Boscarino, J. E. (2016) - Setting The Record Straight - Frame Contestation As An Advocacy Tactic.

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The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2016
Setting the Record Straight: Frame Contestation as an

Advocacy Tactic
Jessica E. Boscarino
Policy scholars recognize that most policy arenas are characterized by competition among interests
advancing different problem frames with conflicting problem definitions and/or solutions. At the
same time, there is little research that empirically analyzes the dynamics of such framing contests.
Using a case study of energy policy advocacy by the Sierra Club and Environmental Defense Fund
across three decades, I examine the tactics that interest groups employ when faced with agenda
conflict. Contrary to what most policy research suggests, I find that interest groups do not avoid
public clashes with their competitors; rather, they often willingly engage in confrontational framing
techniques. I call this activity frame contestation, and it involves attempts at discrediting
opponents’ factual claims, policy ideas, and/or group character. The study reveals interesting
differences between groups in the specific types of frame contestation employed. In particular, the use
of character frames that attack an opponents’ reputation appears to be linked to group ideology and
orientation toward the business community. These findings enhance our understanding of advocacy
group decision making and focus our attention on the role of frame contestation in agenda setting and
policymaking outcomes.
KEY WORDS: framing, environmental, energy
Introduction
Research on the role of interest groups in the political process reveals both signif-
icant intellectual gains and areas of theoretical deficiency (Baumgartner & Leech,
1998). One area that offers an opportunity to further our understanding of interest
group activity and influence is issue framing. While we know that framing is a delib-
erate and strategic act, relatively little research has been directed at generating theo-
ries about how interest groups develop a framing approach (Gerrity, 2006, pp. 90–91).
In particular, less attention has been given to counter-framing as a strategic activity
(McCright & Dunlap, 2000). In policy arenas occupied by multiple interests, groups
encounter rival problem frames that compete for public acceptance. In the face of
oppositional frames, policy advocates sometimes engage in confrontational framing
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Boscarino: Frame Contestation as an Advocacy Tactic 281
contests (Entman, 2003), in which policy rivals seek to establish rhetorical control
over the terms of policy debate. What is less well understood is what such confronta-
tion looks like, and what drives tactical decisions about how to engage in frame
contestation.
The answers to these questions have important implications for theories of
agenda setting and the policy process. By selecting and defining key terms and outlin-
ing the contours of an issue, framing can have profound consequences for structuring
policy debate. The way that policy problems and solutions are presented affects pub-
lic opinion (Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Zaller, 1992) and media attention
to issues (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). As Richard Smith (1984) demonstrates, interest
group advocacy can influence congressional support for specific policy proposals,
and diversity of debate increases the likelihood of policy change (Boydstun, Bevan, &
Thomas, 2014, p. 178). In short, framing matters. Moreover, some research suggests
that there are unique framing effects that occur within more crowded policy environ-
ments. For example, scholars have found that when publics are exposed to competi-
tive framing environments, individuals are more likely to consistently take positions
compatible with their political ideology than when framing is one-sided (Chong &
Druckman, 2007, p. 112). To the extent that the nature of framing within contested
arenas differs in this and other ways, it is important to understand just what such
contests look like. Given the potential importance of interest group framing behavior
on agenda setting and policymaking outcomes, this research addresses the fact that
“little is known about the dynamics of framing in competitive contexts” (Chong &
Druckman, 2007, p. 113) and points our attention in new and interesting directions.
Specifically, I aim to further our understanding of frame contestation, the most
confrontational form of framing in response to policy opponents. Frame contestation
involves attempts to discredit opponents’ factual claims, policy proposals, and/or
group legitimacy. It stands in contrast to other responses to policy rivals that are
noncontradictory in nature. The paper begins by reviewing research on the competi-
tive nature of framing in “crowded” policy arenas, drawing on the Advocacy Coali-
tion Framework (ACF), Narrative Policy Framework (NPF), and literatures on issue
definition and framing. Based on this research, I develop a typology to describe the
specific nature of frame contestation, arguing that this activity can take on four dif-
ferent forms. I then apply this typology to a case study of energy policy advocacy by
two environmental interest groups, the Sierra Club and Environmental Defense
Fund (EDF), between 1971 and 2004. Through content analysis of organizational
materials, I analyze exactly how often and when these groups address competing
frames through these different frame contestation types. I find evidence that deci-
sions governing frame contestation are driven by group identity and the nature of
interest groups’ relationships with their policy rivals.
Policymaking in Competitive Arenas
Much like living organisms, advocacy organizations compete for scarce resources,
including members, donations, media attention, and policy influence (Gray & Lowery,
1996). Aseem Prakash and Mary Kay Gugerty assert that “the imperatives for resource
282 Policy Studies Journal, 44:3
acquisition might be a primary motivator” for NGOs, guiding their organizational

