Chapter 1- Introduction

During the final stage of World War II, the United States detonated two nuclear weapons over
the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, respectively. The
United States dropped the bombs after obtaining the consent of the United Kingdom, as
required by the Quebec Agreement. The two bombings killed at least 129,000 people, most of
whom were civilians. They remain the only use of nuclear weapons in the history of warfare.

In the final year of the war, the Allies prepared for what was anticipated to be a bloody invasion
of the Japanese mainland. This undertaking was preceded by a conventional and firebombing
campaign that destroyed 67 Japanese cities. The war in Europe had concluded
when Germany signed its instrument of surrender on May 8, 1945. As the Allies turned their
full attention to the war in the Pacific War, the Japanese faced the same fate. The Allies called
for the unconditional surrender of the Imperial Japanese armed forces in the Potsdam
Declaration on July 26, 1945—the alternative being "prompt and utter destruction". The
Japanese ignored the ultimatum and the war continued.1

By August 1945, the Allies' Manhattan Project had produced two types of atomic bomb, and
the 509th Composite Group of the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) was equipped
with the specialized Silver plate version of the Boeing B-29 Superfortress that could deliver
them from Tinian in the Mariana Islands. Orders for atomic bombs to be used on four Japanese
cities were issued on July 25. On August 6, one of its B-29s dropped a Little Boy uranium gun-
type bomb on Hiroshima. Three days later, on August 9, a Fat Man plutonium implosion-type
bomb was dropped by another B-29 on Nagasaki. The bombs immediately devastated their
targets. Over the next two to four months, the acute effects of the atomic bombings killed
90,000–146,000 people in Hiroshima and 39,000–80,000 people in Nagasaki; roughly half of
the deaths in each city occurred on the first day. Large numbers of people continued to die from
the effects of burns, radiation sickness, and other injuries, compounded by illness and
malnutrition, for many months afterward. In both cities, most of the dead were civilians,
although Hiroshima had a sizable military garrison.

Japan announced its surrender to the Allies on August 15, six days after the bombing of
Nagasaki and the Soviet Union's declaration of war. On September 2, the Japanese government

1
https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/the-top-5-air-battles-of-world-war-ii-big-week/

4
signed the instrument of surrender, effectively ending World War II. The ethical and legal
justification for the bombings is still debated to this day.

Chapter 2- History of Aerial Warfare

Air warfare, also called aerial warfare, the tactics of military operations conducted by
airplanes, helicopters, or other manned craft that are propelled aloft. Air warfare may be
conducted against other aircraft, against targets on the ground, and against targets on the water
or beneath it. Air warfare is almost entirely a creation of the 20th century, in which it became
a primary branch of military operations.2

World war I

Powered aircraft were first used in war in 1911, by the Italians against the Turks near Tripoli,
but it was not until the Great War of 1914–18 that their use became widespread. At first, aircraft
were unarmed and employed for reconnaissance, serving basically as extensions of the eyes of
the ground commander. Soon, however, the need to deny such reconnaissance to the enemy
led to air-to-air combat in which each side tried to gain superiority in the air. Fighter planes
were armed with fixed, forward-firing machine guns that allowed the pilot to aim his entire
aircraft at the enemy, and the effective range of these weapons (no more than about 200 yards)
meant that the first aerial combat took place at very short range.

By the second year of the war fighter tactics emerged on all sides emphasizing basic concepts
that, with modification, remained applicable through the jet age. First was the surprise attack;
from the very beginning of aerial warfare in World War I, “jumping” or “bouncing”
unsuspecting victims accounted for more kills than did the spectacular aerobatics of
dogfighting. Because a pilot’s only warning system was the naked eye, attacking fighters,
whenever possible, approached from the rear or dove out of the sun, where they could not be
seen. The German ace Max Immelmann, in exploiting the superior abilities of his Fokker
Eindeker to climb and dive quickly, helped expand aerial combat from the horizontal into the
vertical dimension. Immelmann developed what became known as the Immelmann turn, in
which an attacking fighter dove past the enemy craft, pulled sharply up into a vertical climb
until it was above the target again, then turned hard to the side and down so that it could dive

2
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_airwar.html

5
a second time. Fighters operated at least in pairs, flying 50 to 60 yards apart, so that the
wingman could protect the leader’s rear. Flying speed averaged 100 miles per hour, and
communication was by hand signaling, rocking the wings, and firing coloured flares.

The next role to emerge for military aircraft was ground attack, in which planes, by strafing
with machine guns and dropping rudimentary bombs, aided an advance on the ground, helped
cover a retreat, or simply harassed the enemy. By the late stages of the war, ground-attack
aircraft had forced almost all large-scale troop movements to be carried out at night or in bad
weather.

By war’s end a fourth vision of air power arose—that of an independent air force attacking the
enemy far from the front lines, the purpose being to destroy essential elements of the enemy’s
war capability by bombing factories, transportation and supply networks, and even centres of
government. This role, never effectively implemented in World War I, was spurred largely by
the German air attacks on London. Carried out at first by zeppelin airships, the bombing was
later done by aircraft such as the Gotha bomber, which, by flying at night and often as high as
20,000 feet (forcing the crew to breathe bottled oxygen through a tube in the mouth), operated
beyond the ceiling of many defensive fighters.

Thus, the basic roles that aircraft would play in modern war were presaged in World War I:
reconnaissance, air superiority, tactical ground support, and strategic bombing.

World war II

The Second World War saw the military use of air power come of age. The development during
the war saw the most rapid and drastic changes in military aircraft technology and airborne
weaponry. Whereas aircraft development in the First World War had been evolutionary
although rapid, the Second World War saw truly revolutionary development. The monoplane
quickly became the dominant design and speed and fire power rapidly increased, resulting in a
propeller driven fighter that could possibly break the sound barrier in a dive, the British
Typhoon. Aces were still important but the sheer scale of air combat made personalities less
important and technology more so. The first jet fighters came into front line service by the end
of the war with the British Meteor and German Me 262 although propeller driven combat
aircraft would remain in military service for many years to come. Air to Air weaponry was still
based on machine guns and cannon with some unguided rockets in use against large bombers.

