctrine of parens patriae is a mere substitute or supplement to
parents' authority over their children. It operates only when parental authority is
established to be absent or grossly deficient. The wisdom underlying this doctrine
considers the existence of harm and  the subsequent inability of the person to
protect himself or herself. This premise entails the incapacity of parents and/or
legal guardians to protect a child.
To hold otherwise is to afford an overarching and almost absolute power to the
State; to allow the Government to arbitrarily exercise its parens patriae power
might as well render the superior Constitutional right of parents inutile.
More refined applications of this doctrine reflect this position. In these instances
where the State exercised its powers over minors on account of parens patriae, it
was only because the children were prejudiced and it was without  subverting the
authority of the parents themselves when they have not acted in manifest offense
against the rights of their children.
Thus, in Bernabe v. Alejo,109parens patriae was exercised in order to give the
minor his day in court. This is a matter beyond the conventional capacities of
parents, and therefore, it was necessary for the State to intervene in order to
protect the interests of the child.
In People v. Baylon110 and other rape cases,111 this Court held that a rigorous
application of the penal law is in order, since "[t]he state, as parens patriae, is
under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their
minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully." 112 In these criminal
cases where minor children were victims, this Court, acting as the representative
of the State exercising its parens patriae power, was firm in imposing the
appropriate penalties for the crimes—no matter how severe—precisely because it
was the only way to mitigate further harm to minors. Parens patriae is also the
reason why "a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent
to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse," as this Court held in People v.
Malto.113 Again, these State actions are well outside the conventional capabilities of
the parents and in no way encroach on the latter's authority.
Such assistive and justified regulation is wanting in this case.
VIII
In my view, the interpretation that this Court gives to Section 4, item (a) of the
Quezon City Ordinance will sufficiently narrowly tailor its application so as to save
it from its otherwise apparent breach of fundamental constitutional principles.
Thus, in the ponencia of Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe:
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her
minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the
night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate
Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the
deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an
exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment should be
understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court
sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this exception so as to
reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State
interference is not superior but only complementary to parental supervision. After
all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to rear their children is
not only natural but primary.
Of course, nothing in this decision will preclude a stricter review in a factual case
whose factual ambient will be different. Accordingly, for these reasons, I concur in
the result. 

176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005. *
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. DANTE O.
GARIN, respondent.
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority; Driver’s Licenses; Actions;  Moot and Academic
Questions;  Since the MMDA is not precluded from re-implementing Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, or
any other scheme, for that matter, that would entail confiscating driver’s licenses, the Supreme Court deems it
appropriate to make certain observations for the proper implementation of MMDA’s future programs.—On 12
August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented Memorandum Circular No.
04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme.
Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic
enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers’ licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. All
motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from the date of implementation of the new system to
pay their fines and redeem their license or vehicle plates. It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence
of a prima facie case to enjoin the petitioner from confiscating drivers’ licenses is concerned, recent events
have overtaken the Court’s need to decide this case, which has been rendered moot and academic by the
implementation of Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004. The petitioner, however, is not precluded
from re-implementing Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, or any other scheme, for that matter, that would
entail confiscating drivers’ licenses. For the proper implementation, therefore, of the petitioner’s
_______________
 SECOND DIVISION.
*
177
VOL. 456, APRIL 15, 2005 177
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
future programs, this Court deems it appropriate to make the following observations: 1. A license to
operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police power.
Same; Same; A license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by
the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power. —The petitioner
correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by
the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of
the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process requirements. This is consistent with our
rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal on the license to operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director of
Forestry and Oposa v. Factoran on timber licensing agreements, and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality
of Surigao on a legislative franchise to operate an electric plant.
Same; R.A. No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and
that all its functions are administrative in nature.—In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., we categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power,
let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.
Same; Police Power; Municipal Corporations; Local Government Units; Police power is lodged
primarily in the National Legislature and cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power through the National Legislature may delegate it to the President and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.—
We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power, as an inherent
attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for
the subjects of the same. Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by
any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate
178
1 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
78
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Words and Phrases; A local government is a “political subdivision of a
nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.”—Our Congress
delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. A local government is a “political
subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.” Local
government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through
their respective legislative bodies. Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local
government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a
“special development and administrative region” and the administration of “metro-wide” basic services
affecting the region placed under “a development authority” referred to as the MMDA.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Driver’s Licenses;  Only where there is a traffic law or regulation validly
enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated that the MMDA
may confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic
management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic
engineering services and traffic education programs.—Where there is a traffic law or regulation validly
enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of
Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded—and in fact is duty-bound—to confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the
administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs. This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Airthat the MMDA is a development authority
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government
agencies, people’s organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector, which
may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
179
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Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
Same;  The laudable intentions regarding the creation of the MMDA are limited by its enabling law
which the Court can but interpret—MMDA’s efforts must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or
regulation arising from a legitimate source.—The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-
wide impact that transcend local political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by the
individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and traffic management, and we are aware of the valiant
efforts of the petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable
intentions are limited by the MMDA’s enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be
reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising
from a legitimate source.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City,
Br. 260.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     The Solicitor General for MMDA.
     Dante O. Garin for and in his own behalf.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to confiscate and
suspend or revoke driver’s licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was
issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver’s license confiscated for parking illegally
along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. The following statements were
printed on the TVR:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE MMDA TRAFFIC OPERATIONS CENTER PORT 1. “a.There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA Council held on
AREA MANILA AFTER 48 HOURS FROM DATE OF APPREHENSION FOR March 23, 1995, hence MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, authorizing confiscation
DISPOSITION/APPROPRIATE ACTION THEREON. CRIMI- of driver’s licenses upon issuance of a TVR, is void ab initio.
180 2. b.The summary confiscation of a driver’s license without first giving the driver an opportunity to be
heard; depriving him of a property right (driver’s license) without DUE PROCESS; not filling
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
(sic) in Court the complaint of supposed traffic infraction, cannot be justified by any legislation
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin (and is) hence unconstitutional.
NAL CASE SHALL BE FILED FOR FAILURE TO REDEEM LICENSE AFTER 30 DAYS.
VALID AS TEMPORARY DRIVER’S LICENSE FOR SEVEN DAYS FROM DATE OF WHEREFORE, the temporary writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made permanent; th(e) MMDA is
APPREHENSION. 1

directed to return to plain-

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR’s validity, the respondent addressed a letter  to then
2
_______________
MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver’s license, and expressing his
preference for his case to be filed in court. 4
 Memorandum for Defendants, Records, pp. 178-185.
5
 Id., pp. 187-190, penned by Hon. Helen Bautista-Ricafort.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint  with application for
3

182
preliminary injunction in Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque, on 12
September 1995, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby tiff his driver’s license; th(e) MMDA is likewise ordered to desist from confiscating driver’s license without
violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further contended that the first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding.”
provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, In filing this petition,  the MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court below and
6

allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified—and therefore unlimited - fines and
other penalties on erring motorists.
In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Garin alleged that he
suffered and continues to suffer great and irreparable damage because of the deprivation of his
license and that, absent any implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the
confiscation of his license have no legal basis.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that
the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and
imposition of fines and penalties for traffic viola-
_______________
 Records, p. 10.
1
contends that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a
privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety
and welfare. The petitioner further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does not
constitute a taking without due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the
revocation.
To buttress its argument that a licensee may indeed appeal the taking and the judiciary retains
the power to determine the validity of the confiscation, suspension or revocation of the license, the
petitioner points out that under the terms of the confiscation, the licensee has three options:
1. 1.To voluntarily pay the imposable fine,
2. 2.To protest the apprehension by filing a protest with the MMDA Adjudication

 Id., p. 11.
2 Committee, or
 Id., p. 1.
3
3. 3.To request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutor’s Office.
181

VOL. 456, APRIL 15, 2005 181
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
tions, which powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the right to
determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of separation of
powers does not preclude “admixture” of the three powers of government in administrative
agencies. 4
The MMDA also refuted Garin’s allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the governing
board and policy making body of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate the implementing rules for
The MMDA likewise argues that Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 was validly passed in the
presence of a quorum, and that the lower court’s finding that it had not was based on a
“misapprehension of facts,” which the petitioner would have us review. Moreover, it asserts that
though the circular is the basis for the issuance of TVRs, the basis for the summary confiscation of
licenses is Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 itself, and that such power is self-executory and does not
require the issuance of any implementing regulation or circular.
_______________
 Records, pp. 197-225.
6

Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and directed the court’s attention to MMDA Memorandum
Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995. Respondent Garin, however, questioned the validity
of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, as he claims that it was passed by the Metro
Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.
Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a temporary restraining order on 26 September 1995,
extending the validity of the TVR as a temporary driver’s license for twenty more days. A
preliminary mandatory injunction was granted on 23 October 1995, and the MMDA was directed
to return the respondent’s driver’s license.
On 14 August 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision  in favor of the herein
5
respondent and held that:
183
VOL. 456, APRIL 15, 2005 183
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando,
implemented Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use
of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued
an MTT, which can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate
drivers’ licenses as a matter of course in cases of traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed
TVRs were given seven days from the date of implementation of the new system to pay their fines
and redeem their license or vehicle plates. 7
 It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to enjoin the
petitioner from confiscating drivers’ licenses is concerned, recent events have overtaken the
Court’s need to decide this case, which has been rendered moot and academic by the
implementation of Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004.
The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-implementing Memorandum Circular No.
TT-95-001, or any other scheme, for that matter, that would entail confiscating drivers’ licenses.
For the proper implementation, therefore, of the petitioner’s future programs, this Court deems it
appropriate to make the following observations:
is to insure the competency of the operator of motor vehicles. Such a general law is manifestly
directed to the promotion of public safety and is well within the police power.”
The common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the legislature, in the exercise
of police power, which has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor
vehicles may be operated on the state highways.
1. 2.The MMDA is not vested with police power.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,  we categorically 14

1. 1.A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative
exercise of its police power. power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature.
The said case also involved the herein petitioner MMDA which claimed that it had the
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, authority to open a subdivision street owned by the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. to public
but a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic
exercise of its police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the services in Metro Manila. From this premise, the MMDA argued that there was no need for the
procedural due process requirements. This is consistent with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune Street to the public.
Board of Rizal  on the license to operate a cockpit,
8
Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded that
_______________ the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power,
and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for
 Sec. 7, Mem. Circ. No. 04, Series of 2004.
7
the welfare of the community. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its
 56 Phil. 123 (1931).
own order to open the street was invalid.
8

184
We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power,
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED as an inherent attribute
_______________
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
Tan v. Director of Forestry  and Oposa v. Factoran  on timber licensing agreements, and Surigao
9 10

