Research article

Asian Journal of Comparative Politics

1–12
Populism “made in Japan”: ª The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/2057891119844608
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Toru Yoshida
Hokkaido University, Japan

Abstract
Despite rapidly growing literature on populism in advanced democracies, Japan is often over-
looked. However, Japan has certainly not been immune to populist phenomena. In fact, populist
politics in Japan can be divided into two categories: the first was in the 2000s, when Prime Minister
Koizumi implemented vast reforms, and the second has proponents among the governors and
mayors of big cities, such as Yasuo Tanaka, Toru Hashimoto, and Koike Yuriko. They have prin-
cipally promoted neoliberal reforms, such as market deregulation, overhauling administrative
systems, and limiting trade union autonomy. The economic interventionism and political author-
itarianism characterizing recent populism in the West are not found in Japan, which explains why
the literature has neglected Japanese cases of populism. Focusing mainly on the second type of
populism, this article argues analytically that populism in Japan must be understood as a political
strategy employed by the local executives. By examining cases of populist Japanese governors and
mayors, we observe that populist politics are fueled at the local level by the institutional settings
and electoral systems in regional politics. Aiming to contribute to the literature on varieties of
populism, the article emphasizes theoretically that institutional mechanisms tend to foster populist
politicians in Japan.

Keywords
Japanese politics, local politics, party politics, populism

Not only the phenomenon but also the concept of populism has attracted much attention in recent
years as a worrying political trend. Jan-Werner Müller even wrote of the “Age of Populism”
(Müller, 2016: 2). Political scientists concur that “without doubt, both populism and democracy
are today widespread in different parts of the world” (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2012: 205).
Consequently, the literature on populism has been growing rapidly. We have witnessed many
varying concepts and definitions of populism, and explanations for their rise in democratic

Corresponding author:
Toru Yoshida, Hokkaido University, Kita 9, Nishi 7, Kitaku, Sapporo, Japan.
Email: yoshidat@juris.hokudai.ac.jp
2 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

countries. Since, on close examination, these types of populism vary tremendously in their form,
style, and context, it is more appropriate to discuss populisms, rather than populism.
Relatedly, a recent literature review on populism and populist politicians identified three
approaches in populism studies (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013). According to these typologies,
the first approach treats populism as a “thin ideology” that essentially reveres the “people” and
stresses the antagonism between corrupt elites and the good people. This applies to much of the
populism analyzed and commentated in recent years, ranging from Donald Trump’s “make Amer-
ica great again” to Marine Le Pen’s “losers of globalization.” Such interpretation mainly focuses
on political parties and their leaders as a unit of analysis to decrypt ideologies through partisan
literature. The second approach treats populism as a distinct style in politics, especially recogniz-
ing its discursive characteristics. Leaving aside the ideological dimension of populism, it mainly
focuses on interpreting the political rhetoric and public discourse of populist politicians. The final
approach interprets populism as a political strategy, i.e. a specific form of political mobilization led
by politicians. This approach takes into account the so-called “niche parties” and their political
strategies that aim to counteract the established parties (Meguid, 2009).
These three approaches are not mutually exclusive; instead, they allow comprehensive under-
standing and the classification of populisms in different contexts and countries. However, in this
article, we reject the first and second positions – namely, the ideological and organizational aspects
of populism – and principally focus on the third, interpreting populism as a form of political
mobilization. Going further, we shall define populism as a form of political style that maximizes
mobilization in order to win an election in particular circumstances. Our adoption of this definition
is largely premised on the specific institutional settings of current Japanese populism.

Is populism really (now) absent in Japan?

