Advances in Developing

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Crisis Management in Higher Education: What Have We Learned From

Virginia Tech?
Jia Wang and Holly M. Hutchins
Advances in Developing Human Resources 2010 12: 552
DOI: 10.1177/1523422310394433

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What is This?
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Advances in Developing Human

Crisis Management Resources

12(5) 552­–572
© 2010 SAGE Publications
in Higher Education:  Reprints and permission: http://www.
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What Have We Learned DOI: 10.1177/1523422310394433
http://adhr.sagepub.com
From Virginia Tech?

Jia Wang1 and Holly M. Hutchins2

Abstract
Crisis management is a relatively new research territory in the field of human resource
development (HRD). With the increasing number of crisis events occurring in higher
education institutions in recent years, crisis management has increasingly attracted
research attention. This article focuses on the shootings that occurred on the campus
of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (US) in 2007. By adopting the
single case study as research methodology and Mitroff’s crisis management model
as the conceptual and analytical framework, the authors examine one higher edu­
cation institution’s real-life experience with crisis events and the resultant change
management. The authors highlight implications this crisis experience has for HRD
practice, specific to educational institutions and business organizations that may exp­
erience crises of the same/similar nature.

Keywords
crisis management, change management, higher education, case study

Crisis management is a relatively new research topic in the field of human resource
development (HRD). A recent issue in Advances in Developing Human Resources
(Hutchins & Wang, 2008a) marked the first attempt of HRD scholars at exploring the
role of HRD in organizational crisis management. In this special issue, a collection of
seven articles demonstrated how various HRD interventions in learning, performance,
and change could be employed to help organizations detect, prevent, deal with, and
learn from crisis events. Building on these efforts and extending the research context

1
Texas A&M University
2
University of Houston

Corresponding Author:
Jia Wang, 561 Harrington Tower, College Station, TX 77843
Email: jiawang@tamu.edu

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Wang & Hutchins 553

beyond business organizations, this article takes a close look at one high-impact crisis
event that occurred in the higher education setting, on the campus of Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) in Blacksburg, Virginia, the United States,
on April 16, 2007.
Like their corporate counterparts, higher education institutions in the United States
have been beset by an increasing number of crisis events at different levels (e.g., grade
tampering, ethical breaches by top administrators, harassment and discrimination suits,
and student unrest). More specifically, the recent years have witnessed the University
of Colorado football scandal, the harassment of female cadets at the Air Force Academy,
the Texas A&M University bonfire disaster that killed 12 students and injured 27 others,
a residence hall fire at Interlaken University that claimed the lives of three students,
and the Virginia Tech campus shootings that killed 32 people and wounded many others
(Rollo & Zdziarski, 2007). When news of such crises makes national headlines, pro-
spective students and their parents may reconsider enrolling or withdrawing their
applications from the institutions associated with the crisis events. Crisis events also
create panic within the campus community and raise the question of whether colleges
and universities can timely prepare and respond to crisis events while still maintaining
a culture of inclusivity and open access. Thus, for administrators of educational insti-
tutions, it is crucial to develop an effective strategic plan that would likely prevent the
occurrence of a crisis event or minimize the impact if one occurs.
Despite the increasing level of risks colleges and universities are facing today asso-
ciated with the complexity of institutional operations, technology, and infrastructure
(Mitroff, 2006), ample research discloses the lack of overall crisis management plans
at the institutional level. For instance, in an online survey conducted by Simpson
Scarborough, a consulting firm that focuses on colleges and universities, the results
revealed that almost 100% of the respondents (mostly presidential assistants and chiefs
of staff) reported that although their institutions had written crisis plans, these rarely
addressed situations falling outside traditional parameters—suicides, strikes, terrorist
attacks, mass shootings, administrative scandals, hazing, or incidents of racial discrimi-
nation that have occurred with increasing frequency in recent years (Williams, 2007).
Similarly, a survey administered to the provosts of 350 major U.S. colleges and uni-
versities, Mitroff found that the 117 respondents reported their institutions were gener-
ally prepared for only the most commonly experienced crises such as fires, lawsuits,
and crimes. Few of the surveyed institutions have broad-based crisis management pro-
grams or crisis management teams that are similar to those established in the corporate
world. Mitroff also noted that what colleges and universities currently call crisis man-
agement teams are really emergency response teams (whose primary function is to pre-
pare for and respond to natural disasters and environmental crises) or business continuity
teams (whose function is to ensure the continuity of the business functions and services
of major organizations).
Although data collected immediately after the Virginia Tech shootings suggested
that campus crisis plans in general were inadequate, there are some more recent instances
that suggest universities have taken heed of crisis readiness since the Virginia Tech

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554 Advances in Developing Human Resources 12(5)

