In-Service Activities: Customer Canadair Regional Jet Services

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IN-SERVICE ACTIVITIES

Customer Canadair Regional Jet


Services

Report No. 98-03


Nov. 1998

THIS REPORT SUMMARIZES IN-SERVICE ACTIVITIES


AND IS FOR BOMBARDIER REGIONAL AIRCRAFT
CUSTOMER INFORMATION ONLY.

FLEET STATISTICS

(THROUGH August 31, 1998)

Airplanes In Service 247


Total Flight Hours 1,312,167.00
Total Flight Cycles 1,168,747.00
High Flight Hours (A/C 4) 14,062.90
High Flight Cycles (A/C 12) 12,371.00
Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

ALL OPERATOR MESSAGES ISSUED FOR THE PERIOD


OF February 1, 1997 to April 30, 1998

A.0.M. ATA SUBJECT

242 2300 8.33 Khz VHF Comm Channel Spacing


243 2750 Flap System Incident
244 3210 MLG - Main Fitting P/N 17064 Found Cracked
245 3210 Proposed Revision to Airworthiness Directive FAA
246 2300 8.33 KHz VHF Communications Channel Spacing
247 3210 MLG Main Fitting P/N 17064 Crack
248 0000 Issue of Electronic Data Standard Exchange (EDSE)
249 2750 Issuance of TC AD CF-98-14 against the Flap System
250 0000 Year 2000 and Bombardier Products
251 3210 MLG Main Fitting Crack Issuance of AJB A601R-32-074
252 2400 Notice of Issue: ASB 601R-24-085
253 3413 AD CF-96-16R1 Uncommanded Air Data Setting Change
254 3261 PSEU Program Exchange (SB 648-31-03)
255 2740 Issuance of FAA AD 98-13-24 on Horizontal Stabilizer System
256A 2750 Update on the Flap System Situation
257 5300 SB 601R-53-048 Intercostal Members
258 3210 Eddy Current Inspection of MLG Fittings
259 7100 Alert Service Bulletin A601R-71-024 “Inspection of Powerplant
Ambient Sensing Line”
260 5211 SB 601R52-068 Mechanism Interlock to Prevent Latchpin
Damage to the Fuselage
261 2300 8.33 KHz VHF Communication Channel Spacing
262 3211 Issuance of AD 98-16-25 MLG Shock Strut Upper/Lower
Attachment Pins
263 2151 Torque Values for Clamps NH103323-0350
264 0500 Maintenance Program Task Interval Escalation
265 2750 Update on the Flap System Situation
266 2810 Fuel System - Chafing Conduit
267 2751 Issuance of FAA AD 98-20-01
268 5300 Bulkhead 409+128 Reinforcement Strap Incorporation
269 5211 Passenger Door Push Rod Adjustment Tool
270 5210 Passenger Door, Bansbach Gas Spring
271 2310 VHF Communication Experiencing EMI Interference
272 2750 Transport Canada AD CF-98-14 Flap System Alternate Means
273 3210 Eddy Current Inspection - MLG Fitting Cracks
274 2811 TC AD CF-98-35 Electrical Conduits in the Center Wing Tank
275 2750 De-Icing Procedures vs Flap Selection
276 2710 Aileron Installation Mod.

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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

98-03-3251 - LANDING GEAR - INSTALLATION OF NOSE WHEEL STEERING


RUDDER PEDAL ROTARY VARIABLE DIFFERENTIAL TRANSDUCER
(RVDT))
By: Dave Grant, Mechanical, CRJ In-Service Support.

A CRJ aircraft was released for return to service after maintenance on the rudder
control system. On the first flight of the day, the take-off (T/O) was aborted. The
flight crew reported the following: "A/C turned to the right during T/O roll (Initial
acceleration phase)". The nose wheel steering was checked, with 'no fault found'.
On the next flight, the T/O was once again aborted for the same reason. During
troubleshooting, it was found that the rudder pedal RVDT had been installed with the
shaft 180 degrees out of alignment (“missing spline” installed 180 degrees opposite
E-Z mark). When the left rudder pedal was pushed, the nose wheel steered right.

The Rudder Pedal RVDT (Messier-Dowty P/N 16740-103) shaft is keyed to prevent
“backward” installation (See Figure below). The shaft, however, is split (a design
feature which helps minimize mechanical backlash) allowing the splines to be
compressed. As a result, it may be possible to install the shaft incorrectly. Note:
Installation in any position other than the correct position and 180 degrees backward
would not allow the RVDT electrical null to be achieved during rigging.

The fact that the RVDT shaft has a master spline may deceive mechanics into
thinking that it will only fit in one position.

The installation and adjustment


tasks for the rudder pedal
RVDT (installation 32-51-05-
400-801, adjustment 32-51-05-
820-801) will be revised to
include steps to prevent
inadvertent improper
installation of the RVDT spline
shaft. The installation task will
include an additional warning,
alerting technicians to the
potential for incorrect
installation, as well as the
possible consequences. The
adjustment task will include
steps to ensure that the correct
voltage polarity is observed
Rudder Pedal RVDT Installation
when deflecting rudder pedals

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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

in either direction immediately following RVDT fine adjustment. The task will also
include steps to visually check the direction of steering deflection during rudder
pedal deflection. These changes were released October 02, 1998 by Temporary
Revision (TR) to the CRJ AMM.

