Maurice

Sarrail

Born 6 April 1856

Carcassonne, France

Died 23 March 1929 (aged 72)

Paris, France

Allegiance Flag of France.svg France

Service/branch French Army

Years of service 1877–1925

Rank Général de division

Commands held Third Army

Battles/wars World War I

Great Syrian Revolt

Awards Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor

Médaille militaire

Croix de guerre 1914–1918

Maurice-Paul-Emmanuel Sarrail (6 April 1856 – 23 March 1929) was a French

general of the First World War.[1] Sarrail's openly socialist political connections
made him a rarity amongst the Catholics, conservatives and monarchists who
dominated the French Army officer corps under the Third Republic before the
war, and were the main reason why he was appointed to command at Salonika.
[2][3]

At the start of the war, Sarrail commanded VI Corps then Third Army in the
Ardennes and around Verdun, where his army played an important role in the
final stages of the First Battle of the Marne and where he took the credit for
holding Verdun (later the site of an important battle in 1916). He was dismissed
for poor leadership, amidst political uproar, in July 1915.

The Salonika campaign – chosen out of several strategic options presented by

Sarrail – was intended originally to support Serbia, with Bulgaria entering the
war on the side of the Central Powers, and later (as the Gallipoli campaign was
winding down) to provide a chance for France to assert her economic and
political influence over Greece and the declining Ottoman Empire. Sarrail ended
up commanding a multinational Allied force amidst political intrigue and a state
of near civil war in Greece, whose King Constantine was pro-German, whilst the
Prime Minister Venizelos was pro-Allied and also keen to gain territory off the
Turks in western Anatolia.[4] Despite a number of offensives, Sarrail's forces did
not succeed either in conquering Bulgaria or in preventing the Central Powers'
conquest of Serbia in 1915 or Romania in 1916.

Sarrail was dismissed from his Salonika command in December 1917. He later
played a role in the French suppression of the Great Syrian Revolt in the mid
1920s.

Contents

1 Biography

1.1 Early career

1.2 First World War: western front 1914–15

1.2.1 Battle of the Ardennes

1.2.2 Fighting around Verdun

1.2.3 Winter 1914–15

1.2.4 Argonne and dismissal: 1915

1.3 Salonika

1.3.1 1915

1.3.1.1 Strategic options

1.3.1.2 Allies occupy Salonika

1.3.2 1916

1.3.2.1 Spring

1.3.2.2 Summer

1.3.2.3 Autumn

1.3.3 1917

1.3.4 Dismissal

1.4 Later career

2 References

3 Further reading

4 External links

Biography

Early career

Sarrail was born at Carcassonne, and attended St Cyr, graduating in third place
on 1 October 1877. He was posted as a sub-lieutenant to the infantry. His
regimental service and promotion followed the normal course. He was promoted
to lieutenant in October 1882, captain in 1887, and chef-de-bataillon (major) in
1897. In 1901 he was appointed Commandant of the École Militaire d'Infanterie
(St. Maixent), where rankers were turned into loyal republican officers.[5][6]

In 1902 he was promoted lieutenant-colonel. From 1904 to 1906 he was Military

Commandant of the Palais Bourbon, which housed the Chamber of Deputies,
and he was promoted colonel in 1905. In 1907 he became Director of Infantry at
the War Office ,  an appointment which he held for four years. He was made
General de Brigade in 1908. In 1911 he was promoted General de Division when
his radical Socialist friend Caillaux formed his first government, and on 1
November 1913 he was given command of VIII Corps.[5][6]

Unlike many French officers, Sarrail was a freemason and a Dreyfusard.[6] After
a left-wing government came to power in 1914, he was due to be appointed
Commander-in-Chief designate in Joffre's place in the autumn, but war broke out
before this could take place.[7]

First World War: western front 1914–15

Battle of the Ardennes

Main article: Battle of the Ardennes

At Virton in the Ardennes in August 1914 he commanded VI Corps, part of

Ruffey’s Third Army. VI Corps was strengthened with an extra (third) infantry
division, and faced German VI Reserve Corps. Sarrail's was the only corps of
Ruffey’s Third Army to withstand the strong German counterattacks (the others
being Brochin’s V Corps and Victor-Rene Broelle’s IV Corps). It was eventually
forced to fall back to avoid encirclement.[8] Sarrail told 42nd Division, which
formed the rearguard, “you have given proof of cran (guts)”. [9]

On 30 August Sarrail was promoted to succeed Ruffey in command of Third

Army.[10] In early September IV Corps was removed from his command and
sent to Maunoury’s new Sixth Army near Paris.[11]

Fighting around Verdun

Main article: First Battle of the Marne

Battle of the Marne positions on 9 September.