6
The Second World War saw the bomber come of age, with a massive increase in bomb load
and range compared to their First World War counterparts. The concept of strategic bombing
brought destruction to cities on a scale never seen before although the effectiveness of large
scale bombing of cities is highly debatable. Bombers became massive multi gunned, multi
engined machines with such aircraft as the British Lancaster and American Flying Fortress and
Super Fortress being deployed in vast numbers. The power of strategic bombing reached new
levels with the first use of nuclear weapons in 1945.

Radar became important and a new breed of aircraft the Night Fighter developed, to hunt the
night time bombing raids. Photographic reconnaissance became increasingly important to
commanders on the ground. Depth charge armed sub hunting aircraft ranged far over the
world’s oceans. The Second World War also saw the development of close air support, the use
of attack aircraft in direct support of ground troops often making attacks very close to the
forward edge of battle. New aircraft types developed to take on this role such as the Stuka Dive
bomber and the British Typhoon and Tempest. Aircraft now took on tank hunting as a specific
role, using large calibre guns in the case of modified German Stuka aircraft or unguided rockets
as in the case of aircraft of many other countries. At sea the aircraft career became the dominant
weapon end the battleship's supremacy, as shown at the Battle of Midway. Air power now
showed the vulnerability of large warships to air launched torpedoes and bombs although the
big fleets had considerable defences against air attack.3

Air craft also impacted on warfare in another area - that of transport and supply. Paratroopers
were used on a large scale for the first time with the German airborne invasion of Crete in
1941 and the nearly disastrous Allied operation Market Garden in 1944. Transport planes such
as the Ju-52 and DC-3 made large scale operations possible and allowed the rapid resupply of
forces in environments where the transport networks were poor or non-existent. Helicopters
started to be developed during the Second World War but failed to have a significant affect.

Air power in the Second World War was a vital part of the conflict. Unlike the First World
War where air power was a useful addition to forces or a propaganda weapon, Second World
War airpower helped decide the fate of whole campaign areas if not the course of the war as in
the Battle of Britain. Furthermore, it became integrated into warfare as never before, with the
use of airborne troops, close air support and Naval Aviation.

3
https://www.britannica.com/topic/air-warfare

7
 Chapter 3- Ryuichi Shimoda v. The State
Ryuichi Shimoda et al. v. The State was an unsuccessful case brought before the District
Court of Tokyo by a group of five survivors of the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
who claimed the action was illegal under the laws of war and demanded reparations from the
Japanese government on the ground that it waived the right for reparations from the U.S.
government under the Treaty of San Francisco.

Background

Ever since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there has been legal debate over
the action. On August 10, 1945, the Japanese government addressed a communication to
the International Committee of the Red Cross, asking it to denounce the U.S. government as
performing a crime under international law. Following surrender and the landing of US
occupation troops in Japan, the Prime Minister Naruhiko Higashikuni offered not to make any
complaints in the media or in legal institutions about the use of the nuclear weapons if the
United States Government agreed to drop its demand to try Japanese war criminals. During the
Tokyo War Crimes Trial, some of the defence lawyers tried to convince the International
Military Tribunal of the Far East to launch a legal investigation into the matter of the legality
of the first use of nuclear weapons, but their motions were ignored. One of these defence
lawyers, Shoichi Okamoto, continued to deal with the issue after the trial was concluded. In
February 1953, he published a booklet titled "Genbaku Minso Wakumon (Questions and
Answers on the Civil Lawsuit over the Atomic Bombings)", in which he called upon
individuals in Hiroshima and Nagasaki to take legal action against the U.S. government within
the U.S. legal system. 4

Okamoto's plan met great deal of opposition within Japanese society and even in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. Shinzo Hamai, the mayor of Hiroshima at the time, opposed the plan on grounds
that the US legal system was not favorable to such actions. As a result, Okamoto gave up the
notion of trying the case in a US court and decided to seek action in the Japanese legal system.
In co-operation with local organizations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a group of five people
were selected for the purpose of making the motion in a Japanese court. Shimoda, the leader
of the group, came from Hiroshima and was 57 years old. He lost four daughters and one son

4
http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/Case/53/Shimoda-et-al/

8
in the atomic attack on Hiroshima, and he, his wife and surviving son suffered from persistent
health problems. A lawyer named Yasuhiro Matsui joined the legal team.

Proceedings at the District Court in Tokyo began in April 1955, and they lasted for eight and a
half years until the final ruling was rendered on December 8, 1963. Okamoto died of a stroke
in April 1958 and did not live to see the final ruling.

The ruling

On 7 December 1963, in Ryuichi Shimoda et al. v. The State the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the subject of a Japanese judicial review. On the 22nd
anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the District Court of Tokyo declined to rule on the
legality of nuclear weapons in general, but found that "the attacks upon Hiroshima and
Nagasaki caused such severe and indiscriminate suffering that they did violate the most basic
legal principles governing the conduct of war". In the opinion of the court, the act of dropping
an atomic bomb on cities was at the time governed by international law found in Hague
Convention of 1907 IV - The Laws and Customs of War on Land, and IX - Bombardment by
Naval Forces in Time of War, and the Hague Draft Rules of Air Warfare of 1922–1923, and
was therefore illegal.

It was reported in the Hanrei Jiho, vol. 355, p. 17; translated in The Japanese Annual of
International Law, vol. 8, 1964, p. 231. that the facts were that

The plaintiffs, Japanese nationals, were all residents either of Hiroshima or of Nagasaki when
atomic bombs were dropped on these cities by bombers of the United States [Army] Air
Force in August 1945. Most of the members of their families were killed and many, including
some of the plaintiffs themselves, were seriously wounded as a result of these bombings. The
plaintiffs jointly brought the present action against the defendant, the State, for damages on the
following grounds:

(a) that they suffered injury through the dropping of atomic bombs by members of the [Army]
Air Force of the United States of America;

(b) that the dropping of atomic bombs as an act of hostilities was illegal under the rules of
positive international law (taking both treaty law and customary law into consideration) then
in force, for which the plaintiffs had a claim for damages;

9
(c) that the dropping of atomic bombs also constituted a wrongful act on the plane of municipal
law, ascribable to the United States and its President, Mr. Harry S. Truman;

(d) that Japan had waived, by virtue of the provisions of Article 19 (a) of the Treaty of Peace
with Japan of 1951, the claims of the plaintiffs under international law and municipal law, with
the result that the plaintiffs had lost their claims for damages against the United States and its
President; and

