GERMAN PARACHUTE OPERATIONS

IN WW2
_____________________________________________________________________

PART 1 – DODECANESE ISLANDS (September – October 1943)

Background

By the beginning of 1943 Germany had lost the strategic initiative and was hard
pressed on several fronts: in Russia her southern flank was collapsing; she faced
extreme danger in North Africa; American daylight precision bombing within the
borders of the Reich had commenced; and her strongest ally, Italy, was faltering.
Notwithstanding these setbacks, Hitler and the OKW were hopeful of a return to the
offensive and of seizing the initiative from the Allies. In a Memorandum of the
Wehrmacht Operations Staff of 10th December 1942, the OKW also acknowledged the
impending danger of an allied invasion of southern Europe aimed at Italy, the Balkans
or the Greece islands, with a secondary objective of an attack on the Rumanian
oilfields.1

To cover against such an eventuality Hitler insisted on the transfer of substantial

forces to reinforce the Mediterranean. By the end of 1943 there were twenty-five
German divisions in Italy and approximately another twenty in Yugoslavia, Greece
and the islands of the Aegean, including the Dodecanese.2 Later that year Hitler
ordered that the Aegean islands were to be held at all costs and, in particular, that
those in the Dodecanese already lost to recent British action were to be recaptured.3
Hitler had two concerns. Firstly, that ‘a retirement would create an unfavourable
impression on Turkey and [other] Allies in South Eastern Europe.’4 And, secondly,
the Aegean islands had to be defended ‘in order to deny to the Allies island stepping-
stones towards the southeast mainland.’5

The German Mediterranean strategy was designed to secure German supply routes
through the Adriatic and protect the approaches to the Balkans. By controlling the
islands of the Aegean, and in particular those of the Dodecanese, the Germans could
establish a cordon of garrisons and airfields that barred Allied entry into the Aegean
Sea.

Planning

The OKW immediately drafted plans to recapture the Dodecanese islands from their
recently surrendered Italian allies, who were now being supported by British troops.
The first of a series of assaults was to be against the combined British / Italian
garrison at Kos (Operation Eisbär, or Polar Bear). Kos was chosen by the Germans as
1
See, for example, Hitler’s War, p.173
2
H. Greiner & P. Schramm (ed.), Kriegstagebuch der Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Frankfurt,
1963, vol.III, p.1562
3
Islands occupied by small detachments of British forces between 8th & 16th September 1943 were
Casteloriso, Symi, Stampalia, Kos, Kalimno, Leros and Samos
4
Aegean Operations, p.7
5
The Meditarranean and Middle East, p.543

1
their first objective in the Dodecanese as it was the only island with an airfield which
could be used as a forward base for the Luftwaffe in future operations in the
Dodecanese. It would also prevent the RAF from providing air cover to the other
islands, especially Leros (Operation Leopard) which would be next on the list of
German objectives.

While audacious, a strength of the German battle plans was that they were relatively
simple and straight-forward. Firstly, the island's defences would be neutralised by
intensive air attack. Once this was achieved a combined air and sea-borne assault
would occur at several dispersed locations by along the coast. Having established and
secured their beach heads the individual groups would then join forces and enter the
fourth and final phase: the detailed defeat of the enemy.

The Commander & His Forces

The overall commander of the operations for both Kos and Leros was Generalleutnant
Müller. Müller had a reputation as a ruthless but very capable and energetic officer.
He had served with his 22nd Infantry Division in the Polish campaign in 1939, the
Netherlands in 1940 and the Russian Front in 1941-42, where he was awarded the
Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves. His battle group for the assaults in the Dodecanese
was based on this very experienced and battle-hardened division. However, it was
supported by elements of the Brandenburgers, an elite German commando unit, two
battalions of Fallschirmjagers (parachute troops), and numerous air and naval forces.6
Overall Plan for Use of Para Forces

On both Kos and Leros parachute drops were not the main form of assault. In both
cases paratroops were used to complement amphibious assaults. On Kos on the 5th
October, a parachute company of the Brandenburg Regiment used gliders to reinforce
troops attacking the main airfield. The following month a more substantial parachute
force of two battalions was employed on Leros to gain as much surprise as was
possible against a garrison that had been expecting an imminent attack for the past
month.

DZ Security & Reconnaissance

Captain Kuhne, the commander of the initial airborne assault group, had an advantage
few parachute forces can claim - German officers had been on the islands until
September 1943 and they knew the topography and the existing defences intimately.
This intelligence was more important to the landings on Leros than may at first be
appreciated. The British, who had now been on Leros for a couple of months, had
assumed that the island was unsuitable for landing paratroops.7 Therefore, the use of
para’s provided the German commander with the best possible chance of achieving a
level of surprise.

