International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 189 (2021) 104281

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International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping

journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ijpvp

Quantitative risk-based inspection approach for high-energy piping using a

probability distribution function and modification factor
Jung Soo Song a, Vanno Lok a, Kee Bong Yoon a, *, Young Wha Ma b, Byeong Ook Kong b
a
Department of Mechanical Engineering, Chung-Ang University, 84, Heukseok-ro, Dongjak-gu, Seoul, 06974, South Korea
b
R&D Institute, Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction Co., 22, Doosan Volvo-ro, Seongsan-gu, Changwon-si, Gyeongsangnam-do, 51711, South Korea

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Risk-based inspection (RBI) offers the most cost-effective operation and maintenance strategy for minimizing
Risk-based inspection overall risks and making financial and safety improvements within a power plant. Risk assessment may also
Weibull distribution benefit decision-making with regards to plant design and equipment manufacturing processes. The purpose of
Mean time to failure
this study is to propose a quantitative RBI methodology that can be applied to a high-energy piping system
Modification factor
Risk target
operating at elevated temperatures and high pressures in power plants. Three major steps involved are: (i) using
High-energy piping generic mean time to failure (MTTF), specified as the expected lifetime of the equipment obtained from a
theoretical equation; (ii) adding a modification factor that identifies the specific conditions that can influence the
failure rate; and (iii) incorporating individual inspection locations as a factor in risk evaluation.
Probability-of-failure (POF) assessment was conducted using a Weibull distribution with MTTF and the
modification factor. In addition, consequence-of-failure (COF) assessment was conducted based on financial
consequences in terms of downtime costs per day and the length of downtime due to failure. The main steam
piping system in a thermal power plant was selected as the case study unit. The actual inspection locations where
damage to components could frequently occur were defined as risk evaluation targets for the RBI. The generic
MTTF for the main steam piping system was evaluated using the Larson-Miller parameter (LMP) equation for
creep rupture time. Piping system stress analysis was conducted to obtain the stress applied to the LMP. An
equation for the modification factor applied to the main steam piping system was also proposed based on five
subfactors.

1. Introduction Inspection - Document of Guidelines,” which explains how RBI can

Risk-based inspection (RBI) in industrial plants requires an engi­
neering strategy for risk assessment and optimal inspection processes
that focus on the potential loss of integrity of pressurized equipment
such as pressure vessels, heat exchangers, and piping due to various
forms of damage, thus improving safety and equipment integrity [1].
RBI addresses risks that can be controlled through appropriate inspec­
tion and maintenance routines and has been accepted as an effective
method for inspection programs that increases plant availability and
reduces unplanned shutdowns. In order to implement RBI successfully,
inspection strategies (i.e., what, how, when, and where to inspect) that
most efficiently match forecasted or observed damage mechanisms need
to be designed [2].
Since 1991, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
has published a variety of technical documents, including “Risk-Based
optimize the inspection and replacement strategies for equipment in
fossil-fuel-fired power plants [3,4]. The American Petroleum Institute
(API) has also published a number of standards, such as “Recommended
Practice (RP) 580 (Risk-Based Inspection)” and “Recommended Practice
(RP) 581 (Risk-Based Inspection Technology),” which have been appli­
cable to refineries, petrochemical plants, chemical process facilities, and
gas production facilities since 2000 [5,6]. For application engineers, the
recommended practices of API serve as major practical standards in
risk-based inspection. In Europe, the Risk Based Inspection Framework,
a standardization project for the development of a methodology that can
be applied to various industries and to different types of equipment, such
as static, rotating, safety, and electrical/instrument equipment, was
launched in response to the API’s RBI. As a result, the European Com­
mittee for Standardization (CEN) Workshop Agreement (CWA) 15,740,
Risk-Based Inspection and Maintenance Procedures for European

