Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

ISSN: 1057-610X (Print) 1521-0731 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uter20

Russia's fifth column: The influence of Night

Wolves Motorcycle Club

Kira Harris

To cite this article: Kira Harris (2018): Russia's fifth column: The influence of Night Wolves
Motorcycle Club, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2018.1455373

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1455373

Accepted author version posted online: 22

Mar 2018.

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Publisher: Routledge
Journal: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1455373

Russia’s fifth column: The influence of Night Wolves Motorcycle Club

Dr Kira Harris

Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security, Charles Sturt University, Canberra, Australia
Email: kirharris@csu.edu.au
Post: Charles Sturt University, Locked Bag 119, Kingston, Australian Capital Territory, 2604.

Abstract

While the Night Wolves Motorcycle Club’s (NWMC) roots are similar to Western counterparts such

as the Hells Angels MC and Bandidos MC, they have evolved into a proxy of the Russian state who

unite combat ready diasporas. The NWMC NGO provides soft propaganda while they operate

alongside the Russian military and imbed military tactics into foreign Russian populations through

their corporate entity Wolf Holding of Security Structures. This case study explores the evolution

from outlaw motorcycle club to political force and their integration into Russia’s information

operations and conflict. The NWMC activities in Eastern Europe, particularly Ukraine, highlight how

this motorcycle club has been able to cultivate a fifth column to agitate domestic politics and

increase ties to the Kremlin.

Keywords: Night Wolves Motorcycle Club, Russia, Motorcycle club, International conflict, Propaganda, Wolf

Holding of Security Structures

 2

Introduction

Organised crime has long been etched into Russia’s political history with the systemic entanglement

of state and illegal actors defining the Russian social order at all levels.1 With the collapse of the

Soviet state, the destabilised environment in Russia allowed criminal organisations to establish their

own systems of power and led to increasing integration of crime leaders into political structures.

Interdependencies between criminal networks and political authorities enabled the sharing of

criminal and administrative skill sets to protect personal and political interests.2 The relationship

between the state and crime groups is not fundamentally competitive, but rather the strategic

interactions sustain and support the existing system of power.3

The Russian state is highly criminalised, and as Stephenson4 argues, the separation between criminal

and mainstream society is not a necessity in Russia when legal and criminal forms are closely

intertwined. Stephenson’s work highlights how the Russian state embraces organised crime

members and leaders who provide benefits through private violence and illegal expertise (which the

state either lacks or is unable to use freely), while suppressing other crime networks. In this

symbiotic relationship, organised crime members receive symbolic power, administrative resources,

and protection.

The integration of criminal organisations into the political regime has enabled the use of criminal

networks as State proxies. Russian-based organised crime operating in Europe provide a variety of

functions on behalf of the Kremlin, such as providing proceeds of crime, cyber-attacks, trafficking of

illicit commodities and people, and political assassinations.5 The Kremlin also uses criminal networks

for traditionally government functions, such as intelligence operations and as instruments of political

influence. US Russian expert Galeotti6 argues the growing evidence of collaboration between

organised criminals and Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), military intelligence (GRU), and

the Federal Security Service (FSB) presents an escalating threat to the West.
 3

This paper does not focus directly on Russia’s warfare or international relations strategy, but instead

provides an in-depth look at one of the proxy groups that grew in prestige throughout the Ukrainian

conflict - the Night Wolves Motorcycle Club (Russian: Ночные волки; NWMC). The NWMC started

receiving greater attention around 2008 when they rode out in support of Dmitry Medvedev’s

presidential win.7 Galeotti attributes the NWMC’s political growth to the Kremlin’s successful

strategy of turning potential adversaries into compliant allies.8

The NWMC have demonstrated their ability to mobilise nationalist sentiment in Russians, both

internally and abroad through propaganda, and as a paramilitary organisation. While NWMC’s

engagement with Russians in post-Soviet and European states continues, their reach beyond Europe

is growing. Today, the club has approximately 5,000 members domestically with regional units in

almost all major Russian cities.9 The club also claims to have more than 65 chapters in over 10

countries, including Belarus, Bulgaria, Germany, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine.10 While

mostly European based, the NWMC have extended their influence to other continents with alleged

ties in the US and Australia. Florida-based Spetsnaz MC (an ex-patriot law enforcement and military

motorcycle club) sought official recognition from the NWMC and Spetsnaz MC members have ties to

Russian security officials.11 In Australia, YouTube videos show Moscow-based NWMC members in

Australia for the delivery of monuments donated from the Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius monastery in

February 2017, and Victory Day (9 May).12 The clips show the NWMC were well received by Russian

diasporas in Sydney and Melbourne.

While the motorcycle club’s roots are similar to Western counterparts such as the Hells Angels MC

and Bandidos MC, they have evolved into an enterprise with ideological influence. Not only do the

NWMC operate as a propaganda machine under their NGO designation, they also function alongside

Russian military and imbed military tactics into foreign Russian populations through their corporate

entity Wolf Holding of Security Structures. This paper explores the history of the club, how the

NWMC became a political force and their role in stimulating pro-Russian sentiment abroad.
 4

Methodology

While there is increasing interest in Russia’s foreign policy, there has been little attention given to

specific non-state actors outside the cyber realm. This paper presents an intensive study of a single

case (the NWMC) and provides an in-depth analysis of the organisation over time. The case study

methodology supports the investigation into complex phenomena within their contexts.13

Sources of data include open-source materials from news sites, government reports and archival

documents, academic literature, as well as media sites and motorcycle club websites (both in English

and Russian). While the breadth of sources is unobtrusive and allows for repeated review, the data

was limited by accessibility and reporting bias.14 Data source triangulating, in both English and

Russian, helps to reduce the bias in sources15; however, during the current political environment and

tensions between the West and Russia it is not unreasonable to expect biased views on both sides of

reporting.

Data analysis included the examining and categorisation of information, which was tabled into

themes relating to NWMC history, ideological development, businesses and affiliations, and foreign

activities. Further analytical techniques included time series analysis16 to understand the NWMC

transition from outlaw motorcycle club to political entity, and explanation-building techniques17 to

further illuminate their influence of Russian diasporas.

