The accused-appellant, Romeo F.
Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of
EN BANC
G.R. No. 132875-76           February 3, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
Public Officers; The privileges and rights arising from having been
elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.—True, election is the
expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of
suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of
government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of
its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been
elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to
ascertain the applicable law.
Same; All top officials of Government—executive, legislative and
judicial are subject to the majesty of law; Privilege has to be granted
by law, not inferred from the duties of a position.—We start with the
incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive,
legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an
unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or
appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from
the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by
law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the
rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.
Same; The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege
cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms.—The
immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history
of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
Same; Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the
peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests.—Because of the
broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant,
convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim
parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same
general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions
were pending appeal, x x x For offenses punishable by more than six
years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.
Same; The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely
authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.—The accused-
appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it
has constitutional foundations.
Same; One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or
after final conviction, is public self-defense.—One rationale behind
confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public
self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example
and warning to others. A person charged with crime is taken into
custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in
United States v. Gustilo, it is the injury to the public which State action
in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied
bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his
absconding.
Same; Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement.—We, therefore, find that
election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness
on six counts1 is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this
motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of the first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and
rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In
answering the query, we are called upon to balance relevant and
conflicting factors in the judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in
the context of penal law.
The accused-appellant's "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate
As Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that
—
1. Accused-appellant's reelection being an expression of
popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving
priority to any right or interest — not even the police power
of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative
amounts to taxation without representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties
amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed
mandates entrusted to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte
wants their voice to be heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained
lawmaker to attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.
6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona
fide member thereof and urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect its mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily
curtail the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his
mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign
will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress.
Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform
the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his
constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds
that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising
from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the
continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits.
However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising
from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our
first task is to ascertain the applicable law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of
Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the
majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public
mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself,
frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege
has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In
fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience
rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of
the House of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as
Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history
of the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special
privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative
Department.
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same, . . .
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the
exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the
accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal
Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was
subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried
or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall,
in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his
attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from
the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there
was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity
and intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated
by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member
involved the custody of the law within twenty four hours
after its adjournment for a recess or for its next session,
otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after
final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It
also serves as an example and warning to others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,3 it is the
injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress.
It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional
Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to
incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.4
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which
voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he
might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform
congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest
was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his
colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the
sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is
now the same body whose call he initially spurned which accused-
appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to
well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims
of the State's penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial
Court of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at
the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held
at the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of
whether to expel/suspend him from the House of
Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic
of his dentist in Makati City;

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati
obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the
Medical Center, Makati City;
custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending
sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively
minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session. d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In
this case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane
and private vehicle.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to
attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution which states that — He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the
New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise
allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day
and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program"
manner, and under such penalties, as such House may for the purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank
provide. and 2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For
this purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use
his own vehicle and driver in going to and from the project
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he
area and his place of confinement.
should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a dentist in Makati City.
crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City
for his heart condition.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos2,
which states, inter alia, that —
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to
a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the
prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be authorities or upon court orders.
to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.
When a people have elected a man to office, it must be
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature.
assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and
Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position.
Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status
overrule the will of the people.
to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of
the correction system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:5
the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the
administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and
present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from
fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full
the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress,
preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is
and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress
entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge
or, otherwise, disqualified.
their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except
 the dictates of their conscience of their conscience.
Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be
accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest,
however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged
class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their
liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered
immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to
and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent
from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can
perform his functions efficiently and well, without the need
for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an
unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any
other citizen considering that there is a strong public interest
in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the
fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the
government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to
the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the
safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution,
solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an
obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The
presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain
independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the
essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he
is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the
latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.
He also claims that the concept of temporary detention does not
necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has
always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to
leave jail.
few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that
has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be
deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to
nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor
with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a
particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial
constituents. A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never
has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise,
insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or
types of individuals.8
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.9
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not
a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted
in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to
the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class.10
Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion
exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of
locomotion.11

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of

We remain unpersuaded.1âwphi1.nêt
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other
member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a
congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building,
House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City,
manned by a full complement of staff paid for by Congress. Through
[an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an office
at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City,
where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant further
admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and
resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and
other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been
discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative
consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under
detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have
been allowed by the prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to
perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to
Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within
the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect
a person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal illness,
they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full
term in office.
one's liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or
lawful tribunal, and is personal to the accused.12 The term refers to the
restraint on the personal liberty of another; any prevention of his
movements from place to place, or of his free action according to his
own pleasure and will. 13 Imprisonment is the detention of another
against his will depriving him of his power of locomotion 14 and it "[is]
something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of
restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior barrier."15
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature,
changes an individual's status in society.16 Prison officials have the
difficult and often thankless job of preserving the security in a
potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to provide
rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social
mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment
and elimination of certain rights.17
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-
appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any
other right or interest, including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question

of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of laws."6 This simply means that all persons similarly
situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed.7 The organs of government may not show any
undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not
prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that

allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from
the same class as all persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public

officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.
The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious.
The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest
in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of
250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a