strategies, including which constituencies they are responsive to (Prakash & Gugerty,
2010, p. 15). The ACF developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith is a useful
starting point for understanding the behavior of competing groups within the policy
process. The ACF departs from previous theories of policymaking by shifting attention
away from a strict focus on institutions and toward coalitions of policy actors that
share core political values and more specific policy beliefs (Sabatier, 1993). These views
are extremely resistant to change, often even in the face of inconsistent or contrary
information. When challenged by policy rivals, coalitions will react defensively and
attack opponents’ beliefs (McBeth, Shanahan, Arnell, & Hathaway, 2007, p. 89). The
key source of policy struggle, then, is competition between advocacy coalitions with
differing belief systems that operate within the same policy subsystem. By focusing on
the nature of this competition, the ACF can help “explain the escalation and continua-
tion of policy conflict” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 194).
Arguably, this conflict is most visible in the rhetoric that surrounds policy
debate on a given issue. More recently, scholars have called for increased atten-
tion to the role of narratives within models of policy change and learning
(Shanahan, Jones, & McBeth, 2011). They argue that narrative analysis is espe-
cially relevant to the “meso level” of policy analysis, which is centered on policy
subsystems and the advocacy coalitions that exist within them (Shanahan et al.,
2011, p. 540). Within the NPF, narratives are described as a vehicle for communi-
cating worldviews, perspectives, and understandings of particular policy prob-
lems (Shanahan et al., 2011). These socially constructed elements of policy
discourse are situated within a (geographical, institutional, and/or temporal) set-
ting and progress through a plot line with the use of characters (heroes, villains,
and victims), symbols, climactic moments, and messages about the “moral of the
story” (Jones & McBeth, 2010). In the words of Roberta Coles, narrative frames
“answer the journalist’s favorite questions: who, what, where, when, why, and
how” (Coles, 1998, p. 377). These narratives serve both a cognitive function—
enabling individuals to organize and make sense of information and events—
and a communicative one, acting as a persuasive tool for shaping the perceptions
of others (Jones & McBeth, 2010). As such, they are useful for identifying under-
lying political values and points of conflict (Stone, 2012).
Policy narratives can be communicated (in part or whole) through the use of
issue frames. Most scholarship on framing takes as its foundation Erving Goffman’s
concept of “schemata of interpretation” that allow individuals to “locate, perceive,
identify and label” issues and events (1974, p. 21). Issue framing refers to the process
of conceptualizing and interpreting policy issues by adopting specific understand-
ings of issue scope, significance, locus of responsibility, and appropriate policy rem-
edies. Although applied in many disciplines, framing theory has arguably been most
well developed in the study of social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 611).
This work has addressed key questions related to how movement activists generate
shared frames, how such frames facilitate (or undermine) collective action, and the
impacts of framing efforts on movement success (e.g., Benford, 1993; McAdam,
McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986).
This study focuses on external framing, the process through which actors pro-
duce frames to mobilize support for their policy positions. I subscribe to the view of
framing as a “strategic process of creating specific meaning in line with political
interests” (Fiss & Hirsch, 2005, p. 29). Interest groups attempt to sway public percep-
tion by highlighting (or suppressing) various issue attributes (Entman, 1993). Specifi-
cally, policy entrepreneurs use symbols, metaphors, language, and myths to present
a policy image that favors a given issue interpretation (Edelman, 1985; Stone, 2012).
As Jonathan Lange explains, “Facts, explanations, and interpretations are contextual-
ized to discursively construct a reality favorable to one’s rhetorical goals” (1996,
p. 139).
In so doing, frames deliver messages about the relative importance of different
problem components, including assignation of responsibility and blame (Nelson &
Oxley, 1999). Iyengar (1990) demonstrated that frames created by the news media
can affect public opinion about responsibility for policy issues (e.g., individual vs.
society-at-large). Causal attributions are susceptible to frame influence because indi-
viduals lack both clear information linking problems to causes and the cognitive abil-
ities to efficiently process such information (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001, p. 523).
Just as other aspects of problem definition (e.g., scope, consequences) may be con-
tested in alternative frames, so might depictions of blame. Melissa Merry (2014) dem-
onstrates that policy actors not only utilize blame attribution to advance policy goals,
but they also ready these causal arguments in advance of policy problems, building
causal stories about their policy rivals that can be rapidly deployed in the wake of
public crises (a phenomenon she terms “blame-casting”). As will be discussed below,
blame—for faulty information, poor judgment, ulterior motives, etc.—becomes a key
element in framing contests involving competing interests.
Depending on the relative success of a given frame in winning public acceptance,
every policy arena can be described along a continuum that ranges from total domi-
nance of one frame to the coexistence of several frames that enjoy roughly equal sup-
port (Entman, 2003, p. 418). For example, in the immediate period following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush framed the attacks
as an act of war perpetrated by an evil enemy that merited an equal military response.
This frame was overwhelmingly accepted by elites and Bush received near unanimous
congressional support for military operations in Afghanistan (Entman, 2003, pp.
415–16). The case of nuclear power in the 1970s, however, illustrates an issue for which
multiple frames competed for control of public understanding. On the pro-nuclear
side, two frames—one that presented nuclear power as a form of technological pro-
gress, and another that centered on its ability to promote energy independence—coex-
isted with several negative frames that argued against its use for environmental,
safety, accountability, and/or cost effectiveness reasons (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989).
There is a great deal of evidence that groups are acutely aware of their competi-
tors and the alternative messages that they are offering. Even in cases where there is
little or no direct interaction among groups, policy advocates track their opponents’
actions closely (Lange, 1996). In interviews with policy advocates, Jeffrey Berry,
Frank R. Baumgartner, Marie Hojnacki, David C. Kimball, and Beth L. Leech (2007)
noted that these actors frequently mention their competitors without prompting.
More importantly, groups actively shift their advocacy strategy in response to the
strategies of their policy rivals (Pralle, 2006). If advocacy groups sense that their
opponents are “winning” the framing battle, they feel pressure to mount a counter-
attack (Pralle, 2006, p. 224).
Although we understand this, the literature has not yet come to any clear conclu-
sions regarding exactly how these groups address competing claims. Groups may co-
opt symbols already being used by their competitors and try to associate themselves
with the same values being portrayed (Davis, 1995). More broadly, advocacy groups
may try to match the framing actions of their opponents by utilizing the same tactics,
in effect copying the rhetorical, symbolic, or other devices being used successfully by
the other side (Lange, 1996, p. 148). Sarah Pralle refers to this as a group “playing the
game” of their competitors, engaging them on their own rhetorical turf, and in so
doing, beginning to resemble their opponents (2006, pp. 222–24).
One body of research suggests that advocacy groups are disposed to engage in
noncontradictory argumentation, ignoring the claims of their opponents and trying to
direct the debate elsewhere (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). When employed by oppos-
ing sides, this behavior results in “dual framing” (Chong & Druckman, 2013, p. 2), in
which policy rivals offer simultaneous incompatible frames that present only one side
of the debate. This is a low-cost tactic for defusing the competition by suggesting that
their ideas do not even warrant consideration (Cobb & Ross, 1997). For example, in
1995, Greenpeace and the Shell Oil Company were involved in a public disagreement
over the disposal of the Brent Spar oil structure in the North Sea. One analysis of the
dispute argues that effectively, the two sides were framing the debate in completely
different terms by approaching it as an environmental (Greenpeace) versus an indus-
try (Shell) problem, and thus neither addressed the other on their own terms (Jordan,
1998, pp. 721–22). Similarly, an environmental group promoting more protective for-
est policies might highlight the ecological value of conserving old-growth forests,
while at the same time industry might point out the economic contribution of logging
such forests. Both positions might have merit, and rather than debating opposition
points, each side simply emphasizes the benefits of their own policy goals (Hojnacki
& Baumgartner, 2003, pp. 12–13).
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993, p. 48) agree that policy advocacy coalitions
tend to engage in a “dialogue of the deaf” in which they talk past each other—but
only until a shift in the balance of power occurs and participants are forced to con-
tend with the arguments offered by their opponents. Indeed, several recent studies
provide evidence that such confrontation is common in policy debates (see McCright
& Dunlap, 2000; Rohlinger, 2002, for studies examining the climate change and abor-
tion debates, respectively). Some scholars argue that the relationship between oppos-
ing movements is inherently inclined to antagonism because each side has nothing
to offer the other apart from threat (Knight & Greenberg, 2011; Meyer &
Staggenborg, 1996). Whereas the relationship between advocacy groups and
decision-making elites may at times be cooperative, there is never a reason to offer
concessions to countermovements because they do not have the authority to meet
policy demands, thus creating a structural incentive for antagonism (Knight &
Greenberg, 2011; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996).
When this antagonism enters the public arena, it often does so in the form of a
framing contest. This activity involves attempts to “rebut, undermine or neutralize a
person’s or group’s myths, version of reality, or interpretive framework” (Benford,
1987, p. 75) by directly addressing the information and underlying assumptions con-
tained within opposing frames. There is a growing body of literature addressing the
functioning and nature of interest group framing behavior in competitive contexts.
For example, McBeth, Shanahan, and Jones (2005) detail the competing frames
offered by environmentalists versus recreation and extractive industry interests over
management of the Yellowstone National Park. They describe the policy arena as a
“political battlefield” populated by “warring interest groups” that use framing tech-
niques as their weapon (McBeth et al., 2005, p. 414). Brummans et al. (2005) similarly
locate framing at the heart of policy conflict; they argue that intractable conflicts are
rooted in incompatible issue frames that become embedded over long periods of
time. The process of frame contestation is an iterative one, in which competing inter-
ests both anticipate and react to the arguments of their opponents (Coles, 1998;
Fisher, 2009). Despite this increase in scholarly interest, however, these topics remain
relatively understudied (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). For
example, even when studies look at how groups address the claims of opposing coa-
litions, they have rarely examined the ways in which these counterframes address
those competitors themselves (see Fisher, 2009, for an exception).
Frame Contestation
I define frame contestation as an explicit and confrontational engagement with oppos-