In early September Sarrail, along with Franchet d’Esperey (Fifth Army) and
Foch (Ninth Army), was ordered (Instruction Generale No 5) to stop retreating
and be ready to counterattack. However, during the Battle of the Marne, unlike
those other French generals, Sarrail was ordered simply to pin down German
Crown Prince Wilhelm’s Fifth Army opposite him, in the vicinity of Verdun.[12]

The Revigny Gap had opened up between the right of de Langle's Fourth Army
and the left of Third Army. A similar, larger, gap, 20km wide, had opened up
between Fourth Army’s left and the right of Foch’s Ninth Army. Whilst Joffre
was bringing up XV and XXI Corps from Lorraine to plug the gaps, the
Germans attacked, although these attacks were unsuccessful in part as a result of
squabbling between Albrecht (commander of German Fourth Army) who
wanted Wilhelm to support him whilst he enveloped de Langle from the west,
whilst Wilhelm wanted Albrecht to support him while he pushed into the
Revigny Gap between de Langle and Sarrail. Wilhelm eventually appealed
directly to his father the Kaiser.[13]

Sarrail attacked on the morning of 6 September, his right pivoting on Verdun

whilst the main body of his force, 20km to the southwest, attacked in a roughly
north-westerly direction. Joffre, the French commander-in-chief, had expected
Sarrail to take the German Fifth Army on its eastern flank as it advanced south
from the Argonne into the Revigny Gap, but instead Crown Prince Wilhelm was
advancing south-east towards Bar-le-Duc, so his army and Sarrail’s clashed head
on. Sarrail’s forces were again mauled by von Pritzelwitz’s VI Corps, which had
beaten the French colonials so badly at Rossigny, earning Sarrail (6 September) a
blistering written rebuke from Joffre. Joffre criticised Sarrail’s men for
abandoning equipment and officers for poor leadership and demanded that he
“re-establish order, taking whatever measures necessary”.[14]

Beginning on 8 September, the Germans were also attacking around Troyon

(south-east of Verdun), threatening the heights of the Meuse in Sarrail’s rear.
Combined with the chance of breakthrough in the Revigny Gap, there was a
chance that Verdun and Third Army would be encircled altogether, allowing the
Germans then to attack Second Army in Lorraine. At 20.00 on 8 September
Joffre authorised Sarrail to break contact with the Fortified Region of Verdun, so
as to shift his forces west and better block the German advance. Sarrail refused
and would later describe himself as the “Saviour of Verdun”, claiming that his
actions had saved Verdun from capture. This is an exaggeration: Verdun,
defended by 350 heavy and 442 light guns, and 65,774 soldiers, was probably in
little real danger of immediate capture. His actions, which risked the
encirclement of his army, are described as “churlish” by Herwig, whilst Doughty
is equally critical.[15][16]

The German Fifth Army made a final major attack on 10 September, running
into heavy fire from the soixante-quinzes (“black butchers” as the Germans
called them) of Micheler’s V Corps and Verraux’s VI corps. Moltke, increasingly
concerned at the failure of the German attacks at Nancy, initially rescinded his
permission for the final night attack until Wilhelm threatened to appeal to his
father again. In the first ten days of September the German Fifth Army suffered
15,000 casualties, with some units suffering up to 40% officer casualties. At 9am
on 10 September Lt-Col Hentsch, returning from ordering von Kluck and von
Bülow to fall back from the Marne at the west of the German line, ordered Fifth
Army to retreat also, an order which Wilhelm and his chief of staff Schmidt von
Knobelsdorff refused to obey unless received in writing from the Kaiser or from
Moltke. That day Sarrail was able to signal Joffre “situation satisfactory”, whilst
at 2pm Joffre was able to inform Millerand (War Minister) that the Battle of the
Marne was now an “incontestable victory”.[17]


Despite the German retreat, neither Third nor Fourth Army made much progress.
Joffre rebuked Sarrail over the telephone on 13 September 1914, demanding a
formal inquiry of how Sarrail had “not been informed” of the enemy retreat 48
hours previously, a demand which Sarrail sidestepped by having his staff
telephone a routine progress report to Joffre.[18] To the south-east of Verdun the
Germans took Fort Troyon on 13 September and Fort Camp des Romains on 26
September, creating the Saint-Mihiel Salient.[19] The salient cut off one of the
railway lines supplying Verdun, which would force the defenders to rely heavily
on road transport in the 1916 battle.[20]

