The Concept of One in Heraclitus

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THE CONCEPT OF ONE IN HERACLITUS

Author(s): Eleni Papamichael-Paspalides
Source: Revue de Philosophie Ancienne, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2005), pp. 41-54
Published by: EURORGAN s.p.r.l. - Éditions OUSIA
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THE CONCEPT OF ONE IN HERACLITUS
According to the traditional understanding regarding the perception

of the world by the pre-Socratic Heraclitus, this early philosophic
perception, in the général context of présentation of the history of ph
sophy, was usually classified, as is well known, in a position that wa
always in opposition to Parmenidean thought. Heracletian philosophy
has always been considered to be the philosophy of multiplicity an
movement, while Parmenidean philosophy, to be the philosophy of O
and of immobility.
The view of the existence of opposition with regard to the matter
concerning which these two particular pre-Socratic philosophers gene
ally choose to give emphasis, - to the ceaseless interplay of opposites
the part of Heraclitus and to unchangeable One, sole object of though
on the part of Parmenides -, is of course correct. However, we consid
it incorrect to draw the conclusion that, on the basis of these extern
thematological différences, it would be justified to juxtapose these tw
philosophers with regard to the essence of their philosophical perceptio
and to set them in opposition to one another as proponents of two
diametrically conflicting and contradictory views on things.
In this paper our aim is to prove how much the views of Heraclitus an
Parmenides actually converge, through a study of Heraclitus's perceptio
of the particular concept of One. That the concept of One is not non
existent in the philosophical discourse of Heraclitus can of course be see
clearly through his own fragments and certainly we are not the first to pu
forward such a view '. The point that we wish to stress particularly and
1. See, for example, Ramnoux C., Heraclite ou l'homme entre les choses e
les mots, Paris, 1968, Stokes M.C., One and many in Pre-Socratic Philosophy
Cambridge (Mass.), 1971, Veïkos Th., Εν-πάντα. Μιά θεμελιακή δομή σκ
ψης στήν πρώιμη ελληνική φιλοσοφία, "Dodoni" Publications, loannin
1973, Papadis D.I., Ηράκλειτος: Περί άνθρωπου, Synchroni Paideia Pub
cations, Thessalonique 1995.
REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE ANCIENNE, XXIII. 1,2005
42 Eleni Papamichael-Paspalides
which we will concentrate our attention lies in the

One, not only simply has a place in the phil
Heraclitus, but mainly that the position that this co
Heraclitus is of primary importance and that thi
principle which is considered to be as fundamental
To begin with, it is indicative to enumerate the i
fragments in which Heraclitus makes express refer
unity of specific opposites, which, despite their
stated as identical: these are fragments2 10,32,3
88, 89, 106, 114. Indirect reference to One or to
sites is made in the case of fragments 8, 10, 51,
90,91, 102, 103, 111, 123, 126.
But how precisely does Heraclitus perceive One
One is perceived by him:

a) as «φρονέειν»
b) and as «σοφόν»
c) and as «λόγος»
d) and as «θείος νόμος»/«θεός»
e) and as «πόλεμος»
0 and as «κόσμος»
g) and as the principle of the multiplicity of being
of the alternation of opposites
h) and as «πυρ»
Following the above classification we will firs

relation to «φρόνησις». The concept of One is att
to «φρονέειν» or to «σωφρονειν», to correct though
thought is considered common to ail3; for the reas
the nature of correct thought does not vary from
that it is not subject to the particularities, to the
each individual person"1 and, consequently, for the
2. The référencés to Heraclitus's fragments will be

édition of H. Diels - W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vors
3. «ξυνόν εστί πάσι τό φρονέειν»: fr. 113, «άνθρ
γινώσκειν έωυτούς καί σωφρονείν»: fr. 116.
4. «...ζώουσιν οί πολλοί ώς ιδίαν εχοντες φρόνησ
THE CONCEPT OF ONE IN HERACLITUS 43
is one, everywhere the same. The characteristics of correct