responses. During morning classes on September 28, 2010, a lone shooter opened fire
in one of the libraries on the University of Texas (Austin) campus. Within minutes, the
university crisis command team had locked down the campus and sent mobile and text
messages to approximately 43,000 students, faculty, and staff alerting them of the
crisis and warning them to stay away from campus. Messages were also immediately
posted to UT’s website and Facebook sites, where students shared accounts of the
shooting, their locations, and eyewitness accounts of the shooter’s location. The UT
response time and communication method is in notable contrast to the 2-hour delay by
Virginia Tech in alerting the campus community that shooting had occurred on cam-
pus. Virginia Tech’s experience is credited with helping UT police capture the shooter
and avoiding any fatalities.
By examining how Virginia Tech responded to the massacre (the magnitude of which
they had not anticipated or experienced), this article intends to unfold the process of
crisis management in which the university engaged and the strategies used to facilitate
the institution’s recovery from the crisis event. Furthermore, while a number of res­
earchers have examined planned change (organization development) initiatives in
higher education institutions (Torraco, 2005), they have paid little attention to higher
education (HE) institutions’ experience with crises and the role of HRD in their crisis
management endeavor. This lack of attention has inhibited a more complete under-
standing of how HRD can be used to support organization development and change in
the higher education setting. This article intends to address this issue and suggest areas
HRD can contribute to organizations’ crisis management endeavor.
The balance of this article begins by reviewing crisis management research with a
focus on the guiding theoretical framework (Mitroff, 2005) for this study. Following
that, we discuss the research methods we used. And then we apply Mitroff’s crisis
management model to analyze how a real-life organization (Virginia Tech University)
responded to a high-impact crisis event (2007 campus shootings). Specifically, we
explore how the university engaged in the different phases of crisis management, what
strategies it employed during the crisis, and what lessons have been learned to improve
the university’s crisis preparedness in the postcrisis period. The article concludes with
a discussion of the implications and opportunities for HRD practice and research in the
development of crisis management programs.

Crisis Management
The field of crisis management has a relatively short, 20-plus year history (for a com-
prehensive review, see Hutchins & Wang, 2008b). The event that marks the beginning
of serious research on organizational crisis management was the 1982 poisoning (from
Tylenol capsules laced with cyanide) incidents in a Chicago suburb (Smith & Elliott,
2006). The fact that Johnson & Johnson (J&J), the makers of Tylenol, quickly pulled
all bottles of the medication off the shelves signaled that the company was putting the
safety of consumers ahead of profits, making J&J an early role model for crisis manage-
ment. Since then, much has been learned about how and why crises occur, particularly

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Wang & Hutchins 555

what makes for an ideal or best-practice crisis management program. A crisis manage-
ment program is more than just an emergency preparedness plan or just thinking about
or planning for particular types of crises in isolation, one from another. Such a pro-
gram also plans for a wide range of crises and the subsequent effect one crisis has on
producing others (Hutchins & Wang, 2008b; Mitroff & Alpasian, 2005). For example,
a key lesson from the Hurricane Katrina response debacle was that natural disasters
often set off human-caused crises, the makings of which were in place well before the
precipitating event. Quarentelli (1999) captured this effect clearly:

It is a misnomer to talk about natural disaster as if they could exist outside of

the actions and decisions of human beings and their societies. . . . For instance,
floods, earthquakes and other so-called “natural” disaster agents have social
consequences only because of the activities of the communities involved before,
during, and after the impact of the disaster. (p. 11)

Prior to any disaster, a successful crisis management plan exposes weaknesses within
the current system and builds capabilities to deal with a wide variety of resultant and
interrelated situations. That way, the crisis management team can enact these capabili-
ties with speed and efficiency during a crisis and can learn from the experience in
order to further improve the program. If an organization is not prepared (e.g., FEMA
in response to Hurricane Katrina), the effects of any event can quickly spiral into mul-
tiple crisis events.

Theoretical Framework
Various models have been constructed to illustrate crisis management processes
(Elsubbaugh, Fildes, & Rose, 2004; Pearson & Claire, 1998; Reilly, 1993; Shrivastava,
1993; Smits & Ally, 2003). Each model identifies similar steps regarding how organi-
zations manage and respond to a crisis event. This study adopted Mitroff’s (2005)
crisis management model as the conceptual and analytical framework, primarily because
it is representative of and accommodates many of the earlier and more current model
articulations (Figure 1).
According to Mitroff (2005), the crisis management process consists of six phases—
signal detection, probing/preparation, containment/damage limitation, business recovery,
no fault learning, and redesign. In the signal detection phase, small but significant indi­
cators that a crisis could occur begin to emerge, for example, customer complaints
about product defects or employee concerns about potential discrimination. The failure
of organizations in recognizing and responding to the existence of early crisis indica-
tors (signals) subsequently often causes substantial losses in revenue, reputation, and
even human life. Once a potential crisis situation is detected, organizations need to
develop a systematic plan for managing the crisis, identifying critical personnel and
other resources, and allocating actions during a crisis situation (the crisis preparation
phase). According to Hutchins, Annulis, and Gaudet (2007), an effective crisis plan

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556 Advances in Developing Human Resources 12(5)

Figure 1. Crisis management model

Source: Mitroff, 2005; Mitroff & Pearson, 1993.

includes a cross-functional crisis team, business continuity plans that explicate both
technological and human resource issues, a crisis communication plan, and crisis train-
ing. The third phase in crisis management is containment, involving actions that allow
the organization to respond to and contain the impact of the crisis event so that further
escalation and losses can be mitigated or prevented. An example is communicating
with internal and external stakeholders about how the organization is handling the
crisis event and how resources or investments are being secured. Other communication
activities include providing emergency contact information to management, employees,
retirees, and emergency stakeholders—so they can learn about operational (e.g., building/
facility access and security, work schedule changes, alternative office locations)—and
employee relations issues (e.g., compensation and benefits, employee assistance pro-
grams, and travel and relocation; Hewitt Associates’ Report on Crisis Communication,
2004; Reilly, 2008).
In the recovery phase, organizations begin to enact procedures to resume normal
business activities. Recovery efforts include long- and short-term business continuity
recovery plans and reassuring stakeholders that the organization will return to business
as usual. The no-fault learning phase (i.e., not blaming an individual for the crisis
event) involves critical reflection on the crisis experience, analyzing the crisis impact
on central and ancillary system processes, and then adapting behaviors and systems to
improve the organization’s crisis management practices. Mitroff (2005) encouraged
organizations to engage in no-fault learning except in cases of criminal behavior and
liability. Finally, the new knowledge generated from the learning will be used to pro-
mote change and to restructure the crisis management system (the redesign phrase).