 G.R. No. 135962, 27 March 2000, 328 SCRA 836, penned by Justice Reynato S. Puno.
14

Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao  on a legislative franchise to operate an electric plant.
11

Petitioner cites a long list of American cases to prove this point, such as  State ex. Rel.
Sullivan,  which states in part that, “the legislative power to regulate travel over the highways and
12
thoroughfares of the state for the general welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in any
reasonable manner to conserve the safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are
instruments of potential danger, their registration and the licensing of their operators have been
required almost from their first appearance. The right to operate them in public places is not a
natural and unrestrained right, but a privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police
power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The power to license imports further power
to withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance with prescribed conditions.”
Likewise, the petitioner quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v.
Funk,  to the effect that: “Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power. The use of them
13
186
186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group
or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of

municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise
constitutes an element of danger to persons and property upon the highways. Carefully operated, only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
an automobile is still a dangerous instrumentality, but, when operated by careless or incompetent Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991.  A 15

persons, it becomes an engine of destruction. The Legislature, in the exercise of the police power local government is a “political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
of the commonwealth, not only may, but must, prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall substantial control of local affairs.”  Local 16

be operated on the highways. One of the primary purposes of a system of general regulation of the _______________
subject matter, as here by the Vehicle Code,
_______________ 15
 Sec. 16 of Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991 states:
General Welfare.—Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
 G.R. No. L-24548, 27 October 1983, 125 SCRA 302.
9
Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
 G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792.
10
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
 G.R. No. L-22766, 30 August 1968, 24 SCRA 898.
11
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
 63 P. 2d 653, 108 ALR 1156, 1159.
12 promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65 (108 ALR 1161).
13  Supra, Note 18, p. 844, citing Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, pp. 95-98 [1996], citing
16

185 UP Law
187
VOL. 456, APRIL 15, 2005 185
VOL. 456, APRIL 15, 2005 187
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police
power through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the
passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a “special
development and administrative region” and the administration of “metro-wide” basic services
affecting the region placed under “a development authority” referred to as the MMDA. Thus:
. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924  that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike
the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers
the MMDA or its Council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
“development authority.” It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating
with the various national government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations
and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan
area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz.:
“Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.—x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and
su-
_______________
Center Revision Project, Part II, 712 [1970] citing Sady, “Improvement of Local Government Administration for Development Purpose,”
Journal of Local Administration Overseas 135 [July 1962].
188
188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
pervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the
local government units concerning purely local matters.”
....
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that
given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDA’s functions. There is no grant ofauthority to enact ordinances and regulations for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. (footnotes omitted, emphasis supplied)
17
Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the
petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’
licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police
power.
1. 3.Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and
regulations.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the “Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila
Development Authority.” The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall “install
and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of
violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate
and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 4136 and P.D. No. 1605  to
18 19
_______________
 Ibid., pp. 849-860.
17
 Entitled “An Act to Compile the Laws Relative to Land Transportation and Traffic Rules, to Create a Land
18
Transportation Commission and for Other Purposes,” approved on 20 June 1964. Sec. 29 thereof states:
Confiscation of driver’s license.—Law enforcement and peace officers duly designated by the Commissioner shall, in
 Entitled “Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Certain Powers Related to Traffic Management and Control in
19
Metropolitan Manila, Providing Penalties, and for Other Purposes,” dated 21 November 1978.
SEC. 5.—In case of traffic violations, the driver’s license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation
ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation
and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or
Philippine Veteran’s Bank or their branches within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket. (emphasis supplied)
189
VOL. 456, APRIL 15, 2005 189
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
the contrary notwithstanding,” and that “(f)or this purpose, the Authority shall enforce all traffic
laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or
members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject
to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose.”
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those
agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the
petitioner is not precluded—and in fact is duty-bound—to confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers’ licenses in the exer-
_______________
apprehending any driver for violations of this Act or of any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules
and regulations, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Commission
therefore which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the
time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid
thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will cause suspension and
revocation of his license. (emphasis supplied)
190
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
cise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and
implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs. 20
This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development authority
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national
government agencies, people’s organizations, nongovernmental organizations and the private
sector, which may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory construction that a statute is to be
read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it,  and is supported by the
21
criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. 22
_______________
 Section 3(b), Rep. Act No. 7924.
20
 Thus, in Briad Agro Development Corporation v. Dela Serna, (G.R. No. 82805, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 524) we
21
upheld the grant of concurrent jurisdiction between the Secretary of Labor or its Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters to
pass upon money claims, among other cases, “the provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding,” as
enunciated in Executive Order No. 111. Holding that E.O. 111 was a curative law intended to widen worker’s access to the
Government for redress of grievances, we held,” . . . the Executive Order vests in Regional Directors jurisdiction, ‘[t]he
provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding,’ it would have rendered such a proviso—and the
amendment itself—useless to say that they (Regional Directors) retained the self-same restricted powers, despite such an
amendment. It is fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it.” (See
also Philtread Workers Union v. Confessor, G.R. No. 117169, 12 March 1997, 269 SCRA 393.)
 In Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes, (G.R. No. 60549, 26 October 1983, 125 SCRA 221) we upheld the constitutionality of
22
Presidential Decree No. 564, the Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism Au-
191
VOL. 456, APRIL 15, 2005 191
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin
A last word. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that
transcend local political
_______________
thority, and Proclamation No. 2052 declaring certain municipalities in the province of Cebu as tourist zones. The law
granted the Philippine Tourism authority the right to expropriate 282 hectares of land to establish a resort complex
notwithstanding the claim that certificates of land transfer and emancipation patents had already been issued to them thereby must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance,
making the lands expropriated within the coverage of the land reform area under Presidential Decree No. 2, and that the
agrarian reform program occupies a higher level in the order of priorities than other State policies like those relating to the
or regulation arising from a legitimate source.
health and physical well-being of the people, and that property already taken for public use may not be taken for another public WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.
use. We held that, “(t)he petitioners have failed to overcome the burden of anyone trying to strike down a statute or decree SO ORDERED.
whose avowed purpose is the legislative perception of the public good. A statute has in its favor the presumption of validity.      Puno (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr.and Tinga, JJ., concur.
All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law. The courts will not set aside a law as
violative of the Constitution except in a clear case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). And in the absence of factual findings or Petition dismissed.
evidence to rebut the presumption of validity, the presumption prevails (Ermita-Malate Hotel, etc. v. Mayor of Manila, 20 Notes.—Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. (Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc.
SCRA 849 [1967]; Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 [1968]).” vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 20 [1998])
In the same manner, we upheld in Dumlao v. Commission on Elections(G.R. No. L-52245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA
392) the first paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that any retired elective provincial, city or
The newly delegated powers to the Local Government Units (LGUs) pertain to the franchising
municipal official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits and who shall have been 65 years of age at the and regulatory powers theretofore exercised by the LTFRB and not to the functions of the LTO
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected is disqualified to run for the same elective local office relative to the registration of motor vehicles and issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. (Land
from which he has retired. Invoking the need for the emergence of younger blood in local politics, we affirmed that the Transportation Office vs. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805 [2000])
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class. (See also  Tropical
Homes, Inc. v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. L-48672, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 540; Peralta v. Commission on ——o0o——
Elections, G.R. No. L-47791, 11 March 1978, 82 SCRA 55; People v. Vera, G.R. No. 45685, 65 Phil. 56 [1937].)
192
_______________
192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 7924.
23

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Garin

193
boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially with © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
regard to transport and traffic management,  and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the
23

petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable
intentions are limited by the MMDA’s enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner
Same;  Same; Firearms; The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since the early days of our
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Republic, the legislature’s tendency was always towards the delegation of power.—The evolution of our laws
Chavez vs. Romulo on firearms shows that since the early days of our Republic, the legislature’s tendency was always towards the
delegation of power. Act No. 1780, delegated upon the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1)
G.R. No. 157036. June 9, 2004. *
to approve or disapprove applications of any person for a license to deal in firearms or to possess the same for
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY personal protection, hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time. Further, it
AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; DIRECTOR GENERAL HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN authorized him to issue regulations which he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the Act. With
HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE PNP, et al., respondents. the enactment of Act No. 2711, the “Revised Administrative Code of 1917,” the laws on firearms were
Actions; Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts;  The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad integrated. The Act retained the authority of the Governor General provided in Act No. 1780. Subsequently,
dictum—the Court may set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial determination of cases of national the growing complexity in the Office of the Governor-General resulted in the delegation of his authority to the
interest and of Chief of the Constabulary. On January 21, 1919, Acting Governor-General Charles E. Yeater issued Executive
_______________ Order No. 8 authorizing and directing the Chief of Constabulary to act on his behalf in  approving and
disapproving applications for personal, special and hunting licenses. This was fol-
 EN BANC.
* 536
535
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 535
36
Chavez vs. Romulo
Chavez vs. Romulo
serious implications, such as one involving the citizens’ right to bear arms.—On the alleged breach of
lowed by Executive Order No. 61 designating the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the government
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that the doctrine is not an iron-clad  dictum. In several
custodian of all firearms, ammunitions and explosives. Executive Order No. 215, issued by President Diosdado
instances where this Court was confronted with cases of national interest and of serious implications, it never
Macapagal on December 3, 1965, granted the Chief of the Constabulary, not only the authority to approve or
hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial determination of the cases. The case at bar is of
disapprove applications for personal, special and hunting license, but also the authority to revoke the
similar import as it involves the citizens’ right to bear arms.
same. With the foregoing developments, it is accurate to say that the Chief of the Constabulary had exercised
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power
the authority for a long time. In fact, subsequent issuances such as Sections 2 and 3 of the Implementing Rules
is not absolute and inflexible.—It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are
and Regulations of Presidential Decree No. 1866 perpetuate such authority of the Chief of the Constabulary.
distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent departments: the legislative, the executive
Same;  Same; Same;  Statutes; By virtue of R.A. No. 6975, the Philippine National Police absorbed the
and the judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
Philippine Constabulary, consequently the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore,
own sphere. Pertinently, the power to make laws—the legislative power—is vested in Congress. Congress may
assumed the latter’s licensing authority.—By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975, the Philippine National Police
not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any attempt
(PNP) absorbed the Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the
to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that “delegata potestas non potest
Constabulary and, therefore, assumed the latter’s licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of
delegari”—“delegated power may not be delegated.” The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative
PNP’s powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in accordance with law.
power, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by
This is in conjunction with the PNP Chief’s “power to issue detailed implementing policies and instructions”
immemorial practice permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain persons, municipal
on such “matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties” of the PNP.
corporations, towns, boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors. Such
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of the Constabulary (now the PNP
licensing power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.
Chief) of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of P.D. No. 1866.
—Contrary to petitioner’s contention, R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of the Constabulary (now the
PNP Chief) of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of P.D. No.
1866. For one, R.A. No. 8294 did not repeal entirely P.D. No. 1866. It merely provides for the reduction of
penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus, the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chief of the
Constabulary the authority to issue rules and regulations regarding firearms remains effective.
Correspondingly, the Implementing Rules and Regulations dated September 15, 1997 jointly issued by the
Department of Justice and the DILG pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 8294 deal only with the automatic
review, by the Director of the Bureau of Corrections or the Warden of a provincial or city jail, of the records of
convicts for violations of P.D. No. 1866. The Rules seek to give effect to the beneficent provisions of R.A. No.
8294, thereby ensuring the early release and reintegration of the convicts into the community. Clearly, both
P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 6975 authorize the PNP Chief to issue the assailed guidelines.
537
VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 537
Chavez vs. Romulo
Same; Presidency; Power of Control; As Chief Executive, the President holds the steering wheel that
controls the course of her government—she lays down policies in the execution of her plans and programs,
and whatever policy she chooses, she has her subordinates to implement them.—Corollarily, petitioner
disputes President Arroyo’s declaration of a nationwide gun ban, arguing that “she has no authority to alter,
modify, or amend the law on firearms through a mere speech.” First, it must be emphasized that President
Arroyo’s speech was just an expression of her policy and a directive to her subordinate. It cannot, therefore, be
argued that President Arroyo enacted a law through a mere speech. Second, at the apex of the entire executive
officialdom is the President. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution specifies his power as Chief Executive,
thus: “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.” As Chief Executive, President Arroyo holds the steering wheel that
controls the course of her government. She lays down policies in the execution of her plans and programs.
Whatever policy she chooses, she has her subordinates to implement them. In short, she has the power of
control. Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to her subordinate, she may act directly
or merely direct the performance of a duty. Thus, when President Arroyo directed respondent Ebdane to
suspend the issuance of PTCFOR, she was just directing a subordinate to perform an assigned duty. Such act is
well within the prerogative of her office.
Same; Right to Bear Arms;  The bearing of arms is a tradition deeply rooted in the English and
American society—it antedates not only the American Constitution but also the discovery of firearms; An
examination of the historical background of the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution shows that it
pertains to the citizens’ “collective right” to take arms in defense of the State, not to the citizens’ “individual
right” to own and possess arms.—Petitioner earnestly contends that his right to bear arms is a constitutionally-
protected right. This, he mainly anchors on various American authorities. We therefore find it imperative to
determine the nature of the right in light of American jurisprudence. The bearing of arms is a tradition deeply
rooted in the English and American society. It antedates not only the American Constitution but also the
discovery of firearms. A provision commonly invoked by the American people to justify their possession of
firearms is the Second Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, which reads: “A well
regulated militia, being necessary for the security of free state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,
shall not be infringed.” An examination of the historical background of the foregoing provision shows that it
pertains to the citizens’ “collective right” to take arms in defense of the State, not to the citizens’ “individual
right” to own and possess arms. The setting under which the right was contemplated has a profound connection
with the
538
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
38
Chavez vs. Romulo
keeping and maintenance of a militia or an armed citizenry. That this is how the right was construed is
evident in early American cases.
Same; Same; It is erroneous to assume that the U.S. Constitution grants upon the American people the
right to bear arms.—With the foregoing jurisprudence, it is erroneous to assume that the US Constitution
grants upon the American people the right to bear arms. In a more explicit language, the  United States vs.
Cruikshank decreed: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms is not a right granted by the Constitution.
Neither is it in any way dependent upon that instrument.”Likewise, in People vs. Persce, the Court of Appeals
said: “Neither is there any constitutional provision securing the right to bear arms which prohibits legislation
with reference to such weapons as are specifically before us for consideration. The provision in the
Constitution of the United States that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed is not
designed to control legislation by the state.”
Same;  Same; The right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution—the right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right.—With more
reason, the right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Our
Constitution contains no provision similar to the Second Amendment, as we aptly observed in the early case
of United States vs. Villareal: “The only contention of counsel which would appear to necessitate comment is
the claim that the statute penalizing the carrying of concealed weapons and prohibiting the keeping and the use
of firearms without a license, is in violation of the provisions of section 5 of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in the United States Constitution against the infringement
of the right of the people of the United States to keep and bear arms (U.S. Constitution, amendment 2), which
is not included in the Philippine Bill. But it may be well, in passing, to point out that in no event could this
constitutional guaranty have any bearing on the case at bar, not only because it has not been expressly
extended to the Philippine Islands, but also because it has been uniformly held that both this and similar
provisions in State constitutions apply only to arms used in civilized warfare (see cases cited in 40 Cyc., 853,
note 18); x x x.” Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the
rule. The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere statutory
creation.
Same;  Same; Due Process; Licenses; The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person
to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor a property right.—In evaluating a due process claim, the
first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of
jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to
539
VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 539
Chavez vs. Romulo
enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry,
we ruled that “a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs.
Factoran, Jr. that: “Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not
a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.”
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; A Permit to Carry Firearms Outside Residence (PTCFOR) does not
constitute a property right protected under our Constitution.—In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted
broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that “the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as
determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry
them outside of residence.” Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does
not constitute a property right protected under our Constitution.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; A PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be
revoked any time—it does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under
existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed.—Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like
ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but
only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably
imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one
of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a
license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or
privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs.
Continental Ins. Co, held: “The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence
of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.”
Same;  Same; Police Power; All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations,
necessary to the common good and general welfare.—At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR
constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be
placed beyond the reach of the State’s police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general
regulations, necessary to the common good and general welfare. In a number of cases, we laid down the test to
determine the validity of a police measure, thus:
540
5 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
40
Chavez vs. Romulo
 (1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
exercise of the police power; and (2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely
reiterates the essence of the constitutional guarantees of substantive due process, equal protection, and non-
impairment of property rights.
Same; Same; Same; Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently
been upheld as reasonable exercise of the police power—with the promotion of public peace as its objective
and the revocation of all PTCFOR as the means, we are convinced that the issuance of the assailed Guidelines
constitutes a reasonable exercise of police power.—The only question that can then arise is whether the means
employed are appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly
oppressive. In the instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What
they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their
firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable
regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals
carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the
revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other
hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them. Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession
of guns have frequently been upheld as reasonable exercise of the police power. In State vs. Reams, it was held
that the legislature may regulate the right to bear arms in a manner conducive to the public peace. With the
promotion of public peace as its objective and the revocation of all PTCFOR as the means, we are convinced
that the issuance of the assailed Guidelines constitutes a reasonable exercise of police power.
Same; Same; Ex Post Facto Laws; The assailed Guidelines cannot be considered as an ex post facto
law because it is prospective in its application.—In Mekin vs. Wolfe, an ex post factolaw has been defined as
one—(a) which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done
criminal, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when
committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.
We see no reason to devote much discussion on the matter. Ex post facto law prohibits retrospectivity of penal
laws. The assailed Guidelines cannot be considered as an ex post facto law because it is
541
VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 541
Chavez vs. Romulo
prospective in its application. Contrary to petitioner’s argument, it would not result in the punishment
of acts previously committed.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Francisco I. Chavez for and in his own behalf.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The maintenance
of peace and order and the protection of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the
1
State, and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these
constitutional duties.
Before us is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of
the “Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of
Residence”  (Guidelines) issued on January 31, 2003, by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.,
2
Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The facts are undisputed:
In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members
of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime
incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits
to Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR), thus:
“THERE IS ALSO NEED TO FOCUS ON THE HIGH PROFILE CRIMES THAT TEND TO DISTURB
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERIMETERS OF THE COMMUNITY—THE LATEST BEING THE KILLING
OF FORMER NPA LEADER ROLLY KINTANAR. I UNDERSTAND WE ALREADY HAVE THE
IDENTITY OF THE CULPRIT. LET US BRING THEM TO THE BAR OF JUSTICE.
THE NPA WILL FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT THEIR PLOTS IF OUR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CAN RID THEM-
_______________
1
 Section 5, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
 Annex “A” of the Petition, Rollo at pp. 60-62.
2
542
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chavez vs. Romulo
SELVES OF RASCALS IN UNIFORM, AND ALSO IF WE ENFORCE A GUN BAN IN PUBLIC PLACES.
THUS, I AM DIRECTING THE PNP CHIEF TO SUSPEND INDEFINITELY THE ISSUANCE OF
PERMIT TO CARRY FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES. THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS WILL NOW BE
LIMITED ONLY TO OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF GUNS AND NOT TO CARRYING THEM IN
PUBLIC PLACES. FROM NOW ON, ONLY THE UNIFORMED MEN IN THE MILITARY AND
AUTHORIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS CAN CARRY FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES, AND
ONLY PURSUANT TO EXISTING LAW. CIVILIAN OWNERS MAY NO LONGER BRING THEIR FIREARMS
OUTSIDE THEIR RESIDENCES. THOSE WHO WANT TO USE THEIR GUNS FOR TARGET PRACTICE
WILL BE GIVEN SPECIAL AND TEMPORARY PERMITS FROM TIME TO TIME ONLY FOR THAT
PURPOSE. AND THEY MAY NOT LOAD THEIR GUNS WITH BULLETS UNTIL THEY ARE IN THE
PREMISES OF THE FIRING RANGE.
WE CANNOT DISREGARD THE PARAMOUNT NEED FOR LAW AND ORDER. JUST AS WE
CANNOT BE HEEDLESS OF OUR PEOPLE’S ASPIRATIONS FOR PEACE.”
Acting on President Arroyo’s directive, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines quoted
as follows:
“TO      :       All Concerned
FROM :   Chief, PNP
SUBJEC :   Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms
T Outside of Residence.
DATE :   January 31, 2003
1. 1.Reference: PD 1866 dated June 29, 1983 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
2. 2.General:The possession and carrying of firearms outside of residence is a privilege
granted by the State to its citizens for their individual protection against all threats of
lawlessness and security.
As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license, special permit, certificate of
registration or MR) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of residence. However, the
Chief, Philippine National Police may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under
conditions as he may impose, authorize such person or persons to carry firearms outside of
residence.
543
VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 543
Chavez vs. Romulo
3. Purposes:
This Memorandum prescribes the guidelines in the implementation of the ban on the carrying of firearms
outside of residence as provided for in the Implementing Rules and Regulations, Presidential Decree No.
1866, dated June 29, 1983 and as directed by PGMA. It also prescribes the conditions, requirements and
procedures under which exemption from the ban may be granted.
4. Specific Instructions on the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms:
 1. a.All PTCFOR are hereby revoked. Authorized holders of licensed firearms covered with valid 4. d.Applications for renewal of PTCFOR shall be processed in accordance with the provisions of par.
PTCFOR may re-apply for a new PTCFOR in accordance with the conditions hereinafter 6 above.
prescribed. 5. e.Application for possession and carrying of firearms by diplomats in the Philippines shall be
2. b.All holders of licensed or government firearms are hereby prohibited from carrying their processed in accordance with
firearms outside their residence except those covered with mission/letter orders and duty detail
orders issued by competent authority pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that the
545
said exception shall pertain only to organic and regular employees.
VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 545
5. The following persons may be authorized to carry firearms outside of residence. Chavez vs. Romulo
NHQ PNP Memo dated September 25, 2000, with Subj: Possession and Carrying of Firearms by Diplomats in
1. a.All persons whose application for a new PTCFOR has been approved, provided, that the persons the Philippines.
and security of those so authorized are under actual threat, or by the nature of their position, 8. Restrictions in the Carrying of Firearms:
occupation and profession are under imminent danger.
2. b.All organic and regular employees with Mission/Letter Orders granted by their respective 1. a.The firearm must not be displayed or exposed to public view, except those authorized in uniform
agencies so authorized pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such Mission/Letter and in the performance of their official duties.
Orders is valid only for the duration of the official mission which in no case shall be more than 2. b.The firearm shall not be brought inside public drinking and amusement places, and all other
ten (10) days. commercial or public establishments.”
3. c.All guards covered with Duty Detail Orders granted by their respective security agencies so
authorized pursuant to Section 4, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such DDO shall in no case exceed
24-hour duration. Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued,
4. d.Members of duly recognized Gun Clubs issued Permit to Transport (PTT) by the PNP for requested the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the
purposes of practice and competition, provided, that such firearms while in transit must not be implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the
loaded with ammunition and secured in an appropriate box or case detached from the person. present petition impleading public respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as
5. e.Authorized members of the Diplomatic Corps. Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.
He anchored his petition on the following grounds:
6. Requirements for issuance of new PTCFOR: “I
544