Interviews of German staff who had been on Leros also helped identify the best DZs.
The area that was eventually chosen was a little more than half a mile wide between
the Gurna and Alinda Bays which offered, tactically, the best chance of splitting the
island's defenders. However, such intelligence was dated the airborne assault planners
6
For Kos & Leros the Brandenburgers were used as both glider assault and parachute troops
7
H.Q. R.A.F. to Air Ministry, 14th September 1943, 1706, Appendix E.44

2
were not know that the area was defended by the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Irish
Fusiliers, one of the three battalions of British infantry forming the garrison of Leros.

Conduct of Para Assault

Landing at dawn the amphibious force took most of that first morning to establish a
foothold on Leros. Once this was achieved one parachute battalion and their Ju.52
transports took off from an airfield outside Athens for their one hour flight. While the
para’s were in the air the British Garrison Commander, Brigadier Tilney, was
confident of the ability of the garrison to hold the Germans on the beaches and then
defeat them. However, the arrival of the para’s at 1340hrs that day took him and his
force completely by surprise and was a deciding point in the battle. By his own
admission, the initiative passed to General Müller with the arrival of his
Fallschirmjagers.

The paratroopers dropped from an altitude of between 450 & 600 feet: sufficient
height for the parachute canopies to open safely but a height that kept the descent time
to a minimum.8 While they landed accurately, virtually cutting the island in half, they
suffered heavy casualties during the landing operation due to a combination of terrain
(see below), proximity to opposing ground troops (they landed on an area defended by
a British battalion) and because some of the aircraft reputably ‘dropped [the troops]
from such a low altitude that they hit the ground before their parachutes opened.’9

Assuming the island unsuitable for parachute operations the British were taken off-
guard. To meet the threat the British were forced to commit their reserves, thereby
providing the amphibious forces with an opportunity to achieve a toe-hold in several
locations on the east coast. On the second day of the battle for Leros the Germans
continued to consolidate their positions, despite a series of British attacks. These
assaults never broke the paras' line across the island's narrow neck, and so the British
units in the north remained separated and isolated from those in the south. On both the
third and fourth days the Germans consolidated their positions and reinforced. These
reinforcements included a further para battalion which tipped the scales against the
defenders - the recently arrived German paratroops were fresh whereas the British
infantry were exhausted by Stuka attacks and the strain of battle.

It was on the fourth day of battle, 16th November 1943, that a patrol from one of the
infantry battalions gained touch with the para’s and the two groups formed up for the
final attack on the British HQ. It was to a party of Jaegers that Brigadier Tilney, the
commander of the 234th Brigade on Leros, surrendered. Operation Leopard was over.
It was a great success for the Germans who displayed great courage, tenacity, skill
and determination. They had overcome superior numbers who were supported by
heavy artillery and coastal guns in only four days and once again gained control in the
Dodecanese. Hitler was overjoyed and conferred on General Müller the title
‘Conqueror of Leros’.

Link-up with Supporting Ground Forces

8
Some British observers of these landings believed that a number of parachutes failed to open due to a
few of the aircraft being too low
9
Aegean Operations, p.25

3
Although the German paratroopers incurred a high rate of casualties, they quickly
reorganised and moved towards their individual objectives: cutting roads, conducting
reconnaissance and providing defensive screens. As early as the evening of D day on
Leros, groups from the Brandenburgs’ Para Company went out, moving cross-country
to avoid British patrols, and made contact with the beach party on the northeast coast.
Throughout the night, guides from the Brandenburgers led the infantry southwards to
thicken the battle line around Rachi Ridge. Other elements of German para’s held
their ground until the infantry could reach them. By the afternoon of the second day of
the battle there were few isolated detachments of paratroops; most had linked up with
other ground forces.

Organisation, Equipment & Training

The para’s used by the Germans on Kos and Leros were, in the main, experienced and
well trained, equipped and led troops. They landed on light scales, armed mainly with
submachine guns, and had few support weapons (an exception being 81mm mortars
and some anti-tank weapons). While not organic to the 22nd Infantry Division, the
Brandenburgs and Fallschirmjagers were accustomed to independent and ‘fire
brigade’ actions.

Impact of Terrain

On Kos, the area used for the gliders was generally flat and suitable for airborne
operations. However, Leros was another matter altogether. Leros is approximately ten
miles long and varies in width from one to five miles. It falls naturally into three
sections joined by a narrow isthmus. The whole is very mountainous, devoid of cover
and exceedingly rocky. The British and Italian defenders found the rocky nature of the
ground often impossible to provide adequate shelters to protect the anti aircraft and
coastal guns. Even digging slit trenches proved difficult. It was for these reasons that
the British had assumed the island unsuitable for para operations.

The direct affect of the terrain on the para’s casualties can only be surmised.
However, anecdotal evidence suggests that approximately 10% of the force would
have suffered some level of incapacitation (eg. broken legs and bad sprains) as a
result of the ground.

