PART FOUR III.

Prescriptive period of ULP cases – 305, 2nd

Unfair Labor Practice paragraph

IV. Unfair labor practices of Employers – 259

I. Concept, Elements and Liabilities – 219 (k); 257- A. In general

258; 278 (g)

Mariano v. Royal, Feb. 27,

Foodbev International v. Ferrer, 1961
September 16, 2019 Hongkong v. NLRC, Nov. 6,
Standard Chartered v. Confesor, 1997
June 16, 2004 Bondoc v. CIR, Jan. 26,
Montealegre v. De Vera, July 10, 1989
2019 Wise v. Wise, Oct. 13, 1989
Baptista v. Villanueva, July 31, 2013
T&H v T&H Union, February 26,
2014
Schering Union v. Schering, February B. Interference – 259(a)
17, 2005
Cuadra v. CA, July 31, 2006 Dabuet v. Roche, April 30, 1987
Samahan v. NLRC, July 17, 1997
II. Jurisdiction over ULP – 224 (1)(a)

East Asiatic v. CIR, 16 SCRA 820 FACTS:

EAST ASIATIC vs CIR, EAST ASIATIC CO.
EMPLOYEES' UNION (PTUC) and SOLEDAD A.
DIZON
EN BANC G.R. No. L-17037  April 30, 1966
C.J BENGZON
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1966/apr1966/gr_l-
17037_1966.html
March 1958 - Asiatic Employees Union was organized. It
was duly registered as a legitimate labor organization, and
Dizon was a member.
April 22, 1958 - Employees' Union presented to East
Asiatic, a written demand for collective bargaining. EAST
ASIATIC required proof that the members of said union
represented the majority of the company's employees.

