Asian Affairs

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/raaf20

COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD:

THE CASES OF SYRIA, LIBYA AND YEMEN

Hassanein Ali

To cite this article: Hassanein Ali (2020) COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB
WORLD: THE CASES OF SYRIA, LIBYA AND YEMEN, Asian Affairs, 51:4, 838-855, DOI:
10.1080/03068374.2020.1837540

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2020.1837540

Published online: 23 Nov 2020.

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 Asian Affairs, 2020
Vol. LI, no. IV, 838–855, https://doi.org/10.1080/03068374.2020.1837540

COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB

WORLD: THE CASES OF SYRIA, LIBYA AND
YEMEN
HASSANEIN ALI

Dr. Hassanein Ali is a professor of political science at Zayed University in

the United Arab Emirates. He is the author and editor of numerous books,
book chapters, and journal articles on contemporary politics of the Middle
East and North Africa. Email: hassanin79@hotmail.com

Introduction
In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic and its disastrous repercus-
sions on the health, economic, social, political and security sectors, the
United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, called on 23
March 2020 for an immediate ceasefire in all conflict areas around the
world. Guterres stressed the importance of mobilizing national and inter-
national efforts to confront the virus, which he described as a ‘common
enemy’ of ‘the whole world’, given its effect on all states and societies
regardless of language, religion, race, or geographical location.1

Although the Covid-19 pandemic has intensified the problems and chal-
lenges faced by the fractured Arab states that are witnessing civil wars
such as Libya, Yemen, and Syria, the United Nations Secretary-Gener-
al’s call for an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire has had no
lasting practical effect on these wars. The political divisions and
armed confrontations have continued at the same pace or worsened, as
in the cases of Libya and Yemen. This fact indicates that the pandemic,
despite all of its negative consequences, did not represent a turning point
in the course of these civil wars, as it did not create a new dynamic
towards peace. Most parties involved in these wars viewed Covid-19
and its repercussions as an opportunity to increase and consolidate
their military and political gains.

Reliable figures for the incidence of Covid-19 in these countries are hard
to come by, in particular, because of the turmoil in their healthcare
systems.2 Nonetheless, Yemen is regarded by the United Nations
© 2020 The Royal Society for Asian Affairs
 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD 839

Development Programme as having the highest unofficial death rate of

Covid-19 in the world.3 Recent reports have stated that the number of
cases of the virus in Syria are far in excess of the officially-reported
figures, with an estimate of 112,500 cases in Damascus alone during
August 2020.4 A similar situation is also reported by the World Health
Organization in Libya.5

There is no doubt that the continuation of civil wars in Syria, Libya, and
Yemen during the Covid-19 pandemic validate the idea that pandemics
do not necessarily put an end to wars and increase peacemaking oppor-
tunities. Pandemics may at best lead to periods of fragile stability after
which armed confrontations will continue. This means that additional
deaths resulting from the pandemic do not prompt the conflicting
parties to reevaluate their positions and goals in terms of the wars,
especially when these wars have continued for long periods, and are
complex in terms of their issues and conflicting parties involved. Conse-
quently, the pandemic becomes, in the view of the conflicting parties, an
opportunity to achieve more military and political gains.6

This article aims to discuss why civil wars have continued in the Arab
world despite the spread of Covid-19 and its disastrous consequences,
and why the pandemic did not create a new dynamic that would push
towards a peaceful settlement of the civil wars in Syria, Libya and
Yemen.

The article is divided into six sections, following this introduction. The
first section discusses the current situation of the continuing of the civil
wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen. The subsequent five sections each
discuss particular reasons for the continuation of the wars despite the
pandemic. The first concerns the disastrous situation in Syria, Libya
and Yemen before the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic. This situ-
ation is deepened with the transformation of civil wars in the three
countries into protracted conflicts. The second is related to the nature
of these civil wars as proxy wars, given the large number of regional
and international actors that have been involved in them each having
its own agenda and interests. The third refers to the development of
war economies in the three countries. This phenomenon escalates the
conflicts and prompts their continuation. The fourth focuses on the frag-
mentation of the nation state in Syria, Libya and Yemen due to the
absence of a strong central government, and the multiplicity of actors
that control the state’s territory, especially in light of the escalating
roles of violent non-state actors which makes reaching political
840 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD

settlements complicated. The fifth is related to the ineffectiveness of the

political efforts by the untied Nation to achieve peaceful settlements of
Arab civil wars.