Technicians are advised to pay special attention when installing the rudder pedal
RVDT to ensure proper alignment and orientation of the RVDT spline with respect to
the RVDT housing and the rudder pedal pivot assembly

This ISAR is considered closed.

98-03-2800 - FUEL - CHAFING ON WIRING CONDUITS INSIDE THE FUEL TANK


By: Carlos Lima, Mechanical, CRJ In-Service Support

An Alert Service Bulletin (A601R-28-036) was issued on 29 June 1998 to provide inspection
procedures and corrective actions with regards to possible chafing on the right wing crossflow
valve wiring conduit in the center fuel tank.

To keep operators updated on the results of that Alert Service Bulletin and to advise them on
the incoming co-related activities, AOM 266 was released on 16 Sept 1998.

Recently, a similar case was reported during the accomplishment of the above Alert Service
Bulletin on a CRJ delivered in early 1998. Chafing was observed between a fuel level
indication electrical harness and a pipe (P/N 601R-62261-55) inside the left central wing fuel
tank (see illustration below). This case seems to be related to either a mis-clipping,
considering the age of the aircraft, or a length problem (short wiring).

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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

To investigate the problem, the above finding will be addressed during the wider scope fuel
tank inspection to be accomplished on a sample of the fleet (to begin November 1998) under
the cover of the ATA Fuel System Safety Program initiative. Also, an internal request has
been issued to investigate possible problems in production.

This ISAR item is considered open.

98-03-3250 - NOSE WHEEL STEERING - TROUBLESHOOTING TIPS FOR NOSE


WHEEL STEERING FAULTS
By: Dave Grant, Mechanical CRJ In-Service Support

CRJ Technical Services has received a number of reports of Nose Wheel Steering
system faults which were difficult to isolate and which required extensive time to
rectify. One such example, reported by a number of operators, is reported below to
assist technicians in troubleshooting:

Nose wheel steering system is inoperative, STEERING INOP Caution message on


EICAS. No gear extension/retraction faults reported. BITE check of the steering
system Electronic Control Unit (ECU) showed maintenance display fault codes
“- 5, 6”, indicating possible faults to either the steering system Solenoid Selector
Valve (SSV) (P/N 16850-101) or to the steering system hydraulic pressure switch
(P/N 16745-101) (S2GC).

The SSV is the 28VDC controlled, solenoid operated valve which opens and closes,
via signal from the steering ECU, controlling hydraulic pressure to the steering
system. The subject hydraulic switch is the steering system pressure switch,
installed up-stream of the steering module and located in the forward hydraulics bay
(FS 170).

Troubleshooting and/or replacement of the SSV and switch proved unsuccessful.


Other steering system components were then replaced on a “most likely component”
basis, including the ECU, steering module and compensator.

Following these replacements, efforts were made to measure hydraulic pressure


reaching the module. It was then determined that the system was receiving less
than the minimum of 2200 psi. The NLG priority valve was replaced and the system
checked serviceable.

If faced with a STEERING INOP condition with the above symptoms (ECU faults
codes 5 & 6), it is recommended that the following verification of steering system
pressure be made:

With the aircraft weight on wheels and the NLG torque links disconnected,
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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

1. Pressurize #3 hydraulic system and verify system pressure using EICAS


(hydraulics synoptic page). Pressure should be 3000 psi.
2. Disconnect the connector from the steering system pressure switch located in the
forward hydraulics compartment (L/H nose) and install a jumper on connector
P5GC between pins A and B.
3. Arm the steering system and verify that the STEERING INOP message
disappears from EICAS and that the steering system can be operated (use the
hand control unit and cycle the steering system left and right at a normal rate).
Note: When arming the system, you should hear the familiar “clunk” of the SSV.

If you observe that the steering system operates, but at a slower than normal rate,
suspect either the NLG priority valve or the NLG selector valve. If no gear
extension/retraction problems have been reported. Replace the NLG priority valve
and test the system again.

Forward Hydraulics Bay -


You can further confirm the finding
Components by plumbing a 3000 psi gauge to the
steering system pressure switch port
and repeating the steps above. The
correct operating pressure is 2800 to
3000 psi. If less than 2200 psi is
observed, replace the NLG priority
valve.

It is possible that the NLG priority


valve may be partially stuck or
obstructed, allowing only limited
pressure to the steering system,
without causing a gear
extension/retraction fault. The nose
gear may retract more slowly but still
be fully retracted within the
maximum time allowed before the

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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

PSEU posts a GEAR DISAGREE message on EICAS.

The CRJ Fault Isolation Manual (FIM) for ATA section 3250 (Nose Wheel Steering)
is currently under review and will be revised shortly to improve troubleshooting
information and include the use of computer downloading of the ECU Non-Volatile
Memory to assist in isolation of steering faults. The above information will be
included in this revision.