Gerring18 argues case studies are an intensive study of a single unit for understanding a larger class

of (similar) units; however, the political environment and group nuances restrict the generalisation

of NWMC case to other non-state actors more broadly. Rather, this paper intends to provide a case

description19 that highlights the NWMC’s characteristics and evolution into a political player.
 5

History of NWMC

Like most outlaw motorcycle clubs, the NWMC began as a counter culture movement during the

Soviet era. The establishment of the NWMC began with dissidents, in the form of metal heads and

bikers, gathering in the anarchic underground scene in Moscow during the 1980’s.20 Similar to early

Western outlaw motorcycle clubs, the NWMC provided security at rock concerts and ran protection

rackets to protect businesses from both police and gangsters.21

Alexander Zaldostanov (also known as the Surgeon) formally founded the NWMC in 1989.

Zaldostanov worked as a dentist and travelled frequently to Germany where he was married to a

German woman. During this time, Zaldostanov reportedly enjoyed the underground world of West

Berlin and experienced the motorcycle culture through the local Hells Angels MC charter.22

Zaldostanov exerted his influence over the NWMC early on and was interested in establishing a

motorcycle club that emulated those from the US - this included introducing club by-laws that were

reportedly a word-for-word translation of the Hells Angels MC doctrine.

Drawing on his experiences in West Berlin, Zaldostanov is reported to have opened the Moscow

bike-centre ‘Sexton’ in 1992. When Sexton burnt down in the mid-1990s, Zaldostanov allegedly

financed two buildings on the outskirts of Moscow to serve as the new club and biker headquarters.

While outlaw motorcycle gangs tend to have communal or club owned assets, Zaldostanov it is

claimed then took complete ownership of the properties.23 The Sexton property currently includes a

nightclub, several bars and a restaurant, and has become a Russian bikers Mecca.24 In addition, the

NWMC own a tattoo parlour, a bike shop, and Woolf Veart, which specialises in wholesale trade of

non-food items, including the “Wolf Wear” clothing line.25 The Sexton bike-centre was subject to US

sanctions in 2017.26

In Tabor’s expose, a former NMWC member alleges that Zaldostanov rewrote the club’s charter to

create a centralised structure, which gave him more power and special voting rights to make any
 6

decision.27 In the early 2000’s, it is claimed that concerns over Zaldostanov’s growing power saw the

club splinter with 10 members leaving the NWMC and two former members establishing the Hells

Angels MC charter in Moscow, which has since expanded to five Russian chapters.28 While other

members were reportedly disillusioned, Sexton remained a focal point for Russian bikers and

provided enough pull for members to maintain their involvement with the club and Zaldostanov.

Despite the NWMC shift into the political realm, they have not been immune to gang-warfare. In

2012, a shoot-out between NWMC and the Three Roads MC left one ‘wolf’ dead. While each club

presented differing accounts of the conflict, Three Roads MC leader Yevgeny Vorobyev told the

media the incident was retaliation for Three Roads MC ending their alliance with NMMC and siding

the US motorcycle club, the Bandidos MC.29 Vorobyev cited NWMC’s increasing publicity and

politicization as the cause of the split.

In August 2017, a conflict between the NWMC and Pirates of Winds MC led to a shoot-out, killing

one and putting others in critical care.30 In May 2017, The Pirates of Winds MC reportedly patched

over the anti-government 1% club the Turncoats MC Russia as part of their expansion; however, it is

unknown whether the expansion or anti-Kremlin sentiment was the cause of the conflict. NWMC

posted a rebuttal on their homepage with Zaldostanov stating he knew of the shooting but did not

know the details; however, he took the opportunity to state the NWMC do not receive funding from

America31 suggesting an ongoing conflict with Western-based outlaw motorcycle gangs.

Zaldostanov’s enthusiasm for the Western outlaw motorcycle gang model has apparently diminished

as he lobbied the Kremlin to ban both the Bandidos MC and Hells Angels MC under the undesirable

foreign organisations legislation.32 Zaldostanov has become outspoken about the organised crime

element of outlaw motorcycle gangs, deriding them as a product of Western influence.33 However,

pictures with 3 star Col. General and representative for The State Duma Valery Vostrotin posing with

international Hell’s Angels members would suggest not all support Zaldostanov’s view.34 While a list

of outlaw motorcycle gangs in Russia is yet to be published, Rock Machine MC, Commancheros MC,
 7

Bandidos MC, Hells Angels MC, Outlaws MC and Rebels MC all list Russian chapters and/or charters

on their websites.

NWMC political and ideological shift

NWMC political involvement extends further than their traditional outlaw counterparts and has led

to their alienation from much of the culture. Ideologically, NWMC initially opposed the official Soviet

government and cultivated the philosophy of the free man.35 However, during the late 1980s

President Mikhail Gorbachev introduced plans to move towards democratised socialism, known as

the Perestroika policy, which aimed to decentralise the Soviet economy and re-orient social

priorities.36 Glasnost, or ‘openness’, was a key component of Perestroika and allowed for the greater

freedom of press which included criticisms and dissent to be voiced legally, as well as the flow of

ideas in and out of the Soviet Union.37 During Gorbachev’s reign, western music, drugs and Soviet

counterculture grew in Moscow and the NWMC embraced this changing environment.