Civil wars during the time of Covid-19

In Yemen, the internationally-recognized government of President Hadi
and its supporters, the Arab Alliance led by the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, announced a unilateral ceasefire on 9 April 2020 in response to
the call of the United Nation’s Secretary-General, which aimed to focus
attention on dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic and allowing the UN’s
efforts of political settlement to be more active.7 Despite this situation,
the Houthis, who initially welcomed the Secretary-General’s initiative,
ignored the ceasefire and continued to escalate their operations against
the Yemeni army, as well as against Saudi Arabia, where they continued
to target them with ballistic missiles and drones. This military action of the
Houthis forced Saudi Arabia to respond to the source of the threat.8

On the other hand, on 24 April 2020, the Southern Transitional Council,

which controls Aden and its adjacent areas, announced the establishment
of self-rule in Southern Yemen following a dispute with the government
of President Hadi.9 In this context, armed confrontations re-emerged
between the Yemeni army and the forces of the Southern Transitional
Council. These confrontations exhibit a civil war within the anti-
Houthi camp.10

In Libya, the pre-Covid-19 phase witnessed several ceasefire initiatives

that were never respected by the conflicting parties. In light of the pan-
demic, the Libyan conflict sharply escalated. In particular, Turkey threw
its weight behind the forces of the National Accord Government led by
Fayez al-Sarraj and its supporting organizations. Turkey sent additional
heavy weapons and thousands of Syrian mercenaries to Libya, ignoring
Security Council resolutions and the decisions of the Berlin conference
held in January 2020, in which Turkey itself participated. Turkey’s inter-
vention resulted in the change of the balance of military power on the
ground, as the Libyan National Army, led by Field Marshal Haftar,
was forced to withdraw from the vicinity of Tripoli in western Libya
to the city of Sirte and the Al-Jafra airbase.11

Based on the accelerating developments in Libya, the Egyptian leader-

ship decisively announced on 20 June 2020, that Sirte and Al-Jafra
 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD 841

would be a red line for Egypt, and that it would intervene militarily if the
forces of the National Accord Government and the parties supporting it
entered either place, on the grounds that such an action would represent a
direct threat to Egyptian national security. On 5 July 2020, air defence
systems installed by Turkey at the Al-Wattia air base in western Libya
were destroyed. All these developments present the possibility a poten-
tial regional war in Libya, especially after Turkey continued to send
more weapons and Syrian mercenaries to Libya on the one hand, and
the request of the Libyan Parliament along with the tribal sheikhs of
Libya on 14 and 16 July 2020 for Egyptian militarily assistance to coun-
teract Turkey’s interference and protect the national security of Libya
and Egypt on the other hand.12

In Syria, the crisis is continuing thanks to the increased involvement of

local, regional and international actors involved in the conflict, and also
the absence of the conditions required to achieve a tangible political
settlement. In June 2020, the USA promulgated the Caesar Act on
Syria, which imposes a number of sanctions on the Syrian regime,
with the intention of increasing the pressure on both the regime and its
supporters.13 This decision adds additional complications to the Syrian
crisis. In addition, Islamic State (Daesh, IS) took advantage of the pan-
demic and escalated its armed operations against the Syrian regime’s
forces in northwestern Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)
in northeastern Syria.14

From civil wars to protracted conflicts

Without doubt, the situation in Yemen, Libya and Syria was disastrous
before the emergence of Covid-19. Long years of war have killed and
injured hundreds of thousands of civilians and destroyed the infrastruc-
ture and health-care systems in these countries. To illustrate, Yemen,
which was classified before 2011 as being the poorest Arab country, is
now classified according to United Nation reports as being one of the
poorest countries worldwide. Yemen is currently witnessing the worst
humanitarian crisis in the world, where more than 80% of the population
rely on humanitarian aid for survival. The humanitarian aid provided to
Yemen by donor countries has decreased in light of the covid-19 pan-
demic, thus aggravating the situation.15