Method
This study adopted a single case design to answer how Virginia Tech engaged in the
process of crisis management. The case study is considered the preferred research metho­
dology when the researcher intends to explore a bounded system (a case, Yin, 2003).

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Wang & Hutchins 557

From this setting, the researcher may be able to assemble “lessons learned” (p. 41) to
inform similar contexts.

Case Selection
The 2007 Virginia Tech campus shootings was selected as the case for analysis not
only due to its profound impact on the campus but also due to the attention it brought
over the need for a viable crisis management program in the campus. To date, the
Virginia Tech shootings are the deadliest shooting rampage by a single gunman in
U.S. history, on or off a school campus, ending in the deaths of 32 students and faculty
(The Roanoke Times, 2007). The crisis received extensive international media cover-
age and drew heavy criticism of United States and state laws from commentators
around the world. The event sparked intense debate about gun violence, gun laws, and
gaps in the U.S. system for treating mental health issues, the perpetrator’s state of mind,
the responsibility of college administrators, privacy laws, and so on. A brief review of
the events follows.
On the morning of April 16, 2007, Seung Hui Cho, a senior at VA Tech, shot and
killed two people in West Ambler Johnston residence hall shortly after 7:00 a.m. He
then returned to his own residence hall, changed from his bloody clothes, and visited
the Blackburn Post Office to mail a collection of writings to NBC (television news
broadcasting company) describing his peers as privileged, spoiled, and morally cor-
rupted by a materialistic society. Cho also mailed a letter to his former English
professor whom he accused of chastising him. He then entered Norris Hall (includ-
ing classrooms and laboratories) carrying two semiautomatic handguns, about
400 rounds of ammunition, a hammer, and a knife. He chained the main doors shut
from the inside and began entering classrooms on the second floor, shooting anyone
he saw. Police were alerted to the building by a student’s 911 call and quickly blasted
the lock off an unchained door only to find Cho had committed suicide with a shotgun
(Davies, 2008).

Data Collection and Analysis

The primary source of data in this case is secondary and archival data, including arti-
cles, commentary, empirical evidence, and reports published about the Virginia Tech
campus shootings. Data analysis in this study followed closely the procedures set for
interpreting qualitative data (Strauss, 1987) in general, and procedures for case study
(Yin, 2003) in particular. All the data were coded using content analysis procedures
(Krippendorff, 2004). This involved coding data into categories representative of
Mitroff’s (2005) crisis management model, specific strategies employed by Virginia
Tech, major issues encountered in the change process, and outcomes of the change
effort. Emerging themes were further pursued to extract leads for understanding how
VA Tech engaged in learning and change in the post crisis period.

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558 Advances in Developing Human Resources 12(5)

Findings of the 2007 Virginia

Tech Crisis Analysis
This section presents findings of the analysis of the Virginia Tech crisis. It discusses
how the university engaged in different phases of the crisis management processes as
identified by Mitroff (2005).

Phase 1: Signal Detection

Ample evidence shows that Virginia Tech administrators and state regulators failed to
detect the various signs that foreshadowed the tragic campus shootings in 2007
(Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). At the individual level, Cho’s unusual behavior
(e.g., stalking, taking cell-phone photos of female students during class, violent writ-
ing, and unwillingness to participate in classes) was reported on several occasions by
students and faculty, yet resulted in little serious action by the university. There was
an incident where a female sophomore observed Cho using a knife to stab the carpet
at a party. Later she received self-deprecating instant messages and postings to her
Facebook (which she believed were sent by Cho). No one from the university author-
ity informed the student of her right to file a complaint with Judicial Affairs. However,
based on reports by this and several other female students, campus police forbade Cho
from having further contact with these students, and he was detained at Carilion
St. Alban’s Behavioral Health Center for assessment (Davies, 2008). While records
document multiple e-mail communications regarding the incident among Virginia
Tech residential staff (i.e., the residence life administrator on call, and the president’s
and upper quad area coordinator, the director of Residence Life, and the assistant
director of Judicial Affairs), the issue was never brought to the attention of the VA
Tech Multidisciplinary Care Team that is charged with identifying and working with
students having behavioral problems (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). The Care
Team took no action even when alerted by the English department and residence advi-
sors about Cho’s deviant behavior in class and in the dorm (Davies, 2008).
At the state level, inconsistent policies concerning the public mental health care
system, firearm background checks, and privacy laws also allowed Cho’s unusual
behavior go virtually undetected (Davies, 2008). The mental health system in Virginia
had been underfunded for years. The state had not earmarked the resources necessary
to establish making deinstitutionalization of persons with mental disabilities a viable
policy. For example, beds for short-term detention were in short supply, patient assess-
ments were done too quickly and without the benefit of ancillary information, and
judicial processes could be haphazard—all for lack of resources (Davies, 2008).
Similarly, gun acquisition laws had loopholes, and there were inconsistencies between
federal and state laws in this matter. For example, the Federal Gun Control Act of
1968 prohibits gun purchases by anyone who “has been adjudicated as a mental defec-
tive (i.e., a person determined to be a “danger to himself or to others”) or who has been

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Wang & Hutchins 559

committed to a mental institution” (U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, &

Explosives, 2005). While federal law clearly includes court-ordered outpatient treat-
ment as a form of involuntary commitment, Virginia law is ambiguous on this matter.
Due to this unclear requirement, Cho’s name was not entered into the federal system
for firearms background checks, and he was able to buy two semiautomatic weapons
from gun dealers. Furthermore, Virginia’s public colleges and universities did not
have a specific policy prohibiting guns on campus (Davies, 2008). Finally, the federal
education privacy and health privacy laws (the Family Educational Records Privacy
Act, or FERPA, and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, or
HIPAA) appeared to be rift with unclear language and conflicting policy concerning
record-keeping and release of students’ mental health records. In sum, multiple instances
of Cho’s disruptive behavior and unstable mental state, coupled with university and
state regulations dealing with mental illness, worked together to provide an environ-
ment where a crisis event might be imminent.