(e) that this waiver of the plaintiffs' claims by the defendant, the State, gave rise to an
obligation on the part of the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs' cause of action was based, more specifically, on the provisions of Article I of
the State Redress Law, which was applicable to the case of injury to a private person through
an unlawful act of a government official; on the provisions of Article 29 of the Constitution,
which provided for the obligation to pay just compensation in every case of expropriation of
private property by the State for public use; and, finally, on unlawful infringement of the rights
of the plaintiffs through the omission of the defendant to take appropriate measures for
recovery of compensation.

and that it was held

that the action must fail on the merits. The aerial bombardment with atomic bombs of the cities
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an illegal act of hostilities according to the rules of
international law. It must be regarded as indiscriminate aerial bombardment of undefended
cities, even if it were directed at military objectives only, inasmuch as it resulted in damage
comparable to that caused by indiscriminate bombardment. Nevertheless, the claimant as an
individual was not entitled to claim damages on the plane of international law, nor was he able,
as a result of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, to pursue a claim on the plane of municipal
law. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs had no rights to lose as a result of the waiver
contained in Article 19 (a) of the Treaty of Peace with Japan.

Court opined

The aerial bombardment with atomic bombs of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an
illegal act of hostilities according to the rules of international law. Nevertheless, the claimant
as an individual was not entitled to claim damages on the plane of international law, and he
was not able, as a result of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, to pursue a claim on the plane

10
of municipal law. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs had no rights to lose as a result of the
waiver contained in Article 19 (a) of the Treaty of Peace with Japan.

Chapter 4- Evaluation of the act of bombing according to

international law
Whether an atomic bomb as a so-called nuclear weapon is permitted in international law or not
is no doubt an important and very difficult question of international law. In the present case,
however, the point at issue is whether the act of atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
by the United States is to be regarded as illegal in the light of positive international law then in
force. It will suffice here therefore to consider this point only.5

As a preliminary for judging how the act of atomic bombing referred to above is to be estimated
in positive international law, we will begin by considering what are the rules of international
law that have come into existence among modern States with regard to warfare, especially acts
of hostilities, since the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Listed chronologically, the following may be cited as relevant to the present case:

In 1868—St. Petersburg Declaration renouncing the use, in time of war, of explosive projectiles
under 400 grammes weight.

In 1899—Convention relative to the laws and customs of war on land, concluded at the First
Hague Peace Conference, and its annex, Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war
on land.

Declaration concerning the prohibition of the use of bullets which expand or flatten.

Declaration concerning the prohibition of the launching of projectiles and explosives from
balloons.

Declaration concerning prohibition of the use of projectiles the object of which is the diffusion
of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.

5
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181869.pdf

11
In 1907—Convention relative to the laws and customs of war on land, which was concluded at
the Second Hague Peace Conference (the revision of the Convention of the same name
concluded at the First Hague Peace Conference).

Declaration concerning the prohibition of the launching of projectiles and explosives from
balloons.

In 1922—Treaty relating to the use of submarines and noxious gases in warfare.

In 1923—Draft Rules of air warfare.

In 1925—Protocol for the prohibition of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and
bacteriological methods of warfare.

The rules contained in these instruments do not include any provisions directly touching upon
the atomic bomb, a new weapon which appeared during the Second World War. On the strength
of this fact, the defendant State argues that the question of violation of positive international
law cannot arise, since the use of an atomic bomb was not expressly prohibited by positive
international law inasmuch as there was neither a customary rule of international law nor treaty
law-prohibiting its use at that time.

It can naturally be assumed that the use of a new weapon is legal as long as international law
does not prohibit it. However, the prohibition in this context is to be understood to include not
only the case where there is an express rule of direct prohibition, but also the case where the
prohibition can be implied de plano from the interpretation and application by analogy of
existing rules of international law (customary international law and treaties). Further, the
prohibition must be understood also to include the case where, in the light of principles of
international law which are at the basis of these positive rules of international law, the use of a
new weapon is deemed to be contrary to these principles, for there is no reason why the
interpretation of rules of international law should be limited to literal interpretation, any more
than the interpretation of rules of municipal law.

An argument is also advanced that a new weapon by its very nature cannot be subject to the
regulation of international law at all, but the argument is as much unfounded as the one just
referred to. Any weapon the use of which is contrary to the customs of civilized countries and
to the principles of international law should ipso facto be deemed to be prohibited even if there
is no express provision in the law; the new weapon may be used as a legal means of hostilities
only if it is not contrary to the principles of international law.

12
Against this, some may argue that the invention and use (if new weapons have always been
objected to in various quarters, but that they have soon come to be regarded merely as more
advanced weapons, and their prohibition has become altogether meaningless as with the
progress in technology they turned out to be effective means of waging hostilities. This is
testified by past history, and the atomic bomb is no exception.

It is undeniable that often in the past although a new weapon was objected to, at its first
appearance, in various interested quarters, it nevertheless came to be regarded as lawful with
the advance of civilization and the development of science and technology. This may perhaps
have been due to the fact that international law was still in an undeveloped state, that feelings
of hostility were so strong against the enemy or the heathen, or else that the progress of weapons
in general was so gradual. This, however, has not always been the case, as is evident from the
existence of the Treaties prohibiting the use of dum-durn bullets and poisonous gases, referred
to above. Thus, for a weapon to be legal it is not enough that it is a new weapon; and a new
weapon must naturally be subjected to the examination of positive international law.

The next step is to examine the rules of international law of that time, relevant to the act of
atomic bombing.

The first question which arises is whether the act of atomic bombing is permissible under the
rules of law respecting aerial bombardment, since such act constitutes aerial bombardment
performed by military aircraft as an act of hostilities.

No general treaty respecting aerial bombardment has been concluded. However, according to
the customary rules generally recognized in international law concerning hostile acts, there is
a distinction between a defended city and an undefended city with regard to bombardment by
land forces, and between a defended area and an undefended area with regard to bombardment
by naval forces. While indiscriminate bombing of a defended city or a defended area is
permissible, in regard to an undefended city or an undefended area only bombardment directed
at combatants and military installations (military objectives) and not against non-combatants
and non-military installations (non-military objectives) is permissible. Bombardment in breach
of this principle is necessarily regarded as an illegal act of hostilities. The existence of such a
principle is beyond doubt in view of the following provisions: Article XXV of the Hague
Regulations respecting war on land, which provides that 'the attack or bombardment, by
whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is
prohibited'; Article I of the Convention concerning bombardment by naval forces in time of

13
war, adopted at the Hague Peace Conference of 1907, which provides that 'the bombardment
by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden ...';
and Article II, which lays down that among the above-mentioned objects against which
bombardment is prohibited are not included 'military works, military or naval
establishments, depôts of arms or war matériel workshops or plant which could be utilized for
the needs of the hostile fleet or army, and the ships of war in the harbour'.