After more than nine years of war, according to estimates issued by the
United Nations in early 2019, there were about 11.7 million Syrians in
842 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD

need of some form of humanitarian aid, and there were about 6.2 million
Syrians displaced within their homeland and about 5.6 million refugees
in other countries. In addition, about 83 per cent of Syrians live below the
poverty line. Regarding the level of health care and education, only about
50 per cent of public hospitals in Syria are still able to operate in light of
a great shortage of their capabilities, equipment and medical supplies.
There are also more than 2 million children who are not receiving an
education.16

In Libya, large sectors of the population are deprived of basic needs such
as health care, education, and housing due to prolonged years of the war
and its disastrous effects. According to recent United Nations data, there
are about 1.3 million Libyan citizens in need of humanitarian assistance.
There are more than 200,000 displaced people who have left their homes
because of armed conflict. Additionally, Libya has about 636,000
migrants and refugees who also rely on humanitarian aid.17

In light of these poor living-conditions, Covid-19 began spreading in

Syria, Libya and Yemen. It is undoubtedly the case that Covid-19
exacerbated the economic and social problems in these countries due
to the lockdown and consequent cessation of many economic activities.
These activities were indeed already limited due to the long years of the
war, the decline in supplies, inflating prices, and the decreased humani-
tarian aid. However, the impact of Covid-19 did not create a new
dynamic or generate sufficient pressure to propelled the conflicting
parties to cease their conflicts and seek political settlements. In fact,
the conflicts continued at the same pace or become more severe, as in
the case of Libya and Yemen.18

The main reason behind this phenomenon is that the prolonged years of
military confrontations transformed the civil wars in Syria, Libya and
Yemen into protracted and complex conflicts where they became
linked to the economic, political and security interests of different
parties. Furthermore, the conflicts in these countries are related to sectar-
ian, regional, and ethnic divisions which further complicates the situ-
ation. In light of this, most of the conflicting local parties along with
the regional and international actors supporting them have viewed
Covid-19 as an opportunity to achieve military and political gains.
These parties were no longer concerned with people’s suffering, or
being eager to establish national consensus for peace; rather, their
struggles for power and resources have turned into a zero-sum game.
 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD 843

Proxy wars
The second, related reason for the continuation of civil wars in the Arab
world despite the Covid-19 pandemic and its negative repercussions is
the fact that these conflicts are bring conducted as proxy wars. The
local actors involved in each war have sought to obtain support from exter-
nal regional and international parties to strengthen their positions in facing
their local opponents. At the same time, these regional and international
parties have viewed civil wars as an opportunity to achieve economic
gains, especially in oil and gas rich countries, or political gains related
to their regional and international roles, or else strategic and security
gains related to establishing military bases and important sea lanes.

In Yemen, Iran has been involved in the war by providing economic and
military support, including ballistic missiles and drones, to the Houthis.
As a result, the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia intervened to support
the legitimate government led by President Hadi. This war has entered its
fifth year as of 2020, and it seems that there is no chance for a peace
settlement in the foreseeable future. In Libya, Turkey has signed military
and security agreements with the National Accord Government and sup-
plied it with various types of weapons, drones, and thousands of Syrian
mercenaries. In response, countries such as Egypt, Russia and France
provided support to the Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal
Khalifa Haftar. In Syria, Russia and Iran saved the Assad regime from
collapsing through direct military intervention. On the other side, the
United States provided military support to the Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF), while Turkey and some Arab countries provided – in
some periods – support to various factions and forces that oppose
Assad’s regime. The United Nations also interfered in civil wars in
Syria, Libya and Yemen with the aim of reaching political settlements.19

As a result, the civil wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen have been interna-
tionalized and the paths of these wars have become dependent not on the
desires and orientations of the local actors involved, but mainly depen-
dent on the interactions and balances between the regional and inter-
national parties involved in these wars, whether directly or indirectly.
Given the extreme contrast between the agendas and interests of these
regional and international powers, the settlement of these civil wars
has become difficult and complex.