Despite being considered one of the world’s most important developed democracies (Stockwin,
2008), Japan has not yet been fully examined in the growing literature on populism. An exception
is the extensive analysis during the 2000s, when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who was
interpreted as a populist politician in Japan and overseas due to his antagonistic and sound-bite
politics. The political scientist Hideo Ohtake identified Koizumi as an archetypal Japanese populist
politician because he has presented himself as an outsider, stressing the moral dimension in
politics, and adopting a “theatrical style,” i.e. preferring to communicate directly to the public
through television (Ohtake, 2003, 2006, 2009). Sharing this perspective, Lindgren (2015: 575)
stresses Koizumi’s populistic characteristics: “In terms of his attacks on the politics-as-usual and
on established political structures and actors in Japan, Koizumi’s style and rhetoric resembled what
has been studied as populism elsewhere (in Latin America, in Northern America, and in Europe).”
Based on this description, including his many communalities with other countries’ populists,
Koizumi’s populism has similar characteristics to those attributed to French President Nicolas
Sarkozy (in office 2007–2012) or to Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (in office 1994–1995,
2001–2006, and 2008–2011): they both stressed the virtue of individualism (self-effort and mer-
itocracy), the free market, and entrepreneurship, which could be termed “neoliberal” populism
(Amable and Palonbarini, 2011; Campus, 2010). Indeed, as reflected by culturalist Stuart Hall’s
(1983) characterization of Thatcherism as “authoritarian populism,” neoliberalism and populism
have been naturally associated since the 1980s.
However, “neoliberal” populism differs from the currently observed populism in several
respects. Without going into too much detail, the likes of Donald Trump, Nigel Farage, Marine
Yoshida 3

Le Pen, and the Austrian Heinz-Christian Sträche, though contextually diverse, are culturally
authoritarian (politically right) and economically interventionist (politically left), which are dif-
ferent traits to those of neoliberal populists (Betz and Meret, 2013). Even more clearly contrasting
are the policies of left-wing populism, represented by the Italian Five Star Movement (MS5), the
Spanish Podemos, and the Greek Syriza, who principally advocate more market regulation and
redistributive policies.
The fact that Japan has experienced only neoliberal populism, rather than the culturally author-
itarian and economically interventionist populism recently emerging in developed democracies,
has led many respected commentators to assert there has been no serious rise of populism in
Japan.1 However, on closer examination, even after Koizumi resigned and retired in 2006,2 we
see the constant and regular rise of neoliberal populists in Japan. One possible reason for Japan
being often neglected in populism studies is that its populist politicians are not only neoliberal
types but also local figures: most are governors or mayors of big cities pledging neoliberal policies.
It is always difficult to set objective criteria to denote a politician as populist, since the word
itself is neither descriptive nor analytic, but simply pejorative, functioning as what Max Weber
named a “fighting term” (Kampfbegriff) in politics. Nonetheless, there are several local political
figures who are commonly called populists in Japan. For the sake of argument, I adopt the list of
populist politicians devised by Matsutani (2017), who sets three criteria to specify populist pol-
iticians: their ideology, style, and strategy, exhibiting similarity to the three approaches identified
in the above-mentioned literature review. The first criterion refers to the ideological dualism of
“the good people and evil elites”; the second refers to praising “the people” in their general public
discourse; and the third refers to adopting a “theatrical” way of communicating as their political
strategy, for example through specific TV programs preferred by the common class.
Based on these three criteria, Matsutani has identified five genuine populist politicians of the 10
generally termed populist from the 1990s onward. In addition to Prime Minister Koizumi, the other
four were all local political figures: Yasuo Tanaka, Governor of Nagano (2000 to 2006); Toru
Hashimoto, Governor of Osaka (2008 to 2011) and then Mayor of Osaka City (2011 to 2015);
Takashi Kawamura, Mayor of Nagoya (2009 to present); and Yuriko Koike, who was elected
Governor of Tokyo by a landslide victory in 2016.3 As Shintaro Ishihara, Governor of Tokyo (1999
to 2012) is often cited as a populist, he would not fit the criteria by the fact that he is not building up
his discourse based on “the people.”
Other characteristics shared by these figures include reform-orientation, a pro-business agenda,
and a focus on securing the wide mobilization of the city electorate. For example, before being
elected Governor of Osaka in 2008, Hashimoto was already a famous lawyer who appeared
frequently on TV. After taking office, he fiercely denounced the prefectural bureaucracy and the
local bureaucratic system organized by central government. His longtime political program called
for a local referendum to establish a new administrative entity (“Osaka-to,” similar to Tokyo-to),
which he claimed would be a smaller and more efficient governing body. His plan was ultimately
rejected by the inhabitants of Osaka when this referendum was held in 2015. Besides having a
sharp tongue, Hashimoto is also known for his sometimes-violent criticisms (often through local
TV programs or Twitter) of intermediate organizations such as local councils, labor unions, and
school councils, as well as his attacks on national newspapers and academic intellectuals.
Another leading local populist figure is Yuriko Koike, the first female Governor of Tokyo,
whose electoral program included halving the governor’s salary, bringing transparency into
decision-making procedures, and making Tokyo a big financial center of Asia. Having started her
career as a TV news anchorwoman, she was later elected as an MP in 1993, and served several
4 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