With regard to air warfare, the 'Draft Rules of Air Warfare [of 1923][1] provide in Article 24 as
follows:

' (1) Aerial bombardment is legitimate only when directed at a military objective — that is to
say, an object of which the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military advantage
to the belligerent.

' (2) Such bombardment is legitimate only when directed exclusively at the following
objectives: military forces; military works; military establishments or depots; factories
constituting important and well-known centres engaged in the manufacture of arms,
ammunition, or distinctively military supplies; lines of communication or transportation used
for military purposes.

'(3) The bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings not in the immediate
neighbourhood of the operations of land forces is prohibited. In cases where the objectives
specified in paragraph (2) are so situated that they cannot be bombarded without the
indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population, the aircraft must abstain from
bombardment.

'(4) In the immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land forces, the bombardment of
cities, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is legitimate provided that there exists a
reasonable presumption that the military concentration is sufficiently important to justify such
bombardment, having regard to the danger thus caused to the civilian population.

It is also provided, in Article 22, that 'aerial bombardment for the purpose of terrorizing the
civilian population, of destroying or damaging private property not of military character, or of
injuring non-combatants, is prohibited'. Thus, the Draft Rules of Air Warfare prohibit target
less aerial bombardment; establish the principle of military objectives; and, the basis of the
distinction between areas in the immediate vicinity of the operations of land forces and other
areas, provide that indiscriminate aerial bombardment against the former is permitted while

14
against the latter the aerial bombardment of military objectives only, is permitted. These
provisions might appear too strict in expression in comparison with those concerning
bombardment by land and naval forces, but what is meant by them is thought to be the same as
the distinction between the defended city (area) and the undefended city (area). Although the
Draft Rules of Air Warfare cannot be described as part of positive law as they have not yet
come into effect as a treaty, students of international law regard them as authoritative on the
law of air warfare. Some States adopt the substance of the Rules as a code for the activities of
their armed forces, and their essential provisions were formulated in line with the rules of
international law and practice then in force. It can therefore be said that the prohibition of
indiscriminate aerial bombardment of an undefended city and the principle of military
objectives contained therein are rules of customary international law in view of the fact that
these are also found in common in the rules of land and sea warfare. Further, whereas the
distinction between land, sea, and air warfare is based on the place of hostilities and their
purpose, there would seem to be ample ground for the view that the laws and regulations
respecting land warfare may apply by analogy to the aerial bombardment of a city, since in
effect the latter is no more than bombardment on land.

What, then, is the distinction between a defended city and an undefended city? In principle, a
defended city is a city which resists an attempt at occupation by land forces. A city even with
defence installations and armed forces cannot be said to be a defended city if it is far away
from the battlefield and is not in immediate danger of occupation by the enemy. Since there is
no military necessity for indiscriminate bombardment, only bombing of military objectives
there is permissible. However, indiscriminate bombardment is permissible on grounds of
military necessity against a city which resists an attempt at occupation by the enemy, since in
that case an attack based on the distinction between military objectives and non-military
objectives is of little military effect and cannot achieve the intended purpose. Thus, it can be
concluded that it is a generally recognized principle of international law respecting air warfare
that indiscriminate aerial bombardment going beyond the aerial bombardment of military
objectives is not permissible in regard to an undefended city.

Of course, it is possible that the aerial bombardment of a military objective will result also in
the destruction of non-military objectives or in casualties to non-combatants; this is not
unlawful as long as it is an inevitable result incidental to the aerial bombardment of a military
objective. Nevertheless, it remains true that aerial bombardment directed at a non-military
objective or without distinction between military objectives and non-military objectives (the

15
so-called 'blind aerial bombardment of an undefended city is not permissible in the light of the
principle enunciated above.

As already stated, the power of destruction and damage of the atomic bomb is tremendous, and
even such a small-scale bomb as the one dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki discharges
energy equivalent to 20,000 tons of conventional bombs. It is clear that the explosion of an
atomic bomb of such power of destruction will bring about the almost complete destruction of
a medium-sized city, to say nothing of the distinction between military objectives and non-
military objectives. Thus, the aerial bombardment with an atomic bomb of an undefended city,
if not of a defended city, should be regarded as tantamount to a blind aerial bombardment and
as such contrary to international law of the time.

It is beyond dispute that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not cities which were resisting an
attempt at occupation by land forces at that time. It is also clear from what has been stated that
neither of these cities fell within the definition of a defended city, since they were not in
immediate danger of occupation by the enemy, even though both were defended with anti-
aircraft and other guns against air raids and had military installations. Further, it was well
known that some 330,000 civilians in Hiroshima and some 270,000 civilians in Nagasaki had
their homes there, even though both cities also had what may be called military objectives,
such as armed forces, military installations and munitions factories. In these circumstances, it
is proper to conclude that the aerial bombardment with an atomic bomb of both Hiroshima and
Nagasaki was an illegal act of hostilities under international law as it existed at that time, as an
indiscriminate bombardment of undefended cities. This is so since aerial bombardment with an
atomic bomb, even if its target is confined to military objectives, bring, about the same result
as a blind aerial bombardment because of the tremendous destructive power of the bomb.

Against this conclusion is advanced the argument that war in those days had the character of
so-called 'total war ', in which it was difficult to distinguish between combatants and non-
combatants or between military objectives and non-military objectives, and that the principle
of military objectives was not always maintained during the Second World War.

