G.R. No.

199440, January 18, 2016

MARY LOU GETURBOS TORRES, Petitioner, v. CORAZON ALMA G. DE LEON, IN

HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED
CROSS AND THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED
CROSS, NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, dated December 23, 2011 of petitioner Mary Lou Geturbos Torres
seeking the reversal of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated June 30, 2011
that affirmed Resolution No. 080691 dated April 21, 2008 and Resolution No. 081845
dated September 26, 2008, both of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) that imposed
upon her the penalty of dismissal from service as Chapter Administrator of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), General Santos City Chapter for grave
misconduct.

The facts follow.

When petitioner was the Chapter Administrator of the PNRC, General Santos City
Chapter, the PNRC Internal Auditing Office conducted an audit of the funds and
accounts of the PNRC, General Santos City Chapter for the period November 6, 2002 to
March 14, 2006, and based on the audit report submitted to respondent Corazon Alma
G. De Leon (De Leon), petitioner incurred a "technical shortage" in the amount of
P4,306,574.23.

Hence, respondent De Leon in a Memorandum dated January 3, 2007, formally charged

petitioner with Grave Misconduct for violating PNRC Financial Policies on
Oversubscription, Remittances and Disbursement of Funds.

After the completion of the investigation of the case against petitioner, respondent
issued a Memorandum dated June 12, 2007 imposing upon petitioner the penalties of
one month suspension effective July 1-31, 2007 and transfer to the National
Headquarters effective August 1, 2007.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a Memorandum dated
June 28, 2007.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal addressed to the Board of Governors of

the PNRC through respondent and furnished a copy thereof to the CSC. Petitioner
addressed her appeal memorandum to the CSC and sent copies thereof to the PNRC
and the CSC. Respondent, in a memorandum dated August 13, 2007, denied
petitioner's appeal.

The CSC, on April 21, 2008, promulgated a Resolution dismissing petitioner's appeal
and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from service. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration with the CSC, but the same was denied.
Thus, petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA, and in its assailed
Decision dated June 30, 2011, the CA denied the said petition. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied on October 6, 2011.

Hence, the present petition with the following grounds relied upon:

GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
(CSC) HAS NO APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE;

THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO REALIZE THAT RESPONDENT DE

LEON HAS NO INTENTION TO DISMISS PETITIONER FROM THE SERVICE AND IT WAS
SERIOUS ERROR ON THE PART OF THE CSC TO MODIFY THE SAME OR TERMINATE
PETITIONER FROM THE SERVICE WITHOUT ANY AUTHORITY;

GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE CSC HAS CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OVER THE

PNRC, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE CSC DID NOT ACQUIRE
OR HAD LOST APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE; [and]

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE COMMENT (INITIATORY

PLEADING) FILED BY THE KAPUNAN LOTILLA FLORES GARCIA & CASTILLO LAW FIRM
IN BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS, DATED MARCH 31, 2009, IS NOT VERIFIED NOR
ACCOMPANIED BY A CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.
According to petitioner, this Court has decided that PNRC is not a government-owned
and controlled corporation (GOCC), hence, the CSC has no jurisdiction or authority to
review the appeal that she herself filed. As such, she insists that the CSC committed
grave abuse of discretion in modifying the decision of respondent De Leon. She further
argues that the PNRC did not give due course to her notice of appeal since petitioner's
counsel erroneously addressed and filed her notice of appeal to the office of respondent
PNRC NHQ BOGs through the office of respondent De Leon instead of filing it directly
with the CSC, and respondent De Leon denied due course to the notice of appeal, thus,
according to petitioner, there was no more appeal to speak of. Petitioner also claims
that she voluntarily served the sentence of one month suspension and transfer of
assignment before her counsel erroneously filed the notice of appeal, hence, when the
notice of appeal was filed, the decision of respondent De Leon was already final. Finally,
petitioner asserts that the CA erred in not finding that the comment filed by the law
firm in behalf of the respondents, dated March 31, 2009, violated the rules against
forum shopping.

The petition lacks merit.

As ruled by this Court in Liban, et al. v. Gordon,3 the PNRC, although not a GOCC, is sui
generis in character, thus, requiring this Court to approach controversies involving the
PNRC on a case-to-case basis. As discussed:
A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not just in
terms of structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status
accorded to it by the State and the international community. There is merit in PNRC's
contention that its structure is  sui generis.

xxxx

National Societies such as the PNRC act as auxiliaries to the public authorities of their
own countries in the humanitarian field and provide a range of services including
disaster relief and health and social programmes.

The International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and Red Crescent Societies (RCS)
Position Paper, submitted by the PNRC, is instructive with regard to the elements of (he
specific nature of the National Societies such as the PNRC, to wit:
National Societies, such as the Philippine National Red Cross and its sister Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies, have certain specificities deriving from the 1949 Geneva
Convention and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement (the Movement). They are also guided by the seven Fundamental Principles
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality,
Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity and Universality.

A National Society partakes of a sui generis character. It is a protected

component of the Red Cross movement under Articles 24 and 26 of the First Geneva
Convention, especially in times of armed conflict. These provisions require that the staff
of a National Society shall be respected and protected in all circumstances. Such
protection is not ordinarily afforded by an international treaty to ordinary private
entities or even non-governmental organizations (NGOs). This sui generis character is
also emphasized by the Fourth Geneva Convention which holds that an Occupying
Power cannot require any change in the personnel or structure of a National Society.
National societies are therefore organizations that are directly regulated by
international humanitarian law, in contrast to other ordinary private entities, including
NGOs.

xxxx

In addition, National Societies are not only officially recognized by their public
authorities as voluntary aid societies, auxiliary to the public authorities in the
humanitarian field, but also benefit from recognition at the International level. This is
considered to be an element distinguishing National Societies from other organizations
(mainly NGOs) and other forms of humanitarian response.

x x x No other organization belongs to a world-wide Movement in which all Societies

have equal status and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other. This
is considered to be the essence of the Fundamental Principle of Universality.

Furthermore, the National Societies are considered to be auxiliaries to the public

authorities in the humanitarian field, x x x.

The auxiliary status of [a] Red Cross Society means that it is at one and the same time
a private institution and a public service organization because the very nature of its
work implies cooperation with the authorities, a link with the State. In carrying out their
major functions, Red Cross Societies give their humanitarian support to official bodies,
in general having larger resources than the Societies, working towards comparable ends
in a given sector.

x x x No other organization has a duty to be its government's humanitarian partner

while remaining independent.
It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has
remained valid and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under
the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987
Constitution.

The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on
constitutional grounds, not even in this case lie fore the
Court now.

xxxx

By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other
private corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC's special status
under international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to
assist it in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions. Although the
PNRC is called to be independent under its Fundamental Principles, it interprets such
independence as inclusive of its duty to be the government's humanitarian partner. To
be recognized in the International Committee, the PNRC must have an autonomous
status, and carry out its humanitarian mission in a neutral and impartial manner.

However, in accordance with the Fundamental Principle of Voluntary Service of National

Societies of the Movement, the PNRC must be distinguished from private and profit-
making entities. It is the main characteristic of National Societies that they "are not
inspired by the desire for financial gain but by individual commitment and devotion to a
humanitarian purpose freely chosen or accepted as part of the service that National
Societies through its volunteers and/or members render to the Community."

The PNRC, as a National Society of the international Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither "be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to
lose its character of neutrality" as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private
corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as an
auxiliary of the State.

Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now sufficiently established.
Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a
government-owned or -controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof, as succinctly
explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009, so much so that respondent, under the
Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently
while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC
is a "private corporation" within the contemplation of the provision of the Constitution,
that must be organized under the Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned by Justice
Roberto A. Abad, the sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a casc-to-case basis.4 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In this particular case, the CA did not err in ruling that the CSC has jurisdiction over the
PNRC because the issue at hand is the enforcement of labor laws and penal statutes,
thus, in this particular matter, the PNRC can be treated as a GOCC, and as such, it is
within the ambit of Rule 1, Section 1 of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act 67135,
stating that:
Section 1. These Rules shall cover all officials and employees in the government,
elective and appointive, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career
service, including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive
compensation, regardless of amount.
Thus, having jurisdiction over the PNRC, the CSC had authority to modify the penalty
and order the dismissal of petitioner from the service. Under the Administrative Code of
1987,6 as well as decisions7 of this Court, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction on
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for
more than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary. The
CA, therefore, did not err when it agreed with the CSC that the latter had appellate
jurisdiction, thus:
The Court cites with approval the disquisition of the CSC in this regard:
The Commission is fully aware that under the Civil Service Law and rules and
jurisprudence, it has appellate jurisdiction only on administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or
fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days' salary.

In the instant case, although the decision appealed from states that Torres was
imposed the penalty of "one month" suspension from the service, it is unequivocally
spelled out therein that the period of her suspension is from July 1-31, 2007." This
specifically written period unmistakably indicates that Torres was actually imposed the
penalty of thirty-one (31) days and not merely thirty (30) days or one (1) month.
Petitioner submits that the actual duration of the period of her suspension was only
thirty (30) days since July 1, 2007 was a legal holiday, it being a Sunday. This
submission, however, is flawed considering that she was imposed the penalty of "One
Month Suspension effective July 1-31, 2007" or for a period of thirty-one (31) days.