In August 1991, NWMC members helped barricade against a coup by Communist hard-liners against

Gorbachev. Boris Yeltsin awarded Zaldostanov a medal for his efforts, and while he now abhors the

honour,38 it provided NWMC with new opportunities. They hired a business manager and began

appearing in advertising campaigns. By the end of 1991, Zaldostanov was reportedly more likely to

appear in youth television programmes, video clips and newspapers, than at club hangouts.39 The

appeal to youth gave NWMC greater business opportunities with the establishment of the NGO

Youth Autonomous Non-commercial organisation “Night Wolves MANO” (Russian: Молодежная

автономная некоммерческая организация "Ночные волки"; MANO) in 2003. MANO lists its main

activities as performing arts for youth between 18 and 30 years old; however, the company

acknowledges their involvement in the motorcycle and automobile industry, tourism and

accommodation, hospitality, entertainment industry, as well as cultural institutions such as libraries

and archives.40
 8

The NWMC were not unique in establishing an NGO; Stephenson41 and Tilly42 reported the

dissimulation of criminal networks during the 1990s and 2000s, where organised crime minimised

the visibility of their activities and feigned conformity through establishing public identities and

branding. The late 1990s saw the State become the biggest producer of wealth in Russia,

encouraging organised crime leaders to actively attempt to integrate into the political structures of

the state by developing interpersonal ties with its representatives. Organised crime leaders opened

charitable foundations, sponsored film and city festivals, donated money to children’s homes and

built public sports facilities as part of the integration into the political elite.43

The organised crime groups’ charitable foundations provided opportunities for legitimate social

engagement with law enforcement officials and political parties, and legitimised criminal figures as

genuine business or political entities. The collaboration with state officials in various public events

and ceremonies, charity work and shared membership in NGOs enabled the gang aristocracy to

assimilate into government circles. The integration with the political elite was not necessarily

through the exploitation of politicians; as noted by Sukharenko44, criminals were integrated into the

political system for their criminal behaviour and connections. State officer holders were involved in

the acquisition of assets during the post-Soviet era – often through fraudulent means and the

intimidation of competitors. This in turn led to further relations between major political actors and

criminal actors for the purposes of exchanging criminal expertise and resources in illegal schemes

that allowed both sides to benefit fiscally and reduce threats.45

MANO invests in educating Russia’s youth in pro-nationalist views and the club holds Kremlin-funded

holiday shows for children in the Sexton bike centre, as well as in Sevastapol, Crimea since 2009. The

pro-Russian shows, which attract more than 4,000 children annually,46 work as a soft propaganda

campaign to promote anti-Western views as well as establish pro-Russian nationalism in Crimea. The

grant applications describe a patriotic atmosphere that combines Russian history, spirituality and

current political events. For example, the 2013 performance involved a character resembling the
 9

Statue of Liberty who attempts to kidnap the snow princess Snegurochka. In the story line, the Night

Wolves save the princess and give the children in the audience an “alternative to foreign

domination.”47 The 2016 ‘Fifth Empire’ theme showcased the Soviet people’s strengths during the

Great Patriotic War and drew parallels from the Soviet era to present-day Russia.48 After Crimea’s

annexation, the show’s narrative presented “the Maidan Revolution as a neo-nazi coup

masterminded by the West”, which justified Russia’s interference.49 These shows typically appeal to

younger audiences by using stuntmen, lasers, pyrotechnics, and other special effects.50

MANO and its activities provide an overt connection between NWMC and the Kremlin, which has

reportedly assisted them in obtaining multi-million ruble grants. In 2015, anti-corruption activist

Alexei Navalny's foundation alleged Zaldostanov and NWMC entities received 56 million rubles in

government grants in 2013 and 2014.51 Additionally, it was claimed the NWMC received a 99%

discount on 266-hectare property in Sevastopol in May 2015. The Russian Union of Youth granted

NWMC 12 million rubles for the establishment of a national youth centre “the Patriot” at Mount

Gasfor.52 The Patriot centre would be located where the Sevastopol International Bike Show has

taken place since 2009. The grant application proposes the centre will support military, patriotic,

sports and youth organisations; however, the Defence Ministry denied any official involvement.53

The Legislative Assembly of Sevastopol is also currently contesting the lease agreement and lack of

tender process.54

Religion

Nationalism in Russia tends to follow two lines – imperial-orthodox and ethnic nationalism. NWMC

are imperial-orthodox supporters who identify with the Orthodox faith, Russian Orthodox Church

and the promotion of a Russian world bonded by culture, language, and faith.55 Other organisations

promoting imperial-orthodoxy include the Cossack movements, Russian National Unity paramilitary

movements and the White Army. Unlike the ethnic-nationalists, who allege discrimination from the
 10

Russian state and voice their grievances against immigrants, imperial-orthodox supporters favour

strengthening relations with the Kremlin and diasporas.

During the early 2000’s the NWMC trajectory differed significantly from traditional outlaw

motorcycle clubs, to the extent that they have completely rejected their counterculture past. Similar

to the original outlaw motorcycle clubs, interaction with the club is built on the readiness for

members to exist outside the usual social hierarchical framework; however, NWMC leader Alexei

Vayts’ (Алексей Вайц, also spelt as Alexei Weitz) also argues there is a requirement to be self-giving

and provide a service:

“We are patriots of our country; we have our own civil position, that's why we are

with those who in fact work for the benefit of Russia.”56

Vayts’ engagement with the NWMC since 2008 has been instrumental in shaping the NWMC’s

religious growth, with Tabor arguing Vayts provided the religious and political narrative to support

Zaldostanov’s goals.57 The club follows a strict hierarchical structure with conservative principles and

traditions, overtly excluding drug addicts, drug dealers, Satanists and homosexuals.58

Vayts reportedly is heavily involved in the Russian youths’ religious development and is a member of

the Commission for Spiritual, Moral and Patriotic Education of Children, Youth of the Council for

Interethnic Relations59 and vice president of Pereprava (Переправа). Pereprava runs a conservative

orthodox news site online60 and hosted the February 2014 Orthodox Youth Forum “ideology of

leadership” during the World Youth Day celebration in Moscow.61 Vayts, it is claimed. is also loyal to

the political party ‘Right Cause’, which describes itself as holding a ‘patriotic bias’ and is endorsed by

the Kremlin.62

In response to the Pussy Riot’s ‘punk prayer’ in 2012 which protested against Putin in the Cathedral

of Christ the Savior, NWMC organised a club ride to demonstrate support of Patriarch Kirill, the

Russian Orthodox Church and the orthodox values of Russian civilisation.63 These motorcycle
 11

pilgrimages have received government funding in the past for their promotion of a Slavic fraternity,

including an alleged 3.5 million rubles for a rally to Mount Athos.64 Igor Mintusov, president of the

Russian Association of Political Consultants and member of the European Association of Political

Consultants, claimed the Kremlin endorses the NWMC, both explicitly and implicitly, because of their

conservative values, patriotism, anti-Westernism and pro-Stalin sentiments.65

Russia’s Fifth Column

Crimea’s annexation was a demonstration on how Russia used non-state actors, albeit reinforced by

state-based capabilities, to initiate civil unrest and secure physical territory.66 Russia established

itself through asserting five elements of national power: economic pressure; information

operations; conventional military posturing; unconventional destabilisation; and political activities67

and its success has increased concerns in Eastern Europe.