To illustrate, Iran is keen on continuing and strengthening its role in

Yemen by supporting the Houthis with the aim of opposing the
844 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Also, Iran seeks to employ its Houthi support
as a pressure mechanism when managing its relations with the USA on
other issues, as well as strengthening its strategic role near the Bab al-
Mandab strait. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia will not accept a
threat to its national security coming from the Houthis supported by
Iran, especially since the Houthis have targeted several Saudi cities
over the past years with hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones.20

Regarding Libya, Turkey seeks to consolidate its role in it through the

National Accord Government led by Fayez al-Sarraj. In this context, it
seeks several goals, including economic gains represented in the oil,
gas and investment sectors, thus opposing traditional rivals such as
Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. Moreover, Turkey aims to pressure the Euro-
pean Union with the card of migrants and refugees from Libyan ports.21
As for Russia, it looks forward to regaining and expanding its influence
in the Middle East. Asides from making itself the main actor on the
Syrian scene, Russia is looking to expand its influence in the Arab
Maghreb through its role in Libya. As for the USA, its current objective
in Libya is to limit Russia’s influence there in order to avoid a repeat of
the Syrian scenario. As for Egypt, its primarily goal is to avoid having a
hostile power in Libya, since the two states share a common border of
more than 1,100 km. The presence of any anti-Egyptian force in Libya
represents a fundamental threat to its national security, especially if
this force is Turkey. With regards to France and Italy, their policies
towards the Libyan crisis revolve around economic considerations, as
well as their perception of the dangers of illegal immigration flowing
from Libya to the EU countries. Furthermore, there is also the threat
of terrorism, which may be caused by the presence of a failed state in
Libya.22

In Syria, there are tensions and an overall state of competition (which

sometimes passes into periods of mutual understanding) between
Russia and Turkey, where the former supports the Assad regime,
while the latter supports the factions opposing it. Also, there is a conflict
between Turkey and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) who control
northeastern Syria. The tension and competition between Russia and
USA in Syria are part of the strained relations between both parties
due to various regional and international issues. There is also conflict
between Iran and Israel related to Syria, because Israel rejects any
Iranian military presence in Syria, while Tehran supports the Assad
regime and anti-Israel factions such as Hezbollah and Hamas. In
addition, IS (Daesh) still has some cells in Syria, and they took advantage
 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD 845

of the Covid-19 pandemic to escalate their terror operations against the

Syrian army and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).23

The regional and international parties involved in the civil wars in Libya,
Yemen and Syria become very keen on not having the local actors
associated with them defeated as this will harm their interests, goals
and prestige. Therefore, they competed in providing military support
to the local actors which prevented any party from achieving a decisive
military victory in any of the concerned civil wars. Therefore, these wars
transformed into protracted conflicts and arenas for competition between
some regional and international powers.

The expansion of war economies

The third reason for the continuation of civil wars in the Arab world is
the increasing phenomenon of war economies in the region.24 Many
internal, regional and international powers involved in the Arab civil
wars have economic aspirations, especially in countries with valuable
natural resources such as Libya, which has very considerable oil
reserves. In this context, the economic factor represents an important
determinant of the policies and attitudes of many external actors
towards the Libyan crisis. For example, Turkey has signed agreements
with the National Accord Government regarding Libyan oil, and
France and Italy are keen in securing the interests of their own companies
also currently working in Libyan fields. In addition to oil, investments in
other sectors, especially in the post-conflict phase, are an important
driving factor for all regional and international parties involved in the
conflict.25

It is not only external regional and international actors that play a part in
the war economies of these conflicts. There are also many local actors
that have achieved economic gains from these wars, so that the continu-
ation of conflicts is in their interests. Also, there are many businessmen
who provided support to the Assad regime in Syria, the Houthis in
Yemen and the National Accord Government in Libya, and in exchange
they received significant economic benefits and facilities and they were
also allowed to involve in illegal economic activities without any
accountability.26

The state’s inability to impose its control on its territory in Syria, Libya
and Yemen has given rise to various violent non-state actors such as
846 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD

terrorist jihadi organizations, armed militias, and organized crime gangs.