ing frames and framers. In frame contestation, interest groups directly address the
claims being made in rival frames and attempt to discredit them by refuting informa-
tion and policy proposals included in the frame, and/or attacking the framers them-
selves. This conception of frame contestation describes a much more aggressive
framing activity than previously explored, and in so doing, it acknowledges the often
conflictual nature of many policy debates (Schon & Rein, 1994). Frame contestation is
designed to refute and undermine a group’s representation of reality. The ultimate
goal is to raise doubts and encourage negative perceptions of the competition in the
minds of the public and elites (Cobb & Ross, 1997, p. 29), paving the way for the
acceptance of one’s own preferred policy image.
Drawing upon this and other related literatures, I propose a typology of four dif-
ferent types of frame contestation used by advocacy groups when attacking oppo-
nents’ policy frames: (1) discrediting frames, (2) futility frames, (3) perversity frames,
and (4) character frames. The first three forms of frame contestation directly chal-
lenge the substantive foundation for policy claims included in competing issue
frames and aim to “set the record straight” (Lange, 1996). The last frame contestation
type, a character frame, attacks the reputation and legitimacy of opponents them-
selves, drawing into question their authority to participate in a given policy debate.
Each of these contestation methods is described in detail below.
Discrediting frames contest the specific information on which competitors’
frames are based. Most often, this involves frames that dispute the factual
information related to a policy problem (Cobb & Ross, 1997, p. 30; Stone, 2012, chap.
8). As Deborah Stone points out, statistics and other forms of counting or measuring
aspects of a policy phenomenon are always subject to challenges because they
involve subjective decisions about inclusion and exclusion, what to count, and how
to count it (2012, pp. 183–84). Indeed, policy advocates often fight competitors’
frames by pointing out inaccuracies in the facts and figures relied on by opponents
in their policy arguments. For example, in 2005, Greenpeace U.K. urged British Prime
Minister Tony Blair to “get his facts straight” regarding his assertion that nuclear
power could serve as an answer to climate change. The group contended that even if
the United Kingdom were to invest in nuclear power by upgrading all of its existing
plants, it could only hope to gain a 10 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions
(Greenpeace, 2005). Moreover, the group cited a study that found that, in comparison
to electricity produced by wind power, nuclear power produced 50 percent more
greenhouse gases when lifecycle impacts were considered (Greenpeace, 2005).
Futility frames focus on the likely outcomes of rival policy proposals, arguing
that a given policy solution will have no mitigating effect on the issue (Cobb & Ross,
1997; Hirschman, 1991). They may make the case that the policy solution offered by
opponents is inadequate or inappropriate for the problem at hand; technically, finan-
cially, or politically infeasible; or otherwise fundamentally flawed. Albert Hirschman
(1991) first suggested that futility frames are a tool for conservative actors to oppose
progressive reforms. For example, anti–gun-control advocates argue that restrictive
gun laws represent a futile policy response to violent crime because they target law-
ful gun owners while failing to deal with the criminal market for guns (Cook &
Leitzel, 1996, p. 92). Similarly, anti–environmental-policy actors have argued that the
Superfund program is ineffective because it has not made a measurable dent in
cleaning up the number of contaminated sites across the country and does not pre-
vent new contamination (Futrell, 1993–94, p. 831).
We can expect this framing tactic to also be utilized by pro-change actors. When
a public problem demands governmental action and rival interest groups propose
incompatible policies, futility frames can serve to move attention away from compet-
ing policy ideas and toward one’s own proposal. Futility arguments are frequently
paired with proposed policy alternatives (Cook & Leitzel, 1996, p. 91), which are
framed as comparatively effectual. The education policy arena is especially familiar
with such arguments, as reformists of all stripes argue that the answers to educa-
tional problems can be alternatively found in marketized solutions, the establishment
of common (and higher) standards, or a new focus on teacher and administrator
accountability (Apple, 2004, p. 15). Each of these approaches is in part advanced by
pointing out the ineffectiveness or inappropriateness of other solutions.
Perversity frames are similar in that they focus on the failures of competing pol-
icy proposals. However, these arguments go a step further and contend that the solu-
tion proposed by opponents would actually make the condition worse or create new
problems entirely. Albert Hirschman describes this as a situation in which “the
attempt to push society in a certain direction will result in its moving . . . in the oppo-
site direction” (1991, p. 43; see also Cobb & Ross, 1997, p. 16). Stone details this type
of argument when she describes conservative attacks on proposals to increase the
minimum wage as a way to fight poverty, which arguably exacerbates unemploy-

ment by raising the cost of doing business (2012, p. 211). Perversity frames challenge
nearly every aspect of an opponents’ arguments and go so far as to make the case
that the cure may be “worse than the disease” (Cobb & Ross, 1997, p. 146). This
strong critique can be employed as a tactic to delay or prevent unwanted policy
action, as when General Electric argued that dredging the Hudson River to remove
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) would actually spread the contamination further
(Kamieniecki, 2006, p. 153). Perversity frames need not always be obstructionist in
nature, however. Just as in the case of futility frames, these arguments can serve as
an effective defensive tool to combat competing proposals and clear the way for
one’s own ideas for policy change.
Alternatively, groups can leave behind specific policy arguments and go after
the reputation and legitimacy of their opponents through the use of character frames.
Jonathan Lange refers to this tactic as “vilifying” the competition, by “casting [oppo-
nents] in an exclusively negative light, attributing diabolical motives to them, and
magnifying their power” (1996, p. 142). The objects of such “adversarial framing”
are categorized as antagonists in larger policy narratives and serve as the locus for
responsibility and blame (Knight & Greenberg, 2011). Often, this is accomplished
through the use of symbols and negative stereotypes. This is a common tactic within
the environmental community, which often portrays its competitors as “big busi-
ness” organizations that pursue self-interest at the expense of the common good. In
the case of wetlands policy in the Southeast, environmental activists seeking greater
protection for Louisiana wetlands framed the regulators as “captured” by local polit-
ical and economic interests, arrogant, and not acting in the public interest (Krogman,
1996). The regulators fought back with frames that painted environmentalists as
chronic complainers who wasted valuable agency time (Krogman, 1996).
Successful character attacks often draw upon deeply held political values, such as
patriotism, morality, and an “honest day’s work.” Questioning opponents’ adherence
to these values, as well as their level of sincerity (Ibarra & Kitsuse, 1993, pp. 41–42),
lessens the strength of their policy claims. Cynthia Lopez and Michael Reich (1997)
argue, for example, that those opposing a water distribution system in border settle-
ments near El Paso, Texas, focused on the alleged undocumented status of the people
living in the area, making an implicit argument that the residents were undeserving
of policy assistance. Similarly, hawkish policy actors attacked the position of peace
activists in the 1960s and 1970s by questioning their patriotism (Davies, 1999, p. 6).
In the arena of regulatory politics, criminal records become a strong weapon in
the use of character frames. Conservation groups, for example, can point to legal
complaints and fines imposed on companies as a result of environmental statute vio-
lations, implying that these organizations cannot be trusted. Pralle (2006, p. 71) notes
that forest conservationists in British Columbia publicized the substantial criminal
record of MacMillan Bloedel when fighting proposed logging on the Clayoquot
Sound by the timber company. Repeated violations signal a lack of respect for the
law, suggesting that any future agreements or policy arrangements are equally vul-
nerable to subversion or defiance. Deploying character frames is useful not only for
discrediting the claims of opponents but also for mobilizing supporters. In some
cases, advocacy groups may be able to argue that their opponents are not just mis-
guided in their assessment of the problem or proposed solution, but may actually be
the source of the problem. This creates a clear target in the policy conflict, which is
more likely to induce outside participation than a threat posed by an external,
unknown, or widely dispersed source (Pralle, 2006).
Any attempts to discredit competing groups involve appeals to an “us versus
them” mentality, in which opponents are pitted against one another with one
“correct” and one “incorrect” side (Cobb & Ross, 1997, p. 32). Thus, advocacy groups
might marry negative character attacks with attempts to bolster—or “ennoble”
(Lange, 1996)—their own images. When groups attempt to frame themselves as her-
oes within a policy conflict, they are utilizing the “angel shift” (Shanahan, Jones,
McBeth, & Lane, 2013), a complement to the “devil shift” that frames opponents as
more powerful and “evil” than they may be in actuality (Sabatier, Hunter, &
McLaughlin, 1987). To do so, they may point to their expertise in given issue areas,
their ability to work across political divides and compromise, and/or their pursuit of
the common good (Lange, 1996, p. 143). For instance, during the Persian Gulf War,
peace activists sought to bolster their authority through a “credentialing” process
that highlighted the longevity and first-hand experience of the organizations they
belonged to (Coy & Woehrle, 1996). Environmentalists often attempt to achieve a
positive group image by emphasizing their ability to speak out for those with no
voice, such as future generations and animal species, and that, in contrast to private
industry, they seek benefits for the public.
Interest groups are not limited in their choice of frame contestation techniques,
and indeed, we should expect them to use more than one. For example, discrediting
frames that refute factual claims being made by rival interests might be effectively
paired with character attacks that suggest the inaccurate information represents a
deliberate attempt to mislead. One such example of the coupling of contestation types
can be found in the framing of the “Climategate” scandal involving leaked emails
from the University of East Anglia. Climate skeptics argued that the emails provided
evidence to suggest that data included in leading international climate models were
faulty; moreover, they asserted, the communications revealed that the scientists had
deliberately falsified these data. As Graham Knight and Josh Greenberg describe, these
events “gave the climate sceptic movement an opportunity to amplify its message by
discrediting the moral character and professional practices of climate scientists as well as
the validity of their claims” (2011, p. 324, emphasis added).
Expectations
This research develops several expectations regarding the use of these four
frame contestation types. I propose both expectations regarding general interest
group activity, and also predict certain differences between the tactics of interest
groups on the “same side” of a policy debate (in this case, environmental groups).
Research in communications and interest groups has found that both external and
internal group characteristics drive decisions about framing techniques. “Repertoires
of contention” (Barasko, 2010, p. 160) reflect tactical decisions as much as a group’s
sense of self and “who we are.” In particular, Merry (2014) notes the importance of a
group’s relationships with members/supporters and pre-identified opponents in
influencing group framing of environmental disasters. For example, interest groups
are more likely to direct blame attribution frames at historic policy rivals in the
immediate aftermath of a focusing event (Merry, 2014).
More generally, we should expect advocacy groups to engage in frame contesta-
tion at higher rates during periods when attention to a policy issue is high. Previous
research has found a link between the level of competition over an issue and the scope
of participation (Schattschneider, 1975). Salient issues attract multiple actors into the
debate, and these participants may bring varying points of view and/or preferred sol-
utions. When the scope of the debate can be contained, participants have better control
over policy outcomes. On the contrary, when a conflict becomes “socialized,” out-
comes are much less certain; indeed, “each addition changes the balance of the forces
involved” (Schattschneider, 1975, p. 3). Competing perspectives thus pose a threat to
interests with specific policy goals. Therefore, it stands to reason that as attention
grows, so too does the need to confront rival frames offered by one’s competitors.
Proposition 1: Frame contestation is more likely during periods of high issue