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: kbyoon@cau.ac.kr (K.B. Yoon).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpvp.2020.104281
Received 17 April 2020; Received in revised form 3 December 2020; Accepted 8 December 2020
Available online 16 December 2020
0308-0161/© 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
J.S. Song et al.
Industry (RIMAP), was published in 2008 [7] and EN 16691, Risk-Based
Inspection Framework, was published in 2018 [8].
Over the past two decades, various approaches to risk-based in­
spection and qualitative and quantitative management methods have
been reported [2,9–23]. An increasing number of case studies have
applied the API’s RBI method, either directly or in a slightly modified
form, and there have been also many studies based on probabilistic risk
assessment using system analysis tools for specific systems. A brief re­
view of some of the frequently cited approaches for power plants is
presented here, though case studies that directly employed API’s RBI in
a straight-forward manner are not included.
Fujiyama et al. (2004) studied RBI and maintenance processes for
steam turbine components using life cycle event trees coupled with
component breakdown trees. A default unreliability function was
assigned to every event using the statistical analysis of field failure data,
which was modified by inspection information and probabilistic life
assessment. The risk was calculated as the product of the unreliability
functions and expected monetary loss for every event in the event tree.
The optimal maintenance plan was selected based on the risks and
preventive costs calculated over the entire life cycle [13]. In addition,
Fujiyama (2011) described a two-step approach to risk-based mainte­
nance with application examples for steam turbine components. The
first step was risk prioritization based on a risk matrix, and the second
step was quantitative risk assessment and decision-making for the
optimal conditions for operation and maintenance intervals. A Bayesian
network approach was applied to produce scenarios for failure events
based on numerical probability values, and a probabilistic material se­
lection and design diagram was presented to assess the creep-fatigue
damage for high-temperature turbine components [14].
Krishnasamy et al. (2005) classified Unit 3 of Holyrood Thermal
Generating Station into major subsystems based on their operational
characteristics and estimated the parameters of Weibull and exponential
distributions based on failure data obtained from the power plant’s re­
cords. Fault tree analysis was used to determine the failure probability
for 13 basic events and the top event (the failure to generate and supply
power). Subsequent analysis involved the estimation of the maintenance
and production loss costs. A risk index was used to compare the esti­
mated risk for each individual subsystem against acceptable risk criteria,
creating three categories: high risk, medium risk, and low risk [15].
Hameed and Khan (2014) proposed an estimation framework for the
risk-based shutdown interval for a gas chilling/liquefaction unit at an
LNG processing plant. A Weibull distribution model for the critical
equipment and a block diagram representing the relationships among
the equipments were used to estimate the probability of system failure.
The consequences of failure included asset, human health, and pro­
duction losses, as well as shutdown inspection and maintenance costs.
The estimated shutdown interval for maintenance and inspection was
based on assumed acceptable risk criteria [16].
Bertolini et al. (2009) proposed an RBI and maintenance process for
an oil refinery that integrated classic reliability-centered maintenance
(RCM) analysis with models of risk analysis. This process comprised
several modules: identification of the scope, functional analysis, risk
assessment, risk evaluation, operation selection and planning, and
computation of the J-factor. The J-factor indicates the reduction in risk
in relation to the costs invested in alternative strategies such as pre­
ventive and mitigating actions [17]. Carazas and Souza (2010)
described a risk-based decision-making method for the selection of a
maintenance policy for a lubrication oil system used in gas turbine
journal bearings based on RCM concepts in which equipment failure
states were referred to as functional failures. A cause-consequence dia­
gram approach focusing on the occurrence of an initiating event was
proposed to evaluate various failure scenarios [18].
The studies mentioned above typically calculated the probability of
failure for the entire system using probability distributions, such as
Weibull and exponential distributions, for the equipment within that
system, and systematic relation of the equipment. However, this
2
International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 189 (2021) 104281
approach is not easy to employ in reality because past data on equip­
ment failure is usually insufficient and its systematic relation is quite
uncertain, which can lead to unrealistic risk assessment results.
A number of previous RBI studies have focused on high-energy
piping in fossil-fuel-fired power plants. The main steam and hot reheat
piping systems have been recognized as the components of high-energy
piping systems most likely to be subject to significant forced downtime.
Cohn (2007) and Cohn et al. (2008) proposed an RBI methodology based
on a life management strategy for welds in the main steam and hot
reheat piping systems based on a 16-year historical database of incidents
from the Generating Availability Data System (GADS) of the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) [19,20]. Statistical
evaluation such as survival analysis and Monte Carlo simulation was
performed to determine the failure frequencies and failure consequences
of the reported incidents, including weld failures. A fractional factorial
design was used to evaluate the governing parameters of the outage
costs. Plant personnel response, number of injuries, and the interaction
between the plant personnel response and weldment stress were
considered in the RBI analysis.
The purpose of the present study was to propose a quantitative RBI
methodology that can be applied to high-energy piping operating at
elevated temperatures and high pressures in a power plant. This
approach was built upon the recommended procedures outlined in the
API’s RBI but with simplification where appropriate. Probability-of-
failure (POF) assessment was conducted using a Weibull distribution
model with mean time to failure (MTTF) and a modification factor. In
addition, consequence-of-failure (COF) assessment was based on finan­
cial consequences that considered the downtime costs per day and the
length of downtime due to failure, which is a general practice in RBI for
power plants [10]. The quantitative risk was expressed as the combi­
nation of the POF and COF, and a newly proposed risk matrix was
designed based on these approaches. The inspection time for the
equipment was determined to be the time required for the equipment to
reach the maximum acceptable POF as determined by a pre-determined
risk target and uncertainties.
The main steam piping system in a thermal power plant was selected
as the case study unit for the present research. High-energy piping sys­
tems for power plants generally include main steam piping and hot
reheat piping, which operate at elevated temperature and high pressure.
As a result, these systems are exposed to conditions under which a