While Russia was intending to annex Crimea, the NWMC were attempting to enter Ukraine

territories through the north. NWMC members with separatist sentiments were prevented from

crossing the Belarusian-Ukrainian border.68 The Estonian NWMC chapter worked with local ethnic

Russians who formed the volunteer group Dobrosvet in collecting humanitarian aid for civilians in

rebel-held eastern Ukraine - the NWMC delivered the aid by riding through Russia into Crimea.69

During a delivery of humanitarian aid to Slavyansk, Donestk, Ukrainian forces arrested Kiev-based

NWMC member Alexey Vereshchagin.70 The Estonian Police publicly announced the NWMC a

security threat and Lithuania has also voiced concerns over school children being “involved in an

action with obvious propaganda signs” during a 12 day stay in Krasnogorsk.71

In Tabor’s expose, he quotes Lugansk Night Wolves chapter leader Vitaly Kishkinov, who declares

NWMC’s intent:
 12

“resurrect the motherland – to connect the pieces that were killed off. We’re one

land, one people. We were artificially divided. We have Night Wolves divisions in

territories of former Soviet Union. Our mission is to bring the patriotism, orthodoxy,

love for motherland and reunite.”

By empowering non-state actors, Putin can rely on social networks of influence to promote an

ideological agenda through associations, and early in the conflict, Putin’s decentralise political and

military involvement afforded Russia ambiguity and deniability. The agitation of the Russian

population in the Crimean region prior to annexation is part of the hybrid model to mobilise support

and establish a ‘fifth column’. The fifth column refers to groups imbedded in a population to

undermine the majority; Lanoszka72 argues these groups can deliberately agitate, or wait for

hostilities to break out and act in support of a military campaign by their own government.

Working with insurgents, these groups can insert ‘unmarked soldiers’ who operate checkpoints,

occupy government buildings and other sites of strategic interest, seize prized military assets and

clear an area ahead of an overt military operation. Where protracted conflict is undesirable, the fifth

column can destabilise a contested environment. When fighting erupted in eastern Ukraine, a

NWMC’s chapter joined pro-Russia militias and Zaldostanov reportedly flew to Crimea in February

2014 and worked with the militias setting up roadblocks in Sevastopol.73 By March, the Ukrainian

Naval facility was under the militia’s control and Zaldostanov, it is claimed, took control of weapons -

earning himself a medal for “the liberation of the Crimea and Sevastopol” in Moscow.74 Lugansk

NWMC member Kishkinov confirmed NWMC acted as a special police squad with a SWAT division

and duties included guarding facilities and sites, as well as patrolling the city.75

In addition to para-military activities, the non-state networking model ensures that Putin’s intent is

ambiguous and messages are not always consistent, which prevented a unified response from

NATO.76 Inconsistent messaging and disinformation campaigns provide the opportunity for a
 13

Russian-made version of reality and information and culture become ‘weaponised’ with the intent of

destabilising the post-Soviet state.77

Zaldostanov reportedly co-founded the Anti-Maidan movement (a pro-government movement in

Ukraine that support President Victor Yanukovych and strengthening ties with Russia) with mixed

martial arts champion Iuliia Berezikova in January 2015.78 This patriotic group was used to counter

pro-democracy movements in Russia and Crimea. The anti-Maidan and Crimean self-defence

movements composed of the NWMC, Combat Brotherhood, Cossacks, Russian veterans from

Afghani and Chechen wars, and Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov (also an honorary NWMC

member) volunteered Chechen fighters and other professionals trained in combat, including the

Fighting Brotherhood (an Afghan veterans organisation).79 Lipman80 reported the NWMC and

Combat Brotherhood were the largest recipients of state funding in 2015, and that both these two

groups were heavily involved in the Anti-Maidan movement.

In May 2015, the Ukrainian Security Service (USS) filed a criminal law suit against Zaldostanov

accusing him of financing terrorism. The USS alleged Zaldostanov financed the self-proclaimed

“republics” of Donestk and Lugansk, that the NWMC were closely associated with Russia’s Special

Services, and were recruiting for militias in which the Ukrainian government described as terrorist

groups.81 The NWMC had evolved into a militant form, and at the time of Tabor’s interview, over 40

NWMC members were involved in the war – and three had died in combat. While Russia rewarded

the NWMC for their involvement in the conflict, the United States and Canada imposed sanctions

against the NWMC and Zaldostanov, noting their relationship to Russian Special Services and their

involvement in recruiting fighters for Lugansk and Kharkiv frontlines.82

Beyond Crimea

Fifth columns do not appear sporadically - the nationalism and ideological drive require

development before leading to an operationalised response.83 The NWMC were able to cultivate a
 14

fifth column and provide a legitimating tool in Crimea, and potentially in other Russian diasporas

throughout Europe through propaganda and cultivating combat ready diaspora.84

NWMC use the Allied victory of World War II as an opportunity for uniting Russian diasporas. The

bikers have tried to ride through Europe in a Victory parade, which was met with resistance from

other states, notably Poland who suffered great losses to both the Nazi and Stalin regimes. Poland

denied entry to NWMC on their transit to Berlin in 2015 and 2016,85 and detained NWMC member

Nikolai Loginov during the May 2017 ‘Victory Roads to Berlin’ ride.86 In 2017, a number of NWMC

members, including Zaldostanov, travelled to Budapest and laid flowers at the Fiume Road Memorial

Garden for Victory Day.87 A number of European governments have tried to prevent NWMC from

entering their countries, describing the ride as deliberately provocative.88 Galeotti89 suggest Central

European governments were concerned about the NWMC forcing a border or inciting violence that

would lead the Kremlin to justify military intervention.