It is difficult to deny that the concept of a military objective, though prescribed by various
expressions in these treaties, is not necessarily static in content but may change with time, and
its scope tends to be enlarged under conditions of total war. Nevertheless, the distinction
between a military objective and a non-military objective cannot be said to have completely
disappeared. For example, schools, churches. temples, shrines, hospitals and private houses

16
cannot be classed as military objectives, even under conditions of total war. If the concept of
total war were to be taken to imply that everyone who is a national of a belligerent State is a
combatant, and that all means of production are means of injuring the enemy, there would arise
the necessity to destroy the whole population and all the property of the enemy, and it would
be meaningless to distinguish between a military objective and a non-military objective.
However, this concept of total war has been propounded in recent times simply to point to the
fact that the outcome of a war is not decided only by armed forces and weapons, but that other
factors — mainly economic factors — such as energy, resources, productive capacity of
industry, food stuffs, and trade, and human factors including the general population and the
labour force, also have a far-reaching effect on the method and the potential of war. Thus, the
concept of total war has not been propounded as consisting of a mere failure to distinguish
between combatants and non-combatants, etc., as has been argued; nor, indeed, has there been
any case of that kind. Accordingly, it is wrong to claim that the distinction between a military
objective and a non-military objective has disappeared under the situation of a total war.

During the Second World War, it was sometimes found impossible to identify each individual
military objective for attack in a place where munitions factories and military installations were
concentrated in a comparatively small area, and where defence installations against air raids
were very strong. In such a case aerial bombardment of the whole area took place, and some
hold the view that this practice may be regarded as lawful. Such aerial bombardment, called
target-area bombardment, may be regarded as lawful even if it goes beyond the principle of
military objectives, since the destruction of non-military objectives is small in proportion to
the large military interests or necessity involved. However, the doctrine of target-area
bombardment cannot apply to the cases of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. since both cities clearly
could not be said to be areas where such military objectives were concentrated.

Again, the atomic bombing of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki is believed to be contrary to the
principle of international law prohibiting means of injuring the enemy which cause unnecessary
suffering or are inhuman. It goes without saying, however, that it is not permissible to extend
this argument so as to prove that the atomic bomb must necessarily be prohibited because it
has characteristics different from other conventional weapons in the inhumanity of its effects.

For the international law of war is not formulated simply on the basis of humanitarian feelings.
It has as its basis both considerations of military necessity and effectiveness and humanitarian
considerations and is formulated on a balance of these two factors. To illustrate this, an example

17
often cited in the textbooks may be given, of the provisions of the St. Petersburg Declaration
of 1868 prohibiting the use of projectiles under 400 grammes which are either explosive or
charged with combustible or inflammable substances. The reason for the prohibition is
explained as follows: such projectiles are small and just powerful enough to kill or wound only
one man, and as an ordinary bullet will do for this purpose, there is no overriding need for using
these inhuman weapons. On the other hand, the use of a certain weapon, great as its inhuman
result may be, need not be prohibited by international law if it has a great military effect.

When looked at from this angle, the question is whether the act of atomic bombing falls under
'the employment of poison or poisonous weapons' prohibited by Article XXIII (a) of the Hague
Regulations respecting war an land, or under the prohibitions provided for in the Declaration
of 1899 prohibiting the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases, or the Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the rise in war of
asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and bacteriological methods of warfare. With regard
to this point, there is as yet no agreement among international lawyers on the difference
between poisons, poisonous gases, bacteria, etc., on the one hand, and atomic bombs, on the
other. However in view of the fact that the St. Petersburg Declaration provides that '. . .
considering that the use of a weapon which increases uselessly the pain of people who are
already placed out of battle and cause their death necessarily is beyond the scope of this
purpose, and considering that the use of such a weapon is thus contrary to humanity . . . ' and
that Article XXIII (e) of the Hague Regulations respecting war on land prohibits the
employment of such 'arms, projectiles, and material as cause unnecessary injury', it can safely
be concluded that besides poisons, poisonous gases and bacteria, the use of means of injuring
the enemy which cause injury at least as great as or greater than these prohibited materials is
prohibited by international law. It is doubtful whether the atomic bomb with its tremendous
destructive power was appropriate from the viewpoint of military effect and was really
necessary at that time. It is indeed a fact to be regretted that the atomic bombing of the cities
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki took away the lives of tens of thousands of citizens, and that among
those who have survived are those whose lives are still imperilled owing to its radioactive
effects even now after eighteen years. In this sense it is not too much to say that the sufferings
brought about by the atomic bomb are greater than those caused by poisons and poisonous
gases; indeed, the act of dropping this bomb may be regarded as contrary to the fundamental
principle of the law of war which prohibits the causing of unnecessary suffering.

18
 Chapter 5- conclusion
Residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki jointly brought an action against the government of Japan
for the damages they and members of their families suffered as a result of the atomic bombings
by the United States in August 1945. Among other things, it was alleged that the dropping of
the atomic bombs was an unlawful act and that Japan's waiver of claims for damages under
domestic and international law against the US gave rise to an obligation for the government of
Japan itself to pay damages. The action was dismissed.

The State contended that since neither international customary nor treaty law prohibited the
use of atomic bombs at the time, the question of a violation of positive international law did
not arise. The Court agreed that the use of nuclear weapons was not expressly prohibited by
international law, but it felt that the use a particular weapon was also to be ascertained in light
of the principles of international law applicable to the conduct of warfare, in particular the
prohibition on indiscriminate bombardment of an undefended city and the prohibition on
inflicting unnecessary suffering. Although no generally applicable treaty relative to aerial
bombardment was in force at time of the bombing, the Court held – on the basis of the Draft
Rules of Air Warfare (1923) and, by analogy, on the rules applicable to bombardment by land
and naval forces – that the indiscriminate bombing of undefended cities was unlawful under
customary law. It further stated that the principle of distinction between military and non-
military objectives had not been nullified by the supposed adoption by the belligerents of a
doctrine of total war. The bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, as undefended cities, were
thus held to have been unlawful acts.

Ruling that individuals did not have rights under international law unless this was specifically
recognized in a treaty, the Court took the view that there was no general way open to an
individual to claim damages directly under international law. A claim for damages caused by
a State to a national of another State could be based on diplomatic protection, but as it is widely
recognized in classical international law, any such claim is in fact the State's own claim for
damages suffered by its nationals and not the claim of an individual. Thus, Japan could waive,
and did waive, all its claims – including those deriving from diplomatic protection – against
the US under the peace treaty of 1951. The Court further held that claims by Japanese nationals
under domestic law had also been waived.