number of damage mechanisms might be active, causing thinning, the
degradation of material properties, and/or cracking of welds [24]. These
systems can also be subject to higher stress at certain locations due to
thermal expansion and the conditions of the support/hanger. Therefore,
the stress applied at these locations can be used as a major factor in risk
assessment.
2. RBI for high-energy piping
2.1. Proposal for an RBI framework
2.1.1. Failure, risk, and inspection effectiveness in RBI
Failure in RBI is defined as a loss of containment from the pressure
boundary resulting in leakage to the atmosphere or the development of a
hole, crack, or rupture of the equipment. Risk is defined as the product of
POF and COF, which can be expressed qualitatively or quantitatively
[5]. Risk increases as damage to the equipment accumulates during
in-service operation. Therefore, the risk target or the acceptable risk for
a system should be predetermined. An inspection method that is fairly
effective in quantifying the damage to the equipment can be recom­
mended initially, with more effective approaches recommended as the
risk of equipment failure increases. Although the inspection activity it­
self does not reduce the inherent risk, it provides reliable information
about the damage to the equipment and thus reduces uncertainty
regarding damage mechanisms, damage rate, and the susceptibility of
the equipment to damage.
J.S. Song et al.
Table 1
Numerical values associated with POF and financial-based COF categories.
POF
POF category POF range (0–1)
Lower limit (<) Upper limit (≤)
1 0 0.006
2 0.006 0.045
3 0.045 0.143
4 0.143 0.306
5 0.306 1 E
The calculation of risk involves the determination of the POF (Pf (t))
combined with COF (Cf ). In general, Riskf (t) is determined using Eq. (1)
as a function of time:
Riskf (t) = Pf (t) × Cf ,
where POF is a function of time because damage to the equipment ac­
cumulates over time. However, COF can be assumed to remain un­
changed over time.
Risk is also a function of information regarding the state of damage to
the equipment obtained from past inspections. When the effectiveness of
the inspection method (IE ), which is related to uncertainty, is applied to
Eq. (1), the equation can be rewritten as Eq. (2) [6]:
Riskf (t, IE ) = Pf (t, IE ) × Cf .
2.1.2. Estimation of POF
2.1.2.1. POF using the weibull distribution. Due to its versatility, the
Weibull distribution is one of the most widely used probability distri­
butions for the prediction of time-related POF for equipment in reli­
ability engineering and in life data analysis [15]. With an appropriate
choice of parameters in the Weibull distribution, a variety of failure rate
behaviors can be modeled, such as all three failure stages of the bathtub
curve: the decreasing failure rate (i.e., early failure), the constant failure
rate (i.e., random failure), and the increasing failure rate (i.e., wear-out
failure) [18].
The POF as the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the 2-
parameter Weibull distribution can be expressed as shown in Eq. (3):
[ ( t )β ]
Pf (t) = 1 − exp − , (3)
η
where t is the time in years, β is the shape parameter, which can have a
marked effect on the shape of the Weibull probability density function
(PDF), and η is the scale parameter, which determines the range of the
Weibull PDF [25,26]. The β parameter is also known as the Weibull
slope because its value is equal to the slope of the regressed line in a
probability plot [25], and the η parameter, regardless of the value of the
β parameter, is also known as the characteristic life in years, which is
defined as the time at which about 63.2% of the equipment has failed
[6].
The time to reach a specified POF can be determined by rearranging
Eq. (3) as shown in Eq. (4):
( [ ])1
t = η⋅ − ln 1 − Pf (t) β .
2.1.2.2. POF using MTTF. The η parameter can be adjusted to increase
or decrease the POF based on the mechanical integrity of the plant
equipment, which is associated with equipment type, inspection results,
and management systems. This can be considered an adjustment to the
MTTF of the equipment [6].
When deterministic or theoretical life equations exist for a specific
type of equipment, the MTTF can be specified as the average lifetime of
the equipment in years. If the β parameter is known beforehand or is
constant (the default is 3 in the present study), the η parameter can be
International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 189 (2021) 104281
COF
COF category COF range ($)
Lower limit (<) Upper limit (≤)
A 0 10,000
B 10,000 100,000
C 100,000 1,000,000
D 1,000,000 10,000,000
10,000,000 ∞
calculated using the gamma function, as shown in Eq. (5):
/ ( )
1
η = MTTFgeneric Γ 1 + , (5)
β
(1)
where MTTFgeneric is the lifetime determined by the deterministic or
theoretical life equation for each type of equipment, and Γ(n) is the
gamma function of n. The η parameter is equivalent to the MTTF when
the β parameter is equal to 1. The η parameter for the Weibull distri­
bution can determined using Eq. (5), which represents the relationship
between MTTF and Weibull parameters. Then, if only the MTTF of the
equipment is known, the POF(t) as the CDF having a Weibull distribu­
tion, can be determined as shown in Eq. (3). Changes in POF related to
operation period in years can also be estimated.
(2)
The actual life of equipment can differ significantly from the life
obtained from a deterministic or theoretical equation depending on a
number of factors, including the equipment type, operating conditions,
and installation conditions. Therefore, MTTFgeneric needs to be modified
using a modification factor, as suggested in Eq. (6):
MTTFmodi = MTTFgeneric × Fmodi , (6)
where Fmodi is the modification factor, which identifies the specific
conditions that can have a major influence on the POF of the equipment.
These conditions can be categorized into subfactors to reflect the various
characteristics of a system associated with damage that can lead to the
failure of the equipment [1,6,21,22].
2.1.3. Estimation of COF
There are many costs incurred due to the failure of equipment in a
power plant, including but not limited to Ref. [5]:
• Direct equipment repair and replacement costs
• The cost of damage to other equipment in the affected area
• Interruption to business as a result of the downtime required to
repair or replace damaged equipment
• Costs related to the injuries and deaths caused by a failure
• Environmental clean-up costs
• Increases in future insurance costs following failure
• Loss of brand value due to an accident or the loss of reputation
• Costs associated with regulatory action that limits production.
Because the indirect costs of a failure are not easy to estimate, only
the direct costs are considered in this study. COF is determined based on
the financial consequences, which include the business interruption
(4)
costs associated with lost opportunities due to production downtime,
environmental clean-up costs, and total maintenance costs associated
with the repair and replacement of the equipment. The estimated
downtime is the time required to return to normal operation. The
consequence of an unplanned shutdown for a plant due to equipment
failure is determined using Eq. (7):
Cf = Costbusiness + Costmaint + Costenv , (7)
where Costbu sin ess is the business interruption costs ($), calculated using
the cost of downtime per day ($/day) and the length of downtime in
3
J.S. Song et al. International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 189 (2021) 104281

