Eufrocino P.

Salazar
Philo 291 Final Paper
Prof. Ciriaco Sayson

Why is friendship a virtue? What does friendship fulfill (complete) in the human being? Discuss your
own view, comparing it with Aristotle’s theory

Friendship as Virtue : What It Does to Human Fulfillment

A significant number of Aristotelian scholars have read into his Nicomachean Ethics’ so called

“friendship treatise” (Chapters VIII, X) an interpretation that inextricably joins together virtue and

friendship as interrelated conceptual categories. This paper will attempt to respond to the question as to

why friendship maybe considered a virtue and what it fulfills/completes in the human being. Also, the

paper will juxtapose an Aristotelian theory of friendship and this writer’s own.

Virtue as an Expression of Human Excellence

Of the many aspects of the human predicament, it is not unthinkable to meditate on the

relevance of the human pursuit of what is good. The eudaemonist approach to living has, despite

multiple interpretations accorded to it by sundry thinkers and philosophers and as articulated in various

cultures, historical moments and particular milieus, provided an excellent starting point for framing the

most important questions in its application in human life.

Highly relevant to the eudaimonic project which Aristotle pursued in his Nicomachean Ethics is

the clarification of what it is that human beings should pursue and why this orientation is crucial in

finding the goal of this teleological task. Also crucial is the definition of what it is good and why this or

that shape of the good needs to be followed to achieve a truly flourishing existence. Part of this is the

corollary that virtue is what humans need to seek. In his book, Virtue Ethics : A Pluralistic View, Christine

Swanton, University of Auckland, New Zealand philosophy professor defines virtue as :

 good quality of character, more specifically a disposition to
respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in
an excellent or good enough way.1

Imbued with an Aristotelian definition of virtue (An Aristotelian definition? Wouldn’t Aristotle’s
definition have been better?) and interpreted in a way that accommodates

contemporary theoretical directions, Swanton highlights the centrality of “the good” (to agathon) as a

controlling attribute of the definition, along also with the emphasis on “disposition” to stress the

collective, if not unanimous, assent of many scholarly readers in this particular qualification. Virtue (arête)

is traditionally framed as excellence in a field or dimension where the individual has, through repetitive and

conscious choice choose to value what is good (whether in the development of a skill or a personal

characteristic. If as Swanton and other Aristotelian scholars agree that virtue, as the acquisition of character,

is something that becomes part of the human person, then such demonstration of excellence in so many

aspects (see the various chapters of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics) of the human person, then it is but

reasonable to assume that it is an expression of human excellence. The conscious effort on the part of a

human agent to exhibit traits or personal qualities that are directed towards a goal that is consciously

teleological supports the notion that driven behaviors that lead to the formation of qualities that are

perceived “well” and “good” and are therefore desirable ends themselves proves the excellence of the idea

itself.

Why Friendship is a Virtue

Aristotle describes friendship as something “that is virtue or involves virtue”2 Several readers of

Aristotle reject the equation of virtue with friendship (Aristotle did not equate virtue with friendship) and
their common justification is that whereas

friendship is external to the agent (as it exists as a state of affairs between or among individuals), and

consequently not a virtue, it does not meet the requisite elements that define what a virtue is as virtue

would demand an inner quality of an agent. Also, as Lorraine Smith Pangle notes, true friendships actually
1
Christine Swanton. Virtue Ethics : A Pluralistic View, Oxford University Press, 2003. p. 20
2
Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. trans. Roger Crisp. Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy.
share a bond with moral virtues, the way other virtues do not.3

How does one respond to this criticism of friendship as something not sharing a conceptual field with

virtue? First off, one can say that if virtue refers to the state of being one reaches through conscious choice

and with conscious objective of acquiring a state of goodness or excellence, then one can say that in the

attitudinal aspects of agents who are friends with those they consider their friends, there is a field or space of

discernment where the person has attained a status of “considering the friend for his own sake” – that is

thinking not just in terms of Aristotle’s classic friendship of utility and friendship of pleasure but of genuinely

and mutually reciprocating goodness to one’s friend, then such state demands that one has reached a point

in one’s thinking/feeling towards that friend as one that is virtuous. In other words, treating one’s friends in

the traditional definition of Aristotelian friendship requires a capitulation to the excellence subsumed in the

notion of an authentically good friend. Secondly, aside from the potential manifestation of moral virtues as

referenced by Smith Pangle, where good laudable qualities like loyalty, compassion, solidarity, commonality

of interests, etc. are seen, there is also the possibility of attribution of those praiseworthy qualities as