times as a minister in the Koizumi government. Already a known figure, she further raised her
profile during the governorship election campaign, for example by denouncing the procedure that
allowed the prestigious fish market Tsukiji to be moved to a new location where its ground was
reportedly being polluted. Once in office, she publicly criticized the prefectural assembly’s leader,
a member of the Liberal Democrat Party (LDP), and even interrogated in a standing committee
former Governor of Tokyo Ishihara, contending that his decision to transfer the fish market had
endangered Tokyoites’ health. The political style of blaming the old political structure and calling
for reforms applies also to Tanaka and Kawamura. For example, the former designed his office to
have clear glass walls as a symbol of transparency, while the latter reduced the city councilor salary
and cut inhabitant tax.4
Thus, while Japan may not have populist politicians at the national level, there is clear evidence
of populism in local politics.

Regional populism’s institutional setting

It needs to be considered why, in contrast to western populists, Japan’s so-called populist politi-
cians are: 1) local/regional figures, and 2) politically reform-oriented and pro-business. Following
Margaret Canovan’s canonical book, it is true that some state governors in the United States, such
as Huey Long, have been described as among the archetypes of “populist dictatorship” which is
one of the six typologies of populism (Canovan, 1981). However, the Governor of Louisiana
during the 1920s was certainly not a market-believer, directing criticism at big companies and
supporting public spending. Political reform-oriented and pro-business populism was widely wit-
nessed in the West from the 1990s, but has almost vanished today, and is only still seen at the
national level; by contrast, in Japan, it is prominent at the local level.
To explain these differences, which add local neoliberal populism as another variety of this
political phenomenon, we must go beyond contextual conditions to try to find substantive reasons
why this type of populism emerges in Japan.
For this purpose, in focusing on Japanese local/regional populists we adopt a neo-institutional
analysis. Neo-institutionalism allows us to see, through institutional settings, how the strategy of
actors at different levels is framed (Kato, 1996). This also applies when trying to understand
populist strategies.
The key to understanding the presence of Japanese populist politicians at the local and regional
level lies in its unique institutional and electoral setting, particularly the dual representation system
(Nigen Daihyo-sei),5 under which executives (governors and mayors) and assemblies (councilors)
are both elected as political representatives and share competencies over public policy formation
and implementation.
As a part of its reform program after the Second World War, the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers, led by the United States, initiated decentralization, transferring responsibility from
central government to local authorities with the aim of realizing grassroots democracy in Japan
(Steiner, 1965). This idea concretized to a model imitating the US local government structure: it
comprises four levels of local assembly (prefecture, city, town, and village), which function as
deliberative organs. On the other hand, each of these public entities has an elected head (governor
or mayor) as its executive branch. As a whole, the Japanese local government structure has been
conceptualized as a hybrid system, combining the pre-Second World War local assembly system
with the subsequently introduced American-style executive branch.
Yoshida 5