identical everywhere where it is encountered: and this th
course encountered everywhere, since it is precisely this
element, the «ξυνόν»5, that ail men («πάσι»)6 have.
This is, in other words, the meaning of the attribution of
ive «ξυνόν» to «φρονέειν»: to underline precisely that th
«φρονέειν» is one and unalterable, that it is one common t
ility, one possible «αρετή»7 common to all, irrelevant to th
separate persons, who in their majority do not develop it8,
they cannot - since it is precisely commonly possible and
ail to develop it - but because they do not seek to do so, bein
under the false impression that they know the truth of thing
do not know it', while in fact they act and speak as if asleep1
Just as «φρόνησις» is one, in the same way it is considered
that there can exist but one wisdom («είναι γάρ εν τό
Encyclopédie knowledge or multiple, fragmentary, knowle
world, can never constitute wisdom12. «Τό σοφόν» can arise
case that the development of the common to ail «φρόνησες
possible to achieve, in the case that the development of t
which is the greatest of ail becomes possible to achieve, an
such, is by its nature necessarily one. Most people who do no
truth, possess therefore precisely only a multiple, fragme
«ώς» clearly indicates that thing which most people think they h
in reality they do not have it. Most people lack «φρόνησις», not
the sense that they do not possess the ability to develop it - such
confute the fact that «φρόνησις» is common to ail but in the sen
νησις» does not have subjective characteristics, but universal ones
5. fr. 113.
6. frr. 113 and 116.
7. fr. 112.
8. «où γάρ φρονέουσι τοιαύτα πολλοί, όκόσι έγκυρεύσιν»; fr. 17.

9. «...ουδέ μαθόντεςγινώσκουσιν, έωυτοΐσιδέδοκέουσι»: fr. 17.
10. fr. 73.
11. fr. 41.
12. fr. 40.
13.fr. 112.
14. «σωφρονείν άρετή μεγίστη»: fr. 112.
meal perception of things, and, as a conséqu

without knowledge15.
Ignorance of the real truth, which is only one
versal correct thought -, has, in other word
men's discourse, which itself cannot by extens
course only one. In contrast, the discourse whic
ledge, which Springs from the one true «φρο
necessarily be one and unique. Thus, the c
concern only the one «φρονέειν»/«σοφόν», bu
équivalent to the one «λόγος»; that «λόγος»
which is of necessity one, since, as such, "is s
and to which reference is made from the begin
of Heraclitus's fragments.
In fragment 2, which explains the nature of
always", it is made clear that this is universa
or «κοινός», in precisely the same way that «
ed as «ξυνόν» in fragment 113. The eternal tru
«λόγος» which governs all things16 and whic
one, -the same for all-, is again that which pr
by most men, with the result that "though th
men live as if they had a private φρόνησις" ".
clearly the close corrélation which exists betw
common «φρόνησις» and the one universally
content of this one universal phronesis-logo
allowed to be heard through its discourse
moreover, that which is described in fragmen
content which is summed up in the truth that «
At the same time, however, the common lo
are also correlated with a third term: that of d
precisely as «λόγος» itself and as «φρονέειν»
15. fr. 19.

16. fr. 72.
17. fr. 2.
18. «ούκ έμοΰ, άλλά του λόγου άκούσαντας...»: fr. 50.

19. «ούκ έμοΰ, αλλά τοϋ λόγου άκούοαντας ομολογεί ν σοφόν έστιν εν
πάντα είναι».
common to ail things («...τφ ξύνω πάντων...»)20. Indeed,

«λόγος» and «φρονέει/ν» that are characterized as comm
which is given the characterization of «ξυνόν». This char
also given to a law, to the divine law which supersedes al
laws21, and which, as such, is necessarily one and unique
The law in question is a law the content of which appears
that which men are unable to comprehend, with the resuit o
informing us that most divine things elude us and we do n
and fragment 78 telling us that correct knowledge is not i
human character but only in the divine. Inherent in the hu
is only the «δαίμων»23; a fact which means that the ac
correct knowledge by man requires from him that h
specifically for this through a great effort of awakening, a
What men specifically fail to comprehend is how opp
between themselves25, with the resuit that they are delu
ception that they form regarding the sensible world26. Th
fail to comprehend is, therefore, the truth of things precisely
is declared by «λόγος» itself in fragment 5027. In other wo
to comprehend that the multiplicity and interplay of oppo
in One, that in fact, ail are One28; that precisely "God" h
one, is at the same time also all the opposites: «ô θεός ήμ
χειμών θέρος, πόλεμος ειρήνη, κόρος λιμός, ,..»29.
This "God" of the above fragment who is ail the oppos
the same time remaining one and the same («εν»), in fra
takes the name of Zeus30. This particular approach of fr
manifestly monotheistic, for this précisé reason that this
20. fr. 114.

