Oposa vs Factoran

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit
of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as
well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
Ysmael vs Deputy Executive Secretary

190 SCRA 673

GR No. 79538, 18 October 1990.

CORTES, J:

FACTS:

In 1986, at the start of President Corazon Aquino’s administration, petitioner sent letters to the Office of
the President and to the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) seeking the reinstatement of its timber
license agreement (TLA No. 87), which was cancelled in August 1983 along with nine other concessions,
during the Marcos administration. It alleged that after the its TLA was cancelled without being given
the opportunity to be heard, its logging area was re-awarded to other logging concessionaires
without a formal award or license, as these entities were controlled or owned by relatives or
cronies of deposed President Marcos.

The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the
Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so
demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten
concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. It also emphasized the fact that there was
currently a total log ban being imposed on the subject areas.

After the logging ban was lifted, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, but the petition was
denied on the ground that the appeal was prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in
the MNR. Hence, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their predecessors.

RULING:

The refusal of public respondents to reverse final and executory administrative orders does not
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is an established
doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have,
upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of
res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as
though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus
forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within
their exclusive jurisdiction.

Petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law for attacking the validity of these administrative
actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter to the newly appointed Minister of the
MNR requesting for reconsideration, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was
concerned.

More importantly, the assailed orders of the MNR disclose public policy consideration, which
effectively forestall judicial interference. Public respondents, upon whose shoulders rests the
task of implementing the policy to develop and conserve the country's natural resources,
have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into,
and permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. A long line of cases establish the
basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under their special technical
knowledge and training.

Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause. The Court expresses its concern
regarding alleged irregularities in the issuance of timber license agreements to a number of
logging concessionaires. Should the appropriate case be brought showing a clear grave abuse of
discretion on the part of concerned officials with respect to the implementation of this public policy, the
Court will not hesitate to step in. However, in this case, the Court finds no basis to issue a writ of
certiorari and to grant any of the affirmative reliefs sought.

Petition is dismissed.
HENARES vs. LTFRB

G.R. No. 158290; October 23, 2006

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS:

Citing statistics from National and International agencies, petitioners prayed for a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to
use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Petitioners allege that the particulate matters
(PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions
emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on health,
productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. In addition, they allege that with the
continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the
major sources of harmful emissions. They cited studies showing that vehicular emissions in Metro
Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that
pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and that the children in Metro Manila showed
more compromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are
mostly due to the emissions of PUVs.

Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of
mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. and Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749
otherwise known as the “Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.”

Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government agencies clothed with
power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies’ awareness
and knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that
these are curbed falls under respondents’ functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General said that the respondent government agencies, the DOTC and
the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. He explained that the
function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749
and the said law only goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does
not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. He recommended that the petition should be addressed to
Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondent is the agency responsible to implement the suggested alternative of requiring
public utility vehicles to use compressed natural gas (cng)

Whether the respondent can be compelled to require public utility vehicles to use compressed natural
gas through a writ of mandamus
RULING:

Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here,
there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles
to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 “to grant
preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs
based on the results of the DOTC surveys.”

In addition, under the Clean Air Act, it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission standards for fuel
use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon
the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan
and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.

No. Petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents
that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. The
legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems
bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

In addition, the petition had been mooted by the issuance of Executive Order No. 290, which
implemented a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. The court was assured that the
implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. ATIENZA

G.R. No. 156052; March 7, 2007

CORONA, J.:

Facts:

Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified the area from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.

However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were
required to remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of
safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the
DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint
operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution
No. 97.

Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.

Issue:

Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

Ruling:

Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local
Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the
city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the
Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of
an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes
and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
unconstitutional.
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

GR No. 171947-48; 18 December 2008

VELASCO, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government agencies, among them the
petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that
the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically
PD 1152. Respondents, as plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and
submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-government agencies to clean
up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds,
petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act, which can be
compelled by mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents?

Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay?

RULING:

Issue 1:

PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident
occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any
pollution incident.

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up
the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future
generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.

Issue 2:

Yes, petitioners may be compelled.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD
1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system
cannot be characterised as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or
right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the conclusion that these government
agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly
or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are
precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.

The petition is DENIED.

Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran

G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995

ROMERO, J.:

Facts:

Former President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order Nos 211 and 279 in the exercise of her
legislative powers. EO No. 211 prescribes the interim procedures in the processing and approval of
applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution. EO No. 279 authorizes the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint-
venture, co-production, or production- sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and
utilization of mineral resources.

The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 which
declares that all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution…shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the
effectivity of these guidelines.” and Administrative Order No. 82 which provides that a failure to submit
Letter of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreement within 2 years from the effectivity of the
Department Administrative Order No. 57 shall cause the abandonment of the mining, quarry, and sand
and gravel claims, after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the
Philippines, Inc., an organization composed of mining prospectors and claim owners and claim holders,
to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.

Issue :

Are the two Department Administrative Orders valid?

Ruling :

Yes. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the
governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of
applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive
Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease"
which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the
said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded
Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources
under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed
and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of
administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides,
thus:
Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their
implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect.

Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements
granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this
petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.

Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the
constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the
mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the
demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279
which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into
effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

PICOP vs Base Metal Mining

G.R. No. 163509, Dec 6, 2006

TINGA, J.:

FACTS:

Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation entered into a Mines Operating Agreement
with Banahaw Mining and Development Corporation. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement,
Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease Contracts over the mining claims with the
Bureau of Mines. On April 29, 1988, Banahaw Mining was issued a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing
it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found within its mining claims.

Since a portion of Banahaw Mining's mining claims was located in petitioner PICOP's logging concession
in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement,
whereby, in mutual recognition of each other's right to the area concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed
Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining claims. Banahaw Mining thereafter converted its
mining claims to applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreements. While the MPSA were
pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign its rights and interests over
thirty-seven mining claims in favor of private respondent. Base Metals Mineral Resources Corporation
(Base Metals for brevity). The transfer included mining claim sheld by Banahaw Mining in its own right
as claim owner, as well as those covered by its mining operating agreement with CMMCI. Upon being
informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the assignment made by
Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby recognizing private
respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims. On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed
with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB), Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/or
Opposition to private respondent Base Metals' application on the following grounds:

I. THE APPROVAL OF THE APPLICATION AND ISSUANCE OF THE MPSAOF BASE METALS WILL
VIOLATE THECONSTITUTIONAL MANDATEAGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION IN A CONTRACT

The Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the MAB, ruling that the Presidential Warranty of
September 25, 1968 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos merely confirmed the timber license
granted to PICOP and warranted the latter's peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of its
concession areas. It was only given upon the request of the Board of Investments to establish the
boundaries of PICOP's timber license agreement. The Presidential Warranty did not convert PICOP's
timber license into a contract because it did not create any obligation on the part of the government in
favor of PICOP.

Thus, the non-impairment clause finds no application. Neither did the Presidential Warranty grant
PICOP the exclusive possession, occupation and exploration of the concession areas covered. If
that were so, the government would have effectively surrendered its police power to control
and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the impairment of contracts apply?

HELD:

No. The guaranty is merely a collateral inducement An examination of the Presidential

Warranty at once reveals that it simply reassures PICOP of the government's commitment to
uphold the terms and conditions of its timber license and guarantees PICOP's peaceful and adequate
possession and enjoyment of the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood
processing complex. The warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its
concession area, and does not extend to the utilization of other resources, such as mineral resources,
occurring within the concession. The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be construed as a
contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its
concession areas. Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication by the State
in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to control and supervise the exploration, development and
utilization of the natural resources in the area.
SECRETARY OF THE DENR vs. YAP

G.R. No. 173775; 8 October 2008

REYES, R.T., J.:

Facts:

The Court of Appeals affirmed RTC Kalibo’s decision to grant the petition for declaratory relief filed by
Boracay Mayor Jose Yap et al. to have a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for
titling purposes for the land they have been occupying in Boracay. Yap et al alleged that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
Later in 2006, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into 400
hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable).

Issue:

Whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and
all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.

Ruling:

Yes, because the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert
portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the
public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property. The Regalian Doctrine
dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. All lands that
have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as
part of the inalienable public domain.

Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902,
Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public Land
Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable. Where the
land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights.

It is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No.
926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are
alienable and disposable.
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain
prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.

The private claimants cannot apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No.
1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to
prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in
Boracay since June 12, 1945.