The legacy of WWII and the ‘Great Patriotic War’ narrative remains in Russia’s foreign politics and

contribute to ongoing confrontation with the West. While most WWII veterans have passed away,

the resurgence of pro-Stalin sentiment within nationalist groups provides an association and identity

with the extreme demonstration of force from the Soviet era.90 The ideological attachment and

semiotic projection of the Great Patriotic War to contemporary issues are central to the Putin’s

security discourse.91 Blank92 argues Putin’s fascist hyper-nationalism is similar to fascist regimes in

the past, where diasporas glorify Russian culture and political leadership. These diasporas in post-

soviet countries can be moulded into fifth columns who appeal to Russia for assistance, and during

political instability provide defence on behalf of the motherland.

In his discussions with Tabor, Zaldostanov reminisced about the strength of the Soviet and described

the social changes as leading to a corrupt value system:

 15

All the values were lost, everybody started kicking their history, spitting on their own

granddads.... All these pretenders I always hated – they painted themselves so

quickly from Communists to capitalists.... This democratic system is the same as

communism. I see no difference, the same lies, the same fuckery.93

The NWMC narrative towards the West bears striking similarities to other extremist groups with

denunciation of Western ideological beliefs and characterising the battle between good and evil, or

in the case of Zaldostanov spiritual warfare and dehumanisation:

“For the first time, we showed resistance to the global Satanism, the growing

savagery of Western Europe, the rush to consumerism that denies all spirituality, the

destruction of traditional values, all this homosexual talk, this American

democracy”.94

Zaldostanov’s narrative reflects a slippery slope fallacy where changes in moral codes will inevitably

lead to a further decline in society:

“What was considered a sin before, paedophilia” – he means homosexuality – “now

it’s legalised. They even allow them to take marriage in the Catholic Church! The

priests are not just traitors, but Satanists themselves. When these marriages are

allowed, tomorrow paedophilia will be fine, then sex with dead people, then eating

the shit, and if we don’t stop, we will see the abyss of hell.”95

While Zaldostanov states the NWMC are against violence for the sake of violence, he acknowledges

they will not hesitate to use suppression, discrimination or intimidation tactics against those

considered Russian enemies, even on foreign soil.96 The Belarusian Popular Front’s (Belarusian

opposition party) chairman Alexei Yanukevich lobbied the Prosecutor General’s Office to recognise

the NWMC’s as an extremist organisation actively supporting separatism in post-Soviet states.97

Yanukevich argued Zaldostanov had failed to recognise the Republic of Belarus publicly by stating,
 16

"Belarus is Russia” and the NWMC aimed to undermine the sovereignty of the State. Yanukevich has

separately spoken about NWMC’s overt declarations as evidence of an ideological basis for a hybrid

war against Belarus.98

Hybrid warfare includes campaigns that combine conventional and special operations, and include

offensive cyber and psychological operations, and use social and traditional media to influence

domestic and international perceptions. 99 Like other forms of war, hybrid warfare is an instrument

of policy that combines reconnaissance, special operations, organised crime, and extensive

information and psychological campaigns. 100 External to the motorcycle club identity and NGO, the

NWMC have established recognition through the security industries and martial arts sub-culture

across Europe, which has raised concerns about ex-patriots who are combat-ready and exposed to

Russian information campaigns.101

The NWMC own Wolf Holding of Security Structures (Wolf Holding; a.k.a. Defense Holding Structure

'Wolf’, Holding Security Structure Wolf, Kholding Okhrannykh Struktur Volk; Wolf Holding

Company),102 which provides “martial arts and tactical military courses to foreign military, law

enforcement, and Russian-speaking compatriots from European and Asian States”. While there are a

number of autonomous companies under the Wolf Holding of Security Structures umbrella, the core

business (under the same name) offers detective services including the use of lie detectors, armed

and unarmed protection of premises and transport, as well as property fortification through

installation of monitoring and tracking systems.103

The company has bases in Russia and the occupied areas of Ukraine, and allegedly worked with

Zaldostanov to organise the self-defence of Sevastopol.104 US government reports indicated Wolf

Holding provides martial arts and tactical military training to pro-Russian fighters in eastern Ukraine

and the company was included in US sanctions in June 2017 for “having materially assisted,

sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in

support of, the Night Wolves.”105

 17

Within the list of designations, two individuals within Wolf Holding of Security Structures were

singled out – company president Gennadii Anatolievich Nikulov and Combat Trainer Leader Denis

Yuryevich Ryauzov.106 Nikulov remains entwined with military and politics (Nikulov is the Deputy

Ataman of the Central Cossack Army, Vice President of the Foundation for Legal Protection of Law

Enforcement Officials and Special Forces and member of the Council of the International Union of

Airborne Troops) and is the co-founder of Volk 77 and Vlata.107 Nikulov was also a recipient of a

Russian Ministry of Defence medal for the ‘Recovery of Crimea’. Ryauzov, senior leader in Wolf

Holding, is also responsible for training Russian Special Forces, military personnel and police.108

Other companies reportedly falling under Wolf Holding include International Alliance of Assault

Forces (Assault Alliance) and Wolf International Centre for Special Training; Assault Alliance reports

directly to Nikulov. The Wolf International Centre for Special Training website advertises training in

martial arts (specialised for Russian special services) and includes the use of knives and guns,

psychological warfare and technical training as well as training for security personnel.109 Mucha

quotes Polish biker and organiser of opposition against the NWMC rally Jarosław Podworski, who

argued the power structures based on combat systems, weapons and teaching of “black” or “green”

tactics is a prologue to setting up networks that can provide NWMC and inadvertently, the Kremlin,

with resources in future. He goes on to claim the

“philosophy of martial arts and military discipline build closely-knit teams of ‘faithful

soldiers’.... In the Islamic State, it is the religion, and in this case – it may be the vision

of Russia’s “Messianic” role among people who perceive a different order of the

world and who subscribe to different values. Our concept of war boils down to what

happened 70 years ago.”

The NWMC use of the security and combat industry as a tool of soft power is further emphasised by

Chmelnizki’s110 report claiming Russian intelligence services GRU and FSB are using systema martial

arts clubs to recruit in EU countries.