Phase 2: Probing/Preparation
The main probing/preparation articulation in the case of Virginia Tech was the Emer­
gency Response Plan (ERP) of 2005. This plan describes preparedness for and res­
ponses to a variety of emergencies, such as weather problems, fires, and terrorism, but
there was nothing specific to campus shootings. The plan calls for an official to be
designated as an emergency response coordinator (ERC) to direct a response. It also
calls for the establishment of an emergency operations center (EOC) as well as satel-
lite operations centers to assist the ERC (Virginia Tech Emergency Response Plan,
2005). The ERP classifies emergencies into four levels (0, I, II, III).

• Level 0 includes unplanned events of short duration that are unlikely to

adversely impact or threaten life, health, or property (e.g., automatic fire alarm,
minor flooding from excessive rain, student demonstration). Control of this
type of internal “routine” emergency is within the capabilities of university
employees, and the response is made in accordance with departmental emer-
gency plans. The university ERP is not activated for Level 0 events.
• Level I involves unplanned event that may adversely impact or threaten life,
health, or property within a single area (e.g., fire or explosion in a residence
hall or academic building, a suicide, an odor requiring evacuation) or loss
of heat or power to a building. Outside agency assistance may be necessary.
Departments are to follow the procedures outlined in their departmental
emergency plan when responding. The ERP would not typically be activated
for Level I emergencies.
• Level II involves unplanned events of unpredictable duration that may adversely
impact or threaten life, health, or property on a large scale at one or more
locations within the university (e.g., water main break involving service to
multiple buildings loss of heat or power to multiple buildings, a fire affecting

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560 Advances in Developing Human Resources 12(5)

an entire residential or academic building, acts of violence on or near campus

that have broad implications for university operations). Control of the inci-
dents will require specialists in addition to university and outside agency
personnel.
• Level III relates to widespread unplanned events of unpredictable duration
that adversely and severely impact or threaten life, health, or property at the
university on a large scale (e.g., large-scale chemical release affecting a
significant portion of the university, earthquake, tornado, major power outage).
Control of the incident requires multiple agencies and multiple university
departments working together.

In the case under study, the Norris Hall shooting falls in the category of Level III,
the highest, based on the number of lives lost, the physical and psychological damage
suffered by the injured, and the psychological impact on a very large number of people.
In such an emergency, the VA Tech police department would assess the emergency
level and then decide whether to activate the ERP. Thirty minutes after police discov-
ered the first two shooting victims, the VT Police Chief enacted the ERP.
Two key decision groups identified in the Virginia Tech ERP were the Policy Group
and the Emergency Response Resources Group. The Policy Group is comprised of
nine vice-presidents and support staff, chaired by the university president. The Policy
Group deals with procedures to support emergency operations and to determine recov-
ery priorities. Prior to the 2007 mass shootings, there had been no crisis events requir-
ing the involvement of the Policy Group. Furthermore, there was no training or testing
of how the campus Policy Group would respond to a crisis situation despite the spe-
cific recommendations regarding policy training for active shooters made in May 2005
by the Commonwealth of Virginia Board members to VA Tech administrators (Virginia
Tech Review Panel, 2007). The Emergency Resources Group (ERRG) directs res­
ources in support of emergency response operations, assures the continuity of critical
business functions, and implements business recovery and resumption activities. The
ERRG is composed of lead administrators and support personnel from departments
that have an emergency response and/or business continuity or business recovery role.
Just prior to the shooting, Virginia Tech had received recommendations to update their
ERG, specifically in the areas of conducting threat assessments, updates to warning
and communication systems, and specific training for police to handle shooters. These
recommendations were not formalized until after the campus shootings, when they
were then included in the revised Emergency Response Plan of 2007.

Phase 3: Damage Control/Containment

After the first shootings occurred, the campus Policy Group acted slowly to alert the
VA Tech community about a dangerous situation. Nearly 2 hr elapsed from the time
of the first shootings at West Ambler Johnston Hall and the time the Police Group
announced the shootings. Even then, they did not specify that two people had been

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Wang & Hutchins 561

killed and that the shooter had not been apprehended (Davies, 2008). In addition,
communication among the various parties (police and rescue units, emergency medi-
cal services, and hospitals) was impeded initially because each party was operating on
their own discreet radio frequencies and had trouble accessing other parties’ commu-
nications systems.
In contrast, regarding response time, the Virginia Tech police’s response to the
Norris Hall shootings was prompt and effective, as was triage and evacuation of the
wounded (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). Blacksburg and Virginia Tech Police,
the VA Tech Rescue Squad (consisting of students), and the Blacksburg Volunteer
Rescue Squad, all coordinated efforts to provide immediate emergency medical inter-
ventions and evacuation (Davies, 2008). With support from the Department of Public
Safety, the Virginia State Police played a pivotal role in the aftermath of the shootings.
Officers arrived quickly and stayed through the week. Working with local law enforce-
ment officers, the State Police personally carried news of death or injury to families
across the state. Emergency medical care was provided immediately following the
shootings. Countless responders, including law enforcement officers, concerned vol-
unteers, government entities, community-based organizations, victim assistance pro-
viders, faculty, staff, and students, worked together assisting victims and families (Virginia
Tech Review Panel, 2007).
Nevertheless, despite being called for by Virginia Tech’s Emergency Plan, the uni-
versity did not establish an emergency operations center, which could have been a
central locus for all communications. While the university did establish a family assis-
tance center (which was not a part of the 2005 ERP), the response and support was
slow because workers in the center were not trained and there was a lack of coordina-
tion between service providers. Volunteers tried to step in but were unable to answer
many questions or guide families to the resources they needed (Davies, 2008). The VT
Care Team, a group composed of the dean of student affairs, legal counsel, and the
directors of residence life, judicial affairs, and student-health services, was also brought
together to offer support.