Winter 1914–15

The railway into Verdun from Paris and Chalons, which passed through
Aubreville, 20 km west of Verdun, was under shelling from the German
occupied Heights of Aubreville, 7 km to the north. After attacks by French
artillery, directed by aircraft, had failed to do the trick, Sarrail spent much of the
winter of 1914–15 attempting to drive the Germans from the Heights. Third
Army suffered 10,000 casualties alone in November.[21]

On 7 November Sarrail reported that in the previous month alone sixteen men of
Third Army had been sentenced to death for self-inflicted wounds or for
deserting their posts.[22]

Argonne and dismissal: 1915

Early in 1915 Sarrail's political allies touted him as a replacement for Joffre as
commander-in-chief.[6]

The Germans attacked in the Argonne on 20 and 30 June and 12 and 13 July
1915. Joffre complained that Third Army had performed poorly and had
“yielded the initiative to the adversary”. Joffre transferred Third Army from
Dubail’s Eastern Army Group to de Castelnau's Central Army Group, and on 16
July Dubail wrote to de Castelnau expressing his concerns about Sarrail’s
leadership, and noting that the Germans opposite had kept up an “aggressive
attitude” without undue casualties, whereas Sarrail had attempted to maintain
“moral ascendancy” with many small attacks, and had ended up being driven
back. On 16 July Joffre asked Dubail to investigate the “persistent lack of
success” in the Argonne. Dubail sent two separate reports to Joffre: the one on
operations was partly positive, but criticised Sarrail’s plans for being “too
simplistic” and for keeping his divisions in “rigid zones”. The report on morale
criticised the “malaise” at Third Army – “lack of mutual confidence” between
Sarrail and the XXXII Corps commander and problems in Third Army staff,
including allegations of false reports being sent to higher headquarters – and
recommended Sarrail’s removal.[23]

Joffre replaced Sarrail with Humbert on 22 July 1915, an act which created the
war's first direct clash between politicians and soldiers in France. The resulting
uproar on the political Left nearly swept away the Sacred Union government.
During the preparations for the upcoming offensive Castelnau supervised
Humbert closely, criticising Sarrail's legacy of poor construction of obstacles and
shelters and “defective practices” amongst the artillery.[6][23]

Salonika

Main article: Macedonian front

General Maurice Sarrail and his chief of staff in Thessaloniki

1915

Strategic options

Viviani (French Prime Minister) shored up his coalition government by

appointing Sarrail, a republican socialist general, to command an expedition to
the Eastern Mediterranean. He was initially given a British division (committed
with great reluctance by the British authorities) and Bailloud’s division from the
Dardanelles.[24] Joffre described Sarrail as “a factious general”, suspected him
of having plotted a coup d’etat in France and would have preferred Franchet
d’Esperey for the job. Sarrail initially felt that commanding a corps-sized force
was a severe demotion. After meeting Millerand (War Secretary) on 3 August he
accepted on condition the name of his force was changed to “Army of the
Orient”, a title with Napoleonic overtones, and that it was reinforced with an
extra four divisions, and was not under British generals. He was formally
appointed on 5 August. Sarrail's memo of 11 August proposed landing at
Smyrna, Alexandretta, Chanak or Salonika. Joffre was strongly critical of the
logistical feasibility of these proposals. Throughout August President Poincaré,
Viviani and Millerand pushed Joffre to release four divisions for the planned
Asian expedition, and he eventually promised to do so after his autumn
offensive. He had the Office of National Security Studies criticise the logistics of
the operation.[25]

On 31 August 1915 Kitchener (British War Secretary) was informed that France
was to land six divisions on the Asian coast of the Dardanelles.[26] Joffre was
probably involving the British to help block Sarrail’s plans.[6] The entry of
Bulgaria into the war on 6 September, threatening Serbia's rear, finally meant
that Sarrail’s more ambitious plans had to be shelved.[25] Joffre had already
agreed (4 August) to a military mission going to Salonika, but it was not ready
until 22 September, the day the Bulgarian Army mobilised.[27] On 28
September Sarrail was told he was to command an expedition at Salonika, not in
Turkey-in-Asia. The Greek government, pro-Allied but technically still neutral,
went through the motions of formal diplomatic protest. Sarrail, asked by the War
Minister for his views, recommended that the British be urged to maintain their
presence at Gallipoli for reasons of Allied prestige. He urged that 30,000 British
troops defend Salonika, whilst three or four French corps would push up towards
the Bulgarian capital of Sofia. Joffre disapproved of much of this but was only in
a position to obstruct, not to block.[28]

