CASE STUDY 129

BlackBerry in Red China:

Research in Motion
Navigates Institutional
Barriers in an Emerging
Market
By
Prescott C. Ensign
Nicholas P. Robinson

Research in Motion’s (RIM’s) entry into the Chinese market during a time when many distrac-
tions—principally a patent dispute with NTP—occupied management’s attention was not a fore-
gone conclusion. China remained a difficult market to crack. One holdup was an impasse with re-
gard to RIM’s use of encryption technology and the Chinese authorities’ desire to monitor e-mail
traffic and content. Here the technical and political concerns were entangled. To further complicate
things, the entirety of RIM had until recently been preoccupied with the legal settlement with NTP
in the United States. Issues in this study highlight real-world dilemmas in a thriving firm. The
founders are still in charge, and new markets present themselves regularly. A very real challenge
is divided attentions. The standstill over market entry calls for integrative thinking—bringing to-
gether disparate and contradictory elements for resolution. RIM’s way out will invariably involve
embracing complex relationships in order to find a resolution to the various conflicting institutional
forces. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Correspondence to: Prescott C. Ensign, University of Ottawa, Telfer School of Management, 55 Laurier Avenue East, Ottawa ON, K1N 6N5, Canada,
613.562.5800 x4925 (phone), ensign@telfer.uOttawa.ca.

Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com).

© 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. • DOI: 10.1002/tie.20184
130 CASE STUDY
Introduction
his case study provides a glimpse at Research in Mo-
T tion’s (RIM’s) entry into the Chinese market during
a time when many distractions—principally a patent
dispute with NTP—occupied management’s attention.
Norm Lo had been in charge of the Asia Pacific region
for eight months, though he had been with RIM for five
years. Lo was successful in signing new partners through-
out Asia, but China remained a difficult market to crack.
One holdup was an impasse with regard to RIM’s use
of encryption technology and the Chinese authorities’ de-
sire to monitor e-mail traffic and content. Here the tech-
nical and political concerns were entangled. Even calling
in Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty to pay the Chinese
federal authorities a visit (during a trade mission) pro-
vided no resolution.
To further complicate things, the entirety of RIM had
until recently been preoccupied with the legal settlement
with NTP in the United States. There was much concern
that NTP’s patent infringement claims could sink or sub-
stantially stymie RIM’s economic progress. Even as the
NTP matters were settled, additional distracting infringe-
ment suits arose. Those holding patents thought they
could get rich just by having a lawyer knock on RIM’s door.
The study shadows Norm Lo trying to bring Black-
Berry’s entry into mainland China to fruition. Should he
“play hardball?” Is slow and steady going to do it? Is RIM
getting walked all over in China, or is this what an outside
firm should expect? Wishful thinking and a great product
are not enough. Incentives must be properly aligned with
the local partner China Mobile. Meanwhile, China Mo-
bile moved to introduce products that compete at the low
end—which may be the best point of entry into this mar-
ket. RIM could introduce a stripped-down product, but
this would be uncharted territory for a BlackBerry, and
potential customers may not be satisfied. Even the author-
ities would likely reject the inferior technology, knowing
a more sophisticated and capable device exists. Alterna-
tively, RIM might partner with outsiders. Embracing
other organizations as customers or perhaps aligning with
suppliers (intermediaries) to assist in market entry may
prove beneficial.
Issues in this study highlight real-world dilemmas in a
thriving firm. The founders are still in charge, and new
markets present themselves regularly. A very real chal-
lenge is divided attentions. Norm Lo is focused on China
and future opportunities, while most at RIM have been
concerned with North America, which represents the
bulk of revenues. But North America’s future prospects,
though substantial, are knowable and finite.
Thunderbird International Business Review Vol. 50, No. 2 March/April 2008
The standstill over market entry calls for integrative
thinking1—bringing together disparate and contradic-
tory elements for resolution. RIM’s way out will invariably
involve embracing complex relationships in order to find
a resolution to the various conflicting institutional forces.
Breaking down the problem into simpler components or
individual pieces to work on separately will not prove suc-
cessful in launching the BlackBerry into this market.
The Situation
The Chinese personal digital assistant (PDA) market is
dominated by many niche players—homegrown compa-
nies that have developed a full range of PDAs and appli-
cations. This includes everything from devices that allow
full Internet access to simple day planners and electronic
dictionaries.
Despite the strength of local brands, such as Lenovo
(which had grown to acquire IBM’s PC division), Meijin
Computer, GSL (Group Sense International Limited),
Digital China, Legend, and Hi-Tech Wealth, the most
popular devices in China continued to be ones that either
incorporated imported technology or were imported alto-
gether. Palm’s operating system and Linux-based systems
both found application in Chinese PDAs, while Palm con-
tinued to attempt to market its hardware to Chinese con-
sumers.2 Other firms, such as Research in Motion, found
themselves in a peculiar position as they attempted to
navigate a very competitive PDA market surrounded by
institutional barriers.
Although obstacles were substantial, the Chinese mar-
ket could not be ignored. In February 2006, China had a
base of over 400 million cell phone users (which had
eclipsed landline phone users in late 2003 or early 2004 at
the 250 million mark) and the highest growth rates in new
cell phone sales in the world, making China a destination
that could make or break a company and determine its
long-term success in an industry that continued to mature.
China Mobile Communications Corporation (China
Mobile), RIM’s partner in China, held two-thirds of the
domestic cell phone market, with over 250 million cus-
tomers. In contrast, the entire U.S. wireless market was
204 million subscribers. The latest statistic from the gov-
ernment’s official Xinhua News Agency was that Chinese
mobile handset users “thumbed” 22.8 billion text mes-
sages in March 2006, 66% more than in March 2005.
Meanwhile, the Canadian Embassy in Beijing continued
to intervene on RIM’s behalf in efforts to help RIM pass
technical tests and finally enter this market.
On April 6, 2006, Jim Balsillie, co-chief executive offi-
cer of RIM, announced that BlackBerry’s unveiling in
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 BlackBerry in Red China: Research in Motion Navigates Institutional Barriers in an Emerging Market
China was imminent: “We are on the verge of launching
BlackBerry service with China Mobile and expect to
launch by the end of May.” A week later, Norm Lo, VP of
Asia Pacific for RIM, told reporters that mid-summer was
more likely: “Our talks with China Mobile are going very
well. We are working very tightly with them, and a deal is
expected very soon, probably by the middle of this year.”
Then Lo discovered that China Mobile would introduce a
rival service, “PushMail,” in Shanghai the following
month that would allow China Mobile customers to re-
ceive e-mail on their existing handsets.