Even granting that petitioner was imposed the penalty of suspension for thirty (30)
days only, it should be noted that she was also imposed another penalty of "Transfer to
the NHQ effective August 01, 2007." Hence, the CSC would still have appellate
jurisdiction.8
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Neither can it be considered that the CSC had lost its appellate jurisdiction because, as
claimed by petitioner, she voluntarily served the sentence of one month suspension and
transfer of assignment before her counsel filed the notice of appeal, hence, the decision
of the PNRC was already final even before a notice of appeal was filed with the CSC.
The CA was correct in finding that petitioner's appeal was properly and timely made
with the CSC under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(URACCS). It ruled:
As enunciated in the cases cited by petitioner, a decision becomes final even before the
lapse of the fifteen-day period to appeal when the defendant voluntarily submits to the
execution of the sentence. In the present case, however, it cannot be said that she
voluntarily served her penalty in view of the fact that she appealed therefrom.
Moreover, the service of the penalty is pursuant to Section 47 of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) which reads:
Section 47. Effect of filing. - An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory,
and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal, in the
event he wins the appeal.
Petitioner's claim that the Notice of Appeal and the Appeal Memorandum were filed with
the PNRC and not with the CSC deserves scant consideration. Section 43 of the URACCS
pertinently provides:
Section 43. Filing of Appeals. -

xxx

A notice of appeal including the appeal memorandum shall be filed with the appellate
authority, copy furnished the disciplining office. The latter shall submit the records of
the case, which shall be systematically and chronologically arranged, paged and
securely bound to prevent loss, with its comment, within fifteen (15) days, to the
appellate authority.
An examination of the Notice of Appeal shows that the same was addressed to the
PNRC and copy furnished the CSC. On the other hand, an examination of the Appeal
Memorandum shows that the same was addressed to the CSC and copies thereof were
sent to both the PNRC and the CSC. It is thus clear that a copy of the Notice of Appeal
was furnished the CSC and the Appeal Memorandum was filed with it. While the rules
required that the notice of appeal including the appeal memorandum shall be filed with
the CSC, it is undeniable that furnishing a copy of the Notice of Appeal with the CSC
and filing with it the Appeal Memorandum substantially complied with the rule. The
important thing is that the Appeal Memorandum was clearly addressed to the
CSC.9 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Anent the issue that respondents' Comment filed before the CA lacks verification and a
certificate of non-forum shopping, such is inconsequential because a comment is not an
initiatory pleading but a responsive pleading. [T]he required certification against forum
shopping is intended to cover an "initiatory pleading," meaning an "incipient application
of a party asserting a claim for relief."10 A comment, required by an appellate tribunal,
to a petition filed with it is not a pleading but merely an expression of the views and
observations of the respondent for the purpose of giving the court sufficient information
as to whether the petition is legally proper as a remedy to the acts complained of.11

Based on the above disquisitions, all other issues presented by petitioner are rendered
immaterial.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
dated December 23, 2011 of petitioner Mary Lou Geturbos Torres is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 30, 2011, is
therefore AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
G.R. No. 114795 July 17, 1996

LUCITA Q. GARCES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SALVADOR EMPEYNADO and CLAUDIO
CONCEPCION, respondents.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:p

Questioned in this petition for review is the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 (CA), as well as its resolution, which affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court 3 (RTC) of Zamboanga del Norte in dismissing a petition for mandamus against a Provincial Election Supervisor and
an incumbent Election Registrar.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Petitioner Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July
27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion who, in turn, was
transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.   Correspondingly approved by the Civil Service
4

Commission,   both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion,
5

however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it.   Garces, on the other hand, was
6

directed by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post.   But she was 7

not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election Supervisor

Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office in Gutalac as the same is not
vacant.  8

On February 24, 1987, Garces was directed by the same Office of Assistant Director to defer her
assumption of the Gutalac post. On April 15, 1987, she received a letter from the Acting Manager,
Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of
polling booths. It was addressed "Mrs. Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte" which
Garces interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order.   Meanwhile, since respondent 9

Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his
appointment to Liloy.  10

On February 26, 1988, Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado   and Concepcion, among 11

others. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc through a Resolution dated June 3, 1988, resolved to
recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac,   and ordered that the 12

appointments of Garces to Gutalac and of Concepcion to Liloy be cancelled.   In view thereof, 13

respondent Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was
rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable
only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution. The RTC, thereafter,
dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper
remedy,   and (2) that the "cases" or "matters" referred under the constitution pertain only to those
14

involving the conduct of elections. On appeal, respondent CA affirmed the RTC's dismissal of the
case. Hence, this petition

The issues raised are purely legal. First, is petitioner's action for mandamus proper? And, second, is
this case cognizable by the RTC or by the Supreme Court?
On the first issue, Garces claims that she has a clear legal right to the Gutalac post which was
deemed vacated at the time of her appointment and qualification. Garces insists that the vacancy
was created by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution.   On the contrary, Concepcion
15

posits that he did not vacate his Gutalac post as he did not accept the transfer to Liloy.

Article III Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution provides:

All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in the office until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and
qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year
from February 25, 1986. (Emphasis supplied).

The above organic provision did not require any cause for removal of an appointive official
under the 1973 Constitution.   The transition period from the old to the new Constitution
16

envisioned an "automatic" vacancy;  7 hence the government is not hard put to prove
1

anything plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it.   Mere appointment and
18

qualification of the successor removes an incumbent from his post. Nevertheless, the
government in an act of auto-limitation and to prevent indiscriminate dismissal of government
personnel issued on May 28, 1986, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 17. This executive order,
which applies in this case as it was passed prior to the issuance of Concepcion's transfer
order, enumerates five grounds for separation or replacement of elective and appointive
officials authorized under Article III, Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution, to wit:

1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the

Civil Service Law;

2. Existence of the probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned;

3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;

4. Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;

5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain
in the service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service.

Not one of these grounds was alleged to exist, much less proven by petitioner when
respondent Concepcion was transferred from Gutalac to Liloy. More, Concepcion was
transferred without his consent. A transfer requires a prior appointment.   If the transfer was
19

made without the consent of the official concerned, it is tantamount to removal without valid
cause   contrary to the fundamental guarantee on non-removal except for
20

cause.   Concepcion's transfer thus becomes legally infirm and without effect for he was not
21

validly terminated. His appointment to the Liloy post, in fact, was incomplete because he did
not accept it. Acceptance, it must be emphasized, it is indispensable to complete an
appointment.  Corollarily, Concepcion's post in Gutalac never became vacant. It is a basic
22

precept in the law of public officers that "no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is
for a certain position may be appointed to an office which is not vacant.   There can be no
23

appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed, or his
appointment validly terminated before one could be validly installed to succeed him. Further,
Garces' appointment was ordered to be deferred by the COMELEC. The deferment order,
we note, was not unequivocably lifted. Worse, her appointment to Gutalac was even
cancelled by the COMELEC en banc.

These factors negate Garces' claim for a well-defined, clear, certain legal right to the Gutalac
post. On the contrary, her right to the said office is manifestly doubtful and highly
questionable. As correctly ruled by respondent court, mandamus, which petitioner filed
below, will not lie as this remedy applies only where petitioner's right is founded clearly in law
and not when it is doubtful.   It will not issue to give him something to which he is not clearly
24

and conclusively entitled.   Considering that Concepcion continuously occupies the disputed
25

position and exercises the corresponding functions therefor, the proper remedy should have
been quo warranto and not mandamus.   Quo warranto tests the title to one's office claimed
26

by another and has as its object the ouster of the holder from its enjoyment,
while mandamus avails to enforce clear legal duties and not to try disputed titles.  7
2

Garces' heavy reliance with the 1964 Tulawie   case is misplaced for material and different
28

factual considerations. Unlike in this case, the disputed office of "Assistant Provincial
Agriculturist" in the case of Tulawie is clearly vacant and petitioner Tulawie's appointment
was confirmed by the higher authorities making his claim to the disputed position clear and
certain. Tulawie's petition for mandamus, moreover, was against the Provincial Agriculturist
who never claimed title to the contested office. In this case, there was no vacancy in the
Gutalac post and petitioner's appointment to which she could base her claim was revoked
making her claim uncertain.

Coming now to the second issue.

The jurisdiction of the RTC was challenged by respondent Empeynado   contending that this
29

is a "case" or "matter" cognizable by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987
Constitution. The COMELEC resolution cancelling the appointment of Garces as Election
Registrar of Gutalac, he argues, should be raised only on certiorari before the Supreme
Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a reviewer of an en
banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.

The contention is without merit. Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:

Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members

any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission
for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by
this constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be
brought to the supreme court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.

This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the COMELEC. On
the contrary, it was the COMELEC's resolution that triggered this controversy. The "case" or
"matter" referred to by the constitution must be something within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled rule is that "decision,
rulings, order" of the COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the COMELEC's exercise of
its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers   involving "elective regional, provincial, and city
30

officials."   In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELEC's choice of an appointee to
31

occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-up of an
 agency.   The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly can this
32

matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. To rule otherwise would surely
burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are best ventilated before the RTC,
a court which the law vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over "all cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction over of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial
functions."  33

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby DENIED without
prejudice to the filing of the proper action with the appropriate body.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 207422

ANGEL ABAD, Petitioner,
vs.
HERMINIO DELA CRUZ, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Appointments in the civil service are made fundamentally on the basis of merit. Both the Constitution
and law ensure that those appointed are fit for the position. While those who are next in rank to a
vacant position may be given some preference, no one has a vested right to a government position.
Seniority and salary grades should be given their due weight but should not trump the public interest.

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari  filed by Angel Abad assailing the Court of
1

Appeals Decision  dated April 11, 2012. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Civil Service Commission
2

Resolution  dated June 22, 2010. This Resolution affirmed the permanent appointment of Herminio
3

Dela Cruz as City Government Department Head III. 4

Mayor Jaime R. Fresnedi appointed Herminio Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) as City Assessor  of the City
5

Government of Muntinlupa in a permanent capacity on December 28, 2006.  The City Assessor is
6

given the item of City Government Department Head III. 7

In Resolution No. 06-361,  majority of the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City
8

Government of Muntinlupa concurred in the appointment of Dela Cruz as City Government

Department Head III. 9

Pursuant to Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 02-1235 granting the City Government of
Muntinlupa the power to take final action on its appointments, the appointment of Dela Cruz was
considered attested to by the Civil Service Commission. 10

Angel A. Abad (Abad), Local Assessment Operations Officer V in the Office of the City Assessor,
wrote the Civil Service Commission and requested the disapproval of Dela Cruz’s appointment as
City Government Department Head III.  Abad alleged that the position of City Government
11

Department Head III corresponded to Salary Grade 27, nine (9) salary grades higher than Dela
Cruz’s former position as Local Assessment Operations Officer III with Salary Grade 18.  According
12

to Abad, Dela Cruz’s appointment violated Item 15 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 3, Series of 2001, which prohibits the promotion of an employee to a position more than
three (3) salary grades above his or her former position:13

15. An employee may be promoted or transferred to a position which is not more than three (3)
salary, pay or job grades higher than the employee’s present position except in very meritorious
cases, such as: if the vacant position is next-in- rank as identified in the System of Ranking Positions
(SRP) approved by the head of agency, or the lone or entrance position indicated in the agency
staffing pattern.

Abad added that being a qualified next-in-rank, he applied for the position of City Government
Department Head III. However, he and three (3) other qualified applicants were allegedly excluded
from the selection process, in violation of Item 10 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular
No. 3, series of 2001.  This provides:
14

10.For vacancies in the first and second levels, all qualified next-in-rank employees shall be
automatically considered candidates for promotion to the next higher position.

According to Abad, the appointment of Dela Cruz caused "demoralization within [their] ranks." 15

In the letter  dated January 26, 2007, the Civil Service Commission referred Abad’s letter to the City
16

Government of Muntinlupa’s grievance machinery for proper action.