Cooperation between Airborne, Amphibious & Other Forces

The German attack was well planned and coordinated and displayed a high-level of
inter-service cooperation: the infantry being well supported by ground attack aircraft
and naval support.10 The parachute troops, as typified the ground actions, showed
initiative, courage and flexibility. All ground forces were able to request air support
by using a succession of flares to communicate with a liaison aircraft circling slowly
overhead. Within minutes this air link was able to direct the Stukas to the target.

Drop of Heavy Weapons /Vehicles

10
The main assault force was supported by three destroyers, 130 ground attack aircraft (Ju.88s &
Ju.87s) and fighter cover (Me.109s)

4
All of the heavy support weapons, such as artillery, vehicles and armour, were landed
with the amphibious force. Some light support weapons were landed with the glider
force at Kos.

Affect of Training on Casualties

While the casualties among the para forces were among the highest of the ground
troops on Leros,11 it is difficult to attribute any of this to poor training. If anything, the
determination and success of the landing, in an area assessed as unsuitable by the
enemy, showed courage, determination and confidence in their ability.

Air Terminal Ops

After seizing Kos, the Germans enjoyed local air and sea superiority. This enabled
them to employ the slow Ju.52 transport aircraft effectively. Air terminal operations,
while limited, were provided from the 22nd Air Landing Division, located back in
Greece. This support was primarily in form of arranging the air delivery of supplies
and reinforcements. On Kos, supplies could be flown in directly. However, on Leros,
where no airfield existed, greater use was made of air supply until the port near the
Leros Township could be opened to shipping.

Tactical & Operational Lessons

An examination of how the Germans were able to dominate and defeat a numerically
superior Allied force in the Dodecanese using a relatively small force highlight a key
lesson for the conduct of air & sea-borne operations. This lesson was the paramount
importance of inter-service cooperation and the sheer folly of trying to conduct
combined operations without air cover. In the Dodecanese Britain got this wrong.
Their forces at Kos, Samos and Leros were quickly isolated and, at two of those
islands, defeated in detail. General Müller’s force, on the other hand, was an almost
flawless example of cooperation between land forces and naval and air forces. It was
his ability to establish and maintain local air and sea dominance that was the major
contributing factor to his success. Air superiority enabled him to limit British freedom
of movement in the islands and to pick his time and deploy a comparatively small
force with decisive results. Even the British Admiralty acknowledged this fact: ‘We
failed because we were unable to obtain airfields in the area of operations . . . As soon
as it was clear that adequate air support could not be provided British forces should
have withdrawn.’12

The key lesson in the use of para forces at Leros is that occasionally an ambitious,
risky but simple plan can sometimes succeed against all odds. Müller clearly believed
that the risks were worth taking. He was right. The use of his well trained paratroops
gained him the initiative on the first day, from which the British never recovered.

Conclusion

11
It was estimated that the initial drop cost the German para’s 150 killed or wounded.
12
Aegean Operations, p.34

5
German success in the Dodecanese was not due to any overwhelming superiority in
force. Their victory was due more to their ability to concentrate their forces on set
objectives and to choose a time and location of battle as best suited their
circumstances. These factors, combined with shorter supply routes and closer bases,
gave them a clear operational advantage over the more ‘dispersed and vague Allied
effort.’13

The British response to the German attacks was piecemeal, indecisive and inefficient,
the German actions were systematic, vigorous and effective. The Luftwaffe and
Wehrmacht quickly took advantage of the low Allied priority accorded to this theatre
and subsequent operations were a model of efficient and resolute action by a small
compact force against an undetermined enemy.14

Bibliography
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Bryant, Sir A., Triumph in the West, Doubleday Press, London, 1959

Buckley, C., Five Ventures: The Second World War, 1939-45 – A Short Military
History Series, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1977

Chant, C. (ed.), Warfare and the Third Reich: The Rise and Fall of Hitler’s Armed
Forces, Salamander Books, New York, 1996

Holland, J., The Aegean Mission: Allied Operations in the Dodecanese, 1943,
Greenwood Press, New York, 1988

Howard, M., The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War, Greenhill Books,
London, 1993

Ehrman, J., Grand Strategy, Vol. V, August 1943-September 1944, H.M. Stationery
Office, London, 1956

Magenheimer, H., Hitler’s War: Germany’s Key Strategic Decisions 1940-1945,

Cassell & Co., London, 1999

Matloff, M., Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943 1944, Washington, 1959

Malony, C.J.C., The Meditarranean and Middle East, vol.5, History of the Second
World War, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1973

13
War in the Aegean, p.67
14
See Warfare and the Third Reich, pp.404-5

6
Seligman, A., War in the Islands: Undercover Operations in the Aegean 1942-4, Alan
Sutton Pubs., Gloucestershire, UK, 1996

Smith, P.C., & Walker, E., War in the Aegean, William Kimber, London, 1974