Lo learned on April 10, 2006—after an almost two-
year regulatory delay blocking the introduction of RIM’s
BlackBerry to mainland China—that a “RedBerry” had
just been launched by China Unicom. The state-owned en-
terprise China Unicom—the second largest mobile opera-
tor in mainland China—revealed in a press release, “The
RedBerry name extends the vivid name of BlackBerry that
people are already familiar with, and it also combines the
new red symbol of China Unicom.” The RedBerry was
driven by software from the Chinese firm Facio. Tony
Chan, CEO of Facio Software, believed that they could win
the battle with RIM: “The RedBerry is not afraid, neither
did David fear Goliath!” Lo began to feel like he was
David; RIM was the one going to battle against giants.
China was not a universal constant—monolithic in
some respects, but its policies were not delivered uni-
formly. While some institutional forces work in one direc-
tion, others work in opposition. Market-entry challenges
(pushes and pulls) are, to some degree, idiosyncratic and
differ from one firm to another. Assuming that all multina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) face the same obstacles would
be improper. Every company faces unique challenges, so
there may be no simple, singular formula to embrace. One
MNE’s best practice may become another’s worst night-
mare, “and otherwise commonly followed advice can be
wasteful, even harmful, if applied to the wrong situations.”3
Background on Research in Motion
Founded in Waterloo, Ontario, in 1984, RIM had enjoyed
a high level of success in the North American market, see-
ing its position rise from being a distant competitor to
market leader. The firm’s presence outside of the United
States, the world’s largest PDA market, had been notably
weaker but was improving; RIM boasted BlackBerry ser-
vice in over 60 countries through more than 160 carriers.
The U.S. market, however, accounted for over 75% of
RIM’s sales in 2004; RIM had been working hard to diver-
sify geographically, though by the end of 2005, only one
in five subscribers resided outside of North America. RIM
DOI: 10.1002/tie
131
Founded in Waterloo, On-
tario, in 1984, RIM had
enjoyed a high level of suc-
cess in the North American
market, seeing its position
rise from being a distant
competitor to market leader.
continued to forge new partnerships internationally,
specifically in Asia and Europe, to distribute its products.
RIM provided users with handheld units, the Black-
Berry (available in many models), and the accompanying
software needed to use the BlackBerry for numerous
functions, while telecom carriers provided access to
servers and networks needed to use the product. PDA
makers like RIM offered a product that was comparable
to any of the major mobile phone makers. As with mobile
phone makers, RIM’s role was limited to manufacturing
and providing software and updates.
It was no coincidence that mobile phone makers such
as Motorola, Nokia, Samsung, Siemens, and Sony Erics-
son were often viewed as direct competitors to RIM’s
BlackBerry product. However, all of these manufacturers
made hardware that interfaced with BlackBerry software
and applications. The bulk of RIM’s revenues were de-
rived from product sales. Service fees paid by telecommu-
nications companies like Bell (Canada), Rogers
(Canada), AT&T (United States), T-Mobile (United
States and United Kingdom), Vodaphone (United King-
dom), and Orange (France) to RIM as a share of rev-
enues from product users also contributed substantially
and provided a stable long-term revenue stream—“the
service tail.” In fact, 70% of revenue for the first quarter
of 2006 was derived from handhelds, 21% from service,
5% from software licenses, and 4% from other sources.
Research in Motion aimed to increase sales by form-
ing new partnerships and continuously entered Asian
markets through alliances with local wireless carriers. By
Thunderbird International Business Review Vol. 50, No. 2 March/April 2008
132 CASE STUDY
April 2006, RIM had ties with 21 telecom providers in 11
markets, including India, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong
Kong, Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, and the Philippines.
RIM offered services in all major European markets;
in total, RIM had 3.65 million subscribers worldwide by
mid-2005, more than double the 1.66 million users of a
year earlier, and this number reached 5 million at the end
of fiscal year 2006.
Despite signing a memorandum of intent in the fall
of 2004 with Chinese wireless service provider China Mo-
bile—the largest mobile telecommunications firm in
China, and one of six Chinese state-controlled telecom-
munications firms—RIM had yet to launch its BlackBerry
on the mainland. Nevertheless, it was estimated that there
were hundreds of BlackBerry devices in mainland China
that were paying hefty roaming fees for service, all be-
yond the watchful eye and eavesdropping ability of the
Chinese authorities.
For an entrepreneurial organization like Research in
Motion, facing stifling obstacles was a serious setback.
RIM’s history had not prepared it to confront such sizable
barriers and forces as those it faced in the Chinese con-
text. Previously and subsequently, every new market wel-
comed both them and their marvelous product.
Prior Experience in Asian Markets
RIM signed agreements with Hutchison Telecom and
CSL of Hong Kong in 2002, but by October 2004 Hutchi-
son Telecom had landed only 500 corporate customers
for the BlackBerry device. The deals in Hong Kong, how-
RIM’s history had not pre-
pared it to confront such
sizable barriers and forces
as those it faced in the
Chinese context.
Thunderbird International Business Review Vol. 50, No. 2 March/April 2008
ever, gave RIM the opportunity to test its product and
business strategy in a Chinese market. Cultural similari-
ties—not to mention language and political attach-
ment—with the mainland made Hong Kong a perfect ex-
periment. Analysts concluded that RIM’s limited success
in Hong Kong was due to the company’s “pricing struc-
ture” and the fact that demand for product “has been hit
by the high licensing fees for the BlackBerry server soft-
ware in Hong Kong.”4
Competing with technologically inferior, but
cheaper, local PDA products was expected to be the key
to succeeding in Hong Kong and would also be vital to
success in mainland China. This said, BlackBerry had
been welcomed as a godsend by many Chinese firms, in-
cluding Hutchison and China Mobile; the product would
help them offer “higher margin data service,” improve
profitability, and slow the “rapid decline in average rev-
enue per user.”5 The BlackBerry had been seen similarly
in other Asian markets, where anxious telecom compa-
nies partnered with RIM to launch the BlackBerry in
hopes of improving margins and increasing value of ser-
vices provided to customers.
Vivian Yeo of ZDNet Asia reported on May 26, 2005,
that “RIM emerged as the worldwide leading seller of
PDAs in the first quarter of 2005, growing 75.6% over the
same period last year.” Increased volume had occurred
mostly in the United States, but the pace of growth in
overseas markets had passed that of the North American
market. Considering that Asian telecommunication mar-
kets (specifically India and China) accounted for much of
the growth in telecommunications worldwide, partner-
ships with mobile service providers in these countries
were projected to be the most promising prospect for
growth in BlackBerry subscribers.
