1
G.R. No. L-12647             May 31, 1961
AMERICAN MAIL LINE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
CITY OF BASILAN, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila "declaring illegal and
void Ordinance No. 180, Series of 1955, of the City of Basilan," and dismissing
defendants, counterclaim for lack of merit.
On September 12, 1955 the City Council of Basilan City enacted Ordinance No. 180,
Series of 1955, (Exh. N) amending Title IV, Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1948, (Exh. A)
by adding thereto Section 1 (D) and Sections 2 (C) and (D). The first reads as follows:
Section 1. Article IV of ordinance numbered seven entitled, 'The Port Area
Ordinance', is hereby amended to read as follows:
ARTICLE IV. REGULATION FOR BERTHING, MOORING, DOCKING AND
ANCHORING AT PIERS OR WHARVES AT ANY POINT WITHIN THE CITY OF
BASILAN AND FOR ANCHORING AT ANY OPEN BAY, CHANNEL OR ANY OTHER
POINT WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL WATERS OF THE CITY OF BASILAN
Sec. 2. Section 1 of Ordinance No. 7 is hereby amended and adding thereto a new
paragraph to be known as Section 1 (D), to read as follows:
"Section 1 (D). Any foreign vessel engaged in coastwise trade which may anchor at
any open bay, channel, or any loading point within the territorial waters of the City of
Basilan for the purpose of loading or unloading logs or passengers and other cargoes
shall pay an anchorage fee of 1/2 centavo (P.005) per registered gross ton of the
vessel for the first twenty-four (24) hours, or part thereof, and for succeeding hours, or
part thereof, PROVIDED, that maximum charge shall not exceed, seventy-five pesos
(P75.00) per day, irrespective of the greater tonnage of the vessels."
Appellees are foreign shipping companies licensed to do business in the Philippines,
with offices in Manila. Their vessels call at Basilan City and anchor in the bay or
channel within its territorial waters. As the city treasurer assessed and attempted to
collect from them the anchorage fees prescribed in the aforesaid amendatory
ordinance, they filed the present action for Declaratory Relief to have the courts
determine its validity. Upon their petition the lower court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining appellants from collecting or attempting to collect from them the
fees prescribed therein.
After the denial of appellants' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of wrong
venue, they filed their answer alleging therein that the City of Basilan had authority,
through its city council, to enact the questioned ordinance in the exercise of either its
revenue-raising power or of its police power. They also filed a counterclaim to recover
alleged uncollected anchorage dues amounting to P7,500.00, and the sum of
P2,000.00 for expenses incurred in defending the suit.
The question to be resolved is whether the City of Basilan has the authority to enact
Ordinance 180 and to collect the anchorage fees prescribed therein.
In support of the affirmative, appellant city relies upon the following provisions of its
Charter (Republic Act 288):
SEC. 14. General Powers and Duties of the Council. — Except as otherwise provided
by law, and subject to the conditions and limitations thereof, the Council shall have
the following legislative powers:
(a) To levy and collect taxes for general and special purposes in accordance with law.
xxx     xxx     xxx
(c) To enact ordinances for the maintenance and preservation of peace and good
morals.
xxx     xxx     xxx
(v) To fix the charges to be paid by all watercraft landing at or using public wharves,
docks, levees, or landing places.
Under paragraph (a) transcribed above, it is clear that the City of Basilan may only
levy and collect taxes for general and special purposes in accordance with or as
provided by law; in other words, the city of Basilan was not granted a blanket power of
taxation. The use of the phrase "in accordance with law" — which, in our opinion,
means the same as "provided by law" — clearly discloses the legislative intent to limit
the taxing power of the City.
The next point to be considered whether the questioned ordinance may be upheld
under the provisions of Section 14(v) of Republic Act No. 288. After a careful
consideration of the language employed therein, we have reached the conclusion that
said provision does not authorize the City of Basilan to promulgate ordinances
providing for the collection of "Anchorage" fees. This is clearly not included in the
power granted by the provision under consideration "to fix the charges to be paid by
all watercraft landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places."
That this is so is shown by the need which the City of Basilan had to enact the
amendatory ordinance.
Appellants also argue that the ordinance in question was validly enacted in the
exercise of the city's police power and that the fees imposed therein are for purely
regulatory purposes. In this connection it has been held that the power to regulate as
an exercise of police power does not include the power to impose fees for revenue
purposes (Cu Unijeng vs. Patstone, 42 Phil. 818; Pacific Commercial Co. vs.
Romualdez etc. et al., 46 Phil. 917; Arquiza etc. vs. Municipality of Zamboanga, 55
Phil. 653). In the Cu Unjieng case it was held that fees for purely regulatory purposes
"may only be of sufficient amount to include the expenses of issuing the license and
the cost of the necessary inspection or police surveillance, taking into account not
only the expense of direct regulation but also incidental expenses. In Manila Electric

Co. vs. Auditor General, 73 Phil. 129-135, it was also held that the regulatory fee
"must be more than sufficient to cover the actual cost of inspection or examination as
nearly as the same can be estimated. If it were possible to prove in advance the exact
cost, that would be the limit of the fee."
To support the claim that the fees imposed are merely regulatory it is said that the
City of Basilan is an island with mountainous coasts and fringed by numerous coves
and island bays and islets, and may become a veritable haven for smugglers if the
city has no funds or means to suppress their illegal activities, but we believe that, this
notwithstanding, the fees required are extended for revenue purposes. In the first
place, being cased upon the tonnage of the vessels, the fees have no proper or
reasonable relation to the cost of issuing the permits and the cost of inspection or
surveillance. In the second place, the fee imposed on foreign vessels — 1/2 centavo
per registered gross ton for the first 24 hours and which shall not exceed P75.00 per
day — exceeds even the harbor fee imposed by the National Government, which is
only P50.00 for foreign vessels (sec. 2702 of the Tariff and Customs Code, Republic
Act No. 1937, taken from Sec. 2, Republic Act No. 1317 which was enacted by
Congress to raise revenues for the Port Works Fund). Moreover, Mariano Mancao,
Port Inspector of the City of Basilan, in his affidavit dated February 17, 1956 (Exh. O),
states that were it not for the injunction issued by the lower court in this case, the city
"would have collected considerable amounts from the plaintiffs for anchorage fees".
All these circumstances point to the conclusion that the fees were intended for
revenue purposes.
Lastly, appellant city's own contention that the questioned ordinance was enacted in
the exercise of its power of taxation, makes it obvious that the fees imposed are not
merely regulatory.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, and the preliminary injunction
issued heretofore is made final. Without costs.
G.R. No. 135535             February 14, 2005
ZOOMZAT, INC., petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Resolution1 dated June 17, 1998 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 22026 approving the
withdrawal of the Information charging herein respondents, all members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City, of violation of Section 3(e), R.A.
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and its Resolution2 dated September 9, 1998, denying petitioner Zoomzat, Inc.’s
motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Zoomzat, Inc. alleged that on December 20, 1991, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Gingoog City passed Resolution No. 2613 which resolved "to express
the willingness of the City of Gingoog to allow Zoomzat to install and operate a cable
TV system." Thereupon, petitioner applied for a mayor’s permit but the same was not
acted upon by the mayor’s office.
2
Subsequently, or on April 6, 1993, respondents enacted Ordinance No. 194 which
granted a franchise to Gingoog Spacelink Cable TV, Inc. to operate a cable television
for a period of ten (10) years, subject to automatic renewal.
Hence, on July 30, 1993, petitioner filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against herein respondents for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019.
The complaint alleged that in enacting Ordinance No. 19, the respondents gave
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to Spacelink, to the prejudice of
petitioner who was a prior grantee-applicant by virtue of Resolution No. 261.
On December 20, 1994, Graft Investigation Officer I Virginia Tehano-Ang,
recommended the indictment of the respondents under Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019,5 which recommendation was affirmed on review by Special Prosecution Officer
II Rolando Ines.6
Accordingly, a criminal information for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, was
filed against the respondents before the Sandiganbayan. The case was docketed as
Crim. Case No. 22026.
However, upon directive by the Sandiganbayan to restudy the instant case, Special
Prosecution Officer II Antonio Manzano recommended the dismissal of the case and
the Information withdrawn for lack of probable cause.7 On further investigation,
Special Prosecution Officer III Victor Pascual also recommended that the case be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.8
Consequently, on June 17, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued the now assailed
resolution approving the dismissal of the case and ordering the withdrawal of the
Information against the respondents. On September 9, 1998, the Sandiganbayan
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner assails the findings of Special Prosecutor Pascual that under Executive
Order No. 205,9 it is the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), and not the
local government unit, that has the power and authority to allow or disallow the
operation of cable television. It argues that while the NTC has the authority to grant
the franchise to operate a cable television, this power is not exclusive because under
the Local Government Code, the city council also has the power to grant permits,
licenses and franchises in aid of the local government unit’s regulatory or revenue
raising powers.
Petitioner also contends that the grant of exclusive franchise to Spacelink for a period
of ten (10) years subject to automatic renewal, contravenes Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 205, which provides that "a certificate of authority to operate a CATV by
the Commission shall be on a non-exclusive basis and for a period not to exceed 15
years." Thus, in awarding an exclusive franchise, the petitioner asserts that
respondents gave Spacelink undue or unwarranted advantage and preference
because it stifled business competition. It claims that, even assuming the lack of

actual damage or injury, the fact remains that respondents extended undue favor and
advantage to Spacelink, which makes them liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Respondents were charged with violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, which
states:
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
…
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses
or permits or other concessions. (Emphasis ours)
Thus, for one to be held liable under Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, he must be an
officer or employee of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
Executive Order No. 205 clearly provides that only the NTC could grant certificates of
authority to cable television operators and issue the necessary implementing rules
and regulations. Likewise, Executive Order No. 436,10 vests with the NTC the
regulation and supervision of cable television industry in the Philippines.
Our pronouncement in Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,11 is pertinent:
There is no law specifically authorizing the LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV
system. Whatever authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn
when President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1512 "terminating all franchises, permits or
certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local
governments." Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, "only persons,
associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional
Authority or Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a
cable television system or render cable television service within a service area."
It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization,
municipalities have no power to grant franchises. Consequently, the protection of the
constitutional provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not
extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its
powers, or ultra vires.
3
It is undisputed that respondents were not employees of NTC. Instead, they were
charged in their official capacity as members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Gingoog City. As such, they cannot be charged with violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No.
3019 for enacting Ordinance No. 19 which granted Spacelink a franchise to operate a
cable television.
Petitioner, however, insists that while the NTC is the licensing and regulatory body,
nonetheless, the actual operations of cable television entails other activities, which
may be regulated by the local government unit pursuant to the general welfare clause
or subject to its revenue generating powers.
Again, this issue has been discussed in Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,12 thus:
But, lest we be misunderstood, nothing herein should be interpreted as to strip LGUs
of their general power to prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of the
Local Government Code. It must be emphasized that when E.O. No. 436 decrees that
the "regulatory power" shall be vested "solely" in the NTC, it pertains to the
"regulatory power" over those matters, which are peculiarly within the NTC’s
competence …
There is no dispute that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, like other local
legislative bodies, has been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions
under the general welfare clause of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code of
1983. That it continues to possess such power is clear under the new law, R.A. No.
7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991).
Indeed, under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code, the local
government unit can regulate the operation of cable television but only when it
encroaches on public properties, such as the use of public streets, rights of ways, the
founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions. 13 Beyond these parameters,
its acts, such as the grant of the franchise to Spacelink, would be ultra vires.
Plainly, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City overstepped the bounds of its
authority when it usurped the powers of the NTC with the enactment of Ordinance No.
19. Being a void legislative act, Ordinance No. 19 did not confer any right nor vest
any privilege to Spacelink. As such, petitioner could not claim to have been
prejudiced or suffered injury thereby. Incidentally, petitioner’s claim of undue injury
becomes even more baseless with the finding that Spacelink did not commence to
operate despite the grant to it of a franchise under Ordinance No. 19.
In addition, petitioner could not impute manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence on the part of the respondents when they enacted Ordinance
No. 19. A perfunctory reading of Resolution No. 261 shows that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod did not grant a franchise to it but merely expressed its willingness to
allow the petitioner to install and operate a cable television. Had respondents
intended otherwise, they would have couched the resolution in more concrete,
specific and categorical terms. In contrast, Ordinance No. 19 clearly and

unequivocally granted a franchise to Spacelink, specifically stating therein its terms
and conditions. Not being a bona fide franchise holder, petitioner could not claim prior
right on the strength of Resolution No. 261.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 17, 1998, approving the withdrawal of
the Information against the respondents and the dismissal of Crim. Case No. 22026,
for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, and the Resolution dated September 9,
1998, denying reconsideration thereof, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150640             March 22, 2007
BARANGAY SINDALAN, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA, rep. by BARANGAY
CAPTAIN ISMAEL GUTIERREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE MAGTOTO III, and PATRICIA
SINDAYAN, Respondents.
Expropriation, if misused or abused, would trench on the property rights of individuals
without due process of law.
The Case
For review before the Court in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 are the May 30,
2001 Decision1 and October 26, 2001 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
reversing and setting aside the August 2, 1990 Order 3 of the San Fernando,
Pampanga Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43. The CA Resolution denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the May 30, 2001 Decision and in effect, the
appellate court dismissed petitioner’s Complaint for eminent domain.
The Facts
On April 8, 1983, pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council, petitioner
Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, represented by Barangay Captain
Ismael Gutierrez, filed a Complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses
Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan, the registered owners of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117674-R. The Complaint was docketed
as Civil Case No. 6756 and raffled to the San Fernando, Pampanga RTC, Branch 43.
Petitioner sought to convert a portion of respondents’ land into Barangay Sindalan’s
feeder road. The alleged public purposes sought to be served by the expropriation
were stated in Barangay Resolution No. 6, as follows:
WHEREAS, said parcels of land shall be used, when acquired, as a barangay feeder
road for the agricultural and other products of the residents, and just as inlet for their
basic needs;
WHEREAS, presently, residents have to take a long circuitous dirt road before they
can reach the concrete provincial road, entailing so much time, effort and money, not
4
to mention possible damage and/or spilage [sic] on the products consigned to or
coming from, the market outside the barangay; and
WHEREAS, said lots, used as outlet or inlet road, shall contribute greatly to the
general welfare of the people residing therein social, cultural and health among other
things, beside economic.4
Petitioner claimed that respondents’ property was the most practical and nearest way
to the municipal road. Pending the resolution of the case at the trial court, petitioner
deposited an amount equivalent to the fair market value of the property.5
On the other hand, respondents stated that they owned the 27,000- square meter
property, a portion of which is the subject of this case. In their Memorandum,6 they
alleged that their lot is adjacent to Davsan II Subdivision privately owned by Dr. Felix
David and his wife. Prior to the filing of the expropriation case, said subdivision was
linked to MacArthur Highway through a pathway across the land of a certain Torres
family. Long before the passage of the barangay resolution, the wives of the
subdivision owner and the barangay captain, who were known to be agents of the
subdivision, had proposed buying a right-of-way for the subdivision across a portion
of respondents’ property. These prospective buyers, however, never returned after
learning of the price which the respondents ascribed to their property.
Respondents alleged that the expropriation of their property was for private use, that
is, for the benefit of the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision. They contended that
petitioner deliberately omitted the name of Davsan II Subdivision and, instead, stated
that the expropriation was for the benefit of the residents of Sitio Paraiso in order to
conceal the fact that the access road being proposed to be built across the
respondents’ land was to serve a privately owned subdivision and those who would
purchase the lots of said subdivision. They also pointed out that under Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 957, it is the subdivision owner who is obliged to provide a feeder
road to the subdivision residents.7
After trial, the court a quo ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises duly considered, the herein
plaintiff is hereby declared as having a lawful right to take the property hereinabove
described and sought to be condemned for the public purpose or use as aforestated,
upon payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
Complaint in this [sic] expropriation proceedings.
Upon the entry of this Order of Condemnation, let three (3) competent and
disinterested persons be appointed as Commissioners to ascertain and report to the
Court the just compensation for the property condemned.8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Upon respondents’ appeal, the CA held:

We are convinced that it is the duty of the subdivision owner to provide the right of
way needed by residents of Davsan II Subdivision as provided for in Section 29 of
P.D. 957. Records show that Purok Paraiso, which is supposed to benefit from this
[sic] expropriation proceedings is in reality Davsan II Subdivision as per the testimony
of Ruben Palo, plaintiff’s own witness (TSN, p. 12, December 115, 1986) [sic].
Appellants correctly stated that:
"The act of Bo. Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, in effect relieved the owners of
Davsan II Subdivision of spending their own private funds for acquiring a right of way
and constructing the required access road to the subdivision. It spent public funds for
such private purpose and deprived herein defendants-appellants of their property for
an ostensible public purpose x x x."
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the Complaint for Eminent Domain is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.9
The Issues
Petitioner imputes errors to the CA for (1) allegedly violating its power of eminent
domain, (2) finding that the expropriation of the property is not for public use but for a
privately owned subdivision, (3) finding that there was no payment of just
compensation, and (4) failing to accord respect to the findings of the trial court. Stated
briefly, the main issue in this case is whether the proposed exercise of the power of
eminent domain would be for a public purpose.1awphi1.nét
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
In general, eminent domain is defined as "the power of the nation or a sovereign state
to take, or to authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without the
owner’s consent, conditioned upon payment of just compensation."10 It is
acknowledged as "an inherent political right, founded on a common necessity and
interest of appropriating the property of individual members of the community to the
great necessities of the whole community."111ªvvphi1.nét
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional
provisions: (1) that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no person shall
be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without due process of law under Art. III,
Sec. 1.
However, there is no precise meaning of "public use" and the term is susceptible of
myriad meanings depending on diverse situations. The limited meaning attached to
5
"public use" is "use by the public" or "public employment," that "a duty must devolve
on the person or corporation holding property appropriated by right of eminent domain
to furnish the public with the use intended, and that there must be a right on the part
of the public, or some portion of it, or some public or quasi-public agency on behalf of
the public, to use the property after it is condemned." 12 The more generally accepted
view sees "public use" as "public advantage, convenience, or benefit, and that
anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and
promote the productive power of any considerable number of the inhabitants of a
section of the state, or which leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new
resources for the employment of capital and labor, [which] contributes to the general
welfare and the prosperity of the whole community."13 In this jurisdiction, "public use"
is defined as "whatever is beneficially employed for the community."14
It is settled that the public nature of the prospective exercise of expropriation cannot
depend on the "numerical count of those to be served or the smallness or largeness
of the community to be benefited."15 The number of people is not determinative of
whether or not it constitutes public use, provided the use is exercisable in common
and is not limited to particular individuals.16 Thus, the first essential requirement for a
valid exercise of eminent domain is for the expropriator to prove that the expropriation
is for a public use. In Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, this Court explicated that
expropriation ends with an order of condemnation declaring "that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation."17
Another vital requisite for a valid condemnation is the payment of just compensation
to the property owner. In the recent case of APO Fruits Corporation v. The Honorable
Court of Appeals,18 just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator," and that the
gauge for computation is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. In order for the
payment to be "just," it must be real, substantial, full, and ample. Not only must the
payment be fair and correctly determined, but also, the Court in Estate of Salud
Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone  stressed that the payment should be
made within a "reasonable time" from the taking of the property. 19 It succinctly
explained that without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just"
inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being
immediately deprived of the land while being made to wait for a decade or more
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss. Thus, once just
compensation is finally determined, the expropriator must immediately pay the
amount to the lot owner. In Reyes v. National Housing Authority, it was ruled that 12%
interest per annum shall be imposed on the final compensation until paid.20 Thus, any
further delay in the payment will result in the imposition of 12% interest per annum.
However, in the recent case of Republic v. Lim, the Court enunciated the rule that
"where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the
finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall
have the right to recover possession of their property."21

Since the individual stands to lose the property by compulsion of the law, the
expropriation authority should not further prejudice the owner’s rights by delaying
payment of just compensation. To obviate any possibility of delay in the payment, the
expropriator should already make available, at the time of the filing of the
expropriation complaint, the amount equal to the BIR zonal valuation or the fair
market value of the property per tax declaration whichever is higher.
The delayed payment of just compensation in numerous cases results from lack of
funds or the time spent in the determination of the legality of the expropriation and/or
the fair valuation of the property, and could result in dismay, disappointment,
bitterness, and even rancor on the part of the lot owners. It is not uncommon for the
expropriator to take possession of the condemned property upon deposit of a small
amount equal to the assessed value of the land per tax declaration and then
challenge the valuation fixed by the trial court resulting in an "expropriate now, pay
later" situation. In the event the expropriating agency questions the reasonability of
the compensation fixed by the trial court before the appellate court, then the latter
may, upon motion, use its sound discretion to order the payment to the lot owner of
the amount equal to the valuation of the property, as proposed by the condemnor
during the proceedings before the commissioners under Sec. 6, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court, subject to the final valuation of the land. This way, the damage and
prejudice to the property owner would be considerably pared down.
On due process, it is likewise basic under the Constitution that the property owner
must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the issues of public use
and just compensation and to present objections to and claims on them.22 It is settled
that taking of property for a private use or without just compensation is a deprivation
of property without due process of law.23 Moreover, it has to be emphasized that
taking of private property without filing any complaint before a court of law under Rule
67 of the Rules of Court or existing laws is patently felonious, confiscatory, and
unconstitutional. Judicial notice can be taken of some instances wherein some
government agencies or corporations peremptorily took possession of private
properties and usurped the owner’s real rights for their immediate use without first
instituting the required court action. Running roughshod over the property rights of
individuals is a clear and gross breach of the constitutional guarantee of due process,
which should not be countenanced in a society where the rule of law holds sway.
In the case at bar, petitioner harps on eminent domain as an inherent power of
sovereignty similar to police power and taxation. As a basic political unit, its
Sangguniang Barangay is clothed with the authority to provide barangay roads and
other facilities for public use and welfare. Petitioner relied on the following cases
which held a liberal view of the term "public use" in recognition of the evolving
concept of the power of eminent domain: Seña v. Manila Railroad Co.; Philippine
Columbian Association v. Panis; Sumulong v. Guerrero; Province of Camarines Sur
v. Court of Appeals; and Manosca v. Court of Appeals.24
Petitioner’s delegated power to expropriate is not at issue. The legal question in this
petition, however, is whether the taking of the land was for a public purpose or use. In
6
the exercise of the power of eminent domain, it is basic that the taking of private
property must be for a public purpose. A corollary issue is whether private property
can be taken by law from one person and given to another in the guise of public
purpose.
In this regard, the petition must fail.
Petitioner alleges that there are at least 80 houses in the place and about 400
persons will be benefited with the use of a barangay road. The trial court believed that
the expropriation "will not benefit only the residents of the subdivision, but also the
residents of Sitio or Purok Paraiso and the residents of the entire Barangay of
Sindalan x x x."25 The trial court held that the subdivision is covered by Sitio or Purok
Paraiso which is a part or parcel of Barangay Sindalan. However, this finding was not
supported by evidence. On the contrary, it is Sitio Paraiso which is within Davsan II
Subdivision based on the testimony of petitioner’s own witness, Ruben Palo, as
follows:
Atty. Mangiliman: Mr. Palo, you said that you have been residing at Sitio Paraiso
since 1973, is this Sitio Paraiso within the Davson [sic] Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Atty. Mangiliman: And before you purchased that or at the time you purchased it in
1972, I am referring to the lot where you are now residing, the Davson [sic]
Subdivision did not provide for a road linking from the subdivision to the barrio road,
am I correct?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: And despite [sic] of that you purchased a lot inside Davson [sic]
Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: Did you not demand from the developer of Davson [sic] Subdivision
that he should provide a road linking from the subdivision to the barrio road of
Sindalan?
Witness: No, sir, because I know they will provide for the road.
Atty. Mangiliman: And when you said that they will provide for that road, you mean to
tell us that it is the developer of Davson [sic] Subdivision who will provide a road
linking from the subdivision to the barrio road of Sindalan?
Witness: Yes, sir.