19
2 / Process of Change

but also certain emotional readiness. It is a task made difficult by many of

our traditions and norms from the past. Difficulties arise not only from the
fact that there are “visible” political and ideological obstacles, but also
“invisible” psychological and emotional barriers. Traditional thinking
naturally attempts to exclude painful and traumatizing new information.
Psychological defenses permit one to operate with familiar and habitual
concepts. They provide protection from rigorous intellectual engagement
with the outstanding reality of the nuclear age: mutual vulnerability.
In the past, major causes of war were efforts of rival tribes or nations to
gain control over tangible resources such as territory, national resources, or
human labor. The two chief rivals on the world scene today - the USSR and
the US - do not covet any tangible resources possessed by the other.
Instead, their conflict, which poses a massive threat to the continuance of
civilization, if not humanity itself, is over which of the two political and
socioeconomic systems will prevail.
In such a conflict, ideological clashes, mutual perceptions, and misper-
ceptions assume much greater importance than disputes over material
assets. Many of these determinants are aspects of what has been termed the
image of the enemy – a phenomenon displayed by almost all antagonistic
groups. (1)

The Image of the Enemy

For humans as for all social creatures, the group, not the individual, is the
unit of survival. Humans can survive only as members of organized groups.
Groups provide protection against hostile environments and external
enemies, and also provide a sense of psychological security. Since the
majority of a group’s members share the same customs and norms, they
can readily understand each other’s behavior, and the group carries the
values that give meaning and significance to their lives. A threat to the
group’s integrity, especially when posed by a group with a different
worldview, strikes at the very basis of its members’ psychological as well
as biological survival.
Many people experience the thought of submission to an alien ideology
and social system as more intolerable than death itself, a major reason for
the escalation of wars. Hence humans share with all social animals the
predisposition to fear and distrust members of groups other than their own.
When two groups compete for the same goal, this distrust often rapidly
escalates into the mutual perception of each other as enemies.

Mirror Images
The perceptions of the enemy very often tend to mirror each other – that
is, each side attributes the same virtues to itself and the same vices to the
 The Image of the Enemy and the Process of Change / 3

enemy. We could find people on both sides of the East-West conflict

whose images are in many aspects identical, as illustrated by the American
film Rambo and the Soviet film Solitary Mission. In each case, “we” are
trustworthy, peace-loving, honorable, and humanitarian; “they” are
treacherous, warlike, and cruel. In 1942, when Germany and Japan were
enemies of the United States, the first five adjectives used by Americans in
public opinion surveys to describe the enemies included warlike,
treacherous, and cruel. None of these words appeared among the first five
describing the Soviets, who at that time were allies of the United States. In
1966, when the Soviet Union was no longer an ally, among the first five
adjectives describing the Soviets were warlike and treacherous. These
adjectives also were applied to the Chinese, but had disappeared from the
lists of adjectives applied to the Germans and Japanese, who by then were
allies of the United States. (2)

“. . . ‘we’ are trustworthy, peace-loving, honorable, and

humanitarian; ‘they’ are treacherous, warlike, and cruel.”

One should also note that enemy images are not monolithic – there are
variations. For example, it is often said that “the people are good; it is only
the leaders who are evil.” It is much easier to hate a few evil leaders than all
those people. This view may create a false hope that if somehow people
could only get rid of a few evil leaders, then the problem would be solved.
In fact, the problem is much more complex than that. In addition, whether it
is the leaders or the people who are subject to the enemy images, the effects
in either case on perception, feelings, and behavior are similar and the
distinction is largely irrelevant.

Ways of Thinking
A key issue is the degree and type of thinking that has decisive influence
on the formation of the policy of the state. A derogatory political cartoon is
a symptom of an underlying attitude and a statement by a leader of the
country officially endorsing the attitude is even more serious. While the
ripple effects of the latter are greater, in fact, the two are mutually
reinforcing, and one is probably not possible without the other. It is
important for the public to be aware of each, and to be able to distinguish
old thinking from new wherever it is found.
New ways of thinking, new morality, and new psychology lie in a
dimension outside the traditional, accepted opposition between classes and
social systems. The old ways of thinking emphasize divergent and even
contrary social and political content, but new thinking strives for synthesis
4 / Process of Change

on the basis of common values. New thinking enables groups to unite

rather than fight.
The enemy image impedes resolution of group conflicts in several ways.
First, under the influence of mutual enmity, adversaries acquire the evil
characteristics they attribute to each other; that is, the enemy image is a
self-fulfilling prophecy. In combating what each perceives to be the other’s
cruelty and treachery, each may become more cruel and treacherous itself.
This characteristic has its roots in societal evolution; nations that failed to
recognize that their enemies were treacherous and warlike did not survive
long. There was survival value in matching the tactics of the opponent, at
least in the short run.

Disruption of Communication
While the image of the enemy once may have served an evolutionary
purpose, it always has had serious negative effects. Escalation of enemy
images profoundly disrupts communication. It isn’t pleasant to
communicate with persons one dislikes, and, since enemies can be
treacherous, they may use communication for purposes of deception. In
most societies, a common way of punishing children is to refuse to speak to
them, and breaking off communication remains a way of expressing
displeasure among adults. However, disruption of communication between
adversaries reduces the chances of discovering areas of agreement or
common interests.
These enemy images also act like distorting lenses that magnify
confirming information and filter out incompatible information. This, in
turn, increases the likelihood of serious misunderstandings of the enemy’s
intentions. Thus the mass media in both the USSR and the US often play
up incidents which were regarded as manifestations of the other’s treachery
or cruelty and tended to ignore examples of humanitarian or honorable
behavior. Similarly, the same behavior is often seen in the service of good
motives if performed by one side and in the service of bad motives if
performed by the other side. For example, although in wartime both sides
always commit atrocities, the enemy’s atrocities are evidence of his evil
nature, whereas ours are portrayed as regrettable necessities.

Dehumanization
As the mutual formation of the image of the enemy develops, the
adversary is progressively dehumanized. Members of hostile groups see
each other as bestial and subhuman on the one hand, and diabolically clever
on the other. In either case, this perception seriously weakens inhibitions
humans may possess against attacking fellow humans. Destroying vermin
or devils becomes a praiseworthy, even holy activity.
 The Image of the Enemy and the Process of Change / 5

All this can progress to the point where the enemy is perceived as
literally demonic, that is, as totally evil. If the enemy is viewed as the
incarnation of evil, then whatever it perceives to be in its interest must by
definition be disadvantageous to us. (“It” is an object; “we” are human.) In
many cases, for example, the mere fact that either of the superpowers
offered a proposal for arms control was sufficient to cause the other to
reject the proposal out of hand. The “zero option” proposal for intermediate
nuclear missiles in Europe is illustrative. Proposed by the US in 1981, it
was at first rejected by the USSR. Later, repackaged, but offered in a
substantially similar form by the USSR, it was at first rejected by the US.