May 3, 1958 - the Union submitted the list with the

SUMMARY: Dizon worked with East Asiatic since
1951. 7 years later or on 1958, Asiatic Employees
(Dizon as member) was organized and demanded for
CBA. Months later, Dizon was dismissed by her
supervisors telling her that she had become inefficient
because of union activities.
Union and Dizon filed for ULP for dismissing Dizon by
reason of her Union Activities.
ISSUE: W/N EAST ASIATIC is guilty of ULP? YES
Dizon’s delay was not habitual while working w/ East
Asiatic for 7 years. Root cause of termination was her
concern for the Union.
corresponding signatures of its members, one of them
Dizon's, Dizon began working with East Asiatic as
secretary since Feb 1951.
August 28, 1958, due to an unfinished task, Dizon’s
Supervisor Sorensen called her inefficient, less efficient
than when she was not yet a union member.
Later on, Sorensen called her to his table and inquired why
she had abandoned her desk for three hours; that when she
tried to explain that she was out for only 15 minutes for a
call of nature, Sorensen again reproached her with the
imputations that she merely attended to union activities,
and neglecting her work; that when she asked him if
they wanted her to leave the company, Sorensen replied
that "Surely that was what he had been waiting for and
that the earlier she left, the better
on September 1, 1958, Dizon, who felt sick, was adviced
by the company’s medical officer for two days sick leave.
September 4, 1958, petitioner Jakobsen informed Dizon
that he had decided that she should resign voluntarily from
the company. Jakobsen also told her that she had
become inefficient because of union activities; that
should she not resign, the Company would be forced to
dismiss her;
September 6, 1958, Dizon asked if she was being kicked
out for union activities, petitioner Jakobsen answered that
"more or less, I have to put it this way"; Dizon was
dismissed effective September 1, 1958.
On September 28, 1958, Employees' Union and Dizon
charged The East Asiatic with unfair labor practice,
alleging specifically that they had dismissed Dizon by
reason of her union activities.
EAST ASIATIC averred that Dizon had been dismissed by
reason of inefficiency, grave discourtesy and usurious
practices.
ISSUE: W/N EAST ASIATIC is guilty of ULP for
dismissing Dizon by Reason of her union
activities?
Insular v. Insular, Jan. 30, 1971
INSULAR (UNION),  vs. INSULAR
G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971
EN BANC CASTRO, J.:
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1971/jan1971/gr_25291
_1971.html
FACTS: During CBA renewal negotiations, Insular Co.
insisted that the Unions drop their demand for union
security, promising money benefits if this was done.
The Unions dropped the particular demand, but still
Insular Co. continually refused to make their final
counter-proposals particularly on the salary increase.
The unions declared to strike in protest against the
insular companies. Thereafter:
1) 87 unionist were reclassified as supervisors
without increase in salary/responsibilities,
thus these unionist had to resign from the
unions.
2) When the Unions went on strike, the
company president sent individual letters
(Exh. A) to each of the striking employees
RULING: YES
DELAY WAS NOT HABITUAL; REASON FOR
TERMINATION WAS DIZON JOINING THE UNION
It is to be observed that delay in her assigned work has
not been shown to be habitual although she was in the
employ of the company for seven years; and only after
she had joined the Union, was she called to account or
reproached for something that, under other circumstances,
might have been overlooked.3 
She must have perceived the new fault-finding attitude of
her superiors, and realizing she had become persona non-
grata, she burst into tears on the day (August 30, 1958),
when Sorensen asked why she had not yet finished the
tube-mills chore and sneeringly referred to her other
interests.
Root-cause of it all, she suspected, — and as the court
found — was her concern for the new labor association.
Her employment was terminated without any of the
justifying causes enumerated in Republic Act No. 1787.
BRIBING them to abandon their strike with a
promise of free coffee, occasional movies
and overtime pay. Some continued to strike.
3) Thereafter, management men and the
company brought 3 buses and penetrated
the picket line causing injuries to the
picketers.
4) Later on, the company president sent
another letter (Exh B) to the strikers that
they shall be replaced if they failed to return
to work.
5) Company filed criminal cases against the
strikers on the ground of the injury caused to
nonstrikers. An injunction was issued against
the strikers, thus calling off the strike.
6) Company refused readmission of employees
who took active part in the strike.
On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint
for unfair labor practice against Insular under Republic
Act 875
Issue: W/n the companies are guilty of ULP for
interfering with the union’s exercise of their right
to self org? YES.
Ruling: YES the issuance of the letters, exhibit A and
B, yield clear inference by Insular to prevent the
Unions from exercising their right to self-organization.
(1) EXH A: Company Pres.’ Individual Letter -
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement
and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with
"comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional
movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in
excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their
families, so they would abandon the strike and return
to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or
union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor
practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a
strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to
striking employees individually, when they are
represented by a union, since the employees thus
offered reinstatement are unable to determine what
the consequences of returning to work would be.
(2) EXH B: Company Pres’ Individual Letter - It is
likewise an act of interference for the employer to
send a letter to all employees notifying them to return
to work at a time specified therein, otherwise new
employees would be engaged to perform their jobs.
Individual solicitation of the employees or visiting
their homes, with the employer or his representative
urging the employees to cease union activity or cease
striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All the
above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices
because they tend to undermine the concerted
activity of the employees, an activity to which they are
entitled free from the employer's molestation.
ON INSULAR’S CONTENTION THAT: Injunction
was the root cause why the strikers returned to
work not the letter. = SC HELD NO MERIT
Based on Test of Interference, and The Totality
Doctrine, the companies interference through letters
was the root cause.
The test of whether an employer has interfered
with and coerced employees within the meaning
of subsection (a) (1)
 is whether the employer has engaged in
conduct which it may reasonably be said
tends to interfere with the free exercise of
employees' rights under section 3 of the Act,