Atty. Mangiliman: Now, Mr. Witness, you will agree with me that the proposed road
which will connect from Davson [sic] Subdivision to the barrio road of Sindalan would
benefit mainly the lot buyers and home owners of Davson [sic] Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: And you also agree with me that there is no portion of Davson [sic]
Subdivision which is devoted to the production of agricultural products?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: When the road which is the subject of this case and sought to be
expropriated has not yet been opened and before a Writ of Possession was issued by
the Court to place the plaintiff in this case in possession, the residents of Davson [sic]
Subdivision have other way in going to the barrio road?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: In that case Mr. Witness, how do you negotiate or go out of the
subdivision in going to the barrio?
Witness: We passed to the lot own [sic] by Mr. Torres which is near the subdivision in
going to the barrio road, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: Did you not complain to the owner/developer of the subdivision that
he should provide for a road linking to [sic] his subdivision to the barrio road because
there is no available exit from the said subdivision to the barrio road?
Witness: We have been telling that and he was promising that there will be a road,
sir.26
Firstly, based on the foregoing transcript, the intended feeder road sought to serve
the residents of the subdivision only. It has not been shown that the other residents of
Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga will be benefited by the contemplated
road to be constructed on the lot of respondents spouses Jose Magtoto III and
Patricia Sindayan. While the number of people who use or can use the property is not
determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use or purpose, the factual milieu
of the case reveals that the intended use of respondents’ lot is confined solely to the
Davsan II Subdivision residents and is not exercisable in common. 27 Worse, the
expropriation will actually benefit the subdivision’s owner who will be able to
circumvent his commitment to provide road access to the subdivision in conjunction
with his development permit and license to sell from the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board, and also be relieved of spending his own funds for a right-of-way.
In this factual setting, the Davsan II Subdivision homeowners are able to go to the
barrio road by passing through the lot of a certain Torres family. Thus, the
inescapable conclusion is that the expropriation of respondents’ lot is for the actual
benefit of the Davsan II Subdivision owner, with incidental benefit to the subdivision
homeowners.
7
The intended expropriation of private property for the benefit of a private individual is
clearly proscribed by the Constitution, declaring that it should be for public use or
purpose. In Charles River Bridge v. Warren, the limitation on expropriation was
underscored, hence:
Although the sovereign power in free government may appropriate all property, public
as well as private, for public purposes, making compensation therefore; yet it has
never been understood, at least never in our republic, that the sovereign power can
take the private property of A and give it to B by the right of eminent domain; or that it
can take it at all, except for public purposes; or that it can take it for public purposes,
without the duty and responsibility of ordering compensation for the sacrifice of the
private property of one, for the good of the whole (11 Pet. at 642) (emphasis
supplied).28
US case law also points out that a member of the public cannot acquire a certain
private easement by means of expropriation for being unconstitutional, because "even
if every member of the public should acquire the easement, it would remain a bundle
of private easements."29
Secondly, a compelling reason for the rejection of the expropriation is expressed in
Section 29, PD 957, which provides:
Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road.—The owner or developer of a subdivision
without access to any existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a
public road or street and such right of way must be developed and maintained
according to the requirement of the government authorities concerned.
Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are all subdivision lot owners,
it is the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision owner to acquire a right-of-way for
them. However, the failure of the subdivision owner to provide an access road does
not shift the burden to petitioner. To deprive respondents of their property instead of
compelling the subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the law is an
abuse of the power of eminent domain and is patently illegal. Without doubt,
expropriation cannot be justified on the basis of an unlawful purpose.
Thirdly, public funds can be used only for a public purpose. In this proposed
condemnation, government funds would be employed for the benefit of a private
individual without any legal mooring. In criminal law, this would constitute
malversation.
Lastly, the facts tend to show that the petitioner’s proper remedy is to require the
Davsan II Subdivision owner to file a complaint for establishment of the easement of
right-of-way under Articles 649 to 656 of the Civil Code. Respondents must be
granted the opportunity to show that their lot is not a servient estate. Plainly,
petitioner’s resort to expropriation is an improper cause of action.
One last word: the power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and
with just compensation. Taking an individual’s private property is a deprivation which

can only be justified by a higher good—which is public use—and can only be
counterbalanced by just compensation. Without these safeguards, the taking of
property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would also
constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individual’s basic right to
property as well.
For this reason, courts should be more vigilant in protecting the rights of the property
owner and must perform a more thorough and diligent scrutiny of the alleged public
purpose behind the expropriation. Extreme caution is called for in resolving
complaints for condemnation, such that when a serious doubt arises regarding the
supposed public use of property, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the property
owner and against the State.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the May 30, 2001 Decision and the October 26, 2001
Resolution of the CA, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC., Petitioners,
vs. MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, Respondent.
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 59050, and its Resolution dated February 18, 2002, denying the motion
for reconsideration thereof. The assailed decision affirmed the order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the respondent Municipality (now
City) of Pasig as having the right to expropriate and take possession of the subject
property.
The Antecedents
The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a
municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig,
where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of light materials, were located. The road had to
be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks
could pass through in case of conflagration.2 Likewise, the residents in the area
needed the road for water and electrical outlets. 3 The municipality then decided to
acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. PT-66585,4 which is abutting E. R. Santos Street.
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an
Ordinance5 authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to
acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance stated that
8
the property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to purchase the property
for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer.
On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a complaint, amended on August 6, 1993,
against the Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. The
plaintiff alleged therein that it notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to
construct an access road on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the
same portion. The plaintiff appended to the complaint a photocopy of the letter
addressed to defendant Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.6
The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based
on the latest tax declaration covering the property. On plaintiff’s motion, the RTC
issued a writ of possession over the property sought to be expropriated. On
November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at
the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name of the Jesus Is Lord
Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the
property.7 Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a width of
three meters; the road was called Damayan Street.
In their answer,8 the defendants claimed that, as early as February 1993, they had
sold the said property to JILCSFI as evidenced by a deed of sale9 bearing the
signature of defendant Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho and his wife.
When apprised about the complaint, JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as
defendant-in-intervention, which motion the RTC granted on August 26, 1994.10
In its answer-in-intervention, JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative
defenses, that the plaintiff’s exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class
and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It alleged that the property sought
to be expropriated is not the best portion for the road and the least burdensome to it.
The intervenor filed a crossclaim against its co-defendants for reimbursement in case
the subject property is expropriated.11 In its amended answer, JILCSFI also averred
that it has been denied the use and enjoyment of its property because the road was
constructed in the middle portion and that the plaintiff was not the real party-in-
interest. The intervenor, likewise, interposed counterclaims against the plaintiff for
moral damages and attorney’s fees.12
During trial, Rolando Togonon, the plaintiff’s messenger, testified on direct
examination that on February 23, 1993, he served a letter of Engr. Jose Reyes, the
Technical Assistant to the Mayor on Infrastructure, to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco at his
store at No. 18 Alkalde Jose Street, Kapasigan, Pasig. A lady received the same and
brought it inside the store. When she returned the letter to him, it already bore the
signature of Luz Bernarte. He identified a photocopy of the letter as similar to the one
he served at the store. On cross-examination, he admitted that he never met Luz
Bernarte. 13

Edgardo del Rosario, a resident of Sto. Tomas Bukid since 1982 declared that he
would pass through a wooden bridge to go to E. R. Santos Street. At times, the bridge
would be slippery and many had met accidents while walking along the bridge.
Because of this, they requested Mayor Vicente Eusebio to construct a road therein.
He attested that after the construction of the cemented access road, the residents
had water and electricity.14
Augusto Paz of the City Engineer’s Office testified that, sometime in 1992, the plaintiff
constructed a road perpendicular from E. R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid; he
was the Project Engineer for the said undertaking. Before the construction of the
road, the lot was raw and they had to put filling materials so that vehicles could use it.
According to him, the length of the road which they constructed was 70 meters long
and 3 meters wide so that a fire truck could pass through. He averred that there is no
other road through which a fire truck could pass to go to Sto. Tomas Bukid.15
Manuel Tembrevilla, the Fire Marshall, averred that he had seen the new road, that is,
Damayan Street, and found that a fire truck could pass through it. He estimated the
houses in the area to be around 300 to 400. Tembrevilla also stated that Damayan
Street is the only road in the area.16
Finally, Bonifacio Maceda, Jr., Tax Mapper IV, testified that, according to their
records, JILCSFI became the owner of the property only on January 13, 1994.17
The plaintiff offered in evidence a photocopy of the letter of Engr. Jose Reyes
addressed to Lorenzo Ching Cuanco to prove that the plaintiff made a definite and
valid offer to acquire the property to the co-owners. However, the RTC rejected the
same letter for being a mere photocopy.18
For the defendant-intervenor, Normita del Rosario, owner of the property located
across the subject property, testified that there are other roads leading to E. R.
Santos Street. She asserted that only about ten houses of the urban poor are using
the new road because the other residents are using an alternative right-of-way. She
averred that she did not actually occupy her property; but there were times that she
visited it.19
Danilo Caballero averred that he had been a resident of Sto. Tomas Bukid for seven
years. From his house, he could use three streets to go to E. R. Santos Street,
namely, Catalina Street, Damayan Street and Bagong Taon Street. On cross-
examination, he admitted that no vehicle could enter Sto. Tomas Bukid except
through the newly constructed Damayan Street.20
Eduardo Villanueva, Chairman of the Board of Trustees and President of JILCSFI,
testified that the parcel of land was purchased for purposes of constructing a school
building and a church as worship center. He averred that the realization of these
projects was delayed due to the passing of the ordinance for expropriation.21
The intervenor adduced documentary evidence that on February 27, 1993, Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco and the co-owners agreed to sell their property covered by TCT No.
9
PT-66585 for ₱1,719,000.00.22 It paid a down payment of ₱1,000,000.00 for the
property. After payment of the total purchase price, the Ching Cuancos executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale23 over the property on December 13, 1993. On December 21,
1993, TCT No. PT-92579 was issued in the name of JILCSFI. 24 It declared the
property for taxation purposes under its name.25
On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the plaintiff, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 67 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the Court Resolves to DECLARE the plaintiff as having a
lawful right to take the property in question for purposes for which the same is
expropriated.
The plaintiff and intervenor are hereby directed to submit at least two (2) names of
their recommended commissioners for the determination of just compensation within
ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.26
The RTC held that, as gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No. 21, there was
substantial compliance with the definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of
R.A. No. 7160, and that the expropriated portion is the most convenient access to the
interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.
Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the CA on the following assignment of
errors:
First Assignment of Error
THE LOWER COURT SERIOUS[LY] ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE LAW WHEN IT
EXPROPRIATED JIL’S PROPERTY TO BE USED AS A RIGHT OF WAY.
Second Assignment of Error
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING JIL’S EVIDENCE PROVING THAT THERE WAS NO PUBLIC NECESSITY TO WARRANT THE
EXPROPRIATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.27
The Court of Appeals’ Decision
In a Decision dated March 13, 2001, the CA affirmed the order of the RTC. 28 The CA
agreed with the trial court that the plaintiff substantially complied with Section 19 of
R.A. No. 7160, particularly the requirement that a valid and definite offer must be
made to the owner. The CA declared that the letter of Engr. Reyes, inviting Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco to a conference to discuss with him the road project and the price of
the lot, was a substantial compliance with the "valid and definite offer" requirement
under said Section 19. In addition, the CA noted that there was also constructive
notice to the defendants of the expropriation proceedings since a notice of lis
pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 on November 26,
1993.29
Finally, the CA upheld the public necessity for the subject property based on the
findings of the trial court that the portion of the property sought to be expropriated

appears to be, not only the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas
Bukid, but also an easy path for vehicles entering the area, particularly fire trucks.
Moreover, the CA took into consideration the provision of Article 33 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which regards the
"construction or extension of roads, streets, sidewalks" as public use, purpose or
welfare.30
On April 6, 2001, JILCSFI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision
alleging that the CA erred in relying on the photocopy of Engr. Reyes’ letter to
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco because the same was not admitted in evidence by the trial
court for being a mere photocopy. It also contended that the CA erred in concluding
that constructive notice of the expropriation proceeding, in the form of annotation of
the notice of lis pendens, could be considered as a substantial compliance with the
requirement under Section 19 of the Local Government Code for a valid and definite
offer. JILCSFI also averred that no inspection was ever ordered by the trial court to be
conducted on the property, and, if there was one, it had the right to be present thereat
since an inspection is considered to be part of the trial of the case.31
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. It held that it was not
precluded from considering the photocopy32 of the letter, notwithstanding that the
same was excluded by the trial court, since the fact of its existence was duly
established by corroborative evidence. This corroborative evidence consisted of the
testimony of the plaintiff’s messenger that he personally served the letter to Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco, and Municipal Ordinance No. 21 which expressly stated that the
property owners were already notified of the expropriation proceeding. The CA noted
that JILCSFI failed to adduce controverting evidence, thus the presumption of
regularity was not overcome.33
The Present Petition
In this petition, petitioner JILCSFI raises the following issues: (1) whether the
respondent complied with the requirement, under Section 19 of the Local Government
Code, of a valid and definite offer to acquire the property prior to the filing of the
complaint; (2) whether its property which is already intended to be used for public
purposes may still be expropriated by the respondent; and (3) whether the requisites
for an easement for right-of-way under Articles 649 to 657 of the New Civil Code may
be dispensed with.
The petitioner stresses that the law explicitly requires that a valid and definite offer be
made to the owner of the property and that such offer was not accepted. It argues
that, in this case, there was no evidence to show that such offer has been made
either to the previous owner or the petitioner, the present owner. The petitioner
contends that the photocopy of the letter of Engr. Reyes, notifying Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco of the respondent’s intention to construct a road on its property, cannot be
considered because the trial court did not admit it in evidence. And assuming that
such letter is admissible in evidence, it would not prove that the offer has been made
to the previous owner because mere notice of intent to purchase is not equivalent to
an offer to purchase. The petitioner further argues that the offer should be made to
10
the proper party, that is, to the owner of the property. It noted that the records in this
case show that as of February 1993, it was already the owner of the property.
Assuming, therefore, that there was an offer to purchase the property, the same
should have been addressed to the petitioner, as present owner.34
The petitioner maintains that the power of eminent domain must be strictly construed
since its exercise is necessarily in derogation of the right to property ownership. All
the requirements of the enabling law must, therefore, be strictly complied with.
Compliance with such requirements cannot be presumed but must be proved by the
local government exercising the power. The petitioner adds that the local government
should, likewise, comply with the requirements for an easement of right-of-way;
hence, the road must be established at a point least prejudicial to the owner of the
property. Finally, the petitioner argues that, if the property is already devoted to or
intended to be devoted to another public use, its expropriation should not be
allowed.35
For its part, the respondent avers that the CA already squarely resolved the issues
raised in this petition, and the petitioner failed to show valid and compelling reason to
reverse the CA’s findings. Moreover, it is not the function of the Supreme Court to
weigh the evidence on factual issues all over again. 36 The respondent contends that
the Ching Cuancos were deemed to have admitted that an offer to purchase has
been made and that they refused to accept such offer considering their failure to
specifically deny such allegation in the complaint. In light of such admission, the
exclusion of the photocopy of the letter of Engr. Reyes, therefore, is no longer
significant.37
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised by the
parties and passed upon by the Supreme Court in petitions for review
on certiorari.38 Findings of fact of the CA, affirming those of the trial court, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.39
Nonetheless, where it is shown that the conclusion is a finding grounded on
speculations, surmises or conjectures or where the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts, the Supreme Court may reexamine the evidence on
record.40
Eminent Domain: Nature and Scope
The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a
public purpose. The nature and scope of such power has been comprehensively
described as follows:
… It is an indispensable attribute of sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary
duty of government to serve the common need and advance the general welfare.

Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to every independent government
without the necessity for constitutional recognition. The provisions found in modern
constitutions of civilized countries relating to the taking of property for the public use
do not by implication grant the power to the government, but limit the power which
would, otherwise, be without limit. Thus, our own Constitution provides that "[p]rivate
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." Furthermore,
the due process and equal protection clauses act as additional safeguards against
the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power.41
Strict Construction and Burden of Proof
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights. 42 It is one of the
harshest proceedings known to the law. Consequently, when the sovereign delegates
the power to a political unit or agency, a strict construction will be given against the
agency asserting the power.43 The authority to condemn is to be strictly construed in
favor of the owner and against the condemnor. 44 When the power is granted, the
extent to which it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication
of the statute in which the grant is contained.45
Corollarily, the respondent, which is the condemnor, has the burden of proving all the
essentials necessary to show the right of condemnation.46 It has the burden of proof to
establish that it has complied with all the requirements provided by law for the valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
The grant of the power of eminent domain to local government units is grounded on
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160 which reads:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its chief executive
and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment
of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised
unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such
offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be
paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
The Court declared that the following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of
eminent domain by a local government unit must be complied with:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
11
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for
the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.47
Valid and Definite Offer
Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
provides:
ARTICLE 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale. – (a) The offer to buy private property
for public use or purpose shall be in writing. It shall specify the property sought to be
acquired, the reasons for its acquisition, and the price offered.
(b) If the owner or owners accept the offer in its entirety, a contract of sale shall be
executed and payment forthwith made.
(c) If the owner or owners are willing to sell their property but at a price higher than
that offered to them, the local chief executive shall call them to a conference for the
purpose of reaching an agreement on the selling price. The chairman of the
appropriation or finance committee of the sanggunian, or in his absence, any member
of the sanggunian duly chosen as its representative, shall participate in the
conference. When an agreement is reached by the parties, a contract of sale shall be
drawn and executed.
(d) The contract of sale shall be supported by the following documents:
(1) Resolution of the sanggunian authorizing the local chief executive to enter into a
contract of sale. The resolution shall specify the terms and conditions to be embodied
in the contract;
(2) Ordinance appropriating the amount specified in the contract; and
(3) Certification of the local treasurer as to availability of funds together with a
statement that such fund shall not be disbursed or spent for any purpose other than to
pay for the purchase of the property involved.
The respondent was burdened to prove the mandatory requirement of a valid and
definite offer to the owner of the property before filing its complaint and the rejection
thereof by the latter.48 It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable
efforts to obtain the land it desires by agreement.49 Failure to prove compliance with
the mandatory requirement will result in the dismissal of the complaint.50
An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the
celebration of a contract.51 It creates a power of acceptance permitting the offeree, by
accepting the offer, to transform the offeror’s promise into a contractual
 12

obligation.52 Corollarily, the offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness In this connection, may we respectfully request your presence in our office to discuss
the kind of contract intended and definitely stating the essential conditions of the this project and the price that may be mutually agreed upon by you and the
proposed contract.53 An offer would require, among other things, a clear certainty on Municipality of Pasig.
both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract.54
Thank you.
The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the
owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for Very truly yours,
public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action.55 The law is
(Sgd.)
designed to give to the owner the opportunity to sell his land without the expense and
inconvenience of a protracted and expensive litigation. This is a substantial right ENGR. JOSE L. REYES
which should be protected in every instance.56 It encourages acquisition without
litigation and spares not only the landowner but also the condemnor, the expenses Technical Asst. to the Mayor
and delays of litigation. It permits the landowner to receive full compensation, and the
on Infrastructure59
entity acquiring the property, immediate use and enjoyment of the property. A
reasonable offer in good faith, not merely perfunctory or pro forma offer, to acquire It bears stressing, however, that the respondent offered the letter only to prove its
the property for a reasonable price must be made to the owner or his privy. 57 A desire or intent to acquire the property for a right-of-way.60 The document was not
single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice. offered to prove that the respondent made a definite and valid offer to acquire the
property. Moreover, the RTC rejected the document because the respondent failed to
The expropriating authority is burdened to make known its definite and valid offer to
adduce in evidence the original copy thereof.61 The respondent, likewise, failed to
all the owners of the property. However, it has a right to rely on what appears in the
adduce evidence that copies of the letter were sent to and received by all the co-
certificate of title covering the land to be expropriated. Hence, it is required to make its
owners of the property, namely, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and
offer only to the registered owners of the property. After all, it is well-settled that
Ernesto Kho.
persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required
to go beyond what appears on its face.58 The respondent sought to prove, through the testimony of its messenger, Rolando
Togonon, that Lorenzo Ching Cuanco received the original of the said letter. But
In the present case, the respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it
Togonon testified that he merely gave the letter to a lady, whom he failed to identify.
made a written definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an
He stated that the lady went inside the store of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, and later gave
access road. The only evidence adduced by the respondent to prove its compliance
the letter back to him bearing the signature purportedly of one Luz Bernarte.
with Section 19 of the Local Government Code is the photocopy of the letter
However, Togonon admitted, on cross-examination, that he did not see Bernarte
purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only one of the co-owners,
affixing her signature on the letter. Togonon also declared that he did not know and
Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. The letter reads:
had never met Lorenzo Ching Cuanco and Bernarte:
MR. LORENZO CHING CUANCO Q And after you received this letter from that lady, what did you do afterwards?

18 Alcalde Jose Street A I brought it with me, that letter, and then I went to Caruncho.

Q So, [M]r. Witness, you are telling this Honorable Court that this letter intended to Mr. Lorenzo was served at Pasig Trading
Capasigan, Pasig which was situated at No. 18 Alkalde Jose Street on February 23, 1993?

Metro Manila A Yes, Ma’am.

ATTY. TAN:
Dear Mr. Cuanco:
That is all for the witness, Your Honor.
This refers to your parcel of land located along E. Santos Street, Barangay Palatiw,
COURT:
Pasig, Metro Manila embraced in and covered by TCT No. 66585, a portion of which
with an area of fifty-one (51) square meters is needed by the Municipal Government Do you have any cross-examination?
of Pasig for conversion into a road-right of way for the benefit of several residents
ATTY. JOLO:
living in the vicinity of your property. Attached herewith is the sketch plan for your
information. Just a few cross, Your Honor, please. With the kind permission of the Honorable Court.

COURT:

Proceed.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTY. JOLO:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know Mr. Lorenzo Ching [Cuanco]
A I do not know him.
Q As a matter of fact, you have not seen him even once, isn’t not (sic)?
A Yes, Sir.
Q This Luz Bernarte, do you know her?
A I do not know her.
Q As a matter of fact, you did not see Mrs. Bernarte even once?
A That is correct.
Q And as a matter of fact, [M]r. Witness, you did not see Mrs. Luz Bernarte affixing her signature on the bottom portion of this
demand letter, marked as Exh. "C-2"?
A Yes, Sir.62
Even if the letter was, indeed, received by the co-owners, the letter is not a valid and
definite offer to purchase a specific portion of the property for a price certain. It is
merely an invitation for only one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, to a
conference to discuss the project and the price that may be mutually acceptable to
both parties.
There is no legal and factual basis to the CA’s ruling that the annotation of a notice
of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of petitioner’s TCT No. PT-92579 is a substantial
compliance with the requisite offer. A notice of lis pendens is a notice to the whole
world of the pendency of an action involving the title to or possession of real property
and a warning that those who acquire an interest in the property do so at their own
risk and that they gamble on the result of the litigation over it. 63 Moreover, the lis
pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of the title only on November 26, 1993,
long after the complaint had been filed in the RTC against the Ching Cuancos.
Neither is the declaration in one of the whereas clauses of the ordinance that "the
property owners were already notified by the municipality of the intent to purchase the
same for public use as a municipal road," a substantial compliance with the
requirement of a valid and definite offer under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
Presumably, the Sangguniang Bayan relied on the erroneous premise that the letter
of Engr. Reyes reached the co-owners of the property. In the absence of competent
evidence that, indeed, the respondent made a definite and valid offer to all the co-
owners of the property, aside from the letter of Engr. Reyes, the declaration in the
ordinance is not a compliance with Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.
The respondent contends, however, that the Ching Cuancos, impliedly admitted the
allegation in its complaint that an offer to purchase the property was made to them
and that they refused to accept the offer by their failure to specifically deny such
13
allegation in their answer. This contention is wrong. As gleaned from their answer to
the complaint, the Ching Cuancos specifically denied such allegation for want of
sufficient knowledge to form a belief as to its correctness. Under Section 10, 64 Rule 8
of the Rules of Court, such form of denial, although not specific, is sufficient.
Public Necessity
We reject the contention of the petitioner that its property can no longer be
expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place
for religious worship and a school for its members. As aptly explained by this Court
in Manosca v. Court of Appeals,65 thus:
It has been explained as early as Seña v. Manila Railroad Co., that:
… A historical research discloses the meaning of the term "public use" to be one of
constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual increases and
each demand is a new use to which the resources of the individual may be devoted.
… for "whatever is beneficially employed for the community is a public use."
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a
literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As
just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines
what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots
for resale at cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this
power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to
state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirements of public use.
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure
Administration, has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument and one that "is not
to be construed narrowly or pedantically so as to enable it to meet adequately
whatever problems the future has in store." Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted
constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimately emerged
is a concept of public use which is just as broad as "public welfare."
Petitioners ask: But "(w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of
(Felix Manalo’s) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain" when only members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo  would benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case
deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective
of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power.
The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to

commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical
reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo  than by
most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be
merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually
benefit from the expropriation of property, does not necessarily diminish the essence
and character of public use.
The petitioner asserts that the respondent must comply with the requirements for the
establishment of an easement of right-of-way, more specifically, the road must be
constructed at the point least prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be
no adequate outlet to a public highway. The petitioner asserts that the portion of the
lot sought to be expropriated is located at the middle portion of the petitioner’s entire
parcel of land, thereby splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for
the petitioner to put up its school building and worship center.
The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The
respondent is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement
of right-of-way under the New Civil Code. Case law has it that in the absence of
legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the
location and route of the land to be taken66 unless such determination is capricious
and wantonly injurious.67 Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good
and there is genuine necessity of public character.68 Government may not capriciously
choose what private property should be taken.69
The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E. R.
Santos Street to Sto. Tomas Bukid. The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas
Bukid, testified that although there were other ways through which one can enter the
vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except
through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to
establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area.
After all, absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity
will suffice.70
Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road
particularly in the petitioner’s property and not elsewhere.71 We note that the whereas
clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest and most
suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E. R. Santos Street. The
respondent’s complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioner’s lot has
been surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress. However, the respondent
failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence to prove its claims.
On this point, the trial court made the following findings:
… The contention of the defendants that there is an existing alley that can serve the
purpose of the expropriator is not accurate. An inspection of the vicinity reveals that
the alley being referred to by the defendants actually passes thru Bagong Taon St.
but only about one-half (1/2) of its entire length is passable by vehicle and the other
half is merely a foot-path. It would be more inconvenient to widen the alley
14
considering that its sides are occupied by permanent structures and its length from
the municipal road to the area sought to be served by the expropriation is
considerably longer than the proposed access road. The area to be served by the
access road is composed of compact wooden houses and literally a slum area. As a
result of the expropriation of the 51-square meter portion of the property of the
intervenor, a 3-meter wide road open to the public is created. This portion of the
property of the intervenor is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas
Bukid since it is not only a short cut to the interior of the Sto. Tomas Bukid but also an
easy path for vehicles entering the area, not to mention the 3-meter wide road
requirement of the Fire Code.72
However, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in the record
that an ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at all, the trial court
conducted an ocular inspection of the subject property during the trial, the petitioner
was not notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due
process. It bears stressing that an ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is
thereby received and the parties are entitled to be present at any stage of the
trial.73 Consequently, where, as in this case, the petitioner was not notified of any
ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said
inspection has no probative weight. The findings of the trial court based on the
conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be rejected.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is
ordered to dismiss the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling
thereof.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131457 April 24, 1998
FORTICH vs. CORONA
The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged farmer-
beneficiaries in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City
on October 9, 1997 commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders and
some presidential candidates tried to intervene for the strikers' "cause."
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision 1 of the Office of the President
(OP), issued through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-
C-6424, which approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare
land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the
President, through then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the
so-called "Win-Win" Resolution 2 on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its
earlier Decision after it had already become final and executory. The said Resolution
modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent

of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to
be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
But, did the "Win-Win" Resolution culminate in victory for all the contending parties?
The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court urging us to
annul and set aside the "Win-Win" Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary
Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said
Resolution.
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the
"Win-Win" Resolution issued by the Office of the President on its earlier Decision
involving the same subject matter, which had already become final and executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings, may be stated
as follows:
1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto
Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The
property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 3 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of
Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del
Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop
Producer and Grower's Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the
entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million.4
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DAR's action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case
No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director, the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of
Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives "to
desist from pursuing any activity or activities" concerning the subject land "until further orders."5
5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a memorandum, dated May
21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to
conduct summary proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC
objected to these moves and filed on June 9, 1992 an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order of March
31, 1992 and to nullify the summary proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on
the valuation of the subject property.
6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering the DAR
Regional Director and Land Bank "to seriously comply with the terms of the order dated March 31, 1992;" (b)
nullifying the DAR Regional Director's memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and the summary proceedings
conducted pursuant thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank "to return the claim folder of Petitioner
NQSRMDC's subject Property to the DAR until further orders."6
7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened in the name of
petitioner NQSRMDC. 7
8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O.
Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6,8 dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre
Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.
15
9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March 29, 1996, pertinent
portions of which we quote:
Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted
Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San
Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of
providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new economic vitality,
provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.
Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize the
classification of five percent (5%) of their agricultural land area and provide for the
manner of their utilization or disposition.
On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said
Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant application for conversion
was filed by Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-
Industrial Development Association).
Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial Board, on the
basis of a Joint Committee Report submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee
on Agrarian Reform and Socio-Economic Committee approved, on 1 February 1994,
the said Ordinance now docketed as Resolution No. 94-95. The said industrial area,
as conceived by NQSRMDC (project proponent) is supposed to have the following
components:
1. Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes following: Institute for Continuing Higher Education;
Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical School); Institute for Agribusiness Research;
Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports Development Complex which covers an area of 24
hectares;
2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil, corn starch, various corn
products; rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice; cassava processing for starch, alcohol
and food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruit products such as juices; processing plants for
vegetables processed and prepared for market; cold storage and ice plant; cannery system; commercial
stores; public market; and abattoir needing about 67 hectares;
3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation, horse-back riding, memorial and
mini-zoo estimated to cover 33 hectares; and
4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a
housing project covering an area of 20 hectares.
The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995, adopted
by the Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its
flagship projects. The same was likewise favorably recommended by the Provincial
Development Council of Bukidnon; the municipal, provincial and regional office of the
DAR; the Regional Office (Region X) of the DENR (which issued an Environmental
Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive Director, signing "By Authority
of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ," Office of the President — Mindanao; the Secretary of
DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.

In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office,
Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial
Irrigation Office, interposed NO. OBJECTION to the proposed conversion "as long as
the development cost of the irrigation systems thereat which is P2,377.00 per hectare
be replenished by the developer . . . ." Also, the Kisolon-San Vicente Irrigators Multi
Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no objection to the
proposed conversion of the land in question "as it will provide more economic benefits
to the community in terms of outside investments that will come and employment
opportunities that will be generated by the projects to be put up . . . .
On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at the
Kisolan Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR
Central Office and DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the affected
barangay rallied behind their respective officials in endorsing the project.
Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on November 14,
1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of
lands under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant
application for the conversion of the subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial
and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed
the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries on the following grounds:
1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility;
2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA);
3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable;
4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries;
5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for agro-industrial project has no reference
to Memo Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and E.O. No. 124, Series of 1993.
A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on January 9, 1995 by applicant but the same
was denied (in an Order dated June 7, 1995). 9
10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director "to proceed with the compulsory acquisition
and distribution of the property." 10
11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed" the order of denial to the Office of the President and
prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the
people of Bukidnon.
12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretary's order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995, filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction, 12 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
37614.
13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then Presidential Assistant for Mindanao,
after conducting an evaluation of the proposed project, sent a memorandum 13 to the President favorably
endorsing the project with a recommendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the
application of the province for the conversion of the land.
14. Also, in a memorandum 14 to the President dated August 23, 1995, the Honorable Rafael Alunan III, then
Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), recommended the conversion of the
16
subject land to industrial/institutional use with a request that the President "hold the implementation of the
DAR order to distribute the land in question."
15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a Resolution 15 ordering the
parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition. At the hearing held in said case on October 5,
1995, the DAR, through the Solicitor General, manifested before the said court that the DAR was merely "in
the processing stage of the applications of farmers-claimants" and has agreed to respect status quo pending
the resolution of the petition. 16
16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres,
issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretary's decision,
the pertinent portions of which read:
After a careful evaluation of the petition vis-a-vis the grounds upon which the denial
thereof by Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant application for
conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be
sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open
great opportunities for employment and bring about real development in the area
towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. On the other hand,
distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there are
none) does not guarantee such benefits.
Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with
irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it
is true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes
thru the property (as a right of way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the
lower portion thereof. The land itself, subject of the instant petition, is not irrigated as
the same was, for several years, planted with pineapple by the Philippine Packing
Corporation.
On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory
Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas
covered by NCA is not applicable, suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared
null and void by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as
early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed
out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could not validly be
the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease contract
with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and
ordered the DAR Regional Office and the Land Bank of the Philippines, both in
Butuan City, to "desist from pursuing any activity or activities covering petitioner's
land.
On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has
already contributed substantially to the land reform program of the government, as
follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70's and another 400 hectares
in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten(10) years ago, for which
they have not received "just compensation" up to this time.