This ISAR is considered Closed.

98-03-2811 - FUEL SYSTEM - LH/RH XFER SOVS AND FUEL COMPUTER


FAILURES
By: Carlos Lima, Mechanical, CRJ In-Service Support

As a result of the investigation on the failure reports of the LH/RH Xfer SOVs and Fuel
Computer which have been received from some operators, a procedure was defined to allow
normal operation of the system avoiding unnecessary damage to these components.

The situation may be expected to occur when the fuel transfer SOVs are energized for an
extended period of time, while the aircraft is on ground with no or low fuel quantity in the center
fuel tank. To avoid the problem, the valves must be kept de-energized while the above
condition is present.

A Service Letter (RJ-SL-28-001) was released 21st September 1998, to let operators know
about the procedure, which provides details on how/when to de-energize the valves.

Further, Bombardier and Intertechnique are still working on a solution that can be introduced to
the system/components in a definitive way without requiring any additional procedure.

This ISAR item is considered open.

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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

98-03-3130 - INDICATING RECORDING SYSTEMS - DFDR (DIGITAL FLIGHT


DATA RECORDER) PARAMETER UPGRADE REQUIREMENTS FOR
CRJ 100/200s PER FAR 121.344
By: J. Michael McKinnon, Avionics/Electrical, CRJ In-Service Support

The United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) have released new requirements for
the recording of aircraft parameters by DFDR units in Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR)
121.344.

These new requirements affect aircraft already in-service and new production aircraft
differently. This ISAR is an overview of the FAR requirements, and how Bombardier is
planning to comply with them. A listing of the complete 88 parameters are included at the end
of this ISAR article.

The CRJ 100/200 aircraft in-service, manufactured after 11-Oct-1991 are require to be
upgraded with parameters 1-34 on the list by 20 Aug-2001.

The CRJ 100/200 aircraft manufactured after 18-Aug-2000 must record parameters 1-57 on
the list.

The CRJ 100/200 aircraft manufactured after 18-Aug-2002 must record parameters 1-88 on
the list.

Bombardier intends to comply with these requirements in the following way. First, the 34
parameters will be done by providing operators of those in-service aircraft with Service
Bulletins (SB) to allow the upgrade to take place in two stages. The first SB will provide kits
and instructions to modify the aircraft with provisional wiring installation for the additional
parameters required to meet the 34 parameter mandate. This installation will allow operators
to prepare their aircraft in advance, and alleviate a huge work load near the compliance date
for this phase. The second SB will complete the installation by mounting the auxiliary Data
Concentrator Unit (DCU), connecting the provisional wiring to it, and installing the upgraded
DFDR in the aft equipment bay. There is no fixed date for the release of the first SB.
However, all efforts are being made to have it available before the end of the first quarter 1999.

To meet the 34 parameter mandate, it will be necessary to install five new sensors on the
aircraft, with associated wiring, to a new auxiliary DCU which is expected to be installed under
the center pedestal in the cockpit, close to where all the new sensors will be required. This
Aux. DCU will be wired to the main 2 or 3 DCUs on the aircraft (whichever configuration the
operator has) through an ARINC 429 bus. The existing DCUs will report these new
parameters to the DFDR on the existing ARINC 429 bus as currently installed.

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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

Bombardier intends to introduce the full 88 parameters for new production aircraft at the FAA
compliance date for the 57 as stated above. This will remove the need to create a dual staged
introduction in manufacturing, and provide operators with better equipped aircraft recording all
88 parameters two years in advance of the FAA’s 88 parameter compliance date. We believe
this proactive approach is a win-win benefit to both the operators and Bombardier.

Complete 88 Parameter List Per FAR 121.344

(1) Time;
(2) Pressure altitude;
(3) Indicated airspeed;
(4) Heading - primary flight crew reference (if selectable, record discrete, true or magnetic);
(5) Normal acceleration (Vertical);
(6) Pitch attitude;
(7) Roll attitude;
(8) Manual radio transmitter keying, or CVR/DFDR synchronization reference;
(9) Thrust/power of each engine--primary flight crew reference;
(10) Autopilot engagement status;
(11) Longitudinal acceleration;
(12) Pitch control input;
(13) Lateral control input;
(14) Rudder pedal input;
(15) Primary pitch control surface position;
(16) Primary lateral control surface position;
(17) Primary yaw control surface position;
(18) Lateral acceleration;
(19) Pitch trim surface position or parameters of paragraph (a)(82) of this section if currently
recorded;
(20) Trailing edge flap or cockpit flap control selection (except when parameters of
paragraph (a)(85) of this section apply);
(21) Leading edge flap or cockpit flap control selection (except when parameters of
paragraph (a)(86) of this section apply);
(22) Each Thrust Reverser position (or equivalent for propeller airplane);
(23) Ground spoiler position or speed brake selection (except when parameters of
paragraph (a)(87) of this section apply);
(24) Outside or total air temperature;
(25) Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) modes and engagement status, including
autothrottle;
(26) Radio altitude (when an information source is installed);
(27) Localizer deviation, MLS Azimuth;
(28) Glideslope deviation, MLS Elevation;
(29) Marker beacon passage;
(30) Master warning;
(31) Air/ground sensor (primary airplane system reference nose or main gear);
(32) Angle of attack (when information source is installed);
(33) Hydraulic pressure low (each system);
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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