 18

Internationally, Systema club (Russian martial arts) Wolf Academy encompasses the NWMC wolf

logo into the academy logo, and branches in Italy and Greece openly display GRU insignia and

slogans. Chmelnizki’s report lists systema clubs that are suspected of promoting pro-Russian

sentiment and recruiting foreign agents, and argues the 63 systema clubs in Germany could establish

a fifth column of up to 315 recruits. GRU doctrine allows these recruits to engage in combat if a

Russian-NATO war occurs, as well as create disruption and fear during peacetime. 111

Conclusion

Russia’s ability to integrate the NWMC into a political force demonstrates Putin’s flexibility in

warfare and promoting nationalism. Internationally, the NWMC united behind Russia’s offensive

against Ukraine and their relationship with the Kremlin has increased their domestic popularity

significantly, and led to recognition on the international scale, including Russian cosmonauts flying

the NWMC flag above the International Space Station in 2015.112

Vayts emphasises NWMC members’ enthusiasm and ability to operate outside of government

bureaucracies is central to their success in promoting their ideology.113 NWMC’s promotion of pro-

Kremlin sentiment, combined with a hyper-masculine identity and combat skills, presents a threat to

Soviet states with significant Russian populations. While the NWMC pro-Kremlin propaganda and

influence is well documented in post-Soviet states, it is unclear how much influence extends to

countries further abroad. It is possible that Russian diasporas in countries outside of Europe -

including countries with known associations, such as the USA and Australia - are receptive to the

NWMC, as well as Putin’s ideological stance and foreign policy. In light of Russian interference in the

Trump election, understanding Putin’s use of crime groups as State proxies becomes increasing

crucial.
 19

Notes

1. Svetlana Stephenson, “It takes two to tango: The state and organized crime in Russia,”

Current Sociology, 65 no. 3 (May 2017): 411- 426.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Svetlana Stephenson, Gangs of Russia: From the Streets to the Corridors of Power

(New York: Cornell University Press, 2015).

5. Mark Galeotti, “Crimintern: How the Kremlin uses Russia’s Criminal Networks in

Europe,” Policy Brief No. 208, European Council on Foreign Relations, London, UK

(April 2017). http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR208_-_CRIMINTERM_-

_HOW_RUSSIAN_ORGANISED_CRIME_OPERATES_IN_EUROPE02.pdf

6. Ibid.

7. Yekaterina Sinelschikova, “Crimean Land Dispute: Who are Russia’s Night Wolves

and What Do They Stand For?” Russia Beyond the Headlines, June 3, 2015,

https://www.rbth.com/society/2015/06/03/crimean_land_dispute_who_are_russias

_the_night_wolves_and_what_do_the_46593.html
 20

8. Tabor, Damon, “Putin's Angels: The Ride of Russia's Night Wolves,” Rolling Stone,

November 26, 2015, http://rollingstoneaus.com/culture/post/putins-angels-the-

ride-of-russias-night-wolves/2773.

9. “How Bikers "Night Wolves" Became a Political School”, Собеседник, trans. Kira Harris, June

30, 2014, https://sobesednik.ru/rassledovanie/20140630-kak-baykery-nochnye-volki-stali-

politicheskoy-staey; Yuliya Zabyelina, “Russia’s Night Wolves Motorcycle Club: From 1%ers

to political activists,” Trends in Organised Crime (2017): 1-15, doi: 10.1007/s12117-017-

9314-7

10. Zabyelina, “Russia’s Night Wolves Motorcycle Club”.

11. Charles Pierce, “The Russia Scandal Was Desperately Missing a Biker Gang Subplot.

Well, Here It Is,” Esquire, June 26 2017, http://www.esquire.com/news-

politics/politics/news/a55879/russian-bikers-trump/

12. Magav2000, “7 Мая-День Победы,Мельбурн (Ночные Волки и Русские Мотоциклисты),”

YouTube, June 17, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nqz_NM46rHw; Мотоклуб

Ночные волки, “Ночные Волки Прибыли в Австралию для Участия в Мотоэкспедиции

"Православная Австралия 2017," YouTube, Feb 7, 2017,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qg4emmpsHHg; Tvsoyuz, “В Аэропорт Сиднея

Прибыли Представители Мотоклуба Ночные Волки,” YouTube, Feb 7, 2017,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mw9AEKrPTqk.

13. Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, “Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design

and Implementation for Novice Researchers,” The Qualitative Report 13, no. 4

(December 2008): 544-559.

14. Winston Tellis, “Application of a Case Study Methodology,” The Qualitative Report 3,

no. 3 (September 1997): 1-19.

15. Ibid.
 21

16. Baxter and Jack, “Qualitative Case Study Methodology”; Tellis, “Application of a Case

Study Methodology”.

17. Ibid.

18. John Gerring, “What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?” American Political

Science Review 98, no. 2 (May 2004): 341-354.

19. Robert Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994).

20. Tabor, “Putin’s Angels.”

21. Ibid.

22. Sinelschikova, “Crimean Land Dispute.”

23. Tabor, “Putin’s Angels.”

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. “Resource Centre: Russia/Ukraine-related Designations and Identifications,”

Sanctions, US Department of the Treasury, last modified June 20, 2017,

https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-

Enforcement/Pages/20170620.aspx

27. Tabor, “Putin’s Angels.”; “How bikers “Night Wolves became a political school.”

28. The Hells Angels MC has the following charters in Russia: Moscow, Kazan, City Crew,

Simferopol and Nomads. Tabor, “Putin’s Angels.”; “Charters,” Hells Angels MC,

accessed August 1, 2017, http://hellsangels.ru/en/charters.

29. Tom Parfitt, “Member of Vladimir Putin's Favourite Biker Group Shot Dead”, The

Telegraph, November 14, 2012,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/9678136/Member-of-

Vladimir-Putins-favourite-biker-group-shot-dead.html.
 22

30. Katerina Kristallov, “In Rostov-on-Don, One Person Died in the Course of the Bikers'

Conflict,” Слухи, trans. Kira Harris, 29 August, 2017, http://slyxi.com/v-rostove-na-

donu-odin-chelovek-pogib-v-xode-konflikta-bajkerov/.