The Japanese constitution stipulates that “local public entities shall establish assemblies as their
deliberative organs” (Article 93(1)), and that these members (councilors) shall be elected by direct
popular vote, in the same way as the executives (Article 93(2)). The number of councilors in each
assembly is decided by bylaws and varies according to the size of the public entity, ranging from 12
(for a village with fewer than 2000 inhabitants) up to 127 (Metropolitan Tokyo).6 The average
numbers of seats is around 55 in a prefectural assembly, and around 75 in the assembly of a big city
of more than 1.3 million inhabitants.
Each assembly has authority to issue resolutions to establish or amend bylaws, make budgetary
decisions, approve statements of accounts, endorse expenditures, and deal with matters raised by
local demands. Another important power is their ability to submit a motion of no confidence in
their executive, which requires a majority of at least three-quarters of the vote in assembly.
On the other hand, the executive branch has sole authority to submit the budget, and shares
power with the assembly on proposing bylaws. The executive can also insist on reconsideration of
the assembly’s resolution when he/she objects to a bylaw’s enactment, amendment, or abolition, or
to a resolution concerning a budgetary matter. Finally, if not resigning, he/she could also dissolve
the assembly when the vote of no confidence is approved.
In sum, the dual representation system means that “the relation between the executive and the
assembly is to inspect and check each other mutually, and when needed, to cooperate between the
two” (Kitamura et al., 2017: 36). When implementing or deciding on public policies, they share
competencies and authority, as both the assembly and the executive of local governments are
directly elected to represent the inhabitants.
Some literature suggests that this resembles the US presidential system (Soga and Machidori,
2000), but they are not entirely analogous, since Japanese local assemblies have more power to
hold the executive to account, whether by passing a vote of no confidence in them or requiring
them to appear on the floor of the assembly to explain their actions. Moreover, the executive has
the right to dissolve the assembly. This strong dual system is dissimilar to other systems of
government. In practice, in the main assembly, the process of question and answer between
councilors and the executive concerns important content and has substantive consequences. In
this respect alone, it differs greatly from the management of Congress under the US presidential
system, where the central focus is on discussions between individual members of Congress.
Indeed, there are conflicting analyses and interpretations on the power relationship and equilibrium
between the two bodies, with some arguing the predominance of the executive (Yoda, 1995), and
others contending that the assembly has real autonomy to influence and challenge the executive’s
authority (Natori, 2004). In any event, the Japanese system assures much more equality between
the two branches.
With regard to the two branches’ dual competences and our focus on local populism in Japan,
the dual representation system provides two different channels to reflect the popular will of
citizens: the executive and the assembly have different electoral systems, often characterized by
different partisan structures, and are sometimes elected at different times, which is another feature
of the institutional setting that allows populism – a point we will address later.
Since 1993, the year when the long dominance of the LDP ended, the de-alignment of Japanese
voters has been observed (Tanaka and Martin, 2003). Consequently, there was growth in the
number of so-called “independent governors” (Mutoha Chiji), unaffiliated with any established
party during the 1990s.7 This period saw greater levels of conflict between governors and assem-
blies than during the 1980s. On some occasions, conflicting objectives caused serious conflicts to
arise. Having collected data from every prefecture, Tsuji (2015) asserts that after 1993, the
6 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

conflicts between governors and assemblies were mainly caused by “reformist governors” (Kai-
kakuha Chiji) trying to implement their program (whether conservative or progressive) regardless
of the assembly’s composition. Many of the policies they championed concerned reducing public
utilities, administrative reform, and information disclosure.8
In the same manner, analyzing cases from the Tokyo administration, Soga and Machidori
(2017) demonstrate a shift in the policy realms over which conflict has arisen: whereas social
security issues were a major source of conflict until the end of the 1980s, reflecting the old
conservative-progressive cleavage, disputes now mainly concern such issues as deregulation, the
environment, and information disclosure. These new sources of conflict have arisen through
independent governors’ politicization of many new policy areas.
These two studies elucidate how the mechanism and functioning of the dual representation
system have undergone groundbreaking transformation.9 They also concur that a new relationship
has been established between the two representative branches. In many cases, discord has been
rooted in differences over basic political preferences: for example, the assembly tends to demand
more budget spending, whether to benefit local business as part of the conservative pork-barrel
politics agenda, or to assure greater welfare provision for citizens as a core progressive policy. This
strategy increased council candidates’ prospects of electoral success. We observe that general
expenditure levels across the different prefectures were stable for the second-half the 1990s, even
after the bubble economy crashed. On the other hand, prefectural tax revenues gradually dropped
as local economies shrank, notably after the 2008 recession, which left prefectures more dependent
on national government expenditure (for an overview, see Somusho, 2017). Under this condition,
independent governors have been the only political actors calling for “small government
orientation” (Soga and Machidori, 2017: 309). With old political preferences colliding with new
budgetary constraints, political opportunities opened up for populist executives.
In sum, we have seen that the dual representation system of Japanese local politics has inher-
ently controversial dimensions that can induce cooperation or collision between the two branches.
However, after the second half of the 1990s, this equilibrium was changed by growing numbers of
independent governors politicizing many nontraditional policy areas and opting for budget reduc-
tion and administrative reforms.
The real question is why these actors, namely, the governors and the councilors of local
assemblies, adopt different strategies that cause them to collide.