 and it is not necessary that there be direct
evidence that any employee was in fact
intimidated or coerced by statements of
threats of the employer if there is a
reasonable inference that anti-union
conduct of the employer does have an
adverse effect on self-organization and
collective bargaining.
The letters should be interpreted according to the
"totality of conduct doctrine,"
 ... whereby the culpability of an
employer's remarks were to be evaluated
not only on the basis of their implicit
implications, but were to be appraised
against the background of and in
conjunction with collateral circumstances:
IN THIS CASE:
PRECEDING ACTS:
 hired Enaje and Garcia, former legal counsels
of the petitioners, as personnel with
attractive compensations.
 the respondents reclassified 87 employees as
supervisors without increase in salary or in
responsibility, in effect compelling these
employees to resign from their unions
 despite the fact that the petitioners granted
the respondents' demand that the former
drop their demand for union shop and in
spite of urgings by the conciliators of the
Department of Labor, the respondents
adamantly refused to answer the Unions'
demands en toto.
SUBSEQUENT ACTS:
 The President’s letters (Exh A&B)
 The Criminal case filed by the company
 The non-readmission of union officials/active
strikers
(Note: Reason for strike: Union saw that Insular Co will
not negotiate in good faith.)
Rizal v. NLRC, Oct. 12, 1989
RIZAL VS NLRC
CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner Rizal Memorial
Colleges Faculty Union (RMCFU, for short), a
legitimate labor organization affiliated with the Davao
Worker’s Union (DWU, for brevity), together with the
other individual petitioners who are members thereof,
charge their employer, respondent Rizal Memorial
Colleges (hereinafter called RMC) and its
correspondents for allegedly having committed acts of
interference with said workers’ right to organization.
FACTS: Rodolfo Braga and Dionisio B. Jaboni,
presidents of RMCFU and DWU, respectively, sent a
letter to the board of trustees of RMC asking for direct
recognition and collective bargaining.
Abellera, as president of the school, replied that the
letter would be presented to the board of trustees at
its meeting and further informed them of the receipt of
another letter from respondent Rizal Memorial
Colleges Faculty League (hereafter RMCFL) likewise
requesting recognition and demanding collective
bargaining.
RMCFU filed a petition for direct certification, as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative,
with the then Court of Industrial Relations claiming
that it was the only union in the bargaining unit and its
members constituted the majority of the faculty of
RMC.
RMCFL intervened in said proceedings alleging
that it had already filed an application for registration
as a labor union with the Department of Labor, further
claiming that its members constituted the majority of
the teachers and instructors in RMC who were eligible
to vote in a certification election, and contending that
the majority of the members of petitioner union were
not legally qualified to be union members since they
were stockholders of RMC.
RMCFU staged a strike.
In a complaint, petitioner filed with the then Court of
Industrial Relations an unfair labor practice case,
alleging that "Leopoldo M. Abellera has initiated,
dominated, assisted or contributed to the organization
of the so-called Rizal Memorial Colleges Faculty
League which is composed of few teachers or
instructors employed with the RMC for the primary
purpose of busting the FACULTY UNION and
delaying its recognition by the management," and that
the president of the petitioner union, Rodolfo D.
Braga, had been subjected to discrimination by
respondent Abellera in regard to the terms and
conditions of his employment.
What ensued thereafter, according to petitioner, was
the holding of a meeting between the striking
teachers and Abellera wherein the picketing
teachers allegedly agreed to return to their
classrooms, with respondent Abellera having made
the following commitments substantially embodied in
a "return to work agreement,"
a) That the employer will not take any
retaliatory measures against the
members of the striking union by
reason of any union activities;
b) That the employer shall not dismiss
any member of the striking union by
reason of union activities and that
there would be no hiring of new
teachers, unless the present
teachers cannot cope up with the
work;
c) That job security shall be extended
to the striking members of the
union; and
d) That the striking members shall be
paid completely their salary during
the entire duration of the strike."
Petitioners, however, claim that the picket lines
were thereafter lifted and the teachers returned to
work, but when the aforesaid agreement was
presented to Abellera and the board of trustees,
they refused to affix their signatures thereto.
Significantly, while the NLRC agrees with the
foregoing statement of facts, private respondents
vigorously deny that there was such a conference
about the strike. They claim that "it was purely a
faculty meeting that was held on that date which dealt
exclusively on the rules and regulations of the Bureau
of Private Schools and of the Rizal Memorial Colleges
itself," hence no agreement could be said to have
been arrived at.
Likewise controverted by private respondents is
the claim of petitioners that Abellera again
promised that he would take in all the striking
teachers after the second strike of the teachers
commenced on June 20, 1970.
The reason advanced by the teachers for staging this
second strike was the dismissal of Abelardo Posadas,
Jr., Lilia Villanueva, Feliciano Villanueva, Abelardo
Celestial and Jose Majaducon.
Petitioners aver that they lifted the strike to show
their good faith to Abellera who met with their
union leader and one of their lawyers, in which
meeting specific issues which could lead to the
settlement of the strike were discussed. It was also
during this meeting when Abellera was supposed to
have promised to reinstate all teachers who had
struck anew.
It is not sufficiently apparent from the records as to
whether such agreements were actually made nor
can we make definite findings thereon at this late
stage.
What is adequately clear to us, however, is that a
dispute between the parties resulted in the filing
by the petitioners of Unfair Labor Practice Case with
the former Court of Industrial Relations based on the
following grounds:
(1) refusal to recognize and bargain with the
complainant RMCFU;
(2) dismissal, harassment, discrimination and
intimidation of RMCFU members by Abellera; and
(3) the RMC Faculty League is dominated and
assisted by the employer.
The assistant director found that the refusal of
therein respondents to recognize and negotiate with
RMCFU during the pendency of the petition for
certification election was legal because to do so
would be unfair labor practice against RMCFL.
He consequently ruled that unless and until RMCFU
is certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the faculty members, the employer
could not be compelled to confer with RMCFU for the
execution of a collective bargaining agreement.
Additionally, he found that there was insufficient proof
