The Domestic Politics Model: Nuclear Pork and Parochial Interests

Slide 1-
It is the second theoretical framework which tell us that why state build nuclear weapon. You
know… state visualize that nuclear weapon as a political tool that can use to increase domestic
and bureaucratic interests. This second model of nuclear weapons proliferation focuses on the
domestic actors who encourage or discourage governments from pursuing the bomb.
So, … there are three main actors commonly appear in the historical case-studies of nuclear
proliferation: First, state's nuclear energy establishment, it is included the officials in state-run
laboratories as the civilian reactor facilities. Second, the important military units often within
the air force and sometimes in navy bureaucracies interested in nuclear propulsion. Third,
Politicians in state in which individual parties or the mass public or people who strongly favor
nuclear weapons acquisition.

 Actors form coalition: When the they form coalitions that are strong enough to control the
government's decision-making process, either through their direct or indirect political
power and through their control of information-nuclear weapons programs are likely to
develop.

Slide 2-
During the Cold War, states have been influenced by the different of perspectives on
bureaucratic politics and the social construction of technology concerning military procurement in
the United States and the Soviet Union. First, if we take a look to Bureaucratic Actors, they are
not seen as the passive recipients of top-down political decisions because they create the conditions
that favor weapons acquisition by encouraging irrational perceptions of external threats, promoting
supportive politicians, and actively lobbying for increased defense spending. Second, Scientific-
Military-Industrial Complex, it is the initial ideas for individual weapons innovations are often
developed inside state laboratories, where scientists favor military innovation because it is
technically exciting and keeps the money and the prestige flowing to their laboratories. Last but
not least, Political Coalition, the coalition builds broader political support within the executive or
legislative branches by shaping the perceptions about the costs and benefits of weapons programs.

For realists recognize the domestic political actors that they have political interests, and
those interests have only a marginal influence on the crucial national security issues due to
bureaucratic battles may determine if a state should build 500 or 1000 ICBMs (Intercontinental
ballistic missile). However, based on this second model, Security threats are not the central cause
of weapons decisions, but merely open the opportunity to gain their political interests.
Slide 3;

Proliferation Revisited: Addressing the India Puzzle

After the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, there was no consensus among officials in New Delhi
that there was necessary to have a nuclear deterrent as a response to China because in the historical
case of Indian nuclear weapon reveal the bureaucratic battle in New Delhi did not encourage India
to get nuclear weapons. It means that, New Delhi should make a concert effort to seek nuclear
guarantees from the US, the Soviet Union, or other nuclear power.
However, 1971, the first female Indian Prime Minister Gandhi developed an alliance with the
defense laboratories to build and test a “peaceful” Indian Nuclear device. Unfortunately, the device
does not exist.
If we take a look to Domestic Political Concerns, there are three issues in hand: First, the
decision to test was made in a very small circle of personal advisers and scientists from the nuclear
establishment. For example, the defense and foreign affairs officials in India were not involved in
the initial decision to prepare the nuclear device for the testing. Second, the absence of a
systematic program for nuclear weapons because the New Delhi did not prepare on the Canada's
immediate termination of nuclear assistance. In this scenario that Canada has terminate the nuclear
assistances from India because New Delhi under prime minister Gandhi focus on political concerns
more than security interest or external threats. Last, Domestic support for Gandhi was at an all-
time low, because the prolonging and severing of domestic recession, the outbreak of large-scale
protests in countries, and the residual consequences of the ruling Congress Party. Therefore, the
PM Gandhi already realize that what she has to resist the crisis, then increase her opportunity in
public opinion polls and to resolve a problem about which she had been criticized by her domestic
opponents. Indeed, the nuclear detonation occurred and it contributed to a major increase in
support for her government. Surprisingly, the public support for Gandhi increased by one-third in
the month after the nuclear test in 1974 and 90% of individual answered in the affirmative if they
were personally proud of this achievement. Therefore, PM Gandhi, acknowledge that the nuclear
test would have been useful for elections.
So, we can see that, Nuclear weapons are more than tools of national security, but Nuclear
weapons are also the political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and internal
bureaucratic battle in a state for other reasons.

Thus, on May 18, 1974, under the Indira Gandhi government, India conducted its first nuclear bomb test,
nicknamed Smiling Buddha, at Pokhran Test range in Rajasthan.