The BlackBerry Phenomenon
Despite holding less than a quarter of the U.S. PDA mar-
ket, RIM’s BlackBerry had a cult-like following. The prod-
uct’s cutting-edge technology, nifty ergonomic design,
user-friendly keypad, and exceptionally simplistic inter-
face led it to win many awards. Of these features, RIM’s
push technology, used to notify users instantaneously
when e-mail was present, had been the source of the
product’s reputation as “addictive.” For the first time in
the history of communications technology, people could
stay connected—continuously—with real-time, streaming
e-mail, accessible whenever and wherever, provided that a
service provider with coverage existed. Real estate agents,
businesspeople, and public servants all found the device
indispensable, to such an extent that in December 2005
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 BlackBerry in Red China: Research in Motion Navigates Institutional Barriers in an Emerging Market
the U.S. government issued a legal statement indicating
that it might oppose an injunction against RIM in the
event that the company lost its U.S. patent dispute.
The BlackBerry itself was basically the size of a hand-
held calculator or deck of cards; it was a wireless device
with a built-in keyboard that enabled users to send and re-
ceive text messages and e-mail. Its more advanced units,
with a color display, included Internet browsing and
phone capabilities. The purchase of the device and sub-
scription to the service gave customers access to a wide
array of specialized software, which could be downloaded
from RIM’s Web site. Much of the software was designed
by RIM, as was the operating system that made the Black-
Berry run. Unlike competitors such as Palm, RIM’s status
as a relative newcomer to the PDA market had meant that
far fewer applications were available to BlackBerry users.
However, this had not been enough to stop rival Palm
from admitting defeat to RIM. Tom Krazit of IDG News
Service reported on May 6, 2003, that Palm would allow
its licensees to use “Research in Motion’s BlackBerry wire-
less e-mail software in their Palm OS handhelds and
smartphones.” According to RIM, the popularity of the
push technology e-mail system was due to the fact that
there was “no need to find your e-mail or data—it finds
you.”6 This feature, combined with numerous other at-
tributes—such as Bluetooth technology, allowing for easy
data transfer from a computer to the PDA and vice versa
(“syncing”), day planner, word processor, and SMS mes-
saging—meant that many consumers were replacing their
laptops with PDAs.
In addition to these features, communication streams
to and from BlackBerry devices were incredibly secure.
The use of encryption technology originally developed by
the U.S. military further added to the value of an already
indispensable device. Businesses recognized PDAs in gen-
eral, and BlackBerrys in particular, as tools to enhance
productivity and provide a “competitive edge,” as in-
creased connectivity and better communications could
mean the difference between securing a contract or not.
The Red Factor
In early 2006, more than 16 months after signing a letter
of intent with China’s largest mobile telephone com-
pany—state-controlled China Mobile—RIM had yet to see
its product launched. A variety of China-specific problems
seemed to pose barriers to RIM’s entry into the vast mar-
ket. Of these, the most pressing issues revolved around
the technology used by RIM that would make it near im-
possible for the Chinese government to monitor the com-
munication activities of private citizens and businesses
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133
using a BlackBerry. According to one Toronto-based
newspaper:
China is worried that the high-level encryption technology used
in BlackBerrys could make it difficult for security authorities
there to gain access to email messages on China’s Internet
servers, which are all state-controlled . . . without being given
the key to RIM’s security algorithms, the Chinese government
would find it virtually impossible to tap into the highly secure
communications stream between portable BlackBerrys and
desktop email accounts . . . although BlackBerry hardware and
software is Canadian technology, the encryption algorithms
that underlie it were developed years ago by the U.S. military.7
Having China decrypt the algorithms used in the soft-
ware could constitute a security risk for the United
States—RIM’s single largest market. Given these issues,
many observers foresaw that the “U.S. would try to pre-
vent the sale of encryption technology to China.”8 Navi-
gating this predicament would require that either RIM
(with the consent of the U.S. government) or China make
a compromise in order to give China Mobile’s customers
access to the best PDA technology on the market. Either
RIM would have to reveal its secrets (an unlikely option
given China’s reputation for respecting intellectual prop-
erty) or China would have to soften its hold on communi-
cations in the country (even less likely).
In response to improvements in communications tech-
nology and burgeoning Internet and cell phone usage,
laws regarding telecommunications were becoming ever
more stringent. In 2005, China announced that it would re-
quire mobile phone users to register, claiming that the gov-
ernment wanted to stop phone fraud, while citing the need
to monitor communications for the good of the Chinese
people. “The new rule, announced by the Ministry of Infor-
mation Industry, is part of a crackdown on telephone fraud
and illegal text-messaging practices”—practices that typi-
cally involved the discussion of issues that were considered
to be off-limits to Chinese citizens; this was expected to
help authorities curb “improper political commentary.”9
As far as the Internet was concerned, government
monitoring of communications had grown in tandem
with the technology. In addition to this, individual Inter-
net users had to “register with the police” and were “not
allowed to publish, discuss, and spread any state secrets
through the email systems.”10
All traffic to the computer networks outside China must be ef-
fectuated through the gateway maintained by China Telecom
and other approved public networks . . . no person or units may
establish or use other gateways for Internet traffic without prior
approval from government.11
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134 CASE STUDY
Altogether, these rules ensured that the government
retained control over information transmitted over Inter-
net networks, though actual monitoring of all traffic
would be a near impossibility. Further complicating the
issue for a company like RIM offering the BlackBerry de-
vice in China were laws regarding encryption technology
in China.
On October 7, 1999, the State Council adopted Administra-
tion of Commercial Encryption Regulations governing the sale,
distribution, use and production of encryption products in
China, including a ban on the sale of all foreign products.12
The use of RIM’s technology in China was subject to
government approval, as encryption was a crucial part of
the BlackBerry platform. That approval had yet to be re-
ceived, even after the intervention of several high-profile
political players, including Ontario Premier Dalton
McGuinty, who showed off the gadget to a Chinese cabi-
net minister on a recent trade mission. Despite efforts, lit-
tle had changed. The product had yet to be formally
launched in China. Nevertheless, hundreds of people—
paying costly roaming charges—did use BlackBerrys in
China, unbeknownst to the Chinese government.