to support the contention that RMCFL was dominated
and assisted by RMC and Abellera.
Applying the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of
Republic Act No. 875, as amended by Republic
Act No. 3350, which was then the governing
legislation, the charge of unfair labor practice was
upheld but only because of the illegal dismissal of
the eleven (11) teachers named therein. Their
dismissal, according to the assistant director, was for
no other reason than their union activities. This finding
was made on the basis of a letter written by Abellera
of the following
"1. We have definitely refused to renew
our contract with the following because
of their propensity to create intrigues in
the school, to instigate others to abandon
(sic) their classes and for other school
violations. If we renew their contracts, WE
ARE SURE OF HAVING ANOTHER STRIKE
IN OUR SCHOOL THIS SEMESTER:
The National Labor Relations Commission
promulgated a decision modifying the appealed
decision by completely absolving RMC and
Abellera from any liability for unfair labor practice.
Public respondent, holding that there was no sufficient
basis for holding the employer guilty of such illegal
acts considering that the teachers mentioned in the
letter of Abellera were the ones who led the earlier
strike, which was even flayed by the Assistant
Director in his decision, the refusal of the respondent
Abellera to renew their contracts was motivated by a
desire to safeguard the rights of the school and its
students.
ISSUE: WON respondents RMC and ABELLERA are
guilty of unfair labor practice acts
RULING: YES, unfair labor practice was actually
committed.
The finding of unfair labor practice due to the
employer’s refusal to renew the teaching
contracts of the eleven (11) faculty members
referred to in the letter of Abellera should not
have been disturbed by the NLRC.
It was established that said teachers were permanent
employees who had rendered six (6) to twenty (20)
years of service. Their permanent status
notwithstanding, they were dismissed because
Abellera feared that if their contracts were renewed,
there would be a strike in the school the following
semester.
This is indisputably an unwarranted interference
with the right of workers to self-organization and
to engage in concerted activities.
An apprehension that there might be a future strike in
the school is not a ground for dismissal of the
workers.
While a strike may result in hardships or prejudice to
the school and the studentry, the employer is not
without recourse. If the employer feels that the
action is tainted with illegality, the law provides
the employer with ample remedies to protect his
interests.
Decidedly, dismissal of employees in anticipation of
an exercise of a constitutionally protected right is not
one of them.
As to the contention that there was no actual
strike
Neither can we accept respondent commission’s
theory, considering the positive factual findings
thereon, that there was no actual strike hence it
supposedly could not be said that the respondent
school interfered with or prevented the right of the
teachers concerned from participating therein.
Furthermore, the existence of a strike was not of
such pervasive significance because it is
indubitable that the employees concerned were
dismissed by reason of their union activities. No
other reason is suggested by the facts of these cases
which would support a contrary conclusion, especially
if we consider that the teachers concerned were the
ones who led the earlier strike.
OTHER ISSUES:
As to Majaducon:
The finding that unfair labor practice was committed
should also cover the case of Majaducon whose
contract was not renewed.
Not only was he listed in the letter of Abellera which,
as earlier stated, was the basis for the finding of unfair
labor practice, but no sufficient ground to validly
dismiss him was established.
ABELLERA’S CLAIM: Abellera claimed that
Majaducon stopped teaching on his own volition
supposedly because when he discovered that
Majaducon was appearing as collaborating lawyer in
a case against the former mayor, Majaducon was
reminded that the school owed favors to the city
government and the city mayor hence the school had
to maintain cordial relations with them.
Eventually, Majaducon was asked to make a choice
whether to continue as a faculty member or to
withdraw as a lawyer against the mayor.
Such compulsion to make an unnecessary choice
placed undue and unjustified pressure on the
employee who otherwise would not have thought
of leaving his employment as a teacher.
Moncada v. CIR, March 30, 1962
MONCADA VS CIR
In a complaint filed, the Moncada United Workers
Union, hereafter referred to as respondent union,
prayed that the Moncada Bijon Factory and/or Lao Oh
Kim, Yu Guat and Sotero Bernal be held guilty of
unfair labor practices and sentenced to reinstate
certain dismissed or laid-off employees who are
members of said union, and that the Rising Labor
Union — whose members are, also, employees of
said factory — be declared company dominated and,
hence, ordered dissolved.
After due trial, the Court of Industrial Relations
rendered a decision, which was affirmed by the Court
There was no showing whatsoever that Majaducon’s
work as counsel interfered with his duties as a
teacher. Majaducon’s cessation from employment
could not, therefore, be considered as voluntary on
his part and was in the nature of a contrivance to
effect a dismissal without cause.
As to Masiglat:
The case of Arnaldo Masiglat is different.
Although he was one of the teachers listed in the
aforesaid letter of Abellera, the ground for
dismissing him appears to be tenable.
He was one of those teachers who were advised by
Abellera of the expiration of their teaching contracts
hence it was within the discretion of the school to
terminate his services.
No proof establishing his permanent status
appears from the records, hence the termination
of his employment was not due to dismissal but
because of the expiration of his contract.
As to other employees:
With respect to the other petitioners who were
allegedly illegally dismissed, the records do not
reveal any act of unfair labor practice.
No countervailing evidence was presented to rebut
the proof submitted by respondent RMC showing
lawful causes for dismissing them. Neither was there
any substantial evidence that they were dismissed for
their union activities.
The suspicion that they were dismissed for such
reasons, when coupled with other facts which in
themselves might have been inadequate to support
an adverse finding against the employer, may suffice
to sustain a finding that the employer violated the
provisions of the law. Such other complementary
circumstances are, however, absent with respect to
them.
en banc, granting the first prayer, but denying the
second.
Hence, this appeal by certiorari taken by the factory
and/or Lao Oh Kim, Yu Guat and Sotero Bernal.
FACTS: Admittedly, Lao Oh Kim owned the Moncada
Bijon Factory, which is operated in Moncada, Tarlac
Respondent union, whose members are
employees and laborers of said factory, filed a
case with the Court of Industrial Relations against
Lao Oh Kim, for overtime services allegedly
rendered by them.
Soon thereafter, the factory seemingly suspended
operations.