In the meantime, newly elected Mayor Aldrin San Pedro (Mayor San Pedro) assumed his office in
the City Government of Muntinlupa on July 1, 2007. On August 3, 2007, the main building of
Muntinlupa City Hall was gutted by fire, destroying the Office of the City Personnel. The City
Government of Muntinlupa, therefore, failed to act on Abad’s Letter. 17

Thus, on September 25, 2007, Abad filed with the Mayor’s Office the letter-complaint  reiterating his
18

request for disapproval of Dela Cruz’s permanent appointment as City Government Department
Head III.

Mayor San Pedro referred Abad’s letter-complaint to the City Government of Muntinlupa’s Personnel
Department. 19

Finding that Dela Cruz’s promotion violated Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 3,
Series of 2001 on the three- salary-grade rule,  the Grievance Committee recommended the
20

invalidation of Dela Cruz’s permanent appointment as City Government Department Head III.  This 21

recommendation was approved by Mayor San Pedro.

Mayor San Pedro’s approval was then referred to the Civil Service Commission-National Capital
Region for appropriate action. 22

In the Decision  dated August 17, 2009, the Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region
23

invalidated Dela Cruz’s permanent appointment as City Government Department Head III and ruled
that he was appointed in violation of the three-salary-grade rule under Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 3, Series of 2001. 24
On Dela Cruz’s appeal,  the Civil Service Commission reversed and set aside the Civil Service
25

Commission-National Capital Region’s Decision in Resolution No. 101276 dated June 22, 2010. 26

The Civil Service Commission found that the City Government of Muntinlupa’s Personnel Selection
Board ranked the applicants for City Government Department Head III based on the following
criteria: performance, work history, awards, education, training, potential, and physical
characteristics and personality traits. Out of nine (9) applicants, Dela Cruz ranked first with a grade
of 90.67 out of 100 points. Although it conceded that Abad was not among the nine (9) applicants
screened, the Commission nevertheless ruled that Dela Cruz’s appointment was an exception to the
three-salary-grade rule.  Dela Cruz underwent a deep selection process rendering his appointment
27

"very meritorious[.]" 28

The Commission likewise noted that contrary to the rule that whoever alleges must prove, the
Grievance Committee placed on Dela Cruz the burden of proving that Abad was not considered for
appointment. The Grievance Committee, therefore, erred. As for Abad, he failed to prove the
allegation that he was not considered for promotion. 29

Abad’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Civil Service Commission in the Resolution
dated November 12, 2010. 30

A Petition for Review was filed before the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals, however,
31

dismissed the Petition for Review in the Decision dated April 11, 2012. 32

The Court of Appeals held that the three-salary-grade rule "only gives preference to the person
occupying the position next in rank to a vacancy, but does not by any means give [the employee
next in rank] [the] exclusive right to be appointed to the said vacancy."  As long as the employee
33

appointed to the position possesses the minimum qualifications for the position, the appointment is
valid.
34

The Court of Appeals also found that Abad failed to prove that he was the employee next in rank to
the position of City Government Department Head III.  On the other hand, Dela Cruz proved that he
35

possessed the minimum qualifications for the position and that he underwent a deep selection
process where he ranked first among nine (9) applicants.  The Court of Appeals, thus, affirmed Dela
36

Cruz’s appointment. 37

Both Motion for Reconsideration  and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration  filed by Abad were
38 39

denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution  dated June 4, 2013.

40

On July 25, 2013,  Abad filed before this court the Petition for Review on Certiorari. Dela Cruz filed
41

his Comment,  after which Abad filed his Reply.

42 43

Abad insists that Dela Cruz’s promotion was void for violation of the three-salary-grade rule under
Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 3, Series of 2001. Moreover, he and other
employees who were allegedly next in rank to the position of City Government Department Head III
were not considered for the position. Contrary to the finding of the Civil Service Commission and the
Court of Appeals, the City Government of Muntinlupa’s Personnel Selection Board did not conduct
any deep selection process in appointing a new City Government Department Head III. 44

Thus, Abad prays that this court invalidate Dela Cruz’s appointment and order the City Government
of Muntinlupa to conduct a new selection process for the position of City Government Department
Head III. 45
Dela Cruz refutes Abad’s claim of lack of deep selection process. As the Civil Service Commission
and the Court of Appeals found, the City Government of Muntinlupa’s Personnel Selection Board
conducted a deep selection process for the position of City Government Department Head III where
he ranked first out of nine (9) applicants.  Dela Cruz emphasizes that the factual findings of the Civil
46

Service Commission, which was sustained by the Court of Appeals, must be accorded great respect
since these have been made by the "administrative agency which [has] acquired expertise [in the
field of civil service law.]"
47

The issues for this court’s resolution are:

First, whether respondent Dela Cruz’s promotion to the position of City Government Department
Head III is void because it violated the next- in-rank rule; and

Second, whether respondent Dela Cruz’s promotion to the position of City Government Department
Head III is void for lack of a deep selection process.

This Petition must be denied.

The Civil Service Commission is the "central personnel agency of the Government[.]"  Its mandate is
48

to ensure that appointments in the civil service are generally made on the basis of merit and
fitness.  The Commission is tasked to strengthen the merit and rewards system in the civil
49

service  by administering and enforcing the "constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit
50

system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service[.]"51

The Constitution adopts the merit system to ensure that those appointed in the civil service are
competent.  This is to "eradicate the system of appointment to public office based on political
52

considerations and to eliminate . . . the element of partisanship and personal favoritism in making
appointments." 53

"The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government- owned or controlled corporations with original charters."  Thus, 54

all appointive local government employees are covered by civil service laws and rules.  Appointive
55

local government employees must possess the qualifications provided by law for the positions they
hold.56

The qualifications the appointee must satisfy depend on whether the position belongs to the career
service or the non-career service. Entrance in the career service is based on "merit and fitness to be
determined as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly technical
qualifications[.]"  On the other hand, entrance in the non-career service is based on criteria other
57

than the "usual tests of merit and fitness[.]" 58

Positions in the career service are further grouped into three (3) levels. The first level includes
positions requiring less than four (4) years of collegiate studies.  The second level includes positions
59

with duties requiring at least four (4) years of college work up to the Division Chief level.  The third
60

level includes positions in the Career Executive Service. 61

Candidates for appointment to first and second level positions are generally screened by the
Personnel Selection Board.  In local government units, the Personnel Selection Board is headed by
62

the local chief executive and is composed of members appointed by the sanggunian
concerned.  The Personnel Selection Board of each local government unit "assist[s] the local chief
63

executive in the judicious and objective selection of personnel for employment as well as . . .
promotion[.]" 64

The appointing authority in local government units, therefore, is the local chief executive who must
assess the merits of the Personnel Selection Board’s recommendation.  If heads of offices or
65

departments in a local government unit are appointed, majority of the members of the sanggunian
concerned must concur in the appointment.  Finally, the appointment must be submitted to the Civil
66

Service Commission for attestation within 30 days from the appointment’s issuance date. 67

For local government units, the appointment of an assessor is mandatory.  In the City Government
68

of Muntinlupa, the City Assessor is given the item of City Government Department Head III under the
City’s 2007 Personnel Schedule.  As provided in Section 472(a) of the Local Government Code of
69

1991, the assessor must possess the following qualifications:

SECTION 472. Qualifications, Powers and Duties. - (a) No person shall be appointed assessor
unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a resident of the local government unit concerned, of good
moral character, a holder of a college degree preferably in civil or mechanical engineering,
commerce, or any other related course from a recognized college or university, and a first grade civil
service eligible or its equivalent. He must have acquired experience in real property assessment
work or in any related field for at least five (5) years in the case of the city or provincial assessor, and
three (3) years in the case of the municipal assessor.

The 1997 Revised Qualification Standards Manual reiterates the following minimum qualifications for
the position of assessor:

Education : Bachelor’s degree preferably in Civil or

Mechanical Engineering, Commerce or any
related course
Experience : Five (5) years experience in real property
assessment work or in any related field
Training : None
Eligibility : First grade or its equivalent.70

The Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region and the Civil Service Commission agree that
respondent possesses the minimum qualifications under the law for the position of City Government
Department Head III:

A comparative evaluation of the qualifications of Dela Cruz as indicated in his Personal Data Sheet
(PDS) vis-à-vis the qualification standards for the position of City Assessor III shows that he meets
all the requirements for appointment thereto. Likewise, he satisfies the requirements prescribed by
RA 7160. Hence, Dela Cruz qualifies for the issuance of permanent appointment as City Assessor
III.

Moreover, the appointment of Dela Cruz was confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng
Muntinlupa in Resolution No. 06-361 dated December 7, 2006. 71

With its constitutional mandate, the Civil Service Commission has acquired "specialized knowledge
and expertise"  in the field of civil service law. Consequently, its findings of fact, if based on
72

substantial evidence, are "accorded great respect and even finality"  by appellate courts, this court
73
included. Absent grave abuse of discretion, this court will not disturb the findings of fact of the Civil
Service Commission. 74

II

Petitioner contends, however, that he is a qualified next-in-rank who was bypassed for appointment
to the position of City Government Department Head III. Thus, respondent’s appointment is void
notwithstanding his possession of the qualifications for the position.

In promotions,  the appointing authority must automatically consider the employees next in rank as
75

candidates for appointment. Section 21, paragraphs (2) and (3) of the Civil Service Law provide for
the next-in-rank rule:

SEC. 21. Recruitment and Selection of Employees. — . . .

(2)When a vacancy occurs in a position in the first level of the Career Service as defined in
Section 6, the employees in the department who occupy the next lower positions in the
occupational group under which the vacant position is classified, and in other functionally
related occupational groups and who are competent, qualified and with the appropriate civil
service eligibility shall be considered for promotion.

(3)When a vacancy occurs in a position in the second level of the Career Service as defined
in Section 8, the employees in the government service who occupy the next lower positions
in the occupational group under which the vacant position is classified and in other
functionally related occupational groups and who are competent, qualified and with the
appropriate civil service eligibility shall be considered for promotion. (Emphasis supplied)

"Promotion is the advancement of an employee from one position to another with an increase in
duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and usually accompanied by an increase in
salary."  Employees next in rank are those "who occupy the next lower positions in the occupational
76

group under which the vacant position is classified, and in other functionally related occupational
groups and who are competent, qualified and with the appropriate civil service eligibility[.]" 77

The reason behind the next-in-rank rule is to maintain the policy of merit and rewards in the civil
service.  Since appointments in the civil service are based on merit and fitness, it is assumed that
78

the appointments of employees next in rank are equally meritorious. Appointments that consider
rank, salary grades, and seniority promote progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service. 79

Still, the next-in-rank rule is a rule of preference on who to consider for promotion.  The rule does
80

not give employees next in rank a vested right to the position next higher to theirs should that
position become vacant.  Appointment is a discretionary power of the appointing authority.  So long
81 82

as the appointee possesses the qualifications required by law, the appointment is valid. 83

Who to appoint is "a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide."  For the betterment of government service, the appointing authority may
84

consider other "abstract criteria[,]"  aside from the minimum qualifications set by law in making
85

appointments. As this court explained in Cortez v. Civil Service Commission: 86

[M]any factors are taken into account in evaluating the qualifications of prospective appointees and
that formal examinations, work experience and educational attainment are only some of them. Such
abstract criteria as loyalty, cordiality, initiative, resourcefulness, discipline, and other personality
traits are also properly considered. When making this evaluation, the appointing authority should be
given the widest possible leeway and cannot be controlled by the Commission. . . .