It was thought that those users from Hong Kong, Sin-
gapore, the United States, and elsewhere living in China
brought the product into the country and refused to give
it up. This led some to argue that the Chinese govern-
ment could do little to stop the use of new communica-
tions technologies in the country, as monitoring the ever-
increasing volume of information, and cracking the
increasingly complex encryption algorithms, was not fea-
sible. In fact, the world-renowned Nobel economist Mil-
ton Friedman argued that the threat posed by rapidly ad-
vancing technology and a rapidly growing middle class
would ultimately lead to “future Tiananmen Squares.”13
Improvements in technology and the general welfare of
Chinese citizens may hasten the march toward democra-
tization, just as maintaining an authoritarian regime
could constitute an economic disadvantage.
Telecommunications Industry in China
The Chinese telecommunications industry was character-
ized by high government involvement and extraordinarily
tight controls on foreign investment and private enter-
prise. This sector—which had been identified by the
Communist People’s Party government as being key to
China’s economic development—was controlled by a
plethora of provincial and federal organizations, with the
State Council ultimately having power to override other
decisions. Adding to this control was that all the major
Thunderbird International Business Review Vol. 50, No. 2 March/April 2008
telecommunication companies were, at a minimum,
partly government-owned.
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization
(WTO) was forcing the country to give increased access
to foreign investors who were anxious to profit from
China’s booming telecom market. More specifically, in
the mobile market, the number of subscribers “continues
to increase at the phenomenal rate of 5 million per
month,” giving China the “mantle of the world’s largest
mobile phone market.”14 Another reason for China to
keep investment in its telecom sector restricted was that
telecom had been “an extremely profitable” industry and
a substantial source of government revenue.15
Outsiders like Nortel Networks and Lucent Technolo-
gies saw lack of transparency as a major barrier to invest-
ing in China. “Foreign companies noted the difficulty in
finding and obtaining copies of regulations and other
measures undertaken by various ministries,”16 and the
issue had forced China to change its practices and estab-
lish a set of national gazettes to inform the business com-
munity of Chinese laws and regulations.
In March 2002, preparing for China’s accession to
the WTO, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation (MOFTEC) issued an order identifying
mobile phones and mobile communications systems as
being sectors in which foreign investment would be en-
couraged. Although the only outright control on the
importation of PDAs and other mobile telecommunica-
tions devices was a stipulation that imports be subject to
tendering, there were numerous other regulatory, legal,
and political barriers that made it possible for the Chi-
nese government to halt imports without any sort of
government decree. Furthermore, the fact that the in-
dustry had been identified as being of national impor-
tance to develop could make RIM’s entry into China
more difficult than initially assumed. RIM’s manufac-
turing and design facilities were almost exclusively lo-
cated in North America, and the firm would simply be
creating new competition for domestic manufacturers
of similar products.
Institutional Environment
Entering the Chinese market involves overcoming chal-
lenges that are unique to economies that have made, or
are in the process of making, a transition from a con-
trolled economy to a freer, market-oriented economy. In
China, an immature financial system, weak intellectual
property protection, and tight labor controls character-
ized an economy shedding the vestiges of socialism.
Though many of these issues might not be of direct con-
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 BlackBerry in Red China: Research in Motion Navigates Institutional Barriers in an Emerging Market
cern to RIM, all would likely have impact on the firm’s ex-
perience in China.
Repatriating Profits
China’s financial system was tightly controlled by the Chi-
nese government and contained minimal private involve-
ment. The most pressing concern that Chinese banking
raised for RIM—or any firm involved with China—was get-
ting paid. The process of repatriating RMB to the home cur-
rency typically involved receiving approval from the Foreign
Exchange Adjustment Centre, which registered the firm’s
foreign exchange and completed the transaction.
Intellectual Property
China’s reputation as a safe haven for companies involved
in piracy and other violations of intellectual property was
grounded in cultural attitudes toward ownership. After
years of socialism, the importance of private property to
the Chinese people had been eroded and was reflected in
weak enforcement of intellectual property laws. Officially,
however, China was a party to the Paris Convention and
thus recognized patent protection.
Despite this assurance, other Canadian companies had
had difficult experiences protecting their intellectual prop-
erty in China. For instance, Canadian bomb-suit and riot-
gear maker Med-Eng Systems was upset to discover that—
notwithstanding commitments to the contrary—suits
provided to a Chinese government agency had been
cloned in near perfect detail and were then marketed
throughout the world by a Chinese company.17 Med-Eng’s
response was to take legal action against buyers—a maneu-
ver that was both successful and costly. The threat for RIM
was incredibly significant, as the BlackBerry was valuable
precisely because of the intellectual property involved. Any
violation of the company’s proprietary intellectual prop-
erty, or patents involving key elements of its technologies
(hardware or software), could run the firm out of business.
Cultural Barriers
Business in China was not as impersonal as it was in North
America, where RIM had seen the majority of its success.
As the former CEO of Ericsson, Kurt Hellstrom, put it,
“personal relationships based on mutual understanding
are the key to success” in the Chinese business environ-
ment.18 From an outsider’s perspective, Chinese attitudes
toward relationships almost bordered on corruption, as
favoritism and camaraderie might take precedence over
such factors as price and quality. In fact, some Chinese
scholars theorized that this emphasis on relationships
could be partly due to old mind-sets, which were gradu-
ally changing in China.
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135
China’s reputation as a safe
haven for companies in-
volved in piracy and other
violations of intellectual
property was grounded in
cultural attitudes toward
ownership.
Transition from a centrally planned economy to the socialist
market economy in China is expressed by many contemporary
Chinese legal philosophers as the transition from the rule of
man (renzhi) to the rule of law (fazhi) or from supremacy of
power to supremacy of law.19
Chinese attitudes toward relationships were reflective
of the pre–laissez faire mindset, which some expected
would gradually dissipate as Chinese businesspeople were
held accountable to their shareholders, partners, and in-
ternational institutions (like the WTO). The emphasis on
guanxi (a Chinese word for social connections) meant
that businesses in China must cultivate meaningful rela-
tionships, which could be the “difference between getting
the contract or not.”20 For this reason, many Canadian
businesses in China chose to hire Chinese nationals “with
contacts in China to help promote their business.”21 RIM
was hoping that Norm Lo, VP for the Asia Pacific Region,
would be able to make such inroads.
Labor
In China, nine out of ten foreign enterprises had unions.
The strength of unions in China and meeting the strin-
gent requirements set by the government and its agen-
cies could be daunting obstacles.22 Fortunately, China
was continuing to liberalize rules with regard to labor,
and the rules were really only relevant for labor-intensive
industries such as manufacturing. Service industries,
such as RIM’s BlackBerry, would find the rules to be less
of a barrier.