Neither can the assertion that "there is no clear and tangible compensation package
arrangements for the beneficiaries' hold water as, in the first place, there are no
beneficiaries to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.
Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject
property for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law
granting autonomy to local government units in the management of their local affairs.
Stated more simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and
affords no room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants
local government units autonomy in their local affairs including the power to convert
portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and
disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.
WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in
view of the favorable recommendations of the various government agencies
abovementioned, the subject Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary,
Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE and the instant application of
NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED. 17
17. On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.
18. On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March 29, 1996, NQSRMDC and the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the
former donated four (4) hectares from the subject land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High
School. 18
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS,
it discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon
found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with
Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to
the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just
compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title on August 11, 1995 and
had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-
50264 19 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995,
DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No.
00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT
No. AT-3536 20 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint 21 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title, damages
and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order on April 30,
1997 22 and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19, 1997, 23 restraining the DAR and 141 others from
entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order 24 was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres
denying DAR's motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15)
days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and
executory.
21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order of the
President.
17
22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by some
alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the issuance of a writ of prohibition from
further trying the RTC case.
23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR
Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10, 1997, some persons
claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a motion for intervention (styled as
Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP Decision allowing the
conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be set aside. 25
24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve their grievance
within the framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by
Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and recommend possible solutions to the
problem. 26
25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers' protest by issuing the so-called
"Win/Win" Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President,
through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is hereby
MODIFIED as follows:
1. NQSRMDC's application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the approximately forty-four (44)
hectare portion of the land adjacent to the highway, as recommended by the Department of Agriculture.
2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an irrigation canal and found to be
suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to said portion from the highway provided in the
portion fronting the highway. For this purpose, the DAR and other concerned government agencies are
directed to immediately conduct the segregation survey of the area, valuation of the property and generation of
titles in the name of the identified farmer-beneficiaries.
3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and meticulously determine who among
the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to expedite payment of just compensation to
NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be covered by the CARP, including other lands previously
surrendered by NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.
5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full assistance to the Department of Agrarian
Reform in the implementation of this Order.
We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October 10,
1997 without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass
upon it at this time.
SO ORDERED. 27
A copy of the "Win-Win" Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of
Bukidnon, Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November
24, 1997 28 and, on December 4, 1997, they filed the present petition for certiorari,
prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent
prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under
Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR
Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.

On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene 29 was filed by alleged
farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as
they were "previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries
on the 144-hectare" property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently
opposed 30 by the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution, the petitioners claim that the
Office of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution "after a very well-
managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in
pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with
this purely political decision to appease the 'farmers,' by reviving and modifying the
Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order
of 23 June 1997. . . ."31 Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona "committed grave abuse of discretion and
acted beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7
November 1997. . . ." 32 They availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari "because
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law."33 They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject Resolution
"because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to
seek a reconsideration. . . ." 34
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that
it be dismissed outright on the following grounds:
(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly with the Court of
Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution before filing
the present petition; and
(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including the incident
on the motion for intervention filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is
proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error
of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise
of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. 35 On the other
hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the
court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. 36 This
error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. 37
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial
functions, 38 including the Office of the President, 39 may be taken to the Court of
Appeals by filing a verified petition for review 40 within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the said judgment, final order or resolution, 41 whether the appeal involves questions
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. 42
18
However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is
inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the
challenged resolution is "patently illegal" 43 and was issued with "grave abuse of
discretion" and "beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Corona's)
jurisdiction" 44 when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of
March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In other words, the
crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment
which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to
annul and set aside the assailed resolution is an original special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent
portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.
x x x           x x x          x x x
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases — cases in
which the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. 45
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the
assailed illegal act "may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court." The
proper court where the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule
65 which reads:
Sec. 4. Where petition filed. — The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme
Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation,
board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of
Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a)
Under the above-qouted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
Regional Trial Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari, 46 prohibition 47 and mandamus. 48 But the jurisdiction of these three (3)
courts are also delineated in that, if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of
a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be filed
with the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as
defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-judicial

agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise
provided by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of
concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al.,49 through now Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
. . . . This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive.
It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance),
which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also
shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals
(formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the
extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.
A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for
the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed
with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals.
(Citations omitted)
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the
petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the
issues raised, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has
been reiterated in subsequent cases, namely: 50 Uy vs. Contreras, et. al., 51 Torres
vs. Arranz, 52 Bercero vs. De Guzman, 53 and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et. al. 54 As we
have further stated in Cuaresma:
. . . . A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy
that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the
present petition in the interest of speedy justice 55 and to avoid future litigations so as
to promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by
petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the magnitude of the problem
created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed
later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file
their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and
money.
19
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of
justice is well-entrenched, in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon
vs. Court of Appeals: 56
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and
excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of
justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper
procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to
the merits of the case.
As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse
when they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before
seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is not necessary when
the questioned resolution is a patent nullity, 57 as will be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners
of: (a) a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No.
37614) with the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment and cancellation of
title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97)
with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition,
constitute forum shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The
principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection
with litigation commenced in the courts while an administrative proceeding is pending,
as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an
unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in
this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought, has no jurisdiction
(citations omitted).
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has
been laid down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), . . . and that is,
forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other, as follows:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563
identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts, and the identity on the two preceding particulars is such
that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is

successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the
requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant. 58
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum
shopping. The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum
shopping is where a final judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the
action under consideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners
does not show that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretary's
order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject
property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the
annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in
applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC's title, used documents which were
earlier declared null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title
was made without payment of just compensation; and (3) without notice to
NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is entirely different from
the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution of
the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long
after the previous two cases were instituted.
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed
by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their
motion, movants contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in
question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex "I"
in their motion a Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master
list was made pursuant to the directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed "Win-
Win" Resolution which directs the DAR "to carefully and meticulously determine who
among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries." However, a perusal of the
said document reveals that movants are those purportedly "Found Qualified and
Recommended for Approval." In other words, movants are
merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Real interest means a  present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest. 59 Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in question is a mere
expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as
intimated earlier, null and void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to
stand on.
Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29,
1996 can still be substantially modified by the "Win-Win" Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
20
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the
Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
Sec. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as
otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration
thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and
entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours).
It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a
suppletory character whenever practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the
Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a
motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open
the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the
President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration
filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the
assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section
4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for
reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even
if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in "exceptionally
meritorious cases," as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still
the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for
reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29,
1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening
the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already
become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal
precept that accord  finality to administrative determinations.
In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 60 we held:
Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the
President had long become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed
by the courts. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders
of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have
upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of
the doctrine of  res judicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956), Ipekdijna
Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30,
1963, 9 SCRA 72.] The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter
once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and
quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting
within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers
[Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503].

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court
or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and
regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. 61 This is a
fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would no end to
litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained
by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle
must immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which substantially modified the
Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void
resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street 62 in a 1918 case, 63 is "a
lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever and whenever it exhibits its head." 64
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution
dated November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-
6424, is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To Intervene filed
by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127876 December 17, 1999
ROXAS & CO., INC. vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner
and the validity of the acquisition of these haciendas by the government under
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three
haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the
Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares in area and is
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 985. This land is covered by
21
Tax Declaration Nos. 0465, 0466, 0468, 0470, 0234 and 0354. Hacienda Banilad is
1,050 hectares in area, registered under TCT No. 924 and covered by Tax
Declaration Nos. 0236, 0237 and 0390. Hacienda Caylaway is 867.4571 hectares in
area and is registered under TCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665.
The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President Corazon C.
Aquino. In February 1986, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating
a Provisional Constitution. As head of the provisional government, the President
exercised legislative power "until a legislature is elected and convened under a new
Constitution." 1 In the exercise of this legislative power, the President signed on July
22, 1987, Proclamation No. 131 instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program and Executive Order No. 229 providing the mechanisms necessary to
initially implement the program.
On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over
legislative power from the President. 2 This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657,
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the
President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.
Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a
voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229.
Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by
respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.
Hacienda Palico
On September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled "Invitation to
Parties" to petitioner. The Invitation was addressed to "Jaime Pimentel, Hda.
Administrator, Hda. Palico." 3 Therein, the MARO invited petitioner to a conference on
October 6, 1989 at the DAR office in Nasugbu to discuss the results of the DAR
investigation of Hacienda Palico, which was "scheduled for compulsory acquisition
this year under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program." 4
On October 25, 1989, the MARO completed three (3) Investigation Reports after
investigation and ocular inspection of the Hacienda. In the first Report, the MARO
found that 270 hectares under Tax Declaration Nos. 465, 466, 468 and 470 were "flat
to undulating (0-8% slope)" and actually occupied and cultivated by 34 tillers of
sugarcane. 5 In the second Report, the MARO identified as "flat to undulating"
approximately 339 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0234 which also had several
actual occupants and tillers of sugarcane; 6 while in the third Report, the MARO found
approximately 75 hectare under Tax Declaration No. 0354 as "flat to undulating" with
33 actual occupants and tillers also of sugarcane. 7
On October 27, 1989, a "Summary Investigation Report" was submitted and signed
jointly by the MARO, representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), and by the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO). The Report recommended that 333.0800 hectares of

Hacienda Palico be subject to compulsory acquisition at a value of
P6,807,622.20. 8 The following day, October 28, 1989, two (2) more Summary
Investigation Reports were submitted by the same officers and representatives. They
recommended that 270.0876 hectares and 75.3800 hectares be placed under
compulsory acquisition at a compensation of P8,109,739.00 and P2,188,195.47,
respectively. 9
On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through then Department Secretary Miriam
D. Santiago sent a "Notice of Acquisition" to petitioner. The Notice was addressed as
follows:
Roxas y Cia, Limited
Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes
Manila, Metro Manila. 10
Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico were
subject to immediate acquisition and distribution by the government under the CARL;
that based on the DAR's valuation criteria, the government was offering
compensation of P3.4 million for 333.0800 hectares; that whether this offer was to be
accepted or rejected, petitioner was to inform the Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Distribution (BLAD) of the DAR; that in case of petitioner's rejection or failure to reply
within thirty days, respondent DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings
with notice to petitioner to determine just compensation for the land; that if petitioner
accepts respondent DAR's offer, or upon deposit of the compensation with an
accessible bank if it rejects the same, the DAR shall take immediate possession of
the land. 11
Almost two years later, on September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to
the LBP Land Valuation Manager three (3) separate Memoranda entitled "Request to
Open Trust Account." Each Memoranda requested that a trust account representing
the valuation of three portions of Hacienda Palico be opened in favor of the petitioner
in view of the latter's rejection of its offered value. 12
Meanwhile in a letter dated May 4, 1993, petitioner applied with the DAR for
conversion of Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-agricultural lands
under the provisions of the CARL. 13 On July 14, 1993, petitioner sent a letter to the
DAR Regional Director reiterating its request for conversion of the two haciendas. 14
Despite petitioner's application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with the
acquisition of the two Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts as compensation for
Hacienda Palico were replaced by respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. 15 On
October 22, 1993, from the mother title of TCT No. 985 of the Hacienda, respondent
DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 6654. On October
30, 1993, CLOA's were distributed to farmer beneficiaries. 16
Hacienda Banilad
22
On August 23, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent MARO of Nasugbu,
Batangas, sent a notice to petitioner addressed as follows:
Mr. Jaime Pimentel
Hacienda Administrator
Hacienda Banilad
Nasugbu, Batangas 17
The MARO informed Pimentel that Hacienda Banilad was subject to compulsory
acquisition under the CARL; that should petitioner wish to avail of the other schemes
such as Voluntary Offer to Sell or Voluntary Land Transfer, respondent DAR was
willing to provide assistance thereto. 18
On September 18, 1989, the MARO sent an "Invitation to Parties" again to Pimentel
inviting the latter to attend a conference on September 21, 1989 at the MARO Office
in Nasugbu to discuss the results of the MARO's investigation over Hacienda
Banilad. 19
On September 21, 1989, the same day the conference was held, the MARO
submitted two (2) Reports. In his first Report, he found that approximately 709
hectares of land under Tax Declaration Nos. 0237 and 0236 were "flat to undulating
(0-8% slope)." On this area were discovered 162 actual occupants and tillers of
sugarcane. 20 In the second Report, it was found that approximately 235 hectares
under Tax Declaration No. 0390 were "flat to undulating," on which were 92 actual
occupants and tillers of sugarcane. 21
The results of these Reports were discussed at the conference. Present in the
conference were representatives of the prospective farmer beneficiaries, the BARC,
the LBP, and Jaime Pimentel on behalf of the landowner. 22 After the meeting, on the
same day, September 21, 1989, a Summary Investigation Report was submitted
jointly by the MARO, representatives of the BARC, LBP, and the PARO. They
recommended that after ocular inspection of the property, 234.6498 hectares under
Tax Declaration No. 0390 be subject to compulsory acquisition and distribution by
CLOA. 23 The following day, September 22, 1989, a second Summary Investigation
was submitted by the same officers. They recommended that 737.2590 hectares
under Tax Declaration Nos. 0236 and 0237 be likewise placed under compulsory
acquisition for distribution. 24
On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Department Secretary, sent to
petitioner two (2) separate "Notices of Acquisition" over Hacienda Banilad. These
Notices were sent on the same day as the Notice of Acquisition over Hacienda Palico.
Unlike the Notice over Hacienda Palico, however, the Notices over Hacienda Banilad
were addressed to:
Roxas y Cia. Limited

7th Floor, Cacho-Gonzales Bldg. 101 Aguirre St., Leg.
Makati, Metro Manila. 25
Respondent DAR offered petitioner compensation of P15,108,995.52 for 729.4190
hectares and P4,428,496.00 for 234.6498 hectares. 26
On September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation
Manager a "Request to Open Trust Account" in petitioner's name as compensation for
234.6493 hectares of Hacienda Banilad. 27 A second "Request to Open Trust
Account" was sent on November 18, 1991 over 723.4130 hectares of said
Hacienda. 28
On December 18, 1991, the LBP certified that the amounts of P4,428,496.40 and
P21,234,468.78 in cash and LBP bonds had been earmarked as compensation for
petitioner's land in Hacienda Banilad. 29
On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and
Banilad.
Hacienda Caylaway
Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May 6,
1988 before the effectivity of the CARL. The Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571
hectares and is covered by four (4) titles — TCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664
and T-44665. On January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director
for Region IV, sent to petitioner two (2) separate Resolutions accepting petitioner's
voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway, particularly TCT Nos. T-44664 and T-
44663. 30 The Resolutions were addressed to:
Roxas & Company, Inc.
7th Flr. Cacho-Gonzales Bldg.
Aguirre, Legaspi Village
Makati, M. M 31
On September 4, 1990, the DAR Regional Director issued two separate Memoranda
to the LBP Regional Manager requesting for the valuation of the land under TCT Nos.
T-44664 and T-44663. 32 On the same day, respondent DAR, through the Regional
Director, sent to petitioner a "Notice of Acquisition" over 241.6777 hectares under
TCT No. T-44664 and 533.8180 hectares under TCT No. T-44663. 33 Like the
Resolutions of Acceptance, the Notice of Acquisition was addressed to petitioner at its
office in Makati, Metro Manila.
Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas,
sent a letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda
Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the
reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a
23
result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of
Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other
uses. 34
In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner
that a reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian reform.
Respondent Secretary also denied petitioner's withdrawal of the VOS on the ground
that withdrawal could only be based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of the
soil for agriculture, or if the slope of the land is over 18 degrees and that the land is
undeveloped. 35
Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, on May 11, 1993,
petitioner filed its application for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and
Banilad. 36 On July 14, 1993, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo Roxas,
reiterated its request to withdraw the VOS over Hacienda Caylaway in light of the
following:
1) Certification issued by Conrado I. Gonzales, Officer-in-Charge, Department of
Agriculture, Region 4, 4th Floor, ATI (BA) Bldg., Diliman, Quezon City dated March 1,
1993 stating that the lands subject of referenced titles "are not feasible and
economically sound for further agricultural development.
2) Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas approving the
Zoning Ordinance reclassifying areas covered by the referenced titles to non-
agricultural which was enacted after extensive consultation with government
agencies, including [the Department of Agrarian Reform], and the requisite public
hearings.
3) Resolution No. 106 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas dated March 8,
1993 approving the Zoning Ordinance enacted by the Municipality of Nasugbu.
4) Letter dated December 15, 1992 issued by Reynaldo U. Garcia of the Municipal
Planning & Development, Coordinator and Deputized Zoning Administrator addressed
to Mrs. Alicia P. Logarta advising that the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas has no
objection to the conversion of the lands subject of referenced titles to non-
agricultural. 37
On August 24, 1993 petitioner instituted Case No. N-0017-96-46 (BA) with
respondent DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the
CLOA's issued by respondent DAR in the name of several persons. Petitioner alleged
that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where the haciendas are located, had been
declared a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for agricultural production, and
that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land to non-agricultural.
In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent DARAB held that the case
involved the prejudicial question of whether the property was subject to agrarian
reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform for determination. 38

On October 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No.
32484. It questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial
of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings.
Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three haciendas was denied by the
MARO on November 8, 1993.
Petitioner's petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on April 28,
1994. 39 Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied on January
17, 1997 by respondent court. 40
Hence, this recourse. Petitioner assigns the following errors:
A. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS PREMATURE FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN VIEW OF THE PATENT ILLEGALITY OF THE
RESPONDENTS' ACTS, THE IRREPARABLE DAMAGE CAUSED BY SAID
ILLEGAL ACTS, AND THE ABSENCE OF A PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE
REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW — ALL OF WHICH ARE
EXCEPTIONS TO THE SAID DOCTRINE.
B. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER'S LANDHOLDINGS ARE SUBJECT TO COVERAGE UNDER THE
COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW, IN VIEW OF THE UNDISPUTED
FACT THAT PETITIONER'S LANDHOLDINGS HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO NON-
AGRICULTURAL USES BY PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 1520 WHICH
DECLARED THE MUNICIPALITY NASUGBU, BATANGAS AS A TOURIST ZONE,
AND THE ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU RE-
CLASSIFYING CERTAIN PORTIONS OF PETITIONER'S LANDHOLDINGS AS
NON-AGRICULTURAL, BOTH OF WHICH PLACE SAID LANDHOLDINGS OUTSIDE
THE SCOPE OF AGRARIAN REFORM, OR AT THE VERY LEAST ENTITLE
PETITIONER TO APPLY FOR CONVERSION AS CONCEDED BY RESPONDENT
DAR.
C. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
DECLARE THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE RESPONDENT DAR VOID FOR
FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS
BLATANTLY DISREGARDED THE PROCEDURE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF
PRIVATE LANDS UNDER R.A. 6657, MORE PARTICULARLY, IN FAILING TO GIVE
DUE NOTICE TO THE PETITIONER AND TO PROPERLY IDENTIFY THE
SPECIFIC AREAS SOUGHT TO BE ACQUIRED.
D. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
RECOGNIZE THAT PETITIONER WAS BRAZENLY AND ILLEGALLY DEPRIVED
OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION, CONSIDERING THAT
PETITIONER WAS NOT PAID JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE IT WAS
UNCEREMONIOUSLY STRIPPED OF ITS LANDHOLDINGS THROUGH THE
24
ISSUANCE OF CLOA'S TO ALLEGED FARMER BENEFICIARIES, IN VIOLATION
OF R.A. 6657. 41
The assigned errors involve three (3) principal issues: (1) whether this Court can take
cognizance of this petition despite petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies; (2) whether the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were
valid and in accordance with law; and (3) assuming the haciendas may be reclassified
from agricultural to non-agricultural, whether this court has the power to rule on this
issue.
I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
In its first assigned error, petitioner claims that respondent Court of Appeals gravely
erred in finding that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. As a general
rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice,
he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress. This is not
absolute, however. There are instances when judicial action may be resorted to
immediately. Among these exceptions are: (1) when the question raised is purely
legal; (2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; (3) when the act complained of
is patently illegal; (4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; (5) when the
respondent acted in disregard of due process; (6) when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied
or assumed approval of the latter; (7) when irreparable damage will be suffered; (8)
when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (9) when strong public
interest is involved; (10) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and (11)
in quo warranto proceedings. 42
Petitioner rightly sought immediate redress in the courts. There was a violation of its
rights and to require it to exhaust administrative remedies before the DAR itself was
not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA's) to farmer
beneficiaries over portions of petitioner's land without just compensation to petitioner.
A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) is evidence of ownership of land by a
beneficiary under R.A. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988. 43 Before this may be awarded to a farmer beneficiary, the land must first be
acquired by the State from the landowner and ownership transferred to the former.
The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are
conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or
deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title
remains with the landowner. 44 There was no receipt by petitioner of any
compensation for any of the lands acquired by the government.
The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is also specific. The law provides
that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or "LBP bonds." 45 Respondent DAR's
opening of trust account deposits in petitioner' s name with the Land Bank of the
Philippines does not constitute payment under the law. Trust account deposits are not
cash or LBP bonds. The replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did

not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this
compensation was marred by lack of due process. In fact, in the entire acquisition
proceedings, respondent DAR disregarded the basic requirements of administrative
due process. Under these circumstances, the issuance of the CLOA's to farmer
beneficiaries necessitated immediate judicial action on the part of the petitioner.
II. The Validity of the Acquisition Proceedings Over the Haciendas.
Petitioner's allegation of lack of due process goes into the validity of the acquisition
proceedings themselves. Before we rule on this matter, however, there is need to lay
down the procedure in the acquisition of private lands under the provisions of the law.
A. Modes of Acquisition of Land under R. A. 6657
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL),
provides for two (2) modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and voluntary.
The procedure for the compulsory acquisition of private lands is set forth in Section 16
of R.A. 6657, viz:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. — For purposes of acquisition of
private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:
a). After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR
shall send its notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or
registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building
and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain
the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the valuation
set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.
b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery
or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the
DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the
purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a
deed of transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and
other muniments of title.
d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary
administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land requiring the
landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice. After the
expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR
shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
25
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter
proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and
the farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall
send a Notice of Acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail,
and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the
place where the property is located. Within thirty days from receipt of the Notice of
Acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of
his acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and
delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of
title. Within thirty days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects the
DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative
proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP
representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just
compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the
DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just
compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case
of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall
immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer
certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be
redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may question the decision of the
DAR in the regular courts for final determination of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of the land acquisition to
hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). 46 Under Section 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is
the identification of the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries. However, the law
is silent on how the identification process must be made. To fill in this gap, the DAR
issued on July 26, 1989 Administrative Order No. 12, Series or 1989, which set the
operating procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as follows:
II. OPERATING PROCEDURE
A.  The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, with the assistance of the pertinent
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), shall:
1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under the CARP in his area
of responsibility. The masterlist shall include such information as required under the
attached CARP Masterlist Form which shall include the name of the landowner,
landholding area, TCT/OCT number, and tax declaration number.

2. Prepare a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title (OCT/TCT) or
landholding covered under Phase I and II of the CARP except those for which the
landowners have already filed applications to avail of other modes of land acquisition.
A case folder shall contain the following duly accomplished forms:
a) CARP CA Form 1 — MARO Investigation Report
b) CARP CA Form 2 — Summary Investigation Report of Findings and Evaluation
c) CARP CA Form 3 — Applicant's Information Sheet
d) CARP CA Form 4 — Beneficiaries Undertaking
e) CARP CA Form 5 — Transmittal Report to the PARO
The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the above-mentioned
forms have been examined and verified by him and that the same are true and
correct.
3. Send a Notice of Coverage and a letter of invitation to a conference/meeting to the
landowner covered by the Compulsory Case Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said
conference/meeting shall also be sent to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the
BARC representative(s), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) representative, and
other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property. He shall
discuss the MARO/BARC investigation report and solicit the
views, objection, agreements or suggestions of the participants thereon. The
landowner shall also be asked to indicate his retention area. The minutes of the
meeting shall be signed by all participants in the conference and shall form an
integral part of the CACF.
4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO).
B. The PARO shall:
1. Ensure that the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his MAROs.
2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation of the land in
accordance with A.O. No. 6, Series of 1988. 47 The valuation worksheet and the
related CACF valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the PARO and all the
personnel who participated in the accomplishment of these forms.
3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO through ocular
inspection and verification of the property. This ocular inspection and verification shall
be mandatory when the computed value exceeds = 500,000 per estate.
4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder, together with the duly
accomplished valuation forms and his recommendations, to the Central Office. The
LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall be furnished a copy each of his
report.
26
C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Distribution (BLAD), shall:
1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO, review, evaluate
and determine the final land valuation of the property covered by the case folder. A
summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared and duly certified by the
BLAD Director and the personnel directly participating in the review and final
valuation.
2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized representative, a
Notice of Acquisition (CARP CA Form 8) for the subject property. Serve the Notice to
the landowner personally or through registered mail within three days from its
approval. The Notice shall include, among others, the area subject of compulsory
acquisition, and the amount of just compensation offered by DAR.
3. Should the landowner accept the DAR's offered value, the BLAD shall prepare and
submit to the Secretary for approval the Order of Acquisition. However, in case of
rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) shall conduct a
summary administrative hearing to determine just compensation, in accordance with
the procedures provided under Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1989.
Immediately upon receipt of the DARAB's decision on just compensation, the BLAD
shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the required Order of
Acquisition.
4. Upon the landowner's receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or upon deposit
of payment in the designated bank, in case of rejection or non-response, the
Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of Deeds to issue the
corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. Once the property is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall take
possession of the land for redistribution to qualified beneficiaries.
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) keep an updated master list of all agricultural lands under the
CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO
prepares a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by
CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner a "Notice of Coverage" and a "letter of
invitation" to a "conference/meeting" over the land covered by the CACF. He also
sends invitations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries the representatives of the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the
property and solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At
the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area.
The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) who shall complete the valuation of the land. Ocular inspection and
verification of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory when the computed value
of the estate exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the valuation, the PARO
shall forward all papers together with his recommendation to the Central Office of the

DAR. The DAR Central Office, specifically, the Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Distribution (BLAD), shall review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of
the property. The BLAD shall prepare, on the signature of the Secretary or his duly
authorized representative, a Notice of Acquisition for the subject property. 48 From this
point, the provisions of Section 16 of R.A. 6657 then apply. 49
For a valid implementation of the CAR program, two notices are required: (1) the
Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation  to a preliminary conference sent to the
landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other
interested parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of
Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL.
The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of
invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are
steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The
implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and the power
of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the
landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property
in accordance with the Constitution. 50 But where, to carry out such regulation, the
owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there
is also a taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to
and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the
owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. 51 The Bill of Rights provides that "[n]o person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 52 The CARL
was not intended to take away property without due process of law. 53 The exercise of
the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of
private property.
DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989, from whence the Notice of Coverage first sprung,
was amended in 1990 by DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and in 1993 by DAR A.O.
No. 1, Series of 1993. The Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to the
conference meeting were expanded and amplified in said amendments.
DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 entitled "Revised Rules Governing the Acquisition of
Agricultural Lands Subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition
Pursuant to R.A. 6657," requires that:
B. MARO
1. Receives the duly accomplished CARP Form Nos. 1 & 1.1 including supporting documents.
2. Gathers basic ownership documents listed under 1.a or 1.b above and prepares corresponding VOCF/CACF by landowner/landholding.
3. Notifies/invites the landowner and representatives of the LBP, DENR, BARC and prospective beneficiaries of the schedule of ocular inspection of the
property at least one week in advance.
4. MARO/LAND BANK FIELD OFFICE/BARC
a) Identify the land and landowner, and determine the suitability for agriculture and productivity of the land and jointly prepare Field Investigation Report
(CARP Form No. 2), including the Land Use Map of the property.
b) Interview applicants and assist them in the preparation of the Application For Potential CARP Beneficiary (CARP Form No. 3).
27
c) Screen prospective farmer-beneficiaries and for those found qualified, cause the signing of the respective Application to Purchase and Farmer's
Undertaking (CARP Form No. 4).
d) Complete the Field Investigation Report based on the result of the ocular inspection/investigation of the property and documents submitted. See to it
that Field Investigation Report is duly accomplished and signed by all concerned.
5. MARO
a) Assists the DENR Survey Party in the conduct of a boundary/ subdivision survey delineating areas covered by OLT, retention, subject of VOS, CA (by
phases, if possible), infrastructures, etc., whichever is applicable.
b) Sends Notice of Coverage (CARP Form No. 5) to landowner concerned or his duly authorized representative inviting him for a conference.
c) Sends Invitation Letter (CARP Form No. 6) for a conference/public hearing to prospective farmer-beneficiaries, landowner, representatives of BARC,
LBP, DENR, DA, NGO's, farmers' organizations and other interested parties to discuss the following matters:
Result of Field Investigation
Inputs to valuation
Issues raised
Comments/recommendations by all parties concerned.
d) Prepares Summary of Minutes of the conference/public hearing to be guided by CARP Form No. 7.
e) Forwards the completed VOCF/CACF to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) using CARP Form No. 8 (Transmittal Memo to PARO).
x x x           x x x          x x x
DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 lays down the rules on both Voluntary Offer to Sell
(VOS) and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) transactions involving lands enumerated
under Section 7 of the CARL. 54 In both VOS and CA. transactions, the MARO
prepares the Voluntary Offer to Sell Case Folder (VOCF) and the Compulsory
Acquisition Case Folder (CACF), as the case may be, over a particular landholding.
The MARO notifies the landowner as well as representatives of the LBP, BARC and
prospective beneficiaries of the date of the ocular inspection of the property at least
one week before the scheduled date and invites them to attend the same. The
MARO, LBP or BARC conducts the ocular inspection and investigation by identifying
the land and landowner, determining the suitability of the land for agriculture and
productivity, interviewing and screening prospective farmer beneficiaries. Based on its
investigation, the MARO, LBP or BARC prepares the Field Investigation Report which
shall be signed by all parties concerned. In addition to the field investigation, a
boundary or subdivision survey of the land may also be conducted by a Survey Party
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to be assisted by
the MARO. 55 This survey shall delineate the areas covered by Operation Land
Transfer (OLT), areas retained by the landowner, areas with infrastructure, and the
areas subject to VOS and CA. After the survey and field investigation, the MARO
sends a "Notice of Coverage" to the landowner or his duly authorized representative
inviting him to a conference or public hearing with the farmer beneficiaries,
representatives of the BARC, LBP, DENR, Department of Agriculture (DA), non-
government organizations, farmer's organizations and other interested parties. At the
public hearing, the parties shall discuss the results of the field investigation, issues
that may be raised in relation thereto, inputs to the valuation of the subject
landholding, and other comments and recommendations by all parties concerned.
 28

Form No. 17.