(34) Ground speed (when an information source is installed);


(35) Ground proximity warning system;
(36) Landing gear position or landing gear cockpit control selection;
(37) Drift angle (when an information source is installed);
(38) Wind speed and direction (when an information source is installed);
(39) Latitude and longitude (when an information source is installed);
(40) Stick shaker/pusher (when an information source is installed);
(41) Windshear (when an information source is installed);
(42) Throttle/power lever position;
(43) Additional engine parameters (as designated in Appendix M of this part);
(44) Traffic alert and collision avoidance system;
(45) DME 1 and 2 distances;
(46) NAV 1 and 2 selected frequency;
(47) Selected barometric setting (when an information source is installed);
(48) Selected altitude (when an information source is installed);
(49) Selected speed (when an information source is installed);
(50) Selected mach (when an information source is installed);
(51) Selected vertical speed (when an information source is installed);
(52) Selected heading (when an information source is installed);
(53) Selected flight path (when an information source is installed);
(54) Selected decision height (when an information source is installed);
(55) EFIS display format;
(56) Multi-function/engine/alerts display format;
(57) Thrust command (when an information source is installed);
(58) Thrust target (when an information source is installed);
(59) Fuel quantity in CG trim tank (when an information source is installed);
(60) Primary Navigation System Reference;
(61) Icing (when an information source is installed);
(62) Engine warning each engine vibration (when an information source is installed);
(63) Engine warning each engine over temp. (when an information source is installed);
(64) Engine warning each engine oil pressure low (when an information source is installed);
(65) Engine warning each engine over speed (when an information source is installed);
(66) Yaw trim surface position;
(67) Roll trim surface position;
(68) Brake pressure (selected system);
(69) Brake pedal application (left and right);
(70) Yaw or sideslip angle (when an information source is installed);
(71) Engine bleed valve position (when an information source is installed);
(72) De-icing or anti-icing system selection (when an information source is installed);
(73) Computed center of gravity (when an information source is installed);
(74) AC electrical bus status;
(75) DC electrical bus status;
(76) APU bleed valve position (when an information source is installed);
(77) Hydraulic pressure (each system);
(78) Loss of cabin pressure;
(79) Computer failure;
(80) Heads-up display (when an information source is installed);
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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

(81) Para-visual display (when an information source is installed);


(82) Cockpit trim control input position--pitch;
(83) Cockpit trim control input position--roll;
(84) Cockpit trim control input position--yaw;
(85) Trailing edge flap and cockpit flap control position;
(86) Leading edge flap and cockpit flap control position;
(87) Ground spoiler position and speed brake selection; and
(88) All cockpit flight control input forces (control wheel, control column, rudder pedal).

This ISAR is considered open.

98-03-3310 - LIGHTS - BACKPANEL LIGHTING POWER SUPPLY INPUT FUSES ARE


BLOWING
By: J. Micheal McKinnon, Avionics/Electrical, CRJ In-Service Support

This ISAR is providing more in-depth information on this issue than did SL 33-004

Two operators have reported they have specific aircraft on which the input fuses of two power
supplies have suddenly begun to blow daily. After replacing the fuses, the power supplies
operate correctly until the next event.

The two most affected units that we are aware of are, PS1LN driving the First Officer (F/O)
side panel and PS2LT driving the Overhead (OVHD) panel. The only common connection
between these two power supplies is AC bus 2 and the common aircraft chassis.

Bombardier sent a team of people to assist in troubleshooting this anomaly. Nothing


substantial nor conclusive was found during all the ground tests performed.

The following troubleshooting steps were performed on site and are identified as helpful
background information.

1. Changed fuses and/or the PS for each event.


2. Wrung out all circuit wiring for both OVHD & F/O PNLs, including meger checks.
3. Verified GND stud connections by removing, cleaning and re-installation.
4. Pull wire tests for loose connections at all joints
5. Vibrate by banging all mounting plates for good connections to chassis.
6. Swapped PSs with known good units from unaffected A/C.
7. Measured the 115 VAC PS input power from bus 2 with an oscilloscope for obvious
wave shape defects, voltage amplitude, distortion and / or spikes & unexpected
oscillations. None noted with the equipment available, performed on ground while
operating a variety of systems to cause as much load transitions as possible.
8. Took a new PS into the lab and attempted to cause the input fuse to blow, by employing
tests that would not be considered as normal operating criteria. Shorted the output load
circuit repeatedly. Varied the input voltage between 90-120 VAC, while varying loads,
short circuited the loads. Pulsed manually, the input voltage to cause spikes while
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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