Thunderbird International Business Review Vol. 50, No. 2 March/April 2008
136 CASE STUDY
Man on a Mission
Norm Lo was appointed VP for Asia Pacific in July 2005
after five years with Research in Motion. His mandate was
to expand RIM’s regional presence and “drive BlackBerry
mindshare and market penetration across the Asia-
Pacific.”23 RIM had offices in Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Australia with a staff of about 50 employees. His initial
plan included doubling the number of carriers RIM
worked with in Asia. This represented a substantial in-
crease from the 16 alliances RIM had in eight countries,
but in the eight months since taking charge, RIM moved
closer to this goal—the April 2006 tally was 21 partner-
ships in 11 countries. According to Lo, RIM was just
“scratching the surface. . . . Everything in Asia-Pacific is
wide open. We’re talking to basically everybody. There
isn’t one country that we are not currently involved in a
business discussion.”24
Lo’s career spanned 20 years in high-tech research,
product development, management, sales, and market-
ing. Prior to his present task, Lo had been responsible for
two business units focused on the North American mar-
ket. Before joining RIM in 2000, he worked at Nortel Net-
works. He had a B.Sc. in engineering physics from the
University of British Columbia, M.Eng. and PhD degrees
in electrical engineering from Carleton University, and
an MBA from the University of Ottawa.
Like everyone at RIM, Lo had followed daily ac-
counts of the saga between RIM and NTP. The tech ana-
lysts Gartner placed RIM as the market leader but at the
same time recommended clients not go with BlackBerry
The tech analysts Gartner
placed RIM as the market
leader but at the same time
recommended clients not go
with BlackBerry devices until
legal issues were resolved.
Thunderbird International Business Review Vol. 50, No. 2 March/April 2008
devices until legal issues were resolved. Gartner’s Decem-
ber 5, 2005, news release suggested BlackBerry users in
the United States might lose service. While current U.S.
customers and potential ones were being made nervous,
headquarters in Waterloo, Ontario, was scrambling. Ex-
ecutive attention had been focused almost exclusively on
this issue. Market development and the stalemate in
China were well off the radar for most everyone back in
Canada.
U.S. Patent Dispute
Back in the North American market, RIM continued to
wage a legal war against NTP, an obscure American
patent holding company that had managed to success-
fully convince two courts that RIM’s product infringed on
eight patents held from as early as 1991. The patents con-
cerned a key element of BlackBerry’s “push” e-mail tech-
nology—a major selling point of the device. NTP had
originally been awarded damages of U.S. $23.1 million
for the infringement, but upon appeal by RIM, that num-
ber climbed to over U.S. $53 million (as well as 8.55% of
future U.S. BlackBerry sales).
In March 2005, NTP and RIM entered discussions
to settle the dispute, which resulted in RIM agreeing to
pay NTP U.S. $450 million.25 However, NTP failed to
ever finalize the agreement, supposedly in the hope
that the U.S. Patent Office would find that all eight
patents were infringed by RIM, creating the possibility
of a far larger award for damages. In response to this,
RIM attempted to have a court enforce the discussed
settlement but failed to prove the existence of an agree-
ment between the parties. Almost immediately, RIM
stockholders reacted by dumping shares at record vol-
umes, in fear that an injunction could be the next
threat against RIM, making it near impossible for RIM
to sell its product.
RIM countered this scenario by asserting that it had
developed an alternate technology that could be substi-
tuted for the infringing portion of the patent, in case an
injunction were to be imposed. But this ethereal technol-
ogy was never revealed, and most analysts questioned its
existence. Meanwhile, the U.S. government filed a legal
brief in a U.S. court indicating that it might have an inter-
est in seeing that BlackBerry service not be interrupted by
an injunction, as “hundreds of thousands” of U.S. govern-
ment employees counted on BlackBerry technology to
get their jobs done each day.26 The technology was cred-
ited with giving government workers “a lot of infrastruc-
ture,” making it the “lifeblood” of government communi-
cation.27 Despite directives from Gartner and others
DOI: 10.1002/tie
 BlackBerry in Red China: Research in Motion Navigates Institutional Barriers in an Emerging Market
against new BlackBerry purchases, it seemed that RIM
had support in powerful places.
A China Entry and the Balance of
Probabilities
RIM was facing an increasingly complex web of issues.
Over the past few years, RIM had seen its PDA become
the market leader in terms of sales and reputation for
quality. The firm had successfully built a multibillion-dol-
lar company out of a start-up, and had managed, against
the odds, to conquer a U.S. market filled with competi-
tion from companies such as Nokia, Samsung, and Palm.
Despite past triumphs, the future of RIM was at stake. The
NTP threat had subsided with a U.S. $612 million payout
to prevent the devastation of BlackBerry’s existence in the
U.S. market, but events had taken their toll. The threat to
the BlackBerry network caused some customers to delay
purchases and others to defect. More importantly, how-
ever, RIM understood that its overall corporate perfor-
mance would be dependent on its successes overseas.
China had emerged as the largest telecom market in
the world. An incredible opportunity seemed to lie ahead
for any firm that could make sense of the government’s
complicated regulatory scheme and win favor with local
decision makers and organizations, which would be essen-
tial in order to put BlackBerrys in the hands of people in
mainland China.
RIM needed to tout its potential to contribute to the
economic and technological advancement of the country,
perhaps by generating support from local and regional
government—not just central authorities.
Had RIM invested too heavily in China or not com-
mitted nearly enough resources? It was really hard to de-
termine, but 18 months after saying that the BlackBerry
entry into China was imminent, nothing happened. How
often can a CEO cry wolf? Management attention was
clearly diverted to other matters through much of this
time period (i.e., the NTP patent dispute). More recently,
in March 2007, co-CEO Jim Balsillie resigned his post as
chairman over stock option accounting errors. If a CEO
promises something is imminent and it transpires—he or
she receives accolades for foresight and daring; Balsillie
would be congratulated for his strategic stretch.28 But if
predictions fail to materialize, proclamations are dis-
missed as wishful thinking and empty promises.
Damned if you do, damned if you don’t. RIM could
have spent (wasted) more time and money with no re-
turns (attention that could be focused elsewhere on other
markets). But because RIM did not plunge forward, they
are subject to the criticism that they did not try nearly
DOI: 10.1002/tie
137
hard enough—they pulled back too soon, falling short of
the goal. What action is more conservative? Proceeding
with caution and exercising diligence, perhaps even
doing nothing fits with our conventional view of conser-
vative behavior. But under many circumstances, moving
ahead with complete commitment—exhibiting daring,
even abandonment—is less risky.