21 .Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. fr. 119.
24. frs 73 and 89.
25. fr. 51.
26. fr. 56.
27. See note 18.
28. «...καί έκ πάντων εν καί έξ ένός πάντα»: fr. 10.

29. fr. 67.
30. «εν τό σοφόν μοϋνον λέγεσθαι ούκ έθέλει καί έθέλει Ζηνός δνομα».
concern one exclusive object, identical to the one

... Ζηνός όνομα»)51, must express the "one divine l
the one universally common «φρόνησις» and to
common «λόγος». Thus, the one wisdom-phronesi
one divine law or with one God, who is considered
the same time, also One with regard to its essen
essence, God is one in the sense of the unity of op
counterbalancing movements, such as those of
which are in fact hidden harmony33. If, however
God on whom the one phronesis-logos relies and s
the opposition of opposites and at the same time th
in unity, then at the same time the «κόσμος» s
common («...ενα και κοινόν κόσμον είναι»)3
constitutes opposition of opposites, «πόλεμος»36,
acteristic of all things, that is to say, precisely
eternal γίγνεσθαι. Thus, in the same way that div
as common to all things38, «πόλεμος» is also cha
to all things39, and «κόσμος», in the same way,
te 41
common40 and t
Of course «κόσμ
all men, since, ac
nor by any man
has always existe
of fragment 30,
31. fr. 32.
32. This accord is

the possibility of t
with the requirem
33. fr. 51.
34.fr. 114.
35. fr. 89.
36. frs 53 and 80.
37. «τόν πόλεμον έόντα ξυνόν»: fr. 80

38. See note 20.
39. fr. 53 and note 37.
40. See note 35.
41.fr. 30.
the divine law of fragment 114, nor with the divine thin
ων...») of fragment 86. It is this divine law of fragmen
divine things of fragment 86 that are identical to the «κ
any particular god42, as part of the universe. The «κόσμο
to the divine, which is «πόλεμος» of opposites and one at t
and which of course in an isolated way takes also the na
and therefore, also the name of the one God. In other
«κόσμος» is identical to the divine in only that way that th
is described in the very significant fragment 67, where, ch
«θεός», this divine is presented precisely as the «πόλεμος
In the same way that in fragment 67 "God" is ail the opp
(«εν»)44 at the same time, in the same way the «κόσμος»
which takes place the «πόλεμος» which governs all thing
itself it remains always one, the same for ail («κόσμ
αυτόν άπάντων, .,.»)46, that is to say, harmony. Th
therefore also the «πάν» of fragment 50, which include
particular divisions which are enumerated within t
fragment, and which, being many and opposite to each o
things, are at the same time also one47: that One from w
spring or in which ail things converge in their never-endin
One is the one of many, just as harmony is the resuit which
the many things which are mutually différent from one a
των διαφερόντων καλλίστην άρμονίαν [καί πάντα κατ
σθαι]»49. And it is for this précisé reason that the concept
in Heraclitus: this concept exists in Heraclitus becau
42. The parallel, to his own monotheistic approach to the div

ing unit of the many opposites, maintenance, in the cases of spec
of the polytheistic perception of his time does not appear to c
blem for Heraclitus.
43. See note 30.
44. fr. 32.
45. fr. 53.
46. fr. 30.
47. « ... εν πάντα είναι»: fr. 50, « ... έκ των διαφερόντων καλλίστην
άρμονίαν»; fr. 8.
48. fr. 10.
49. fr. 8, « ... των εναντίων ... έκ τούτων αποτελεί τό σύμφωνον, ούκ
precisely to his own perception, many cannot exist

same way that neither can One itself exist withou
opposites. But the opposites agree in harmony,
opposition and unifies them, justifying them or lay
this way for their very existence. The world ha
other side of many and many are the other side of
In other words, opposites are the mutual transfo
the same thing50: «τάδε γάρ μεταπεσόντα έκεΐνά
μεταπεσόντα ταύτα». These transformations or
in fragment 67 are attributed to the one God, as
tutes unity of opposites, are presented at the sa
fragment also as similar to the changes of fire (
δέ οκωσπερ <πϋρ> ... »)51. In this way it is not
is transformed; it is also «πυρ»: that is to say, that
its continuai transmutations, also appears as on
which governs all things52, in precisely the sam
«λόγος» also governs all things53 and is common
precisely the same way that the one «φρονέε
(«ξυνόν») to all things and in the same way tha
war («πόλεμος») and the universe («κόσμος») are
one, the same in all things, common54. It is gene
Heraclitus that which governs all things and is c
necessarily équivalent to One. And «πυρ» itself, is
as one, even though it changes («μεταβάλλον αν
fire which continually changes form, ignites and
ever disappearing, remaining, in other words, alw
is equated in fragment 30 to the "κόσμος" itsel
changes, while at the same time being and rema
same for all.
έκ τών όμοιων» : fr. 10, «... διαφερόμενον έωυτψ ό

άρμονίη ...» : fr. 51.
50. fr. 88.
51.fr. 67.
52. fr. 64.
53. fr. 72.
54. See relevant notes 3, 38, 39, 40, 41.