544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY—MUCH LESS BY A MERE SPEECH—TO ALTER,
MODIFY OR AMEND THE LAW ON FIREARMS BY IMPOSING A GUN BAN AND CANCELING
Chavez vs. Romulo EXISTING PERMITS FOR GUNS TO BE CARRIED OUTSIDE RESIDENCES.

1. a.Written request by the applicant addressed to Chief, PNP stating his qualification to possess II
firearm and the reasons why he needs to carry firearm outside of residence.
2. b.Xerox copy of current firearm license duly authenticated by Records Branch, FED; OFFICIALLY, THERE IS NO PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCE ON THE GUN BAN; THE
3. c.Proof of actual threat, the details of which should be issued by the Chief of Police/Provincial or PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH NEVER INVOKED POLICE POWER TO JUSTIFY THE GUN BAN; THE
City Directors and duly validated by C, RIID; PRESIDENT’S VERBAL DECLARATION ON GUN BAN VIOLATED THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO
4. d.Copy of Drug Test Clearance, duly authenticated by the Drug Testing Center, if photocopied; PROTECT LIFE AND THEIR PROPERTY RIGHT TO CARRY FIREARMS.
5. e.Copy of DI/ RIID clearance, duly authenticated by ODI/RIID, if photocopied;
6. f.Copy of Neuro-Psychiatric Clearance duly authenticated by NP Testing Center, if photocopied;
III
7. g.Copy of Certificate of Attendance to a Gun Safety Seminar, duly validated by Chief, Operations
Branch, FED;
8. h.NBI Clearance; THE PNP CHIEF HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE QUESTIONED GUIDELINES
9. i.Two (2) ID pictures (2” x 2”) taken not earlier than one (1) year from date of filing of application; BECAUSE:
and
10. j.Proof of Payment 1. 1)THERE IS NO LAW, STATUTE OR EXECUTIVE ORDER WHICH GRANTS THE PNP
CHIEF THE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE THE PNP GUIDELINES.
7. Procedures:
546
1. a.Applications may be filed directly to the Office of the PTCFOR Secretariat in Camp Crame. In 546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the provinces, the applications may also be submitted to the Police Regional Offices (PROs) and
Provincial/City Police Offices (P/CPOs) for initial processing before they are forwarded to the Chavez vs. Romulo
office of the PTCFOR Secretariat. The processors, after ascertaining that the documentary
requirements are in order, shall issue the Order of Payment (OP) indicating the amount of fees
1. 2)THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF PD 1866 CANNOT BE THE
payable by the applicant, who in turn shall pay the fees to the Land Bank.
SUBJECT OF ANOTHER SET OF IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES.
2. b.Applications, which are duly processed and prepared in accordance with existing rules and
2. 3)THE PRESIDENT’S SPEECH CANNOT BE A BASIS FOR THE PROMULGATION OF
regulations, shall be forwarded to the OCPNP for approval.
IMPLEMENTNG GUIDELINES ON THE GUN BAN.
3. c.Upon approval of the application, OCPNP will issue PTCFOR valid for one (1) year from date of
issue.
 IV
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP GUIDELINES IMPLEMENT PD 1866, AND THE
AMENDMENTS THERETO, THE PNP CHIEF STILL HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE
THE SAME BECAUSE—
1. 1)PER SEC 6, RA 8294, WHICH AMENDS PD 1866, THE IRR SHALL BE
PROMULGATED JOINTLY BY THE DOJ AND THE DILG.
2. 2)SEC. 8, PD 1866 STATES THAT THE IRR SHALL BE PROMULGATED BY THE CHIEF OF
THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY.
V First, whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines;
THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
BECAUSE:
1. 1)THE RIGHT TO OWN AND CARRY A FIREARM IS NECESSARILY INTERTWINED
WITH THE PEOPLE’S INHERENT RIGHT TO LIFE AND TO PROTECT LIFE. THUS, THE
PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF THIS RIGHT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF
LAW FOR:
1. A)THE PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF HIS MOST POTENT, IF NOT HIS
ONLY, MEANS TO DEFEND HIMSELF.
2. B)THE QUESTIONED GUIDELINES STRIPPED PETITIONER OF HIS MEANS OF
PROTECTION AGAINST CRIME DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE STATE COULD NOT
POSSIBLY PROTECT ITS CITIZENS DUE TO THE INADEQUACY AND INEFFICIENCY
OF THE POLICE FORCE.
1. 2)THE OWNESHIP AND CARRYING OF FIREARMS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED PROPERTY RIGHTS WHICH CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW AND WITHOUT JUST CAUSE.
547
VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 547
Chavez vs. Romulo
VI
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP GUIDELINES WERE ISSUED IN THE EXERCISE
OF POLICE POWER, THE SAME IS AN INVALID EXERCISE THEREOF SINCE THE MEANS USED
THEREFOR ARE UNREASONABLE AND UNNCESSARY FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ITS
PURPOSE—TO DETER AND PREVENT CRIME—THEREBY BECOMING UNDULY OPPRESSIVE TO
LAW-ABIDING GUN-OWNERS.
VII
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE AND CONFISCATORY SINCE IT REVOKED
ALL EXISTING PERMITS TO CARRY WITHOUT, HOWEVER, REFUNDING THE PAYMENT THE
PNP RECEIVED FROM THOSE WHO ALREADY PAID THEREFOR.
VIII
THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
BECAUSE THEY ARE DIRECTED AT AND OPPRESSIVE ONLY TO LAW-ABIDING GUN OWNERS
WHILE LEAVING OTHER GUN-OWNERS—THE LAWBREAKERS (KIDNAPPERS, ROBBERS, HOLD-
UPPERS, MNLF, MILF, ABU SAYYAF COLLECTIVELY, AND NPA)—UNTOUCHED.
IX
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE AND UNFAIR BECAUSE THEY WERE
IMPLEMENTED LONG BEFORE THEY WERE PUBLISHED.
X
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE EFFECTIVELY AN EX POST FACTO LAW SINCE THEY APPLY
RETROACTIVELY AND PUNISH ALL THOSE WHO WERE ALREADY GRANTED PERMITS TO
CARRY OUTSIDE OF RESIDENCE LONG BEFORE THEIR PROMULGATION.”
Petitioner’s submissions may be synthesized into five (5) major issues:
Second, whether the citizens’ right to bear arms is a constitutional right?;
548
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chavez vs. Romulo
Third, whether the revocation of petitioner’s PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed
Guidelines is a violation of his right to property?;
Fourth, whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of
police power?; and
Fifth, whether the assailed Guidelines constitute an ex post facto law?
The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Nonetheless, in refutation of petitioner’s arguments, he contends that: (1) the PNP Chief is
authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does not have a constitutional right to
own and carry firearms; (3) the assailed Guidelines do not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution; and (4) the assailed Guidelines do not constitute an ex post facto law.
Initially, we must resolve the procedural barrier.
On the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that the doctrine
is not an iron-clad dictum. In several instances where this Court was confronted with cases of
national interest and of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed
with the judicial determination of the cases.  The case at bar is of similar import as it involves the
3
citizens’ right to bear arms.
I Authority of the PNP Chief
Relying on the principle of separation of powers, petitioner argues that only Congress can
withhold his right to bear arms. In revoking all existing PTCFOR, President Arroyo and
respondent Ebdane transgressed the settled principle and arrogated upon themselves a power they
do not possess—the legislative power.
We are not persuaded.
_______________
 See Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718; Fortich vs.
3
Corona, G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 624; Dario vs. Mison, G.R. No. 81954, August 8, 1989, 176 SCRA 84.
549
VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 549
Chavez vs. Romulo
It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among
three coordinate and substantially independent departments: the legislative, the executive and the
judiciary. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme
within its own sphere. 4
 Pertinently, the power to make laws—the legislative power—is vested in Congress.  Congress 5
may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or
authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that
“delegata potestas non potest delegari”—“delegated power may not be delegated.” 6 the authority of the Governor General provided in Act No. 1780. Subsequently, the growing
The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and
inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the
legislative body to delegate its licensing power to certain persons, municipal corporations, towns,
boards, councils, commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors.  Such licensing 7 behalf in approving and disapproving applications for personal, special and hunting licenses. This
power includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations. 8 was followed by Executive Order No. 61 designating the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the
The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since the early days of our Republic, the
legislature’s tendency was always towards the delegation of power. Act No. 1780, delegated upon 9
the Governor-General (now the President) the authority (1) to approve or disapprove applications
of any person for a license to deal in firearms or to possess the same for personal protection,
hunting and other lawful purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time. Further, it authorized 10
him to issue regulations which he
_______________
 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
4
 Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
5
 Freund, Sutherland, Howe, Brown, Constitutional Law Cases and Other Problems, Fourth Edition, 1977, at p. 653.
6
 51 Am. Jur. 2d § 51.
7
 51 Am Jur 2d § 52.
8
 “AN ACT TO REGULATE THE IMPORTATION, ACQUISITION, POSSESSION, USE, AND TRANSFER OF
9
FIREARMS, AND TO PROHIBIT THE POSSESSION OF SAME EXCEPT IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS
OF THIS ACT.”
 SECTION 11. An application for a personal license to possess firearms and ammunition, as herein provided for, made
10
by a resident of the city of Manila, shall be directed to the chief of police of said city, and it shall be the duty of the chief of the
police to forward the application to the
550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chavez vs. Romulo
may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the Act.  With the enactment of Act No. 2711,
11
the “Revised Administrative Code of 1917,” the laws on firearms were integrated.  The Act 12
retained
_______________
Governor-General with his recommendations. Any such application made by a resident of a province shall be directed to
the governor of the province who shall make his recommendations thereon and forward the application to the senior inspector
of the Constabulary of the province, who in turn shall make his recommendations thereon and forward the application, through
official channels, to the Governor-General. The Governor-General may approve or disapprove any such application, and, in
the event of the approval, the papers shall be transmitted to the Director of Constabulary with instructions to issue the license
as hereinbefore provided. The Director of Constabulary, upon receiving and approving the bond, or receiving the certificate of
deposit duly endorsed to the order of the Insular Treasurer, shall issue the license for the time fixed for such license as
hereinafter provided, and the Director of Constabulary shall transmit the license direct to the applicant, and shall notify the
chief of police of the city of Manila if the applicant resides in Manila, otherwise the senior inspector of Constabulary of the
province in which the applicant resides. The Director of Constabulary shall file the certificate of deposit in his office. It shall
be the duty of all officers through whom applications for licenses to possess firearms are transmitted to expedite the same.
 SECTION 30. The Governor-General is hereby authorized to issue executive orders prescribing the forms and
11
regulations which he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the provisions of this Act.
 SEC. 882. Issuance of special hunting permits.—The Department Head may authorize the Chief of Constabulary to
12
issue special hunting permits to persons temporarily visiting the Philippine Islands, without requiring a bond or deposit as a
guarantee of security for their arms and ammunition. Such special hunting permit shall be valid only during the temporary
sojourn of the holder in the Islands, shall be nontransferable, and shall be revocable at the pleasure of the Department Head.
SEC. 887. License required for individual keeping arms for personal use.—Security to be given.—Any person desiring to
possess one or more firearms for personal protection or for use in hunting or other lawful purposes only, and ammunition
thereof, shall make application for a license to possess such firearm or firearms or ammunition as hereinafter provided. Upon
making such application, and before receiving the license, the applicant shall, for the purpose of security, make a cash deposit
in the postal savings bank in the sum of one hundred pesos for each firearm for which the license is to be issued, and shall
indorse the certificated of deposit therefor to the Insular Treasurer; or in lieu thereof he may give a bond in such form as the
Governor-General may prescribed, payable to the
551
VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 551
Chavez vs. Romulo
complexity in the Office of the Governor-General resulted in the delegation of his authority to the
Chief of the Constabulary. On January 21, 1919, Acting Governor-General Charles E. Yeater
issued Executive Order No. 8  authorizing and directing the Chief of Constabulary to act on his
13
14
government
_______________
Government of the Philippine Islands, in the sum of two hundred pesos for each such firearms.
SEC. 888. Mode of making application and acting upon the same.—An application for a personal license to possess
firearms and ammunition, as herein provided, made by a resident of the City of Manila, shall be directed to the Mayor of said
city, whose duty it shall be to forward the application to the Governor-General, with his recommendation. Applications made
by residents of a province shall be directed to the governor of the same, who shall make his recommendation thereon and
forward them to the Governor-General, who may approve or disapprove any such application.
SEC. 889. Duration of personal license.—A personal firearms license shall continue in force until the death or legal
disability of the licensee, unless, prior thereto, the license shall be surrendered by him or revoked by authority of the
Governor-General.
SEC. 899. Revocation of firearms license by Governor-General.—Any firearms license may be revoked at any time by
order of the Governor-General.
SEC. 905. Forms and regulations to be prescribed by Governor-General.—The Governor-General shall prescribe such
forms and promulgate such regulations as he shall deem necessary for the proper enforcement of this law.
 “(Delegating the CPC to Approve/Disapprove Applications)
13
15. In carrying out the provisions of Sections eight hundred and eighty-one, eight hundred and eighty-two, eighty hundred and eighty-eight, as
amended by Section two of Act two thousand seven hundred and seventy-four, eight hundred and ninety-one and eight hundred and ninety-two of
the Administrative Code, empowering the Governor-General to approve and disapprove applications for personal, special, and hunting licenses to
possess firearms and ammunition, the Chief of Constabulary is authorized and directed to act for the Governor-General.”
 Issued on December 5, 1924 by Governor-General Leonard Wood.
14
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chavez vs. Romulo
custodian of all firearms, ammunitions and explosives. Executive Order No. 215,  issued by 15
President Diosdado Macapagal on December 3, 1965, granted the Chief of the Constabulary, not
only the authority to approve or disapprove applications for personal, special and hunting license,
but also the authority to revoke the same. With the foregoing developments, it is accurate to say
that the Chief of the Constabulary had exercised the authority for a long time. In fact, subsequent
issuances such as Sections 2 and 3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Presidential
Decree No. 1866  perpetuate such authority of the Chief of the Constabulary. Section 2 specifically
16
provides that any person or entity desiring to possess any firearm “shall first secure the necessary
permit/license/authority from the Chief of the Constabulary.” With regard to the issuance of
PTCFOR, Section 3 imparts: “The Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined
by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry
them outside of residence.” These provisions are issued pursuant to the general power granted by
P.D. No. 1866 empowering him to promulgate rules and regulations for the effec-
_______________
15
 “Pursuant to the provisions of Section 905, Administrative Code, as amended, empowering the President of the
Philippines to prescribe regulations for the enforcement of the provisions of the law relating to the possession, use of firearms,
etc., the following regulations are hereby promulgated.
SECTION 1. In carrying out the provision of Sections 881, 882 and 888 of the Revised Administrative Code,
empowering the President of the Philippines to approve or disapprove applications for personal, special and hunting license to
possess firearms and ammunition, the Chief of Constabulary or his representative is authorized and directed to act for the
President.
SECTION 2. In carrying out the provisions of Section 899 of the Revised Administrative Code, empowering the
President of the Philippines to revoke any firearm license anytime, the Chief of Constabulary is authorized and directed to act
for the President.”
16
 “CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN,
ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN
THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES
FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.”
553
VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 553
Chavez vs. Romulo
tive implementation of the decree.  At this juncture, it bears emphasis that P.D. No. 1866 is the
17
chief law governing possession of firearms in the Philippines and that it was issued by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in the exercise of his legislative power. 18
In an attempt to evade the application of the above-mentioned laws and regulations, petitioner
argues that the “Chief of the PNP” is not the same as the “Chief of the Constabulary,” the PC
being a mere unit or component of the newly established PNP. He contends further that Republic
Act No. 8294  amended P.D. No. 1866 such that the authority to issue rules and regulations
19
regarding firearms is now jointly vested in the Department of Justice and the DILG, not the Chief
of the Constabulary. 20
Petitioner’s submission is bereft of merit.
By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975,  the Philippine National Police (PNP) absorbed the
21
Philippine Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the
Constabulary
_______________
 Section 8 of P.D. No. 1866.
17
 Baylosis vs. Chavez, Jr., G.R. No. 95136, October 3, 1991, 202 SCRA 405.
18
 “AN ACT AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS AMENDED, ENTITLED
19
‘CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION
OR DISPOSITION OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE
MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR
CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF, AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.’ ” Issued on June 29, 1983.
 Section 6 of R.A. No. 8294 provides:
20
“SECTION 6. Rules and Regulations.—The Department of Justice and the Department of the Interior and Local Government shall jointly issue,
within ninety (90) days after the approval of this Act, the necessary rules and regulations pertaining to the administrative aspect of the provisions
hereof, furnishing the Committee on Public Order and Security and the Committee on Justice and Human Rights of both Houses of Congress copies
of such rules and regulations within thirty (30) days from the promulgation hereof.”
 “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARMENT
21
OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.” Approved December 13, 1990.
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chavez vs. Romulo
and, therefore, assumed the latter’s licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of
PNP’s powers, the issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in
accordance with law.  This is in conjunction with the PNP Chief ’s “power to issue detailed
22
implementing policies and instructions” on such “matters as may be necessary to effectively carry
out the functions, powers and duties” of the PNP. 23
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of the
Constabulary (now the PNP Chief) of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the
effective implementation of P.D. No. 1866. For one, R.A. No. 8294 did not repeal entirely P.D.
No. 1866. It merely provides for the reduction of penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus,
the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chief of the Constabulary the authority to issue
rules and regulations regarding firearms remains effective. Correspondingly, the Implementing
Rules and Regulations dated September 15, 1997 jointly issued by the Department of Justice and
the DILG pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 8294 deal only with the automatic review, by the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections or the Warden of a provincial or city jail, of the records of
convicts for violations of P.D. No. 1866. The Rules seek to give effect to the beneficent provisions
of R.A. No. 8294, thereby ensuring the early release and reintegration of the convicts into the
community.
Clearly, both P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 6975 authorize the PNP Chief to issue the assailed
guidelines.
Corollarily, petitioner disputes President Arroyo’s declaration of a nationwide gun ban,
arguing that “she has no authority to alter, modify, or amend the law on firearms through a mere
speech.”
First, it must be emphasized that President Arroyo’s speech was just an expression of her
policy and a directive to her subordinate. It cannot, therefore, be argued that President Arroyo
enacted a law through a mere speech.
_______________
 Under Section 2(11), Chapter 1, Book 7 of Executive Order No. 292, the “Administrative Code of 1987,” the term
22
licensing includes agency process involving the “grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal,
limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license.”
 Section 26 of R.A. No. 6975.
23
555
VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 555
Chavez vs. Romulo
Second, at the apex of the entire executive officialdom is the President. Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution specifies his power as Chief Executive, thus: “The President shall have control of
all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.” As Chief Executive, President Arroyo holds the steering wheel that controls the course
of her government. She lays down policies in the execution of her plans and programs. Whatever
policy she chooses, she has her subordinates to implement them. In short, she has the power of
control. Whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to her subordinate, she
may act directly or merely direct the performance of a duty.  Thus, when President Arroyo
24
directed respondent Ebdane to suspend the issuance of PTCFOR, she was just directing a
subordinate to perform an assigned duty. Such act is well within the prerogative of her office.
II Right to bear arms: Constitutional or Statutory?
Petitioner earnestly contends that his right to bear arms is a constitutionally-protected right. This,
he mainly anchors on various American authorities. We therefore find it imperative to determine
the nature of the right in light of American jurisprudence.
The bearing of arms is a tradition deeply rooted in the English and American society. It
antedates not only the American Constitution but also the discovery of firearms. 25
_______________
 Chapter 7, Book IV of E.O. No. 292.
24
 Under the laws of Alfred the Great, whose reign began in 872 A.D., all English citizens, from the nobility to the
25
peasants, were obliged to privately purchase weapons and be available for military duty.  This body of armed citizens was
25
known as the “fyrd.”
Following the Norman conquest, many of the Saxon rights were abridged, however, the right and duty of arms
possession was retained. Under the Assize of Arms of 1181, “the whole community of freemen” is required to possess arms and
to demonstrate to the Royal officials that each of them is appropriately armed.
The Tudor monarchs continued the system of arm ownership and Queen Elizabeth added to it by creating what came to
be known as “train bands” that is, the selected portions of the citizenry chosen for special training. These “trained
bands” were distinguished from the “militia”
556
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chavez vs. Romulo
A provision commonly invoked by the American people to justify their possession of firearms is
the Second Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, which reads:
_______________
which term was first used during the Spanish Armada crisis to designate the entire of the armed citizenry.
The militia played a pivotal role in the English political system. When civil war broke out in 1642, the critical issue was
whether the King or Parliament had the right to control the militia. After the war, England, which was then under the control of
a military government, ordered its officers to “search for and seize all arms” owned by Catholics, “opponents of the
government,” or “any other person whom the commissioners had judged dangerous to the peace of the Commonwealth.”
The restoration of Charles II ended the military government. Charles II opened his reign with a variety of repressive
legislation. In 1662, a Militia Act was enacted empowering officials to “search and to seize all arms in the custody or
possession of any person or persons whom the said lieutenants or any two or more of their deputies shall judge dangerous to
the peace of the kingdom.” Such seizures of arms continued under James I, who directed them particularly against the Irish
population.
In 1668, the government of James was overturned in a peaceful uprising which came to be known as “ The Glorious
Revolution.” Parliament promulgated a Declaration of Rights, later enacted as the Bill of Rights. Before coronation, James’
successor, William of Orange, was required to swear to respect these rights. The Bill of Rights, as drafted in the House of
Commons, simply provided that “the acts concerning the militia are grievous to the subject” and “it is necessary for the public
safety that the subjects, which are protestants, should provide and keep arms for the common defense; And that the arms
which have been seized, and taken from them, be restored.” The House of Lords changed this to a more concise statement:
“That the subjects which are Protestant may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law.”
In the colonies, the prevalence of hunting as means of livelihood and the need for defense led to armament statutes
comparable to those of the early Saxon times. When the British government began to increase its military presence therein in
the mid-eighteenth century, Massachusetts responded by calling upon its citizens to arm themselves in defense. In September
1774, an incorrect rumor that British troops killed colonists prompted 60,000 citizens to take arms. A few months later, when
Patrick Henry delivered his famed “Give me liberty or give me death” speech, he spoke in support of a proposition “that a well
regulated militia, composed of gentlemen and freemen, is the natural strength and only security of a free government . . .”
557
VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 557
Chavez vs. Romulo
“A well regulated militia, being necessary for the security of free state, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed.”
An examination of the historical background of the foregoing provision shows that it pertains to
the citizens’ “collective right” to take arms in defense of the State, not to the citizens’ “individual
right” to own and possess arms. The setting under which the right was contemplated has a
profound connection with the keeping and maintenance of a militia or an armed citizenry. That
this is how the right was construed is evident in early American cases.
The first case involving the interpretation of the Second Amendment that reached the United
States Supreme Court is United States vs. Miller.  Here, the indictment charged the defendants
26
with transporting an unregistered “Stevens shotgun” without the required stamped written order,
contrary to the National Firearms Act. The defendants filed a demurrer challenging the facial
validity of the indictment on the ground that the National Firearms Act offends the inhibition of
the Second Amendment. The District Court sustained the demurrer and quashed the
indictment. On appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted the right to bear arms under the Second
Amendment as referring to the collective right of those comprising the Militia—a body of citizens
enrolled for military discipline. It does not pertain to the individual right of citizen to bear arm.
Miller expresses its holding as follows:
_______________
When the first Congress convened for the purpose of drafting a Bill of Rights, it delegated the task to James Madison.
Madison did not write upon a blank tablet. Instead, he obtained a pamphlet listing the States’ proposals for a Bill of Rights and
sought to produce a briefer version incorporating all the vital proposals of such States. Madison proposed among other rights:
“The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and regulated militia being the best
security of a free country; but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service.”
In the House, this was initially modified so that the militia clause came before the proposal recognizing the right. The proposal
finally passed the House in its present form: “A well regulated militia, being necessary for the security of free state, the right
of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”In this form it was submitted to the Senate, which passed it the
following day
 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
26
558
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chavez vs. Romulo
“In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less
than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency
of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear
such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary
military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.
The same doctrine was re-echoed in Cases vs. United States.  Here, the Circuit Court of Appeals
27
held that the Federal Firearms Act, as applied to appellant, does not conflict with the Second
Amendment. It ruled that:
“While [appellant’s] weapon may be capable of military use, or while at least familiarity with it might be
regarded as of value in training a person to use a comparable weapon of military type and caliber, still there is
no evidence that the appellant was or ever had been a member of any military organization or that his use of
the weapon under the circumstances disclosed was in preparation for a military career. In fact, the only
inference possible is that the appellant at the time charged in the indictment was in possession of,
transporting, and using the firearm and ammunition purely and simply on a frolic of his own and without any
thought or intention of contributing to the efficiency of the well regulated militia which the Second amendment
was designed to foster as necessary to the security of a free state.”
With the foregoing jurisprudence, it is erroneous to assume that the US Constitution grants upon
the American people the right to bear arms. In a more explicit language, the  United States vs.
Cruikshank  decreed: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms is not a right granted by the
28
Constitution. Neither is it in any way dependent upon that instrument.” Likewise, in People vs.
Persce,  the Court of Appeals said: “Neither is there any constitutional provision securing the right
29
to bear arms which prohibits legislation with reference to such weapons as are specifically before
us for consideration. The provision in the Constitution of the United States that the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed is not designed to control legislation by the
state.”
_______________
 131 Federal Reporter, 2d Series, 916.
27
 92 U.S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588.
28
 204 N.Y. 397, 97 N.E. 877.
29
559
VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 559
Chavez vs. Romulo
With more reason, the right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987
Philippine Constitution. Our Constitution contains no provision similar to the Second Amendment,
as we aptly observed in the early case of United States vs. Villareal: 30
“The only contention of counsel which would appear to necessitate comment is the claim that the statute
penalizing the carrying of concealed weapons and prohibiting the keeping and the use of firearms without a
license, is in violation of the provisions of section 5 of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in the United States Constitution against the
infringement of the right of the people of the United States to keep and bear arms (U.S. Constitution,
amendment 2), which is not included in the Philippine Bill. But it may be well, in passing, to point out that in
no event could this constitutional guaranty have any bearing on the case at bar, not only because it has not been
expressly extended to the Philippine Islands, but also because it has been uniformly held that both this and
similar provisions in State constitutions apply only to arms used in civilized warfare (see cases cited in 40
Cyc., 853, note 18); x x x.”
Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule .
The right to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere statutory
creation. What then are the laws that grant such right to the Filipinos? The first real firearm law is
Act No. 1780 enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 12, 1907. It was passed to
regulate the importation, acquisition, possession, use and transfer of firearms. Section 9 thereof
provides:
“SECTION 9. Any person desiring to possess one or more firearms for personal protection, or for use in
hunting or other lawful purposes only, and ammunition therefor, shall make application for a license to
possess such firearm or firearms or ammunition as hereinafter provided. Upon making such application, and
before receiving the license, the applicant shall make a cash deposit in the postal savings bank in the sum of
one hundred pesos for each firearm for which the license is to be issued, or in lieu thereof he may give a bond
in such form as the Governor-General may prescribe, payable to the Government of the Philippine Islands, in
the sum of two hundred pesos for each such firearm: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That persons who are actually
members of gun clubs, duly formed and organized at the time of the passage of this Act, who at such time have
a
_______________
 28 Phil. 390 (1914).
30
560
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chavez vs. Romulo
license to possess firearms, shall not be required to make the deposit or give the bond prescribed by this 34
 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792, penned by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
35
 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
section, and the bond duly executed by such person in accordance with existing law shall continue to be 36
 680 F 2d 61 (1982).
security for the safekeeping of such arms.” 562
The foregoing provision was restated in Section 887  of Act No. 2711 that integrated the firearm
31