Phase 4: Business Recovery

In the aftermath of the shootings, VA Tech enacted their business recovery plans.
Although the ERP (2005) did not delineate specific practices to be implemented by
the business recovery plan, a variety of formal and informal methods were employed
by the university to assist surviving victims and families of deceased victims. These
included university-based liaisons, state victims services, and compensation personnel,
the family assistance center, counseling and health center services, and other university
assistance.
University-based liaisons. The Division of Student Affairs organized a group of family
liaisons who were assigned to two or more families to provide direct support to victim
survivors. The liaison staff was comprised of individuals from the Division of Student
Affairs, the graduate school, and the Provost’s Office. They were tasked to track down

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562 Advances in Developing Human Resources 12(5)

and provide information to families of those killed and to victim survivors, to assist
them with the details of recovering personal belongings and contacting funeral homes
and to act as an information link between families and the university. Liaisons worked
out the details on matters such as transportation, benefits from federal and state vic-
tim’s compensation funds (as that information became available), coordination with
the Red Cross, travel arrangements for out-of-country relatives, and so on. They also
helped families participate in commencement activities where deceased students
received posthumous degrees. Victims’ families confirmed that the liaisons were sen-
sitive, knowledgeable, caring, and helpful (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).
State victims services and compensation personnel. The victim assistance team, repre-
sented by a network of trained, skilled professionals, provided assistance for family
members by informing them of their rights as victims and offering assistance in a
number of areas, including helping make funeral arrangements, providing childcare
when needed, arranging for transportation, emotional support, and referral informa-
tion (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).
The family assistance center (FAC). This body was set up in one of the ballrooms at
Skelton Conference Center at the Inn of the university. The Inn became the de facto
information center and gathering place where people congregated to await news on the
identification of the wounded and deceased. It was also designated as a family assis-
tance center that provided victims and family members with refreshments, access to
telephones for long-distance calls, and support from mental health counselors and
victims’ service providers. Accommodations at the inn (rooms, food, and staff service)
were well received.
Counseling and health center services. The University’s Cook Counseling Center quickly
lent efforts to provide additional counseling resources and expanded psychological assis-
tance to students and others on campus. They extended their hours of operation and
focused special attention on individuals residing in the West Ambler Johnston dormitory,
surviving students in Norris Hall at the time of the incident, roommates of deceased stu-
dents, and classmates and faculty in other classes where the victims were enrolled.
Dozens of presentations on trauma, postincident stress, and wellness were made to hun-
dreds of faculty, staff, and student groups. The center helped make referrals to other men-
tal health and medical support services and sent 50 mental health professionals to the
graduation ceremonies several weeks later, recognizing that the commencement would be
an exceptionally difficult time for many people. Resource information on resilience and
rebounding from trauma was developed and distributed. Schiffert Health Center at the
university sent medical personnel to the hospitals where injured victims received treat-
ment to check on their well-being and reassure them of follow-up treatment at Schiffert if
needed. The medical personnel included some psychological screening questions in their
conversations with the injured students so that they could assess and monitor the students’
psychological state (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).
Other university assistance. Virginia Tech adopted several other services that were
not mentioned in the business recovery plan. These included support for academic, safety,
and counseling issues.

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Wang & Hutchins 563

Academic:

• The Services for Students with Disabilities Office began investigating class-
room accommodations that might be needed for injured students and planned
for possible needs among students with psychological disabilities.
• The Provost’s Office announced flexible options for completing the semester
and for grading, and academic suspensions and judicial cases were deferred.

Safety:

• Cranwell International Center provided complimentary international tele-

phone cards to students who needed to contact their families abroad and
assure them they were safe. Working together with the Asian American Stu-
dent Union and Multicultural Programs and Services, the center staff called
each Korean undergraduate and many Korean graduate students to share
the university’s concern for their safety. They especially addressed poten-
tial retaliation and entertained requests from the press. Residence Life asked
resident advisors to speak, personally, with all residents on campus and make
sure they were aware of available counseling services as they grappled with
lost friends or roommates.

Counseling:

• The graduate school helped open the multipurpose room in the Graduate Life
Center as a place for graduate students to gather and receive counseling ser-
vices. They also aided graduate assistants in continuing their teaching and
research responsibilities.
• Hokies United, a student-driven volunteer group that responds to local,
national, and international tragedies, organized several well-attended activi-
ties designed to bring the campus community together.
• Human Resources requested assistance from the university’s employee assis-
tance provider, which sent crisis counselors to work with faculty and staff on
issues of self-care, recovery, how to communicate the tragedy to their chil-
dren, and other subjects. After 4 weeks, more than 125 information sessions
had been held, and 800 individuals had been individually counseled.