55. fr. 84a.
With regard to the transformations themselves of fire, fr

informs us that ail things arise from the transformations of
ail things in their turn become fire, just as gold becomes
money gold (« πυρός τε άνταμοιβή τά πάντα καί πυρ
όκωσπερ χρυσού χρήματα και χρημάτων χρυσός»), while
31 makes it clear that the sea is the first transformation of fir
subséquent transformations following therefrom, similar to
are also described in fragment 76.
Transformation is generally one of the ways by which t
opposites is explained. This way also explains the alternatio
death and, as a direct conséquence, Heraclitus's custom of r
quently to this subject as well56. The fréquent reference mad
tus to the alternation between life and death cornes from p
fact: that for him the transformation of life into death and of d
does not présent any peculiarity, does not actually contain w

mystery: life ends in death; from death or non-existence, th
nothingness, life Springs or ensues, in precisely the same w
tums into night and night into day. Consequently, in the sam
on this never-ending transformation of day into night and the
regard to day and night he does not hesitate in fragment 57
conclusion that these in fact constitute one identity, that
(«εστι γάρ εν»), in precisely the same way he does not hes
equate life to death, stating that «ταύτό τ' ενι ζών και τεθνη
identification between life and death arises from precisely thi
are one, that is to say, more specifically, mutual tranformati
These transformations of One, - of the divine, that is to say
or of the "κόσμος" itself -, are endless; a fact which precl
sibility of any one ever stepping into the same river twice58. Th
by which can be explained the unity of opposites is that of t
value which things can acquire under specific non-contrad
tions or owing to the concurrent existence of différent récip
In the first category of specific non-contradictory con
included, for example, the case of doctors, who cure their
56. For example, see frs. 21, 48, 50, 62, 77,1
57. fr. 88.
58. frs. 12, 49a, 91.
using ways that cause torment, a fact which, accor

fragment 58, leads to the conclusion that good an
αγαθόν καί κακόν [εν έστιν]». In this same categ
the contents of fragments 59 and 60.
In the second category, that of the différent réc
for instance, the content of fragment 9, accor
desirable to the donkey, while it is not desirable to
gold is desirable to man, while not to the donk
content of fragment 9 is also the content of fra
Indeed, these fragments too, in their turn, enable
be drawn: that is to say, that of the unity of oppo
that conclusion according to which the same thi
time both pleasant and unpleasant and both des
and both the same and not the same and so on.
The reason for which, through the two above-mentioned ways, that
is to say, through the successive changes, the transformations, on the one
hand, and the différent appraisals, on the other, unity of opposites can be
achieved, is because that which is at the basis of these ways, is precisely
"the One".
If we examine first of all the case of the transformations, it really is

easy to ascertain that that which is transformed each time is actually one,
since it is in fact each one thing which, being and remaining always the
same as itself, is transformed into something eise. For the purposes of
this ascertainment we can, for example, take as a basis fragment 126,
according to which "cold things grow warm, warm grows cold, wet
grows dry, and parched grows moist". Without in any way altering the
meaning of this fragment, is it not in fact evident that we could repeat it
in a différent way as follows: "It is cold things that grow warm; it is
warm that grows cold; it is wet that grows dry, and parched that grows
moist" and of course vice versa?
The same also occurs in the case of the différent appraisals: that
which is appraised differently, despite this fact, that is to say, the fact that
it is appraised differently, that it is open to différent appraisals, it is
indeed once again evident that, from its point of view, it is the same and
remains always unalterable and identical to itself.
Thus, if, for example, sea-water is for fish drinkable and life-saving
and for humans undrinkable and deadly, the one true fact is that sea
water59 does not change; it remains always the same as it