Allies occupy Salonika

The pro-German King Constantine dismissed the pro-Allied Prime Minister
Venizelos on 5 October 1915, replacing him with Zaimis.[24] On 5 October
landings began at Salonika.[29] Belgrade, the Serb capital, fell to the Central
Powers on 9 October. On 12 October Sarrail arrived at Salonika and took
command from General Bailloud. He at once ordered an advance to Strumica
station, over the Serb border (Bailloud had previously been given contradictory
instructions as to how far to advance). Under Serb pressure he agreed to advance
as far as Krivolak, but not Skopje (capital of Macedonia, which was part of
Serbia at the time), but was checked in the Vardar and Tcherna Valleys. His
arrival had been too little and too late either to prevent German, Austro-
Hungarian and Bulgarian forces overrunning Serbia, or to give the Serbs
somewhere to retreat, ultimately forcing the Serb Army to retreat to Albania. He
later wrote in his memoirs “one cannot do something with nothing”. On 12
November Gallieni, now French War Minister in the new Briand government,
ordered him to fall back on a fortified position around Salonika, but Sarrail
replied that a retreat would be bad for prestige and would face resistance from
Greek troops along the line of communication and at Salonika. Sarrail held his
positions on the Tcherna for a week, hoping that the new French government
would agree to build up his force from three divisions to four corps, and after
receiving a dusty answer from Gallieni wrote to members of the government and
appealed to Kitchener[30] when he visited on 17 November. On 20 November
Sarrail relieved a local commander who ordered a withdrawal, but on 21
November he was informed by Gallieni (who thought him “indecisive and not up
to the task”, but gave him liberty to decide when to retreat) that the French
government would not be reinforcing him, leaving him little choice but to
withdraw, and on 23 November he gave the order to pull back. By 12 December
Sarrail’s forces were holding a perimeter 20 km around Salonika. Sarrail forced
the surrender of the Greek artillery in the town.[31][32]

By December Sarrail's force had grown to 150,000 men.[24] On 9 and 11

December Kitchener, Grey (British Foreign Secretary), Briand (French Prime
Minister), Gallieni (French War Minister) and Joffre (French Commander-in-
Chief, and who had just been given authority over Salonika also) met in Paris
and agreed to hold Salonika. Joffre had humoured an impractical Russian
proposal that Budapest be taken by converging Italian and Russian thrusts from
the Isonzo Front and Galicia, along with a thrust of ten corps up from Salonika.
Joffre also argued that 150,000 troops would be enough to hold the bridgehead,
but sent Castelnau on a fact-finding mission. Castelnau reported to Joffre,
Briand, Gallieni and Poincare on Christmas Day, criticising Sarrail for the same
issues which had led to his relief from Third Army, and for his “grave mistakes”
in remaining at Salonika and only visiting the front at Krivolak once. Joffre
rejected Sarrail’s plea for two more divisions, but after lobbying by Sarrail
Gallieni directed him to send another division.[33]

1916

Spring

Fighting along the Greek border, 1916

The Serb Army was evacuated from Albania in December and January by
French and Italian transports, escorted by British and French warships. Some
were evacuated to Bizerte, but most to Corfu which was occupied on 11 January,
to the fury of the Greek government, by a battalion of chasseurs alpins. The
Serbs on Corfu were then organised into six divisions of 20,000 men apiece
under French General Piarron de Mondesir.[31]

In January 1916 Sarrail was granted command of all Allied forces in the
Macedonian theatre.[34] It had been agreed that there would be no action at
Salonika without British agreement. The British CIGS Robertson was suspicious
that the Allied presence at Salonika, which the French wanted the British to
reinforce, was being kept going solely to find employment for Sarrail, which is
not quite true – Joffre hoped to bring Romania into the war on the allied side. On
4 March 1916, two days after the Germans attacked Verdun, Joffre – to the
irritation of Robertson – ordered Sarrail to “study” an offensive to pin down
Central Powers troops. Sarrail replied that he needed 21 divisions and was
unable to do anything major before the Serbs arrived.[35] In March Royalist
Greek troops were ordered not to oppose Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian
forces.[36]