attention.
I also expect that when interest groups make the decision to engage in frame
contestation, they will do so by employing the four frame contestation types
described above at different rates. The decision about which form of contestation to
use is likely driven by several factors. For example, discrediting frames are a compa-
ratively lower-stakes frame contestation tactic. By criticizing policy information
rather than ideas, interest groups allow for the possibility that their rivals are wrong
through no fault of their own. They may, for example, be a mere misguided messen-
ger, not the source, of inaccurate information. Moreover, by avoiding condemning
opponents themselves, groups lower the risk of aggressive counterattacks. As such, I
expect that discrediting frames will be widely used by interest groups, both in tan-
dem with other contestation frames and on their own.
Proposition 2: Discrediting frames will be the most frequently used form of frame
contestation by interest groups.
Futility and perversity frames are more confrontational than discrediting

frames (though less so than character frames) because they criticize proposals
that originate with rival groups. They are similar in that they both hold oppo-
nents responsible for advancing “bad” ideas, but futility frames focus on the
ineffectiveness of these ideas, while perversity frames suggest that the proposals
will result in unintended and undesirable outcomes. As such, I expect that advo-
cacy groups will choose between them when engaging in frame contestation.
That is, they will argue either that rival ideas will not solve the problem at hand
or that they will make it worse, not both.
Proposition 3: Because futility and perversity frames are two variants of the same
underlying argument, advocacy groups will choose one or the other when contest-
ing opposing groups.
Finally, character frames are both the most risky and potentially most effective
form of frame contestation. Arguably, character frames are the “strongest” form of
frame contestation because they seek to delegitimize rivals themselves, effectively
throwing doubt on all frames—past, present, and future—originating from the same
source. Implicitly, questioning a group’s reputation also throws suspicion on their
policy information and proposals. However, it is also highly confrontational, making
counterattacks more likely and significantly reducing the prospects for future coop-
eration with the targets of character frames. As such, I expect that the nature of one’s
orientation toward their rivals (adversarial vs. cooperative) will influence the fre-
quency with which they employ character frames. If interest groups are more likely
to engage in blaming with preexisting policy opponents (Merry, 2014), then we
should also expect that they will be more likely to deploy character frames against
policy actors with whom they have an established adversarial relationship.
In the environmental arena, these rivals are typically identified as “big business.”
In the energy policy subsystem, the oil industry is a favorite target of environmental
interests (Merry, 2014, p. 99). The relationship between environmental groups and
industry varies widely, however. Free-market environmentalism, for example, is an
approach that relies on market mechanisms and voluntary actions rather than
command-and-control regulations to solve environmental problems (Livesey, 1999).
Groups that subscribe to this method view business interests as partners rather than
adversaries, entering into voluntary coalitions such as the U.S. Climate Action Part-
nership, a joint effort of environmentalists and corporations to push for national cli-
mate change legislation. Such cooperative relations have triggered strong critiques
from observers of the movement who argue that compromise with business interests
has resulted in capitulation that has left environmentalists in a position of being weak
and superfluous (Dowie, 1995). Others argue that cozy relationships constrain envi-
ronmentalists’ ability to engage in more aggressive frame contestation techniques
(Merry, 2014). Despite these charges, we would expect such groups to be much more
reluctant to engage in the use of character frames.
Proposition 4a: Environmental interest groups that have historically had an adver-
sarial relationship with business interests will be more likely to utilize character
frames than groups that have a cooperative relationship with business and
industry.
Furthermore, when groups do choose to use a character frame, the literature sug-
gests that they are likely to couple these attacks with attempts to bolster their own
reputation, an act known as “ennobling” (Lange, 1996). Shanahan et al. (2013) refer
to this as the “angel shift,” in which a group presents themselves as a policy hero
capable of fixing the problem at hand. This serves as a complement to the devil shift,
in which policy rivals are positioned as villains within a policy narrative. I, therefore,
expect to see this component of issue framing when character frames are present.
Proposition 4b: When interest groups employ a character frame, they will also
engage in ennobling to improve their own image.
Case Study: U.S. Energy Policy
This study analyzes one set of participants in the policy debate over U.S. energy
policy between 1971 and 2004: environmental advocacy groups. Energy policy advo-
cacy serves as a useful case study through which to examine the dynamics of frame
contestation for two reasons. First, framing contests are especially common in the
energy policy domain because the debate is not over whether we should continue to
consume energy, but rather, how we can consume energy in a more intelligent man-
ner. Much like the case of pesticides policy, energy debates might be similarly
“intractable” because the myriad ends sought by competing interests are often
incompatible (Bosso, 1987, p. iii), as in the inherent conflict between climate protec-
tion and a cheap, plentiful domestic energy supply. These debates involve discus-
sions about supply and demand projections; the relative accessibility, efficiency, cost,
waste products, and environmental impacts of various energy sources; and foreign
policy and national security considerations. They contain moral, economic, and sci-
entific/technical dimensions. This invites actors from various sectors to get involved
and results in a very crowded—and competitive—policy space. Merry (2014, p. 10)
argues that in the energy arena in particular, environmental groups operate at a com-
petitive disadvantage with regard to their opponents in the fossil fuel industries. The
need to refute contrasting frames emerging from these sources is, therefore, crucial
for policy success for green groups. This fact increases the pressure on interest
groups to act fast during framing contests.
Second, though this case will be of particular significance to those with environ-
mental interests, the findings are not contained to this issue area. Studies of environ-
mental interest group behavior have shed light on many aspects of public interest
advocacy more generally. For example, Ronald Shaiko (1999) explored the organiza-
tional transformation of environmental groups between the 1960s and 1990s and
found that trends in group-member relationships occurred not just within environ-
mental groups, but the broader public interest community as well. Christopher Bosso
similarly argues that the forces governing organizational survival and maintenance
of environmental groups apply to all advocacy communities (2005, p. 10). Those
studies and others pay attention to the factors influencing group tactical choices, and
we should, therefore, expect the dynamics governing frame contestation to be simi-
larly generalizable to interest groups focused on civil rights, lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and/or queer (LGBTQ) rights, consumer rights, abortion, and other
issues in the public interest realm. In sum, in many respects, the environmental
movement can be considered a “larger, broader, and more resilient version” of what
could be any public interest advocacy community (Bosso, 2005, p. 8).
Environmental groups have long been players in the energy policy arena
(Berman & O’Connor, 1996; Hays, 1987; Paehlke, 1989), though modern environmen-
tal advocacy for clean energy sources did not fully develop until the 1970s (Paehlke,
1989). Since that time, however, the issue has moved to the top of many organiza-
tions’ agendas. Energy issues recently ranked in the top seven concerns for environ-
mental groups, as measured by the number of advocacy organizations active on the
issue (Bosso, 2005, pp. 70–73).
Prior to 1973, the United States effectively had no comprehensive energy policy
(Kashand & Rycroft, 1985). This changed in rapid order following the 1973–74 oil cri-
sis, which catapulted energy onto the U.S. public and governmental agendas. Atten-
tion to energy issues spiked again between 1979 and 1980 following oil shortages
resulting from the Iranian Revolution, accompanied by the return of long gas lines
during the summer months of 1979. At this time, polls showed that 94 percent of
Americans supported the rapid development of solar energy (Berman & O’Connor,
1996, p. 2). Following a sharp decline in interest during the last years of the Carter
and subsequent Reagan administrations, energy complacency was again disrupted
with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces on August 2, 1990. The UN embargoed
Iraqi oil exports, which caused panic in the market and temporarily pushed prices
up from $13 to $40 a barrel (Cooper, 1999, p. 196). As with earlier focusing events,
this attention was not sustained. More recently, the emergence of climate change as a
nationally salient issue and military involvement following the 9/11 terrorist attacks
has increased attention to energy issues as Americans are concerned with the source
of energy supplies, the resilience of domestic energy infrastructure, and the environ-
mental impacts of our addiction to fossil fuels.
As indicated above, attention to energy policy issues has shifted in reaction to
these events, rising and falling in and out of saliency. We can see these changes by
examining trends in media coverage of and congressional activity on energy topics,
data for which are available through the Policy Agendas Project. This initiative,
housed at the University of Texas at Austin, serves as a repository of policy-related
data designed to facilitate research into long-term policy trends and developments.1
The news media dataset tracks attention to various policy topics within the New York
Times by systematically sampling the New York Times Index for articles on those
topics. The Project also records trends in congressional attention by collecting data
on the topics of every congressional hearing identified through the use of Congres-
sional Information Service abstracts. Figure 1 graphs these data for both energy-
related articles recorded in the New York Times Index and congressional hearings
addressing energy policy between 1971 and 2004.2
Surges in media coverage can be seen in 1974; 1979; and, to a smaller extent, in
2001 and 2003. Congressional attention to energy also increased significantly in 1975,
though not to the same extent as media attention. The high point for congressional
attention occurred in 1979 (also a year in which media coverage spiked, though not
as extensively). Since then, the number of congressional hearings has decreased,
with the exception of moderate increases centered around 1987 and 2001. Datasets
Figure 1. Attention to Energy Issues in The New York Times and U.S. Congress, 1971–2004.
Source: The Policy Agendas Project, http://www.policyagendas.org/page/trend-analysis.
tracking responses to Gallup’s Most Important Problem Survey, as well as content