31. “Surgeon Denies the Murder of the Biker "Night Wolves" in Rostov-on-Don,” Night

Wolves MC, trans. Kira Harris, last modified August 29, 2017,

http://www.nightwolves.ru/nw/news/4384/.

32. In 2015, Russia adopted a law that criminalises cooperation with “undesirable

organisations”, which are foreign or international organisations who present “a

threat to the foundations of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, to

the defense capability of the country, or to the security of the state”.

33. Tabor, “Putin’s Angels”.

34. “Hells Angels MC Moscow and Valery Alexandrovich Vostrotin "Combat

Brotherhood," Hells Angels MC Gallery, trans. Kira Harris, last accessed 23 July 2017,

http://hellsangels.ru/en/gallery/2016/hells-angels-mc-moscow-i-valerii-

aleksandrovich-vostrotin-voov-boevoe-bratstvo.

35. Sinelschikova, “Crimean Land Dispute”.

36. John Elliott and Abu Dowlah, ““Gorbachev, Perestroika and Democratizing Socialism:

Origins, Institutions and Policies,” International Journal of Social Economics 21, no.10

(1994): 73-115.

37. Laura Cummings, “History: Gorbachev's Perestroika and the Collapse of the Soviet

Union.” Citations – Journal of Undergraduate Research 9 (May 2012): 54-77,

http://www.lagrange.edu/academics/citations/2012/index.html

38. Zaldostanov’s attitude towards the more democratic leadership may have changed

along with the Kremlin’s narrative that glorifies World War II and the image of Stalin.
 23

Public acceptance of Putin’s authoritarian and statist government has likely shaped a

positive view of Stalin’s leadership.

39. Tabor, “Putin’s Angels”.

40. List-Org, “Youth Autonomous Non-Profit Organisation “Night Wolves," trans. Kira

Harris, accessed August 20, 2017, http://www.list-org.com/company/1110300; Open

NGO, “Youth Autonomous Non-Commercial Organization "Night Wolves," trans. Kira

Harris, Accessed July 20, 2017, http://openngo.ru/organization/1037717009846

41. Stephenson, “It takes two to tango.”

42. Charles Tilly, Trust and Rule (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

43. Stephenson, “It takes two to tango.”

44. Alexander Sukharenko, “Organized crime in Russia,” Per Concordiam: Journal of

European Security and Defense Issues 5 no. 4, (2014): 44–49.

45. Stephenson, “It takes two to tango”.

46. The Site of the Contest of State Support to NGOs, “Youth Autonomous Non-Profit

Organisation “Night Wolves,” trans. Kira Harris, Accessed July 15, 2017.

https://grants.oprf.ru/grants348/projects/nno/541/.

47. Tabor, “Putin’s Angels”.

48. The Site of the Contest of State Support to NGOs “Youth Autonomous”

49. Andrey Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk, “Unpacking the Post-Soviet: Political

Legacy of the Tartyu Semiotic School,” All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and

Peace (August 2017): 1-15. doi: 10.20991/allazimuth.334965

50. The Site of the Contest of State Support to NGOs “Youth Autonomous”; Open NGO,

“Youth Autonomous.”
 24

51. “Night Wolves Received a Presidential Grant of 3.1 million Rubles for the “Unity of

the Fraternal Slavic Peoples,” last modified December 27, 2016, http://en.news-4-

u.ru/night-wolves-received-a-presidential-grant-of-3-1-million-rubles-for-the-unity-

of-the-fraternal-slavic-peoples.html

52. “Night Wolves” Received a Presidential Grant.”

53. Crimea Realities, “Night Wolves Lease a Plot of Land in Sevastopol - a decree,” trans.

Kira Harris, last modified May 13, 2015,

https://ru.krymr.com/a/news/27013323.html; “NCOs “Foreign Agents” Among

Recipients of Presidential Grants,” last modified October 23, 2015. http://en.news-4-

u.ru/ncos-foreign-agents-among-recipients-of-presidential-grants.html

54. Sinelschikova, “Crimean Land Dispute”; “NCOs “Foreign Agents”

55. Katarzyna Jarzynska, “Russian Nationalists on the Kremlin’s Police in Ukraine,” Centre

for Eastern Studies, 156 (2014): 1-8,

http://aei.pitt.edu/59228/1/commentary_156.pdf.

56. “Alexei Vaits: "We Consider Peacekeeping as One of our Main Services,” Night

Wolves MC, trans. Kira Harris, last modified February 02, 2015.

https://nightwolves.ru/nw/news/1528.

57. “How Bikers "Night Wolves" Became a Political School.”

58. Sinelschikova, “Crimean Land Dispute.”; Tabor, “Putin’s Angels”.

59. “Members of the Moscow Region: Alexey Weitz,” Government of the Moscow

Region, trans. Kira Harris, Accessed on August 9, 2017,

http://opmo.mosreg.ru/about/structure/item/komissiya-po-migratsionnoy-politike-

mezhnatsionalnym-i-mezhkonfessionalnym-otnosheniyam-.html

60. http://pereprava.org
 25

61. Night Wolves MC, “Alexei Vaits”

62. Tabor, “Putin’s Angels”.

63. Sinelschikova, “Crimean Land Dispute”.

64. “Night wolves” received a presidential grant”; TSN. “Sale of Alcohol and Children's

Holidays. What do Putin's "Night Wolves" Earn?” trans. Kira Harris, last modified

May 18, 2016 https://ru.tsn.ua/svit/prodazha-alkogolya-i-detskie-prazdniki-na-

chem-zarabatyvayut-putinskie-nochnye-volki-632867.html?version=tablet.

65. Sinelschikova, “Crimean Land Dispute.”

66. Nicholas Barber, “A Warning from the Crimea: Hybrid Warfare and the Challenge for the

ADF,” Australian Defence Force Journal, 198 (April 2015): 11-22.

67. Ibid; Sascha Dov Bachmann and Håkan Gunneriusson, “Russia's Hybrid Warfare in the East:

The Integral Nature of the Information Sphere,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs

(Fall 2015): 198-211.

68. TSN, “Sale of Alcohol.”

69. Andrew Radin, “Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics”. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND

Corporation, 2017).

70. “How Bikers "Night Wolves" Became a Political School.”