562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

laws. Thereafter, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1866. It codified the laws on
illegal possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition of firearms, ammunitions or explosives and
imposed stiffer penalties for their violation. R.A. No. 8294 amended some of the provisions of
P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the imposable penalties. Being a mere statutory creation, the right to
bear arms cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute right.
Chavez vs. Romulo
cretion to grant or deny license application in a closely regulated field, initial applicants do not have a
property right in such licenses protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jacobson, supra, 627 F.2d at 180
(gaming license under Nevada law);”
Similar doctrine was announced in Potts vs. City of Philadelphia,  Conway vs. King,  Nichols vs. 37 38

III Vested Property Right County of Sta. Clara,  and Gross vs. Norton.  These cases enunciated that the test whether the
39 40

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law.” Petitioner invokes this provision, asserting that the
revocation of his PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines deprived him of his “vested
property right” without due process of law and in violation of the equal protection of law.
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life,
liberty or property interest exists.  The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person
32
statute creates a property right or interest depends largely on the extent of discretion granted to the
issuing authority.
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR.
This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which
state that “the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under
such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of

residence.” Following the American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not
to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of constitute a property right protected under our Constitution.
Forestry,  we ruled that “a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
33

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under
granted; neither is it property or a property existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed.  A licensee takes his 41

_______________
license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory
 Supra.
31
conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a
 Bzdzuich vs. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 76 F 3d 738, 1996 FED App. 59P (6th Cir. 1996).
32 license is not a contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property,
 G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302. See also Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal, 56 Phil.
33
immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of Rights.  The US 42

123 (1931). Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co,  held: “The correlative power to revoke or recall
43

561
a permission is
VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 561 _______________

Chavez vs. Romulo  01-CV-3247, August 2002.