Phase 5: Learning
The primary mechanism used for reflection and learning was the Virginia Tech Review
Panel, appointed by Virginia Governor Tim Kaine. The panel consisted of eight pro-
fessionals affiliated with mental health services, law enforcement, public policy, and
higher education. The panel communicated with more than 2,000 individuals using
public meetings and individual interviews with many Virginia Tech students, faculty,

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564 Advances in Developing Human Resources 12(5)

and staff members. The panel leveled sharp criticism at Virginia Tech administrators
for failing to take action that might have reduced the number of casualties and for
failing to take note of certain “red flags.” The panel also reviewed gun laws and
pointed out gaps in state mental health care, misinterpretations of privacy laws, and
inherent flaws in the laws that left Cho’s deteriorating mental condition in college
untreated. Three lessons can be learned from this tragedy.
Lesson 1: University and state health care policies. A key finding by the panel addressed
the widespread confusion about what federal and state privacy laws allow in terms of
health care information. The federal laws governing records of health care provided in
educational settings are not entirely compatible with those governing other health
records. For example, the delay and inefficiency of Virginia Tech in disseminating
information about Cho’s detention at the Counseling Center and incidents of his
harassing and unusual behavior may have been attributed to the information privacy
laws that block that information being shared. Similarly, a lack of sufficient resources
resulted in gaps in the mental health system, including short-term crisis stabilization,
comprehensive outpatient services, and enforcement of federal policies, all of which
could have helped Cho if he had been properly assessed and referred for psychiatric
treatment. Another example concerns background checks of individuals with mental
health impairments. Virginia is one of 22 states that report any information about
mental health to a federal database used to conduct background checks on gun pur-
chasers. However, the Virginia law did not clearly require that persons such as Cho—
who had been ordered into out-patient treatment but not committed to an institution—be
reported to that database. Such individuals would be flagged during firearm back-
ground checks and may not be allowed to purchase guns and ammunition.
Other issues concerning the health care system are targeted at problems such as the
involuntary commitment process, lack of critical psychiatric data and collateral infor-
mation, and barriers (perceived or real) to open communications among key health
care professionals. Perhaps, due to lack of resources, incorrect interpretation of pri-
vacy laws, and passivity, the Virginia Tech Cook Counseling Center and the univer-
sity’s Care Team failed to provide needed support and services to Cho during a period
in late 2005 and early 2006. Even records of Cho’s minimal treatment at the Cook
counseling Center were missing (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007).
Lesson 2: Virginia Tech emergency response plan execution. The crisis also revealed
inadequacies in Virginia Tech’s emergency response plan for mass fatality incidents.
Individuals (i.e., Policy Group) and systems (i.e., communication methods) were
caught unaware and reacted slowly to the urgency of the moment and enormity of the
event. In addition, the lack of an adequate emergency response plan to cover the opera-
tion of an onsite, postemergency operations center and a family assistance center ham-
pered the university’s response efforts. Furthermore, senior university administrators
who acted as the emergency Policy Group, failed to issue the campus-wide notifica-
tion about the killings for nearly 2 hr. While the university established a Family Assis-
tance Center at The Inn at Virginia Tech, it fell short in effectively helping families
and others, lacking leadership and coordination among service providers. First, there

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Wang & Hutchins 565

was not a main person heading the Family Assistance Center operation. While volun-
teers stepped in, they were not trained or knowledgeable about how to manage the
entire operation or to guide families to resources they needed. For example, the liai-
sons did not have adequate information on the network of services designed for vic-
tims until at least 2 days later when most of the state’s victim assistance team arrived.
Second, adding to the problem, confusion existed over how the assistance responsibility
was shared between the state government and the university. Under the current state
planning model, the Commonwealth’s Department of Social Services was responsible
for family assistance centers; however, the university stepped in and established its
own center.
In terms of crisis containment, the campus police probably made two errors that
might have affected the way the Norris Hall crisis played out (Davies, 2008). One
error was they might have erred in prematurely concluding that their initial lead in the
double homicide was a good one; they might not have given adequate consideration to
the possibility that their “good lead” might be erroneous. Consequently, they reported
to the university emergency Policy Group that the “person of interest” probably was
no longer on campus. The second error was that the police did not request the senior
university administration to issue a campus-wide notification that two people had been
killed and that the killer remained at large (Davies, 2008).
Lesson 3: Emergency personnel training. Another lesson learned is the importance of
having trained, experienced individuals in crucial positions. The liaisons were primar-
ily volunteers who were untrained or had little experience in dealing with the after-
math of a major disaster. Many were grappling with their own emotional responses to
the deaths and injuries of the students and faculty, which led to poor communication,
insensitivity, failure to follow-up, and misinformation. Consequently, this compounded
the confusion and frustration experienced by a number of victim families (Virginia
Tech Review Panel, 2007). Victim families spoke candidly about this in their inter-
views with the Virginia Panel members. Families emphasized the need for trained
personnel to assist with victim services (i.e., protecting victims from the media, deliv-
ering death notifications to families, etc.) as a part of the emergency plan, establish-
ment of a joint (university and state) communication center with a designated information
officer, and training in crisis management for all university officials.

Phase 6: Redesign
The Virginia Tech shooting crisis prompted rapid changes in federal, state, and uni-
versity policies in less than 2 years. One of the major changes was a reversal of Virginia
law that had previously allowed an individual to purchase handguns without detection
by the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). In addition, the
first major federal gun control measure in more than 13 years, a law that strengthens
the NICS, was signed by President George W. Bush on January 5, 2008 (Cochran,
2008). At the state/regional level, mental health laws have been changed, gun laws have