analysis of presidential State of the Union speeches, show similar results.3
As environmental groups have pushed for the development of clean energy
throughout this period, they have confronted policy frames issued by the
energy industry. These competing frames suggest that the path to stable, affordable
energy supplies lies in the rapid development of domestic fossil fuel sources, includ-
ing offshore oil drilling, coal mining, tar sands mining, and the development of syn-
thetic fuels. These rival frames simultaneously emphasize the arguable high costs
and unreliability of renewable energy sources. How, if at all, did environmentalists
respond?
Data and Methods
To explore how environmentalists have addressed these frames—which provide

very different problem definitions and policy solutions than those espoused by their
own community—I tracked energy policy advocacy by the Sierra Club and EDF
between 1971 and 2004. A primary premise of the ACF is that the dynamics of poli-
cymaking within a subsystem are best understood through long-term study of a dec-
ade or more (Sabatier, 1993, p. 16). These three decades of energy policy capture
many of the important domestic and international developments shaping modern
debates around energy policy, and thus provide both a sufficient and interesting
timeframe within which to examine an advocacy campaign. The period stretches
from the years immediately preceding the establishment of a comprehensive U.S.
energy policy (Kashand & Rycroft, 1985) through the many focusing events
described above and into the twenty-first century. Because the timeframe is lengthy,
includes periods of high and low public interest in energy issues, and contains focus-
ing events that highlight several different dimensions of energy debates (supply/cost,
national security, and environmental) it is ideal for examining trends in frame

contestation.
The Sierra Club and EDF are members of the unofficial environmental “Group
of Ten,” representing the largest and most powerful national environmental organi-
zations. In 1999, the Aspen Institute Nonprofit Sector Research Fund reported the
results of a survey of members of Congress who named the Sierra Club the most
influential U.S. nonprofit organization operating in the environmental arena.4 The
next environmental group on the list was the EDF. In 2002–03, the Sierra Club had a
membership of 736,000 and an operating budget of $86.6 million; EDF counted
350,000 members and a $42.2 million budget in the same time period (Bosso, 2005,
pp. 54–57).
I performed a content analysis of energy policy frames communicated through
articles in organizational magazines and newsletters published by these groups.5
Magazine articles are an ideal source of policy frames because they are intended to
influence public opinion on issues and mobilize supporters, with the ultimate goal of
affecting policy outcomes (Reber & Berger, 2005).6 Such “public consumption doc-
uments”—i.e., group magazines, press releases, newspaper editorials, etc.—have
been regularly used by scholars engaging in narrative policy analysis (McBeth et al.,
2005, p. 415). This may be because at least one study has found that interest groups
are increasingly using newsletters and other documents to influence issue framing
among the public (Tierney & Frasure, 1998, p. 312). Julie Andsager calls for an
increased study of advocacy group rhetoric through the use of group newsletters,
noting that these are an “excellent source of rhetorical frames” (2000, p. 590).
Despite their many advantages, there are some limitations to using group maga-
zines to analyze frame contestation techniques. First, one could question whether the
purpose of organizational publications is truly policy advocacy, or to serve as a
venue for group advertisement and fundraising activities (Boscarino, 2009, footnote
3), which might change the nature of framing generally and frame contestation in
particular. Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) have argued that communications
aimed at the general public (such as group magazines) are less likely to be consistent
in their messaging than communications (such as congressional testimony) directed
at other subsystem participants (McBeth et al., 2005, p. 415). Finally, analyzing hard-
copy publications neglects the volume of advocacy group communication that
happens through online media, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and group
websites (see, e.g., Merry, 2013). We might question whether frame contestation
behavior would be different in these different forums. Given that the use of such
platforms expanded dramatically after the end of this timeframe, I have not included
them here. Nonetheless, it is important to be mindful of these limitations.
Many of these publications are accessible through organizational websites; for
those back issues that are not available through the web, I collected hard copies of
documents at organizational archives (the Sierra Club archives are housed at the
Bancroft Library at the University of California, Berkeley, and the EDF collection is
held at SUNY Stony Brook). Within these publications, I identified all articles in
which these groups advocated for clean energy policies, including policies aimed at
energy efficiency and conservation and the development of alternative and
renewable energy sources. In total, I read and analyzed 180 articles published by the
organizations: 93 appeared in Sierra Club publications and 87 were published by the
EDF.
I analyzed these documents utilizing a “mixed methodological” approach
(McBeth et al., 2005, p. 419), in which qualitative information is quantified and statis-
tically analyzed (see also McComas & Shanahan, 1999). In each article, I recorded
whether or not the group engaged in frame contestation, i.e., directly and explicitly
contested alternative frames offered by their policy competitors. A code of “1” (yes)
required clear identification of policy competitors (whether entities noted by name,
or more amorphous sets of actors such as “Big Oil”), as well as acknowledgment
and refutation of the policy frames advanced by these actors. One-sided advocacy
for clean energy development, which simply discussed the superiority of a group’s
own policies, was coded as “0” to indicate no frame contestation.
In cases where frame contestation was used (a score of 1), I also noted details
about the nature of the frame contestation techniques utilized by environmentalists.
For example, did the group critique the policy ideas advanced by their rivals, or the
rivals themselves? This gave rise to an additional coding scheme that further classified
the specific form(s) of frame contestation into the four categories described above: dis-
crediting, futility, perversity, and/or character. Again, each type of frame contestation
was coded as 0 (absent) or 1 (present). For example, the following statements in an arti-
cle by the EDF result in a code of 1 for futility framing: “one might think that the solu-
tion to the nation’s energy problem lies in simply ‘unlocking’ the West’s ‘vast reserves’
of coal and oil shale . . . [but] even ‘crash’ development in the West would result in
only a minor contribution to the nation’s energy supply . . .. There is no indication that
Western coal development will end the ‘energy crisis’” (Environmental Defense Fund,
1975a). It is important to note that groups could include more than one form of frame
contestation within the same document (e.g., scoring “1” on more than one frame con-
testation type). These data were analyzed for the relative frequency with which the
groups used each specific frame contestation technique. I performed a cross-tabulation
with chi-square analysis to investigate potential differences in the rates of usage of
each frame contestation type between the two organizations.
To assess the potential influence of issue saliency on framing behavior, I drew
upon the data in Figure 1 related to media and congressional attention to energy
issues over time. As can be seen in this figure, the saliency of energy issues was espe-
cially high in the following years: 1973–75, 1979–80, 1987, and 2001–03. I divided the
advocacy materials into two groups based upon those data; materials published in
the years noted above were coded as “1” to designate a time of high issue saliency.
Materials published in all remaining years were coded “0” to specify a time of lower
saliency. I used these data to run a cross-tabulation analysis with chi-square to test
for differences in the use of frame contestation in low vs. high saliency years. Finally,
to better understand the decision-making process influencing decisions about
whether or not to use the different types of frame contestation, I conducted inter-
views with several key staff members from the Sierra Club and EDF.7 These inter-
views provided valuable supplementary material that offered insight into the results
of the content analysis.
Table 1. Frame Contestation in High Versus Low Saliency Time Periods
Frame Contestation Low Saliency High Saliency
Yes 22.4% 41.1%