37

right, nor does it create a vested right.” In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs.  718 F. Supp. 1059 (1989).
38

Factoran, Jr.  that:

34  223 Cal. App. 3d 1236, 273 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1990).
39

“Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,  120 F. 3d 877 (1997).
40

 Stone vs. Fritts, 82 NE 792 (1907) citing Calder vs. Kurby, 5 Gray [Mass.] 597; Freleigh vs. State, 8 Mo. 606; People
property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.”
41

vs. New York Tax, etc., Com’rs, 47 N.Y. 501; State vs. Burgoyne, 75 Tenn. 173, 40 Am. Rep. 60.
Petitioner, in arguing that his PTCFOR is a constitutionally protected property right, relied heavily  Commonwealth vs. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 578.
42

on Bell vs. Burson  wherein the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that “once a license is issued, continued
35
 94 U.S. 535, 540 24 L.Ed.148.
43

possession may become essential in the pursuit of livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus 563
involves state action that adjudicates important interest of the licensees.” VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 563
Petitioner’s reliance on Bell is misplaced. This case involves a driver’s license, not a license to
bear arms. The catena of American jurisprudence involving license to bear arms is perfectly in Chavez vs. Romulo
accord with our ruling that a PTCFOR is neither a property nor a property right. In Erdelyi vs. a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.”
O’Brien,  the plaintiff who was denied a license to carry a firearm brought suit against the
36
The foregoing jurisprudence has been resonating in the Philippines as early as 1908. Thus,
defendant who was the Chief of Police of the City of Manhattan Beach, on the ground that the in The Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Amechazurra  we ruled: 44

denial violated her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. The
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit ruled that Erdelyi did not have a property interest in
obtaining a license to carry a firearm, ratiocinating as follows:
“Property interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do not arise whenever
a person has only ‘an abstract need or desire for’, or ‘unilateral expectation of a benefit. x x x Rather, they
arise from ‘legitimate claims of entitlement . . . defined by existing rules or understanding that stem from an
independent source, such as state law. x x x
Concealed weapons are closely regulated by the State of California. x x x Whether the statute creates a
property interest in concealed weapons licenses depends ‘largely upon the extent to which the statute contains
mandatory language that restricts the discretion of the [issuing authority] to deny licenses to applicants who
claim to meet the minimum eligibility requirements. x x x Where state law gives the issuing authority broad
dis-
_______________
“x x x no private person is bound to keep arms. Whether he does or not is entirely optional with himself, but if,
for his own convenience or pleasure, he desires to possess arms, he must do so upon such terms as the
Government sees fit to impose, for the right to keep and bear arms is not secured to him by law. The
Government can impose upon him such terms as it pleases. If he is not satisfied with the terms imposed, he
should decline to accept them, but, if for the purpose of securing possession of the arms he does agree to such
conditions, he must fulfill them.”
IV Police Power
At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the
Constitution, the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the
State’s police power. All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary
to the common good and general welfare.
In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus:
(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise
of the police power; and Chavez vs. Romulo
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly weapons. It follows that its enactment by the legislature is a proper and legitimate exercise of the police power
oppressive upon individuals. of the state.”
Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the essence of the constitutional V Ex post facto law
guarantees of substantive due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of property rights. In Mekin vs. Wolfe,  an ex post facto law has been defined as one—(a) which makes an action done
48

It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such
peace and order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed;
by the New People’s Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the or (c)which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
_______________ crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to
 10 Phil. 637 (1908).
convict the defendant.
44

564
We see no reason to devote much discussion on the matter. Ex post facto law prohibits
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED retrospectivity of penal laws.  The assailed Guidelines cannot be considered as an ex post facto
49

Chavez vs. Romulo law because it is prospective in its application. Contrary to petitioner’s argument, it would not
community, President Arroyo deemed it best to impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the result in the punishment of acts previously committed.
motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the interest of the public in general. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and SO ORDERED.
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In the      Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
instant case, the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga,
proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to JJ., concur.
carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe Petition dismissed.
is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will Notes.—Section 7 of Rule 65, providing that a petition for certiorari shall not interrupt the
be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would be difficult for criminals to roam has been issued, is intended as an exception to the observance of the
_______________
around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the PNP to apprehend them.
Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as
 2 Phil. 74 (1903).
48

reasonable exercise of the police power.  In State vs. Reams,  it was held that the legislature may
45 46

 Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary¸ G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999, 301 SCRA 298.
49

regulate the right to bear arms in a manner conducive to the public peace. With the promotion of 566
public peace as its objective and the revocation of all PTCFOR as the means, we are convinced 566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
that the issuance of the assailed Guidelines constitutes a reasonable exercise of police power. The
ruling in United States vs. Villareal, is relevant, thus:
47 De Robles vs. Court of Appeals
“We think there can be no question as to the reasonableness of a statutory regulation prohibiting the carrying hierarchical courtesy among courts. (Diaz vs. Diaz, 331 SCRA 302 [2000])
of concealed weapons as a police measure well calculated to restrict the too frequent resort to such weapons in The policy of the Supreme Court respecting the hierarchy of courts and, consequently,
moments of anger and excitement. We do not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a regulation would tend prohibiting the filing of a petition in the Court in view of the concurrent jurisdiction with the lower
to increase the security of life and limb, and to suppress crime and lawlessness, in any community wherein the courts has been consistently observed in the absence of any compelling reason for departing from
practice of carrying concealed weapons prevails, and this without being unduly oppressive upon the individual
owners of these
such policy. (Cano vs. The Chief, Philippine National Police, 392 SCRA 299 [2002])
_______________
——o0o——
 Calvan vs. Superior Court of San Francisco, 70 Cal 2d 851, 76 Cal Rptr 642, 452 P2d 930; State vs. Robinson (Del Sup) 251 A2d
45

552; People vs. Brown, 253 Mich 537, 235 NW 245, 82 ALR 341.
 121 N.C. 556, 557, 27 S.E. 1004, 1005 (1897).
46
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
 28 Phil. 390 (1914).
47

565

VOL. 431, JUNE 9, 2004 565

generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, should justify the interference of the state; and b)
VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 257 the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
National Development Company vs. Philippine Veterans Bank oppressive upon individuals.
Same;  Same; Due Process; Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and given
G.R. Nos. 84132-33. December 10, 1990. *
to another without any compensation and any known public purpose.—A mortgage lien is a property right
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND NEW AGRIX, INC., derived from contract and so comes under the protection of the Bill of Rights. So do interests on loans, as well
petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, THE EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF and as penalties and charges, which are also vested rights once they accrue. Private property cannot simply be
GODOFREDO QUILING, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Calamba, Laguna, respondents. taken by law from one person and given to another without compensation and any known public purpose. This
Constitutional Law; Police Power;  A legislative act based on the police power requires the is plain arbitrariness and is not permitted under the Constitution.
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.—A legislative act based on the police power requires the Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Impairment Clause; While it is true that police power is superior to the
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. In more familiar words, a) the interests of the public impairment clause, the principle will apply only where the contract is so related to the public welfare that it
will be considered congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the interest of the greater number.—
The Court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract between AGRIX and the private
respondent without justification. While it is true that the police power is superior to the impairment clause, the
principle will apply only where the contract is so related to the public welfare that it will be considered
congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the interest of the greater number. Most present-day
contracts are of that nature. But as already observed, the contracts of loan and mortgage executed by AGRIX
are purely private transactions and have not been shown to be affected with public interest. There was
_______________
 EN BANC.
*
258
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
58
National Development Company vs. Philippine Veterans Bank
therefore no warrant to amend their provisions and deprive the private respondent of its vested property
rights.
Same; Same; Presidential Decree No. 1717; Presidential Decree 1717 is an invalid exercise of police
power, not being in conformity with the traditional requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful method.—
Our finding, in sum, is that Pres. Decree No. 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not being in
conformity with the traditional requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction of the
mortgage and other liens and of the interest and other charges pertaining to the legitimate creditors of AGRIX
constitutes taking without due process of law, and this is compounded by the reduction of the secured creditors
to the category of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal protection clause. Moreover, the new
corporation, being neither owned nor controlled by the Government, should have been created only by general
and not special law. And insofar as the decree also interferes with purely private agreements without any
demonstrated connection with the public interest, there is likewise an impairment of the obligation of the
contract.
PETITION to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Br. 34.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Vicente Pascual, Jr. and Lope E. Feble for Philippine Veterans Bank.
CRUZ, J.:
This case involves the constitutionality of a presidential decree which, like all other issuances of
President Marcos during his regime, was at that time regarded as sacrosanct. It is only now, in a
freer atmosphere, that his acts are being tested by the touchstone of the fundamental law that even
then was supposed to limit presidential action.
The particular enactment in question is Pres. Decree No. 1717, which ordered the
rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to be administered mainly by the National
Development Company. The law outlined the procedure for filing claims against the Agrix
companies and created a Claims Committee to process these claims. Especially relevant to this
case, and noted at the outset, is Sec. 4(1) thereof providing that "all mortgages and other liens
presently attaching to any of the
259
VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 259
National Development Company vs. Philippine Veterans Bank
assets of the dissolved corporations are hereby extinguished."
Earlier, the Agrix Marketing, Inc. (AGRIX) had executed in favor of private respondent
Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage dated July 7, 1978, over three (3) parcels of land
situated in Los Baños, Laguna. During the existence of the mortgage, AGRIX went bankrupt. It
was for the expressed purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix companies that the
aforementioned decree was issued by President Marcos. Pursuant thereto, the private respondent
filed a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee for the payment of its loan credit. In the
meantime, the New Agrix, Inc. and the National Development Company, petitioners herein,
invoking Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, for the cancellation of the mortgage lien in favor of the private respondent. For its part,
the private respondent took steps to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage, prompting the
petitioners to file a second case with the same court to stop the foreclosure. The two cases were
consolidated.
After the submission by the parties of their respective pleadings, the trial court rendered the
impugned decision. Judge Francisco Ma. Guerrero annulled not only the challenged
provision, viz., Sec. 4 (1), but the entire Pres. Decree No. 1717 on the grounds that: (1) the
presidential exercise of legislative power was a violation of the principle of separation of powers;
(2) the law impaired the obligation of contracts; and (3) the decree violated the equal protection
clause. The motion for reconsideration of this decision having been denied, the present petition
was filed.
The petition was originally assigned to the Third Division of this Court but because of the
constitutional questions involved it was transferred to the Court en banc.On August 30, 1988, the
Court granted the petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order and instructed the
respondents to cease and desist from conducting a public auction sale of the lands in question.
After the Solicitor General and the private respondent had filed their comments and the petitioners
their reply, the Court gave due course to the petition and ordered the parties to file simultaneous
memoranda. Upon compliance by the parties, the case was deemed submitted.
The petitioners contend that the private respondent is now
260
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Development Company vs. Philippine Veterans Bank
estopped from contesting the validity of the decree. In support of this contention, it cites the recent
case of Mendoza v. Agrix Marketing, Inc.,  where the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1717
1
was also raised but not resolved. The Court, after noting that the petitioners had already filed their
claims with the AGRIX Claims Committee created by the decree, had simply dismissed the
petition on the ground of estoppel.
The petitioners stress that in the case at bar the private respondent also invoked the provisions
of Pres. Decree No. 1717 by filing a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee. Failing to get
results, it sought to foreclose the real estate mortgage executed by AGRIX in its favor, which had
been extinguished by the decree. It was only when the petitioners challenged the foreclosure on
the basis of Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, that the private respondent attacked the validity of the
provision. At that stage, however, consistent with Mendoza, the private respondent was already
estopped from questioning the constitutionality of the decree.
The Court does not agree that the principle of estoppel is applicable.
It is not denied that the private respondent did file a claim with the AGRIX Claims Committee
pursuant to this decree. It must be noted, however, that this was done in 1980, when President
Marcos was the absolute ruler of this country and his decrees were the absolute law. Any judicial
challenge to them would have been futile, not to say foolhardy. The private respondent, no less
than the rest of the nation, was aware of that reality and knew it had no choice under the
circumstances but to conform.
It is true that there were a few venturesome souls who dared to question the dictator's
decisions before the courts of justice then. The record will show, however, that not a single act or
issuance of President Marcos was ever declared unconstitutional, not even by the highest court, as
long as he was in power. To rule now that the private respondent is estopped for having abided
with the decree instead of boldly assailing it is to close our eyes to a cynical fact of life during that
repressive time.
________________
 G.R. No. 62259, April 19,1989.
1
261
VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 261