The Minutes of the conference/public hearing shall form part of the VOCF or CACF
which files shall be forwarded by the MARO to the PARO. The PARO reviews, 6 DARMO Send notice to the LBP, CARP

evaluates and validates the Field Investigation Report and other documents in the BARC, DENR representatives Form No. 3
VOCF/CACF. He then forwards the records to the RARO for another review.
and prospective ARBs of the schedule of the field investigation

DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 was amended by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993. to be conducted on the subject

DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993 provided, among others, that: property.

IV. OPERATING PROCEDURES: 7 DARMO With the participation of CARP

Steps Responsible Activity Forms/ BARC the LO, representatives of Form No. 4

Agency/Unit Document LBP the LBP, BARC, DENR Land Use

(requirements) DENR and prospective ARBs, Map

A. Identification and Local Office conducts the investigation on

Documentation subject property to identify

x x x           x x x          x x x the landholding, determines

5 DARMO Issue Notice of Coverage CARP its suitability and productivity;

to LO by personal delivery Form No. 2 and jointly prepares the Field

with proof of service, or Investigation Report (FIR)

registered mail with return and Land Use Map. However,

card, informing him that his the field investigation shall

property is now under CARP proceed even if the LO, the

coverage and for LO to select representatives of the DENR and

his retention area, if he desires prospective ARBs are not available

to avail of his right of retention; provided, they were given due

and at the same time invites him notice of the time and date of

to join the field investigation to investigation to be conducted.

be conducted on his property Similarly, if the LBP representative

which should be scheduled at is not available or could not come

least two weeks in advance of on the scheduled date, the field

said notice. investigation shall also be conducted,

A copy of said Notice shall CARP after which the duly accomplished

be posted for at least one Form No. 17 Part I of CARP Form No. 4 shall

week on the bulletin board of be forwarded to the LBP

the municipal and barangay representative for validation. If he agrees

halls where the property is to the ocular inspection report of DAR,

located. LGU office concerned he signs the FIR (Part I) and

notifies DAR about compliance accomplishes Part II thereof.

with posting requirements thru In the event that there is a

return indorsement on CARP difference or variance between


the findings of the DAR and the
LBP as to the propriety of
covering the land under CARP,
whether in whole or in part, on
the issue of suitability to agriculture,
degree of development or slope,
and on issues affecting idle lands,
the conflict shall be resolved by
a composite team of DAR, LBP,
DENR and DA which shall jointly
conduct further investigation
thereon. The team shall submit its
report of findings which shall be
binding to both DAR and LBP,
pursuant to Joint Memorandum
Circular of the DAR, LBP, DENR
and DA dated 27 January 1992.
8 DARMO Screen prospective ARBs
BARC and causes the signing of CARP
the Application of Purchase Form No. 5
and Farmer's Undertaking
(APFU).
9 DARMO Furnishes a copy of the CARP
duly accomplished FIR to Form No. 4
the landowner by personal
delivery with proof of
service or registered mail
will return card and posts
a copy thereof for at least
one week on the bulletin
board of the municipal
and barangay halls where
the property is located.
LGU office concerned CARP
notifies DAR about Form No. 17
compliance with posting
requirement thru return
29
endorsement on CARP
Form No. 17.
B. Land Survey
10 DARMO Conducts perimeter or Perimeter
And/or segregation survey or
DENR delineating areas covered Segregation
Local Office by OLT, "uncarpable Survey Plan
areas such as 18% slope
and above, unproductive/
unsuitable to agriculture,
retention, infrastructure.
In case of segregation or
subdivision survey, the
plan shall be approved
by DENR-LMS.
C. Review and Completion
of Documents
11. DARMO Forward VOCF/CACF CARP
to DARPO. Form No. 6
xxx xxx xxx.
DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993, modified the identification process and increased the
number of government agencies involved in the identification and delineation of the
land subject to acquisition. 56 This time, the Notice of Coverage is sent to the
landowner before the conduct of the field investigation and the sending must comply
with specific requirements. Representatives of the DAR Municipal Office (DARMO)
must send the Notice of Coverage to the landowner by "personal delivery with proof
of service, or by registered mail with return card," informing him that his property is
under CARP coverage and that if he desires to avail of his right of retention, he may
choose which area he shall retain. The Notice of Coverage shall also invite the
landowner to attend the field investigation to be scheduled at least two weeks from
notice. The field investigation is for the purpose of identifying the landholding and
determining its suitability for agriculture and its productivity. A copy of the Notice of
Coverage shall be posted for at least one week on the bulletin board of the municipal
and barangay halls where the property is located. The date of the field investigation
shall also be sent by the DAR Municipal Office to representatives of the LBP, BARC,
DENR and prospective farmer beneficiaries. The field investigation shall be
conducted on the date set with the participation of the landowner and the various
representatives. If the landowner and other representatives are absent, the field
investigation shall proceed, provided they were duly notified thereof. Should there be
a variance between the findings of the DAR and the LBP as to whether the land be

placed under agrarian reform, the land's suitability to agriculture, the degree or
development of the slope, etc., the conflict shall be resolved by a composite team of
the DAR, LBP, DENR and DA which shall jointly conduct further investigation. The
team's findings shall be binding on both DAR and LBP. After the field investigation,
the DAR Municipal Office shall prepare the Field Investigation Report and Land Use
Map, a copy of which shall be furnished the landowner "by personal delivery with
proof of service or registered mail with return card." Another copy of the Report and
Map shall likewise be posted for at least one week in the municipal or barangay halls
where the property is located.
Clearly then, the notice requirements under the CARL are not confined to the Notice
of Acquisition set forth in Section 16 of the law. They also include the Notice of
Coverage first laid down in DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989 and subsequently
amended in DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993.
This Notice of Coverage does not merely notify the landowner that his property shall
be placed under CARP and that he is entitled to exercise his retention right; it also
notifies him, pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990, that a public hearing, shall
be conducted where he and representatives of the concerned sectors of society may
attend to discuss the results of the field investigation, the land valuation and other
pertinent matters. Under DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1993, the Notice of Coverage also
informs the landowner that a field investigation of his landholding shall be conducted
where he and the other representatives may be present.
B. The Compulsory Acquisition of Haciendas Palico and Banilad
In the case at bar, respondent DAR claims that it, through MARO Leopoldo C. Lejano,
sent a letter of invitation entitled "Invitation to Parties" dated September 29, 1989 to
petitioner corporation, through Jaime Pimentel, the administrator of Hacienda
Palico. 57 The invitation was received on the same day it was sent as indicated by a
signature and the date received at the bottom left corner of said invitation. With
regard to Hacienda Banilad, respondent DAR claims that Jaime Pimentel,
administrator also of Hacienda Banilad, was notified and sent an invitation to the
conference. Pimentel actually attended the conference on September 21, 1989 and
signed the Minutes of the meeting on behalf of petitioner corporation. 58 The Minutes
was also signed by the representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer
beneficiaries. 59 No letter of invitation was sent or conference meeting held with
respect to Hacienda Caylaway because it was subject to a Voluntary Offer to Sell to
respondent DAR. 60
When respondent DAR, through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), sent
to the various parties the Notice of Coverage and invitation to the conference, DAR
A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989 was already in effect more than a month earlier. The
Operating Procedure in DAR Administrative Order No. 12 does not specify how
notices or letters of invitation shall be sent to the landowner, the representatives of
the BARC, the LBP, the farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties. The
procedure in the sending of these notices is important to comply with the requisites of
due process especially when the owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner
30
is a domestic
corporation, 61 and therefore, has a personality separate and distinct from its
shareholders, officers and employees.
The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL is required to be sent to the
landowner by "personal delivery or registered mail." Whether the landowner be a
natural or juridical person to whose address the Notice may be sent by personal
delivery or registered mail,  the law does not distinguish. The DAR Administrative
Orders also do not distinguish. In the proceedings before the DAR, the distinction
between natural and juridical persons in the sending of notices may be found in the
Revised Rules of Procedure of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Service of
pleadings before the DARAB is governed by Section 6, Rule V of the DARAB Revised
Rules of Procedure. Notices and pleadings are served on private domestic
corporations or partnerships in the following manner:
Sec. 6. Service upon Private Domestic Corporation or Partnership. — If the defendant
is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier,
agent, or any of its directors or partners.
Similarly, the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, in Section 13, Rule 14
provides:
Sec. 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. — If the defendant
is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier,
agent, or any of its directors.
Summonses, pleadings and notices in cases against a private domestic corporation
before the DARAB and the regular courts are served on the president, manager,
secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors. These persons are those through
whom the private domestic corporation or partnership is capable of action. 62
Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager, secretary, cashier or director of
petitioner corporation. Is he, as administrator of the two Haciendas, considered an
agent of the corporation?
The purpose of all rules for service of process on a corporation is to make it
reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an
action against it. 63 Service must be made on a representative so integrated with the
corporation as to make it a priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities
and know what he should do with any legal papers served on him, 64 and bring home
to the corporation notice of the filing of the action. 65 Petitioner's evidence does not
show the official duties of Jaime Pimentel as administrator of petitioner's haciendas.
The evidence does not indicate whether Pimentel's duties is so integrated with the
corporation that he would immediately realize his responsibilities and know what he
should do with any legal papers served on him. At the time the notices were sent and
the preliminary conference conducted, petitioner's principal place of business was

listed in respondent DAR's records as "Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes,
Manila," 66 and "7th Flr. Cacho-Gonzales Bldg., 101 Aguirre St., Makati, Metro
Manila." 67 Pimentel did not hold office at the principal place of business of petitioner.
Neither did he exercise his functions in Plaza Cervantes, Manila nor in Cacho-
Gonzales Bldg., Makati, Metro Manila. He performed his official functions and actually
resided in the haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, a place over two hundred kilometers
away from Metro Manila.
Curiously, respondent DAR had information of the address of petitioner's principal
place of business. The Notices of Acquisition over Haciendas Palico and Banilad
were addressed to petitioner at its offices in Manila and Makati. These Notices were
sent barely three to four months after Pimentel was notified of the preliminary
conference. 68 Why respondent DAR chose to notify Pimentel instead of the officers of
the corporation was not explained by the said respondent.
Nevertheless, assuming that Pimentel was an agent of petitioner corporation, and the
notices and letters of invitation were validly served on petitioner through him, there is
no showing that Pimentel himself was duly authorized to attend the conference
meeting with the MARO, BARC and LBP representatives and farmer beneficiaries for
purposes of compulsory acquisition of petitioner's landholdings. Even respondent
DAR's evidence does not indicate this authority. On the contrary, petitioner claims
that it had no knowledge of the letter-invitation, hence, could not have given Pimentel
the authority to bind it to whatever matters were discussed or agreed upon by the
parties at the preliminary conference or public hearing. Notably, one year after
Pimentel was informed of the preliminary conference, DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990
was issued and this required that the Notice of Coverage must be sent "to the
landowner concerned or his duly authorized representative." 69
Assuming further that petitioner was duly notified of the CARP coverage of its
haciendas, the areas found actually subject to CARP were not properly identified
before they were taken over by respondent DAR. Respondents insist that the lands
were identified because they are all registered property and the technical description
in their respective titles specifies their metes and bounds. Respondents admit at the
same time, however, that not all areas in the haciendas were placed under the
comprehensive agrarian reform program invariably by reason of elevation or
character or use of the land. 70
The acquisition of the landholdings did not cover the entire expanse of the two
haciendas, but only portions thereof. Hacienda Palico has an area of 1,024 hectares
and only 688.7576 hectares were targetted for acquisition. Hacienda Banilad has an
area of 1,050 hectares but only 964.0688 hectares were subject to CARP. The
haciendas are not entirely agricultural lands. In fact, the various tax declarations over
the haciendas describe the landholdings as "sugarland," and "forest, sugarland,
pasture land, horticulture and woodland." 71
Under Section 16 of the CARL, the sending of the Notice of Acquisition specifically
requires that the land subject to land reform be first identified. The two haciendas in
the instant case cover vast tracts of land. Before Notices of Acquisition were sent to
31
petitioner, however, the exact areas of the landholdings were not properly segregated
and delineated. Upon receipt of this notice, therefore, petitioner corporation had no
idea which portions of its estate were subject to compulsory acquisition, which
portions it could rightfully retain, whether these retained portions were compact or
contiguous, and which portions were excluded from CARP coverage. Even
respondent DAR's evidence does not show that petitioner, through its duly authorized
representative, was notified of any ocular inspection and investigation that was to be
conducted by respondent DAR. Neither is there proof that petitioner was given the
opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be
acquired compulsorily. The right of retention and how this right is exercised, is
guaranteed in Section 6 of the CARL, viz:
Sec. 6. Retention Limits. — . . . .
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous,
shall pertain to the landowner; Provided, however, That in case the area selected for
retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose
whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land
with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the
retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a
beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another
agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the
landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from
the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.
Under the law, a landowner may retain not more than five hectares out of the total
area of his agricultural land subject to CARP. The right to choose the area to be
retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, pertains to the landowner. If the area
chosen for retention is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether
to remain on the portion or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land
with similar or comparable features.
C. The Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway
Petitioner was also left in the dark with respect to Hacienda Caylaway, which was the
subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS). The VOS in the instant case was made on
May 6, 1988, 72 before the effectivity of R.A. 6657 on June 15, 1988. VOS
transactions were first governed by DAR Administrative Order No. 19, series of
1989, 73 and under this order, all VOS filed before June 15, 1988 shall be heard and
processed in accordance with the procedure provided for in Executive Order No. 229,
thus:
III. All VOS transactions which are now pending before the DAR and for which no
payment has been made shall be subject to the notice and hearing requirements
provided in Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989, dated 26 July 1989, Section
II, Subsection A, paragraph 3.

All VOS filed before 15 June 1988, the date of effectivity of the CARL, shall be heard
and processed in accordance with the procedure provided for in Executive Order No.
229.
xxx xxx xxx.
Sec. 9 of E.O. 229 provides:
Sec. 9. Voluntary Offer to Sell. — The government shall purchase all agricultural
lands it deems productive and suitable to farmer cultivation voluntarily offered for sale
to it at a valuation determined in accordance with Section 6. Such transaction shall be
exempt from the payment of capital gains tax and other taxes and fees.
Executive Order 229 does not contain the procedure for the identification of private
land as set forth in DAR A.O. No. 12, Series of 1989. Section 5 of E.O. 229 merely
reiterates the procedure of acquisition in Section 16, R.A. 6657. In other words, the
E.O. is silent as to the procedure for the identification of the land, the notice of
coverage and the preliminary conference with the landowner, representatives of the
BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries. Does this mean that these requirements
may be dispensed with regard to VOS filed before June 15, 1988? The answer is no.
First of all, the same E.O. 229, like Section 16 of the CARL, requires that the land,
landowner and beneficiaries of the land subject to agrarian reform be identified before
the notice of acquisition should be issued. 74 Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily
offered for sale in 1989. The Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571 hectares and is
covered by four (4) titles. In two separate Resolutions both dated January 12, 1989,
respondent DAR, through the Regional Director, formally accepted the VOS over the
two of these four
titles. 75 The land covered by two titles has an area of 855.5257 hectares, but only
648.8544 hectares thereof fell within the coverage of R.A. 6657. 76 Petitioner claims it
does not know where these portions are located.
Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land covered by the
four titles were conducted in 1989, and that petitioner, as landowner, was not denied
participation therein, The results of the survey and the land valuation summary report,
however, do not indicate whether notices to attend the same were actually sent to
and received by petitioner or its duly authorized representative. 77 To reiterate,
Executive Order No. 229 does not lay down the operating procedure, much less the
notice requirements, before the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the
landowner, however, cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due
process and is an essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to exercise, at
the very least, his right of retention guaranteed under the CARL.
III. The Conversion of the three Haciendas.
It is petitioner's claim that the three haciendas are not subject to agrarian reform
because they have been declared for tourism, not agricultural
purposes. 78 In 1975, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 declaring
32
the municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas a tourist zone. Lands in Nasugbu, including
the subject haciendas, were allegedly reclassified as non-agricultural 13 years before
the effectivity of R. A. No. 6657. 79 In 1993, the Regional Director for Region IV of the
Department of Agriculture certified that the haciendas are not feasible and sound for
agricultural development. 80 On March 20, 1992, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas adopted Resolution No. 19
reclassifying certain areas of Nasugbu as non-agricultural. 81 This Resolution
approved Municipal Ordinance No. 19, Series of 1992, the Revised Zoning Ordinance
of Nasugbu 82 which zoning ordinance was based on a Land Use Plan for Planning
Areas for New Development allegedly prepared by the University of the
Philippines. 83 Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan was approved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas on March 8, 1993. 84
Petitioner claims that proclamation No. 1520 was also upheld by respondent DAR in
1991 when it approved conversion of 1,827 hectares in Nasugbu into a tourist area
known as the Batulao Resort Complex, and 13.52 hectares in Barangay Caylaway as
within the potential tourist belt. 85 Petitioner present evidence before us that these
areas are adjacent to the haciendas subject of this petition, hence, the haciendas
should likewise be converted. Petitioner urges this Court to take cognizance of the
conversion proceedings and rule accordingly. 6
We do not agree. Respondent DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition
of petitioner's landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate
over petitioner's application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-
agricultural. The agency charged with the mandate of approving or disapproving
applications for conversion is the DAR.
At the time petitioner filed its application for conversion, the Rules of Procedure
governing the processing and approval of applications for land use conversion was
the DAR A.O. No. 2, Series of 1990. Under this A.O., the application for conversion is
filed with the MARO where the property is located. The MARO reviews the application
and its supporting documents and conducts field investigation and ocular inspection
of the property. The findings of the MARO are subject to review and evaluation by the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). The PARO may conduct further field
investigation and submit a supplemental report together with his recommendation to
the Regional Agrarian Reform Officer (RARO) who shall review the same. For lands
less than five hectares, the RARO shall approve or disapprove applications for
conversion. For lands exceeding five hectares, the RARO shall evaluate the PARO
Report and forward the records and his report to the Undersecretary for Legal Affairs.
Applications over areas exceeding fifty hectares are approved or disapproved by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
The DAR's mandate over applications for conversion was first laid down in Section 4
(j) and Section 5 (l) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987 and reiterated in the
CARL and Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the
President. The DAR's jurisdiction over applications for conversion is provided as
follows:

A. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to "approve or disapprove
applications for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into
non-agricultural uses," pursuant to Section 4 (j) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series
of 1987.
B. Sec. 5 (l) of E.O. 129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR, exclusive authority to
approve or disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural lands for residential,
commercial, industrial and other land uses.
C. Sec. 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize under certain
conditions, the conversion of agricultural lands.
D. Sec. 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the
President, provides that "action on applications for land use conversion on individual
landholdings shall remain as the responsibility of the DAR, which shall utilize as its
primary reference, documents on the comprehensive land use plans and
accompanying ordinances passed upon and approved by the local government units
concerned, together with the National Land Use Policy, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657
and E.O. No. 129-A. 87
Applications for conversion were initially governed by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of 1990
entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion of Private Agricultural
Lands and Non-Agricultural Uses," and DAR A.O. No. 2, Series of 1990 entitled
"Rules of Procedure Governing the Processing and Approval of Applications for Land
Use Conversion." These A.O.'s and other implementing guidelines, including
Presidential issuances and national policies related to land use conversion have been
consolidated in DAR A.O. No. 07, Series of 1997. Under this recent issuance, the
guiding principle in land use conversion is:
to preserve prime agricultural lands for food production while, at the same time,
recognizing the need of the other sectors of society (housing, industry and
commerce) for land, when coinciding with the objectives of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law to promote social justice, industrialization and the optimum use
of land as a national resource for public welfare. 88
"Land Use" refers to the manner of utilization of land, including its allocation,
development and management. "Land Use Conversion" refers to the act or process of
changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as
approved by the DAR. 89 The conversion of agricultural land to uses other than
agricultural requires field investigation and conferences with the occupants of the
land. They involve factual findings and highly technical matters within the special
training and expertise of the DAR. DAR A.O. No. 7, Series of 1997 lays down with
specificity how the DAR must go about its task. This time, the field investigation is not
conducted by the MARO but by a special task force, known as the Center for Land
Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI-DAR Central Office). The
procedure is that once an application for conversion is filed, the CLUPPI prepares the
Notice of Posting. The MARO only posts the notice and thereafter issues a certificate
33
to the fact of posting. The CLUPPI conducts the field investigation and dialogues with
the applicants and the farmer beneficiaries to ascertain the information necessary for
the processing of the application. The Chairman of the CLUPPI deliberates on the
merits of the investigation report and recommends the appropriate action. This
recommendation is transmitted to the Regional Director, thru the Undersecretary, or
Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Applications involving more than fifty hectares are
approved or disapproved by the Secretary. The procedure does not end with the
Secretary, however. The Order provides that the decision of the Secretary may be
appealed to the Office of the President or the Court of Appeals, as the case may
be, viz:
Appeal from the decision of the Undersecretary shall be made to the Secretary, and
from the Secretary to the Office of the President or the Court of Appeals as the case
may be. The mode of appeal/motion for reconsideration, and the appeal fee, from
Undersecretary to the Office of the Secretary shall be the same as that of the
Regional Director to the Office of the Secretary. 90
Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special competence. 91 Respondent DAR is in a better
position to resolve petitioner's application for conversion, being primarily the agency
possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determine whether
Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from
the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court.
Finally, we stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of
due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to
nullify the CLOA's already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is
to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course.
Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the
acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer
beneficiaries in 1993. 92 Since then until the present, these farmers have been
cultivating their lands. 93 It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and
equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till.
Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of the
land.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings
over the three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due
process therein. In accordance with the guidelines set forth in this decision and the
applicable administrative procedure, the case is hereby remanded to respondent DAR
for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner's application for
conversion.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 168787             September 3, 2008
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, vs.
POLO COCONUT PLANTATION CO., INC.
In the late 1990s, respondent Polo Coconut Plantation Co., Inc. (PCPCI) sought to
convert 280 hectares of its Polo Coconut Plantation 7 (Polo estate) in Tanjay, Negros
Oriental into a special economic zone (ecozone) under the Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA). On December 19, 1998, PEZA issued Resolution No. 98-320
favorably recommending the conversion of the Polo estate into an ecozone8 subject to
certain terms and conditions including the submission of "all government clearances,
endorsements and documents required under Rule IV, Section 3 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act (RA) 7916."
The following year, PCPCI applied for the reclassification of its agricultural lands into
mixed residential, commercial and industrial lands with the municipal government of
Tanjay. After conducting the prescribed hearing, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanjay
adopted Resolution No. 344 granting PCPCI's application on November 3, 1999.
When Tanjay became a city, its Sangguniang Panglungsod adopted Resolution No.
16 approving Tanjay's Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance where
PCPCI's real properties, including the Polo estate, were reclassified as mixed
residential, commercial and industrial lands.9
Sometime in 2003, petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Stephen M. Leonidas, notified PCPCI that
394.9020 hectares of the Polo estate had been placed under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)10 and would be acquired by the government.
Thereafter, Leonidas requested the Registrar of Deeds of Negros Oriental to cancel
PCPCI's certificate of title and to issue a new one in the name of the Republic of the
34
Philippines. He likewise asked Region VII Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
Arnold C. Arrieta to determine the just compensation due to PCPCI.11
On January 29, 2004, a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines.12 The next day, that title was cancelled and another was issued in
the name of petitioners in G.R. No. 169271 (petitioners-beneficiaries).13
Meanwhile, on March 11, 2004, Arrieta approved the land valuation
(P85,491,784.60)14 of the Land Bank of the Philippines for the Polo estate. PCPCI
moved for reconsideration but it was denied in an order dated March 30, 2004.
On July 16, 2004, Leonidas informed PCPCI that a relocation survey of the Polo
estate would be conducted. PCPCI moved for the suspension of the survey but it was
denied.15
Aggrieved, PCPCI filed a petition for certiorari16 in the Court of Appeals (CA) asserting
that the DAR acted with grave abuse of discretion in placing the Polo estate under the
CARP. It argued that the Polo estate should not be subjected to the CARP because
Resolution No. 16 had already designated it as mixed residential, commercial and
industrial land. Moreover, petitioners-beneficiaries were not qualified to receive land
under the CARP.
In its February 16, 2005 decision, the CA found that the Polo estate was no longer
agricultural land when the DAR placed it under the CARP in view of Resolution No.
16. Furthermore, petitioners-beneficiaries were not qualified beneficiaries as they
were not tenants of PCPCI. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by
us DECLARING as NOT VALID the acts of the [DAR] of subjecting PCPCI's [Polo
estate] to the coverage of the CARP, of canceling and causing the cancellation of
[PCPCI's] Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2304 covering such land, of issuing or
causing the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-36318 for this land in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines by way of transfer to it, of issuing or causing
the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-802 for the said land in the names of
[petitioner-beneficiaries] in the case at bench by way of award of them of such land as
purported farm beneficiaries and of doing other things with the end in view of
subjecting [the Polo estate] to CARP coverage, SETTING
ASIDE and ENJOINING such acts and the consequence thereof, ORDERING the
[petitioner-beneficiaries] to vacate the premises of [the Polo estate] if they had
entered such premises, and ORDERING the respondent Register of Deeds of Negros
Oriental to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-36318 and T-802 and to
reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2304 in the name of petitioner PCPCI.
SO ORDERED.17
Both the DAR and petitioners-beneficiaries moved for reconsideration but they were
denied.18 Hence, this recourse.