Sources of conflict and the rationality of adopting populist agendas

To understand why these two types of representatives hold different policy and budget preferences,
especially when one tries to understand why Japan experiences regional neoliberal populism, we
could refer to the electoral dynamics confronting them.
As noted above, in the dual representation system, the executives and the assemblies are elected
through two different electoral systems, sometimes through elections held at different times.10
As in the United States, executives are elected by citizens and serve a four-year term. However,
the size of the district determines the electoral strategy of the actors: at the prefectural level, each
prefecture constitutes one district; the governors are chosen by electorates exceeding 10 million in
Tokyo and 7 million in Osaka. The turnout rate in these elections has not exceeded 65% since the
1990s. In addition to attempting to become known through mass media, governors must have an
electoral program that is sufficiently vague or otherwise appealing to attract large public support.
In the big cities, such as Tokyo and Osaka, the industrial composition is diverse: the commerce/
Yoshida 7

wholesale sector employs the most workers (18% and 17%, respectively, in Tokyo and Osaka in
2012). The service industries represent about 80% of the total employment; the remainder of the
workforce is employed in manufacturing, construction, and the public sector. More than 70% of
male Tokyoites are employed, and nearly half (42%) have at least a university degree. The
inhabitants are rather young: around 40% of Tokyo’s inhabitants are aged between 25 and 55
(Tokyo Metropolis, 2016). The overall picture suggests that Tokyo citizens are mainly working in
the service industry, are high- or mid-skilled, typically young to middle-aged, and, most relevant
here, politically “independent.” For a governorship candidate to triumph, they have to persuade
these voters.11
The 2011 election of Osaka’s city mayor, held simultaneously with the election of Osaka’s
governor, provides a useful example. Nearly 90% of full-time workers and 85% of managers
supported the populist mayoral candidate Toru Hashimoto, standing as leader of Osaka Ishin-
no-Kai (the Osaka Restoration Association). By contrast, support for that regional party was
recorded at 75% for the unemployed and part-time workers and the same percentage for socio-
cultural professionals. Such strong support for the populist candidate among white-collar voters is
even clearer when one analyzes voters’ educational and income levels. Indeed, 70% of university
graduates supported Hashimoto, compared to only 60% of college graduates and 53% of middle
school graduates. As regards income levels, those with higher incomes were more likely to support
Hashimoto: >4 million yen: 75%; >6 million yen: 77%; >8 million yen: 76%; and >10 million yen:
72%. For context, the average income per household in the city is about 3.2 million yen (Matsutani,
2012; Zenkyo et al., 2012).
Taking the case of Tokyo’s governorship election in 2016, we can observe the “politicization”
of public policies. Although limited details on voters are available, beyond the fact that more than
half (51%) of “independent voters” preferred Koike, the populist candidate’s manifesto was rated
more favorably than those of the other two main candidates in seven policy areas. Among the
policies presented by the candidates, though renovation of urban transportation and infrastructure
attracted greatest support among independent voters (64%), there was also a strong preference for
administrative and budgetary reforms (52%). On the other hand, only 27% of Tokyoites expected
Koike to tackle the problem of poverty in their city (Tokyo Shimbun, 2016).
As noted earlier, the executives (namely, the governor and the mayor) of big cities tend to favor
reform-oriented, pro-business policies to mobilize the inner-city electorate, since such neoliberal
populist policies are certainly attractive to the wealthy, well-educated, middle-class electorate.
However, we must also consider that the style and programs adopted by these populist gover-
nors could mainly be explained by the electoral system, in which it is advantageous for a candidate
to appeal to a geographically dispersed electorate in a large constituency, and to propose policies
for the better-off middle class where the population is concentrated. The LDP lost its hegemony
during the 1990s, and in highly populated inner cities the party’s structural support has been eroded
(Sunahara, 2017). This political vacuum also presented opportunities for candidates to use populist
strategies, relying on the traditional politics of difference: “us vs. them.” From only three inde-
pendent governors in 1995, Japan had 20 in 2015, representing about 40% of the country’s
prefectures (47). Large constituency sizes for executive elections is an institutional feature that
is conducive to candidates adopting populist strategies.
By contrast, the councilors of regional assemblies are elected under a single non-transferable
vote (SNTV) system, in which multiple candidates contest between one and 10 seats, according to
the district’s population. For prefectural assemblies, the electoral district is the area of a county
(called a “gun,” and composed of several towns and villages) or a city. In 2013, there were 1139
8 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

constituencies (polling districts) across the 47 prefectural assemblies. Single-seat constituencies