stakeholders. A two-dimensional risk plot graphically depicts POF and

COF to allow a better understanding of the relative risk for the assessed
equipment, while a risk matrix is a very effective tool for communicating
the distribution of risks without requiring numerical values.
In the present study, the POF and COF for each piece of equipment
are characterized using the categories specified in Table 1. The POF
categories were established using a probability value corresponding to
regular intervals based on the MTTF for the equipment, and the COF
categories followed the log scale method used by the API’s RBI and CEN
CWA 15740. However, it may need to be the stakeholders’ responsibility
to establish the POF, COF, and risk categories that best suit their own
RBI approach.
The risk matrix contained four categories: High Risk, Medium-High
Risk, Medium Risk, and Low Risk. The risk for each piece of equip­
ment can be placed in a box within the risk matrix shown in Fig. 1. Risk
categories are assigned to the boxes based on iso-risk lines, which are
dependent on the level of risk assigned as a threshold between risk
categories. Equipment near an iso-risk line represents a constant risk
level, while the contribution to risk of POF and COF may vary widely.

2.1.5. Inspection planning based on risk analysis

Fig. 1. Risk matrix used in the study. 2.1.5.1. Use of a risk target for inspection planning. A risk target is the
defined level of acceptable risk according to corporate management
policy for continued operation without inspection activity. Therefore,
Table 2 risk targets can differ widely depending on internal corporate guidelines
Categories for inspection effectiveness and uncertainty [6].
and overall risk tolerance. These corporate guidelines should be incor­
Inspection Inspection Additional Remarks porated into an RBI program because acceptable risk levels and decision-
category effectiveness uncertainty of
making rules relating to corporate risk management will differ among
inspection
companies.
A Highly Effective 0.05 (or 5%) Based on Eq. (1) or (2), the maximum acceptable POF (Pf,max ) for
B Usually Effective 0.10 (or 10%)
C Fairly Effective 0.20 (or 20%)
equipment can be determined as a function of the COF and the risk target
D Poorly Effective 0.30 (or 30%) (Risktarget ), as shown in Eq. (8):
E Ineffective 0.50 (or 50%) This also applies to
no inspection. Risktarget
Pf ,max = . (8)
Cf

The time of next inspection can be determined from Eq. (4) using the
maximum acceptable POF obtained from Eq. (8). The next inspection
date is the date at which the risk target specified by the company is
expected to be reached. Therefore, on or before that date, an inspection
should be conducted.

2.1.5.2. Reduction in uncertainty due to inspection effectiveness. Although

Fig. 2. Flowchart of an inspection plan using a risk target and two forms of
uncertainty, generic uncertainty (GU) and additional uncertainty (AU).
days, Costmaint is the total maintenance costs, including repair and
replacement costs ($), and Costenv is the environmental clean-up costs
($).
2.1.4. Risk assessment
Because POF is dimensionless and COF is based on financial conse­
quences, risk may be described in terms of financial value in Eq. (1) or
(2). The distribution of risk for different pieces of equipment can be
plotted on a risk plot or a risk matrix, which can be more informative for
inspection activity itself cannot reduce absolute risk, it may reduce the
uncertainty of risk evaluation, which is an inherent problem when
assessing the conditions to establish the potential for damage to equip­
ment. Therefore, the evaluated risk for equipment that has not under­
gone inspection would be considered higher than that for equipment for
which an inspection has been conducted.
Reducing uncertainty when evaluating the possible rate of damage to
equipment depends on the effectiveness of the inspection method. An
effective inspection method should be applied to identify the type of
damage expected for the equipment and to quantify the extent of that
damage. Inspection methods such as visual testing, ultrasonic testing,
penetrating testing, magnetic-particle testing, radiographic testing, and
field replication have different levels of effectiveness in terms of
locating, sizing, and characterizing the damage, which in turn greatly
affects estimates of damage rates.
Categories for inspection effectiveness are shown in Table 2. These
act as guidelines when assigning levels of uncertainty to particular in­
spection methods. The inspection methods employed for any equipment
in a power plant can be reasonably categorized using Table 2 by an RBI
team and stakeholders. The more advanced the inspection techniques
that are used, the lower the uncertainty will be. If a particular item of
equipment is identified as being high risk prior to an overhaul/

4
J.S. Song et al.
Fig. 3. Flowchart for the calculation of the estimated remaining life (ERL) for equipment in a creep regime.
turnaround or the equipment reaches the end of its life, it will require a
more effective inspection method than what has been used in the past.
In the study, the recommended inspection time, tinsp , for equipment is
determined using Eq. (9):
( [ ])1
tinsp = η⋅ − ln 1 − Pf ,max β ⋅GU⋅(1 − AU), (9)
where generic uncertainty (GU) is applied at 0.9 (or 90%) for a con­
servative approach, and additional uncertainty (AU) is the additional
uncertainty of the inspection method as specified in Table 2.
In summary, the two uncertainties mentioned above are used to
adjust the inspection time. If the equipment has no record of inspection,
the 50% AU from Table 2 is applied to predict the POF for that equip­
ment. The recommended inspection time can be also obtained from the
curve for the 90% lower bound confidence and AU in a Weibull plot of
statistical analysis. Fig. 2 presents a basic flowchart for an inspection
plan using a risk target and the two forms of uncertainty (see Fig. 3).
The POF of equipment, Pf (t,IE ), as a function of time and uncertainty
can be expressed using Eq. (10). The risk for the equipment, Riskf (t, IE ),
can be obtained using Eq. (2):
( ) [ ( )β ]
t 1
Pf t, IE = 1 − exp − × . (10)
η GU⋅(1 − AU)
2.1.5.3. Adjustment of the POF curve based on current conditions. The
results obtained from an inspection can be used to assess the actual
condition of the equipment in terms of damage, and adjustments to the
POF curves can be made as necessary because the inspection reduces
uncertainty. Data from other equipment employed in similar systems
can be used to determine whether the equipment is in worse condition
than what was predicted. On the other hand, if the equipment is found to
be in better condition than expected, this would indicate that the base
POF curve is too conservative. Regardless of the inspection method used
5
International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 189 (2021) 104281
to calculate the predicted failure date based on the inspection results,
the failure date can be used to modify the base POF curve.
• Predicted life based on measured thickness data
The thinning rate of the equipment can be determined using Eq. (11),
which is based on the thickness of the original wall and that measured
during the last inspection:
torig − tmeasured
trate = , (11)
tservice
where trate is the thinning rate of the equipment (mm/year), torig is the
original wall thickness of the equipment (mm), tmeasured is the measured
wall thickness (mm), and tservice is the time in service before inspection
(year).
Assuming that the minimum required wall thickness is the failure
point, the predicted life adjusted according to the inspection results,
PLadj , can be calculated using Eq. (12):
PLadj =
torig − tmin
, (12)
trate
where tmin is the minimum required wall thickness without allowance for
corrosion for each piece of equipment based on the original construction
code or API 579–1/ASME FFS-1.
• Predicted life based on estimated remaining life
For equipment operating in a creep regime, life fraction rules can be
used to obtain the predicted life adjusted according to the inspection
results [27]. The total operation period of the equipment is divided into
several short periods of operating time in which the operating conditions
such as pressure and temperature are constant. As such, the thinning rate
J.S. Song et al. International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 189 (2021) 104281

Fig. 4. Overall flowchart for the proposed risk analysis process.