....

As long as the appointee possesses the minimum qualifications prescribed by law or regulations,
there is no question that his appointment must be respected by the Civil Service Commission even if
it be proved that there are others with superior credentials.87

To successfully protest the issuance of an appointment, the employee next in rank must prove his or
her status as a qualified next-in-rank; otherwise, the protest shall be dismissed.  Being next in rank
88

is a legal conclusion that would be the result of inference from evidence properly alleged and
proven. The burden of proof rests on the employee alleging that he or she is next in rank. 89

Petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proving that he was a qualified next-in-rank. He failed to
prove that his position of Local Assessment Operations Officer V has been previously determined to
be next-in-rank to the position of City Government Department Head III in the Office of the City
Assessor of the City Government of Muntinlupa. 90

Petitioner, therefore, has no right to protest the appointment of respondent.

III

Petitioner further contends that respondent was appointed in violation of the three-salary-grade rule
found in Item 15 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 3, Series of 2001.
Therefore, respondent’s appointment should be recalled.

Item 15 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular, Series of 2001 on the three-salary-
grade rule states that "[a]n employee may be promoted or transferred to a position which is not more
than three (3) salary, pay or job grades higher than the employee’s present position[.]" However, this
rule is subject to the exception of "very meritorious cases." These "very meritorious cases" are
provided in Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 03-0106 dated January 24, 2003:

Any or all of the following would constitute a meritorious case exempted from the 3-salary grade
limitation on promotion:

1.The position occupied by the person is next-in- rank to the vacant position, as identified in
the Merit Promotion Plan and the System of Ranking Positions (SRP) of the agency[;]

2.The position is a lone, or entrance position, as indicated in the agency’s staffing pattern;

3.The position belongs to the dearth category, such as Medical Officer/Specialist positions
and Attorney positions;

4.The position is unique and/or highly specialized such as Actuarial positions and Airways
Communicator;

5.The candidates passed through a deep selection process, taking into consideration the
candidates’ superior qualifications in regard to:

Educational achievements Highly specialized trainings Relevant work experience

 Consistent high performance rating/ranking; and

6.The vacant position belongs to the closed career system.  (Emphasis supplied)
91

Consistent with the next-in-rank rule, the appointing authority shall consider for promotion qualified
next-in-rank employees. However, there are instances when the employees next in rank occupy
positions whose salary grades are more than three (3) grades lower than that corresponding to the
vacant position. These instances should not prevent the appointing authority from filling the vacancy,
but whoever is appointed must undergo a deep selection process and demonstrate his or her
superior qualifications and competence.  This is to maintain the standard of merit and fitness for
92

appointment in the civil service.

The Civil Service Commission found that respondent’s appointment fell under the fifth exception
provided in Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 03-0106 dated January 24, 2003.  Contrary to
93

petitioner’s claim, the Personnel Selection Board conducted a deep selection process, ranking the
candidates for the position of City Government Department Head III based on the following criteria:
performance, 25 points; work history, 25 points; awards, 5 points; education, 5 points; training, 10
points; potential, 10 points; and physical characteristics and personality traits, 20 points.

The document denominated as Merit Promotion and System of Ranking Position shows that out of
nine (9) candidates, respondent ranked first with a grade of 90.67 out of 100 points.  Respondent’s
94

case, therefore, is a "very meritorious case." His promotion from Local Assessment Operations
Officer III with Salary Grade 18 to City Government Department Head III with Salary Grade 27 is
valid.

IV

Even if petitioner were next in rank, he failed to present evidence conclusively showing that he was
not considered for promotion. The document denominated as Merit Promotion and System of
Ranking Position contains only nine (9) names; hence, it appears to be a short list of those ranked
for promotion. To be shortlisted, however, is different from being considered for promotion. Petitioner
might have been considered for promotion, but he did not make it to the short list. Absent contrary
evidence, the presumption that the City Government of Muntinlupa’s Personnel Selection Board
performed its duties with regularity applies.95

In any case, we cannot order the invalidation of respondent’s appointment in the present
proceedings. To do so would necessarily result in his removal from an office he has physically
possessed for almost nine (9) years. Respondent has been discharging the duties of the City
Assessor, at the very least, under a color of title to the position especially since he possesses the
qualifications for it. Analogous to a de facto officer, respondent’s title to his office may only be
attacked through a petition for quo warranto filed by the Government or by the person claiming title
to the office.  ·
96

In Tayko v. Capistrano,  this court held that "[t]he title of a de facto officer cannot be indirectly
97

questioned.... Having at least colorable right to the office[,] [the de facto officer's] title can be
determined only in a quo warranto proceeding or information in the nature of a quo warranto at suit
of the sovereign."98

Respondent possesses the minimum qualifications for the position of City Government Department
Head III. Moreover, his promotion from a Salary Grade 18 to a Salary Grade 27 position was a "very
meritorious case" since he has gone through a deep selection process. Respondent Herminio Dela
Cruz's appointment as City Government Department Head III, therefore, is valid.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision
dated April 11, 2012 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 78957 June 28, 1988

MARIO D. ORTIZ, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner presents before the Court the issue of whether or not a constitutional official whose "courtesy
resignation" was accepted by the President of the Philippines during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution may be entitled to retirement
benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended.

Petitioner was appointed Commissioner of the Commission on Elections [COMELEC] by then

President Ferdinand E. Marcos "for a term expiring May 17, 1992."   He took his oath of office on
1

July 30, 1985.

On March 5, 1986, together with Commissioners Quirino D. Marquinez and Mangontawar G. Guro,
petitioner sent President Corazon C. Aquino a letter which reads as follows:

The undersigned Commissioners were appointed to the Commission on Elections on

July 30, 1985.

Following the example of Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court, on the premise
that we have now a revolutionary government, we hereby place our position at your
disposal.  2

Thereafter, or on March 25,1986, the Freedom Constitution was promulgated through Proclamation
No. 3, Artide III thereof provides:

SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be given to

measures to promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and
corruption.

SEC. 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their
successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.

SEC. 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of the
reorganization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws then
in force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder.
On April 16,1986, the COMELEC, then composed of Chairman Ramon H. Felipe, Jr. and
Commissioners Froilan M. Bacungan, Quirino A. Marquinez, Mario D. Ortiz (petitioner herein),
Ruben E. Agpalo and Jaime J. Layosa, adopted Resolution No. 86-2364 approving the application
for retirement of Commissioners Victorino Savellano and Jaime Opinion. Seven days later, the same
body passed Resolution No. 862370 approving the application for retirement of Commissioner
Mangontawar B. Guro.

On July 21, 1986, the Deputy Executive Secretary requested Acting Chairman Felipe to convey the
information to Commissioners Marquinez, Ortiz, Agpalo and Layosa that the President had
"accepted, with regrets, their respective resignations, effective immediately."   After the presidential 3

acceptance of said "resignations," the new COMELEC was composed of Ramon H. Felipe, Jr. as
Chairman and Commissioners Froilan M. Bacungan, Leopoldo L. Africa, Haydee B. Yorac, Andres
R. Flores, Dario C, Rama and Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr., as members. It was to this body that
Commissioners Agpalo, Ortiz and Marquinez submitted on July 30, 1986 their respective
applications for retirement. They were followed by Commissioner Layosa on August 1, 1986.

To justify their petitions for retirement and their requests for payment of retirement benefits, all seven
former COMELEC Commissioners invoked Republic Act No. l568 as amended by Republic Act No.
3595 and re-enacted by Republic Act No. 6118, specifically the following provision:

SECTION 1. When the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the
Commission on Elections retires from the service for having completed his term of
office or by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, or dies while
in the service, or resigns at any time after reaching the age of sixty years but before
the expiration of his term of office, he or his heirs shall be paid in lump sum his salary
for one year, not exceeding five years, for every year of service based upon the last
annual salary that he was receiving at the time of retirement incapacity, death or
resignation, as the case may be: Provided, That in case of resignation, he has
rendered not less than twenty years of service in the government; And provided,
further, That he shall receive an annuity payable monthly during the residue of his
natural life equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the date
of retirement, incapacity or resignation.

In its en banc Resolution No. 86-2491 * of August 13, 1986   the COMELEC revoked Resolutions Nos. 86-2364 dated April
4

16, 1986 and 86-2370 dated April 23, 1986, and denied the applications for retirement of Commissioners Marquinez, Agpalo, Ortiz and
Layosa on the ground that they were "not entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended" without specifying the
reason therefor. 5

Petitioner Ortiz moved for the reconsideration of said resolution, contending that he was entitled to
the benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. He averred therein that he did not resign but
simply placed his position at the disposal of the President; that he had in fact completed his term as
Commissioner by the "change in the term of [his] office and eventual replacement," and that he was
entitled to retirement benefits under the aforementioned law because Article 1186 of the Civil Code
which states that "the condition [with regard to an obligation] shall be deemed fulfilled when the
obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment." He invoked the aforequoted provisions of Proclamation
No. 3 and cited the cases of former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and Associate Justice
Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. who were allowed to retire by this Court and receive retirement
benefits.  6

Petitioner's letter/motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc resolution
of October 1, 1986.** On December 18, 1986, petitioner appealed the denial of his claim to the Chairman of the Commission on Audit
[COA]. In its memorandum dated January 15, 1987, the COA referred the matter to the COMELEC resident auditor for comment and
recommendation. Having failed to receive any communication from the COA for some six months, on June 3, 1987, petitioner reiterated his
appeal thereto. Again, the matter was referred to the COMELEC resident auditor with a request for immediate action thereon.
A month later, or on July 9, 1987, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari alleging that the
COMELEC's "arbitrary and unjust denial" of his claim for retirement benefits and of his subsequent
motion for reconsideration constitutes "grave and whimsical abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction" which can only be remedied through the instant petition in the absence of an appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy.   In his memorandum, however, petitioner admits that, as
7

correctly stated by the Solicitor General in respondents' comment on the petition, this petition is
basically one for a writ of mandamus aimed at compelling both the COMELEC and the COA to
approve his claim for retirement benefits.  8

We consider this case as a special civil action of both certiorari and mandamus and, notwithstanding
the Solicitor General's contention that action herein is premature as the COA may yet render a
decision favorable to the petitioner, We opt to decide this case to shed light on the legal issue
presented.