No 77.6% 58.9%
Total (N) 100% (107) 100% (73)
Pearson’s chi-square 5 7.200, p 5 0.007
Cramer’s V 5 0.200
Findings
The content analysis reveals that the Sierra Club and EDF utilized frame contes-
tation techniques in 32 and 28 percent of their advocacy materials, respectively.
Moreover, as predicted in Proposition 1, the Pearson’s chi-square analysis shows
that the groups were significantly more likely to employ confrontational framing
techniques in periods when attention to energy issues was high, such as during the
oil shocks of the 1970s and terrorist attacks and ensuing wars of the early 2000s.8
Forty-one percent of magazine and newsletter articles published in 1973–75, 1979–80,
1987, and 2001–03 contained contestation frames. This figure is nearly double the 22
percent of articles from low saliency years that included frame contestation. This dif-
ference between framing behavior in high versus low saliency periods is exhibited
by both of the organizations (Table 1).
This finding is not surprising, given that frame contestation by definition involves
the confrontation of competing frames, which may be more numerous during periods
of high issue saliency. The use of frame contestation may, therefore, be prompted by
the perception of threat that emerges from the entrance of multiple players into the
debate during periods of high attention to energy issues. Elite attention—whether
from the media, president, Congress, or other actors—invites wider participation,
which can steer the debate in new (and, potentially, unwanted) directions. The Sierra
Club, for example, acknowledged the threat of rival frames taking root in 1987, when
cries of an energy crisis increased support for proposals to ramp up domestic oil dril-
ling. An internal Club memo spoke about the oil industry attempt to frame domestic
drilling as a solution to the crisis, warning, “[w]e need to turn the tables on this one
fast . . .. If we don’t puncture this balloon soon, it will become the reality we have to
work in—and that is not a happy political prospect” (Sierra Club, 1987). Interest
groups may have less control over framing outcomes during periods of high saliency,
thus increasing incentives to use aggressive framing techniques.
These results further show that frame contestation is a nuanced framing tactic. It
may be used in varying ways, and look very different when employed by different
actors. Tables 2–5 display the frequency with which each group used the four types
of frame contestation. This analysis includes only those documents in which frame
contestation was present, so the frequency of perversity frames, for example, repre-
sents the percentage of documents including perversity arguments within all docu-
ments that were coded “1” (yes) for frame contestation.
As can be seen in Table 2, discrediting frames appeared in nearly half of Sierra
Club publications (47 percent) and a quarter of EDF pieces, a difference that is not
Table 2. Use of Discrediting Frames
Discrediting Sierra Club Environmental Defense Fund
Yes 46.7% 25.0%

No 53.3% 75.0%
Total (N) 100% (30) 100% (24)
Table 3. Use of Futility Frames
Futility Sierra Club Environmental Defense Fund
Yes 30.0% 4.2%

No 70.0% 95.8%
Total (N) 100% (30) 100% (24)
Table 4. Use of Perversity Frames
Perversity Sierra Club Environmental Defense Fund
Yes 33.3% 83.3%

No 66.7% 16.7%
Total (N) 100% (30) 100% (24)
Table 5. Use of Character Frames
Character Sierra Club Environmental Defense Fund
Yes 50.0% 12.5%

No 50.0% 87.5%
Total (N) 100% (30) 100% (24)
statistically significant according to the Pearson’s chi-square test. In Proposition 2, I

suggested that the “low stakes” nature of discrediting frames would lead to them
being used more frequently than other types of frame contestation. However, this
was not the case for either of the organizations included in the study. For both
groups, there was another frame contestation type that was used at the same or a
higher rate than discrediting frames (specifically, character frames for the Sierra
Club and perversity frames for EDF). There were also some interesting differences
between the two groups’ employment of this framing type. Typically, when EDF uti-
lized discrediting frames, they made claims that policy rivals (often utilities) were
presenting misleading information on energy usage, as they did when arguing that
the California Public Utilities Corporation “greatly overestimated” future electricity
needs in the state, thus creating false demand for additional (polluting) energy devel-
opment (Environmental Defense Fund, 1975b). The Sierra Club’s use of discrediting
frames was more varied, but a theme emerged around the framing of the costs and
benefits of clean energy. An article published in Sierra’s “Mythbuster” column

