LICUDAN VS.

COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 91958 January 24, 1991

Facts:
The petitioners fault the respondent Court for its failure to exercise its
inherent power to review and determine the propriety of the stipulated
attorney's fees in favor of the respondent lawyer and accuse the respondent
lawyer of having committed an unfair advantage or legal fraud by virtue of the
Contract for Professional Services devised by him after the trial court
awarded him attorney's fees for P1,000.00 only instead of respecting the trust
and confidence of the highest level reposed on him considering the close
blood and affinal relationship between him and his clients. The petitioners
contend that under the award for professional services, they may have won
the case but would lose the entire property won in litigation to their uncle-
lawyer. They would be totally deprived of their house and lot and the
recovered damages considering that of the 271.5 square meters of the
subject lot, the respondent lawyer is claiming 121.5 square meters and the
remaining portion of 150 square meters would also go to attorney's fees since
the said portion pertains to the lawyer's son by way of usufruct for ten (10)
years.

Issue:
Whether or not the award of attorney's fees in this case is reasonable,
being in the nature of contingent fees?

Held:
The instant petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' decision of
September 12, 1989 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Atty. Domalanta
is awarded reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00. Ratio
Decidendi: The practice of law is a profession rather than trade. Courts must
guard against the charging of unconscionable and excessive fees by lawyers
for their services when engaged as counsel. Under Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable
fees. In determining whether or not the lawyer fees are fair and reasonable,
Rule 20- 01 of the same Code enumerates the factors to be considered in
resolving the said issue. A similar provision is contained under Section 24,
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which partly states that: Sec. 24.
Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject
matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. . . . A written contract for services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable
RAUL SESBREÑO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
GR. No. 117438 June 8, 1995

Facts:
Sesbreño replaced Atty Pacquiao as counsel for 52 employees in a case
against the Province of Cebu and Governor Espina for reinstatement to work
and backwages. 32 of the employees agreed that Sesbreno would be paid
30% of the backwages as attorney’s fees and 20% for expenses of litigation.
RTC granted employees’ petition. CA affirmed. Judgment became final. There
was a compromise was made between the employees and the Province of
Cebu where said employees waived their right to reinstatement. Cebu
released P2.3M (compromised of representing back salaries, terminal leave
pay, gratuity pay) to Sesbreno for the employees as “Partial Satisfaction of
Judgment”. Sometime November and December 1979, 10 employees, herein
private respondents, filed manifestations before the trial court asserting that
they agreed to pay petitioner 40% to be taken only from their back salaries.
Lower court agreed with them and fixed attorney’s fees for Sesbreno at 40%
plus the 20% expenses. Employees filed an MR asserting that there was
inadvertence in placing 60% where it should only be 50%. This was granted.
Sesbreno was not satisfied by the decision so he went to the CA. CA deemed
the award of 20% of the back salaries as the fair, equitable, and reasonable
amount for attorney’s fees. He then goes to the SC

Issue:
Whether or Not the court acted properly in reducing Sesbreno’s attorney’s
fees despite a pre-existing contract between the parties.

Held:
Yes It is a settled rule that what a lawyer may charge and receive as
attorney's fees is always subject to judicial control. 8 A lawyer is primarily an
officer of the court charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering
impartial justice between the parties. When he takes his oath, he submits
himself to the authority of the court and subjects his professional fees to
judicial control. 9 A stipulation on a lawyer’s compensation in a written
contract for professional services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that
the contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated
amount unreasonable or unconscionable. Though generally, a much higher
compensation is allowed in a contingent fee agreement in consideration of the
risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails. But contingent fee
contracts are under the supervision of the court in order that clients may be
protected from unjust charges. Its validity rests largely on the reasonableness
of the stated fees under the circumstances of the case. An attorney’s fee is
unconscionable when it is so disproportionate compared to the value of the
services rendered. Nevertheless, the existence of an unreasonable fee (no
matter the degree) does not bar recovery. It is only that the courts will fix a
reasonable amount. “Quantum Meruit” which means “as much as he
deserves” is often the court’s basis for determining the amount. The 20%
award is justified.
 Masmud v. NLRC
G.R. No. 183385, 13 February 2009

FACTS:
In 2003, Evangeline Masmud filed a complaint on
behalf of her late husband Alexander Masmud against First
Victory Shipping Services (Hellas) for non-payment of
permanent disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness
allowance, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees
Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Rolando Go as his
counsel. In consideration of Atty. Go's legal services, Alexander
agreed to pay on contingent basis: 20% of total monetary
claims as settled or paid and an additional 10% in case of
appeal. And any award for attorney's fees shall pertain to
respondent's law firm as compensation.