Was it caution, procrastination, or fear holding RIM
back? The challenges in China remain enormous, and
there are substantial risks to either action or inaction.
There are no guarantees that market opportunities will
be realized. Executives inside MNEs think that they can
tackle China and make it work. These brazen managers
believe that they cannot afford to bypass this market.
Forging quality links is pivotal. But how does one
know if those alliances and partnerships are strong unless
you test them? Staying with China Mobile may be wise—
most outsiders would point out that RIM already has the
best partner—but RIM could pursue other options. Un-
less waiting it out is the tactic arrived at, offending China
Mobile is likely: RIM could light a fire under China Mo-
bile or pursue other (competing) partners. It is clear that
time is not on RIM’s side; other handheld devices are pro-
ceeding. RIM may soon have to get to pushing and shov-
ing to see where it stands with China Mobile and other
carriers.
Conclusions and Lessons Drawn
Nokia, Motorola, and others are in China not as im-
porters, but as insiders. In December 2006, Jim Balsillie,
co-chief executive of RIM, was hoping to win approval
from the Ministry of Information Industry to introduce
the BlackBerry into China in early 2007. Balsillie publicly
touted the strength of RIM’s relationship with China Mo-
bile and repeated RIM’s resolution to stay the course, ac-
knowledging that the Asia Pacific market would overtake
the United States and Europe in the near future. RIM
continued to strengthen its position in other markets,
India in particular. The saga continued.
Even with events still unfolding, there are already sev-
eral takeaways from what has transpired. First, top man-
agement appears not all to be on the same page. Co-CEO
Balsillie in April 2006 suggested BlackBerry’s launch in
China would occur in May 2006, and VP of Asia Lo coun-
tered days later that it would be months away. At the end
of 2006, Balsillie had to eat his words, promising a prod-
uct launch in January 2007.
China insiders suggest that it might be prudent for
RIM to pursue other partnerships in China. According to
Xiamen University Professor Guo Lin, there is no reason
Thunderbird International Business Review Vol. 50, No. 2 March/April 2008
138 CASE STUDY
why one cannot simultaneously have multiple relation-
ships in China. The Western notion of exclusivity may be
misguided. This is not to say that partners or potential
partners are to be played against one another. It is not
merely a matter of keeping options open—RIM could go
ahead with several service providers.
Another avenue worth exploring would be to turn
the gatekeepers into customers. The Chinese govern-
ment, of which there are many levels, represents a sub-
stantial target market.29 While an increasingly prosperous
business class could afford a monthly subscription to the
BlackBerry productivity tool, it is really not individuals
that pay the service fees, it is organizations—either for-
profits or those in the public sector. If Chinese authorities
can be brought in as subscribers, perhaps this quandary
can be resolved.
Alternatively, corporations (foreign and domestic)
might be enlisted to lobby for BlackBerry’s acceptance.
RIM is proceeding with the conviction that it is not a mat-
ter of if, but when approval will occur. This premise needs
to be reviewed; delay in entry costs BlackBerry market po-
sition—burying RIM in a hole it is difficult to get out of.
Multinational enterprises with operations in China are
the ideal customers and should be attended to immedi-
ately. These firms are already familiar with and apprecia-
tive of BlackBerry capabilities.
Network effects30—when a product or service gains
value as the number of users increases—are worth bring-
ing up. Obviously, there are still many people in China
that are separated by the digital divide—that is, left in the
dark without an e-mail address or access to the Internet.
While RIM is presently compatible with most systems,
there is likely to be some trouble in China. The variety in
platforms for these devices is greater in mainland China
with the local proliferation of operating systems. Stan-
dardization is not nearly as pronounced as elsewhere. If
RIM can grab market share, it can rest in a much more
comfortable position. But gaining market share in China
can be expected to be costly. Price and a myriad of other
factors confound any familiar approach RIM might em-
ploy. RIM is very much in uncharted waters. In contrast,
India plays by rules similar to those that RIM is experi-
enced with.
Currently, every e-mail on the planet emanating from
or destined to a BlackBerry is routed through Waterloo,
Ontario. It is not clear if this model is acceptable to
China. It is also not clear what concessions would satisfy
the Chinese authorities. While the BlackBerry’s coverage
is extensive (RIM has service in Iceland and Turkey),
small markets pose less of a risk. China is a serious en-
deavor. There may not be a second chance to get it right
Thunderbird International Business Review Vol. 50, No. 2 March/April 2008
(is RIM’s window of opportunity still open, or is it clos-
ing?). It may also be that a final attempt is all that can be
mustered. The situation seems to have progressed to the
point where a “slow and steady” approach will not suc-
ceed. There must be considerable commitment to win
over the market.
Although the legal ramifications of patent disputes
were being resolved, there would always be events that
compete for resources and management attention.31
Trying to remain productive surrounded by such uncer-
tainty is immensely distracting. Dealing with peers and
superiors who are consumed by other matters is de
rigueur for a high-growth, multinational technology en-
terprise.
Epilogue
Quick, creative, and clever, or persistent and patient? It is
not entirely clear which tactics are best. By July 2007,
there was evidence that after eight years of effort32 RIM
had finally cracked the world’s biggest cell phone mar-
ket.33 The announcement by Balsillie that Research in
Motion expected to start selling devices by the end of Au-
gust 2007 for about U.S. $700 also indicated that they
were “considering a plan to manufacture the devices in
China.” To obtain approval from the Chinese Ministry to
Information Industry, it was reported that “under the deal
BlackBerry has to strengthen their relationship with
China Mobile.”34 But in terms of concessions, “it is not
clear what censorship arrangements, if any, BlackBerry
made with the Chinese government.”35
There is some evidence that RIM’s resolution in reg-
ulatory gridlock may have been tied to:
the government’s snail’s-pace progress toward licensing 3G net-
works that have long been promised before the Beijing Olympic
Games, in August 2008. In February 2006 the government re-
leased a timeline for the deployment of the networks that called
for trials to be complete by a year ago. Earlier this year, the
PRC’s state-controlled media reported that those trials will ex-
tend into the fourth quarter of this year.36
It was not clear whether a BlackBerry launch was drag-
ging the 3G network launch forward or vice versa, but
this was an interesting series of events. According to
Deutsche Bank AG, a 3G rollout could mean network in-
vestments of up to U.S. $75 billion over five years. How-
ever, a major “sticking point” was China’s reliance on a
homegrown version of 3G developed by the Chinese
Academy of Telecommunications Technology that the
Ministry of Information Industry set as the national stan-
dard in January 2006.37
DOI: 10.1002/tie
 BlackBerry in Red China: Research in Motion Navigates Institutional Barriers in an Emerging Market 139

Prescott C. Ensign, PhD, is an assistant professor in the Telfer School of Management at the University of Ot-
tawa, Ontario, Canada. He is a Fulbright Scholar and has been recognized for excellence in teaching and re-
search. Ensign has written articles on the strategy and structure of multinational enterprises, and his current work
investigates innovative efforts of entrepreneurs in high-growth, technology-based firms. This is his second article
to appear in Thunderbird International Business Review.