On 10 March Joffre wrote to Sarrail that his presence at Salonika was intended
as a bluff to tie down Central Powers forces, whilst at the same time aiming to
draw Greece and Romania to the Allied side, but at the same time he was to
make “real preparations” for a major offensive. At the Allied conference on 12
March Russia and Serbia pushed for a major offensive from Salonika, but this
did not meet with Anglo-French approval. Joffre gave Sarrail permission (20
April) for a “demonstration”, but five days later wrote to Robertson proposing a
major offensive. This did not meet with British approval.[37]

Summer

Main article: Romanian Campaign (World War I)

Early in 1916 Sarrail ordered his forces up 70 km from Salonika to form a larger
perimeter from the Vardar to the Gulf of Strymon. In May 1916 he extended his
line west to Florina. The refitted Serb divisions were transported into Salonika,
escorted by a French naval squadron which had based itself at Argostoli, again to
the fury of the Greek government. 122,000 Serbs arrived in May. In May Greek
forces surrendered the fortress of Rupel on the Struma without a fight, and in
early June Sarrail used alleged collaboration between the commandant of a
Greek frontier fortress and the Bulgars as an excuse to proclaim a state of siege
in Salonika and Allied jurisdiction over the area occupied by his troops. The
French took control of rail, postal and telegraph services, whilst Sarrail sent a
naval squadron to threaten Athens. Briand supported this, but British suspicions
were further raised, particularly by local French entrepreneurial activity and the
opening of French schools. Under Allied political pressure King Constantine
dismissed Prime Minister Skouloudis on 22 June, but refused to disarm the
Greek troops at Salonika. By mid-July the Serb divisions had moved into
position on the left of Sarrail's front, with the British, whose government were
still lukewarm, on the right. On 23 July Sarrail was placed in command of all
Allied forces at Salonika, although they retained right of appeal to their
governments. A brigade of Russians arrived in late July. By early August there
were 382,728 Allied soldiers at Salonika, and an Italian division arrived in the
second week of August, bringing the total up to 400,000 men. Given the effects
of malaria and the need to detach troops to build and guard transport links, he
lacked reserves. His British forces lacked artillery, although he was given 40
French aircraft and some French passenger liners to use as hospital ships.[38]
[39][40]

Joffre and Robertson were urging attacks, whilst at the same time wanting to
keep the focus on the Western Front. In June and July Joffre (who was keen to
keep Sarrail out of France) once again carried out a charade of seeking British
approval for a major offensive at Salonika, with the British suspecting that he
was merely going through the motions. The Italians were a source of friction,
whilst the Greek government attempted to obstruct supply and Greek Army
reservists committed sabotage.[36][37] As part of Romanian entry to the war,
Sarrail was at last ordered to commit to a major offensive. Lloyd George, who
had just become British War Secretary in June, agreed to commit the British
troops at Salonika to such an offensive.[41]

The British General Milne (letter to Robertson 20 July) thought Sarrail “A strong
man with big ideas and outlook with great brain power but of a conceited,
excitable, impetuous and unscrupulous nature … Possibly a good strategist but
not a great tactician … His mental calibre far and away above his Staff”.[42] On
1 August Sarrail set up a “Commercial Bureau for French Importations” with
links to French Chambers of Commerce at Grenoble, Marseilles, Lyon and
Dijon, and on 3 August Sarrail wrote to Briand “We ought to prepare for after
the war by immediately imposing our products and trademarks on places
regained by our armies”. Sarrail was suspicious of the Italians under General
Pettiti, believing (wrongly) that Italy also had colonial designs on the region.[43]

An Allied offensive was planned for 1 August, but on 25 July Romania

requested a delay. Eventually on 17 August it was agreed that Sarrail should
attack on 20 August, and the Romanians on 28 August. Victor Cordonnier,
chosen by Sarrail from Joffre’s shortlist of three, arrived at Salonika on 11
August to command the French contingent.[31][39][44] But the Bulgars struck
first on 17 August, reinforced by two German divisions brought from the Vosges
to the River Vardar.[45] With Bulgarian morale crumbling, further German
battalions were brought from Champagne, Poland and the Vosges, as well as
some heavy guns from Verdun. The Bulgars began a major offensive against
Sarrail’s right and left – initially successful on the latter. Sarrail’s forces held off
the offensive with difficulty by 28 August and Sarrail recast his plans to avoid
attacking the Germans on the Vardar.[46][47][48]