Then Lao Oh Kim secured permission from the Court
to sell the factory, subject to the condition that the
deed of conveyance would be submitted to said Court
for approval and that, should the factory resume
operations, the laid-off laborers who were members of
respondent union would be given preference by the
new owner, purchaser or operator.
A month later, Lao Oh Kim filed with the Court a
statement to the effect that he had executed, in favor
of Teofilo Limcaco, a deed of lease of, with option to
purchase, said factory.
Subsequently, an amicable settlement was reached
between respondent union on one hand, and Lao Oh
Kim and Limcaco on the other, whereby Lao Oh Kim
and Limcaco undertook to reinstate the dismissed
workers.
Meanwhile, respondent union had filed unfair
labor practice case against the factory and Teofilo
Limcaco, as well as Chan It and Rufino Benitez.
CIR: In due course, decision was rendered thereon,
which was affirmed by the Court en banc, finding
Rufino Benitez, a labor contractor engaged by
Teofilo Limcaco, guilty of the unfair labor
practices charged therein and sentencing him to
reinstate the dismissed workers.
On or about July 10, 1956, Lao Oh Kim called the
factory workers to a meeting, in which he asked
them to resign from respondent union, to forego
their overtime claims and to revert to their former
working hours (from 3:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m.), but
the members of said union rejected the request.
Four (4) days later, the factory suspended its
operations.
C. Yellow Dog Contract – 259(b)
Mendoza v. Officers, January 25, 2016
G.R. No. 201595
MENDOZA vs OFFICERS
YELLOW DOG
SECOND U.L.P.: "YELLOW DOG" CONDITION (ARTICLE
248[b]) Contract provisions whereby an employee
Presently, Lao Oh Kim executed a deed purporting to
convey the factory to Yu Guat.
When the factory resumed operations, the
members of respondent union reported for work,
but — according to the evidence introduced by
respondent union — they were not readmitted,
although those who had resigned from the union
were admitted.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of ULP
RULING: YES
Respondent union tried to prove that the alleged sale
to Yu Guat who was Lao Oh Kim’s former agent in the
purchase and delivery of palay to his (Lao Oh Kim’s)
rice mill, was simulated and a devise resorted to
merely to get rid of the recalcitrant employees who
were members of said union.
Upon the other hand, petitioners herein introduced
testimonial evidence to the contrary, but the lower
court gave no credence to said evidence and
accepted as true the version of respondent union,
and we think, correctly, in the light of the facts
and circumstances surrounding the case.
In any event, the conclusion reached by the lower
court on this point is beyond our power of review on
appeal by certiorari, involving, as it does, a question
of fact and there being competent evidence in support
of said conclusion.
It is urged that the finding of unfair labor practices on
the part of petitioners herein is inconsistent with the
conclusion of the lower court to the effect that the
Rising Labor Union is not company dominated. No
such inconsistency exists, for an employer can
discriminate in favor of a union, even if it were not
company dominated.
Aronson v. ALU, July 9, 1971
agrees that during the period of his employment
he will not become a member of a labor union
have been outlawed in the United States, by
legislation in some states, as well as by Federal
legislation.
The ^yellow dog" contract is a promise exacted from
workers as a condition of employment that they
are not to belong to, or attempt to foster, a union
during their period of employment.
An American scheme, the typical yellow dog contract
 is an at-will employment agreement which contains, in
addition to the usual provisions for employment, the
following three provisions:
(1) a representation by the employee that he
is not a member of a labor union;
(2) a promise by the employee not to join a
labor union;
(3) a promise by the employee that, upon
joining a labor union, he will quit his
employment.
The exacting of such written promise was known in
England as "signing the document," and in the United
States as the "iron clad" at first, and after 1917 as the
"yellow dog contract."
Only a yellow dog, cried the unionists, would sign
such a contract.
Labor's successful designation of this arrangement as
a yellow dog contract was a very effective piece of
public relations, for the term itself has an odious
connotation.
The unions' objection culminated in the passage of
the
Norris-La Guardia Act in 1932. It severely controlled
the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes and
effectively stopped employers from using the yellow
dog contracts to support their petitions against
unionization activities.
In the Philippines, such a contract is considered an
unfair labor practice by express provision of the law.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner was a member of the Manila Water
Employees Union (MWEU).
The respondents were MWEU officers.
MWEU (through Cometa) informed Mendoza that the
union was unable to fully deduct the increased
P200.00 union dues from his salary (due to lack of the
required December 2006 check-off authorization
from him.)
Mendoza was warned that his failure to pay the union
dues would result in sanctions upon him.
For such failure to pay the union dues, there was an
alleged violation of Sec 1(g) Article IX of the MWEU’s
Consitution and By-laws.
The charge was referred to the grievance committee.
MWEU grievance committee recommended suspension
of Mendoza for 30 days.
1st charge – non-payment of dues
Penalty: Mendoza was suspended – effective June 25,
2007
Letter Verdict
1st letter Appeal denied
June 26, 2007 – prescriptive
Mendoza indicated intention to period expired
appeal suspension to General
Membership in accordance with
sec 2(g), Article V of the union’s
constitution and by-laws which
grants them the right to appeal
any arbitrary resolution, policy and
rule promulgated by the Executive
Board to the General Membership
Assembly
2nd letter Not acted
July 4, 2007 upon
Reiterating and demanding that
the general membership be
convened to take up their appeal
2nd charge – non-payment of dues
Penalty – suspension effective Aug 24, 2007
He submitted a written reply invoking his right to
appeal.
Appeal not acted upon.
Meanwhile, MWEU scheduled an election of officers on
September 14, 2007.
Mendoza filed his COC but he was disqualified for not