exist only in big cities and towns (comprising 431 seats and constituting 40% of total constitu-
encies in 2011);12 for the remaining 614 districts (2046 seats), the councilors are elected by
SNTV.13 The same electoral system is employed for city assemblies. For Osaka City, for example,
the assembly has 86 seats, split across 24 constituencies, each of which has between two and
six seats.
Under this system, in constituencies with more than five seats, even parties struggling to gain
seats in the national assembly, such as the Socialist Party or the Communist Party, win around 70%
of the seats they contest in each prefectural assembly election (Sunahara, 2017). The SNTV
electoral system thus allows weakened parties to survive in local politics. Indeed, unlike at the
national level, where partisan politics developed considerably toward bipartisanism after electoral
reforms in 1994, competition at the local level continued to stagnate because the electoral system
remained unchanged. Indeed, Weiner (2008) observed durable uncompetitiveness even at the
prefectural level, where he observed that about half of the districts lacked viable challengers to
the incumbents, while one-quarter of districts were uncontested.
In those political conditions, candidates for the assembly need only receive 20 to 30% of the
vote to be elected; their most rational strategy is, therefore, to represent organized or occupational
interests. When assessing the data on councilors, notably those of the LDP, Toai (2017) found a
strong preference for membership of what Inoguchi and Iwai (1987) termed “particular interests
controlling committees”: (Inoguchi and Iwai 1987:101) as assembly committees implementing
policies on agro-fisheries, construction, and commerce, their members can mobilize and secure
electoral support from related organizations. In fact, facing elections every four years, regional
councilors rely heavily on personal networks and associations to mobilize support during the
electoral campaign, since local elections are more candidate-centered than national elections, in
which party membership is most relevant.
In addition, prefectural assembly elections generally tend to be characterized by the old
conservative-progressive cleavage. In response to a questionnaire sent to local representatives in
2010, LDP councilors replied that they heavily rely on professional organizations for daily political
support, whereas those on the left depend on trade unions (Nishizawa, 2012; Shinada, 2012).
As we have seen, preference differences between local executives and assembly councilors are
closely connected to their respective electoral system and the conditions it generates. Candidates
for executive office must appeal to geographically dispersed constituencies, and especially to
voters in urban areas, who tend to be relatively highly educated and working in the service
industry. These candidates can mobilize support through reformist ideas, which leads them to use
neoliberal populist rhetoric, as outlined above.
Therefore, a rational strategy for executive candidates is to criticize the local assembly and its
councilors, blaming them for prioritizing the particular interests of a specific sector or industry that
they represent. Such prioritization is the best strategy for councilors seeking election, for the
reasons explained above.
Additionally, the more urban the district, the greater the volatility of voters’ preferences and the
weaker their loyalty to any particular party or candidate, giving populist politicians greater oppor-
tunities to win elections. The LDP retains relatively strong roots and support in the countryside, but
is losing its hegemony in big cities. This is confirmed by votes cast in the Lower House election in
2012, decided by proportional representation. While the LDP scored around 35% in the country-
side, its vote share was lower in more densely populated areas, receiving only around 25% in urban
districts (Sugawara, 2013). By contrast, the first opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan
Yoshida 9

(DPJ), receives fewer votes at prefectural level than at national level, which creates room locally
for third parties adopting populist strategies. A good example is the populist party Ishin-No-To,
whose vote share is around 15% in the countryside but increases up to 20% in urban areas. Albeit to
a lesser extent, the same trend was observed for the short-lived Minna-No-To (Your Party), led by
the LDP dissident Yoshimi Watanabe who promoted neoliberal reforms, having been minister for
administrative reforms before leaving the LDP (he lost his seat in 2014, but was then elected as a
senator representing Ishin-No-To in 2016).
Thus, the LDP’s hegemony continues to decline in big cities, while the DPJ is lacking support at
the regional level. This political vacuum allows and indeed incentivizes other political actors to
employ the strategy of neoliberal populism to promote administrative reforms and cost cutting
measures, as the traditional progressive-conservative cleavage favors budgetary increases, either to
pursue pork-barrel politics (LDP) or to expand welfare provisions (DPJ).