The Labor Arbiter granted monetary laims of

Alexander. Hellas appealed to NLRC, during pendency
Alexander died, Evangelina as substituted as complainant
NLRC dismissed the appeal of Hellas. After appeals before the
CA, the decision the decision of the NLRC eventually became
final. The check of P 3454079.00 was granted to Evangelina
and P680000 to Atty. Go. Dissatistied, Atty. Go filed a motion
to record and enforce the attorneys lien alleging that
Evangelina only paid the amount equivalent to 20% of the
award as attorney's fees leaving 10% balance, plus the award
to the counsel as attorneys fees. Evangelina manifested that
the claim for attorney's fees of 40% of the total monetary
award was null and void based on Art. 111 of the Labor Code.

Issue:
Whether Atty. Go's compensation should be
determined under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
or under Article 11 of the Labor Code

Ruling:
His compensation should be governed by Section 24,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and not Article 111 of the Labor
Code. The contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides
for a contingent fee which shall control unless found by the
court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. The decree of
unconscionability ofa stipulated amount in a contingent fee
contract will not preclude recovery. It merelyjustifies the fixing
by the court of a reasonable compensation for the lawyers
services.
 ROXAS V.DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.
V
. DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR.
G. R. No. 152072. July 12, 2007

FACTS:
In a Resolution dated 26 September 2006, the Court En Banc ordered
Atty. Romeo G. Roxas to explain in writing why he should not be held in
contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action when he, in a letter
dated 13 September 2006 addressed to Associate Justice Minita V. Chico
Nazario with copies thereof furnished the Chief Justice and all the other
Associate Justices, intimated that Justice Nazario decided G.R. No. 152072
and No. 152104 on considerations other than the pure merits of the case, and
called the Supreme Court a "dispenser of injustice."
In his letter of explanation, Atty. Roxas extended apologies to Justice Nazario,
to the other members of the High Court and to the High Court itself as a
revered institution and ultimate dispenser of justice. He said he was merely
exercising his right to express a legitimate grievance or articulate a
bona fideand fair criticism of the Honorable Court's ruling. He explained that
his criticism of the assailed ruling was done in good faith with no intention
whatsoever to offend any member, much less tarnish the image of the Court.
Instead of resorting to public criticism through media a exposure, he chose to
ventilate his criticism in a very discreet and private manner by writing a
personal letter confined to the hallowed halls of the Court and within bounds
of decency and propriety.To prevent liability from attaching on account of his
letter, he invokes his rights to free speech and privacy of communication. The
invocation of these rights will not, however, free him from liability.

ISSUE:
Whether Constitutional right to free speech and privacy of
communication can be invoked by the petitioner?

RULING:
NO. The letter directed against the Supreme Court is not an exercise of
free speech but an abuse of such right where
it is contemptuous.
Atty. Roxas’ letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. The making of contemptuous
statements directed against the Court isnot an exercise of
free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the
dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exer
cise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of
courts or public respect therefor and confidence therein. Free expression
must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational obsession to demean,
ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.
The Supreme Court does not curtail the right of any person to be critical of
courts and judges as long as they are made in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels.
The statements of Atty. Roxas against the Court was made in mala fides.
In the case at bar, we find the statements made by Atty. Roxas to have been
made mala fides and exceeded the boundaries of decency and propriety. By
his unfair and unfounded accusation against Justice Nazario, and his mocking
of the Court for allegedly being part of a wrongdoing and being a dispenser of
injustice, he abused his liberty of speech.
Atty. Roxas likewise cannot hide under the mantle of the right to privacy. It
must be disclosed that prior to his letter addressed to Justice Nazario, Atty.
Roxas first wrote then Chief Justice Panganiban asking for an investigation as
to how the assailed decision was rendered and to sanction the perpetrators.
The accusations contained therein are similar to those in his letter to Justice
Nazario. The fact that his letters were merely addressed to the Justices of this
Court and were not disseminated to the media is of no moment. Letters
addressed to individual Justices, in connection with the performance of their
judicial functions, become part of the judicial record and are a matter of
concern for the entire court. As can be gathered from the records, the letter to
then Chief Justice Panganiban was merely noted and no show
cause order was issued in the hope that Atty. Roxas would stop his assault on
the Court. However, since Atty. Roxas persisted in attacking the Court via his
second letter, it behooved the Court to order him to explain why he should not
be held in contempt of court and subjected to disciplinary action.