equipment after the last inspection is then simply determined by sub­

Table 3
tracting the service period of the equipment from the summation of all
Taxonomic hierarchy of the case study unit according to ISO 14224.
calculation periods. Fig. 6 displays a flowchart of the calculation process
Taxonomic Taxonomic Taxonomic information Number of for the ERL of equipment in a creep regime. The predicted life adjusted
level hierarchy items
according to the inspection results, PLadj , can be calculated using the ERL
1 – – of the equipment after the last inspection time, as shown in Eq. (13):
2 – –
3 – – PLadj = tservice + ERL. (13)
4 Unit *** Unit 1 1
5 System Main Steam Piping System 1 The predicted life adjusted according to the inspection results, PLadj ,
6 Line 1161-L-501A-XXH-650 6 can be also calculated using the ERL, as shown in Eq. (14), even if the
1161-L-502A-XXH-650, etc. cause of damage is something other than general or uniform corrosion.
7
Once the predicted life based on the last inspection has been deter­
– – –
8 Spool 1161-P-501A-001 41
1161-P-501A-002, etc. mined using either Eq. (12) or (13), Eq. (14) can be calculated:
9 Component PIPE No. 1, RED. TEE, etc. 50
10 (added) Inspection No. 1 Weld (inlet), No. 2 Extrados, 84
MTTFinsp = PLadj , (14)
location No. 21 Body, No. 22 Saddle
(inlet), No. 23 Saddle (outlet), No. where MTTFinsp is the MTTF adjusted according to the inspection results.
41 Weld (outlet), etc. MTTF should be modified using the modification factor calculated in Eq.
(6). The η parameter for the POF curve based on the inspection results
can be calculated using Eq. (5). Fig. 4 presents the overall flowchart for
is also assumed to be constant during these periods. For each of these
the proposed risk analysis process.
periods, the consumed creep life fraction is estimated; the summation of
these produces the accumulative creep life [28]. At each calculation
step, whether the cumulative creep life has become equal to or greater
than 1 should be checked. The estimated remaining life (ERL) of the

6
J.S. Song et al. International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 189 (2021) 104281

Table 4 Each Level 9 component can be divided into a weld and a base; the
Inspection location for the main steam piping system. names of the inspection locations for the welds and bases are given in
Component type Inspection location type Table 4. The exact location was defined in reference to the streamline of
the fluid flowing within the pipe. For example, for a bent pipe, the in­
Weld Base
spection locations were defined at the weld joint through which the
Straight pipe Weld Weld – – – steam was entering and at the extrados of the bend.
(inlet) (outlet)
(30 (6
locations) locations) 2.2.2. MTTF and the modification factor for main steam piping
Bent pipe Weld – Extrados – – The generic life of a component operating at high temperatures and
(inlet) (16 high pressures, such as main steam piping, can be calculated using a
(16 locations) deterministic/theoretical equation for creep rupture time. The Larson-
locations)
Miller parameter (LMP) describes the equivalence of time spent at a
Elbow (45, 90) Weld – Extrados – –
(inlet) (0 particular temperature for a given material in the thermally activated
(0 locations) creep damage process that can lead to stress ruptures [30]. The LMP is
locations) determined from the applied stress level using the LMP curve for the
Tee Weld – Body (4 Saddle Saddle material. The generic MTTF of main steam piping can be considered the
(inlet) locations) (inlet) (outlet)
creep rupture time of the base metal, which has the relationship with the
(4 (4 (4
locations) locations locations) LMP and temperature shown in Eq. (15):
LMP = (T + 273)(log Le + C), (15)
Reducer Weld Weld – – –
(inlet) (outlet) where T is the operating temperature (◦ C), C is a material-specific
(0 (0
locations) locations)
constant (about 20), and Le is the creep rupture time (hours). Le can
be changed to years and used as the generic MTTF.
The modification factor Fmodi in Eq. (6) should be designed so that the
MTTF is as close as possible to the actual operating life at the inspection
Table 5
locations of the components in the main steam piping system. For the
Subfactors applied to the inspection location of welds only.
present study, Eq. (16) was used to calculate Fmodi for the main steam
Weld correction (SFwc ) Weld process (SFwp ) Dissimilar welds (SFdw ) piping system:
Option Value Option Value Option Value ( )
Fmodi = SFwc ⋅ SFwp ⋅ SFdw × SFhe × SFshc . (16)
Base 1 Shop welding 1 No 1
Weld 0.60–0.90 Field welding 0.90 Yes 0.90 The five subfactors in Eq. (16) are defined as follows:

• Weld correction (SFwc ): takes into account differences between the

Table 6
Subfactors applied to all inspection locations.
History effect (SFhe ) Support/hanger condition (SFshc )
Option Value Option
None 1 Good
Moderate 0.75 Serviceable
Severe 0.50 Poor
– – Unknown
2.2. Application of RBI to a main steam piping system
2.2.1. Taxonomic hierarchy for a main steam piping system
A 1000-MW power plant was selected as the case study unit for this
study. This power plant represents the first 1000-MW Ultra Supercritical
facility in Korea. It uses bituminous coal as fuel and commenced com­
mercial operation in June 2017. The RBI strategy proposed in this study
was applied to the main steam piping system of the unit.
In ISO 14224, a taxonomy is defined as the systematic classification
of items into generic groups based on factors common to most of the
items [29]. Levels 1 to 5 represent high-level categorization that relates
to industry and plant applications, while Levels 6 to 9 are related to
equipment units with subdivisions. In the case study plant, Level 4
(“Plant/Unit”) up to Level 9 (“Part”) are generally used.
Assets within the case study unit can be also classified according to
the systematic taxonomy of ISO 14224. Because inspection locations are
defined as risk evaluation points for the proposed RBI process, one lower
level is added after Level 9 (Table 3). The main steam piping was defined
as Level 5. It consists of 6 lines at Level 6, 41 spools as Level 8, and 50
components at Level 9 (not including four pressure control valves). Each
spool was applied at Level 8 to consider the difference in weld quality
due to different welding processes, such as shop and field welding.
Finally, 84 inspection locations were applied at Level 10.
base and weld metal locations (i.e., material properties) [31,32].
• Welding process (SFwp ): takes into account empirical and managerial
differences between shop welding and field welding since some field
welds could cause low qualities which cannot be accepted by the
Value
1
specification
0.90 • Dissimilar welds (SFdw ): determined based on differences in creep
0.70 behavior for the two types of steel, and differences in thermal
0.60 expansion coefficients between the materials, leading to thermal
stress at the welds and local metallurgical changes near the weld
metal interface due to prolonged service at elevated temperatures
[33].
• History effect (SFhe ): determined based on the frequency of past
failures occurring at similar inspection locations [6].
• Support/hanger condition (SFshc ): determined based on the actual
conditions at the on-site installation that differ from the design
conditions for the support and hanger, such as missing/damaged
supports and inappropriate support conditions [6].
Each subfactor is composed of several options, the choice of which
follows specifically defined rules. For each option, numeric values are
assigned to indicate the degree to which the actual life or the actual
failure time deviates from the generic life as a result of the conditions
being analyzed. Values lower than 1 are assigned to conditions that are
considered more deleterious than those for generic life calculations. The
subfactors employed in this study are shown in Tables 5 and 6. The
modification factor is designed to fall somewhere between about 0.146
and 1 using Eq. (16), but this may vary depending on the functional
relationship between the subfactors and the numeric value of those
options.
For the weld correction subfactor, a value of 0.9 was applied to all 56
weld inspection locations. The welding process subfactor was applied to
all inspection locations in the welds, with 48 shop welding locations

7
J.S. Song et al. International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 189 (2021) 104281

using the commercial software AutoPIPE v8i. ASME B 31.1 Power Piping
Code was employed as the reference piping code [35].
A model of the piping system that includes the inspection locations
(numbered 1 through 84) is presented in Fig. 5. The condition of all of
the supports, such as hangers and anchors, was evaluated based on
piping isometric drawings and pipe support information. The main
steam piping system had a design pressure of 28.80 MPa, and it is
typically operated at 26.87 MPa. The design temperature was 618 ◦ C,
and the operating temperature was 613 ◦ C. The pipe specifications are
shown in Table 7, and the material properties are based on the ASME B
31.1 Power Piping Code in the material library of AutoPIPE v8i
(Table 8).
The stress analysis of the main steam piping system was carried out

Table 7
Pipe specifications for the main steam piping system.
Item Outer diameter Thickness (㎜) Material grade
(㎜)

Pipe size ID393 650.0 128.5 A335-P92/A234-

Fig. 5. Model of the main steam piping system with inspection locations.
WP92
Pipe size DN400 406.4 82.0 A335-P92/A234-
assigned a value of 1.0 and 8 field welding locations assigned 0.9. There WP92
were two dissimilar welds at the ends of the main steam piping; the Insulation – 170 for ID393 E-glass fiber
155 for DN400
material grade of the piping was A335-P92, and the material grade of
Cladding – 0.5 Aluminum sheet
the turbine casing was COST CB2 (9Cr). Finally, the “moderate” option
for the history effect subfactor and the “serviceable” option for support/
hanger condition subfactor were applied to all inspection locations.
Table 8
Material properties employed in the piping system stress analysis.
2.2.3. Piping system stress analysis for POF
The purpose of piping system stress analysis is usually to ensure the Material properties Room temperature (◦ C) Operating temperature (◦ C)
structural integrity and to maintain the operability of the piping system. Min. Yield strength (㎫) 527.70 295.54
The piping is assured of having an acceptable safety factor in terms of Ultimate strength (㎫) 688.00 314.94
Long modulus (x E3 ㎫) 190.61 124.70
structural integrity when all of the minimum requirements of the piping
Hoop modulus (x E3 ㎫) 190.61 124.70
code are satisfied [34]. To ensure the structural integrity of the main Shear modulus (x E3 ㎫) 73.31 47.96
steam piping system in this study and to determine the applied stress at Density (kg/m3) 7850.60 7850.60
all inspection locations, piping system stress analysis was conducted Poisson’s ratio 0.30 0.30

Fig. 6. The six inspection locations with the highest stress (based on von Mises stress).