simultaneously varying and shorting loads. Applied a 28 VDC to the 5 VAC output.
None of these things blew the fuse. Each time, the output circuit breakers protected the
PS and load circuits. Tests were repeated using different fuses, just to be sure.
9. Performed destructive testing on the replacement fuses to prove they were meeting the
rating.
10. Contacted ELDEC, the PS manufacturer to find out if they had any other incidents
reported that may help us find the cause. ELDEC reported a similar incident on a
Boeing 727. After much work it was found that a Transformer Rectifier Unit (TRU)
changed prior to the events, was the cause. The TRU windings were causing an
inductive resonance coupling onto the power bus at a frequency of around 6 KHz. This
was the clipping frequency of the Inductor/Capacitor (LC) circuit at the input of the PS
just after the fuse. With the LC circuit kept very active, the AC current in the PS input
circuit increased, and the fast acting fuse blew.

Analyzed maintenance data dumps for both a/c to see if any significant devices could have
caused a change in inductive coupling on power bus 2 prior to these repeated events. None
noted.

Bombardier have been working very closely with the operator to find the cause and a
resolution. In an attempt to see if the anomaly can be isolated to AC bus 2, Bombardier
provided Repair Non Incorporated Engineering Orders (RNIEO) to the two operators which
moves the power source of these two power supplies to AC bus 1.

The next major step to be taken is to specially instrument an aircraft and power supply, then fly
this aircraft and record the data at the time the fuses blow. One fuse has been seen to blow
during taxi, while the rest are all suspected to have blown in flight only. One Operator will
supply the aircraft, pilots and mechanics at their site. Bombardier will supply the
instrumentation, engineering support and experimental as required. The planned date for
these tests is 16-19 of Nov-98.

An update to this issue will be provided once testing is completed.

This ISAR is considered open.

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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

98-03-0000 Report on the Collins CRJ Avionics Flightline Maintenance Course.


By: J. Micheal McKinnon, Avionics/Electrical, CRJ In-Service Support

We recently participated in the Rockwell Collins “Canadair Regional Jet Avionics Flightline
Maintenace Course”. This ISAR provides an overview of the course, which we consider very
worthwhile for operator avionics engineering, technical and maintenace specialists.

Course Content

Day 1

Went through the entire system interconnect schematic for the Collins Avionics suite.
Overview of the IAPS cage and components.

Day 2

FMS 4200 uses and a full flight demo using the Collins Vista software.
Detailed all the features that are displayed on the MFD/PFD & EICAS screens. Completed the
autopilot hi level system schematic

Day 3

Detail of the FCC/FCP logic & functions to control Aileron/Rudder/Elevator trim controls.
Detail of the complete functionality of the diagnostics available in the system.

Day 4

Completed the FCC/FCP logic from day 3.


Special presentation from John Girodano on the HUGs system
Operated the rig and performed some of the diagnostics learned in class.

Day 5

AHRS diagrams and components.


RSS (Radio Subsystems Schematics) covering VHF, RTU, CTL 23, VIR, DME.
One hour TCAS overview that usually is a two day course.
Short review of DCUs and WXR.
We did not have time to cover the ADC, ARP, & audio control panel

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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

Summary

We found this one week CRJ avionics suite training course at Collins to be very helpful. The
pace was moderate and there was time for questions to be adequately answered. Because
this course deals exclusively with the Collins equipment, it goes into internal details of how the
units communicate with each other, and more importantly, what they do inside. With this
internal unit understanding, it is considered great enhancement to the Bombardier 5 week
training. Knowing how these boxes work internally helps in understanding how to effectively
and better troubleshoot the aircraft. We saw several examples of this during the course.
Access to the Collins rig was available for an afternoon and we made good use of it to run
some class questions.

This course has provided new knowledge, insight and understanding. The course is oriented
toward the Flight Line Maintenance (FLM) person, but anyone involved with the CRJ avionics
can really benefit from it.

This ISAR is considered closed.

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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

98-03-0000 - MAINTENANCE COST ISSUES


By: Marty Gregory, Maintenance Engineering

A CRJ Maintenance Cost Working Group (MCWG) has been meeting since October 1997.
The group consists of representatives from CRJ Airline Operators, Bombardier and selected
suppliers as required. It is our intention in future ISARs to publish the information we find
useful to aid in reducing operating costs for the CRJ. Cost Reduction issues will be identified
with a $ symbol. The last meeting was held recently in Toronto. The main issues discussed
were the APU, and Collins Equipment. Information regarding these will be published in the
next ISAR

$ ACM Heat Exchangers: As part of an on-going effort to improve ACM reliability and
efficiency, we would like to remind operators of the importance of cleaning heat exchangers.
(This is the subject of Service Letter SL-21-012 dated April 1997). Each operator has a unique
operating environment and it is in their best interest to tailor a cleaning schedule based on their
own performance and experience.

In addition, note that it is considered prudent to replace/clean the heat exchanger when
replacing the ACM due to blade or shaft failures. There is a possibility of internal FOD
contamination which might go undetected.