The respondents posit the view that petitioner's "voluntary resignation" prevented the completion of
his term of office, and, therefore, having rendered only sixteen years of service to the government,
he is not entitled to retirement benefits. 9

We disagree. Petitioner's separation from government service as a result of the reorganization

ordained by the then nascent Aquino government may not be considered a resignation within the
contemplation of the law. Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by
which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it.   To constitute a complete and
10

operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or
surrender his position accompanied by the act of relinquishment.   Resignation implies an
11

expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender,
renounce and relinquish the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority.  12

From the foregoing it is evident that petitioner's "resignation" lacks the element of clear intention to
surrender his position. We cannot presume such intention from his statement in his letter of March 5,
1986 that he was placing his position at the disposal of the President. He did not categorically state
therein that he was unconditionally giving up his position. It should be remembered that said letter
was actually a response to Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino issued on February 25,1986
when she called on all appointive public officials to tender their "courtesy resignation" as a "first step
to restore confidence in public administration.

Verily, a "courtesy resignation" can lot properly be interpreted as resignation in the legal sense for it
is not necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his position. Rather, it
manifests his submission to the will of the political authority and the appointing power.

A stringent interpretation of courtesy resignations must therefore be observed, particularly in cases

involving constitutional officials like the petitioner whose removal from office entails an impeachment
proceeding.   For even if working for the government is regarded as no more than a privilege,
13

discharge for disloyalty or for doubt about loyalty may involve such legal rights as those in reputation
and eligibility for other employment. 14

The curtailment of his term not being attributable to any voluntary act on the part of the petitioner,
equity and justice demand that he should be deemed to have completed his term albeit much ahead
of the date stated in his appointment paper. Petitioner's case should be placed in the same category
as that of an official holding a primarily confidential position whose tenure ends upon his superior's
loss of confidence in him. His cessation from the service entails no removal but an expiration of his
term. 15
As he is deemed to have completed his term of office, petitioner should be considered retired from
the service. And, in the absence of proof that he has been found guilty of malfeasance or
misfeasance in office or that there is a pending administrative case against him, petitioner is entitled
to a life pension under Republic Act No. 1568 as amended and reenacted by Republic Act No. 6118.
He is, therefore, protected by the mantle of the Freedom Constitution specifically Article III, Section 3
thereof which was in effect when he was replaced by the appointment and qualification of a new
Commissioner.

Parenthetically, to a public servant, pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of deferred
compensation for services performed and his right thereto commences to vest upon his entry into
the retirement system and becomes an enforceable obligation in court upon fulfillment of all
conditions under which it is to be paid.   Similarly, retirement benefits receivable by public
16

employees are valuable parts of the consideration for entrance into and continuation in public
employment.   They serve a public purpose and a primary objective in establishing them is to induce
17

able persons to enter and remain in public employment, and to render faithful and efficient service
while so employed.  18

Worth noting is the fact that, as originally enacted, Republic Act No. 1568 required not less than
twenty years of service in the government at the time of the retirement, death or resignation of the
Auditor General or the Chairman and any Member of the COMELEC. The same length of service
was required after Republic Act No. 3473 amended the law. However, Republic Act No. 3595 further
amended Republic Act No. 1568 and the 20-year service requirement was mandated only in case of
resignation of the public official covered by the law. Although Republic Act No. 1568, as amended,
was inoperative and abolished in Section 9 of Republic Act No. 4968, it was re-enacted under
Republic Act No. 6118.

On the respondents' assertion that the retirement law is clear and hence, there is no room for its
interpretation, We reiterate the basic principle that, being remedial in character, a statute creating
pensions should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be
benefited thereby.   This is as it should be because the liberal approach aims to achieve the
19

humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security, and well-being of government
employees may be enhanced.  20

WHEREFORE, respondent Commission on Elections denial of petitioner's application for retirement

benefits is hereby reversed and set aside. The Commission on Audit and other public offices
concerned are directed to facilitate the processing and payment of petitioner's retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-3881             August 31, 1950

EDUARDO DE LOS SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
GIL R. MALLARE, LUIS P. TORRES, in his capacity as City Mayor, PANTALEON PIMENTEL, in
his capacity as City Treasurer and RAFAEL USON, in his capacity as City
Auditor, respondents.
Francisco S. Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Augusto Luciano for respondents.
Jose P. Laurel and Abelardo Subido as amici curiae.

TUASON, J.:

This is an original action of quo warranto questioning the legality of the appointment of respondent
Gil R. Mallare to the office of city engineer for the City of Baguio which the petitioner occupied and
claims to be still occupying. The real issue however is the legality of the petitioner's removal from the
same office which would be the effect of Mallare's appointment if the same be allowed to stand. It is
the petitioner's contention that under the Constitution he can not be removed against his will and
without cause. The complaint against the other respondents has to do merely with their recognition
of Mallare as the lawful holder of the disputed office and is entirely dependent upon the result of the
basic action against the last-mentioned respondent (Mallare).

Stripped of details unessential to the solution of the case, the facts are that Eduardo de los Santos,
the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the President,
appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the
23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position.
On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to the
same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and
Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment.
Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as
Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he
commenced these proceedings.

The petitioner rests his case on Article XII of the Constitution, section 4 of which reads: "No officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law."

It is admitted in respondents' answer that the City Engineer of Baguio "belongs to the unclassified
service." And this Court, in an exhaustive opinion by Mr. Justice Montemayor in the case of Lacson
vs. Romero, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778, involving the office of provincial fiscal, ruled that officers or
employees in the unclassified as well as those in the classified service are protected by the above-
cited provision of the organic law. But there is this difference between the Lacson case and the case
at bar: Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, which falls under Chapter 61 entitled "City
of Baguio," authorizes the Governor General (now the President) to remove at pleasure any of the
officers enumerated therein, one of whom is the city engineer. The first question that presents itself
is, is this provision still in force?

Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution declares that "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall
continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such
laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered,
modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, . . . ."

It seems plain beyond doubt that the provision of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code,
he (Governor-General now President) may remove at pleasure any of the said appointive officers," is
incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." The two provisions are mutually
repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable. One in express terms permits what the other in similar
terms prohibits.
The Constitution leaves it to the Congress to provide for the cause of removal, and it is suggested
that the President's pleasure is itself a cause. The phrase "for cause" in connection with the
removals of public officers has acquired a well-defined concept. "It means for reasons which the law
and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not
merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is
implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of removal,
or without any cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and affect the administration of the office,
and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests
of the public."(43 Am. Jur., 47, 48.)

Reconsideration of the decision in Lacson vs. Romero as far as officers in the unclassified service
are concerned is urged. It is contended that only officers and employees in the classified service
should be brought within the purview of Article XII of the Constitution.

Section 1 of this article ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the
Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as those which are
policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according
to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination." The first
clause is a definition of the scope of Civil Service, the men and women which section 4 protects. It
seems obvious from that definition that the entire Civil Service is contemplated, except positions
"which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature." This theory is
confirmed by the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 177 on November 30, 1936 to implement
Article XII of the Constitution. Commonwealth Act No. 177 explains Civil Service almost in the
identical words of that article of the organic law. As a contemporaneous construction, this Act affords
an index to the meaning of Civil Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution. "The
principle of contemporaneous construction may be applied to the construction given by the
legislature to the constitutional provisions dealing with legislative powers and procedure. Though not
conclusive, such interpretation is generally conceded as being entitled to great weight."
(U.S. vs. Sprague, 282 U.S., 716; 75 L. ed. 640; 51 S. Ct., 220; 71 A.L.R., 1381; Den ex dem.
Murray vs. Hoboken Land and Improv. Co., 18 How. [U.S.], 272; 15 L. ed., 372; Clark vs. Boyce, 20
Ariz., 544; 185 P., 136, citing R.C.L.; 11 Am. Jur. 699.) The principle of express mention and implied
exclusion may be made use of also to drive home this point.

We are led to the same conclusion by the existing provisions at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution. Civil Service as embracing both classes of officers and employees possessed definite
legal and statutory meaning when the Constitution was approved. Section 670 of the Revised
Administrative Code already provided that "Persons in the Philippine civil service pertain either to the
classified service," and went on to say that "The classified service embraces all not expressly
declared to be in the unclassified service." Then section 671 described persons in the unclassified
service as "officers, other than the provincial treasurers and assistant directors of bureaus or offices,
appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the government whose appointments are by law
vested in the President of the Philippines alone."

The rules of the construction inform us that the words use in the constitution are to be given the
sense they have in common use. (Okanogan Indians vs. United States, 279, U.S., 665; 64 A.L.R.,
1434; 73 Law ed., 894.) It has been said that we must look to the history of the times, examine the
state of things existing when the Constitution was framed and adopted, (Rhode
Islands vs. Massachusetts, 12 Pet., 657; 9 Law ed., 1233), and interpret it in the light of the law then
in operation. (Mattox vs. United States, 156, U.S., 237; 39 Law ed., 409.)
Attention is drawn to supposed inconveniences of tying the hands of the appointing power in
changing and shifting officers in the unclassified service. "If — it is argued — all important officers
and employees of the government falling within the unclassified service as enumerated in section
671 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 177, may not be
removed by the President except for cause as provided by law, . . . the President would be seriously
crippled in the discharge of the grave duty and responsibility laid upon him by the Constitution to
take care that the laws faithfully executed."

Questions of expediency are, of course, beyond the province of the court to take into account in the
interpretation of laws or of the Constitution where the language is otherwise clear. But the argument
is, we think, unsound even if the case be approached from this angle. It contains its own refutation.
The Constitution and the law implementing it afford adequate safeguards against such
consequences as have been painted.

The argument proceeds, contrary to its context, on the assumption that removes of civil service
officers and employees are absolutely prohibited, which is not the case. The Constitution authorizes
removals and only requires that they be for cause. And the occasions for removal would be greatly
diminished if the injunction of section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution — that appointments in the
civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable
by competitive examination — would be adhered of meticulously in the first place.