8
J.S. Song et al.
Fig. 7. Screenshot of the POF analysis tool in the RBI program.
Fig. 8. Risk matrix for the main steam piping system for an in-service time of
1 year.
with the inclusion of connected piping such as by-pass lines and cold
reheat lines. To confirm the accuracy of the stress analysis, the pipe
movement at several support locations obtained from the analysis was
compared with the designed movement specified in the piping support
drawings. It was found that the differences between the two were slight
at most locations.
The six locations with the highest system stress identified in the
analysis are shown in Fig. 6. The 1st and 3rd highest stresses occurred
near the weld joint of a bent pipe (no. 38: the inlet weld of a straight pipe
and no. 37: the extrados of a bent pipe, respectively). The 2nd highest
stress occurred at the saddle of a tee fitting (no. 63: inlet saddle and no.
64: outlet saddle). The 4th highest stress occurred at the weld joint of the
9
International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 189 (2021) 104281
main steam piping (no. 19: the inlet weld of a straight pipe). The 5th and
6th highest stresses occurred in the branch lines connected with valves
between the main steam piping and the by-pass line (no. 65: the inlet
weld of a straight pipe and no. 32: the outlet weld of a straight pipe,
respectively).
At the inspection location with the highest stress (104.54 MPa), the
primary stress due to the internal pressure was 66.92 MPa, and the
secondary stress due to thermal expansion was 59.14 MPa. According to
the ASME B31.1 Power Piping Code, the allowable primary stress was
66.14 MPa and the allowable secondary stress was 188.9 MPa. There­
fore, it was found that the primary stress at this inspection location
slightly exceeded the allowable stress.
2.2.4. COF analysis for main steam piping
The estimation of COF includes business interruption costs associ­
ated with lost opportunities during the downtime of normal power
generation, environmental clean-up costs, and the maintenance costs
associated with the repair and replacement of the damaged component.
Using Eq. (7), business interruption costs can be obtained from the
downtime costs per day and the estimated length of downtime.
The financial information employed in the COF analysis for the case
study unit was as follows:
• Downtime costs per day: $500,000/day
• Downtime duration: four days for repair welding (two days for
welding, two days preparing for the restart), and nine days for
repairing after cutting-out the damaged part (seven days to cut out
the part and weld it and two days waiting to restart)
• Environmental clean-up costs: $0 because there is no environmental
pollution for steam leaks
• Total maintenance costs including repair and replacement costs: $0
because the total maintenance costs were not confirmed.
Using the above financial information, the financial consequences
were classified as COF Category D (from $2,000,000 to $5,000,000).
J.S. Song et al.
Table 9
Risk results for 35 inspection locations with a risk of $1 or more.
2.2.5. Risk assessment and inspection planning
In this study, the risk was calculated using the POF obtained using
Eq. (10) and the COF obtained using Eq. (7). The risk category was then
determined based on the risk matrix shown in Fig. 1. The maximum
acceptable POF for an inspection location as a function of the risk target
and the COF was determined according to Eq. (8). Because there were no
records of inspection for the case study unit, the recommended inspec­
tion date was predicted by applying the 50% additional uncertainty
(AU) in Table 2 using Eq. (9), but the date was adjusted in accordance
with the scheduled cycle of preventive maintenance (or the overhaul
interval).
A risk assessment was conducted based on the process outlined in the
previous section. The information employed in the assessment is sum­
marized below:
• Service start date: June 2017
10
International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 189 (2021) 104281
• Risk target: $50,000
• Scheduled cycle of preventive maintenance (or the overhaul inter­
val): 48 months
• Inspection records: none
• Inspection locations: 84
• Risk assessment dates: three situations
Case 1 – June 2018 (In-service time: 1 year).
Case 2 – June 2022 (In-service time: 5 years).
Case 3 – June 2026 (In-service time: 9 years).
For newly-installed power plants, comprehensive commissioning
and reliability operations are carried out for about a year after instal­
lation. During regular operation, the various monitoring systems are
checked to ensure stable power generation, and large-scale inspection
and maintenance activities take place during the first shutdown period.
Therefore, the three risk assessment dates listed above were selected in
J.S. Song et al. International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 189 (2021) 104281

Table 10
Thirteen locations where inspection is required immediately or during the next overhaul period.
No. Inspection Component Calculation for inspection planning Next inspection plan
location
Name Type POF Maximum Time to reach max. Next inspection time Inspection effectiveness
acceptable POF Acceptable POF (year) category

19 Weld (inlet) PIPE No. Straight 7.31E- 2.50E-02 2.26 Immediately A: Highly Effective
5 Pipe 04
29 Saddle (inlet) RED. Tee 2.23E- 1.11E-02 6.94 Next overhaul period (after C: Fairly Effective
TEE 05 48 months)
30 Saddle (outlet) RED. Tee 2.23E- 1.11E-02 6.94 Next overhaul period (after C: Fairly Effective
TEE 05 48 months)
31 Weld (inlet) PIPE No. Straight 4.19E- 2.50E-02 7.45 Next overhaul period (after C: Fairly Effective
8 Pipe 05 48 months)
32 Weld (outlet) PIPE No. Straight 1.40E- 2.50E-02 4.66 Next overhaul period (after C: Fairly Effective
8 Pipe 04 48 months)
37 Extrados PIPE No. Bent Pipe 1.18E- 1.11E-02 1.11 Immediately A: Highly Effective
3 03
38 Weld (inlet) PIPE No. Straight 1.11E- 2.50E-02 0.31 Immediately A: Highly Effective
4 Pipe 02
60 Weld (inlet) PIPE No. Straight 1.39E- 2.50E-02 4.66 Next overhaul period (after C: Fairly Effective
5 Pipe 04 48 months)
61 Weld (inlet) RED. Tee 6.14E- 2.50E-02 6.44 Next overhaul period (after C: Fairly Effective
TEE 05 48 months)
62 Body RED. Tee 2.37E- 1.11E-02 6.78 Next overhaul period (after C: Fairly Effective
TEE 05 48 months)
63 Saddle (inlet) RED. Tee 1.38E- 1.11E-02 1.01 Immediately A: Highly Effective
TEE 03
64 Saddle (outlet) RED. Tee 1.38E- 1.11E-02 1.01 Immediately A: Highly Effective
TEE 03
65 Weld (inlet) PIPE No. Straight 2.44E- 2.50E-02 3.70 Immediately A: Highly Effective
6 Pipe 04

Table 11
Change in risk with an increase of in-service time.
Case Case 1 (In-service time: 1 year) Case 2 (In-service time: 5 years) Case 3 (In-service time: 9 years)