resuit that one can, therefore, without contradiction assert
this particular case, that «... καί αγαθόν και κακόν [εν ε
But if all things are indeed one, if the common to all
common to all «φρόνησις», God, is that which it is and at
also all other things, all the opposites and their mutual tran
their «πόλεμος», the «πυρ», the «κόσμος», this means t
cletian One we should at this point draw another importa
that this One is at the same time both being and becomin
erial/intelligible and material/sensible, or, precisely, acco
clitus's own words, both «διαιρετόν άδιαίρετον, γενητ
θνητόν άθάνατον...»61.
That which we conclude, by extension, at this point, is t
these divisions themselves, precisely these very oppositi
they may be and however fundamental and highly mutually
they may appear, are in essence of no importance, for preci
that all are one («εν πάντα είναι»)62. One, as One, oblitérât
tions within their mutual opposition, which of course rema
which it is and that which always exists in Order to be obl
It is indeed self-evident that if One were only immaterial
it would be the opposite of matter/of the sensible, it w
words, be that other thing which would be found against m
result that all would not be one. If, therefore, all are in
Heraclitus Claims -, this is due precisely to the fact that
divine, the immaterial, or the invisible, and the human, the
material, there is no différence.
There is no différence, not of course in the sense of the
of différences, the non-existence of oppositions, but in the
unification of these différences and oppositions in "the On
same as these ones, and at the same time not the same, sinc
them, by unifying them. Precisely as stated above, One o
oppositions within their mutual opposition, which alwa
such and which essentially is never obliterated.
59. fr. 61.

60. fr. 58.
61.fr. 50.
62. Ibid.
In other words, this One which is being discussed h

does not exclude from itself multiplicity, which do
multiplicity; it simply unifies multiplicity, justifi
precisely in the saine way that the existence of disha
harmony64. In this same way, although the concept o
to the concept of «πάν» or to «πάντα», it is neverthe
evident that between these two concepts no distincti
distinction can be drawn between these two conce
same way that in général no opposite can be separate
Thus, in the absolute sense, One cannot be identica
that it is in fact its opposite65. However, in the sam
night are opposites and yet at the same time one and
and evil are opposites and yet at the same time one
life and death, and awake and asleep and young and
each other and yet at the same time one and the sa
downhill are opposites and yet at the same time on
all and not all are opposites and at the same time one
in the same way «εν» and «πάντα» are opposites and
same thing. One has no meaning on its own as such,
ed as such without «πάντα» and of course the reverse. The mutual
relationship between One and all things is, consequently, precisely that
which is described in fragment 10, according to which «... και έκ
πάντων εν καί εξ ενός πάντα». «Έν» is the «εν» of «πάντα» and
«πάντα» is the «πάντα» of «εν».
If men are deluded in their perception of the world and of things, this
63. It could not be said that it «transcends» it, for One does not exist
beyond or behind the many, it is never divided from them, as a separate onto
logical unit.
64. See note 49.
65. Not its direct opposite, since its direct opposite is more likely to be
«πολλά», but certainly its absolute opposite, its opposite to the absolute degree,
since, to the absolute degree, «πάντα» is ail the «πολλά».
66. fr. 57.
67. fr. 58.
68. fr. 88.
69. fr. 60.
70.fr. 10.
occurs, therefore, precisely because they fail to see that whil

many, while many exist, which are in conflict with each oth
many, «τά πάντα», are mutually interconnected, that they
ψιες»71, that they converge in One. They see only the diff
oppositions, each separate thing, the many themselves, b
approach them through their senses, they approach them t
eyes and ears72 and through ail their subjective parameter
jecture 74. Only «φρονέειν», that which is common to ail, c
men - can allow them to perceive - the One of many, that
many the One. Whether beings are perceived as many or as
unit, therefore, dépends exclusively on the way, or rather, o
by which they are approached: by thought or the senses.
Parmenides approaches matters through thought; he ap
them from the point of view of thought, and for this rea
conceives and on which he considers it important to give emp
existence of only one Being, characterizing the many bei
delusion, as the illusion of men who are deluded75.
But why are the many beings considered fallacy, delusion,
nides? The easy answer, the answer based only on the surface
by Parmenides, would be: because in reality the many beings
only one Being exists: «έόν» : that «έόν» which is «εν»77
τον»78. However, Parmenides stresses
79
vigorously that this
the object, the sole and exclusive object, of thought . Many, the exist
Tl. Ibid.
12. fr. 107.
73. fr. 2.
74. fr. 47.
75. « ... πλάττονται ....»: Parmenides, Poem, fr. VI [according to the