argued that “The industry-sponsored Global Climate Coalition claims that efforts to
meet the requirements of the Kyoto climate change treaty will cripple the booming
U.S. economy. But . . . the country could save up to $43 billion by 2010 through the
use of more efficient autos, buildings and appliances powered by alternative energy
sources” (Sierra Club, 1999). Similar arguments can be found in Sierra Club articles
responding to statements made by the fossil fuel industry that renewable energy
sources are far more expensive than traditional fuels. The Sierra Club has responded
by pointing out that “the cheapest source of fuel is conservation” (Sierra Club, 1974).
Table 3 reveals that the Sierra Club utilized futility frames at a significantly
higher rate than the EDF. In 30 percent of the articles in which the Sierra Club
employed frame contestation techniques, they relied on futility frames to assert that
a competing proposal was inadequate and would not solve the problem at hand. For
example, in 1987, the Club addressed proposals to open up the Arctic National Wild-
life Refuge for oil drilling thusly: “If this nation is really facing a long-term oil
dependency problem, opening up two more speculative fields isn’t going to do any-
thing but defer—by one, two, or three years—the date at which we need to have in
place a rational demand reduction strategy” (Sierra Club, 1987). However, these
claims appeared in only 4 percent of EDF contestation frames, and they commonly
focused on the ineffectuality of crash energy development to meet electricity needs
and ensure energy independence.
In contrast, the EDF used perversity frames in 83 percent of frame contestation
documents (see Table 4). A Pearson’s chi-square test shows that this is significantly
higher than the Sierra Club, which included perversity arguments in 33 percent of
frames. EDF directly tackled competing policy proposals and contended that their
opponents’ plans would actually exacerbate energy issues. In November 2002, for
example, they hailed the filibuster defeat of an energy bill promoted by the energy
lobby, which would “wreak havoc on the environment” (Environmental Defense
Fund, 2003, p. 2). Although less frequently, the Sierra Club also engaged their oppo-
nents with perversity frames. For instance, they asserted that labeling the early 1970s
U.S. energy situation as a “crisis” was a scare tactic that would only encourage the
adoption of policies that would leave the nation worse, not better, off. In their words,
“the nation’s current energy policies, even as modified by the President’s proposals,
are a prescription for the problem, not its solution . . . if government and industry had
wanted to make an energy crisis, they couldn’t have picked a better way to do it”
(Sierra Club, 1973, emphasis added).
A closer analysis of the differences in the use of futility and perversity frames
between the groups reveals that these organizations only rarely utilize both forms of
contestation in the same advocacy document. Specifically, only four Sierra Club
documents and one EDF document employed both futility and perversity frames
(representing 27 and 5 percent of frame contestation materials, respectively). These
results reveal support for Proposition 3, which stated that groups will select between
futility and perversity frames rather than employing both in their advocacy materi-
als. This makes a certain degree of sense when one considers that both types of con-
testation address competing policy proposals. Futility frames emphasize the
ineffectuality of rival policy ideas, whereas perversity frames highlight the counter-
productive and harmful nature of opponents’ solutions. It, therefore, appears to be
the case that groups choose only one form of contestation with which to attack these
proposals.
A definitive answer to the reasons behind the decision to employ futility vs. per-
versity frames is beyond the scope of this project; however, there is at least one possi-
ble explanation that deserves further inquiry. This explanation is rooted in the
relationship between the uses of futility, perversity, and character frames. One might
argue that perversity frames are “stronger” then futility frames, because they go
beyond the argument that a given policy will fail to mitigate a problem and assert that
the policy will in fact make it worse (or create new problems entirely). Arguably, char-
acter frames are equally (if not more) aggressive because they seek to delegitimize the
rivals themselves, effectively throwing doubt on all frames originating from the same
source. For groups that eschew the use of character frames, therefore, a perversity
frame is likely to be their most potent form of frame contestation. As such, we might
expect advocacy groups that do not employ character frames to make frequent use of
perversity frames. As is explained in greater detail below, this was the case for EDF.
EDF used significantly fewer character frames in their contestation behavior than the
Sierra Club, while employing perversity frames in 83 percent of frame contestation
documents. The Club, on the other hand, relied more heavily on futility frames, but
coupled these arguments with frequent character attacks. Therefore, it may be the case
that decisions about the use of futility and perversity arguments are influenced by the
degree to which character frames are included in a groups’ frame contestation behav-
ior. There are likely alternative explanations for these tactical decisions related to futil-
ity and perversity frames, and all such propositions require further empirical testing.
In Proposition 4a, I stated the expectation that the likelihood of an advocacy
group using character frames is influenced by their preexisting relationship with pol-
icy rivals. In cases where this relationship has historically been adversarial in nature,
the use of character frames should be more frequent than instances where opposing
groups have cooperated at times. In line with this proposition, another interesting
outcome of this study is the difference in the frequency with which these groups
directly attacked their policy rivals in character frames. Table 5 illustrates that the
Sierra Club deployed character frames disparaging both the fossil fuel industry and
the federal offices and agencies that support it significantly more often than EDF,
including such frames in 50 percent of all frame contestation documents. For exam-
ple, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Club likened several
U.S. legislators to vultures looking to capitalize on the attacks by fast-tracking devel-
opment permits and trade pacts (Sierra Club, 2002). At other points in time, they
referred to oil companies’ policy statements as “glib PR,” questioning their motives
for pushing the development of coal and oil shale in the West (Sierra Club, 1975a),
and pointed out the auto industry’s failure to comply with anti-pollution statutes,
implying that they cannot be trusted (Sierra Club, 1975b). While the EDF regularly
made the claim that competing policy proposals would leave the country (and the
planet) worse off, the group rarely attacked the actors that proposed these solutions,
doing so in only 13 percent of cases of frame contestation.
The source of this difference may be found in the organizational identity of the
two groups and their relationships with policy opponents. The Sierra Club is
strongly grounded in its grassroots membership (Holtzclaw, 2008, telephone inter-
view; Young, 2008). As McGee Young describes, from very early on, “a strong demo-
cratic ethos permeated the governing structure of the Sierra Club, which gave
members opportunities to expand the purview of the Club’s conservation activities”
(2008, p. 188). Activists at the local level often push the organization to take a hard
line on environmental issues. In terms of energy policy, one Sierra Club director
relays, “we are always traveling the line between how much to push, between push-
ing and playing” (Hamilton, 2010, telephone interview). In fact, the Sierra Club has
been criticized for pushing too much, and came to be known as the group that
always “said no” to development projects (Hamilton, 2010, telephone interview).
Many Sierra Club activists want to concentrate their efforts on preventing detrimen-
tal energy policy decisions, such as the construction of new coal plants, and this
evolved into a culture of “stopping bad things”—embodied most evidently in the
Club’s “Beyond Coal” program (Hamilton, 2010, telephone interview). Campaigns
based on opposition to specific projects can be an effective mobilizing tool because
they tap into fears about losing special places or resources. Research has shown that
people place a greater value on goods that they already possess as compared to the
possible gain of those same goods, a psychological phenomenon termed “loss
aversion” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). This policy agenda also lends itself espe-
cially well to aggressive frame contestation. If an organization is comfortable with
“pushing,” and indeed is prodded to do so by an involved and passionate constitu-
ency, the decision to use confrontational tactics becomes an easier one.
EDF has a very different organizational structure and ethos. While EDF does
have a large membership (more than 700,000), the group’s members play a very dif-
ferent role than Sierra Club members. EDF views its members less as advocacy col-
leagues and more as a source of financial support and occasional issue expertise. One
EDF staffer alternately referred to these individuals as “funders,” “contributors,”
“donors,” and “supporters,” but never partners (Brownstein, 2010, telephone inter-
view). In fact, though the EDF was established in 1967, the group did not make build-
ing a membership base a priority until the 1980s (Bosso, 2005, p. 89). Furthermore,
EDF members have little influence over the agenda of the organization. As regional
EDF staffer Kristen Coracini describes, “For us, our membership really is about sup-
porting our work and there isn’t really a role in the governance of the organization or
the decision-making” for members (2010, telephone interview). Put more bluntly, “If
you feel passionately about an issue and you don’t see it in [EDF’s five year] strategic
plan, that may be an indication to you that EDF is not going to be the instrument of
your desire to see something done” (Brownstein, 2010, telephone interview).
Even more fundamental to the identity of EDF is the organization’s orientation
as a group in favor of free market environmentalism. EDF addresses environmental
issues by asking, “instead of working against the market and against industry, how
do we work with the market and with industry to develop smart policy that will
have the least economic impact but will achieve the greatest results?” (Coracini,
2010, telephone interview). As suggested in that statement, a key defining feature of
EDF’s advocacy strategy is the formation of close partnerships with industry and the
commercial sector. Throughout the years, EDF has forged alliances with McDonald’s,
FedEx, DuPont, and Wal-Mart, among others, and prides itself on facilitating the
adoption of new innovations within the corporate sector as they relate to environ-
mental practices.
EDF’s model encourages a collaborative, rather than conflictual, approach to
addressing policy actors that have traditionally been viewed as “the other side” in the
environmental debate (Livesey, 1999). This may explain why EDF very rarely uses
character frames directed at their competitors. In the past, the group has been
denounced for failing to critique the business sector. As Kristen Coracini explains,
“we’ve actually been criticized ourselves because . . . we don’t really attack companies
or industries as a whole in the same way that other groups may. That’s just not a tac-
tic that we use” (2010, telephone interview). The group fights back against these
criticisms from within the environmental community by pointing out that they do not
accept any corporate money and that they are very selective about the organizations
they partner with. They insist that the alliances they forge have specific goals and
therefore do not constrain their ability to talk about issues—even if it means disagree-
ing with industry (Brownstein, 2010, telephone interview). One might summarize this
position as a predilection to attack ideas, not people or groups, and this is reflected in
EDF’s frame contestation activities. When engaging in frame contestation, the group
relies heavily on perversity frames in particular, using them in a large majority of
advocacy materials and significantly more often than the Sierra Club. In contrast, they
utilize character attacks significantly less frequently than does the Club.
Moreover, contrary to my expectations in Proposition 4b, neither group included
ennobling arguments as part of their use of character frames. While existing research
asserts that interest groups couple attacks on competitors with efforts to highlight
their own skills and principles (Lange, 1996), I did not identify any references to
group credibility, expertise, ethics, or convictions by the Sierra Club or EDF in these
materials. This was surprising not only because the literature suggests that such
claims are an integral part of frame contestation techniques, but also because, in the
interviews I conducted, representatives from these groups frequently touted their
credentials and trustworthiness. EDF, for example, has built an identity around its
scientific and economic expertise, and pointed out that at one time it prided itself
on employing more PhDs than any other environmental group (Coracini, 2010, tele-
phone interview). The Sierra Club highlighted its democratic decision-making struc-
ture and the ways that this makes them uniquely able to speak out for the public
interest. Furthermore, research has shown that reputation can be a vital organiza-
tional asset. Richard Harris and Sidney Milkis found that lawmakers seeking inter-
est group partners for lobbying on conservation issues “saw environmental
organizations as valuable allies, both for their mobilization abilities and for their
unimpeachable character as advocates for the environment” (1996, p. 200, emphasis
added). It may be that ennobling frames are present in advocacy materials other
than organizational magazines and newsletters, for example, on group websites,
social media platforms, or in congressional testimony. Future research might exam-
ine different data sources to test this possibility.
Conclusion
Policy scholars have paid little attention to the dynamics of counter-framing