By far greater mischiefs would be fomented by an unbridled authority to remove. Such license would
thwart the very aims of the Constitution which are expounded by Dean Aruego, himself a member of
the Constitutional Convention, in the following remarks copied with approval in Lacson vs.
Romero, supra:

The adoption of the "merit system" in government service has secured efficiency and social
justice. It eliminates the political factor in the selection of civil employees which is the first
essential to an efficient personnel system. It insures equality of opportunity to all deserving
applicants desirous of a career in the public service. It advocates a new concept of the public
office as a career open to all and not the exclusive patrimony of any party or faction to be
doled out as a reward for party service.

The "merit system" was adopted only after the nations of the world took cognizance of its
merits. Political patronage in the government service was sanctioned in 1879 by the
Constitutional right of President of the United States to act alone in the matter of removals.
From the time of Andrew Jackson the principle of the "To the victor belongs the spoils'
dominated the Federal Government. The system undermined moral values and destroyed
administrative efficiency.

Since the establishment of the American Regime in the Philippines we have enjoyed the
benefits of the "merit system." The Schurmann Commission advocated in its reports that "the
greatest care should be taken in the selection of the officials for administration. They should
be men of the highest character and fitness, and partisan politics should be entirely
separated from the government." The fifth act passed by the Philippine Commission created
a Board of Civil Service. It instituted a system here that was far more radical and thorough
than that in the United States. The Governor-General after William Taft adopted the policy of
appointing Filipinos in the government regardless of their party affiliation. As the result of
these the personnel of the Civil Service had gradually come to be one of which the people of
the United States could feel justly proud.
 Necessity for Constitutional provision. — The inclusion in the constitution of provisions
regarding the "merit system" is a necessity of modern times. As its establishment secures
good government the citizens have a right to accept its guarantee as a permanent institution.

Separation, suspension, demotions and transfers. — The "merit system" will be ineffective if
no safeguards are placed around the separation and removal of public employees. The
Committee's report requires that removals shall be made only for "causes and in the manner
provided by law. This means that there should be bona fide reasons and action maybe taken
only after the employee shall have been given a fair hearing. This affords the public
employees reasonable security of tenure. (II Aruego's Framing of the Constitution, 886, 887,
890.)

As has been seen, three specified classes of positions — policy-determining, primarily confidential
and highly technical — are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and
employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These positions involved the highest
degree of confidence, or are closely bound out with and dependent on other positions to which they
are subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service itself
demands that appointments coming under this category determinable at the will of the officer that
makes them.

The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical.

Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the
occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in
the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal
trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city
engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any its subdivisions. His job is
to execute policy, not to make it. With specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers
and duties are carefully laid down for him be section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and
are essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly
so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or training in the
supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly technical" is, we believe, employed
in the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service whose
technical competence is not lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city
engineer are eminently administrative in character and could very well be discharged by non-
technical men possessing executive ability.

Section 10 of Article VIII of the Constitution requires that "All cases involving the constitutionality of a
treaty or law shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court in banc," and warns that "no treaty or
law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the
Court." The question arises as to whether this judgment operates as invalidation of section 2545 of
the Revised Administrative Code or a part of it so as to need at least eight votes to make effective.
The answer should be in negative.

We are not declaring any part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code unconstitutional.
What we declare is that the particular provision thereof which gave the Chief Executive power to
remove officers at pleasure has been repealed by the Constitution and ceased to be operative from
the time that instrument went into effect. Unconstitutionally, as we understand it, denotes life and
vigor, and unconstitutional legislation presupposes posteriority in point of time to the Constitution. It
is a statute that "attempts to validate and legalize a course of conduct the effect of which the
Constitution specifically forbids (State ex-rel. Mack vs. Guckenberger, 139 Ohio St., 273; 39 NE.
[2d], 840.) A law that has been repealed is as good as if it had never been enacted, and can not, in
the nature of things, contravene or pretend to contravene constitutional inhibition. So, unlike
legislation that is passed in defiance of the Constitution, assertive and menacing, the questioned
part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code does not need a positive declaration of
nullity by the court to put it out of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent, outlawed
and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate before this
petitioner was appointed.

Incidentally, the last discussion answers and disposes of the proposition that in accepting
appointment under section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioner must be deemed
to have accepted the conditions and limitations attached to the appointment. If the clause of section
2545 which authorized the President to remove officers of the City of Baguio at pleasure had been
abrogated when petitioner's appointment was issued, the appointee can not presumed to have
abided by this condition.

We therefore hold that the petitioner is entitled to remain in office as City Engineer of Baguio with all
the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he resigns or is removed for cause,
and that respondent Mallare's appointment is ineffective in so far as it may adversely affect those
emoluments, rights and privileges. Without costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, and Montemayor, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 142801-802      July 10, 2001

BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB, CESAR POSADA, REMEDIOS G. PRINCESA, BENJAMIN KHO,

BENIGNO MANGA, LULU MENDOZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO B. ZAMORA, HON. SECRETARY JOSE PARDO,
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, HON. SECRETARY BENJAMIN DIOKNO, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. SECRETARY ARTEMIO TUQUERO, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, respondents.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, petitioners Buklod Ng Kawaning EIIB, Cesar
Posada, Remedios Princesa, Benjamin Kho, Benigno Manga and Lulu Mendoza, for themselves and
in behalf of others with whom they share a common or general interest, seek the nullification
of Executive Order No. 1911 and Executive Order No. 2232 on the ground that they were issued by
the Office of the President with grave abuse of discretion and in violation of their constitutional right
to security of tenure.

The facts are undisputed:

On June 30, 1987, former President Corazon C. Aquino, issued Executive Order No.
1273 establishing the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the structural
organization of the Ministry of Finance.4 The EIIB was designated to perform the following functions:

"(a) Receive, gather and evaluate intelligence reports and information and evidence on the
nature, modes and extent of illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not
 limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, and dollar-salting, investigate the
same and aid in the prosecution of cases;

(b) Coordinate with external agencies in monitoring the financial and economic activities of
persons or entities, whether domestic or foreign, which may adversely affect national
financial interest with the goal of regulating, controlling or preventing said activities;

(c) Provide all intelligence units of operating Bureaus or Offices under the Ministry with the
general framework and guidelines in the conduct of intelligence and investigating works;

(d) Supervise, monitor and coordinate all the intelligence and investigation operations of the
operating Bureaus and Offices under the Ministry;

(e) Investigate, hear and file, upon clearance by the Minister, anti-graft and corruption cases
against personnel of the Ministry and its constituents units;

(f) Perform such other appropriate functions as may be assigned by the Minister or his
deputies."5

In a desire to achieve harmony of efforts and to prevent possible conflicts among agencies in the
course of their anti-smuggling operations, President Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 225 on
March 17, 1989, providing, among others, that the EIIB "shall be the agency of primary responsibility
for anti-smuggling operations in all land areas and inland waters and waterways outside the areas of
sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs."6

Eleven years after, or on January 7, 2000, President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No.
191 entitled "Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau."7 Motivated by the
fact that "the designated functions of the EIIB are also being performed by the other existing
agencies of the government" and that "there is a need to constantly monitor the overlapping of
functions" among these agencies, former President Estrada ordered the deactivation of EIIB and the
transfer of its functions to the Bureau of Customs and the National Bureau of Investigation.

Meanwhile, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 196 8 creating the Presidential Anti-
Smuggling Task Force "Aduana."9

Then the day feared by the EIIB employees came. On March 29, 2000, President Estrada issued
Executive Order No. 22310 providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein
shall be deemed separated from the service effective April 30, 2000, pursuant to a bona
fide reorganization resulting to abolition, redundancy, merger, division, or consolidation of positions. 11

Agonizing over the loss of their employment, petitioners now come before this Court invoking our
power of judicial review of Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223. They anchor their petition on the
following arguments:

"A

Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223 should be annulled as they are unconstitutional for
being violative of Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the Philippine Constitution and/or for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
 B.

The abolition of the EIIB is a hoax. Similarly, if Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223 are
considered to effect a reorganization of the EIIB, such reorganization was made in bad
faith.

C.

The President has no authority to abolish the EIIB."

Petitioners contend that the issuance of the afore-mentioned executive orders is: (a) a violation of
their right to security of tenure; (b) tainted with bad faith as they were not actually intended to make
the bureaucracy more efficient but to give way to Task Force "Aduana," the functions of which are
essentially and substantially the same as that of EIIB; and (c) a usurpation of the power of Congress
to decide whether or not to abolish the EIIB.

Arguing in behalf of respondents, the Solicitor General maintains that: (a) the President enjoys the
totality of the executive power provided under Sections 1 and 7, Article VII of the Constitution, thus,
he has the authority to issue Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223; (b) the said executive orders were
issued in the interest of national economy, to avoid duplicity of work and to streamline the functions
of the bureaucracy; and (c) the EIIB was not "abolished," it was only "deactivated."

The petition is bereft of merit.

Despite the presence of some procedural flaws in the instant petition, such as, petitioners' disregard
of the hierarchy of courts and the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, we deem it necessary
to address the issues. It is in the interest of the State that questions relating to the status and
existence of a public office be settled without delay. We are not without precedent. In Dario v.
Mison,12 we liberally decreed:

"The Court disregards the questions raised as to procedure, failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, the standing of certain parties to sue, for two reasons, `[b]ecause of the
demands of public interest, including the need for stability in the public service,' and
because of the serious implications of these cases on the administration of the Philippine
civil service and the rights of public servants."

At first glance, it seems that the resolution of this case hinges on the question - Does the
"deactivation" of EIIB constitute "abolition" of an office? However, after coming to terms with the
prevailing law and jurisprudence, we are certain that the ultimate queries should be – a) Does the
President have the authority to reorganize the executive department? and, b) How should the
reorganization be carried out?

Surely, there exists a distinction between the words "deactivate" and "abolish." To
"deactivate" means to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or reassigning
personnel,13 while to "abolish" means to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy completely. 14 In
essence, abolition denotes an intention to do away with the office wholly and permanently.15 Thus,
while in abolition, the office ceases to exist, the same is not true in deactivation where the office
continues to exist, albeit remaining dormant or inoperative. Be that as it may, deactivation and
abolition are both reorganization measures.
The Solicitor General only invokes the above distinctions on the mistaken assumption that the
President has no power to abolish an office.

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the
legislature.16 This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. 17 Thus,
except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence.18

The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department
are concerned, the President's power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a
particular office,19 or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization
measures.20 The case in point is Larin v. Executive Secretary.21 In this case, it was argued that there
is no law which empowers the President to reorganize the BIR. In decreeing otherwise, this Court
sustained the following legal basis, thus:

"Initially, it is argued that there is no law yet which empowers the President to issue E.O. No.
132 or to reorganize the BIR.

We do not agree.

x x x      x x x

Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:

'Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive
Branch. – The heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed
to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public
services and which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished, subject to civil service
rules and regulations. X x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities
shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the
President.'