$ ADG Squib: Through negotiations with the Supplier and Spares, Bombardier has agreed
to lower the price of the ADG Squib (P/N 055046B) from the current US $6785+ to US $2100,
and stock them in both our Paris and Detroit facilities. For many operators this will also
translate to fewer shipping and customs charges, cut down on delivery times, and alleviate
some of the problems associated with shipping hazardous goods. This price reduction is
estimated to save operators over $0.90/flt hr.

$ ADG Blade Damage : Further to information regarding retraction procedures in the


previous ISAR, more suggestions to help reduce the incidence of ADG Blade Damage (and
therefore Maintenance Costs) include:

• Use of blade covers whenever the ADG is deployed.


• Cordon off area around ADG when deployed.
• Avoid use of reverse thrust with ADG deployed. (Pilots should be made aware of this)
• To prevent long range corrosion problems, Sundstrand recommends to occasionally
apply a thin layer of corrosion preventative compound (MIL-C-81309) to all blade
surfaces. This note will appear in an upcoming AMM revision
• Take note that the latest revision of the ADG CMM (Oct ‘97) contains relaxed and better
defined limits and inspection criteria for the blades.
• Bombardier training will place additional emphasis on ADG stowage practices.

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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

$ Sundstrand Integrated Drive Generator: The highest cause for IDG removals are (in
order) as follows:

1. Thermal Disconnects (SB 755471-24-9 (no charge at shop visit)) Aug ‘97 addresses this
issue

2. Idler Gearshaft (SB 755471-24-8 Dec. ‘97 addresses this issue)

3. Input Shaft Disconnect Bearing; the main cause for this kind of failure is from running the
engine with the IDG disconnected. Although occasionally required during maintenance
checks, and allowed for in the MEL, prolonged or repetitive running of the engine with the
IDG disconnected is detrimental to the bearing. An improvement is being considered to
alleviate this situation. Meanwhile, operators should be aware of the problem and try to
keep disconnected time to a minimum.

4. NFFs: Although the root causes of No Fault Founds are varied, low oil levels are suspect in
many instances. What may be a slightly low oil level could be enough to illuminate a
warning light during aircraft rotation as the oil sloshes rearward and away from the pump.
Keep those oil levels up! The AMM 12-13-24 p301 gives simple, specific instructions on
servicing the IDG.

As with any component, when shipping for repair, it is important to include as much relevant
information as possible with the accompanying documentation (i.e. detailed reason for
removal, position, Time Since Now (TSN) or Time Since Overhaul (TSO), aircraft S/N, etc...)

In addition to the above mentioned SBs, Sundstrand have recently taken steps to significantly
improve shop turn-around-times for repairs of IDGs, ADGs and AC Generators (APU).

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Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

98-03-0000 - Updated CRJ Top 25 Operator In-Service Priorities List

The CRJ Top 25 In-Service Priorities List was recently updated and is attached below.

Coming off the list are:

IDG: The IDG reliability had remained on the Top 25 List for filed monitoring. It was closed in
June 1998 after discussions at the regional conferences.

ADG Uplock: The solenoid operated uplock was designed to replace the squib and reduce
operating costs. Recently the squib spares price was significantly reduced through volume
purchases (ISAR 98-02 addresses), and the commercial proposal was received for the new
solenoid operated uplock. The resulting business case presented to operators at the recent
Maintenance Cost Working Group showed that the cost was approximately double the savings
over 10 years. The operator position was that this should not proceed.

Junction Box 1 Access: This was initially raised as a maintenance cost savings possibly. The
initiatives have been incorporated as part of the design input to the CRJ 700. On the CRJ
100/200 it has been assessed that it will be unlikely to cost effectively bring savings to the
operators. As this issue was not raised by the operators for any of the recent Maintenance
Cost Working Group meeting, it is not considered a priority.

Coming on the List are:

HSTA & MCU: Investigations initiated into recent increase in failure rates and review overhaul
recommendations and performance.

FECU: Investigation initiated to tackle the continuing higher than desired removal and No
Fault Found (NFF) Rate.

FCC No Fault Found Rate: This issue is being taken on by the Maintenance Cost Working
Group to address the high reported NFF rate (currently estimated at 80%).

17
Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

TOP 25 LIST
November 2, 1998
PRIORITY NO. ATA PART NAME
1 27-50 Flap Actuator #3
2 27-60 Spoiler System - SECU
3 52-00 PAX Door
a) Anchor-Fitting
b) Rigging
c) Inner Skin
d) Hinge Wear
e) Gas Spring Reliability
4 32-00 Landing Gear - Manual Release
5 32-50 Nose Wheel Steering
6 32-20 NLG Noise on Retraction
7 57-00 Wing Leading Edge Sealant
8 25-50 Cargo Compartment Liners
9 56-10 Flight Compartment Windows
10 32-10 MLG Structural Issues
11 34-00 Pitot/Static System
12 30-30 Air Data Sensor Heater Controller
13 49-00 APU Inlet Door
14 29-00 AC Motor Pump
15 30-20 Cowl Anti-Ice Relief Valve
16 21-60 Cabin Comfort
17 52-30 Cargo Door Balance Spring
18 53-40 Bulkhead 409 + 128
19 34-40 RAD ALT Antenna Corrosion
20 78-30 Thrust Reverser - -8 PDU