“A universal feature of the enemy image is that the enemy

can be influenced only by force.”

The image of the enemy tends to impoverish each nation’s own self-image
in that each is tempted to define itself primarily as the opposite of its
enemy. That is, the image encourages ideological rigidity and a self-image
that is monolithic, lacking in depth and complexity, and not in keeping with
reality. Therefore, transcending the image of the enemy inevitably requires
rising to a new level of political thinking.

‘Enemy’ as Justification for the Arms Race

Furthermore, because of a human desire for consistency, whatever the
enemy does is used to confirm the correctness of one’s own behavior. A
universal feature of the enemy image is that the enemy can be influenced
only by force. If the enemy resists the effort to apply force, our side must
double its efforts. If, on the other hand, the enemy seeks conciliation or
compromise, this is a sign that force is having an effect. Alternatively, the
enemy’s conciliatory moves are seen as efforts to weaken one’s own
determination. In either case, conciliatory acts become justification to
intensify the pressure. The enemy phenomenon is a powerful driver of the
arms race and, ultimately, towards war.
There is a vicious circle. Arms races are the source of misconceptions
and stereotypes. The atmosphere of militarism and preparation for war is an
ideal medium for the emergence and confirmation of evil images. Further,
in the nuclear age, absolute weapons need absolute enemies. As a result, the
arms race and image of the enemy feed off each other in an upward spiral.
This interconnection means only one thing: Disarmament is impossible
without fundamental changes in the psychology of international relations,
and it is also impossible to get rid of the image of the enemy without
stopping the arms race. That is why relaxation of tension, overcoming the
6 / Process of Change

image of the enemy and hostility, and establishing a basic trust between
countries and nations are tasks as important as disarmament. They are
among the main components for building up a new way of political
thinking. The struggle against the threat of a nuclear holocaust demands a
struggle against the ideology of hostility, demonology, and against the
legitimation of the image of the enemy with the help of the rhetoric of “just
wars.” To win this struggle demands reorientation of the psychology of
international relations itself.

Internal Implications
The image of the enemy is not only very dangerous for the stability and
security of international relations but leads to highly negative consequences
for the domestic life of countries. This happens because the hysteria about
the outer threat is often used as justification for secrecy and suspicion,
covert actions, policies creating “mobilized” societies, artificial national
unity, “witch hunts,” and policies suppressing dissent, all ignoring domestic
problems and distracting attention from them. By projecting the blame for
these on the enemy, each side protects its own self-esteem from the
realization that it has been unable to solve its own problems.

“. . . hysteria about the outer threat is often used as

justification for secrecy and suspicion, covert actions . . .
and policies suppressing dissent. . .”

Changing Images
Meanwhile, a hopeful consideration is that people can change with
remarkable speed from enemies to friends, despite the apparent
intractability of enemy images. This can occur when they decide that
cooperation yields vastly greater benefits to both than antagonism. A most
encouraging recent case in point is the rapid change in American
perceptions of mainland China. According to public polls in the United
States in 1976, three-quarters of the American public saw China as a hostile
power. Only six years later, in 1982, the same percentage saw China as a
friendly power and close ally, even though the Chinese leaders, like the
Soviet ones, remained faithful to communism. (3)
Realistic understanding of the real doubts and problems of the other side
may well be one of the ways to overcome the image of the enemy. Such
understanding doesn’t eliminate the differences or solve problems and
contradictions, but enhances the possibility of finding compromise
solutions. It demands an obligatory condition of maximum possible truth in
 The Image of the Enemy and the Process of Change / 7

depicting the other side and oneself, free access to information, without
distortion or secrecy. For this effort, one needs political courage and
psychological preparedness. This realistic approach is the starting point for
transcending the image of the enemy.

Specific Requirements for Change

Two essential requirements for progressing to a world beyond war are to
inhibit the formation of the reciprocal images of the enemy by antagonistic
groups, and to inhibit antagonists from resorting to violence as a way of
responding to the fear and frustrations created by images of the enemy.
To consider the second aim first, creating effective means for
determining the outcome of disputes depends on the commitment to
renounce violence in resolving international conflict. This commitment in
turn must begin with the transformation of attitudes and values of
individuals. Specifically, the precepts underlying nonviolent actions
demand that its adherents acknowledge that their opponents share a
common humanity and are activated by motives which in their own eyes
are often regarded as just.
That such a massive inner transformation is somewhat rare, that its
emergence cannot be predicted, and that its successes have usually been
sporadic and temporary must be acknowledged. On the other hand, history
supplies many examples of the enormous power of nonviolent actions, such
as the examples in modern times of Leo Tolstoy, Mohandas Gandhi,
Martin Luther King, and others.

New Technologies
The ability to progress beyond war around the world is greatly facilitated
by new technologies equally as revolutionary as nuclear weapons. These
technologies provide powerful means for heightening awareness of
worldwide threats posed by nuclear weapons, for reducing national
antagonisms, and above all, for fostering cooperation.
At least three new technologies are useful for achieving these ends:
international telecommunication by satellite; international rapid mass travel;
and exploration of outer space. With respect to the first, national leaders
already use the hotline and surveillance satellites to communicate rapidly
and directly without the distorting effects of intermediaries. This may reduce
mutual fears by imposing restraints on secret preparation for hostilities.
Television and radio are by far the most effective means of communicat-
ion ever invented. In contrast to the printed word, they jump the illiteracy
barrier and have immediate and powerful emotional impact. Today,
through television receivers in public places and transistor radios in the
hands of individuals, communication satellites are already capable of
8 / Process of Change

reaching a significant fraction of the world’s population. (4) The possibili-

ties of international satellite communications are limitless for driving home
on a worldwide scale the menace of nuclear weapons and promoting
mutual – and more realistic – appreciation among the world’s people.
Television spacebridges such as those which have several times now
occurred between Moscow and various American cities provide a glimpse
of what the future holds.
Another technical innovation, rapid mass air transportation, can be used
to bring a wide representation from different countries together in face-to-
face interaction with each other. Some such programs are already operative,
especially at the high school level, and they easily could be vastly expanded.
That the official policies of both the US and the USSR now encourage
exchanges of scientists and artists as well as students is heartening.