Said provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of
offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless,
the act of creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62
which provides that:

'Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational charges. - Unless otherwise created by law or directed

by the President of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any
department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organization structures and be
funded from appropriations by this Act.' (italics ours)

The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect
organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency
concerned.

x x x      x x x

Another legal basis of E.O. No. 132 is Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which states:
 'Sec. 20. Residual Powers. – Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall
exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for
under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated
by the President in accordance with law.' (italic ours)

This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law.
What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772
which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies,
to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and
activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees are
unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent
with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. So far,
there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees." (Emphasis supplied)

Now, let us take a look at the assailed executive order.

In the whereas clause of E.O. No. 191, former President Estrada anchored his authority to
deactivate EIIB on Section 77 of Republic Act 8745 (FY 1999 General Appropriations Act), a
provision similar to Section 62 of R.A. 7645 quoted in Larin, thus;

"Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by the

President of the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in any
department or agency shall be authorized in their respective organizational structures and
funded from appropriations provided by this Act."

We adhere to the precedent or ruling in Larin that this provision recognizes the authority of the
President to effect organizational changes in the department or agency under the executive
structure. Such a ruling further finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. 22 Under this
law, the heads of departments, bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in the Executive
Branch are directed (a) to conduct a comprehensive review of their respective mandates, missions,
objectives, functions, programs, projects, activities and systems and procedures; (b) identify
activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled
down, phased-out or abolished; and (c) adopt measures that will result in the streamlined
organization and improved overall performance of their respective agencies. 23 Section 78 ends up
with the mandate that the actual streamlining and productivity improvement in agency organization
and operation shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the
Office of the President.24 The law has spoken clearly. We are left only with the duty to sustain.

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or
agency in the executive branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very
source of the power – that which constitutes an express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III
of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President,
subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to
achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize
the administrative structure of the Office of the President." For this purpose, he may transfer the
functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v.
Aguirre,25 we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place
when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including
the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance.26 It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the
President's continuing authority to reorganize.

It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry out reorganization in any
branch or agency of the executive department, what is then left for us to resolve is whether or not
the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided
they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out in 'good faith' if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. 27 Pertinently, Republic Act No. 665628 provides for
the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service
employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the
number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an
office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where
incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices, and (e) where the
removal violates the order of separation.29

Petitioners claim that the deactivation of EIIB was done in bad faith because four days after its
deactivation, President Estrada created the Task Force Aduana.

We are not convinced.

An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders 30 shows that the deactivation of EIIB and the
creation of Task Force Aduana were done in good faith. It was not for the purpose of removing the
EIIB employees, but to achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which is economy. While Task
Force Aduana was created to take the place of EIIB, its creation does not entail expense to the
government.

Firstly, there is no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force. E.O. No. 196
provides that the technical, administrative and special staffs of EIIB are to be composed of
people who are already in the public service, they being employees of other existing
agencies. Their tenure with the Task Force would only be temporary, i.e., only when the
agency where they belong is called upon to assist the Task Force. Since their employment
with the Task force is only by way of detail or assignment, they retain their employment with
the existing agencies. And should the need for them cease, they would be sent back to the
agency concerned.

Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have a small group of military men under the direct control
and supervision of the President as base of the government's anti-smuggling campaign. Such a
smaller base has the necessary powers 1) to enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, or
office and to use their respective personnel, facilities and resources; and 2) "to select and recruit
personnel from within the PSG and ISAFP for assignment to the Task Force." Obviously, the idea
is to encourage the utilization of personnel, facilities and resources of the already existing
departments, agencies, bureaus, etc., instead of maintaining an independent office with a
whole set of personnel and facilities. The EIIB had proven itself burdensome for the government
because it maintained separate offices in every region in the Philippines.

And thirdly, it is evident from the yearly budget appropriation of the government that the creation of
the Task Force Aduana was especially intended to lessen EIIB's expenses. Tracing from the yearly
General Appropriations Act, it appears that the allotted amount for the EIIB's general administration,
support, and operations for the year 1995, was P128,031,000;31 for 1996, P182,156,000;32 for
1998, P219,889,000;33 and, for 1999, P238,743,000.34 These amounts were far above
the P50,000,00035 allocation to the Task Force Aduana for the year 2000.

While basically, the functions of the EIIB have devolved upon the Task Force Aduana, we find the
latter to have additional new powers. The Task Force Aduana, being composed of elements from the
Presidential Security Group (PSG) and Intelligence Service Armed Forces of the Philippines
(ISAFP),36 has the essential power to effect searches, seizures and arrests. The EIIB did not have
this power. The Task Force Aduana has the power to enlist the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations; and to use their personnel, facilities and resources. Again, the EIIB did not have this
power. And, the Task Force Aduana has the additional authority to conduct investigation of cases
involving ill-gotten wealth. This was not expressly granted to the EIIB. 1âwphi1.nêt

Consequently, it cannot be said that there is a feigned reorganization. In Blaquera v. Civil Sevice
Commission, 37 we ruled that a reorganization in good faith is one designed to trim the fat off the
bureaucracy and institute economy and greater efficiency in its operation.

Lastly, we hold that petitioners' right to security of tenure is not violated. Nothing is better settled in
our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good
faith suffers from no infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the
incumbents.38 In the instructive words laid down by this Court in Dario v. Mison,39 through Justice
Abraham F. Sarmiento:

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in
case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to
exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it
may, if the 'abolition,' which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political
reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, otherwise not in good faith, no valid
'abolition' takes and whatever 'abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid 'abolition'
as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds.

Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold office. Except constitutional offices which
provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested
right in an office or its salary.40

While we cast a commiserating look upon the plight of all the EIIB employees whose lives perhaps
are now torn with uncertainties, we cannot ignore the unfortunate reality that our government is also
battling the impact of a plummeting economy. Unless the government is given the chance to
recuperate by instituting economy and efficiency in its system, the EIIB will not be the last agency to
suffer the impact. We cannot frustrate valid measures which are designed to rebuild the executive
department.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

-
G.R. No. 157684. April 27, 2005

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Petitioners,
vs.
PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE L. PEREZ, and IMELDA Q. AGUSTIN, Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions, the disciplining
authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its face, a decision
imposing administrative sanctions must show the bases for its conclusions. While the investigation of
a case may be delegated to and conducted by another body or group of officials, the disciplining
authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered and indicate the applicable law. In this
manner, the respondents would be informed of the bases for the sanctions and thus be able to
prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure is part of the sporting idea of fair play in a
democracy.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 19, 2003
1 

Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 67720. The challenged Decision disposed
2 

as follows:

"WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the

CSC are hereby SET ASIDE.

"The Department of Health is hereby ordered to:

"1) Reinstate petitioners without loss of seniority rights but without prejudice to an administrative
investigation that may be undertaken against them by the DOH should the evidence warrant; and

"2) Pay petitioners their back salaries from the time their preventive suspension expired. Mandatory
leave credits shall not be charged against their leave credits."3

The Facts

The facts are narrated by the CA as follows:

"[Respondents] are former employees of the Department of Health–National Capital Region

(hereinafter DOH-NCR). They held various positions as follows: [Respondent] Priscilla B.
Camposano (hereinafter Camposano) was the Finance and Management Officer II, [Respondent]
Imelda Q. Agusin (hereinafter Agustin) was an Accountant I, and [Respondent] Enrique L. Perez
(hereinafter Perez) was the Acting Supply Officer III.

"On May 15, 1996, some concerned [DOH-NCR] employees filed a complaint before the DOH
Resident Ombudsman Rogelio A. Ringpis (hereinafter the Resident Ombudsman) against Dir. IV
Rosalinda U. Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and [respondents], arising
out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg.
with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth ₱330,000.00 from Lumar Pharmaceutical
Laboratory on May 13, 1996.

"On August 6, 1996, the Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of
Health recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct against [respondents] and their co-respondents.

"On August 8, 1996, the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge against the [respondents] and their
co-respondents for Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019. On October 25, 1996,
then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Administrative Order No. 298 (hereafter AO 298)
creating an ad-hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the DOH-NCR
employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(hereafter PCAGC) on October 26, 1996. The same reads:

‘I have the honor to transmit herewith, for your information and guidance, a certified copy of
Administrative Order No. 298 dated October 25, 1996 entitled ‘CREATING AN AD HOC
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES FILED AGAINST NCR HEALTH
DIRECTOR ROSALINDA U. MAJARAIS AND OTHER OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION.’

"On December 2, 1996, the PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH. After the
investigation, it issued a resolution on January 23, 1998 disposing [respondents]’ case as follows:

‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission finds Respondents Rosalinda U. Majarais,

Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial Management Chief II, Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting Administrative
Officer V, Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I and Enrique L. Perez, Acting Supply Officer III, all of the
Department of Health – National Capital Region (DOH-NCR) guilty as charged and so recommends
to his Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos that the penalty of dismissal from the government
service be imposed thereon.

‘SO ORDERED.’

"On April 20, 1998, President Ramos issued [Administrative Order No. 390 (hereinafter AO 390)]
that reads:

‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr. Rosalinda U. Majarais is hereby found guilty
as charged and, as recommended by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption, is
meted the Penalty of dismissal from the service. The records of the case with respect to the other
respondents are remanded to Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica, Department of Health for
appropriate action.’

"Thereafter, on May 8, 1998, the Secretary of Health issued an Order disposing of the case against
[respondents] and [Horacio Cabrera]. The dispositive portion reads:

‘WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the Presidential Commission Against Graft
and Corruption (PCAGC) dated 23 January 1998 on the above-captioned case, respondents Priscilla
G. Camposano, Financial Management Chief II, Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting Administrative Officer V,
Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I and Enrique L. Perez, Acting Supply Officer III, all of the
Department of Health – NCR are hereby DISMISSED from the service.

‘SO ORDERED.’
"On May 28, 1998 [respondents] filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order. The Secretary
of Health denied the same on June 5, 1998. Thus, [respondents] filed a Notice of Appeal on June
29, 1998.

"On July 17, 1998, [respondents] filed their appeal with the CSC. The appeal was denied by the CSC
on May 21, 1999. Horacio Cabrera filed a separate appeal with the CSC which was denied on
August 17, 1999. [Respondents]’ motion for reconsideration was denied on September 30, 1999.
While Cabrera’s motion for reconsideration was denied on January 27, 2000. [Respondents],
however, received the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration on November 2001. Thus,
Horacio Cabrera was able to appeal to [the CA] the CSC’s resolutions ahead of [respondents]. The
petition of Cabrera was granted [by the CA] in a decision dated October 15, 2001 with a dispositive
portion which reads:

‘WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Assailed Resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission are hereby SET ASIDE.