Nicholas P. Robinson is a member of the Canadian Bar Association and a graduate of the Faculty of Law at
McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada. He has been active in numerous areas of business and academia.
Robinson has worked in the recording industry, run an IT-based business, conducted tax policy research for gov-
ernment, and worked in the insurance industry. He has written a number of case studies and research papers on
international management, marketing, public policy, and law.

17. L’abbe, R. (2005, August). CEO of Med-Eng, on-site interview Ot-

NOTES
1. Martin, R. (2007). The opposable mind: How successful leaders win through
integrative thinking. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
2. Levander, M. (2002, August 6). Handheld combat: As China’s PDA
makers battle for market share, cautious global giants play a waiting
game. Time Magazine (Asia).
3. Hansen, M. T., & Birkinshaw, J. (2007, June). The innovation value
chain. Harvard Business Review, pp. 121–130.
4. Telco leader signs deal for BlackBerry. (2004, October 5). The Stan-
dard.
5. Ibid.
6. http://www.discoverblackberry.com.
7. Avery, S., & York, G. (2005, November 8). RIM runs into China secu-
rity syndrome. Globe and Mail.
8. Ibid.
9. Associated Press. (2005, December 2). China wants mobile phone
users to register.
10. Qingjiang, K. (2002). China and the World Trade Organization: A legal
perspective. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. The Charlie Rose Show. PBS. December 26, 2005. Washington Post re-
porter Edward Cody observed: “By the hundreds of thousands, the ur-
gent text messages ricocheted around cellphones in Xiamen, warning of
a catastrophe that would spoil the city’s beautiful seaside environment .
. . passionate opposition to the chemical plant generated an explosion
of public anger that forced a halt in construction . . . It was a dramatic
illustration of the potential of technology—particularly cellphones and
the Internet—to challenge the rigorous censorship and political con-
trols through which the party maintains its monopoly on power over
China’s 1.4 billion people . . . Wen said he and his friends have since
concluded that if protestors had been armed with cellphones and com-
puters in 1989, there would have been a different outcome to the noto-
rious Tiananmen Square protest.” Seattle Times, July 4, 2007.
14. Tao, J., & O’Brien, D. (2003). Non-tariff trade barriers in China. Hong
Kong: Sweet & Maxwell.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
tawa, Ontario.
18. Krott, M., & Williamsson, K. (2003). China business ABC: The China
market survival kit. Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press.
19. Wang, K. H. (2000). Chinese commercial law. Oxford, UK: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
20. See note 18.
21. Ibid.
22. Luo, Y. (2002). Multinational enterprises in emerging markets. Copen-
hagen: Copenhagen Business School Press.
23. Yeo, V. (2005, July 12). New Asia-Pacific head drives RIM’s expan-
sion. ZDNet Asia.
24. Ibid.
25. Restivo, K. (2005, December 8). NTP: The firm that may run RIM off
the court. Financial Post.
26. Caterinicchia, D. (2005, December 1). Delay denied in BlackBerry
suit. Knight Ridder Tribune Business News.
27. Larose, G. (2005, June 24). Study shows BlackBerry PDA has seized
control of PDA market. Long Island Business News.
28. Hamel, G., & Prahalad, C. K. (1993, March). Strategy as stretch and
leverage. Harvard Business Review.
29. Remarks made by Guanghua School of Management Professor
Changhui Zhou at the 2006 Academy of International Business Confer-
ence: Beijing, China.
30. See Liebowitz, S. J., & Margolis, S. E. (1994). Network externalities:
An uncommon tragedy. Journal of Economic Perspectives, and Arthur, W. B.
(1996). Increasing returns and path dependence in the economy. Har-
vard Business Review.
31. Bouquet, C. (2005). Building global mindsets: An attention-based perspec-
tive. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
32. RIM registered the BlackBerry trademark in China in 1999.
33. York, G. (2007, July 4). RIM cracks China market for BlackBerry.
Globe and Mail.
34. Farrell, N. (2007, July 9). BlackBerry does China. The Inquirer.
35. Ibid.
36. Martin, R. (2007, July 6). RIM’s China move could catalyze mainland
3G rollout. EE Times.
37. Ibid.

DOI: 10.1002/tie Thunderbird International Business Review Vol. 50, No. 2 March/April 2008
140
Case Comment:
RIM in China
By
Luc Fournier
hen I first saw the “BlackBerry in Red China: Re-
W search in Motion Navigates Institutional Barriers
in an Emerging Market” case, my first reaction
was: “Another business case about China. . . .” I have seen
so many of these over the last years (including while
doing my MBA) that I was curious if I would see some-
thing new. To my surprise, I truly enjoyed reading it and
would consider it as one of the best I have seen.
So what is my history with China and why do I have an
opinion? Since 1986, I have spent over ten years in China
traveling, studying, researching, and working in both the
private and public sectors. Working at the Canadian Em-
bassy in Beijing on all incoming ministerial and commer-
cial delegations provided me with some valuable insight
into the issues faced by foreign organizations and, most
importantly, the reality when it comes to doing business
in China. I have also spent most of the last seven years
providing seminars and consulting services to North
American companies dealing with China.
In my opinion, when dealing with/in China, there
are two separate issues that need to be considered:
1. Is the organization ready to face this challenge?
2. How should my entry strategy be implemented in the
Chinese context?
This case presents these two issues very effectively:
Was the timing right for RIM to enter into this venture,
considering their current dispute with NTP? And was the
entry strategy in line with the Chinese business/commer-
cial/political reality?
Correspondence to: Luc Fournier, National Bank of Canada, Manager, International Trade, Ontario & Western Canada, 350 Burnhamthorpe Rd. West, Ste.
216, Mississauga, ON L5B 3J1, Canada, 905.276.8789 (phone), 905.276.0544 (fax), luc.fournier@bnc.ca.
Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com).