being a member in good standing due to his suspension.
Third charge – non-payment of dues
Penalty – expulsion from the union (unanimous
approval)
His pleas for an appeal to the General Membership
Assembly were once more unheeded.
In 2008, during the freedom period and negotiations
for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with
MWC,
Mendoza joined another union – WATER –AFWC
where he was elected as the president.
Other MWEU members were inclined to join
WATER0AFWC but the MWEU director threatened that
they would not get benefits from the new CBA if they did
so.
The MWEU leadership submitted a proposed CBA which
contained provisions to the effect that in the event of
retrenchment, non-MWEU members shall be removed
first, and that upon the signing of the CBA, only
MWEU members shall receive a signing bonus.
A complaint for ULP was filed before the NLRC
Petitioner accused the respondents of illegal
termination from MWEU in connection with the
events relative to
1. his non-payment of union dues;
2. unlawful interference,
3. coercion, and v
4. violation of the rights of MWC employees to
self-organization – in connection with the
proposed CBA submitted by MWEU leadership,
which petitioner claims contained provisions
that discriminated against non-MWEU
members.
Respondents claimed
1. that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over
the dispute, which is intra-union in nature;
2. that the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) was
the proper venue, in accordance with Article
226 of the Labor Code and Section 1, Rule XI of
Department Order 40-03, series of 2003, of the
DOLE;26 and
3. that they were not guilty of unfair labor
practices, discrimination, coercion or
restraint.
Issue
Whether the respondents [union officers] are guilty
of ULP? YES
Our Ruling
Unfair labor practices may be committed both by the
employer under Article 248 and by labor
organizations under Article 249 of the Labor Code
What was claimed to be an unfair labor practice?
Specifically, Mendoza claims that
he was suspended and expelled from MWEU illegally
as a result of the denial of his right to appeal his case
to the general membership assembly in accordance
with the union’s constitution and by-laws.
The officers of the union claimed that
[charge is intra-union] and that Mendoza lost his right to
appeal when he failed to petition to convene the general
assembly though the required 30% signature of the
union membership in good standing pursuant to
MWEU’s constitution and by-laws.
Under Article VI, Section 2(a) of MWEU’s Constitution
and By-Laws, the general membership assembly has the
power to "review revise modify affirm or repeal [sic]
resolution and decision of the Executive Board and/or
committees upon petition of thirty percent (30%) of the
Union in good standing," and under Section 2(d), to
"revise, modify, affirm or reverse all expulsion cases."
Under Section 3 of the same Article, "[t]he decision of
the Executive Board may be appealed to the General
Membership which by a simple majority vote reverse the
decision of said body.
If the general Assembly is not in session the decision of
the Executive Board may be reversed by a petition of the
majority of the general membership in good standing."
And, in Article X, Section 5, "[a]ny dismissed and/or
expelled member shall have the right to appeal to the
Executive Board within seven days from notice of said
dismissal and/or expulsion which, in [turn] shall be
referred to the General membership assembly.
In case of an appeal, a simple majority of the decision of
the Executive Board is imperative. The same shall be
approved/disapproved by a majority vote of the general
membership assembly in a meeting duly called for the
purpose."
In regard to suspension of a union member, MWEU’s
Constitution and By-Laws provides under Article X,
Section 4 thereof that "[a]ny suspended member shall
have the right to appeal within three (3) working
days from the date of notice of said suspension. In
case of an appeal a simple majority of vote of the
Executive Board shall be necessary to nullify the
suspension."
Based on the CBL provisions:
1. When an MWEU member is suspended, he can
appeal within 3 working days from the notice of
suspension
2. Such appeal, the MWEU executive board is
obligated to act upon by a simple majority vote
3. If a member is expelled – he is given 7 days
from notice to appeal to exec board
4. Board required to act by simple majority
 5. Board’s decision shall be approved/disapproved
by majority vote of general membership
In this case,
1. When Mendoza received the letter of the board
on his first and second suspension, he
immediately and timely filed a written appeal
a. But the executive board did not act on
it
2. When he was charged the third time and
received the notice of expulsion, his timely
appeal was not again acted upon by the board.
Thus, contrary to respondents’ argument that petitioner
lost his right to appeal when he failed to petition to
convene the general assembly through the required
signature of 30% of the union membership in good
standing pursuant to Article VI, Section 2(a) of MWEU’s
Constitution and By-Laws or by a petition of the majority
of the general membership in good standing under
Article VI, Section 3,
SC found that Mendoza was illegally suspended for
the second time and thereafter unlawfully expelled
from MWEU due to respondents’ failure to act on his
written appeals.
On the 30% requirement alleged by the board based
on its CBL
The required petition to convene the general
assembly through the required signature of 30%
(under Article VI, Section 2[a]) or majority (under Article
VI, Section 3) of the union membership does not apply
in petitioner’s case; the Executive Board must first act
on his two appeals before the matter could properly be
referred to the general membership.
Because the Union officers did not act on the two
appeals, Mendoza was
1. unceremoniously suspended, disqualified
and
2. deprived of his right to run for the position
of MWEU VP
3. expelled from MWEU and
4. forced to join another union – WATER –
AFWC
For these, respondents are guilty of unfair labor
practices under Article 249 (a) and (b) – that is,
violation of petitioner’s right to self-organization,
unlawful discrimination, and illegal termination of his
union membership – which case falls within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters, in
accordance with Article 217 of the Labor Code.
The primary concept of unfair labor practices is stated in