‘Petitioner Horacio D. Cabrera is exonerated of the administrative charges against him. The Civil
Service Commission is hereby ORDERED[:]

‘(1) To reinstate petitioner immediately, without loss of seniority rights; and

‘(2) To pay petitioner’s back salaries from the time his preventive suspension expired. Mandatory
leave credits shall not be charged against his leave credits.

‘SO ORDERED.’" 4

Not satisfied with the denial by the CSC (Civil Service Commission) of their appeal, respondents
brought the matter to the CA.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

While the herein assailed Decision made no reference to the separate appeal of Horacio Cabrera,
the CA nonetheless used the same legal bases for annulling the CSC’s Resolution against
respondents. 5

The appellate court held that the PCAGC’s jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only
to presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no power to investigate the charges against
respondents. Moreover, in simply and completely relying on the PCAGC’s findings, the secretary of
6 

health failed to comply with administrative due process. 7

Hence, this Petition. 8

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following grounds for our consideration:

"I

The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAGC) did not have jurisdiction to investigate the anomalous transaction involving respondents.
"II

The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the authority to investigate and decide was
relinquished by the Secretary of Health and that the Secretary of Health merely performed a
mechanical act when she ordered the dismissal of respondents from government service.

"III

The Court of Appeals erred in ignoring the fact that an exhaustive investigation was already
conducted by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) which resulted in
the finding that the anomalous contract for the purchase of medicines without the required public
bidding is patently illegal." 9

The second and the third grounds will be discussed together, as they are necessarily intertwined.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Jurisdiction to Investigate

Executive Order (EO) No. 151 granted the PCAGC the jurisdiction to investigate administrative
10 

complaints against presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and corruption. From a cursory
reading of its provisions, it is evident that EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to investigate charges
against presidential, not non-presidential, appointees. In its Preamble, specifically in its "Whereas"
clauses, the EO "specifically tasked [the PCAGC] to x x x investigate presidential appointees
charged with graft and corruption x x x." More pointedly, Section 3 states that the "Commission shall
have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints involving graft and corruption filed in any form or
manner against presidential appointees x x x." We quote the pertinent provisions below:

"Section 3. Jurisdiction. – The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints
involving graft and corruption filed in any form or manner against presidential appointees, including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations." (emphasis supplied)

"Section 4. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Commission shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:

"(a) Investigation – The Commission shall have the power to investigate administrative complaints
against presidential appointees in the executive department of the government, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, charged with graft and corruption. In the exercise
thereof, the Commission is (1) authorized to summon witnesses, administer oaths, or take testimony
or evidence relevant to the investigation by subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum,
and do such other acts necessary and incidental to the discharge of its function and duty to
investigate the said administrative complaints; and (2) empowered to call upon and secure the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, agency, or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

"The Commission shall confine itself to cases of graft and corruption involving one or a combination
of the following criteria:
"1. Presidential appointees with the rank equivalent to or higher than an Assistant Regional Director;

"2. The amount involved is at least Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00);

"3. Those which threaten grievous harm or injury to the national interest; and

"4. Those which may be assigned to it by the President. 11

"The Commission may refer to the Office of the Ombudsman, when warranted and necessary, any
case calling for the investigation and/or prosecution of the party or parties concerned for violation of
anti-graft and corruption laws.

"Administrative investigation of complaints against presidential appointees currently undertaken by

various presidential committees or government agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations shall continue notwithstanding the creation and organization of the Commission. This,
however, shall be without prejudice to the Commission, in its discretion, taking over the investigation
if the matter under investigation is within its jurisdiction.

"(b) Coordination – The Commission shall coordinate with different government agencies for the
purpose of eradicating opportunities and the climate favorable to the commission of graft and
corruption. x x x." (emphasis supplied)
12 

On the basis of the foregoing verba legis approach, respondents claim that the PCAGC did not have
jurisdiction over them, because they were not presidential appointees.

The Court notes, however, that respondents were not investigated pursuant to EO 151. The
investigation was authorized under Administrative Order No. 298 dated October 25, 1996, which had
created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into the administrative charges filed against Director
Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano, Horacio D. Cabrera, Imelda Q. Agustin and Enrique
L. Perez.

The Investigating Committee was composed of all the members of the PCAGC: Chairman Eufemio
C. Domingo, Commissioner Dario C. Rama and Commissioner Jaime L. Guerrero. The Committee
was directed by AO 298 to "follow the procedure prescribed under Section 38 to 40 of the Civil
Service Law (PD 807), as amended." It was tasked to "forward to the Disciplining Authority the entire
records of the case, together with its findings and recommendations, as well as the draft decision for
the approval of the President."

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted.
Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents
belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully
comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such
13 

validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same
composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.

Parenthetically, the perceived vacuum in EO 151 with regard to cases involving non-presidential
appointees was rectified in Executive Order No. 12, which created the Presidential Anti-Graft
14 

Commission (PAGC). Non-presidential appointees who may have acted in conspiracy, or who may
have been involved with a presidential appointee, may now be investigated by the PAGC. 15

Second and Third Issues:

Validity of Health Secretary’s Decision

The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the former’s
jurisdiction. Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents.
16 

Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was under the jurisdiction of the
President, in line with the principle that the "power to remove is inherent in the power to
appoint." While the Chief Executive directly dismissed her from the service, he nonetheless
17 

recognized the health secretary’s disciplinary authority over respondents when he remanded the
PCAGC’s findings against them for the secretary’s "appropriate action." 18

As a matter of administrative procedure, a department secretary may utilize other officials to

investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be based. In the present case, the
19 

secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to the PCAGC.

Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298
had the power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to
conducting investigations and preparing their findings and recommendations. The power to impose
sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who had to observe due process prior to imposing
penalties.

Due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles:
(1) the respondents’ right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit
supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3)
the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have
acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply
accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that
respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved. 20

The CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the present factual
milieu. Noncompliance with the sixth requisite is equally evident from the health secretary’s Order
dismissing the respondents thus:

"ORDER

"This refers to the Resolution of the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption
(PCAG[C]) on the above captioned case dated January 23, 1998, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission finds Respondents Rosalinda U. Majarais,

Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial Management Chief II, [Horacio] D. Cabrera, Acting Supply Officer
III, all of the Department of Health–National Capital Region (DOH-NCR) guilty as charged and so
recommends to his Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos that the penalty of dismissal from the
government be imposed thereon."

"Acting on the aforequoted resolution of the PCAGC[,] His Excellency President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Administrative Order No. 390 dated [A]pril 20, 1998, resolving thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr. Rosalinda U. Majarais is hereby found guilty
as charged and, as recommended by the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption, is
meted the penalty of dismissal from the service. The records of the case with respect to the other
respondents are remanded to Secretary Carmencita N. Reodica, Department of Health for
appropriate action."

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the Presidential Commission Against Graft
and Corruption (PCAGC) dated January 23, 1998 on the above captioned case, respondents
Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial Management Chief II; Horacio D. Cabrera, Acting Administrative
Officer V; Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I; and Enrique G. Perez, Acting Supply Officer III; all of the
Department of Health–NCR, are hereby DISMISSED from the service." 21

Concededly, the health secretary has the competence and the authority to decide what action should
be taken against officials and employees who have been administratively charged and investigated.
However, the actual exercise of the disciplining authority’s prerogative requires a
prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement
results in an invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an
investigator’s recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered. There
can be no shortcuts, because at stake are the honor, the reputation, and the livelihood of the person
administratively charged.

In the present case, the health secretary’s two-page Order dismissing respondents pales in
comparison with the presidential action with regard to Dr. Majarais. Prior to the issuance of his
seven-page decision, President Fidel V. Ramos conducted a restudy of the doctor’s case. He even
noted a violation that had not been considered by the PCAGC. On the other hand, Health Secretary
22 

Carmencita N. Reodica simply and blindly relied on the dispositive portion of the Commission’s
Resolution. She even misquoted it by inadvertently omitting the recommendation with regard to
Respondents Enrique L. Perez and Imelda Q. Agustin.

The Order of Secretary Reodica denying respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration also failed to
correct the deficiency in the initial Order. She improperly relied on the President’s findings in AO
23 

390 which, however, pertained only to the administrative charge against Dr. Majarais, not against
respondents. To repeat, the Chief Executive recognized that the disciplinary jurisdiction over
respondents belonged to the health secretary, who should have followed the manner in which the
24 

President had rendered his action on the recommendation.

The President’s endorsement of the records of the case for the "appropriate action" of the health
secretary did not constitute a directive for the immediate dismissal of respondents. Like that of
25 

President Ramos, the decision of Secretary Reodica should have contained a factual finding and a
legal assessment of the controversy to enable respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and
thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently, if they so desired.

To support its position, petitioner cites American Tobacco Co. v. Director of Patents. However, this
26 

case merely authorized the delegation of the power to investigate, but not the authority to impose
sanctions. Verily, in requiring the disciplining authority to exercise its own judgment and discretion in
deciding a case, American Tobacco supports the present respondents’ cause. In that case, the
petitioners objected to the appointment of hearing officers and sought the personal hearing of their
case by the disciplining authority. The Court, however, sustained the right to delegate the power to
27 

investigate, as long as the adjudication would be made by the deciding authority.

By the same token, the Constitution grants the Supreme Court disciplinary authority over all lower
28 

court justices and judges, as well as judicial employees and lawyers. While the investigation of
administrative complaints is delegated usually to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) or the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the Court nonetheless makes its own judgments of the cases
29 

when sanctions are imposed. It does not merely adopt or solely rely on the recommendations of the
OCA or the IBP.

Inasmuch as the health secretary’s twin Orders were patently void for want of due process, the CA
did not err in refusing to discuss the merit of the PCAGC’s (or the Ad Hoc Committee’s)
recommendations. Such a discussion should have been made by the health secretary before it could
be passed upon by the CA.

In representation of petitioner, the Office of the Solicitor General insists that respondents are guilty of
the charges and, like Dr. Majarais, deserve dismissal from the service. Suffice it to stress that the
issue in this case is not the guilt of respondents, but solely due process.

In closing, the Court reiterates the oft-quoted aphorism that the end does not justify the means. Guilt
cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first observed. This is the
essence of fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
is MODIFIED in the sense that the authority of the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under
Administrative Order 298 is SUSTAINED. Being violative of administrative due process, the May 8,
1998 and the June 5, 1998 Orders of the health secretary are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Let the
records of this case be REMANDED to the Department of Health, so that proper steps can be taken
to correct the due-process errors pointed out in this Decision.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.