behavior, neglecting to ask questions about exactly what counter-framing looks like,
and how advocacy groups shape a defensive strategy.9 This study takes the first step
toward filling this gap by developing a typology of frame contestation behavior. It is
my hope that by theorizing about the dynamics governing interest group decision
making, this research will both spur and guide future research into framing contests.
Although the case study included here is necessarily limited, it provides preliminary
empirical evidence that advocacy groups do indeed engage in more confrontational
framing contests than has previously been acknowledged in policy studies. Rather
than noncontradictory argumentation (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) or dual framing
(Chong & Druckman, 2013), the groups in this study willingly engaged their policy
opponents on their own rhetorical turf, rebutting their factual claims, policy ideas, and
group character. At times, these groups countered the information and statistics pro-
vided by their rivals, or argued that their proposals would not achieve desired ends; at
other times, they found it more effective to attack the competitors themselves.
At the same time, this case suggests that interest groups might differ in the type
of counter-framing activities they utilize. Specifically, there appears to be a distinc-
tion between contesting policy ideas and the information used to support those
ideas, and calling into question the source of competing proposals. The behavior of
these environmental groups indicates that willingness to employ character attacks
may be influenced by a group’s relationship with their policy rivals. In the environ-
mental arena, this often involves entities in the resource extraction, commercial, and
industrial sectors. As Christopher Bosso (2005) points out, ideological orientation is
an important element of organizational identity, which guides a group’s political
activities, and ideology includes judgments about the role of business in environmen-
tal degradation and its potential to be part of the solution. If and how an advocacy
group forms a relationship with their policy opponents might subsequently impact
their frame contestation activities. Specifically, the formation of public partnerships
and/or policy alliances with these rivals might result in fewer uses of character
frames and greater reliance on discrediting, futility, and perversity frames.
Many questions still remain. For example, scholars have suggested that policy
narratives differ depending on whether a group seeks to portray itself as on the
“winning” vs. the “losing” side of a given policy debate (Shanahan et al., 2011, p.
544). Does this translate into measurable changes in the types of frame contestation
deployed? For instance, are actors on the losing side more likely to engage in the use
of character frames to try to shift the balance of power? There is also the possibility
that groups on the same side of a policy debate influence one another in how they
contest the frames of their common rival(s). Groups that have repeated, structured
interaction through policy partnerships, lawsuit participation, or other forms of long-
term cooperative relationships might be especially likely to be influenced by their
peer organizations. Do groups that frequently interact and/or collaborate develop
similar frame contestation behaviors? These propositions should be tested through
further research, perhaps in different issue areas.
Additionally, researchers might look into the risks of frame contestation as an

advocacy tactic. In particular, are there instances in which confrontational framing
techniques might be counterproductive? Cobb and Ross’s work suggests that attack-
ing opponents is a tactic that must be reserved for groups that already struggle with a
low level of credibility or are relatively unknown, which makes them vulnerable to
attacks on their moral or ethical character (1997, p. 31). If advocacy groups attempt to
use character-based arguments against established organizations with positive reputa-
tions, the tactic might backfire when supporters rally in defense of the competition.
Are there cases that illustrate this outcome? Given that only one target was examined
in this study, future work might look at cases where there are several targets, some of
whom are socially constructed as more deserving than others. Is there a difference in
the use of character frames directed at opponents for which is there is greater public
animus than others (Merry, 2014, p. 97)? These and other questions open up many
avenues for research that will contribute to our understanding of interest group stra-
tegic decision making and the impacts of framing tactics on the policy process.
Jessica E. Boscarino is an assistant professor of political science at Marist College.

Her research interests include energy and environmental policy, issue framing and
policy narratives, and interest group politics.
Notes
I thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments that helped to improve this article. Marist
College provided generous financial support for this project.
1. The data were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of
National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and were distributed through
the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original col-
lectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here. Datasets, codebooks, and
details on the sampling procedure can be found at http://www.policyagendas.org/.
2. The New York Times data displayed here reflect a sampling of the first entry on every odd-numbered
page of the New York Times Index. Details on this sampling procedure, as well as that for the congres-
sional hearings data, can be found at http://www.policyagendas.org/page/datasets-codebooks.
3. For these results, see the “Gallup’s Most Important Problem” and “State of the Union Speeches” data-
sets within the Policy Agendas Project (http://www.policyagendas.org).
4. See http://rmc.sierraclub.org/pandp/1999-02/page05-1.htm.
5. The Sierra Club publishes Sierra magazine, and the Environmental Defense Fund publishes a magazine
currently titled Solutions (previously known as the EDF Letter and Environmental Defense).
6. It is possible that issue frames included in organizational magazines differ from those offered by advo-
cacy groups in different formats, such as issue ads, press releases, or congressional testimony. The
audience to whom the magazines are directed is very specialized: namely, the organization members,
who are likely predisposed to certain opinions. However, as Reber and Berger’s research (2005) shows,
these groups believe that organizational magazines have an impact outside their membership base.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the advocacy messages included in this medium are likely to
be very similar to those targeted more directly at broader audiences.
7. These individuals were selected by referencing organizational materials, including group magazines,
press releases, reports, etc. and identifying staff members that were mentioned in connection with
work on energy issues. During interviews with these individuals, I asked them to suggest additional
staffers who could offer valuable insight. I spoke to five current or former staffers or volunteers for the
Sierra Club and two from the Environmental Defense Fund. I utilized an open-ended interview tech-
nique, asking each interviewee about their position in the organization and job responsibilities, as well
as how the organization decides what line of argumentation to take with any given issue, and how
they deal with competing issue frames. Lastly, I inquired about their perceptions of the identity of the
organization, where they see their group’s position within the environmental advocacy community,
and the nature of organizational relations with members as well as other outside actors. Each interview
was recorded and later transcribed for accuracy.
8. The Cohen’s kappa value of intercoder reliability for this coding scheme is 0.646, p < 0.000. This value
was calculated based on a randomly selected 10 percent sample of the full set of documents, with two
coders, including the researcher.
9. Two notable exceptions are the works of Hirschman (1991) and Cobb and Ross (1997) that examine tac-
tics aimed at keeping issues off the agenda. In addition, social movement scholars have studied inter-
nal frame contestation that occurs when members disagree about group goals or identity. However,
there is far less work that looks at direct confrontation of frames offered by competing groups that both
seek policy change.
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The Policy Studies Journal, Vol. 44, No. 3, 2016

Setting the Record Straight: Frame Contestation as an

Policymaking in Competitive Arenas

acquisition might be a primary motivator” for NGOs, guiding their organizational

I define frame contestation as an explicit and confrontational engagement with oppos-

minimum wage as a way to fight poverty, which arguably exacerbates unemploy-

Proposition 1: Frame contestation is more likely during periods of high issue

Futility and perversity frames are more confrontational than discrediting

Case Study: U.S. Energy Policy

tracking responses to Gallup’s Most Important Problem Survey, as well as content

Data and Methods

To explore how environmentalists have addressed these frames—which provide

national security, and environmental) it is ideal for examining trends in frame

Table 1. Frame Contestation in High Versus Low Saliency Time Periods

Frame Contestation Low Saliency High Saliency

Yes 22.4% 41.1%

Table 2. Use of Discrediting Frames

Discrediting Sierra Club Environmental Defense Fund

Yes 46.7% 25.0%

Table 3. Use of Futility Frames

Futility Sierra Club Environmental Defense Fund

Yes 30.0% 4.2%

Table 4. Use of Perversity Frames

Perversity Sierra Club Environmental Defense Fund

Yes 33.3% 83.3%

Table 5. Use of Character Frames

Character Sierra Club Environmental Defense Fund

Yes 50.0% 12.5%

statistically significant according to the Pearson’s chi-square test. In Proposition 2, I

benefits of clean energy. An article published in Sierra’s “Mythbuster” column

Policy scholars have paid little attention to the dynamics of counter-framing

Additionally, researchers might look into the risks of frame contestation as an

Jessica E. Boscarino is an assistant professor of political science at Marist College.

———. 2013. “Counterframing Effects.” The Journal of Politics 75 (1): 1–16.

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