© 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. • DOI: 10.1002/tie.20184
COMMENTARY
One of my main messages is: If you believe that be-
cause China is now a member of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) this means they are now doing business the
“Western/developed” way, you are mistaken. Chinese en-
trepreneurs have been doing business for over 6,000 years
and are fully aware that, in 2008, you cannot afford to
avoid them. In other words, whether you are buying or
selling goods and/or services anywhere in the world, you
will, at one point, have to deal with China.
The saga of RIM in China raises a list of issues com-
mon to most stories of foreign enterprises trying to pene-
trate the fast-growing Chinese market. I have highlighted
some of the main ones, presented in order of their ap-
pearance in the case.
As mentioned earlier, the complexity of entering the
Chinese market (even more importantly for the IT indus-
try) requires full alignment with the internal overall busi-
ness strategy. The fact that RIM initiated its approach to
China while senior management was obviously preoccu-
pied with a very serious dispute with NTP increased its
risk of finding roadblocks. At the time, PDAs in China
were still a fairly new product, and its “capacity” was
clearly making the Chinese government cautious. There-
fore, a clear involvement from all senior levels of RIM was
needed.
Was Norm Lo the best candidate to drive RIM’s ex-
pansion into the Chinese market? Most probably. But my
experience in dealing with China has forced me to regu-
larly reevaluate the justifications behind the nomination
of the key person dealing with Chinese authorities, espe-
 BlackBerry in Red China: Research in Motion Navigates Institutional Barriers in an Emerging Market
cially when it comes to market entry with or without a
Chinese partner. I am absolutely convinced Lo did every-
thing he could to successfully develop a wise strategy, but
I am questioning whether he could have received
stronger support from higher RIM executives, or also
from a Chinese national linked to decision makers in
China (with the IT sector preferably). Connections and
relationships in China are key. Political “influence” from
country leaders is much less a decisive factor in today’s
reality versus 10–15 years ago. However, connections to
Chinese government key players are essential for a
smoother ride.
A very interesting question is raised at the very be-
ginning of the case: “Is slow and steady going to do it?” My
quick answer to this: yes and you have no choice. I have
seen too often foreign organizations hoping to com-
plete deals the “North American way” and, unfortu-
nately, on very few occasions have I seen it being a suc-
cessful approach. Once again, the Chinese have been
doing business for thousands of years and have mastered
a process that has proven effective in their history: pa-
tience over speed, relations over information, holistic
over segmented, and, most importantly, hierarchical
over egalitarian. I do not see why they would change this
proven method.
It may sound obvious, but communication and media
relations are totally different in China than in North
America. Foreign firms often forget this in the Empire of
the Middle, and the resulting damage can be extreme. It
is vital that a knowledgeable “intermediary” be systemati-
cally involved in all communications with your Chinese
partner. This intermediary needs to fully understand the
cultural and linguistic reality of the partner. When deal-
ing with China, translation goes beyond words, and inter-
pretation goes beyond concepts. To make any public an-
nouncement without prior approval from your Chinese
associates can be dangerous and will most likely create
problems. Ensure that the flow of information is well un-
derstood by both parties and that there are no areas of
ambiguity. The Chinese language is based on semantics,
not phonetics. Therefore, it is essential that concepts are
expressed clearly to avoid painful misunderstandings
later. It is also important to be aware that there are many
different dialects in China, so choosing the right inter-
preter is key.
The “RedBerry” story is typical in China and high-
lights the following reality: Despite being a member of
the WTO, in China, the games are different and so are
DOI: 10.1002/tie
141
the rules. The authors refer refers to this reality through-
out the case, so I can only reinforce it. Another important
point here is that success in Hong Kong does not translate
to instant success in China. Actually, the history between
the two administrative entities is filled with disagreements
and cultural issues. It would be wrong to believe they are
the same, especially in the context of doing business.
Another interesting issue about this case was the fact
RIM relied on the signing of a Letter of Intent (LOI)
when considering the partnership with China Mobile to
be official. This is a frequent misunderstanding by for-
eign companies. Signing an LOI or Memorandum of Un-
derstanding (MOU) is not the end of the partnership
agreement process—in China, it is only the beginning.
MOUs and LOIs define the “philosophical relationship”
between two partners, and the details must continue to be
negotiated.
Clearly, the key issue for RIM’s successful entry to
China is linked to its encryption technology, and the Chi-
nese authority’s desire to monitor e-mail traffic and con-
tent. If there was an easy answer to this issue, RIM would
already be fully present in China, and this case would
have never been written. So what is the best way to ap-
proach this sensitive problem and ensure cultural adapta-
tion, business sense, and strategic alignment? In my expe-
rience, when dealing with China, I have realized that
answering a very simple question is imperative before
making any business decisions: What is in this deal for my
Chinese partner? In other words, what are their motiva-
tions and business objectives for them to enter into this
partnership?
If you think they need you, think again. The Chinese
have a proven record of learning and adapting efficiently
in local and international markets. If China Mobile
agreed to partner with RIM (even with just an LOI), it was
essential to fully understand why. This in itself may pro-
vide clues as to why it is taking so long for the Chinese au-
thorities to get back to RIM to explain the delay. Most im-
portantly, understanding the real motivations for China
Mobile would therefore help to establish the preferred
way to approach negotiations with them.
To conclude, I would agree with all the themes pre-
sented in the “Conclusions and Lessons Drawn” section.
My final comment would be: Never underestimate the im-
portance of “knowing” them. Being aware of the Chinese
culture in all its components (including language, his-
tory, geography, etc.) can only help you make wiser deci-
sions. See beyond the business deal!
Thunderbird International Business Review Vol. 50, No. 2 March/April 2008
142 COMMENTARY

Luc Fournier received a B.Sc. (major in Chinese, minor in geography) from the University of Montreal; a Chi-
nese Language Certificate from the University of Nankai in Tianjin, China; a master’s degree in medical geogra-
phy of the Tibetans from the University of Montreal; and an MBA from the University of Ottawa. Fournier is fluent
in French, English, and Mandarin. His main focus is China, where he has studied, conducted research, and
worked in both the public and private sectors for more than a decade. Fournier has worked for the Canadian fed-
eral government and set up the Visits and Protocol Unit with the international branch, completed numerous legal
and contract negotiations, coordinated refugee issues, and managed grants and contributions. He now works for
the National Bank of Canada as manager of international trade for Ontario and Western Canada. He is also in-
volved in the overall Asian strategy of the National Bank.

Thunderbird International Business Review Vol. 50, No. 2 March/April 2008 DOI: 10.1002/tie