Article 247 of the Labor Code, which states:
Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and
procedure for prosecution thereof. –– Unfair labor
practices violate the constitutional right of workers
and employees to self-organization, are inimical to the
legitimate interests of both labor and management,
including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise
deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and
mutual respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the
promotion of healthy and stable labor-management
relations.
"In essence, [unfair labor practice] relates to the
commission of acts that transgress the workers’ right to
organize."
"[A]ll the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor practice
in essence relate to the workers’ right to self-
organization."
"[T]he term unfair labor practice refers to that gamut of
offenses defined in the Labor Code which, at their core,
violates the constitutional right of workers and
employees to self-organization."52
Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the ‘right to
self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for purposes of
collective bargaining.’ This is made plain by no less than
three provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Article 243 of the Code provides as follows:
ART. 243. Coverage and employees’ right to self-
organization. — All persons employed in commercial,
industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious,
charitable, medical, or educational institutions whether
operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join, or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for purposes or
collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and
itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers
and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for their mutual aid and protection.
Article 248 (a) declares it to be an unfair labor
practice for an employer, among others, to ‘interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their
right to self-organization.’
Similarly, Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization to ‘restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-
organization . . .’
xxxx
The right of self-organization includes the right to
organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine
which of two or more unions in an establishment to join,
and to engage in concerted activities with co-workers for
purposes of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual
aid and protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or
enhancement of their rights and interests.53
Cathay v. CA, August 30, 2006
G.R. No. 164561 August 30, 2006
CATHAY PACIFIC VS CA
FACTS:
Labor case before the NLRC filed by Tamondong
[supervisory employee]
Capasco hired Tamondong as assistant to the personnel
manager for its Canta plant.
Thereafter, he was promoted to the position of
Personnel/Administrative Officer, and later to that of
Personnel Superintendent.
Sometime in June 1996, the supervisory personnel of
CAPASCO launched a move to organize a union
among their ranks, later known as private respondent
CUSE.
Tamondong actively involved himself in the formation of
the union and was elected as one of its officers.
Then, CAPASCO sent a memo to Tamondong
requiring him to explain and discontinue from his
union activities.
Tamondong ignored the memo and replied that as a
supervisory employee, he has a right to join and organize
a labor union.
Due to this, Tamondong was terminated from
employment on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence – his union activities cited as acts constituting
serious disloyalty to the company.
Tamondong challenged his dismissal for being illegal and
as one that constituted unfair labor practice by filing a
complaint for illegal dismissal and ULP before the NLRC.
According to him, there was no just cause for his
dismissal and it was anchored solely on his
involvement and active participation in the
organization of the union of supervisory personnel in
CAPASCO.
CAPASCO’s contention:
1. That tamondong was a managerial employee
(being a personnel superintendent) and under
the law, he was prohibited from joining a union.
2. Why managerial? because he was the one
laying down major management policies on
personnel relations such as: issuing memos on
company rules and regulations, imposing
disciplinary sanctions such as warnings and
suspensions, and executing the same with full
power and discretion.
3. That they are not guilty of illegal dismissal
and unfair labor practice because private
respondent Tamondong was validly
dismissed and the reason for preventing him
to join a labor union was the nature of his
position and functions as Personnel
Superintendent, which position was
incompatible and in conflict with his union
activities. Consequently, it was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals
to rule that petitioner CAPASCO was guilty of
illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.
ISSUE: Did capasco commit ULP when it terminated
Tamondng’s employment?
Ruling:
Note that the petition for certiorari was not the proper
remedy. But granting arguendo that it was -
Case still dismissible –
1. Tamondong not managerial, merely supervisory
– he was required to observe fixed daily
working hours [uncharacteristic of managerial
employee]
2. Tamondong may have possessed enormous
powers and was performing important
functions that goes with the position of
Personnel Superintendent, nevertheless, there
was no clear showing that he is at liberty, by
using his own discretion and disposition, to lay
down and execute major business and
operational policies for and in behalf of
CAPASCO.
3. he does not possess the power to hire, transfer,
terminate, or discipline erring employees of the
company.
Thus, given the foregoing findings of the Court of
Appeals that private respondent is a supervisory
employee, it is indeed an unfair labor practice on the
part of petitioner CAPASCO to dismiss him on
account of his union activities, thereby curtailing his
constitutionally guaranteed right to self-
organization.
[he was clearly terminated for the reason for the joining
of the union, when he had such a right to do so, not
being a managerial employee. Thus, the act of the
employer in terminating him for joining the labor union is
considered an unfair labor practice]
Cainta v. Cainta Employees
Union, May 4, 2006
Purefoods v. Nagkakaisang,
August 28, 2008