21 80-00 Engine Air Starter


22 27-40 HSTCS
- HSTA
- MCU
23 27-50 FECU
24 22-00 FCC
25 33-00 Emergency Lighting

18
Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

SIGNIFICANT SERVICE BULLETINS ISSUED FOR THE PERIOD OF


May 1, 1998 to October 27, 1998

SB_NO SB_ISSUED SB_TITLE SB_ALE


601R-21-037B 05-Oct-98 Installation Of A Temperature Control And Sensors In Gasper Air Supply No
Syst
601R-21-040A 23-Jul-98 Ground Air Conditioning Access Door Modification No

601R-21-045 12-Jun-98 Cabin Air Distribution, Ducts Replacement No

601R-21-049A 14-Jul-98 A/Cond-Ventilation-Second Supply For Right Side Gaspers No

601R-23-017H 14-Oct-98 Installation Of The Provision For The 3rd Vhf Com No

601R-23-029E 26-Jun-98 Installation Of A Single Hf No

601R-23-032H 01-May-98 Installation Of A Selcal System No

601R-23-038 17-Aug-98 Replacement Of P1rj B/Shell On Vcr Control Panel No

601R-24-043B 10-Jul-98 Installation Of Connector Mounting Plates On All Elec Connectors At No


FS621
601R-24-085B 21-Sep-98 Replacement Of Battery Charger ( Main & APU ) Connector Yes

601R-25-100A 24-Jul-98 Installation Of A New Potable Water Control Panel No

601R-25-122A 08-May-98 G1 Galley, Ceilling Panel Fwd, Cockpit Door And Entrance Fwd Lh Cpt No
Midway
601R-26-010B 19-Oct-98 Firex Discharge Line Fouling At Pylon Entrance No

601R-27-053C 22-May-98 Installation Of New HSTCU & Re-Activation Of Mach Trim Switch Yes

601R-27-059A 30-Jul-98 Add Seal Plugs - Flap Position Transmitter Connectors P1cf & P2cf No

601R-27-077 17-Sep-98 Inpection Of Electrical Connector P300 For Correct Orientation No

601R-28-036A 04-Sep-98 Fuel Tanks Wiring Conduits Special Inspection And Modification Yes

601R-29-023A 05-Jun-98 Inspection And Removal Of The Hydraulic Pressure And Return No
Manifolds
601R-30-025 06-Jul-98 Wings-Leading Edges-Thermal Switches Panels Replacement No

601R-31-012A 10-Jul-98 Installation Of Protective Cover On Cockpit Voice Recorder (Cvr) & Fdr No

601R-31-014E 20-Aug-98 Transfer Of Certification From Transport Canada To FAA No

601R-31-016C 11-Jun-98 EICAS Update (Replacement Of EFDs And DCUs) No

601R-32-054 06-Jul-98 MLG System - Inspection/Replacement Of The Trunnion Bushings No

601R-32-074 13-Jul-98 Main Landing Gear Main Fitting Inspection Yes

601R-32-075 04-Aug-98 Landing Gear - MLG - Eddy Current Inspection Of The MLG Fitting Yes

601R-33-014H 13-Oct-98 Maintenance, Boarding, And Stair Lights Transfer From Main Battery No
Bus
601R-33-036 16-Sep-98 Emergency Lighting System - Addition Of Diode/Resistor Splices No

601R-34-069E 15-May-98 Installation Of A Second FMS System No

601R-34-080A 19-Jun-98 Installation Of The Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) No

601R-34-094C 17-Sep-98 Installation Of A New ADC (822-0372-140) And New ARP 622-9819-104) No

19
Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

601R-34-096F 25-May-98 Installation Of The GPS Provisions No

601R-34-098E 22-Sep-98 Installation Of New FMC (FMC 4200) For Single FMS System No

601R-34-101 02-Oct-98 Installation Of New FMCs (FMC 4200) For Dual FMS System No

601R-34-107A 20-Aug-98 Installation Of New Air Data Computer (P/N 822-0372-143) No

601R-34-108A 06-May-98 Conversion From Conventional IRS To Universal IRS/AHRS No

601R-34-109A 05-Aug-98 Metric Altitude Indication Switch No

601R-49-014 10-Jul-98 Relocation Of APU Control Wires No

601R-52-082A 22-Sep-98 Passenger Door Introduction Of A New Stair Nosing No

601R-53-048 31-Jul-98 Visual Inspection Of Intercostals Members At FS 621 / FS625.3 No

601R-53-050A 02-Oct-98 Fuselage - General - Installation Of An External Reinf. Strap At No


FS409+128
601R-71-024 24-Aug-98 Ambient Sensing Line Inspection Yes

601R-71-025A 16-Sep-98 Reconfiguration Of Cf34-3a1 Engine Into A Cf34-3b1 Engine No

20
Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

Compiled By:
Miriam Rodgers Tracy E. Lloyd
CRJ In-Service Support Manager, CRJ In-Service Support
REGIONAL AIRCRAFT REGIONAL AIRCRAFT

For additional information on any of these in-service items, please contact the local
Bombardier Regional Aircraft Field Service Representative or Bombardier Regional
Aircraft Division, CRJ In-Service Support Department, 400 Chemin Cote Vertu
Ouest, Dorval, Quebec, Canada, H4S 1Y9; Telephone (514) 855-5000.