The DAR asserts that the reclassification of the Polo estate under Resolution No. 16
as mixed residential, commercial and industrial land did not place it beyond the reach
of the CARP. Petitioners-beneficiaries, on the other hand, insist that they were
qualified beneficiaries. While they were neither farmers nor regular farmworkers of
PCPCI, they were either seasonal or other farmworkers.
There is merit in these petitions.
Non-Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies
Recourse to court action will not prosper until all remedies have been exhausted at
the administrative level.19
Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure (DARAB Rules) provides:
Section 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. The Adjudicator or Board shall have
no jurisdiction over matters involving the implementation of RA 6657 otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other related
agrarian laws enunciated by pertinent rules and administrative orders, which shall be
under the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office of the Secretary
of the DAR in accordance with his issuances to wit:
3.1. Classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the agrarian
reform program and the initial issuance of [certificates of land ownership award] and
[emancipation patents], including protests or oppositions thereto and petitioners for
lifting of such coverage;
3.2. Classification, identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification or disqualification
of potential/actual farmer/beneficiaries; (emphasis supplied)
xxx   xxx   xxx
Protests regarding the implementation of the CARP fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. He determines whether a tract of land is covered by
or exempt from CARP.20 Likewise, questions regarding the eligibility of CARP
beneficiaries must be addressed to him. The DAR Secretary decides to whom lands
placed under the CARP shall be distributed.21
Before PCPCI filed its petition for certiorari in the CA, it did not file a protest or
opposition questioning the propriety of subjecting the Polo estate to the CARP.
Neither did it assail the eligibility of petitioners-beneficiaries before the DAR
Secretary. There were available administrative remedies under the DARAB Rules but
PCPCI did not avail of them.
Moreover, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court can
be availed of only in the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. 22 Here, recourse to the DAR Secretary was the
35
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law contemplated by
Rule 65.
Non-Conversion To Mixed
Residential, Commercial and
Industrial Land
In Ros v. DAR,23 we held that reclassified agricultural lands must undergo the process
of conversion in the DAR24 before they may be used for other purposes.25 Since the
DAR never approved the conversion of the Polo estate from agricultural to another
use, the land was never placed beyond the scope of the CARP.
The approval of the DAR for the conversion of agricultural land into an industrial
estate is a condition precedent for its conversion into an ecozone. 26 A proposed
ecozone cannot be considered for Presidential Proclamation unless the landowner
first submits to PEZA a land use conversion clearance certificate from the DAR.27 This
PCPCI failed to do.
PEZA Resolution No. 98-320 expressly provides:
Resolved, that the application of [PCPCI] for (1) declaration of the 280-hectare
property in Brgy. Polo, Municipality of Tanjay, Province of Negros Oriental as a
Special Economic Zone, subject to Presidential Proclamation, henceforth to be to be
known as POLO ECOCITY- SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONE and (2) registration as the
Developer/Owner of the said ECOZONE is hereby APPROVED subject to the
following terms and conditions:
xxx   xxx   xxx
2. Prior to PEZA's endorsement of the subject area to the President for proclamation
as an ECOZONE, the PCPCI shall submit all government clearances, endorsements
and documents required under Rule IV, Section 3 of the [Rules and Regulations to
Implement RA 7916];
xxx   xxx   xxx
This condition proves that the favorable recommendation of PEZA did not ipso
facto change the nature of the Polo estate. The property remained as agricultural land
and, for this reason, was still subject to the CARP.
In fact, Resolution No. 16 did not exempt PCPCI's agricultural lands (including the
Polo estate) from the CARP. Section 20 of the Local Government Code 28 provides
that a city or municipality can reclassify land only through the enactment of an
ordinance. In this instance, reclassification was undertaken by mere resolution; 29 thus,
it was invalid.
Qualification Of CARP
Beneficiaries
Section 22 of the CARL provides:
 36

Section 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. - The lands covered by the CARP shall be

distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same baranggay, or in
the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following order
of priority:

(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;

(b) regular farmworkers;

(c) seasonal farmworkers;

(d) other farmworkers;

(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;

(f) collectives or cooperatives of the abovementioned beneficiaries and

(g) others directly working on the land.

xxx   xxx   xxx

A basic qualification of a beneficiary is his willingness, aptitude and ability to cultivate

and make the land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of
monitoring the record or performance of each beneficiary, so that any beneficiary
guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall forfeit
his right to continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit periodic reports on the
performance of the beneficiaries to the [Presidential Agrarian Reform Council].
xxx   xxx   xxx
This provision enumerates who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. Determining
whether or not one is eligible to receive land involves the administrative
implementation of the program. For this reason, only the DAR Secretary can identify
and select CARP beneficiaries. Thus, courts cannot substitute their judgment unless
there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.30
Section 22 of the CARL does not limit qualified beneficiaries to tenants of the
landowners. Thus, the DAR cannot be deemed to have committed grave abuse of
discretion simply because its chosen beneficiaries were not tenants of PCPCI.
G.R. No. 138896               June 20, 2000
BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU vs. Heirs of FRANCISCO PASTOR
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within
the jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject
property.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the March 29, 1999 Order1 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City (Branch 58) in Civil Case No. CEB-
21978, in which it dismissed a Complaint for eminent domain. It ruled as follows:
Premises considered, the motion to dismiss is hereby granted on the ground that this
Court has no jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, the Orders dated February 19,
1999 and February 26, 1999, as well as the Writ of Possession issued by virtue of the
latter Order are hereby recalled for being without force and effect.2

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The February 16, 2005 decision
and June 29, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00043
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The March 11, 2004, March 30, 2004 and August 30, 2004 orders of Region VII
Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Arnold C. Arrieta in RARAD Case No. VII-N-
1284-2004 are REINSTATED. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-802 and Certificate
of Land Ownership Award No. 00114438 are declared VALID.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner also challenges the May 14, 1999 Order of the RTC denying
reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) 3 a
Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8,
1997, the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It
reasoned that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property
for public use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent domain,
therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact

that the action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent
domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
and not with this Court."4
Assailed RTC Ruling
The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for
eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be
expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the
RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the
value of the subject property was less than P20,000, the RTC ratiocinated in this
wise:
The instant action is for eminent domain. It appears from the current Tax Declaration
of the land involved that its assessed value is only One Thousand Seven Hundred
Forty Pesos (P1,740.00). Pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (3), of Republic Act No.
7691, all civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property with an
assessed value of less than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Courts. In the case at bar, it is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu, where the property involved
is located.
The instant action for eminent domain or condemnation of real property is a real
action affecting title to or possession of real property, hence, it is the assessed value
of the property involved which determines the jurisdiction of the court. That the right of
eminent domain or condemnation of real, property is included in a real action affecting
title to or possession of real property, is pronounced by retired Justice Jose Y. Feria,
thus, "Real actions are those affecting title to or possession of real property. These
include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosures of mortgage on, real
property. . . ."5
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a pure question of law. 6 In
a Resolution dated July 28, 1999, the Court denied the Petition for Review "for being
posted out of time on July 2, 1999, the due date being June 2, 1999, as the motion for
extension of time to file petition was denied in the resolution of July 14, 1999."7 In a
subsequent Resolution dated October 6, 1999, the Court reinstated the Petition.8
Issue
In its Memorandum, petitioner submits this sole issue for the consideration of this
Court:
Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or
expropriation where the assessed value of the subject property is below Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?9
This Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
37
Main Issue:
Jurisdiction over an Expropriation Suit
In support of its appeal, petitioner cites Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that
RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation; . . . . ." It argues that the
present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such
right is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Complaint for Eminent Domain
affects the title to or possession of real property. Thus, they argue that the case
should have been brought before the MTC, pursuant to BP 129 as amended by
Section 3 (3) of RA 7691. This law provides that MTCs shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions that involve title to or possession of real property, the
assessed value of which does not exceed twenty thousand pesos or, in civil actions in
Metro Manila, fifty thousand pesos exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
We agree with the petitioner that an expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. The test to determine whether it is so was laid down by the Court in this
wise:
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an
action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the
contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly
that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages, demand an
inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more within the
competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of record at the
time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating jurisdiction
(Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901). 10
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of
money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right
to take private property for public use. 11 In National Power Corporation
v.  Jocson, 12 the Court ruled that expropriation proceedings have two phases:

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise
the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought
to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint." An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course,
since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court
on the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter
as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection
to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall be filed or
heard."
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination
by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is
done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The
order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings
of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the second stage
of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether
the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the
taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the
government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due
process. 1 In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the government's
exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for
the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it.1avvphi1 This,
however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is
determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.
Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v.  Zurbano that "condemnation
proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance," 14 the forerunners of
the regional trial courts. The said case was decided during the effectivity of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of
first instance had original jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation." 15 The 1997 amendments to the
Rules of Court were not intended to change these jurisprudential precedents.
We are not persuaded by respondents' argument that the present action involves the
title to or possession of a parcel of land. They cite the observation of retired Justice
Jose Y. Feria, an eminent authority in remedial law, that condemnation or
expropriation proceedings are examples of real actions that affect the title to or
possession of a parcel of land. 16
Their reliance is misplaced. Justice Feria sought merely to distinguish between real
and personal actions. His discussion on this point pertained to the nature of actions,
38
not to the jurisdiction of courts. In fact, in his pre-bar lectures, he emphasizes that
jurisdiction over eminent domain cases is still within the RTCs under the 1997 Rules.
To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may
expropriate private property under the given set of circumstances. The government
does not dispute respondents' title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a
question of who has a better title or right, for the government does not even claim that
it has a title to the property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to
"appropriate and control individual property for the public benefit, as the public
necessity, convenience or welfare may demand." 17
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Orders SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is directed to HEAR the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-106528 December 21, 1993
PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION vs.
THE HONORABLE DOMINGO D. PANIS as Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila
This is an appeal by certiorari to review: (1) the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 23338, which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein
petitioner, assailing the orders of (a) respondent Judge Domingo D. Panis of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, in Civil Case No. 90-53531, and (b)
respondent Judge Ricardo D. Diaz, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, in
Civil Case No. 90-53346; and (2) its Resolution dated July 30, 1992, which denied the
motion for reconsideration of the decision.
Philippine Columbian Association, petitioner herein, is a non-stock, non-profit
domestic corporation and is engaged in the business of providing sports and
recreational facilities for its members. Petitioner's office and facilities are located in
the District of Paco, Manila, and adjacent thereto, is a parcel of land consisting of
4,842.90 square meters owned by petitioner.
Private respondents are the actual occupants of the said parcel of land, while
respondents Antonio Gonzales, Jr. and Karlo Butiong were duly-elected councilors of
the City of Manila.

In 1982, petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against herein private
respondents before the metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Judgment was rendered
against the said occupants, ordering them to vacate the lot and pay reasonable
compensation therefor. This judgment was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, the
Court of Appeals and subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 85262.
As a result of the favorable decision, petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila, a motion for execution of judgment, which was granted on April 9,
1990. A writ of demolition was later prayed and likewise issued by the same court on
May 30, 1990.
On June 8, 1990, private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27,
Manila, a petition for injunction and prohibition with preliminary injunction and
restraining order against the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and petitioner herein
(Civil Case No. 90-53346) to enjoin their ejectment from and the demolition of their
houses on the premises in question.
On June 28, 1990, the City of Manila filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 90-
53531 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, for the
expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter lot subject of the ejectment proceedings in
Civil Case No. 90-53346. Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
alleging, inter alia, that the City of Manila had no power to expropriate private land;
that the expropriation is not for public use and welfare; that the expropriation is
politically motivated; and, that the deposit of P2 million in the City of Manila
representing the provisional value of the land, was insufficient and was made under
P.D. 1533, a law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
On September 14, 1990, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss and entered an order of condemnation declaring that
the expropriation proceeding was properly instituted in accordance with law. The
Court also ordered the parties to submit, within five days, the names of their
respective nominees as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the land in
question.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying its motion to dismiss,
and later a motion to defer compliance with the order directing the submission of the
names of nominees to be appointed commissioners. The City of Manila, however,
filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession over the subject lot,
mentioning the P2 million deposit with the Philippine National Bank, representing the
provisional value of the land.
In separate orders dated October 5 and 8, 1990, the court issued the writ of
possession, and at the same time, denied petitioner's motion to defer compliance and
motion for reconsideration.
On September 21, 1990, as a result of the expropriation proceedings, the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 27, Manila, in Civil Case No. 90-53346 issued an order, granting
39
the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the private respondents. A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied.
Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition before the Court of Appeals a
petition assailing the orders dated September 14, 1990, and October 5 and 8, 1990 of
Branch 41 of the Regional Trial Court, and the Order dated September 21, 1990 of
Branch 27 of the same court (CA-G.R. SP No. 23338). The Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision on November 31, 1992, denying the petition, and a Resolution
on July 30, 1992, denying consideration thereof.
Hence, this petition.
The land subject of this case is the 4,842.90 square meter lot, which was formerly a
part of the Fabie Estate. As early as November 11, 1966, the Municipal Board of the
City of Manila passed Ordinance No. 5971, seeking to expropriate the Fabie Estate.
Through negotiated sales, the City of Manila acquired a total of 18,017.10 square
meters of the estate, and thereafter subdivided the land into home lots and distributed
the portions to the actual occupants thereof.
The remaining area of 4,842.90 square meters, more or less, was sold in 1977 by its
owner, Dolores Fabie-Posadas, to petitioner. Since the time of the sale, the lot has
been occupied by private respondents. On 23, 1989, the City Council of Manila, with
the approval of the Mayor, passed Ordinance No. 7704 for the expropriation of the
4,842.90 square meter lot.
Petitioner claims that expropriation of the lot cannot prosper because:
(1) the City of Manila has no specific power to expropriate private property under the
1987 Constitution; and (2) assuming that it has such power, this was exercised
improperly and illegally in violation of the Public use requirement and petitioner's right
to due process.
Petitioner argues that under the 1987 Constitution, there must be a law expressly
authorizing local governments to undertake urban land reform (Art. XIII, Sec. 9).
Petitioner forgot that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, R.A. No. 409,
expressly authorizes the City of Manila to "condemn private property for public use"
(Sec. 3) and "to acquire private land . . . and subdivide the same into home lots for
sale on easy terms to city residents" (Sec. 100).
The Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila general
powers over its territorial jurisdiction, including the power of eminent domain, thus:
General powers. — The city may have a common seal and alter the same at
pleasure, and may take, purchase, receive, hold, lease, convey, and dispose of real
and personal property for the general interest of the city, condemn private property for
public use, contract and be contracted with, sue and be sued, and prosecute and
defend to final judgment and execution, and exercise all the powers hereinafter
conferred (R.A. 409, Sec. 3; Emphasis supplied).

Section 100 of said Revised Charter authorizes the City of Manila to undertake urban
land reform, thus:
Sec. 100. The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands in the city and to
subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms for city residents, giving first
priority to the bona fide tenants or occupants of said lands, and second priority to
laborers and low-salaried employees. For the purpose of this section, the city may
raise the necessary funds by appropriations of general funds, by securing loans or by
issuing bonds, and, if necessary, may acquire the lands through expropriation
proceedings in accordance with law, with the approval of the President . . . (Emphasis
supplied).
The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to
acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale
to bona fide  tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried
employees of the city. That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of
the property does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to
provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them (Sumulong v. Guerrero,
154 SCRA 461 [1987] ).
Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined
to vast tracts of land and landed estates (Province of Camarines Sur v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993; J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970] ). It is therefore of no moment that the land
sought to be expropriated in this case is less than half a hectare only (Pulido v. Court
of Appeals, 122 SCRA 63 [1983]).
Through the years, the public use requirement in eminent domain has evolved into a
flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions (Sumulong v. Guerrero, supra;
Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA 89 [1987]; Heirs of Juancho
Ardona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]). Public use now includes the broader notion
of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and
housing.
This concept is specifically recognized in the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
xxx xxx xxx
The state shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the
private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will
make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It
shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the
implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property
owners (Art. XIII, Sec. 9; Emphasis supplied).
x x x           x x x          x x x
40
The due process requirement in the expropriation of subject lot has likewise been
complied with. Although the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner was not set for
hearing as the court is required to do (National Housing Authority v. Valenzuela, 159
SCRA 396 [1988]), it never questioned the lack of hearing before the trial and
appellate courts. It is only now before us that petitioner raises the issue of due
process.
Indeed, due process was afforded petitioner when it filed its motion for
reconsideration of the trial court's order, denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals, in determining whether grave abuse of discretion was
committed by respondent courts, passed upon the very same issues raised by
petitioner in its motion to dismiss, which findings we uphold. Petitioner therefore
cannot argue that it was denied its day in court.
The amount of P2 million representing the provisional value of the land is an amount
not only fixed by the court, but accepted by both parties. The fact remains that
petitioner, albeit reluctantly, agreed to said valuation and is therefore estopped from
assailing the same. It must be remembered that the valuation is merely provisional.
The parties still have the second stage in the proceedings in the proper court below to
determine specifically the amount of just compensation to be paid the landowner
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 67, Sec. 5; National Power Corporation v. Jocson, 206
SCRA 520 [1992] ).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169263               September 21, 2011
CITY OF MANILA, Petitioner, vs. MELBA TAN TE, Respondent.
In this Petition for Review,1 the City of Manila assails the April 29, 2005 Decision 2 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71894, as well as the August 12, 2005
Resolution,3 in the said case denying reconsideration.
The assailed decision affirmed the June 13, 2001 Order4 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 24 issued in Civil Case No. 00-99264 – one for expropriation filed by
petitioner, the City of Manila. The said Order, in turn, granted the motion to dismiss
the complaint that was filed by respondent Melba Tan Te, in lieu of an answer.
The facts follow.
On March 15, 1998, then Manila City Mayor Joselito L. Atienza approved Ordinance
No. 7951 – an expropriation measure enacted on February 3, 1998 by the city council
– authorizing him to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain pieces of real

property along Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets where low-cost housing
units could be built and then awarded to bona fide residents therein. For this purpose,
the mayor was also empowered to access the city’s funds or utilize funding facilities of
other government agencies.5 In the aggregate, the covered property measures 1,425
square meters, and includes the 475-square-meter lot owned by respondent Melba
Tan Te.6
The records bear that respondent had acquired the property from the heirs of
Emerlinda Dimayuga Reyes in 1996, and back then it was being occupied by a
number of families whose leasehold rights had long expired even prior to said sale. In
1998, respondent had sought before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15
the ejectment of these occupants from the premises. The favorable ruling in that case
evaded execution; hence, the court, despite opposition of the City of Manila, issued a
Writ of Demolition at respondent’s instance.7 It appears that in the interim between the
issuance of the writ of execution and the order of demolition, the City of Manila had
instituted an expropriation case8 affecting the same property. Respondent had moved
for the dismissal of that first expropriation case for lack of cause of action, lack of
showing of an ordinance authorizing the expropriation, and non-compliance with the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992.9 The trial court found merit in the motion and
dismissed the complaint without prejudice.10
On November 16, 2000, petitioner11 filed this second Complaint12 for expropriation
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24. 13 This time, it attached a copy of
Ordinance No. 7951 and alleged that pursuant thereto, it had previously offered to
purchase the subject property from respondent for ₱824,330.00. 14 The offer was
contained in a letter sent to respondent by the City Legal Officer on May 21,
1999,15 but respondent allegedly failed to retrieve it despite repeated
notices,16 thereby compelling petitioner to institute the present expropriation
proceedings after depositing in trust with the Land Bank of the Philippines
₱1,000,000.00 cash, representing the just compensation required by law to be paid to
respondent.17
Respondent did not file an answer and in lieu of that, she submitted a Motion to
Dismiss18 and raised the following grounds: that Ordinance No. 7951 was an invalid
expropriation measure because it violated the rule against taking private property
without just compensation; that petitioner did not comply with the requirements of
Sections 919 and 1020 of R.A. No. 7279; and that she qualified as a small property
owner and, hence, exempt from the operation of R.A. No. 7279, the subject lot being
the only piece of realty that she owned.
Petitioner moved that it be allowed to enter the property, but before it could be
resolved, the trial court issued its June 13, 2001 Order21 dismissing the
complaint. First, the trial court held that while petitioner had deposited with the bank
the alleged ₱1M cash in trust for respondent, petitioner nevertheless did not submit
any certification from the City Treasurer’s Office of the amount needed to justly
compensate respondent for her property. Second, it emphasized that the provisions
41
of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279 are mandatory in character, yet petitioner had
failed to show that it exacted compliance with them prior to the commencement of this
suit. Lastly, it conceded that respondent had no other real property except the subject
lot which, considering its total area, should well be considered a small property
exempted by law from expropriation. In view of the dismissal of the complaint,
petitioner’s motion to enter was rendered moot and academic.22
Petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which, finding no merit
therein, dismissed the same.23 Petitioner sought reconsideration,24 but it was denied.25
In this Petition,26 petitioner posits that the trial court’s dismissal of its complaint was
premature, and it faults the Court of Appeals for having failed to note that by such
dismissal it has been denied an opportunity to show previous compliance with the
requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279 as well as to establish that
respondent actually owns other realty apart from the subject property. Besides,
continues petitioner, whether or not it had truly complied with the requirements of the
law is a matter which can be determined only after a trial of the case on the merits
and not, as what happened in this case, at the hearing of the motion to dismiss.27
Respondent, for her part, points out that Ordinance No. 7951 is an invalid
expropriation measure as it does not even contain an appropriation of funds in its
implementation. In this respect, respondent believes that the ₱1M cash deposit
certified by the bank seems to be incredible, since petitioner has not shown any
certification from the City Treasurer’s Office on the amount necessary to implement
the expropriation measure. More importantly, she believes that the dismissal of the
complaint must be sustained as it does not allege previous compliance with Sections
9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279 and, hence, it does not present a valid cause of
action.28 She theorizes that the expropriation for socialized housing must abide by the
priorities in land acquisition and the available modes of land acquisition laid out in the
law, and that expropriation of privately-owned lands avails only as the last
resort.29 She also invokes the exemptions provided in the law. She professes herself
to be a small property owner under Section 3 (q), 30 and claims that the subject
property is the only piece of land she owns where she, as of yet, has not been able to
build her own home because it is still detained by illegal occupants whom she had
already successfully battled with in the ejectment court.31
In its Reply, petitioner adopts a different and bolder theory. It claims that by virtue of
the vesture of eminent domain powers in it by its charter, it is thereby not bound by
the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. 7279. It also asserts its right to
immediately enter the subject property because not only is its complaint supposedly
sufficient in form and substance but also because it has already deposited ₱1M cash
with the bank in trust for respondent. It reiterates that the dismissal of its complaint
constitutes a denial of due process because all the issues propounded by
respondent, initially in her motion to dismiss and all the way in the present appeal,
must be resolved in a full-blown trial.
Prefatorily, the concept of socialized housing, whereby housing units are distributed
and/or sold to qualified beneficiaries on much easier terms, has already been

included in the expanded definition of "public use or purpose" in the context of the
State’s exercise of the power of eminent domain. Said the Court in Sumulong v.
Guerrero,32 citing the earlier case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes:33
The public use requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a
flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time where it was felt that a
literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of
the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. x x x The
constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use.
One is the expropriation of lands to be divided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities
and other enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.
The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal
import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added
the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. x x x
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes
the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and
correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public
purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a
laissez-faire state. And the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power
are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government resources.
Specifically, urban renewal or development and the construction of low-cost housing
are recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of
public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution. x x x The 1987
Constitution [provides]:
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity
and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that
provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living
and an improved quality of life for all. (Article II, Section 9)
The State shall, by law and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the
private sector, a continuing program for urban land reform and housing which will
make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. x xx
In the implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small
property owners. (Article XIII, Section 9)
42
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern
since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in
sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing measures does not change
because units in housing projects cannot be occupied by all but only by those who
satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to
provide housing for all who need it, all at once.
Population growth, the migration to urban areas and the mushrooming of crowded
makeshift dwellings is a worldwide development particularly in developing countries.
So basic and urgent are housing problems that the United Nations General Assembly
proclaimed 1987 as the "International Year of Shelter for the Homeless" "to focus the
attention of the international community on those problems." The General Assembly
is seriously concerned that, despite the efforts of Governments at the national and
local levels and of international organizations, the driving conditions of the majority of
the people in slums and squatter areas and rural settlements, especially in developing
countries, continue to deteriorate in both relative and absolute terms." [G.A. Res.
37/221, Yearbook of the United Nations 1982, Vol. 36, p. 1043-4]
In light of the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" falls
within the confines of "public use."34
Congress passed R.A. No. 7279,35 to provide a comprehensive and continuing urban
development and housing program as well as access to land and housing by the
underprivileged and homeless citizens; uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and
homeless citizens in urban areas by making available decent housing at affordable
cost; optimize the use and productivity of land and urban resources; reduce urban
dysfunctions which affect public health, safety and ecology; and improve the
capability of local governments in undertaking urban development and housing
programs and projects, among others.36 Accordingly, all city and municipal
governments are mandated to inventory all lands and improvements within their
respective locality and identify lands which may be utilized for socialized housing and
as resettlement sites for acquisition and disposition to qualified
beneficiaries.37 Section 10 thereof authorizes local government units to exercise the
power of eminent domain to carry out the objectives of the law, but subject to the
conditions stated therein and in Section 9.38
It is precisely this aspect of the law which constitutes the core of the present
controversy, yet this case presents a serious procedural facet – overlooked by both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals – which needs foremost attention ahead of the
issues propounded by the parties.
Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding: first,  the determination of the authority of
the plaintiff to exercise the power and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts which terminates in an order of dismissal or an order of condemnation affirming
the plaintiff's lawful right to take the property for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint and second, the determination by the court of the just compensation
for the property sought to be expropriated.39