motivated by one’s connection with one’s friends. Being friends with others does not compel people to be

virtuous. It is the nature of such arrangements – demonstrating good deeds and amicable sentiments; thus

friendship is the connective space and even, the theoretical frame that makes possible such expression of

desirable human qualities. Lastly, the sheer containment of qualities within an agent as the basis for

distinguishing the difference between friendship and virtue, seems to me at least, as a rather narrow

definitional straight jacket (straitjacket) to exempt the virtuous attribute to friendship. Human qualities and
excellences

are characterized internally, that is true but the description and proper characterizations of these qualities do

not exist in a conceptual vacuum. Human goodness in all its multivariate forms requires expression in the

context of relational spaces.

One can be described as loyal, or fair (both desirable human virtues) only in the context of their actual

expressions. Thus a person can be loyal only when there is something or someone to be loyal to; also, one
3
Lorraine Smith Pangle. Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship. Cambridge University Press, 2003. p. 9
can be externally described as fair after one observes the human agent acting in situations where, given that

person’s choices, performed behavior that earned the appellation of fairness. To summarize, one can go back

to Aristotle’s classic definition of true friendships – establishing ties with others with whom one has not just

motives of utility or pleasure, but actually have the other person’s good as one’s objective. For Aristotle, true

friendships are rare and even though they are such, individuals can still attain them if they so consciously

choose. Compared to the so called “lesser friendships” ( of utility and pleasure ), true friendship or the

friendship of the good, is something that good people though (?) because, for Aristotle, this is a quality

demonstrated by good people. In this sense, the choice to think, feel and act on behalf of the other person’s

good is an excellent thing and when one has consciously adopted a mindset like that then that person has

indeed elevated his friendship to the level of a virtue.

What Does Friendship Fulfill (Complete) in Human Beings

Although considered as “least natural of loves; the least instinctive, least organic, biological,

gregarious and necessary” by C.S. Lewis in his classic treatise “The Four Loves”, friendship was described in a

positive light in the same book. One may agree in fact, with Lewis on this observation but in this writer’s

perspective, it isn’t the rarity of true friendships that makes it so mysterious and attractive for some people –

it is actually the fact that in an almost depersonalized, function evaluative postmodern society such as ours

that odd relationships like friendship are cast in a suspicious light. The ultimate question is, despite the

establishment of stable romantic partnerships and the institutionalization of marriage, what purpose does

this animal called Friendship serve? The question posted in this part of the essay also precludes the idea that

despite human autonomy and the presence of romantic attractions, it seems that friendship is available to

fulfill some unsatisfiable human need. It also seems to suggest that friendship can be an answer to a human

need beyond what has been traditionally offered.

Aristotle’s two chapters on friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics identifies the purposes of

friendship with benefits that come along the nature of the friendship offered (either utility or pleasure). And
while human beings enjoy companionship in various forms (from superficial to professional associations

which can be the earlier stages of future friendships), it is the actual and conscious choice of enjoyment that

friendship offers for those who are aware that they are seeking out friends. This requires a conscientiousness

and a rational choice on the part of the friend. Regardless of social class, age group and even shared

interests, it is the act of the enjoyment of one’s party that points out the answer to that question being

raised in this section of the essay : that is the human person has to decide to celebrate the joys offered by

companionship. It is true that the pursuit of a lofty goal (and its achievement), the finding of a romantic

partner, or the seeking of a fulfilling life career can bring varying degrees of happiness or fulfillment to a

person, it seems that (in my view at least) one still needs to seek out other pleasures not traditionally passed

down to us by society (no matter how fulfilling they maybe). It seems at least, that the conscious knowledge

and the actual enjoyment offered by the company of others for whatever reason they maybe – playing

League of Legends games together, quietly sitting around together in the beach to get a tan, engaging in

profound philosophical banter, or even laughing out loud together at an episode of The Simpsons seems to

bring out additional ounces of happiness in being alive together “in that luminous, tranquil, rational world of

relationships freely chosen” called by C.S. Lewis as Friendship. 4

Works Cited List

Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. trans. Roger Crisp. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Lewis, C.S. The Four Loves. Harcourt Publishers, London. 1960

Pangle, Lorraine Smith. Aristotle and The Philosophy of Friendship. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Swinton, Christine. Virtue Ethics : A Pluralistic View. Oxford University Press, 2003.

Paper grade: 1.25 (97)

Course grade: 1.0

4
C.S. Lewis. The Four Loves. London : Harcourt Publishers, 1960 p. 59