Conclusion
There has been wide debate on whether the recent populism phenomenon in different parts of the
world is grounded in economical or cultural conditions. The Great Recession and related austerity
policies in the United States and in Western Europe have undoubtedly greatly fueled the ascen-
dancy of populism (Kriesi et al., 2015). Culturally, it is especially noteworthy that members of the
white working class are threatened by erosion of their status (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). Some
assert that these two factors are both correlated with rising populism (Gidron and Hall, 2017). The
debate over populism focuses on how and why populisms are gaining prominence in different
contexts.
Aiming to contribute to this recent debate, this article contended that much of the firmly
established populism in Japanese politics arises for purely institutional reasons, as actors adapt
in attempting to maximize their votes within specific institutional frameworks.
Of course, this article certainly does not deny that economic and cultural factors influence
Japanese populism. For certain populist politicians, these aspects appear of some relevance.
However, in Japanese regional politics, the dual representation system is the major source of
populism, with local executives and assembly members sharing competencies and elected under
two different systems. The dual representation system demands different rationales and strategies
for the executives and councilors: while the former seek to represent general interests, the latter
focus on defending sectorial interests. Therefore, to maximize their (re-)election prospects, incum-
bent and candidate executives may adopt populist strategies, especially neoliberal populism, which
especially appeals to the inhabitants of Japan’s big cities. This strategy is feasible since many
Japanese electorates became independent voters during the 1990s, eroding the traditional political
hegemony of the LDP in metropolitan areas.
In this respect, we could classify Japanese local populism as a variant of political strategy, and
not an ideology or organizational structure as certain literature claims.
Whereas most recent descriptions of populism tend to stress its economically interven-
tionist and politically authoritarian character, populism in Japan is mainly neoliberal in
nature, and attributable to these institutional factors. This fact demonstrates the need to
consider all the varieties of populisms, just as we recognize there is more than one form of
democracy.
10 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD
Toru Yoshida https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9937-689X

Notes
1. See, for example, Funabashi (2017); Plender (2017).
2. It should be noted that he remains actively committed to his anti-nuclear energy movement.
3. In his regression analysis of several opinion surveys conducted in Osaka and Nagoya, Matsutani (2017)
identifies that support for Hashimoto and Kawamura spanned all classes by educational level, thus
confirming that their populism differs from the “white working-class” populism in Western Europe.
4. On the reforms and the communicative style of these regional populist figures, see Arima (2011, 2017).
5. For historical analysis of the dual system in post-war Japan, see Tsuji (2015).
6. Including 23 district assemblies for the City of Tokyo.
7. There were three Mutoha Chiji in 1995, five in 2000, 11 in 2003, 24 in 2011, 20 in 2013, and 14 in 2015.
The same trend has been witnessed for city mayors (Jichi Soken, 2015: 1–30). The diminishing number in
recent years could partly be explained by the relative stability of the LDP national government since
2012.
8. During the 1970s, “progressive governors” (Kakushin Chiji) were elected in many prefectures, including
Tokyo, pursuing radical reform agendas. Though this falls outside our frame of analysis, it is another
demonstration of Japanese local populism being driven by institutional factors, since even progressive
governors clashed with local assemblies. On progressive governors, see Steiner (1965; 2014).
9. Note that systematic studies of regional politics in Japan were rare until the 1990s.
10. Local elections in Japan for the executives and assemblies are held nationwide in April every four years.
However, this electoral schedule varies in certain circumstances, such as the resignation or death of the
executive, the dissolution of the assembly, or even a municipal merger or dissolution.
11. Recent survey on Tokyo electorates who voted for Koike-led political party “Tomin First” in 2017
demonstrated that as she pursued a populist style, it did not resonate with voters, who had no significant
populist attitude such as anti-elitism, anti-pluralism, or xenophobia (Hieda et al., 2018). Sharing our
analysis, the study concludes that the theoretical approach of employing populism as a political ideology
is unable to account for a populist politician who is successful in mobilizing the majority of voters.
12. The prefectures with a high number of single-member districts are Osaka (31 districts), Saitama (27), and
Aichi (25). Approximately 40% of the 1056 districts in 2007 were single-member districts (Ministry of
General Affairs, 2013).
13. Of the 2007 constituencies, 30% were two-member districts, 13% had three members, 7% had four
members, 3% had five members, 1.5% had six members, and 0.1% had 17 members (the highest number).
Note that these numbers vary frequently due to ongoing gerrymandering of district boundaries, which is
necessary to address disparities in vote values caused by population concentration in the cities.

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