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566 Advances in Developing Human Resources 12(5)

been clarified, and psychiatric care providers in the Blacksburg, Virginia, area have
become more diligent about monitoring those with mental health impairments and
sharing information among related agencies. Concerning medical reforms, Governor
Timothy Kaine passed a bill in April 2008, making it easier to involuntarily commit
people with mental health impairments to treatment, bolster oversight of the commit-
ment and treatment processes, and improve coordination among the various agencies
involved in mental health treatment (Media General News Service, 2008). Also, the
state of Virginia, along with some others, is currently considering legislation that requires
public colleges and universities to notify a parent if a student is deemed a danger to
himself or others (Baram, 2008).
At the Virginia Tech University level, more than US$10.4 million has been invested
in safety improvement, including establishing an emergency notification system,
expanding a text-messaging and e-mail alert system that now has more than 20,000
subscribers among students, faculty and administrators, creating a threat assessment
team (which is led by the campus police chief and meets weekly to review cases of
distressed students and employees), hiring an additional nine police officers and men-
tal health counselors, replacing all push bars on campus building exits, and putting
locks on classroom doors (Media General News Service, 2008). The investment rep-
resents a 50% increase in the “safety” budget compared to the year of 2005. In addi-
tion, Virginia Tech is also doing more to teach faculty and staff members to recognize
and report troubled students. For example, wallet cards listing crisis emergency proce-
dures have been distributed, and a web-based system that allows professors to report
their concerns electronically has been created. The Dean of Students and the Director
of the Counseling Center have also provided crisis management–related training ses-
sions for faculty members (Fischer, 2008).
Beyond the changes that have been accomplished in the postcrisis period, a number
of recommendations for the future were also made by various agencies (e.g., The
Virginia Tech Review Panel, Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund, and Department
of Criminal Justice). These recommendations include inclusion of outpatient treat-
ment into the database, accurate guidance for the application of information privacy
laws to the behavior of troubled students, training for information sharing, inclusion of
the Victim Services section in the emergency management plan, training in crisis man-
agement, and creation of a victim assistance system.

Opportunities and Implications for

HRD Practice in Crisis Management
This article points to a number of areas in which HRD can be used to address societal
change, as exemplified by the crisis under study. This section focuses on five areas
in which HRD can contribute in crisis management: (1) developing crisis leaders,
(2) providing crisis management training, (3) facilitating crisis communication,
(4) designing crisis management programs, and (5) promoting organizational learning.

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Wang & Hutchins 567

Developing Crisis Leaders

In the case of the Virginia Tech shooting, the administrators’ failure to detect multiple
precursor signals and then react quickly to them led to the tragedy. This highlights the
importance of leadership in times of crisis. During a crisis, leaders must draw on a
specific set of competencies that will not only drive the crisis toward resolution but
also do so in a way that preserves or enhances the organization’s operational capabili-
ties, financial and other resources, employee morale, and image with stakeholders
(Wooten & James, 2008). Wooten and James identified competencies that character-
ize crisis leadership and are associated with each phase of the crisis management
process, including sense-making and perspective-taking abilities in the signal detection
phase; issue-selling and organizational agility in the prevention/preparation phase;
ability of making decisions under pressure and communicating effectively during the
containment and damage-control phase; promoting organizational resiliency and act-
ing with integrity at the business recovery phase; and learning orientation. These sets
of skills and traits can be useful reference tools for HRD practitioners when designing
programs for crisis leaders. Moats, Chermack, and Dooley (2008) suggested using
scenarios to develop crisis leaders.

Providing Crisis Management Training

The HRD competency of training may contribute to an organization’s overall crisis
management capacity (Reilly, 2008). Awareness and crisis management skills–based
training programs can be developed to help enhance crisis awareness and build the
knowledge base of crisis management among organizational leaders, members, and
stakeholders. Preparing an organization, in advance, by training on crisis management
is better than paying a high cost in the future. Furthermore, training can speed up an
organization’s recovery from crisis events (Carroll & Buchholtz, 2003). Ample evi-
dence in the VA Tech case revealed the inefficiency (e.g., of policy, senior university
administrators, and liaisons) in dealing with the crisis event, both in the process and
aftermath, due to lack of awareness, knowledge, and practical experience dealing
with and managing a crisis of this nature and magnitude.

Facilitating Crisis Communication

Communication is especially important during crises because the natural tendency of
organizations under threat is to restrict the free flow of information (Reilly, 2008). VA
Tech’s shooting event points to the lack of effective crisis communication mechanisms,
both technologically and structurally. In a crisis event like the mass shootings, time is
crucial in putting an effective response into motion (Baram, 2008); this was not the
case during the Virginia Tech campus shootings. Effective communication requires
effective technological support. Ironically, Virginia Tech was in the process of install-
ing a new text-messaging notification system on the day when the shootings happened.
Even though such a system allows thousands of e-mails to be sent in just a few minutes,

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568 Advances in Developing Human Resources 12(5)

the university should not depend on just one electrically powered system that could
be disrupted. Furthermore, the process of communicating should be as free as possible
of bureaucracy to allow quick passing of information. At Virginia Tech, senior admin-
istrators had to meet to assess the situation and then decide whether to issue an emer-
gency message and what to say in it. This cumbersome process was likely to delay the
issuing of an emergency notification (Davies, 2008). Hence, colleges and universities
must seek effective communication mechanisms that will break through any barriers
to communication, so that information about potential threats can be shared timely
and interventions can be employed promptly during an emergency. HRD practitioners,
while they may not be able to provide much of the technical support, can certainly
assist organizational leaders in designing systems and structures that enhance an effec-
tive information flow.