21
IN-SERVICE ACTIVITIES
Customer Canadair Regional Jet
Services

BOMBARDIER REGIONAL AIRCRAFT CRJ FIELD SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES &


ASSIGNED LOCATIONS

Hal Hughes (YUL) Mike Robinson Steve Harrison David Kirstuik


Air Canada Skywest Regional Manager Air Littoral
Montreal, Quebec, Canada Salt Lake City, Utah Asia/Pacific Montpellier
Phone: 514-422-6829 U.S.A. France
Phone: 801-575-2076 Phone:60-12-208-9134 Phone: 33-4-6720-6861

Tom Schweiger Scott Carruthers Gilles Potvin (MCO) Serge Rosa


European Area Rep South African Express 407-825-3863 Air Nostrum
Innsbruck, Austria Flughafenstar, 6,86196 Otto Buth (CVG) Manises,
Augsburg, Germany Dan Pitts Spain
Phone: 43-512-286-559 Phone: 49-821-27097-64 Comair Phone: 34-96-152-4426
Cincinnati, Ohio, U.S.A.
Phone: (606) 767-7852
Bruce Chown Nick DelVecchio Doug Caldwell Jason Schick
Lufthansa CityLine Southern Winds South African Express Tyrolean/Lauda Air
Flughafen Koln-Bonn Cordoba Johannesburg Graz
Heinrich-Stteinmann-StraBe Argentina South Africa Austria
Phone: 49-2203-596-0 Phone: 54-70-55-6145 Phone: 277-978-6797 Phone: 43-1-7007-6757

Robert Labelle (DFW) Maurice Leblanc (MCN) Joe Basile (IAD) Raynald Godon
Gary Reid (SNA) 912-784-0318 ext. 212 Atlantic Coast Airlines Midway Airlines
Mesa Airlines Peter Baker (ATL) Washington, DC, USA. Durham, North Carolina
FortWorth, TX, USA. Atlantic Southeast Airlines Phone: (703) 925-6176 Phone: (919)-840-5685
Phone: 817-740-6615 Phone: 404-765-1927
Martin Tremblay Robin Davies Ross Hitchens
Adria Maersk Regional Manager
Phone: 386-64-226-197 Birmingham Americas
England Phone: 519-659-5527
Phone: 44-121-243-2117
2 Report No. 98-03
Nov, 1998

BOMBARDIER REGIONAL AIRCRAFT DHC8 AREA FIELD SERVICE


REPRESENTATIVES AND LOCATIONS

Max Ingold Ross Hitchins Dan Armstrong Peter Jones


Air Alliance Regional Manager Americas Brymon Canadian Regional
Eastern Canada London, Ontario United Kingdom, Western Canada
Ste Foy, Quebec, Canada Canada Plymonth, UK and Hawaii
Phone: 418-564-5168 Phone: 519-659-5527 Phone: 44-1752-787699 Calgary, Alberta
Phone: 403-974-2464
Scott Carruthers Maurice Takahashi Tom Schweiger Philip Markham
Augsburg Airways Horizon Airlines European Area Rep Middle East Area Rep.
Augsburg, Germany Western USA Innsbruck, Austria Abu Dhabi, UAE
Portland, Oregon , U.S.A. Phone: 43-512-286-449 Phone: 971-653-788
Phone: 49-821-27097-64 Phone: 503-249-4482
Mike Rosso Norm Spraggs Wah Liang Foo Robert Condamines
South & Central America Dac Air Royal Wings GMG Airlines
Miami, Florida, Bucuresti Amman, Jordan Banani, Bangladesh
U.S.A. Romania 882-885-845-9, 889-019
Phone: 305-255-2643 Phone: 401-230-8283 Phone: 416-375-3982

Ray Gatt Jason Tai Chris Davey James Ranger


Allegheny Great China Airlines Midroc Australia Area Rep
Middletown, Pennsylvania GCA Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Sydney
Taipei, Taiwan Phone: 251-1-61-1304 Australia
Phone: 717-944-8843 Phone: 886-2-545-0039 Phone: 61-417-809-379
ext. 604
Brent Lund Peter Karlovcec James Ranger Steve Harrison
Widerøe Ryukyu Air Commuter Australia Area Rep Regional Manager
Floro, Norway Naha City, Okinawa, Japan Mascot, NSW Asia/Pacific
Phone: 47-755-13608 Phone: 81-98-858-3348 Phone: 61-417-809-379 Phone: 60-12-208-9134

Mike Robinson
Western USA Area Rep
Salt Lake City, Utah
Phone: 801-575-2076

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