Total (84 inspection locations)

consideration of the overhaul interval of 48 months. A stand-alone
software tool for RBI (Fig. 7) was constructed for the risk assessment
and equipment management of high-energy piping systems in thermal
power plants.
3. Case study results and discussion
3.1. Risk assessment results for 1-year in-service time: case 1
Risk assessment was performed for 84 inspection locations in the
main steam piping system of a power plant. The results are expressed in
the risk matrix shown in Fig. 8. Because the service period was short, 83
of the 84 inspection locations were classified as POF Category 1. The
only exception was one inlet weld in a straight pipe (no. 38). In addition,
based on the available financial consequence data, all of the inspection
locations were assigned COF Grade B. The resulting risk category for all
inspection locations except one was “Medium”; the exception was
located in the 2D box in the risk matrix and classified as “Medium High.”
Quantitative risk in the form of financial costs may offer a higher
level of confidence compared to a qualitative risk matrix. Even though
the vast majority of the inspection locations had the same risk category
in the risk matrix, their quantitative risk may vary significantly. To
investigate this, the quantitative results of risk assessment for 35 in­
spection locations with a risk of $1 or more are presented in Table 9.
Inspection location no. 38 (an inlet weld in a straight pipe) in particular
exhibited a very high risk of $22,273, which was almost halfway to the
pre-determined risk target of $50,000. Because the generic MTTF was
obtained using the Larson-Miller parameter, the POF and risk were
closely influenced by the applied stress occurring at the inspection
location rather than the modification factor employed in this study.
The plan for next inspection, which takes into account the risk target
and the scheduled cycle of preventive maintenance (or the overhaul
interval), for the case study unit is presented in Table 10. It was
concluded that 13 of the 35 inspection locations with a risk of at least $1
required immediate inspection or inspection during the next overhaul
period. It was also decided that a highly effective inspection method was
required for the six inspection locations at which an immediate in­
spection was required.
3.2. Change in risk with increasing in-service time: case 2 & case 3
Table 11 presents the results of the risk assessment for 5-year and 9-
year in-service times in addition to the 1-year in-service time. Given that
only the POF changes with time, it was observed that the risk for some
inspection locations shifted upward along the POF axis of the risk ma­
trix. The results were evaluated based on the assumption that inspection
and maintenance were not carried out during regular operation of the
case study unit. Therefore, the risk for each inspection location increases
with the POF function, which was determined using the MTTF and the
initial modification factor. In calculating the ERL for the inspection

11
J.S. Song et al.
Table 12
Risk assessment results of the 35 inspection locations same as the Case 1, after 9 year operation.
locations based on inspection activities, the POF, risk, and time of next
inspection will vary accordingly. During actual operation, the inspection
locations, where the risk increases rapidly over time, should take pri­
ority in inspection planning based on the equipment management pol­
icy, and their risk should be lowered. The quantitative risk assessment
results for the same 35 inspection locations are presented in Table 12. At
5 inspection locations, the risk results were POF 5. Particularly, the in­
spection location number 38 (inlet weld of straight pipe) showed a very
high POF value close to the 100% of failure.
4. Conclusions
In this study, a new methodology for quantitative RBI that can be
applied to high-energy piping operating at elevated temperatures and
high pressures in a power plant is proposed. The proposed methodology
is intended to be acceptable and understandable at an inspection level
12
International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 189 (2021) 104281
within the plant.
The methodology differs from previous RBI approaches in the liter­
ature in that it consists of three major steps: (i) the use of generic MTTF,
which is specified as the average life obtained from a deterministic/
theoretical equation for the equipment, (ii) the use of a modification
factor that identifies the specific conditions that can have a major in­
fluence on the POF of the equipment, and (iii) the use of inspection lo­
cations where damage to the equipment can frequently occur as sites of
risk evaluation for RBI.
The main steam piping system of a 1000-MW Ultra Supercritical
facility in Korea was selected as a case study unit for this study. Stand-
alone RBI software was developed in compliance with the framework
for the RBI methodology, and the risk and the next inspection plan were
established based on the inputting of evaluation data into the software.
The main conclusions are as follows:
J.S. Song et al.
1. POF assessment was proposed using the two-parameter Weibull
distribution with MTTF and a modification factor. The generic MTTF
was specified as the average life obtained from a deterministic/
theoretical equation for the equipment. The modification factor was
used to identify the specific conditions which can have a major in­
fluence on the POF of the equipment.
2. COF assessment was based on the financial consequences in terms of
business interruption, environmental clean-up, and total mainte­
nance costs. COF assessment is common practice in power plant RBI.
3. The quantitative risk was expressed as a combination of the POF and
COF, and a novel risk matrix was designed that considered the
characteristics of these approaches. The risk matrix was grouped into
four categories: High Risk, Medium-High Risk, Medium Risk, and
Low Risk.
4. The inspection time for the equipment was determined to be the time
when the POF of the equipment reached the maximum acceptable
POF as determined by the pre-determined risk target and the two
forms of uncertainty: generic uncertainty and additional uncertainty
related to the inspection method. The inspection time can be
adjusted in consideration with the scheduled cycle of preventive
maintenance or the overhaul interval.
5. Using the case study of a main steam piping system, the actual in­
spection locations where damage to the component can accrue
rapidly were defined as risk evaluation sites for RBI. The inspection
locations were added to the lowest level of the taxonomic hierarchy
defined by ISO 14224.
6. The generic MTTF of the main steam piping was evaluated using the
Larson-Miller parameter (LMP) equation for creep rupture time. The
LMP was determined from the applied stress using the LMP curve of
the piping material. Piping system stress analysis was conducted to
obtain the stress applied to the LMP. Piping system stress analysis
was conducted to obtain the von Mises stress occurring at the target
inspection locations.
7. An equation for the modification factor that can be applied to the
main steam piping was proposed consisting of five subfactors: weld
correction, welding process, dissimilar welds, history effect, and
support/hanger conditions. For each subfactor option, numeric
values were assigned to indicate how much the actual life of the
equipment will deviate from generic life as a result of the condition
being analyzed.
Author statement
Jung Soo Song: conducting RBI analysis, programming for proba­
bility calculation and preparing paper draft, Vanno Lok: pipe modeling
and conducting pipe stress analysis, Kee Bong Yoon: project conceptu­
alization, methodology determination, funding acquisition, project
administration, paper proof writing and supervising, Young Wha Ma:
providing industry data, and applying the result as a case study, Byeong
Ook Kong: Funding and project main management.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgments
This study was supported by Doosan Heavy Industries & Construc­
tion in Korea (Armt. No. 2017900142). This work was partly supported
by the KOEN (Proj No. 2020-Hyunjang(Balun)-01) funded by Korea
South-East Power Co in 2020.
13
International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping 189 (2021) 104281
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