Expropriation proceedings are governed by Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Under the
Rules of Court of 1940 and 1964, where the defendant in an expropriation case
conceded to the plaintiff’s right to expropriate (or where the trial court affirms the
existence of such right), the court-appointed commissioners would then proceed to
determine the just compensation to be paid.40 Otherwise, where the defendant had
objections to and defenses against the expropriation of his property, he was required
to file a single motion to dismiss containing all such objections and defenses.41
This motion to dismiss was not covered by Rule 15 which governed ordinary motions,
and was then the required responsive pleading, taking the place of an answer, where
the plaintiff’s right to expropriate the defendant’s property could be put in issue.42 Any
relevant and material fact could be raised as a defense, such as that which would
tend to show that the exercise of the power to condemn was unauthorized, or that
there was cause for not taking defendant’s property for the purpose alleged in the
petition, or that the purpose for the taking was not public in character. With that, the
hearing of the motion and the presentation of evidence would follow. The rule is
based on fundamental constitutional provisions affecting the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, such as those that seek to protect the individual property owner from
the aggressions of the government.43 However, the rule, which was derived from the
practice of most American states, proved indeed to be a source of confusion because
it likewise permitted the filing of another motion to dismiss, such as that referred to in
Rule 16, where the defendant could raise, in addition, the preliminary objections
authorized under it.44
The Supreme Court, in its en banc Resolution in Bar Matter No. 803 dated April 8,
1997, has provided that the revisions made in the Rules of Court were to take effect
on July 1, 1997. Thus, with said amendments, the present state of Rule 67 dispenses
with the filing of an extraordinary motion to dismiss such as that required before in
response to a complaint for expropriation. The present rule requires the filing of an
answer as responsive pleading to the complaint. Section 3 thereof provides:
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. — If a defendant has no objection or defense to the
action or the taking of his property, he may and serve a notice or appearance and a
manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or identifying the property in which
he claims to be interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall
be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in the complaint, or
any objection or defense to the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within
the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or identify the
property in which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent of the
interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the taking of his
property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be alleged or
allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the court, in the
interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer to be made not later than
ten (10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just
43
compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he
may present evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his
property, and he may share in the distribution of the award.45
The defendant in an expropriation case who has objections to the taking of his
property is now required to file an answer and in it raise all his available defenses
against the allegations in the complaint for eminent domain. While the answer is
bound by the omnibus motion rule under Section 8,46 Rule 15, much leeway is
nevertheless afforded to the defendant because amendments may be made in the
answer within 10 days from its filing.1âwphi1 Also, failure to file the answer does not
produce all the disastrous consequences of default in ordinary civil actions, because
the defendant may still present evidence on just compensation.47
At the inception of the case at bar with the filing of the complaint on November 16,
2000, the amended provisions of Rule 67 have already been long in force. Borre v.
Court of Appeals48 teaches that statutes which regulate procedure in the courts apply
to actions pending and undetermined at the time those statutes were passed. And in
Laguio v. Gamet,49 it is said that new court rules apply to proceedings which take
place after the date of their effectivity.
In the case of Robern Development Corporation v. Quitain, 50 a similar motion to
dismiss was filed by the private property owner, petitioner therein, in an expropriation
case filed by the National Power Corporation (NPC), alleging certain jurisdictional
defects as well as issues on the impropriety of the expropriation measure being
imposed on the property. The trial court in that case denied the motion inasmuch as
the issues raised therein should be dealt with during the trial proper. On petition
for certiorari, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to
dismiss. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, but declared
that under the amended provisions of Section 3, Rule 67, which were already in force
at about the time the motion to dismiss had been submitted for resolution, all
objections and defenses that could be availed of to defeat the expropriator’s exercise
of the power of eminent domain must be contained in an answer and not in a motion
to dismiss because these matters require the presentation of evidence. Accordingly,
while the Court in that case sustained the setting aside of the motion to dismiss, it
nevertheless characterized the order of dismissal as a nullity. Hence, it referred the
case back to the trial court and required the NPC to submit its answer to the
complaint within 10 days from the finality of the decision.
Thus, the trial court in this case should have denied respondent’s motion to dismiss
and required her to submit in its stead an answer within the reglementary period.
This, because whether petitioner has observed the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 of
R.A. No. 7279 before resorting to expropriation, and whether respondent owns other
properties than the one sought to be expropriated, and whether she is actually a small
property owner beyond the reach of petitioner’s eminent domain powers, are indeed
issues in the nature of affirmative defenses which require the presentation of
evidence aliunde.51 Besides, Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not

consider these matters grounds for a motion to dismiss, and an action can be
dismissed only on the grounds authorized by this provision.52
The Court declared in Robern Development Corporation, thus:
Accordingly, Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, does not consider as grounds
for a motion to dismiss the allotment of the disputed land for another public purpose
or the petition for a mere easement of right-of-way in the complaint for expropriation.
The grounds for dismissal are exclusive to those specifically mentioned in Section 1,
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and an action can be dismissed only on a ground
authorized by this provision.
To be exact, the issues raised by the petitioner are affirmative defenses that should
be alleged in an answer, since they require presentation of evidence aliunde. Section
3 of Rule 67 provides that "if a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the
allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his property,"
he should include them in his answer. Naturally, these issues will have to be fully
ventilated in a full-blown trial and hearing. It would be precipitate to dismiss the
Complaint on such grounds as claimed by the petitioner. Dismissal of an action upon
a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial of due process if, from a consideration of the
pleadings, it appears that there are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the
case on the merits.
Inasmuch as the 1997 Rules had just taken effect when this case arose, we believe
that in the interest of substantial justice, the petitioner should be given an opportunity
to file its answer to the Complaint for expropriation in accordance with Section 3, Rule
67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.x x x53
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 24 in Civil Case No. 00-99264 dated June 13, 2001, as well
as the April 29, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71894
affirming said order, and the August 12, 2005 Resolution therein which denied
reconsideration, are hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings. Respondent is DIRECTED to file her Answer to the
complaint within ten (10) days from the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154614             November 25, 2004
THE CITY OF ILOILO vs. HON. JUDGE EMILIO LEGASPI.
Via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, the City of Iloilo,
represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treñas, seeks the nullification and/or modification of
the Order dated 05 June 2002 of Honorable Emilio Legaspi, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Iloilo City, denying its Motion for Reconsideration of
the court’s Order dated 15 April 2002, holding in abeyance the resolution of the
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession until after it shall have rested its case.
44
The factual antecedents are the following:
On 07 March 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Iloilo enacted
Regulation Ordinance No. 2001-037 granting authority to its City Mayor to institute
expropriation proceedings on Lot No. 935, registered in the name of Manuela Yusay,
located at Barangay Sto. Niño Norte, Arevalo, Iloilo City. The regulation ordinance
was approved by then City Mayor Mansueto A. Malabor.1
On 14 March 2001, Mayor Malabor wrote the heirs of Manuela Yusay, through Mrs.
Sylvia Yusay del Rosario, Administratrix of the estate of Manuela Yusay, making a
formal offer to purchase their property known as Cadastral Lot No. 935 with an area
of 85,320 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-67506 of
the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo City for P250 per square meter for the purpose of
converting the same as an on-site relocation for the poor and landless residents of
the city in line with the city’s housing development program.2
In a letter dated 26 June 2001, Mayor Malabor informed Administrators Sylvia Y. del
Rosario and Enrique Yusay, Jr. that their counter-proposal to the City’s proposal to
purchase Lot No. 935 was not acceptable to the City Government, particularly to the
City Council, which insisted that an expropriation case be filed per SP Resolution No.
01-445. With their apparent refusal to sell the property, the City terminated further
proceedings on the matter.3
Petitioner City of Iloilo, represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treñas, filed an Amended
Complaint4 for Eminent Domain against private respondents Heirs of Manuela Yusay,
represented by Sylvia Yusay del Rosario and Enrique Yusay, Jr. 5 The subject of the
same is Lot No. 935 of the Cadastral Survey of Arevalo covered by TCT No. T-67506.
Private respondents filed an Answer,6 dated 25 September 2001, to which petitioner
filed a Reply,7 dated 19 October 2001.
On 23 October 2001, private respondents filed a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary
Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses they have raised in the
Answer.8 Petitioner opposed9 the motion to which private respondents filed a Reply.10
In an Order dated 04 February 2002, public respondent Hon. Emilio B. Legaspi,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 22, found the motion to be
in order and meritorious, and the grounds of the opposition to be untenable; thus, he
set the case for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative Defenses.11
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration12 of the order which private respondents
opposed.13
On 01 April 2002, public respondent set the case for Pre-Trial after Atty. Amelita K.
del Rosario-Benedicto, counsel for private respondents, manifested she was
withdrawing the Motion for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative
Defenses. Petitioner did not interpose any objection.14

On 11 April 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession alleging
that since it has deposited with the Court the amount of P2,809,696.50 representing
fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property sought to be
expropriated based on its current tax declaration, it may immediately take possession
of the property in accordance with Section 19, Republic Act No. 7160.15
On 15 April 2002, public respondent issued an Order with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Benedicto is given ten (10) days from
today within which to file an Opposition to the pending Motion For Issuance of Writ of
Possession, furnishing copy of the same to plaintiff’s counsel who has the same
period to file a Reply.
Parties agreed that the Court will resolve the Motion For Issuance of Writ of
Possession after the plaintiffs shall have rested their case after the trial on the
merits.16
Private respondents filed their Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Possession17 to which petitioner filed a Reply.18
On 09 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the lower
court reconsider its order of 15 April 2002, and to consider its Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Possession submitted for resolution after the filing of its Reply to private
respondents’ Opposition to the motion. Citing the case of Robern Development Corp.
v. Judge Jesus V. Quitain, et al.,19 it maintains "there is no need for a hearing before
the Honorable Court can grant [its] Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession."20
Private respondents filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with
Rejoinder to Reply to Opposition. They vehemently opposed the motion arguing that
counsels of the parties had agreed that the lower court will resolve the Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Possession after petitioner shall have rested its case after trial on
the merits. They added that in view of the defects as to form and substance of the
amended complaint, the issuance of a writ of possession ceases to be a ministerial
duty on the court; hence, there is a need for a court hearing.21
On 05 June 2002, the assailed order was issued, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED
and resolution of the Motion for Writ of Possession is hereby held in abeyance until
further orders from this Court.22
Hence, this petition.
The petition raises the following alleged errors of the lower court:
A. THAT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING THE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED MAY 9, 2002 AS CONTAINED IN ITS
45
ORDER OF JUNE 5, 2002, AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION BE RESOLVED AFTER HEREIN
PETITIONER HAS CONVINCED THE TRIAL COURT THAT IT HAS A
MERITORIOUS CASE OF EMINENT DOMAIN, DESPITE THE PROVISIONS OF
SECTION 2, RULE 67 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND DESPITE
THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF "ROBERN
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. JUDGE JESUS V. QUITAIN, ET AL."
B. THAT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ORDER
OF JUNE 5, 2002 WHICH IN EFFECT UPHELD THE CONTENTION OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS THAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR EXPROPRIATION
FILED BY HEREIN PETITIONER IS NOT SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND
SUBSTANCE, HENCE THE LATTER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN IMMEDIATE
ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION.23
As to its Amended Complaint, petitioner maintains that the same is sufficient in form
and substance since it has complied with Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 (1991
Local Government Code) and Section 1, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. It explains that since public respondent has ordered the parties to proceed
with the Pre-Trial Conference and trial of the case, it can be concluded that the
Amended Complaint is sufficient in form and substance.
In compliance with Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government Code, petitioner says it
deposited the amount of P2,809,696.50 with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, which is
equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property sought to
be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. It further argues that in the cases
of Robern Development Corporation v. Judge Jesus Quitain, et al., 24 and Salvador
Biglang-Awa v. Hon. Judge Marciano I. Bacalla, et al.,25 the duty to issue a Writ of
Possession becomes a ministerial duty upon the trial court without necessity of a
hearing once the provisional deposit under Section 2 of Rule 6726 has been complied
with.
In their Comment, private respondents maintain that there was nothing for the lower
court to reconsider because the order dated 15 April 2002 which was dictated in open
court, and which petitioner sought to be reconsidered, was already final (on 30 April
2002) when the latter filed its Motion for Reconsideration on 09 May 2002. Second,
they insist that petitioner is estopped to change its position with respect to the
immediate issuance of the writ of possession. The agreement entered into is binding
and is the law between the parties and should be accorded respect since it was
approved by public respondent. Third, they claim there is waiver on the part of
petitioner to ask for the immediate possession of Lot No. 935 since it took the latter
eight (8) months and twelve (12) days from the filing of the Amended Complaint, and
nine (9) months and thirteen (13) days from the filing of the Original Complaint before
it filed the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession. Moreover, they assert that there
is a need for a court hearing before a writ of possession can be issued, because the
amended complaint is being assailed before the lower court for not being sufficient in

form and substance. Finally, they aver that the issuance of the writ of possession
ceases to be ministerial when the complaint for expropriation fails to allege
compliance with the mandatory requirements for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain for purposes of socialized housing as interpreted in the cases of Filstream
International Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, et al.27
In its Reply, petitioner avers that the order of 15 April 2002 became final only after
fifteen (15) days from the time the same was received by it on 26 April 2002, and not
fifteen (15) days from the time the order was made in open court on 15 April 2002.
Petitioner argues that there is nothing in the rules which prohibits it from reversing its
position with respect to the issuance of the writ of possession in light of Section 2,
Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which allows taking immediate
possession of property sought to be expropriated upon compliance with said section.
Further, it adds that its stand to seek immediate possession of the property is
supported by the Robern and Biglang-awa cases.
It insists that there is no waiver or estoppel on its part. There is no provision of law
which sets a time limit within which to file a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession. It reiterated that the sufficiency of the form and substance of the
Amended Complaint can be determined and resolved by the lower court through an
examination of the allegations contained therein and if the same complies with the
requisites set forth in Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 and Section 1 of Rule
67.28 Thus, there is no necessity of a trial before the lower court can resolve the
Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
Finally, it argues that the Filstream29 cases are not applicable. It adds that the
provisions of Rep. Act No. 7279 which private respondents allege as not to have been
complied with are not conditions precedent for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
We first rule on the issue of whether the Order dated 15 April 2002, which was
dictated in open court, was already final when petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on 09 May 2002. Petitioner maintains that the motion for
reconsideration was filed before the order became final fifteen (15) days from the time
it received a copy thereof in writing, and not from the time the same was dictated in
open court as claimed by private respondents.
Time-honored and of constant observance is the principle that no judgment, or order,
whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and unless it is set in writing,
signed, and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing,
release to the parties and implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it
does not bind the parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on them by
any of the modes prescribed by law. This is so even if the order or judgment has in
fact been orally pronounced in the presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up
and signed and/or a copy thereof somehow read or acquired by any party.30
46
In the case at bar, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was filed before
the 15 April 2002 order became final. The order dictated in open court had no juridical
existence before it is set in writing, signed, promulgated and served on the parties.
Since the order orally pronounced in court had no juridical existence yet, the period
within which to file a motion for reconsideration cannot be reckoned therefrom, but
from the time the same was received in writing. Petitioner had fifteen (15) days from
its receipt of the written order on 26 April 2002 within which to file a motion for
reconsideration. Thus, when it filed the motion for reconsideration on 09 May 2002,
the said motion was timely filed.
Petitioner has the irrefutable right to exercise its power of eminent domain. It being a
local government unit, the basis for its exercise is granted under Section 19 of Rep.
Act No. 7160, to wit:
Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive
and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment
of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised
unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such
offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be
paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a
complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the
amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property to
be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. 31 Upon compliance with these
requirements, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial.32
In the case at bar, petitioner avers that the Amended Complaint it filed complies with
both requisites, thus entitling it to a writ of possession as a matter of right and the
issuance thereof becoming ministerial on the part of the lower court even without any
hearing. On the other hand, private respondents allege that the Amended Complaint
is not sufficient in form and substance since it failed to allege compliance with the
mandatory requirements for the exercise of the power of eminent domain for
purposes of socialized housing.
Section 1 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
Section 1. The complaint. – The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the
filing of a verified complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose of
expropriation, describe the real or personal property sought to be expropriated, and
join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part

hereof or interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest of each
defendant. If the title to any property sought to be expropriated appears to be in the
Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is
otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty
specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the
complaint.
The Court finds the Amended Complaint sufficient in form and substance, and the
amount of P2,809,696.50 deposited with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo is
equivalent to fifteen percent (15%)33 of the fair market value of the property sought to
be expropriated per current tax declaration.
On the averment of private respondents that the Amended Complaint failed to allege
compliance with the mandatory requirements34 for the exercise of the power of
eminent domain for purposes of socialized housing as interpreted in the Filstream
cases, it appears that the Amended Complaint did contain allegations showing
compliance therewith.35 However, whether there is, indeed, compliance with these
requirements, the Court deems it not proper to resolve the issue at this time. Hearing
must be held to establish compliance.
In City of Manila v. Serrano,36 this Court ruled that "hearing is still to be held to
determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided
in Rep. Act No. 7279. x x x The determination of this question must await the hearing
on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the
properties sought to be expropriated." From the foregoing, it is clear that an
evidentiary hearing must be conducted if compliance with the requirements for
socialized housing has been made. This hearing, however, is not a hearing to
determine if a writ of possession is to be issued, but whether there was compliance
with the requirements for socialized housing.
For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency
in form and substance of the complaint and the required provisional deposit. In fact,
no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of possession. The sufficiency in form
and substance of the complaint for expropriation can be determined by the mere
examination of the allegations of the complaint. In this case, the sufficiency of the
Amended Complaint was further confirmed by public respondent when he set the
case for pre-trial and hearing.
We likewise find private respondents’ claim that petitioner cannot change its position
regarding the immediate issuance of the writ of possession on the ground of estoppel,
to be untenable.
First, estoppel may be successfully invoked only if the party fails to raise the question
in the early stages of the proceedings.37 In the case before us, petitioner, through its
counsel, undeniably committed a mistake when it agreed that the resolution of its
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession be made by public respondent after a
hearing is conducted and after it has adduced its evidence. To remedy this, petitioner
immediately filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The filing thereof was precisely for the
47
purpose of rectifying the error it committed. With the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration, petitioner cannot be held in estoppel because it right away asked the
court to nullify the agreement it entered into. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration which was done at the earliest possible time clearly negates the
presence of estoppel.
Second, under the facts of the case, estoppel should not apply because petitioner is
simply following the procedure laid down by the rules and jurisprudence. Under
Section 1938 of Rep. Act No. 7160 (law governing exercise of eminent domain by local
government units [LGU]) and Section 239 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure (law governing exercise of eminent domain by entities other than LGUs),
and in the cases of Robern Development Corporation v. Quitain, et al., and Biglang-
awa v. Bacalla, et al., a prior hearing is not required before a writ of possession can
be issued. As above discussed, a complaint, sufficient in form and substance, and the
required deposit, are the only requirements before a writ of possession can be issued.
Thus, petitioner should not be prevented from changing and correcting its position
when the same is in accord with the rules and jurisprudence.
Private respondents argue that petitioner waived its right to ask for the immediate
possession of Lot No. 935 since it took the latter eight (8) months and twelve (12)
days from the filing of the Amended Complaint, and nine (9) months and thirteen (13)
days from the filing of the Original Complaint, before it filed the Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Possession.
Petitioner did not waive its right. Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 does not put a time
limit as to when a local government may immediately take possession of the real
property. Said section provides that the local government unit may take immediate
possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on its current tax declaration. As long as the expropriation
proceedings have been commenced and the deposit has been made, the local
government unit cannot be barred from praying for the issuance of a writ of
possession.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of respondent
judge in Civil Case No. 01-26801 dated 05 June 2002 and 15 April 2002 are set
aside. Respondent Judge is directed to issue the writ of possession prayed for and to
continue hearing the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[ GR No. 205544, Jun 29, 2016 ]
MUNICIPALITY OF CORDOVA v. PATHFINDER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
& TOPANGA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari which petitioners Municipality of Cordova,
Province of Cebu, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cordova, and the Mayor of the

Municipality of Cordova filed seeking to reverse the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1] dated March 28, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 06193 and to order the trial court
to proceed to the second stage of the proceedings for the determination of the proper
valuation of the expropriated properties. The procedural and factual antecedents of
the case, as borne by the records, are as follows:
Respondent Pathfinder Development Corporation (Pathfinder) is the owner of real
properties in Alegria, Cordova, Cebu: (1) Lot No. 692 covered by Tax Declaration
(TD) No. 190002-02765 with an area of 1,819 square meters (sq.m.), and (2) part of
Lot No. 697 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-95706 and TD No.
190002-02902 with an area of 50,000 sq.m., while respondent Topanga Development
Corporation (Topanga) owns Lot No. 691 covered by TCT No. 109337 and TD No.
190002-02761 with an area of 29,057 sq.m., and part of Lot No. 697 covered by TD
No. 190002-02901 with an area of 15,846 sq.m.
On February 8, 2011, petitioner Sangguniang Bay an of the Municipality of Cordova
enacted Ordinance No. 003-2011 expropriating 836 sq.m. of Lot No. 692, 9,728 sq.m.
of Lot No. 697, 3,898 sq.m. of Lot No. 691, and 1,467 sq.m. of Lot No. 693 owned by
one Eric Ng Mendoza, for the construction of a road access from the national highway
to the municipal roll-on/roll-off (RORO) port. It likewise authorized petitioner Mayor of
Cordova (the Mayor) to initiate and execute the necessary expropriation proceedings.
On February 17, 2011, the Mayor of Cordova filed an expropriation complaint against
the owners of the properties. Later, the Mayor filed a motion to place the municipality
in possession of the properties sought to be expropriated.
On March 4, 2011, Pathfinder and Topanga filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
the Expropriation Ordinance before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City,
Branch 56, claiming that no offer to buy addressed to them was shown or attached to
the expropriation complaint, thereby rendering the Ordinance constitutionally infirm for
being in violation of their right to due process and equal protection. On July 13, 2011,
they likewise filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on prejudicial
question in the case for the declaration of nullity of the Ordinance.
On August 12, 2011, the Lapu-Lapu RTC, Branch 27 issued an Order [2] denying the
corporations' motion for suspension of the proceedings and granting the issuance of a
Writ of Possession in favor of the municipality. Pathfinder and Topanga moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, they elevated the case to the CA
via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
On March 28, 2012, the CA reversed the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders issued by the Regional
trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 53 and Branch 27, Lapu-Lapu City in Civil
Case No. R-LLP-11-05959-CV, dated May 26, 2011, August 12, 2011 and August 22,
2011, are REVERSED, [ANNULLED] and SET ASIDE.
48
The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Lapu-Lapu City for the
reception of evidence de novo on the determination of the authority of the respondent
municipality to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise
in the context of the facts involved in the suit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioners Municipality, Sangguniang Bayan, and Mayor of Cordova then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but the same proved to be futile.
Hence, this petition.
The main issue before the Court is whether or not the CA committed a reversible error
in giving due course to the petition under Rule 65.
The petition deserves merit.
The municipality argues that the CA seriously erred when it allowed the companies'
Petition for Certiorari despite the available remedy of appeal under Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court.
While there exists a settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final
order when appeal is available, a petition for certiorari may be allowed when: (a) the
broader interest of justice demands that certiorari be given due course to avoid any
grossly unjust result that would otherwise befall the petitioners; and (b) the order of
the RTC evidently constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction. In the past, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy
despite the availability of appeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[4] the Court has declared that
"the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law admits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is
necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial
judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where there may be
danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and
insufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is
involved; and (g) in case of urgency."[5]
If appeal is not an adequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy, the
availability of appeal as a remedy cannot constitute sufficient ground to prevent or
preclude a party from making use of certiorari. It is mere inadequacy, not the absence
of all other legal remedies, and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that
must determine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is said to be plain, speedy and
adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or agency. It is understood, then, that
a litigant need not resort to the less speedy remedy of appeal in order to have an
order annulled and set aside for being patently void. And even assuming
that certiorari is not the proper remedy against an assailed order, the petitioner should
still not be denied the recourse because it is better to look beyond procedural

requirements and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory
powers in order that a void order of a lower court may be made conformable to law
and justice.[6]
Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be strictly defined, because
to do so is to destroy the comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary
writ. The wide breadth and range of the discretion of the Court are such that authority
is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition
or mandamus, and that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a
superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case as the
ends of justice may require. Therefore, when, as in this case, there is an urgent need
to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice, the writ will be granted.[7]
The foregoing notwithstanding, the CA erred when it held that the RTC acted with
grave abuse of discretion.
Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private
property to particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of
sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the
common need and advance the general welfare.[8] The power of eminent domain is
inseparable in sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent
in government. Its exercise is proscribed by only two Constitutional
requirements: first, that there must be just compensation, and second, that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.[9]
The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature but may be validly
delegated to local government units. The basis for its exercise by the Municipality of
Cordova, being a local government unit, is granted under Section 19 of Republic Act
7160, to wit:
Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive
and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment
of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised
unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such
offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be
paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
49
Judicial review of the exercise of the power of eminent domain is limited to the
following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of
the taking, and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.[10]
Under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings are comprised of two
stages: (1) the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the surrounding
facts, and (2) the determination of the just compensation for the property sought to be
taken. The first stage ends, if not in a dismissal of the action, with an order of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought
to be condemned, for public use or purpose.[11]
Pathfinder and Topanga contend that the trial court issued an Order of Condemnation
of the properties without previously conducting a proper hearing for the reception of
evidence of the parties. However, no hearing is actually required for the issuance of a
writ of possession, which demands only two requirements: (a) the sufficiency in form
and substance of the complaint, and (b) the required provisional deposit. The
sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint for expropriation can be
determined by the mere examination of the allegations of the complaint. [12] Here, there
is indeed a necessity for the taking of the subject properties as these would provide
access towards the RORO port being constructed in the municipality. The
construction of the new road will highly benefit the public as it will enable shippers
and passengers to gain access to the port from the main public road or highway.
The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are the filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and the deposit of the amount
equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property to be
expropriated based on its current tax declaration. Upon compliance with these
requirements, the petitioner in an expropriation case is entitled to a writ of possession
as a matter of right[13] and the issuance of the writ becomes ministerial.[14] Indubitably,
since the complaint was found to have been sufficient in form and substance and the
required deposit had been duly complied with, the issuance of the writ had aptly
become ministerial on the part of the RTC. It cannot be said, therefore, that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it found the taking of the properties of
Topanga and Pathfinder proper.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 28, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 06193 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-
Lapu, Branches 53 and 27, in Civil Case No. R-LLP-11-05959-CV, dated May 26,
2011, August 12, 2011, and August 22, 2011, are hereby REINSTATED. The case
is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155746             October 13, 2004
LAGCAO vs. LABRA