National Development Company vs. Philippine Veterans Bank
This case must be distinguished from Mendoza, where the petitioners, after filing their claims with
the AGRIX Claims Committee, received in settlement thereof shares of stock valued at
P40,000.00 without protest or reservation. The herein private respondent has not been paid a single
centavo on its claim, which was kept pending for more than seven years for alleged lack of
supporting papers. Significantly, the validity of that claim was not questioned by the petitioner
when it sought to restrain the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage by the private respondent.
The petitioner limited itself to the argument that the private respondent was estopped from
questioning the decree because of its earlier compliance with its provisions.
Independently of these observations, there is the consideration that an affront to the
Constitution cannot be allowed to continue existing simply because of procedural inhibitions that
exalt form over substance.
The Court is especially disturbed by Section 4(1) of the decree, quoted above, extinguishing
all mortgages and other liens attaching to the assets of AGRIX. It also notes, with equal concern,
the restriction in Subsection (ii) thereof that all "unsecured obligations shall not bear interest" and
in Subsection (iii) that "all accrued interests, penalties or charges as of date hereof pertaining to
the obligations, whether secured or unsecured, shall not be recognized."
These provisions must be read with the Bill of Rights, where it is clearly provided in Section 1
that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due course of law nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the law" and in Section 10 that "no law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed."
In defending the decree, the petitioners argue that property rights, like all rights, are subject to
regulation under the police power for the promotion of the common welfare. The contention is that
this inherent power of the state may be exercised at any time for this purpose so long as the taking
of the property right, even if based on contract, is done with due process of law. This argument is
an over-simplification of the problem before us. The police power is not a panacea for all
constitutional maladies. Neither does its mere invocation conjure an instant
262
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Development Company vs. Philippine Veterans Bank
and automatic justification for every act of the government depriving a person of his life, liberty or
property.
A legislative act based on the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a
lawful method. In more familiar words, a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, should justify the interference of the state; and b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. 2
Applying these criteria to the case at bar, the Court finds first of all that the interests of the
public are not sufficiently involved to warrant the interference of the government with the private
contracts of AGRIX. The decree speaks vaguely of the "public, particularly the small investors,"
who would be prejudiced if the corporation were not to be assisted. However, the record does not
state how many there are of such investors, and who they are, and why they are being preferred to
the private respondent and other creditors of AGRIX with vested property rights.
The public interest supposedly involved is not identified or explained. It has not been shown
that by the creation of the New Agrix, Inc. and the extinction of the property rights of the creditors
of AGRIX, the interests of the public as a whole, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
would be promoted or protected. The indispensable link to the welfare of the greater number has
not been established. On the contrary, it would appear that the decree was issued only to favor a
special group of investors who, for reasons not given, have been preferred to the legitimate
creditors of AGRIX.
Assuming there is a valid public interest involved, the Court still finds that the means
employed to rehabilitate AGRIX fall far short of the requirement that they shall not be unduly
oppressive. The oppressiveness is patent on the face of the decree. The right to property in all
mortgages, liens, interests, penalties and charges owing to the creditors of AGRIX is arbi-
________________
 U.S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85; Fabie v. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486; Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256; Bautista v.
2
Juinio, 127 SCRA 329; Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659.
263
VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 263
National Development Company vs. Philippine Veterans Bank
trarily destroyed. No consideration is paid for the extinction of the mortgage rights. The accrued
interests and other charges are simply rejected by the decree. The right to property is dissolved by
legislative fiat without regard to the private interest violated and, worse, in favor of another private
interest.
A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract and so comes under the protection of
the Bill of Rights. So do interests on loans, as well as penalties and charges, which are also vested
rights once they accrue. Private property cannot simply be taken by law from one person and given
to another without compensation and any known public purpose. This is plain arbitrariness and is
not permitted under the Constitution.
And not only is there arbitrary taking, there is discrimination as well. In extinguishing the
mortgage and other liens, the decree lumps the secured creditors with the unsecured creditors and
places them on the same level in the prosecution of their respective claims. In this respect, all of
them are considered unsecured creditors. The only concession given to the secured creditors is that
their loans are allowed to earn interest from the date of the decree, but that still does not justify the
cancellation of the interests earned before that date. Such interests, whether due to the secured or
the unsecured creditors, are all extinguished by the decree. Even assuming such cancellation to be
valid, we still cannot see why all kinds of creditors, regardless of security, are treated alike.
Under the equal protection clause, all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike, both in the privileges conferred and the obligations imposed. Conversely, all persons or
things differently situated should be treated differently. In the case at bar,
persons differently situated are similarly treated, in disregard of the principle that there should be
equality only among equals.
One may also well wonder why AGRIX was singled out for government help, among other
corporations where the stockholders or investors were also swindled. It is not clear why other
companies entitled to similar concern were not similarly treated. And surely, the stockholders of
the private respondent, whose mortgage lien had been cancelled and legitimate claims to accrued
interests rejected, were no less deserving of protection, which they did not get. The decree
operated, to use the
264
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Development Company vs. Philippine Veterans Bank
words of a celebrated case,  "with an evil eye and an uneven hand."
3
On top of all this, New Agrix, Inc. was created by special decree notwithstanding the
provision of Article XIV, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, that:
SEC. 4. The Batasang Pambansa shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof. 4
The new corporation is neither owned nor controlled by the government. The National
Development Corporation was merely required to extend a loan of not more than P10,000,000.00
to New Agrix, Inc. Pending payment thereof, NDC would undertake the management of the
corporation, but with the obligation of making periodic reports to the Agrix board of directors.
After payment of the loan, the said board can then appoint its own management. The stocks of the
new corporation are to be issued to the old investors and stockholders of AGRIX upon proof of
their claims against the abolished corporation. They shall then be the owners of the new
corporation. New Agrix, Inc. is entirely private and so should have been organized under the
Corporation Law in accordance with the above-cited constitutional provision.
The Court also feels that the decree impairs the obligation of the contract between AGRIX and
the private respondent without justification. While it is true that the police power is superior to the
impairment clause, the principle will apply only where the contract is so related to the public
welfare that it will be considered congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the
interest of the greater number.  Most present-day contracts are of that nature. But as already
5
observed, the contracts of loan and mortgage executed by AGRIX are purely private transactions
and have not been shown to be affected
_______________
 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356.
3
     Melencio-Herrera, J., In the result. In Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980), a
portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was declared null and
void for being unconstitutional.
     Feliciano, J., On leave.
Petition dismissed.
Note.—The police power of the state has been described as the most essential, insistent,
illimitable of powers which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society. (Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323.)
——o0o——

 Reworded in Art. XII, Sec. 16, 1987 Constitution.

4 © Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814.
5

265

VOL. 192, DECEMBER 10, 1990 265

National Development Company vs. Philippine Veterans Bank
with public interest. There was therefore no warrant to amend their provisions and deprive the
private respondent of its vested property rights.
It is worth noting that only recently in the case of the Development Bank of the  Philippines v.
NLRC,  we sustained the preference in payment of a mortgage creditor as against the argument that
6

the claims of laborers should take precedence over all other claims, including those of the
government. In arriving at this ruling, the Court recognized the mortgage lien as a property right
protected by the due process and contract clauses notwithstanding the argument that the
amendment in Section 110 of the Labor Code was a proper exercise of the police power.
The Court reaffirms and applies that ruling in the case at bar. Our finding, in sum, is that Pres.
Decree No. 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power, not being in conformity with the
traditional requirements of a lawful subject and a lawful method. The extinction of the mortgage
and other liens and of the interest and other charges pertaining to the legitimate creditors of
AGRIX constitutes taking without due process of law, and this is compounded by the reduction of
the secured creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in violation of the equal protection
clause. Moreover, the new corporation, being neither owned nor controlled by the Government,
should have been created only by general and not special law. And insofar as the decree also
interferes with purely private agreements without any demonstrated connection with the public
interest. there is likewise an impairment of the obligation of the contract.
With the above pronouncements, we feel there is no more need to rule on the authority of
President Marcos to promulgate Pres. Decree No. 1717 under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973
Constitution. Even if he had such authority, the decree must fall just the same because of its
violation of the Bill of Rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Pres. Decree No. 1717 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The temporary restraining order dated August 30, 1988, is LIFTED.
Costs against
_______________

 G.R. Nos. 82763-64, March 19,1990.

6

266

266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Tasarra
the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
     Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Gutierrez,
Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ., concur.