Sciences are distinguished by a "methodological naturalism," which ignores the talk of divine

agency. A variety of philosophers have provided pragmatic defence in response to those who
argue that this represents dogmatic materialism. They claim that the naturalism of science is
transient and defeats: it is explained by the fact that inadequate theistic theories were defeated by
natural explanations that prevailed. However, this activism is conflicting with scientific history.
Science has always demonstrated what we call a naturalism of the domain. They did not call
upon the divine agency, but instead concentrated on the causal mechanism of the natural
universe. It was also not the case that the sciences once used and discarded scientific theories.
Technology's naturalism is as ancient as science itself.

The views of modern science on the kinds of things capable of causing physical results have an
fascinating history (Papineau 2001). A brief version of this history is as follows : ( 1) the
mechanist mechanics of the 17th century only permitted very small numbers; (2) Newtonian
early physicists have been more liberal and have actually placed no real limits on potential
causes.

For example, J.J.C. Smart's (1959) considered that we should classify brain disorders as the
psychiatric state would otherwise be "nomological hazards" and that they would not have any
role in understanding the actions. Taking the points made by David Armstrong (1968), which
mental states must be similar to such claims as they are picked up by their causal function and as
we know that physical states play those functions. Lastly, remember the argument of Donald
Davidson (1970) that, because actions related to physical backgrounds are the only regulation
regulated by behavior, mental activities can only be conduct triggers when they are equal to
physical experience. At first glance it may not be apparent that certain claims require the thesis
of causal closure. But the reasoning for a moment will demonstrate that none of these points will
stay cogent if the closing theses are not implemented.

Armstrong, D., 1968, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Davidson, D., 1970, “Mental Events”, in L. Foster and J. Swanson (eds.), Experience and
Theory, London: Duckworth. Reprinted in Davidson 1980 1980, Essays on Actions and
Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Papineau, D., 2001, “The Rise of Physicalism”, in C. Gillett and B. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism
and its Discontents, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smart, J.J.C., 1959, “Sensations and Brain Processes”, Philosophical Review, 68: 141–56.