“The threat of nuclear annihilation should be useful to draw

nations together.”

To be realistic, increased communication, while a prerequisite for increased

mutual understanding, does not automatically have this effect. It sometimes
intensifies mutual hostile stereotypes. At the same time, there is abundant
information confirming that interaction much more often results in mutual
appreciation than hostility and mistrust. (5)

Superordinate Goals
A powerful way of breaking down enmity between groups and
encouraging them to work together is to create goals that can only be
reached by cooperation between them. The power of this approach has
been illustrated by a classic sociological experiment at a boys’ camp in
which the mutual hostility of two rival groups was overcome when they
had to cooperate to achieve goals that both wanted but neither could
achieve alone. (6)
There are similar “superordinate goals” at the international level that
could promote cooperative attitudes among nations and combat hostile
ones. The most obvious one is survival - a goal surely shared by all nations
and one increasingly jeopardized by the nuclear arms race. The threat of
nuclear annihilation should be useful to draw nations together. Unfor-
tunately, in contrast to the boys’ camp, where joint measures for survival
did not weaken either group, international measures for survival in the long
run are perceived as jeopardizing survival in the short run. All nations want
to survive and recognize that nuclear disarmament is necessary to achieve
this goal, but none is willing to risk the radical unilateral measures
necessary to get the disarmament process started.
 The Image of the Enemy and the Process of Change / 9

Modern scientific and technological advances have created potential

international enterprises that would not threaten the security of any nation,
and nations working together on these projects would achieve much greater
rewards than any one nation could attain alone.
At the international level, a spectacular confirmation of this may be the
treaty about demilitarizing the Antarctic, and providing the cooperative
exploration of the Earth’s crust and oceans. (7) This treaty is self-enforcing.
It is to each nation’s interest not to violate it, because the gains from
respecting the treaty’s provisions outweigh the gains that might result from
each nation attempting to militarize its own zone. Other recent examples of
successful international cooperation to achieve superordinate goals are the
cleaning up of the Mediterranean and the worldwide eradication of
smallpox. Superordinate goals that urgently require immediate international
cooperation are checking pollution of the atmosphere and oceans and
halting the ominous destruction of the ozone layer.
Special mention should be made of outer space. While outer space tends
to become a particularly dangerous arena of conflict, it also provides
magnificent opportunities for international cooperation on projects that
require resources that tax the facilities of even the wealthiest of nations,
such as the Apollo-Soyuz space program. Outer space has the additional
advantage of providing a positive outlet for the nobler martial virtues such
as heroism and self-sacrifice.
Since such activities potentially yield enormous benefits to all parties
involved, they can be expected to increase. Since prolonged participation in
international cooperative ventures is incompatible with maintenance of
mutual images of the enemy, these ventures provide the best immediate
hope for freeing nations from the thrall of this image, thereby diminishing
the threat of nuclear holocaust.
In the nuclear age, there must be a guard against old ways of thinking
dominated by the image of the enemy, and a search for new ways of
thinking based on the priorities of shared humanity, beyond class, political,
and ideological differences.

Conclusion
The arms race is not driven by weapons alone. It is also driven by a very
simple psychological phenomenon, the image of the enemy. Weapons of
total destruction would be useless without such images. For such weapons
to have any purpose, there must be people who may be totally destroyed.
Adversaries must be transformed into demons. Once such images have
been created, they, in turn, drive the arms race. People resist giving them
up. There is a desire to see everything in a light which will reinforce the
image. Images foster closed minds and reinforce resistance to change.
10 / Process of Change

But change is possible. It has happened many times in history. Whole

peoples have changed their views of one another. Even between the
superpowers, areas of special accommodation have been achieved,
agreements have been followed. New technologies offer new potentials for
communication. New goals which transcend the narrow national interests
of each will offer a framework for future common actions. In working out
the way to achieve those goals the enemy images can be gradually
lessened, perhaps even dissolved. If humankind is to survive in the nuclear
age, there must be progress in this direction.
 Chapter 5- conclusion
Residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki jointly brought an action against the government of Japan
for the damages they and members of their families suffered as a result of the atomic bombings
by the United States in August 1945. Among other things, it was alleged that the dropping of
the atomic bombs was an unlawful act and that Japan's waiver of claims for damages under
domestic and international law against the US gave rise to an obligation for the government of
Japan itself to pay damages. The action was dismissed.

The State contended that since neither international customary nor treaty law prohibited the
use of atomic bombs at the time, the question of a violation of positive international law did
not arise. The Court agreed that the use of nuclear weapons was not expressly prohibited by
international law, but it felt that the use a particular weapon was also to be ascertained in light
of the principles of international law applicable to the conduct of warfare, in particular the
prohibition on indiscriminate bombardment of an undefended city and the prohibition on
inflicting unnecessary suffering. Although no generally applicable treaty relative to aerial
bombardment was in force at time of the bombing, the Court held – on the basis of the Draft
Rules of Air Warfare (1923) and, by analogy, on the rules applicable to bombardment by land
and naval forces – that the indiscriminate bombing of undefended cities was unlawful under
customary law. It further stated that the principle of distinction between military and non-
military objectives had not been nullified by the supposed adoption by the belligerents of a
doctrine of total war. The bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, as undefended cities, were
thus held to have been unlawful acts.

Ruling that individuals did not have rights under international law unless this was specifically
recognized in a treaty, the Court took the view that there was no general way open to an
individual to claim damages directly under international law. A claim for damages caused by
a State to a national of another State could be based on diplomatic protection, but as it is widely
recognized in classical international law, any such claim is in fact the State's own claim for
damages suffered by its nationals and not the claim of an individual. Thus, Japan could waive,
and did waive, all its claims – including those deriving from diplomatic protection – against
the US under the peace treaty of 1951. The Court further held that claims by Japanese nationals
under domestic law had also been waived.

19
 Chapter 6- Bibliography

Websites: - https://www.icrc.org/en

www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org

https://www.britannica.com

Library: - Chanakya National Law University

20