Before us is a petition for review of the decision dated July 1, 2002 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 23, Cebu City1 upholding the validity of the City of Cebu’s
Ordinance No. 1843, as well as the lower court’s order dated August 26, 2002
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots
was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an area of 4,048 square
meters. In 1965, petitioners purchased Lot 1029 on installment basis. But then, in late
1965, the 210 lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of
Cebu.2 Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of
Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific
performance and damages in the then Court of First Instance.
On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province
of Cebu to execute the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. On June 11, 1992, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the
appellate court, the Province of Cebu executed on June 17, 1994 a deed of absolute
sale over Lot 1029 in favor of petitioners. Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 129306 was issued in the name of petitioners and Crispina Lagcao.3
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that
it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997, petitioners instituted
ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the
squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s decision and
issued a writ of execution and order of demolition.1avvphi1
However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor
Alvin Garcia wrote two letters4 to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the
demolition on the ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the
squatters. Acting on the mayor’s request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending
the demolition for a period of 120 days from February 22, 1999. Unfortunately for
petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu
City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site
pursuant to RA 7279.5 Then, on June 30, 1999, the SP of Cebu City passed
Ordinance No. 17726 which included Lot 1029 among the identified sites for socialized
housing. On July, 19, 2000, Ordinance No. 18437 was enacted by the SP of Cebu City
authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the
acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered in the name of petitioners. The intended
acquisition was to be used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and
sale to the actual occupants thereof. For this purpose, the ordinance appropriated the
amount of ₱6,881,600 for the payment of the subject lot. This ordinance was
approved by Mayor Garcia on August 2, 2000.
On August 29, 2000, petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity
of Ordinance No. 1843 for being unconstitutional. The trial court rendered its decision
on July 1, 2002 dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners whose subsequent
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on August 26, 2002.
50
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it
sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to the
squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the
Constitution.8 They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people. The ordinance,
according to petitioners, was obviously passed for politicking, the squatters
undeniably being a big source of votes.1avvphi1
In sum, this Court is being asked to resolve whether or not the intended expropriation
by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land owned by petitioners
contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws.
Under Section 48 of RA 7160,9 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991,10 local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
the city. The legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the exercise of its
lawmaking authority are denominated ordinances.
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise
it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. 11 By virtue of RA 7160, Congress
conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843
was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. − A local government unit may, through its chief executive
and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment
of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws xxx. (italics supplied).
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners’ lot was enacted
by the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-
income residents of the City.
However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most serious social problems
of the country, local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise
their power of eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem.
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws;12 and (2) private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation.13 Thus, the exercise by local
government units of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19
of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the provisions
of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowner’s right to
private property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the
preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the
rights to life and liberty.14 Whether directly exercised by the State or by its authorized
agents, the exercise of eminent domain is necessarily in derogation of private

rights.15 For this reason, the need for a painstaking scrutiny cannot be
overemphasized.
The due process clause cannot be trampled upon each time an ordinance orders the
expropriation of a private individual’s property. The courts cannot even adopt a
hands-off policy simply because public use or public purpose is invoked by an
ordinance, or just compensation has been fixed and determined. In De Knecht vs.
Bautista,16 we said:
It is obvious then that a land-owner is covered by the mantle of protection due
process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it is the
antithesis of any governmental act that smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state
power to act in an oppressive manner. It is, as had been stressed so often, the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. In that sense, it stands as a guaranty of
justice. That is the standard that must be met by any governmental agency in the
exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it. As was so emphatically stressed
by the present Chief Justice, "Acts of Congress, as well as those of the Executive,
can deny due process only under pain of nullity. xxx.
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that
necessity must be of public character.17 Government may not capriciously or
arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. In this case, there
was no showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out for expropriation by
the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection.
Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’ property as the site
of a socialized housing project.
Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or piecemeal fashion or the random
expropriation of small lots to accommodate no more than a few tenants or squatters is
certainly not the condemnation for public use contemplated by the Constitution. This
is depriving a citizen of his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible
benefit to the public.18
RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of
urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof provide:
SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. − Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following
order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum
Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
51
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities
mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site
development of government lands. (Emphasis supplied).
SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. − The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include,
among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation
to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That
expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted :
Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall
be exempted for purposes of this Act: xxx. (Emphasis supplied).
In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes et al. vs.
City of Manila,19 we ruled that the above-quoted provisions are strict limitations on the
exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units, especially with
respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized housing and (2) the
resort to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last
in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,
expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other modes of
acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because
these are the only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private property
against what may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their property is
forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use.
We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied strictly
with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate
petitioners’ property without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of
Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of
acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the
passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to
buy petitioners’ property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. 20 We therefore find
Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of the petitioners’
right to due process.
It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had already obtained a
favorable judgment of eviction against the illegal occupants of their property. The
judgment in this ejectment case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of
execution and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial court to
suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was still searching for a relocation
site for the squatters. However, instead of looking for a relocation site during the
suspension period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for the
expropriation of petitioners’ lot. It was trickery and bad faith, pure and simple. The
unconscionable manner in which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly
indicated that respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA 7279.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
city or municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with certain well-established basic
principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5)

must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be
unreasonable.21
Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing substantive requirements. A
clear case of constitutional infirmity having been thus established, this Court is
constrained to nullify the subject ordinance. We recapitulate:
first, as earlier discussed, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;
second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression
masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;
third, the fact that petitioners’ small property was singled out for expropriation for the
purpose of awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality
against petitioners, and
fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation between the
end sought and the means adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to
provide adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such
objective fell short of what was legal, sensible and called for by the circumstances.
Indeed, experience has shown that the disregard of basic liberties and the use of
short-sighted methods in expropriation proceedings have not achieved the desired
results. Over the years, the government has tried to remedy the worsening squatter
problem. Far from solving it, however, government’s kid-glove approach has only
resulted in the multiplication and proliferation of squatter colonies and blighted areas.
A pro-poor program that is well-studied, adequately funded, genuinely sincere and
truly respectful of everyone’s basic rights is what this problem calls for, not the
improvident enactment of politics-based ordinances targeting small private lots in no
rational fashion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The July 1, 2002 decision of Branch
23 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Masikip vs. City of Pasig
52
Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the benefit of a small
community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility,
notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away,
such taking cannot be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid. In
this case, the Court defines what constitutes a genuine necessity for public use.
 This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
dated October 31, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 affirming the Order[2] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig City, dated May 7, 1996 in S.C.A. No. 873.
Likewise assailed is the Resolution[3] of the same court dated November 20, 1998
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
 The facts of the case are:
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with
an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro
Manila.
 In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig,
respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter
portion of her property to be used for the 'sports development and recreational
activities' of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No.
42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
 Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time
the purpose was allegedly 'in line with the program of the Municipal Government to
provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.
 On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended
expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area
of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to 'provide land opportunities to deserving
poor sectors of our community.
 In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the
expropriation of petitioner's property is 'to provide sports and recreational facilities to
its poor residents.
 Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint
for expropriation, docketed as SCA No. 873. Respondent prayed that the trial court,
after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; that
commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the just compensation;
and that judgment be rendered based on the report of the commissioners.
 On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the following
grounds:
I
PLAINTIFF HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, CONSIDERING THAT:
(A) THERE IS NO GENUINE NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED.

(B) PLAINTIFF HAS ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY CHOSEN THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED.
 
(C) EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY MAY BE EXPROPRIATED BY PLAINTIFF, THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY TO BE EXPROPRIATED FAR EXCEEDS SEVENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P78,000.00)
 
 
 
II
 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT IS DEFECTIVE IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE, CONSIDERING THAT:
(A) PLAINTIFF FAILS TO ALLEGE WITH CERTAINTY THE PURPOSE OF THE EXPROPRIATION.
(B) PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PREREQUISITES LAID DOWN IN SECTION 34, RULE VI OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; THUS, THE INSTANT EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING IS PREMATURE.
III
THE GRANTING OF THE EXPROPRIATION WOULD VIOLATE SECTION 261 (V) OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE.
IV
PLAINTIFF CANNOT TAKE POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY MERELY DEPOSITING AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO FIFTEEN PERCENT
(15%) OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY BASED ON THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.[4]
 
On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss,[5] on
the ground that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the
sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig. As to the issue of just
compensation, the trial court held that the same is to be determined in accordance
with the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court in its
Order of July 31, 1996. Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer of
Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain the just compensation. This prompted
petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 41860. On October 31, 1997, the Appellate Court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated November 20, 1998.
 
Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:
 
THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED 31 OCTOBER 1997 (ATTACHMENT 'A')
AND RESOLUTION DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1998 (ATTACHMENT 'B') ARE
CONTRARY TO LAW, THE RULES OF COURT AND JURISPRUDENCE
CONSIDERING THAT:
 
I
 
A. THERE IS' NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GENUINE NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF THE PETITIONER'S PROPERTY.
 
B. THERE IS' NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH.
C. THERE IS' NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT RESPONDENT CITY OF PASIG HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR THE
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN.
THE COURT A QUOS ORDER DATED 07 MAY 1996 AND 31 JULY 1996, WHICH WERE AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, EFFECTIVELY
AMOUNT TO THE TAKING OF PETITIONER'S PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW:
 
II
53
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING OF RULE ON ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTS TO THE DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO
RESPONDENT CITY OF PASIG'S COMPLAINT DATED 07 APRIL 1995 TO JUSTIFY THE COURT A QUO'S DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S RESPONSIVE
PLEADING TO THE COMPLAINT FOR EXPROPRIATION (THE MOTION TO DISMISS DATED 21 APRIL 1995).
 
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULE ON HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION OF FACTS ALLEGED IN A COMPLAINT
CONSIDERING THAT THE MOTION TO DISMISS  FILED BY PETITIONER IN THE EXPROPRIATION CASE BELOW WAS THE RESPONSIVE
PLEADING REQUIRED TO BE FILED UNDER THE THEN RULE 67 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND NOT AN ORIDNARY MOTION TO DISMISS
UNDER RULE 16 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
 
 
The foregoing arguments may be synthesized into two main issues ' one substantive
and one procedural. We will first address the procedural issue.
 
Petitioner filed her Motion to Dismiss the complaint for expropriation on April 25,
1995. It was denied by the trial court on May 7, 1996. At that time, the rule on
expropriation was governed by Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides:
'SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. Within the time specified in the summons, each
defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present in a single motion to dismiss or for other
appropriate relief, all his objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his
property for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. All such objections and
defenses not so presented are waived. A copy of the motion shall be served on the
plaintiff's attorney of record and filed with the court with proof of service.
 
The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearly constitutes the
responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for
expropriation. Such motion is the pleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to
expropriate the defendant's property for the use specified in the complaint. All that the
law requires is that a copy of the said motion be served on plaintiff's attorney of
record. It is the court that at its convenience will set the case for trial after the filing of
the said pleading.[6]
 
The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that the motion to dismiss filed by
petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint,
specifically that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner's property for
public use. Pursuant to the above Rule, the motion is a responsive pleading joining
the issues. What the trial court should have done was to set the case for the reception
of evidence to determine whether there is indeed a genuine necessity for the taking of
the property, instead of summarily making a finding that the taking is for public use
and appointing commissioners to fix just compensation. This is especially so
considering that the purpose of the expropriation was squarely challenged and put in
issue by petitioner in her motion to dismiss.
 
Significantly, the above Rule allowing a defendant in an expropriation case to file a
motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer was amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Section 3, Rule 67 now expressly

mandates that any objection or defense to the taking of the property of a defendant
must be set forth in an answer.
 
The fact that the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 on
October 31, after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect, is of no moment. It is
only fair that the Rule at the time petitioner filed her motion to dismiss should govern.
The new provision cannot be applied retroactively to her prejudice.
 
We now proceed to address the substantive issue.
 
In the early case of US v. Toribio,[7] this Court defined the power of eminent domain
as 'the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use,
whenever the public exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of
providing a reasonable compensation therefor. It has also been described as the
power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is
inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government.[8]
 
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It
delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and
public utility corporations,[9] subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local
governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only
when expressly authorized by statute.[10] Section 19 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power
of eminent domain to local government units and lays down the parameters for its
exercise, thus:
 
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. ' A local government unit may, through its chief executive
and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of
just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws: Provided, however, That, the power of eminent domain may not be exercised
unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such
offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That, the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to
be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
 
Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of
concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and
(c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.[11]
 
In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig failed to establish a
genuine necessity which justifies the condemnation of her property. While she does
54
not dispute the intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there must be a
genuine necessity for the proposed use and purposes. According to petitioner, there
is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at
Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and being utilized by its residents,
including those from Barangay Caniogan. Respondent does not dispute this.
Evidently, there is no 'genuine necessity to justify the expropriation.
 
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from 'the
necessity and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v.
Chinese Community of Manila,[12] we held that the very foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a
public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or
accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law
College,[13] we ruled that 'necessity within the rule that the particular property to be
expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or
practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the
least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner
consistent with such benefit.
 
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish
that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner's property. Our scrutiny of
the records shows that the Certification[14] issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council
dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993
authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the
residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association
are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility.
Petitioner's lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not
clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially
considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and
community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all
residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
 
The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men. It is
so fundamental that it has been written into organic law of every nation where the rule
of law prevails. Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of one's
property is clearly established, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of
individuals to their private property. Important as the power of eminent domain may
be, the inviolable sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the property of the
individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of private property be
specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character,
must also be shown to exist.
 
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 are REVERSED. The

complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by respondent City of Pasig,
docketed as SCA No. 873, is ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14355             October 31, 1919
THE CITY OF MANILA vs.CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET AL.
The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation proceedings by
the city of Manila, may the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of
the expropriation?
That question arose in the following manner:
On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the
Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly
described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. The
petitioner, in the second paragraph of the petition, alleged:
That for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the extension of
Rizal Avenue, Manila, it is necessary for the plaintiff to acquire ownership in fee
simple  of certain parcels of land situated in the district of Binondo of said city within
Block 83 of said district, and within the jurisdiction of this court.
The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila],
answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged that it was a corporation organized and
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its
purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of
Manila; that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint; that it denied  that it was either
necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for street purposes; that
existing street and roads furnished ample means of communication for the public in
the district covered by such proposed expropriation; that if the construction of the
street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available,
which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without
disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in
question; that the lands in question had been used by the defendant for cemetery
purposes; that a great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said
expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead,
would require the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of
the bodies to some other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites, would
involve the destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in
their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant and to all
those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which would have
to be destroyed; that the plaintiff was without right or authority to expropriate said
cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation,
in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement.
The defendant Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the petition, denied each and every
allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said expropriation was not a public
55
improvement; that it was not necessary  for the plaintiff to acquire the parcels of land
in question; that a portion of the lands in question was used as a cemetery in which
were the graves of his ancestors; that monuments and tombstones of great value
were found thereon; that the land had become quasi-public property  of a benevolent
association, dedicated and used for the burial of the dead and that many dead were
buried there; that if the plaintiff deemed it necessary to extend Rizal Avenue, he had
offered and still offers to grant a right of way for the said extension over other land,
without cost to the plaintiff, in order that the sepulchers, chapels and graves of his
ancestors may not be disturbed; that the land so offered,  free of charge, would
answer every public necessity  on the part of the plaintiff.
The defendant Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband, Jose Maria
Delgado, and each of the other defendants, answering separately, presented
substantially the same defense as that presented by the Comunidad de Chinos de
Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting above referred to.
The foregoing parts of the defense presented by the defendants have been inserted
in order to show the general character of the defenses presented by each of the
defendants. The plaintiff alleged that the expropriation was necessary. The
defendants each alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b)
that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many
years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should
not be converted into a street for public purposes.
Upon the issue thus presented by the petition and the various answers, the
Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, in a very elucidated opinion, with very clear
and explicit reasons, supported by ambulance of authorities, decided that there
was no necessity  for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question, and
absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without
any finding as to costs.
From that judgment the plaintiff appealed and presented the above question as its
principal ground of appeal.
The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it
has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the
only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in
question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the
advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the
necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers  of the land involved in
expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method
adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
That the city of Manila has authority to expropriate private  lands for public  purposes,
is not denied. Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides
that "the city (Manila) . . . may condemn private property for public use."

The Charter of the city of Manila contains no procedure by which the said authority
may be carried into effect. We are driven, therefore, to the procedure marked out by
Act No. 190 to ascertain how the said authority may be exercised. From an
examination of Act No. 190, in its section 241, we find how the right of eminent
domain may be exercised. Said section 241 provides that, "The Government of the
Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any  municipality,
and any person, or public or private corporation having, by law, the right to condemn
private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner hereinafter
prescribed."
Section 242 provides that a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be presented;
that the complaint shall state with certainty the right of condemnation, with a
description of the property sought to be condemned together with the interest of each
defendant separately.
Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon  trial that the right to expropriate
the land in question exists, it shall then appoint commissioners.
Sections 244, 245 and 246 provide the method of procedure and duty of the
commissioners. Section 248 provides for an appeal from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance to the Supreme Court. Said section 248 gives the Supreme Court
authority to inquire into the right  of expropriation on the part of the plaintiff. If the
Supreme Court on appeal shall determine that no right of expropriation existed, it
shall remand the cause to the Court of First Instance with a mandate that the
defendant be replaced in the possession of the property and that he recover whatever
damages he may have sustained by reason of the possession of the plaintiff.
It is contended on the part of the plaintiff that the phrase in said section, "and if the
court shall find the right to expropriate exists," means simply that, if the court finds
that there is some law authorizing the plaintiff to expropriate, then the courts have no
other function than to authorize the expropriation and to proceed to ascertain the
value of the land involved; that the necessity for the expropriation is a legislative and
not a judicial question.
Upon the question whether expropriation is a legislative function exclusively, and that
the courts cannot intervene except for the purpose of determining the value of the
land in question, there is much legal legislature. Much has been written upon both
sides of that question. A careful examination of the discussions  pro and con will
disclose the fact that the decisions depend largely upon particular constitutional or
statutory provisions. It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper authority
should grant the expropriation of a certain  or particular parcel of land for some
specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into
the purpose of that legislation.
If, upon the other hand, however, the Legislature should grant general authority to a
municipal corporation to expropriate private land  for public  purposes, we think the
courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the provisions above quoted, to
make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly presented, concerning
56
whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public. In
other words, have no the courts in this jurisdiction the right, inasmuch as the
questions relating to expropriation must be referred to them (sec. 241, Act No. 190)
for final decision, to ask whether or not the law has been complied with? Suppose in a
particular case, it should be denied that the property is not private property but public,
may not the courts hear proof upon that question? Or, suppose the defense is, that
the purpose of the expropriation is not public but private, or that there exists no public
purpose at all, may not the courts make inquiry and hear proof upon that question?
The city of Manila is given authority to expropriate private lands for  public  purposes.
Can it be possible that said authority confers the right to determine for itself that the
land is private and that the purpose is public, and that the people of the city of Manila
who pay the taxes for its support, especially those who are directly affected, may not
question one or the other, or both, of these questions? Can it be successfully
contended that the phrase used in Act No. 190, "and if the court upon trial shall find
that such right  exists," means simply that the court shall examine the  statutes
simply  for the purpose of ascertaining whether a law exists authorizing the petitioner
to exercise the right of eminent domain? Or, when the case arrives in the Supreme
Court, can it be possible that the phrase, "if the Supreme Court shall determine
that no right  of expropriation exists," that that simply means that the Supreme Court
shall also examine the enactments of the legislature for the purpose of determining
whether or not a law exists permitting the plaintiff to expropriate?
We are of the opinion that the power of the court is not limited to that question. The
right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it
can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the
courts come to determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or authority
exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are
two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the
land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial,
finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it
cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law.
Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public, is a
question of fact. Whether the land is public, is a question of fact; and, in our opinion,
when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to
ascertain upon  trial whether the  right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it
intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions. Is
it possible that the owner of valuable land in this jurisdiction is compelled to stand
mute while his land is being expropriated for a use not public, with the right simply to
beg the city of Manila to pay him the value of his land? Does the law in this jurisdiction
permit municipalities to expropriate lands, without question, simply for the purpose of
satisfying the aesthetic sense of those who happen for the time being to be in
authority? Expropriation of lands usually calls for public expense. The taxpayers are
called upon to pay the costs. Cannot the owners of land question the public use or
the public necessity?

As was said above, there is a wide divergence of opinion upon the authority of the
court to question the necessity or advisability of the exercise of the right of eminent
domain. The divergence is usually found to depend upon particular statutory or
constitutional provisions.
It has been contended — and many cases are cited in support of that contention, and
section 158 of volume 10 of Ruling Case Law is cited as conclusive — that the
necessity for taking property under the right of eminent domain is not a judicial
question. But those who cited said section evidently overlooked the section
immediately following (sec. 159), which adds: "But it is obvious that if the property is
taken in the ostensible behalf of a public improvement which it can never by any
possibility serve, it is being taken for a use not public, and the owner's constitutional
rights call for protection by the courts. While many courts have used sweeping
expression in the decisions in which they have disclaimed the power of supervising
the power of supervising the selection of the sites of public improvements, it may be
safely said that the courts of the various states would feel bound to interfere to
prevent an abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature, by an attempted
appropriation of land in utter disregard of the possible necessity of its use, or when
the alleged purpose was a cloak to some sinister scheme." (Norwich City vs.
Johnson, 86 Conn., 151; Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544;
Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368; State vs. Stewart,
74 Wis., 620.)
Said section 158 (10 R. C. L., 183) which is cited as conclusive authority in support of
the contention of the appellant, says:
The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain,  may
directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular
improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement.
In such a case, it is well settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the
extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the
suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land
selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and
the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for those of the
representatives of the people.
Practically every case cited in support of the above doctrine has been examined, and
we are justified in making the statement that in each case the legislature directly
determined the necessity for the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the
particular case. It is not denied that if the necessity for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain is presented to the legislative department of the government and that
department decides that there exists a necessity for the exercise of the right in a
particular case, that then and in that case, the courts will not go behind the action of
the legislature and make inquiry concerning the necessity. But, in the case
of Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry, etc., Co. (72 Ohio St., 368 [106 Am. St.
rep., 622, 628]), which was cited in support of the doctrine laid down in section 158
above quoted, the court said:
57
But when the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how may be
taken, then the necessity of taking particular property  is a question for the courts.
Where the application to condemn or appropriate is made directly to the court, the
question (of necessity) should be raised and decided in limene.
The legislative department of the government was rarely undertakes to designate the
precise property which should be taken for public use. It has generally, like in the
present case, merely conferred general authority to take land for public use when a
necessity exists therefor. We believe that it can be confidently asserted that, under
such statute, the allegation of the necessity for the appropriation is an issuable
allegation which it is competent for the courts to decide. (Lynch vs. Forbes, 161
Mass., 302 [42 Am. St. Rep., 402, 407].)
There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a municipality is
given authority to exercise the right of eminent domain, and a decision by the
municipality that there exist a necessity for the exercise of that right in a particular
case. The first is a declaration simply that there exist reasons why the right should be
conferred upon municipal corporation, while the second is the application of the right
to a particular case. Certainly, the legislative declaration relating to the advisability of
granting the power cannot be converted into a declaration that a necessity exists for
its exercise in a particular case, and especially so when, perhaps, the land in question
was not within the territorial authority was granted.
Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipality the power
to exercise the right of eminent domain, is a question with which the courts are not
concerned. But when that right or authority is exercised for the purpose of depriving
citizens of their property, the courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry
and to hear proof upon the necessity in the particular case, and not the general
authority.
Volume 15 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (Cyc.), page 629, is cited as a
further conclusive authority upon the question that the necessity for the exercise of
the right of eminent domain is a legislative and not a judicial question. Cyclopedia, at
the page stated, says:
In the absence of some constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary,
the necessity and expediency  of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions
essentially political and not judicial in their character. The determination of those
questions (the necessity and the expediency) belongs to the sovereign power; the
legislative department is final and conclusive, and the courts have no power to review
it (the necessity and the expediency) . . . . It (the legislature) may designate the
particular property to be condemned, and its determination in this respect cannot be
reviewed by the courts.
The volume of Cyclopedia, above referred to, cites many cases in support of the
doctrine quoted. While time has not permitted an examination of all of said citations,
many of them have been examined, and it can be confidently asserted that said
cases which are cited in support of the assertion that, "the necessity and expediency

of exercising the right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not
judicial," show clearly and invariably that in each case the legislature itself usually, by
a special law, designated the particular case in which the right of eminent domain
might be exercised by the particular municipal corporation or entity within the state.
(Eastern R. Co. vs. Boston, etc., R. Co., 11 Mass., 125 [15 Am. Rep., 13]; Brooklyn
Park Com'rs vs. Armstrong, 45 N.Y., 234 [6 Am. Rep., 70]; Hairston vs. Danville, etc.
Ry. Co., 208 U. S. 598; Cincinnati vs. Louisville, etc. Ry. Co., 223 U. S., 390;
U.S. vs. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S., 53; U.S. vs. Gettysburg, etc.
Co., 160 U. S., 668; Traction Co. vs. Mining Co., 196 U.S., 239; Sears vs. City of
Akron, 246 U.S., 351 [erroneously cited as 242 U.S.].)
In the case of Traction Co. vs. Mining Co. (196 U.S., 239), the Supreme Court of the
United States said: "It is erroneous to suppose that the legislature is beyond the
control of the courts in exercising the power of eminent domain, either as to
the nature of the use or the necessity to the use of any particular property. For if the
use be not public or no necessity for the taking exists, the legislature cannot authorize
the taking of private property against the will of the owner, notwithstanding
compensation may be required."
In the case of School Board of Carolina vs. Saldaña (14 Porto Rico, 339, 356), we
find the Supreme Court of Porto Rico, speaking through Justice MacLeary, quoting
approvingly the following, upon the question which we are discussing: "It is well
settled that although the legislature must necessarily determine in the first instance
whether the use for which they (municipalities, etc.) attempt to exercise the power is a
public one or not, their (municipalities, etc.) determination is not final, but is subject to
correction by the courts, who may undoubtedly declare the statute unconstitutional, if
it shall clearly appear that the use for which it is proposed to authorize the taking of
private property is in reality not public but private." Many cases are cited in support of
that doctrine.
Later, in the same decision, we find the Supreme Court of Porto Rico says: "At any
rate, the rule is quite well settled that in the cases under consideration the
determination of the necessity of taking a particular piece or a certain amount of land
rests ultimately with the courts." (Spring Valley etc. Co. vs. San Mateo, etc. Co., 64
Cal., 123.) .
In the case of Board of Water Com'rs., etc. vs. Johnson (86 Conn., 571 [41 L. R. A.,
N. S., 1024]), the Supreme Court of Connecticut approvingly quoted the following
doctrine from Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.), section 599: "In all such cases the
necessity of public utility of the proposed work or improvement is a judicial question.
In all such cases, where the authority is to take property necessary for the purpose,
the necessity of taking particular property  for a particular purpose is a judicial one,
upon which the owner is entitled to be heard." (Riley vs. Charleston, etc. Co., 71 S.
C., 457, 489 [110 Am. St. Rep., 579]; Henderson vs. Lexington 132 Ky., 390, 403.)
The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities or
convenience of the inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of
eminent domain, and beyond the power of the legislature to delegate.
58
(Bennett vs. Marion, 106 Iowa, 628, 633; Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222 Pa. St.,
541, 545; Greasy, etc. Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692, 697.)
In the case of New Central Coal Co. vs. George's etc. Co. (37 Md., 537, 564), the
Supreme Court of the State of Maryland, discussing the question before us, said: "To
justify the exercise of this extreme power (eminent domain) where the legislature has
left it to depend upon the necessity that may be found to exist, in order to accomplish
the purpose of the incorporation, as in this case, the party claiming the right to the
exercise of the power should be required to show at least a reasonable degree of
necessity for its exercise. Any rule less strict than this, with the large and almost
indiscriminate delegation of the right to corporations, would likely lead to oppression
and the sacrifice of private right to corporate power."
In the case of Dewey vs. Chicago, etc. Co. (184 Ill., 426, 433), the court said: "Its right
to condemn property is not a general power of condemnation, but is limited to cases
where a necessity for resort to private property is shown to exist. Such necessity must
appear upon the face of the petition to condemn. If the necessary is denied the
burden is upon the company (municipality) to establish it." (Highland, etc.
Co. vs. Strickley, 116 Fed., 852, 856; Kiney vs. Citizens' Water & Light Co., 173 Ind.,
252, 257 ; Bell vs. Mattoon Waterworks, etc. Co., 245 Ill., 544 [137 Am. St. Rep.
338].)
It is true that naby decisions may be found asserting that what is a public use is a
legislative question, and many other decisions declaring with equal emphasis that it is
a judicial question. But, as long as there is a constitutional or statutory provision
denying the right to take land for any use other than a public use, it occurs to us that
the question whether any  particular use  is a public one or not is ultimately, at least, a
judicial question. The legislative may, it is true, in effect declare certain uses to be
public, and, under the operation of the well-known rule that a statute will not be
declared to be unconstitutional except in a case free, or comparatively free, from
doubt, the courts will certainly sustain the action of the legislature unless it appears
that the particular use is clearly not of a public nature. The decisions must be
understood with this limitation; for, certainly, no court of last resort will be willing to
declare that any and every purpose which the legislative might happen to designate
as a public use shall be conclusively held to be so, irrespective of the purpose in
question and of its manifestly private character Blackstone in his Commentaries on
the English Law remarks that, so great is the regard of the law for private property
that it will not authorize the least violation of it, even for the public good, unless there
exists a very great necessity therefor.
In the case of Wilkinson vs. Leland (2 Pet. [U.S.], 657), the Supreme Court of the
United States said: "That government can scarcely be deemed free where the rights
of property are left solely defendant on the legislative body, without restraint. The
fundamental maxims of free government seem to require that the rights of personal
liberty and private property should be held sacred. At least no court of justice in this
country would be warranted in assuming that the power to violate and disregard them
— a power so repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty — lurked

in any general grant of legislature authority, or ought to be implied from any general
expression of the people. The people ought no to be presumed to part with rights so
vital to their security and well-being without very strong and direct expression of such
intention." (Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 603; Lecoul vs. Police Jury 20 La. Ann.,
308; Jefferson vs. Jazem, 7 La. Ann., 182.)
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the English Law said that the right to own and
possess land — a place to live separate and apart from others — to retain it as a
home for the family in a way not to be molested by others — is one of the most
sacred rights that men are heirs to. That right has been written into the organic law of
every civilized nation. The Acts of Congress of July 1, 1902, and of August 29, 1916,
which provide that "no law shall be enacted in the Philippine Islands which shall
deprive any person of his property without due process of law," are but a restatement
of the time-honored protection of the absolute right of the individual to his property.
Neither did said Acts of Congress add anything to the law already existing in the
Philippine Islands. The Spaniard fully recognized the principle and adequately
protected the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands against the encroachment upon the
private property of the individual. Article 349 of the Civil Code provides that: "No one
may be deprived of his property unless it be by competent authority, for some
purpose of  proven  public utility, and after payment of the proper compensation
Unless this requisite (proven public utility and payment) has been complied with, it
shall be the  duty of the courts  to protect the owner of such property in its possession
or to restore its possession to him , as the case may be."
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that
case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by
individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws
more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature
interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an
individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by
doubtly interpretation. (Bensely vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases
cited [73 Am. Dec., 576].)
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of
the most delicate exercise of government authority. It is to be watched with jealous
scrutiny. Important as the power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity
which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the citizens, constrains the
strict observance of the substantial provisions of the law which are  prescribed  as
modes of the exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. Not only must the
authority of municipal corporations to take property be expressly conferred and the
use for which it is taken specified, but the power, with all constitutional limitation
and directions for its exercise, must be strictly pursued. (Dillon on Municipal
Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co.,
22 Phil., 411.)
59
It can scarcely be contended that a municipality would be permitted to take property
for some public use unless some public necessity existed therefor. The right to take
private property for public use originates in the necessity, and the taking must be
limited by such necessity. The appellant contends that inasmuch as the legislature
has given it general authority to take private property for public use, that the
legislature has, therefore, settled the question of the necessity in every case and that
the courts are closed to the owners of the property upon that question. Can it be
imagined, when the legislature adopted section 2429 of Act No. 2711, that it thereby
declared that it was necessary to appropriate the property of Juan de la Cruz, whose
property, perhaps, was not within the city limits at the time the law was adopted? The
legislature, then, not having declared the necessity, can it be contemplated that it
intended that a municipality should be the sole judge of the necessity in every case,
and that the courts, in the face of the provision that "if upon trial they shall find that a
right exists," cannot in that trial inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity for the
appropriation in a particular case?
The Charter of the city of Manila authorizes the taking of private property
for public use. Suppose the owner of the property denies and successfully proves that
the taking of his property serves no public use: Would the courts not be justified in
inquiring into that question and in finally denying the petition if no public purpose was
proved? Can it be denied that the courts have a right to inquire into that question? If
the courts can ask questions and decide, upon an issue properly presented, whether
the use is public or not, is not that tantamount to permitting the courts to inquire into
the necessity of the appropriation? If there is no public use, then there is no
necessity, and if there is no necessity, it is difficult to understand how a public use can
necessarily exist. If the courts can inquire into the question whether a public use
exists or not, then it seems that it must follow that they can examine into the question
of the necessity.
The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity,
and that necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity
must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the
land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co., 166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt.,
281; Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with
the right to exercise it in a  particular case. The power of the legislature to confer,
upon municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to
exercise the right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that
general authority of municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to
exercise it in particular instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity
attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions
accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a
municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain  is admittedly within the
power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is
exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general
authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.

