dresses of other buildings on parallel streets as reference points.

Pickering referred to this technique

as intersection and resection, not related to the method of resection and intersection.
Parallel lines were drawn from known addresses and locations on a parallel street. With this
information it was attempted to reconstruct the pattern of street addresses on Bulevar Umetnosti,
which was information unknown to the targeters. The pattern of street addresses on Bulevar
Umetnosti was not as expected, and the targeter erroneously pinpointed the embassy "located on a
small side street at some distance on Bulevar Umetnosti" from the intended target. This was not true
as Ulica Tresnjevog Cveta (Cherry Blossom St, the small side street where the embassy was
located) does not connect with Bulevar Umetnosti which ends 200 m (220 yd) short of the junction
with Cherry Blossom St.[19] A procedure designed to determine the coordinates of a known address
on a known street produced the coordinates of a different address on a street neither a continuation
of nor connected to the street targeted.
Multiple checks designed to prevent attacks on sensitive targets each failed as the location of the
embassy had not been updated since the embassy moved to New Belgrade three years earlier. As a
result, the bombers took to the air with the coordinates of the Chinese embassy programmed into
the bombs on board.
This account did not draw a connection between the use of an old map and the targeting of the
embassy and did not address the reason that target authorization listed the objective as a
warehouse instead of an office building.

George Tenet statement[edit]

On July 22, George Tenet made a statement before a public hearing of the House Intelligence
Committee.[3] Covering the same ground as Under Sec. Pickering's statement in China, he
additionally acknowledged the target package originated within the CIA and that it was the sole CIA-
directed strike of the war, stated that he had been personally unaware that the CIA was circulating
strike requests and recognised that the CIA possessed maps correctly displaying the
embassy. Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre, giving evidence the same day, stated that "NIMA
is not at fault".[23]

Chinese reaction[edit]
Few Chinese politicians believed the US version of events, believing instead that the strike had been
deliberate.[24]
Former Ambassador Li Daoyu stated "we don't say it was a decision of Clinton or the White House",
[25]
 but the Chinese government describes the US explanation for "the so-called mistaken bombing"
as "anything but convincing" and has never accepted the US version of events. [26]
The incident left a toxic legacy on China-NATO relations and kept them frozen for years. [27][28] In a
2011 meeting with US officials in the aftermath of the 2011 NATO attack in Pakistan, Chinese
general Ma Xiaotian directly referred to the embassy bombing by asking "Were you using the wrong
maps again?"[27][28] Observers immediately noted the "cutting" nature of the remark, describing it as
"jibing" and "priceless".[27][28][29]