71. Mark Galeotti, “Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-linear? How New is Russia’s ‘New Way of

War’?” Small Wars and Insurgencies 27 (2016): 282-301. doi:

10.1080/09592318.2015.1129170; “The Lithuanian mayor has apologised for participation of

children in the “Russian propaganda”, Currently News, October 25, 2016,

http://currentlynews.us/articles/the-lithuanian-13360.
 26

72. Alexander Lanoszka, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern

Europe,” International Affairs 92, no. 1 January 2016): 175-195. doi: 10.1111/1468-

2346.12509

73. Tabor, “Putin’s Angels”.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid.

76. Barber, “A Warning from the Crimea”.

77. Laura Herta, "Russia's Hybrid Warfare - Why Narratives and Ideational Factors Play a

Role in International Politics," Online Journal Modelling the New Europe 21

(December 2016): 52-76.

78. Tabor, “Putin’s Angels.”; Jadar Østbø, “Demonstrations against Demonstrations: The

Dispiriting Emotions of the Kremlin’s Social Media ‘Mobilization’,” Social Movement

Studies 16, no. 3 (2017): 283-296. doi: 10.1080/14742837.2016.1266242

79. “Understanding Putin’s Plans: Russia and Ukraine”, The Economist, January 31, 2015,

https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21641278-russian-president-stepping-

up-both-war-ukraine-and-his-confrontational-rhetoric; “Thousands Take Part in

‘Anti-Maidan’ Protest in Moscow Against Uprising in Ukraine” The Telegraph,

February 21, 2015,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11426775/Thousands-

take-part-in-Anti-Maidan-protest-in-Moscow-against-uprising-in-Ukraine.html;

“Uncontrolled Violence: Russia after Nemtsov”, The Economist, March 17, 2015,

https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21645838-assassination-boris-nemtsov-

leaves-liberal-russians-fear-new-wave-violent
 27

80. Maria Lipman, “At the Turning Point of Repression: Why are there More and More

‘Undesirables Elements’ in Russia,” Russian Politics and Law 54, no. 4 (2016): 341-

350. doi: 10.1080/10611940.2016.1207468

81. Sinelschikova, “Crimean Land Dispute,”

82. Ibid.

83. Lanoszka, “Russian Hybrid Warfare”.

84. Galeotti, “Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-linear”.

85. Joachum Diec, “Russia, Eastern Europe and Central European EU Members after the

Ukrainian Crisis. Alternative Options of International Behaviors”, Annales Politologia

23, no. 1 (2016): 17-32. doi:10.17951/k.2016.23.1.17

86. “Biker from the Club "Night Wolves" Detained in Poland.” trans. Kira Harris,

Редакция Сайта 360°, May 3, 2017, https://360tv.ru/news/mir/bajkera-iz-kluba-

nochnye-volki-zaderzhali-v-polshe-108449/.

87. “Members of Russia’s Night Wolves Motorcycle Club Visit the Fiume Road Memorial

Garden.” Hungarian Ambiance. Last modified May 5, 2017,

http://www.hungarianambiance.com/2017/05/members-of-russias-night-

wolves.html.

88. Sinelschikova, “Crimean Land Dispute.”

89. Galeotti, “Hybrid, Ambiguous, and Non-linear”.

90. Yuto Ozawa, “Causes of the Resurrection of a Positive Image of Stalin in Today's

Russia: Its Historical Background and Putin's Strategy of Maneuvering People's

Perceptions,” (2017) accessed on August 30,2017,

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985309

91. Makarychev and Yatsyk, “Unpacking the Post-Soviet.”

 28

92. Stephen Blank, “A Double Dispossession. The Crimean Tatars after Russia’s Ukrainian

War,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 9, no. 1 (2015): 17-

32. doi: 0.5038/1911-9933.9.1.1271

93. Tabor, “Putin’s Angels.”

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. Hugh Davies, “The Russian Eurasian Concept and the State of Ukraine,” Politik UNSW

International Affairs Review, 1 (May 2017): 29-32.

97. Damien Sharkov, “Pro-Putin Biker Gang Accused of Extremism by Belarus

Opposition,” Newsweek, May 04, 2016. http://www.newsweek.com/putins-bikers-

accused-extremism-belarus-opposition-455455.

98. TSN. “Opposition of Belarus demands to recognize Putin's "Night Wolves" as

extremists.” trans. Kira Harris, May 3, 2016, https://ru.tsn.ua/svit/oppoziciya-

belarusi-trebuet-priznat-putinskih-nochnyh-volkov-ekstremistami-625353.html.

99. International Institute of Strategic Studies, “Directed Energy Weapons: Finally

Coming of Age?” The Military Balance 115 (2015): 9-20. p. 17.

100. Barber, “A Warning from the Crimea.”; Herta, Laura. "Russia's Hybrid Warfare.”;

Miroslaw Banasik, “Russia’s Hybrid War,” Science and Military 11, no. 2 (2016), 39-

47.

101. Wojciech Mucha, “Night Wolves-Russian Killing Machine Factory,” EuroMaidan Press,

April 25, 2015, http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/04/25/night-wolves-russian-

killing-machine-factory/#arvlbdata.
 29

102. Robbie Gramer, “Trump's Renewed Russia Sanctions Look a lot Like Obama's,”

Foreign Policy, June 20, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/20/trumps-

renewed-russia-sanctions-look-a-lot-like-obamas-treasury-department-finance/

103. Mucha, “Night Wolves-Russian Killing Machine.”

104. Ibid.

105. “US Sanctions Resource Centre: Russia”

106. Ibid.

107. Mucha, “Night Wolves-Russian Killing Machine.”

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid.

110. Dmitrij Chmelnizki, Martial Arts Schools Systema. trans. Kira Harris, accessed 30

September, 2017, https://s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/euobs-

media/b8f047c3a710912fc047ead32bb06bf2.pdf; Andrew Rettman, “Fight Club:

Russian Spies Seek EU Recruits”, EU Observer, May 23, 2017,

https://euobserver.com/foreign/137990.

111. Ibid.

112. Pierce, “Russia Scandal.”

113. “Alex Vaits: Peacekeeping”