order of présentation of the fragments adopted by W. Kranz on re-publication
(1951) of Diels' work Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (1912)].
76. For example, Parmenides, Poem, fr. II, «εστι γάρ είναι, μηδέν δ'ούκ
έστιν»: fr. VI, «ού γάρ μήποτε τούτο δαμη είναι μή έόντα»: fr. VII, «μόνος
δ'έτι μύθος όδοΐο λείπεται ώς έστιν»: fr. VIII.
77. Parmenides, Poem, fr. VIII, verse 6.
78. Ibid., fr. VIII, verse 26.
79. Ibid., fr. III, «ταύτόν δ'έστί νοεΐν τε καί οϋνεκεν εστι νόημα»: fr.
VIII, verse 34.
ence, that is to say, both of being and of non-being a

object of the senses. It is the object of those wh
knowledge of the world, make use of their eyes and
If those who are deluded, are deluded, it is not
many do not exist, but precisely because tho
approach the world through the senses, because
they do not conceive it82. They thus grasp only th
the constantly changing things, the moving thi
One which unifies the many, surpassing them,
intellect can discover, this they fail to conceive.
therefore, is necessarily only this: to remain, in
blind83, however much they hear and however mu
that do not see and ears füll of sound, that do not
In the final analysis, the général conclusion that
Heraclitus and Parmenides are in fact saying the sa
they are saying it from a différent point of v
Standpoint: Parmenides says it from the point
Heraclitus from the point of view of the sense
theless, have complété knowledge of the othe
Parmenides has knowledge of the existence of m
the existence of One. In fact, it is for that very
criticize so strongly ail those multitudes of peo
selves, not knowing the truth of this dual aspect of
Eleni Papamichael-Paspalides
80. Ibid., fr. VII.

81. See note 80. The parallelism with Heraclitus is evident (see note 72).
82. They do not make use of «voetv» which permits the conception and
compréhension of «είναι» (Parmenides, Poem, fr. III), they do not make use of
this means (« ... άμηχανίη ...»: Ibid., fr. VI, verse 5), they do not make use of
this "path" («οδός») of knowledge (for example, Ibid., frs II, VI, VII), nor do
they use the logos, which is necessary to make possible the correct choice of
path that man must follow in order to discover what it is that exists («κρίναι δέ
λόγω ...»: Ibid., fr. VII, verse 5).
83. «... κωφοί όμως τυφλοί τε ...»: Parmenides, Poem, fr. VI, verse 7.
See in comparison Heraclitus's frs 1, 19 and 34.
84. « ... ασκοπον όμμα και ήχήεσσαν άκουήν ...»: Ibid., fr. VII, verse 4.
85. fr. 55.

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EURORGAN s.p.r.l.

According to the traditional understanding regarding the perception

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE ANCIENNE, XXIII. 1,2005

which we will concentrate our attention lies in the

One is perceived by him:

Following the above classification we will firs

2. The référencés to Heraclitus's fragments will be

is one, everywhere the same. The characteristics of correct

8. «où γάρ φρονέουσι τοιαύτα πολλοί, όκόσι έγκυρεύσιν»; fr. 17.

14. «σωφρονείν άρετή μεγίστη»: fr. 112.

meal perception of things, and, as a conséqu

15. fr. 19.

18. «ούκ έμοΰ, άλλά του λόγου άκούσαντας...»: fr. 50.

common to ail things («...τφ ξύνω πάντων...»)20. Indeed,

20. fr. 114.

28. «...καί έκ πάντων εν καί έξ ένός πάντα»: fr. 10.

concern one exclusive object, identical to the one

31. fr. 32.

32. This accord is

37. «τόν πόλεμον έόντα ξυνόν»: fr. 80

42. The parallel, to his own monotheistic approach to the div

precisely to his own perception, many cannot exist

έκ τών όμοιων» : fr. 10, «... διαφερόμενον έωυτψ ό

54. See relevant notes 3, 38, 39, 40, 41.

With regard to the transformations themselves of fire, fr

does not présent any peculiarity, does not actually contain w

58. frs. 12, 49a, 91.

using ways that cause torment, a fact which, accor

If we examine first of all the case of the transformations, it really is

water59 does not change; it remains always the same as it

59. fr. 61.

In other words, this One which is being discussed h

occurs, therefore, precisely because they fail to see that whil

75. « ... πλάττονται ....»: Parmenides, Poem, fr. VI [according to the

ence, that is to say, both of being and of non-being a

80. Ibid., fr. VII.

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