Designing Crisis Management Programs

While it is important to foster a crisis mentality, it is more important to develop a
comprehensive crisis management program. Prior to the crisis explored in this study,
the notion of threat-assessment teams has been foreign to most institutions of higher
education, including Virginia Tech. But such teams or similar functionaries are neces-
sary to evaluate a wide range of potential incidents, for example, storms, toxic spills
or leaks, pandemics, and active shooters. Interestingly, while documentations indicate
that educational institutions do plan for most of these disasters, preparing for campus
shooter has not commonly been included among the dangers for the plans that have
been developed. Prior to the shooting, Virginia Tech’s emergency plan had last been
updated in 2004. According to Mitroff (2006), a crisis management plan is more than
just an emergency response plan; it is an evolving document that considers a wide
range of possible emergencies and potential interactions in a crisis portfolio instead of
thinking about a few isolated catastrophes. This portfolio should include a list of prob-
able events that the institution is likely to experience (e.g., campuses located in hur-
ricane zones), since the most effective way to deal with a crisis is to anticipate it by
listening for those signals that often are leading indicators of crises to come. According
to Mitroff, an ideal disaster management program has four essential components:
(1) preparation for a broad range of crisis types; (2) mechanisms for picking up and
amplifying the early warning signals that accompany all crises and are generally per-
ceptible far in advance of the event; (3) a well-trained, interdisciplinary crisis manage-
ment team; and (4) the inclusion of a wide variety of both internal and external
stakeholders in crisis plans, policies, and procedures. Human resource development
practitioners should follow these guidelines to enhance the effectiveness of the crisis
management program they design.

Promoting Organizational Learning

The importance of learning in crisis management is evidenced by this study. In the
Virginia Tech shootings, learning that occurred during the postcrisis period resulted

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Wang & Hutchins 569

in critical thinking and positive change of current policies and practices. However,
Wang argued that in order to effectively manage a crisis, learning should be incorpo-
rated in every stage of the crisis management process. In the case of the Virginia Tech
campus shootings, while critical reflections were done and numerous useful lessons
were derived, they were at the expense of 32 lives and many other wounded individu-
als. HRD practitioners can and should take a leading role in promoting learning prior
to the occurrence of a crisis event. Organizations with crisis-aware beliefs are then
likely to create a culture that stimulates and encourages organizational learning (Pearson
& Clair, 1998). This will consequently enable organizations to become more alert to
early warning signals existing in both internal and external environments and to be
proactive in preparing for and preventing a crisis event, instead of simply reacting to
the crisis (Wang, 2008).

Suggestions for Future Research

Research on higher education institutions’ experience with crises has received limited
attention compared to research in the corporate setting. This study represents one
effort to change that trend. More cases need to be studied to enrich our understanding
of crisis management practices in the educational setting. Particularly, we should
encourage researchers to study cases of success to identify “the best practices” in
crisis management. We also need to encourage studies that focus on identifying the
role of HRD in managing crises in higher education. And future research needs to
embrace diverse research methods. For example, survey and multiple case study
approaches can be used with larger samples to allow generalization and replication.
First-hand data need to be collected through individual interviews and focus groups
to complement the secondary data. In addition, cross-sectional studies are also recom-
mended in search of commonalities and differences in crisis management strategies.
In this regard, a comparison between the corporate setting and the educational setting
would provide interesting and fresh insights. Future research can also explore how
HRD facilitates organizational learning during each phase of a crisis. This requires
researchers to examine organizational learning as an iterative, ongoing process (Wang,
2008) in the context of crises planning and response.

Conclusion
College and university settings are as likely places for crisis events to occur today as
anywhere else as evidenced by the tremendous loss experienced during the Virginia
Tech crisis. In this article, we examined the single case of the Virginia Tech shooting
and its critical events using Mitroff’s (2005) crisis management model. This model
allowed us to not only identify a discernable pattern in how crisis events move from
a few related signals to an overt crisis event but also gain an insight into how key learn-
ing experiences can result in substantial local and state-wide policy changes in medi-
cal reporting, gun policy, and emergency notification procedures. These changes have

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570 Advances in Developing Human Resources 12(5)

also spread to other campuses and have likely resulted in a more alert campus response
to actual and potential crisis events (e.g., UT Austin campus shooter).
As suggested earlier, HRD professionals can engage in each of the crisis manage-
ment steps, from preparing crisis management teams and conducting organizational
culture audits to designing crisis training interventions. While it is impossible to pre-
pare for every conceivable type of crisis, the best-prepared organizations have learned
how to develop a crisis portfolio that reflects the institution’s complexity and that can
change over time. In the case where a crisis situation does occur, the organization is
likely to recover substantially faster and at much less cost under the leadership of a
well-trained, interdepartmental crisis management team (Mitroff, 2006). Crisis events
often drive organizational change, for better or worse (Barnett & Pratt, 2000). As HRD
professionals (both scholars and practitioners), it is our obligation to ensure that a
change effort will lead to desired organizational outcomes. To this end, HRD profes-
sionals must partner with organizational leaders and actively engage them in regular
threat assessments, in identification of effective change interventions and in the process
of leading and facilitating change resultant from a crisis event.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or
publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.

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Bios
Jia Wang is an assistant professor of human resource development in the Department of
Educational Administration and Human Resource Development at Texas A&M University. With
a wide range of international HRD experience in China, Africa, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, Jia’s research focuses on international HRD, crisis management, and learning
within organizations. Jia’s work has been published in a number of journals. She currently serves
on the Editorial Board for Advances in Developing Human Resources, and Journal of Research
on Leadership Education. Jia received her M.B.A. from Aston University, UK, and M.Ed and
Ph.D in Human Resource and Organization Development from the University of Georgia.

Holly M. Hutchins is an associate professor of human resource development at the University

of Houston (main campus). Her primary research areas are in training transfer, crisis manage-
ment, and e-learning design. Professor Hutchins has published articles in these areas in Human
Resource Management, Human Resource Development Quarterly, Performance Improvement
Quarterly, and the Journal of Workplace Learning. She received her Ph.D. in Applied
Technology, Training and Development from the University of North Texas.

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