These violent non-state actors have been involved in various illegal
economic and commercial activities such as smuggling goods, human
trafficking, arms and drug trade, burglary, kidnapping, as well as impos-
ing protection money on residents of areas where state power does not
exist. To illustrate, various smuggling networks have flourished in the
border areas of Libya and its neighbouring countries, as well as in
border areas between Syria and Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey.27

Ironically, the fragile governments in Libya, Syria, and Yemen have

depended on various non-state armed actors to reinforce their positions
in military conflicts against their opponents. For example, the National
Accord Government in Libya has relied on armed militias, while the
Assad regime has used fighters from Hezbollah and the Syrian paramili-
tary forces. Moreover, both the Hadi government and the Houthis in
Yemen have relied on tribal groups to support their positions on the fron-
tlines. All these practices have assisted the expansion of war economies
and made the ‘informal’ economy parallel to the fragile ‘formal’
economy.

The fragmentation of the nation state and the dilemmas of

building national consensus
The fourth reason for the continuation of the civil wars in Syria, Libya
and Yemen is the fragmentation of the nation-state politically and admin-
istratively, where there are several violent non-state entities that control
territories in each of the concerned countries. This phenomenon is a
natural consequence of the reasons already discussed.

The profound difficulties of building nation-states in the Arab world pre-

ceded the events of the ‘Arab Spring’. These difficulties have had their
historical roots in the colonial era on one hand, and the policies of the
post-independence elites on the other. Indeed, in many cases, these
post-colonial elites were keen on building the foundations of authoritar-
ian governments rather than nation states based on the principles of citi-
zenship, the rule of law, and human rights.

The civil wars that have arisen in Syria, Libya and Yemen in the post-
Arab Spring period have led to the disintegration of these states to the
point that their very existence as political entities has become threatened.
These states have lost their legitimacy, and as their institutions have
 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD 847

collapsed they have no longer been able to monopolize the legitimate use
of force, impose control on their territories, and provide minimum essen-
tial public goods and services to their citizens, especially security. As a
result of all this, many violent non-state actors, such as terrorist jihadi
organizations, armed militias, and organized crime gangs, have
expanded at the expense of the state and the borders of these states
have become open to foreign interference.28

According to a recent report by the International Crisis Group:

Yemen is now roughly divided into five cantons of political and military
control: the Huthi-controlled northern highlands; government-aligned areas
in Marib, al-Jawf, northern Hadramawt, al-Mahra, Shebwa, Abyan and Taiz
city; the pro-separatist Southern Transition Council-dominated territories in
Aden and its hinterland; districts along the Red Sea coast where the Joint
Resistance Forces are the chief power; and coastal Hadramawt, where local
authorities prevail. The war rages along multiple fronts, each with its own pol-
itical dynamics and lines of command and control. [There are also local]
groups, some of which are loosely in the government camp but in practice func-
tion independently.29

In light of this fragmentation of the Yemeni state, the parties and issues
of conflict have multiplied, and the chances of reaching a peaceful settle-
ment have become ever more difficult and complex.30

In Libya, the control of the state’s territory is shared by the National Accord
Government led by Fayez al-Sarraj, the Libyan National Army led by Field
Marshal Khalifa Haftar, and various tribes and militias. In early July 2020,
the Al-Wefaq government controlled the western regions of Libya, includ-
ing the capital, Tripoli, and parts of the northern coast, including the city of
Misurata, and small parts of the centre of the country. As for the Libyan
National Army, it controlled eastern Libya, including the city of Sirte,
large parts of central Libya, including the city of Sebha and it also controls
large areas of the southern Libya. In addition to the Al-Sarraj government
and the Libyan National Army, there are tribal forces and militias that
control some border areas in the South.31

In Syria, the Assad regime at the time of writing controls about 63 per
cent of the country, while the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control
northeastern Syria, which is about 26 per cent; finally, forces and
organizations opposed to the Assad regime, some of which are pro-
Turkey like the Free Syrian Army, control areas in northwestern
Syria.32
848 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD

As a result of the failure of the nation state in Syria, Libya and Yemen,
the process of building a national consensus that represents the basis for a
sustainable political settlement has become exceedingly difficult and
complicated. The conflicting parties are driven by personal, sectarian,
regional, and tribal interests that conflict with national interests. In
addition, the violent non-state actors that have been involved in these
civil wars realize that any real political settlement will entail their own
dissolution, the surrender of arms to the state, an end to corruption,
and bringing those who committed war crimes or crimes against human-
ity to justice. Given the benefits they enjoy from the civil wars and the
state of chaos and instability associated with them, it is perhaps no sur-
prise that they are less than enthusiastic about the efforts to seek political
settlements for these conflicts.

Ineffectiveness of political settlement means

The fifth reason for the ongoing civil wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen is
the ineffectiveness of the efforts in seeking political settlements for these
conflicts.33 Here, the discussion turns to the role of the United Nations,
where it was – and is still – involved in this process. As for the League of
Arab States (which includes Syria, Libya and Yemen), no serious
attempts have been initiated to settle any of these conflicts. This is due
to several factors, including the structural weakness of the Arab
League and the limits on its financial capabilities. This has marginalized
its role in managing inter-Arab relations. The League has effectively
become a mirror that reflects the differences and divisions between
Arab countries without having the ability to bridge the differences and
enhance cooperative relations between these countries. The weakness
of the Arab League reflects the collapse of the Arab regional system,
and no one has any genuine expectation of it having a role in settling con-
flicts in the Arab region.

As for the United Nations, multiple attempts were and are being made to
reach political settlements for civil wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen, but
at the time of writing it has still not succeeded in achieving this goal in
any of the three countries.34

The United Nations has attempted three main approaches in dealing with
these civil wars. The first approach has been via Security Council resol-
utions. Although the Security Council has issued several resolutions
regarding the crises in Syria, Libya and Yemen, these decisions have
 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD 849

not implemented because the Council did not link them with specific
implementation mechanisms. There are many reasons for the Security
Council’s inability to deal with the civil wars including the divisions
between the permanent members of the Security Council, and the fre-
quent usage of the veto, which often impedes the work of the Council
and limits its effectiveness. A particular example of a Security Council
resolution that has not been implemented is Resolution No. 1970 of
2011 which imposed an arms embargo on Libya. This resolution
was ignored by many regional and international actors such as
Turkey, who sent large quantities of weapons and thousands of the
Syrian mercenaries to the National Accord Government, thus prolonging
the war.35

The second approach taken by the United Nations is through diplomatic

efforts piloted by special envoys of the United Nations Secretary-
General. The Secretary-General of the United Nations (Ban Ki-moon
and his successor Antonio Guterres) has appointed several envoys to
Syria, Libya and Yemen with the aim of finding political solutions to
the ongoing wars these countries. In Libya, six UN envoys were
appointed, the last of them being Dr. Ghassan Salameh, who resigned
in early March 2020. At the time of writing, no successor has been
appointed. In Syria, four UN envoys have been appointed, the most
recent one being Geir O. Pedersen. In Yemen, there have been three
envoys, most recently Martin Griffiths. These envoys conducted
various dialogues between the conflicting parties and presented a
variety of proposals and solutions to achieve political settlements, but
they failed in finding a sustainable political solution to any of the con-
flicts. Among the most salient reasons for the failure of the UN envoys
is the multiplicity of the parties and issues in each of these conflicts,
as well as the absence of serious support from the permanent members
of the Security Council for the efforts of these envoys.

The third approach by the UN in dealing with these civil wars has been
the provision of humanitarian assistance. Through its specialized
agencies such as the World Food Program and others, the United
Nations has offered humanitarian assistance to victims of the wars in
Libya, Syria and Yemen, as these wars have destroyed infrastructure
and denied of millions of people basic goods and services such as
food, health care, and education; more than 80 per cent of Syrians and
Yemenis are in need of humanitarian aid. The United Nations is trying
to mobilize donor initiatives to support humanitarian efforts in the con-
cerned countries, but the problem is that donor assistance to these
850 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD

countries is declining in the light of the Covid-19 pandemic, which is

likely to make the humanitarian situation in the three countries worse.