The  conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain is purely legislative and not
judicial, arises generally in the wisdom and propriety of the legislature in authorizing
the exercise of the right of eminent domain instead of in the question of the right to
exercise it in a particular case. (Creston Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of
eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes
designated by the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)
And, moreover, the record does not show conclusively that the plaintiff has definitely
decided that their exists a necessity for the appropriation of the particular land
described in the complaint. Exhibits 4, 5, 7, and E clearly indicate that the municipal
board believed at one time that other land might be used for the proposed
improvement, thereby avoiding the necessity of distributing the quiet resting place of
the dead.
Aside from insisting that there exists no necessity for the alleged improvements, the
defendants further contend that the street in question should not be opened through
the cemetery. One of the defendants alleges that said cemetery is  public  property. If
that allegations is true, then, of course, the city of Manila cannot appropriate it for
public use. The city of Manila can only expropriate  private  property.
It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a
cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter
is used only by a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood. (11 C.
J., 50.)
Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can
be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to
the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use.
(Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 434, and cases cited.)
The cemetery in question seems to have been established under governmental
authority. The Spanish Governor-General, in an order creating the same, used the
following language:
The cemetery and general hospital for indigent Chinese having been founded and
maintained by the spontaneous and fraternal contribution of their protector,
merchants and industrials, benefactors of mankind, in consideration of their services
to the Government of the Islands its internal administration, government and regime
must necessarily be adjusted to the taste and traditional practices of those born and
educated in China in order that the sentiments which animated the founders may be
perpetually effectuated.
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the
general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition
of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is
60
true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that
the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public
property.
But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the
uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its
maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its
appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that
the greatest necessity exists therefor.
While we do not contend that the dead must not give place to the living, and while it is
a matter of public knowledge that in the process of time sepulchres may become the
seat of cities and cemeteries traversed by streets and daily trod by the feet of millions
of men, yet, nevertheless such sacrifices and such uses of the places of the dead
should not be made unless and until it is fully established that there exists an eminent
necessity therefor. While cemeteries and sepulchres and the places of the burial of
the dead are still within
the memory and command of the active care of the living; while they are still devoted
to pious uses and sacred regard, it is difficult to believe that even the legislature
would adopt a law expressly providing that such places, under such circumstances,
should be violated.
In such an appropriation, what, we may ask, would be the measure of damages at
law, for the wounded sensibilities of the living, in having the graves of kindred and
loved ones blotted out and desecrated by a common highway or street for public
travel? The impossibility of measuring the damage and inadequacy of a remedy at
law is too apparent to admit of argument. To disturb the mortal remains of those
endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except in
cases of necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting
place of our friends, should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts
should be invoked for that object. (Railroad Company vs. Cemetery Co., 116 Tenn.,
400; Evergreen Cemetery Association vs. The City of New Haven, 43 Conn., 234;
Anderson vs. Acheson, 132 Iowa, 744; Beatty vs. Kurtz, 2 Peters, 566.)
In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street
in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same
through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been
offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.
For all of the foregoing, we are fully persuaded that the judgment of the lower court
should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 107916 February 20, 1997
PERCIVAL MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

The main issue presented in this case is whether a municipality may expropriate
private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals
decision and resolution, promulgated on July 15, 1992 and October 22, 1992
respectively, 1 and a declaration that Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 of the Bunawan
Sangguniang Bayan is null and void.
On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan
del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the
Petition for Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the
National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center
and Other Government Sports Facilities." 2
In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C.
Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On
September 11, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution
and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that
there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government
center." 3
The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent, subsequently filed a petition
for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday before the Regional Trial Court
at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. 4 The complaint was later amended to include the
registered owners, Percival Moday's parents, Zotico and Leonora Moday, as party
defendants.
On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion to Take or Enter
Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case stating that it had already
deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with
Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the
government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to take possession of
the property.
Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits, the Regional Trial
Court granted respondent municipality's motion to take possession of the land. The
lower court held that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution
invalid leaves it effective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is
merely to review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan
under Section 208 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337, old Local Government Code and that the
exercise of eminent domain is not one of the two acts enumerated in Section 19
thereof requiring the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. 5 The dispositive
portion of the lower court's Order dated July 2, 1991 reads:
WHEREFORE, it appearing that the amount of P632.39 had been deposited as per
Official Receipt No. 5379647 on December 12, 1989 which this Court now determines
as the provisional value of the land, the Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession
of the Property filed by petitioner through counsel is hereby GRANTED. The Sheriff of
61
this Court is ordered to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property
involved.
Let the hearing be set on August 9, 1991 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning for the
purpose of ascertaining the just compensation or fair market value of the property
sought to be taken, with notice to all the parties concerned.
SO ORDERED. 6
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on October 31,
1991
Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for certiorari  alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court, but the same was dismissed by respondent
appellate court on July 15, 1992. 7 The Court of Appeals held that the public purpose
for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No. 43-89 and that since the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89
invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed.
Respondent appellate court also denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on
October 22, 1992. 8
Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject
property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool,
both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of
concrete.
In the instant petition for review filed on November 23, 1992, petitioner seeks the
reversal of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals and a declaration that
Resolution No. 43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawan is null and void.
On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining and
restraining public respondent Judge Evangeline Yuipco from enforcing her July 2,
1991 Order and respondent municipality from using and occupying all the buildings
constructed and from further constructing any building on the land subject of this
petition. 9
Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of Restraining Order and for
Contempt, the Court issued a Resolution on March 15, 1995, citing incumbent
municipal mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo for contempt, ordering him to pay the fine and to
demolish the "blocktiendas" which were built in violation of the restraining order. 10
Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and manifested that he lost in the May
8, 1995 election. 11 The incumbent Mayor Leonardo Barrios, filed a Manifestation,
Motion to Resolve "Urgent Motion for Immediate Dissolution of the Temporary
Restraining Order" and Memorandum on June 11, 1996 for the Municipality of
Bunawan. 12

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the legality of the
condemnation proceedings initiated by the municipality. According to petitioners, the
expropriation was politically motivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly
disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, there being other municipal
properties available for the purpose. Petitioners also pray that the former Mayor
Anuncio C. Bustillo be ordered to pay damages for insisting on the enforcement of a
void municipal resolution.
The Court of Appeals declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for
disapproving the resolution "could be baseless, because it failed to point out which
and where are those available lots.'" Respondent court also concluded that since the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan did not declare the municipal board's resolution as invalid,
expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. 13
The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the
instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. 14 It is
government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose. 15 Inherently possessed by the national
legislature, the power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local
governments, other public entities and public utilities. 16 For the taking of private
property by the government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there
must be just compensation. 17
The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not
disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local
Government Code 18 in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated.
Section 9 of said law states:
Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may, through its head and acting
pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and
institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this
right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:
Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. — (1) Within thirty days after receiving
copies of approved ordinances, resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the
municipal mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or
transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial fiscal,
who shall examine them promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing
of any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein and make such comments
or recommendations as shall appear to him proper.
62
(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance, resolution
or executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the
mayor, it shall declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in whole
or in part, entering its actions upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal
authorities thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to annul the ordinance,
resolution or executive order in question in whole or in part. The action of the
sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an
infirm action which does not render said resolution null and void. The law, as
expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the
power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the
power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a
similar provision of law but different factual milieu then obtaining, the Court's
pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas, 19 where we cited significant early jurisprudence,
are applicable to the case at bar.
The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the
powers conferred upon the council or president making the same." Absolutely no
other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial
board in its consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial
(board's) disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised
specifically upon the fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope
of the legal powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it
usurps the legislative function of the municipal council or president. Such has been
the consistent course of executive authority. 20
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove
Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power
to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to
promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337.
Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used
as lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.
As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that Percival Moday
incurred the ire of then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo when he refused to support the
latter's candidacy for mayor in previous elections. Petitioners claim that then
incumbent Mayor C. Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their
land even if there were other properties belonging to the municipality and available for
the purpose. Specifically, they allege that the municipality owns a vacant seven-
hectare property adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch plan. 21
The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public,
compensation must be made and due process of law must be
observed. 22 The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy

of compensation, necessity of the taking and the public use character or the purpose
of the taking, 23 has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must be
genuine and of a public character. 24 Government may not capriciously choose what
private property should be taken.
After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no evidentiary
support for petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopy of the sketch plan does
not conclusively prove that the municipality does own vacant land adjacent to
petitioners' property suited to the purpose of the expropriation. In the questioned
decision, respondent appellate court similarly held that the pleadings and documents
on record have not pointed out any of respondent municipality's "other available
properties available for the same purpose." 25 The accusations of political reprisal are
likewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the Court holds that
petitioners' demand that the former municipal mayor be personally liable for damages
is without basis.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The questioned Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in the case of "Percival Moday." et al. v.
Municipality of Bunawan, et al." (CA G.R. SP No. 26712) are AFFIRMED. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on December 8, 1993 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161656               June 29, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE G. LIM
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions. 1 When the state wields its power of eminent domain, there arises
a correlative obligation on its part to pay the owner of the expropriated property a just compensation. If it fails,
there is a clear case of injustice that must be redressed. In the present case, fifty-seven (57) years have
lapsed from the time the Decision in the subject expropriation proceedings became final, but still the Republic
of the Philippines, herein petitioner, has not compensated the owner of the property. To tolerate such
prolonged inaction on its part is to encourage distrust and resentment among our people – the very vices that
corrode the ties of civility and tempt men to act in ways they would otherwise shun.
A revisit of the pertinent facts in the instant case is imperative.
On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special
civil action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, docketed
as Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate,
Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military reservation for the
Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921 with an area of 25,137 square meters,
while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560
consisting of 13,164 square meters.
After depositing ₱9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to the Order of
the CFI dated October 19, 1938, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter,
63
or on May 14, 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the
Denzons the sum of ₱4,062.10 as just compensation.
The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed on
March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.
In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports
Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it "denied knowledge of the
matter." Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to the Office of then
President Carlos Garcia who wrote the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the
Secretary of National Defense to expedite action on said claim. On September 6,
1961, Lt. Manuel Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the
appraised value of the lots within a reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons’
successors-in-interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-
Panerio,2 filed with the same CFI an action for recovery of possession with damages
against the Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in
possession of the property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-7208.
In the interim or on November 9, 1961, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932
and 939 were issued in the names of Francisca Valdehueza and Josefina Panerio,
respectively. Annotated thereon was the phrase "subject to the priority of the National
Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous
payment of a reasonable market value."
On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and
Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as such over
Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republic’s failure to pay the amount of ₱4,062.10,
adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on
their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic.
In view of "the differences in money value from 1940 up to the present," the court
adjusted the market value at ₱16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from
April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full payment.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza and Panerio appealed
from the CFI Decision, in view of the amount in controversy, directly to this Court. The
case was docketed as No. L-21032.3 On May 19, 1966, this Court rendered its
Decision affirming the CFI Decision. It held that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the
registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment of just
compensation by the Republic. Apparently, this Court found nothing in the records to
show that the Republic paid the owners or their successors-in-interest according to
the CFI decision. While it deposited the amount of ₱9,500,00, and said deposit was
allegedly disbursed, however, the payees could not be ascertained.
Notwithstanding the above finding, this Court still ruled that Valdehueza and Panerio
are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of
their fair market value, ratiocinating as follows:

"Appellants would contend that: (1) possession of Lots 932 and 939 should be
restored to them as owners of the same; (2) the Republic should be ordered to pay
rentals for the use of said lots, plus attorney’s fees; and (3) the court a quo in the
present suit had no power to fix the value of the lots and order the execution of the
deed of sale after payment.
It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having been
a transfer of said lots in favor of the Government. The records do not show that the
Government paid the owners or their successors-in-interest according to the 1940 CFI
decision although, as stated, ₱9,500.00 was deposited by it, and said deposit had
been disbursed. With the records lost, however, it cannot be known who received the
money (Exh. 14 says: ‘It is further certified that the corresponding Vouchers and
pertinent Journal and Cash Book were destroyed during the last World War, and
therefore the names of the payees concerned cannot be ascertained.’) And the
Government now admits that there is no available record showing that payment
for the value of the lots in question has been made (Stipulation of Facts, par. 9,
Rec. on Appeal, p. 28).
The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in
what amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By
final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for
public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the Government. In fact,
the abovementioned title certificates secured by plaintiffs over said lots
contained annotations of the right of the National Airports Corporation (now
CAA) to pay for and acquire them. It follows that both by virtue of the judgment,
long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title
certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their
expropriated lots – which are still devoted to the public use for which they were
expropriated – but only to demand the fair market value of the same."
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente
Lim, herein respondent,4 as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim
despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No. 23934 was
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 63894 was issued in his name.
On August 20, 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Cebu City, against General Romeo Zulueta,
as Commander of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Commodore Edgardo Galeos,
as Commander of Naval District V of the Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna, Doroteo
Mantos and Florencio Belotindos, herein petitioners. Subsequently, he amended the
complaint to implead the Republic.
On May 4, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, thus:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Vicente Lim and against all defendants,
public and private, declaring plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No. 932 with
all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession.  The monetary claims in the
complaint and in the counter claims contained in the answer of defendants are ordered Dismissed.
64
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R.
CV No. 72915. In its Decision5 dated September 18, 2003, the Appellate Court
sustained the RTC Decision, thus:
"Obviously, defendant-appellant Republic evaded its duty of paying what was due to the landowners.
The expropriation proceedings had already become final in the late 1940’s and yet, up to now, or more
than fifty (50) years after, the Republic had not yet paid the compensation fixed by the court while
continuously reaping benefits from the expropriated property to the prejudice of the landowner. x x x.
This is contrary to the rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only
the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for
the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more, in this case more than 50 years,
before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss. To allow the taking of the
landowners’ properties, and in the meantime leave them empty-handed by withholding payment of
compensation while the government speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or
worse, for government to subsequently decide to abandon the property and return it to the
landowners, is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must never be
sanctioned. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404).
xxxxxx
An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt
or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant
to have a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property, which is the subject
matter of the action. Also the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being
alleged as cloud on plaintiff’s title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie  appearance of validity or legal efficacy (Robles vs. Court of
Appeals, 328 SCRA 97). In view of the foregoing discussion, clearly, the claim of
defendant-appellant Republic constitutes a cloud, doubt or uncertainty on the
title of plaintiff-appellee Vicente Lim that can be removed by an action to quiet
title.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the
appealed May 4, 2001 Decision of Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, in
Civil Case No. CEB-12701, the said decision is UPHELD AND
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit."
Undaunted, petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with this Court
a petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Republic has remained the owner of
Lot 932 as held by this Court in Valdehueza vs. Republic.6
In our Resolution dated March 1, 2004, we denied the petition outright on the ground
that the Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error. Petitioners filed an urgent
motion for reconsideration but we denied the same with finality in our Resolution of
May 17, 2004.
On May 18, 2004, respondent filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an entry of
judgment. We only noted the motion in our Resolution of July 12, 2004.
On July 7, 2004, petitioners filed an urgent plea/motion for clarification, which is
actually a second motion for reconsideration. Thus, in our Resolution of

September 6, 2004, we simply noted without action the motion considering that the
instant petition was already denied with finality in our Resolution of May 17, 2004.
On October 29, 2004, petitioners filed a very urgent motion for leave to file a motion
for reconsideration of our Resolution dated September 6, 2004 (with prayer to refer
the case to the En Banc). They maintain that the Republic’s right of ownership has
been settled in Valdehueza.
The basic issue for our resolution is whether the Republic has retained ownership of
Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just
compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May
14, 1940.
Initially, we must rule on the procedural obstacle.
While we commend the Republic for the zeal with which it pursues the present case,
we reiterate that its urgent motion for clarification filed on July 7, 2004 is actually a
second motion for reconsideration. This motion is prohibited under Section 2, Rule
52, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:
"Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. – No second motion for reconsideration
of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained."
Consequently, as mentioned earlier, we simply noted without action the motion since
petitioners’ petition was already denied with finality.
Considering the Republic’s urgent and serious insistence that it is still the owner of
Lot 932 and in the interest of justice, we take another hard look at the controversial
issue in order to determine the veracity of petitioner’s stance.
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be
deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation
cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be just compensation
whenever private property is taken for public use.7 Accordingly, Section 9, Article III,
of our Constitution mandates: "Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation."
The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939.
The length of time and the manner with which it evaded payment demonstrate its
arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory attitude. The final judgment in the
expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No. 781) was entered on April 5, 1948. More
than half of a century has passed, yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent,
has remained empty-handed. Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment
cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair. This is more so when such delay is
accompanied by bureaucratic hassles. Apparent from Valdehueza is the fact that
respondent’s predecessors-in-interest were given a "run around" by the Republic’s
officials and agents. In 1950, despite the benefits it derived from the use of the two
lots, the National Airports Corporation  denied knowledge of the claim of respondent’s
65
predecessors-in-interest. Even President Garcia, who sent a letter to the Civil
Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite the
payment, failed in granting relief to them. And, on September 6, 1961, while the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the
lots, nothing happened.lawphil.net
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to the rules
of fair play, as "just compensation embraces not only the correct determination
of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the payment for the
land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered ‘just.’" In jurisdictions similar to ours, where
an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has
been held that if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be
treated as a trespasser ab initio.8
Corollarily, in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya,9 similar to the
present case, this Court expressed its disgust over the government’s vexatious delay
in the payment of just compensation, thus:
"The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to be paid for their
land which was taken for use as a public high school. As a matter of fair
procedure, it is the duty of the Government, whenever it takes property from private
persons against their will, to supply all required documentation and facilitate payment
of just compensation. The imposition of unreasonable requirements and
vexatious delays before effecting payment is not only galling and arbitrary but a
rich source of discontent with government. There should be some kind of swift
and effective recourse against unfeeling and uncaring acts of middle or lower
level bureaucrats."
We feel the same way in the instant case.
More than anything else, however, it is the obstinacy of the Republic that prompted us
to dismiss its petition outright. As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court
mandated the Republic to pay respondent’s predecessors-in-interest the sum of
₱16,248.40 as "reasonable market value of the two lots in question." Unfortunately, it
did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Court’s
mandate. Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and
to the rule of law, which we cannot countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of
private property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of
government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or the
exigency of the occasion demands, however, the Constitution guarantees that when
this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by
compensation.10 From the taking of private property by the government under the
power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to compensate the owner
for his loss.11
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution
is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the

philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers
to the detriment of the individual’s rights. Given this function, the provision should
therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government,
and liberally in favor of the property owner.12
Ironically, in opposing respondent’s claim, the Republic is invoking this Court’s
Decision in Valdehueza, a Decision it utterly defied. How could the Republic acquire
ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the just compensation,
required by law, for more than 50 years? The recognized rule is that title to the
property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is
consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. In Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. et al., vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,13 thus:
"Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not
vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and
paid, but the condemnor’s title relates back to the date on which the petition under
the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner’s report under the Local Improvement
Act, is filed.
x x x Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is
complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner
until payment is actually made. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that
title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually
been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniform to this effect. As early as
1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, it was held that ‘actual payment to the owner of the
condemned property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to
the property in the State’ albeit ‘not to the appropriation of it to public
use.’ In Rexford v. Knight, the Court of Appeals of New York said that the
construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the
payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate
the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that ‘both on
principle and authority the rule is . . . that the right to enter on and use the
property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the
authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner
without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes,
that:
‘If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are
attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation
adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no
piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until
compensation is paid...’"(Emphasis supplied.)
66
Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title
from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republic’s acquisition of
ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within a
reasonable time.14
Significantly, in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia15 this Court ruled that the expropriation
of lands consists of two stages, to wit:
"x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context
of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action,
"of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint" x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination
by the court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is
done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. x x x.
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have
been completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation,16 we ruled that, "the
process is not completed until payment of just compensation." Thus, here, the failure
of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57
years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.
The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to
recover possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its fair market value. Of
course, we are aware of the doctrine that "non-payment of just compensation (in an
expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners to recover
possession of the expropriated lots." This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic
of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,17 and Reyes vs. National Housing
Authority.18 However, the facts of the present case do not justify its application. It
bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just
compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation proceedings and the second,
in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but
construe the Republic’s failure to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal
on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In
several jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession may be had when
property has been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act
under the power of eminent domain 19 or where a rightful entry is made and the
party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been assessed
or agreed upon;20 or fails or refuses to have the compensation assessed and paid.21
The Republic also contends that where there have been constructions being used by
the military, as in this case, public interest demands that the present suit should not
be sustained.

It must be emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived of his property for the
public convenience.22 In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform,23 we ruled:
"One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the
individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that
there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it
be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional
shortcuts. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or
the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will
excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that
a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a
majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that
right.
The right covers the person’s life, his liberty and his property under Section 1
of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys
the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation."
The Republic’s assertion that the defense of the State will be in grave danger if we
shall order the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an overstatement. First, Lot 932
had ceased to operate as an airport. What remains in the site is just the National
Historical Institute’s marking stating that Lot 932 is the "former location of Lahug
Airport." And second, there are only thirteen (13) structures located on Lot 932, eight
(8) of which are residence apartments  of military personnel. Only two (2) buildings
are actually used as training centers. Thus, practically speaking, the reversion of Lot
932 to respondent will only affect a handful of military personnel. It will not result to
"irreparable damage" or "damage beyond pecuniary estimation," as what the Republic
vehemently claims.
We thus rule that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent
to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic. Unless this form of
swift and effective relief is granted to him, the grave injustice committed against his
predecessors-in-interest, though no fault or negligence on their part, will be
perpetuated. Let this case, therefore, serve as a wake-up call to the Republic that in
the exercise of its power of eminent domain, necessarily in derogation of private
rights, it must comply with the Constitutional limitations. This Court, as the guardian of
the people’s right, will not stand still in the face of the Republic’s oppressive and
confiscatory taking of private property, as in this case.
At this point, it may be argued that respondent Vicente Lim acted in bad faith in
entering into a contract of mortgage with Valdehueza and Panerio despite the clear
annotation in TCT No. 23934 that Lot 932 is "subject to the priority of the National
Airports Corporation [to acquire said parcels of land] x x x upon previous
payment of a reasonable market value."
67
The issue of whether or not respondent acted in bad faith is immaterial considering
that the Republic did not complete the expropriation process. In short, it failed to
perfect its title over Lot 932 by its failure to pay just compensation. The issue of bad
faith would have assumed relevance if the Republic actually acquired title over Lot
932. In such a case, even if respondent’s title was registered first, it would be the
Republic’s title or right of ownership that shall be upheld. But now, assuming that
respondent was in bad faith, can such fact vest upon the Republic a better title
over Lot 932? We believe not. This is because in the first place, the Republic has no
title to speak of.
At any rate, assuming that respondent had indeed knowledge of the annotation, still
nothing would have prevented him from entering into a mortgage contract involving
Lot 932 while the expropriation proceeding was pending. Any person who deals with
a property subject of an expropriation does so at his own risk, taking into account
the ultimate possibility of losing the property in favor of the government. Here, the
annotation merely served as a caveat that the Republic had a preferential right to
acquire Lot 932 upon its payment of a "reasonable market value." It did not
proscribe Valdehueza and Panerio from exercising their rights of ownership including
their right to mortgage or even to dispose of their property. In Republic vs. Salem
Investment Corporation,24 we recognized the owner’s absolute right over his property
pending completion of the expropriation proceeding, thus:
"It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have
been completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title
over the property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for
expropriation has been completed and terminated, ownership over the property being
expropriated remains with the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can
exercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his
property subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through
expropriation.
It bears emphasis that when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to
respondent in 1964, they were still the owners thereof and their title had not yet
passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never did. Such title or ownership was
rendered conclusive when we categorically ruled in Valdehueza that: "It is true that
plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having been a
transfer of said lots in favor of the Government."
For respondent’s part, it is reasonable to conclude that he entered into the contract of
mortgage with Valdehueza and Panerio fully aware of the extent of his right as a
mortgagee. A mortgage is merely an accessory contract intended to secure the
performance of the principal obligation. One of its characteristics is that it
is inseparable from the property. It adheres to the property regardless of who its
owner may subsequently be.25 Respondent must have known that even if Lot 932 is
ultimately expropriated by the Republic, still, his right as a mortgagee is protected. In
this regard, Article 2127 of the Civil Code provides:
 68

"Art. 2127. The mortgage extends to the natural accessions, to the improvements,

growing fruits, and the rents or income not yet received when the obligation becomes
due, and to the amount of the indemnity granted or owing to the proprietor from
the insurers of the property mortgaged, or in virtue of expropriation for public use,
with the declarations, amplifications, and limitations established by law, whether the
estate remains in the possession of the mortgagor or it passes in the hands of
a third person.

In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that "the non-payment of just

compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the
expropriated lots,26 however, in cases where the government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5)27 years from the finality of the judgment in the
expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that "the
government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment."28 To be sure, the
five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation
punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to
facilitate the payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals,29 we
defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within a reasonable
time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just."

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.

72915 is AFFIRMED in toto.

The Republic’s motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated March 1, 2004 is
DENIED with FINALITY. No further pleadings will be allowed. Let an entry of
judgment be made in this case. SO ORDERED.