D. Contracting Out – 259©

4. At the most, the record merely showed that
[private respondent] Tamondong informed and
warned rank-and-file employees with respect to Shell Union v. Shell, May 31,
their violations of CAPASCO’s rules and 1971
regulations. x x x. [Also, the functions
BPI Employees Union v. BPI ,
performed by private respondent such as]
issuance of warning to employees with irregular July 24, 2013
attendance and unauthorized leave of absences CEPALCO v. CEPALCO Union,
and requiring employees to explain regarding June 20, 2016
charges of abandonment of work, are normally
performed by a mere supervisor, and not by a
manager. 32
E. Company domination – 259(d)
Private respondent Tamondong did not perform any of
the functions of a managerial employee as stated in the
definition given to it by the Code. PDC v. CIR, 80 SCRA 434

Hence, the Labor Code provisions regarding Philippine Union v. Phil.

disqualification of a managerial employee from American February 28, 1963
joining, assisting or forming any labor organization
does not apply to herein private respondent
Tamondong.
F. Discrimination – 259(e)
Being a supervisory employee of CAPASCO, he cannot
be prohibited from joining or participating in the
union activities of private respondent CUSE/
1. Illustrations

Lakas v. Marcelo, 118 SCRA 422

Issue: WON there was refusal on the part of Marcelo
Companies to re-admit the complaining striking workers
LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN v.
which would constitute Unfair Labor Practice- NO
MARCELO ENTEERPRISES et al.
Held: It is a settled jurisprudence that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer to reinstate or refuse re-
employment of members of union who abandon their strike
and make unconditional offer to return to work.
In this case, it is the contention of the striking workers that
the act of the company in requiring the striking workers to
fill-up a form in which they would indicate their available
time for work is an act of discrimination.
However, it is clear that the Company did not refuse to
reinstate or re-employ the strikers. While it is true that upon
their return, the strikers were required to fill-up a form, this
requirement was only for the purpose of proper scheduling
of the start of work for each returning striker.
It must be noted that as a consequence of the two strikes
which were both attended widespread acts of violence and
vandalism, the business of the companies was completely
paralyzed. It would hardly be justiciable to demand of the
respondent companies to readmit all the returning workers
in one big force or as each demanded readmission.
What is most striking, according to the Supreme Court, is
the fact that all of the returning strikers who filled up the
form were scheduled for work and consequently started with
their jobs. It is only those strikers who refused or failed to
fill-up the required form, like the complaining employees in
AHS v. NLRC, March 30, 1987
AHS v. NLRC
Issue: WON the increase in the sales quota imposed by the
company is an act of discrimination constituting unfair labor
practice. YES
Held: Unlike the other field representatives whose quotas
were increased by an average of 98%, that of the union
president and vice-president were increased 400% and
300%, respectively. No valid explanation was advised by the
company for such marked difference. Considered in the light
of the anti-union attitude exhibited by the company in
transferring union president from the main office in Manila to
Cebu when the union was still being organized. The uneven
application of its marketing strategy plan by the company is
an act of discrimination considered as an unfair labor
practice.
It has previously been indicated that an employer may treat
freely with an employee and is not obliged to support his
actions with a reason or purpose. However, where the
attendant circumstances, the history of employer’s past
conduct and the like considerations, coupled with an
this case, who were not scheduled for work and
consequently have not been re-employed by the Companies.
Even if there was a sincere belief on their part that the
requirement was a ruse at screening them, this fear would
have been dispelled upon notice of the fact that each and all
of their co-strikers complied with such requirement were in
fact scheduled for work and started to work. The stoppage
of their work was not, therefore, the direct consequence of
the Companies’ complained act.
In the case of Pagkakaisang Itinataguyod ng mga
Manggawa sa Ang Tibay v. Ang Tibay, it is held that the
exaction by the employer from the strikers returning to work
of a promise not to destroy company property and not to
commit acts of reprisal against union members who did not
participate in the strike, cannot be considered an unfair labor
practice because it was not intended to discourage union
membership. It was an act of self-preservation designed to
insure peace and order in the employer’s premises.
In this case, the Supreme Court said that the requirement of
filling up a form was an act of self-preservation, designed to
effect cost-savings as well as to insure peace and order
within their premises.
intimidate connection between the employer’s action and the
union affiliations or activities of the particular employee or
employees taken as a whole raise a suspicion as to the
motivation for the employer’s action, the failure of the
employer to ascribe valid reason therefor may justify an
inference that his unexplained conduct in respect of the
particular employee or employees was inspired by the
latter’s union membership or activities.
While the presence of this mere suspicion neither takes the
place of evidence that the employer’s conduct was
improperly motivated nor dispenses with the requirement of
proof of the fact, such suspicion, when coupled with other
facts which in themselves, might have been inadequate to
support an adverse finding against the employer, may
suffice to sustain a finding that the employer’s action is a
violation.
Manila Hotel v.
Pines Hotel, Sept.
28, 1972
Manila Pencil v.
CIR, 14 SCRA 955
Bataan v. NLRC,
May 9, 1988
 bargaini
ng shop
2. Valid f.
discrimination, bargaini
union security ng for
agreements member
s only
PICOP v. Taneca, g. agency
August 9, 2010 shop
NUWHRAIN v.
NLRC, September 30, 2008 G. Discrimination due to testimony –
BPI V. BPI Union , 259(f)
Aug. 10, 2010
Mabeza v. NLRC, April 18,
a. closed 1997
shop Itogon v. Baldo, Dec. 24,
1964
Tanduay
v. NLRC, H. Violation of the duty to bargain –
249 259(g)
SCRA
470 Standard Chartered v.
Kapisan Confesor, June 16, 2004
an v.
Hamilto I. Paid negotiation – 259(h)
n, Oct.
30, 1962 J. Violation of the CBA – 259(i)
Tropical
v.
Tropical, j.1 Runaway Shop
January
20, 1990
Complex
b. union Electronics v. Complex , July
shop 19, 1999
c. modified
union j.2 Featherbedding
shop
d. Foodbev
mainten International v.
ance of Ferrer, September
member 16, 2019
ship
shop K. Closure during ULP charges
e.
exclusive
 Polymer v. Salamuding,
July 24, 2014

IV. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations –

260

A. In general

Salunga v. CIR, 21 SCRA

216
Heirs of Cruz v. CIR, Dec.
27, 1969
Rance v. NLRC, June 30,
1988

B. To restrain or coerce -
260(a)

Mendoza v. Officers,
January 25, 2016

C. Blue Sky Bargaining- 260

©

Standard Chartered v.
Confesor, June 16, 2004

D. Featherbedding – 260(d)