Conclusion
Despite the deep impact of Covid-19, the pandemic has not been able to
prompt a political settlement of civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Yemen.36
Due to a set of interrelated internal and external factors, the civil wars in
the Arab region have turned into protracted and complex conflicts, both
in terms of their parties, issues, and consequences.

The chances of settling the civil wars in Syria, Libya, and Yemen appear
to be very limited, at least in the short- and medium-terms. Even if par-
ticular parties are able to achieve a military victory, this would not lead to
the final settlement of any of the conflicts to the end of the crisis, unless it
is accompanied by a comprehensive political settlement. Such settle-
ments should include all the main parties and address all of the issues
of the conflict. Also, a sustainable settlement should be based on the
foundations of citizenship, human rights, transitional justice, and state
reconstruction, especially in the security and economic sectors.

In light of the current developments, there are many concerns about the
ongoing disintegration of the nation state in Syria, Libya and Yemen,
which translate to the absence of a central authority capable of imposing
its control on the state’s territory, and the presence of a number of con-
flicting actors, each of which is imposing control over a part of the state.
This situation indicates that these countries are moving towards a ‘Soma-
lization’ scenario, meaning that the disintegration and division of the
state becomes a reality.37

The continuing disintegration of the nation state in Syria, Libya, and

Yemen, and the persistence of these countries in the cycle of failure
and fragility, will make them safe havens for violent non-state actors
such as cross-border jihadi terrorist organizations like IS (Daesh) and
Al Qaeda, armed militias, and crime gangs. This represents a serious
threat to security of these countries, as well as regional and international
security.38 This may be a reason for the United Nations to attempt to
move more effectively to reach sustainable political settlements for
these civil wars. One of the most important conditions and requirements
for achieving this goal is the agreement of the permanent members of the
UN Security Council to support the efforts of the United Nations to settle
 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD 851

the concerned conflicts disregarding narrow interests. This is perhaps the

biggest challenge in a post-Coronavirus world marked by anxiety,
turmoil and uncertainty.

NOTES

1. Secretary-General Calls for Global Ceasefire, ‘Citing War-Ravaged Health

Systems, Populations Most Vulnerable to Novel Coronavirus’. United Nations,
March 23, 2020. https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sgsm20018.doc.htm (accessed
13 April 2020).
2. Frederic Wehrey, ‘Libya and Coronavirus’, in Frances Z. Brown and Jarrett Blanc
(Eds.), Coronavirus in Conflict Zones: Sobering Landscape. Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, April 14, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/
14/coronavirus-in-conflict-zones-sobering-landscape-pub-81518 (accessed 29
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and-worse-still-theres-a-fog-of-mystery-over-how-many-are-dying-12073435
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19-crisis-health-pandemic (accessed 12 October 2020).
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6. Barry R. Posen, ‘Do Pandemics Promote Peace?’ Foreign Affairs, April 23, 2020.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-23/do-pandemics-promote-
peace (accessed 13 May 2020). See also Marina Ottaway, ‘The Null Effect of
COVID-19 on Conflict: Why Iraq and Yemen Keep Fighting’. Middle East
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null-effect-covid-19-conflict-why-iraq-and-yemen-keep-fighting (accessed 17
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a-country-on-the-brink (accessed 28 July 2020).
852 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD

9. See https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/26/separatist-group-announces-self-
rule-in-southern-yemen (accessed 10 October 2020).
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Coronavirus in Conflict Zones: Sobering Landscape. Washington, DC: Carnegie
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19. Mark Lynch, The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle
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 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD 853

Multipolar World Since the 2011 NATO Intervention’. New America, February
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Communitocracy. London: Routledge, 2017.
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29. International Crisis Group, ‘Rethinking Peace in Yemen’. Middle East Report, No.
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(Somaliland and Puntland) have an effective independence from the Somali
 COVID-19 AND CIVIL WARS IN THE ARAB WORLD 855

state. Somalia is considered a typical case of a failed state. Rasna Warah, War
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