Autumn

Sarrail (at the right) with Venizelos and admiral Kountouriotis inspect Greek
troops of the "National Defence" at the Macedonian front

On 27 August 1916 Colonel Zymbrakakis, a local hero of the Balkan Wars,

established a “Committee of Public Safety” in Salonika with Sarrail’s open
support, and pledged to establish a “National Army” which would fight the
Bulgars harder than the Royalist officers who had surrendered their positions in
May. Some Royalist Greek forces defected, whilst others were coerced by
Venizelist Greeks into changing sides.[48][49] In September, an Allied naval
force arrived off Piraeus, but King Constantine rejected its most important terms.
On 10 September an Allied counteroffensive began. On 12 September Serb
troops, supported by French artillery, attacked Mount Kajmakcalan, capturing
and holding it over a fortnight of fighting. Two French divisions and a Russian
brigade attacked towards Kenail and the British up from the Struma Valley, at
each point meeting trenches dug under German supervision. By 17 September
Zouaves and the French Foreign Legion occupied Florina.[34][48][50]

With French help, Venizelos escaped from Athens on 27 September. After

gathering support in Crete he reached Salonika on 9 October, where Sarrail
greeted him at the quayside. Venizelos established a Provisional Government of
National Defence. He was suspicious of Sarrail and Briand, and keen to keep
them at arm's length, instead encouraging closer links with the British.[51] In
October 1916 Leblois replaced Cordonnier in command of the French troops.
[52] By mid-November the (Venizelist) Greek National Army was 23,000
strong.[51] By 19 November Sarrail’s forces took Monastir (over the border in
Macedonia, part of Serbia at the time, roughly north of Florina), allowing Sarrail
to claim the first French victory (Bitola) since the Marne, 26 months earlier,
before winter forced an end to operations.[34][48][53]


On 1 December 3,000 French soldiers and British marines were landed in

Athens, seeking to recover ten batteries of mountain artillery, but they were
withdrawn under cover of naval gunfire after they had suffered 212 casualties,
including 54 deaths, at the hands of Greek troops and hostile crowds. King
Constantine remained in power to continue his policy of attacks on the Allied
lines of communications.[48][54] On 10 December, Henry Descoin, the
commander of the French garrison of Korçë, with Sarrail's approval, declared the
Autonomous Albanian Republic of Korçë in Koritza, asserting control over
Epirus and appointing Themistokli Gërmenji as prefect. French troops had been
active there and in southern Albania, attempting to suppress the local comitaji
bandits.[48][54][55][56]

The fall of Bucharest (6 December) not only ruled out a Russo-Romanian attack
on Bulgaria, but also made possible a Central Powers attack on Salonika. One of
Joffre’s last official duties (11 December) was to order Sarrail to cease his
offensive and establish a strong defensive position, from which further
offensives might be launched in the future. General Roques, Minister of War,
had been on a fact-finding mission to Salonika after Britain, Italy and Russia had
pushed for Sarrail’s dismissal. To Prime Minister Briand’s and Joffre’s surprise,
Rocques returned recommending that Sarrail’s forces be built up to thirty
divisions ready for an attack on Bulgaria. He did not specifically praise Sarrail,
but recommended that Sarrail no longer report to Joffre. Coming on the back of
the disappointing results of the Somme campaign and the fall of Romania,
Rocques’ report further discredited Briand and Joffre and added to the
Parliamentary Deputies’ demands for a closed session. On 27 November the
Council of Ministers met to debate rescinding the decree of 2 December 1915
which had placed Sarrail under Joffre, thus beginning the political manoeuvres
which led to Joffre’s resignation.[57]

The failure of the Allied offensive on the Macedonian front was bitterly resented
by the Romanian troops, who ironically chanted: "O Sarrail, Sarrail, Sarrail,/ Noi
ne batem și tu stai!" (Oh Sarrail, Sarrail, Sarrail,/ We're fighting and you stand
still!). Nevertheless, Romania also partially contributed to the failure by not
dispatching 150,000 troops towards Bulgaria, in conjunction with Sarrail's
offensive, as agreed upon in a military convention on 23 July in Chantilly.[58]

The British still hoped for a reconciliation between the Greek factions and hoped
that a monarchist Greece would be less under French influence than a republic.
However, on 21 December London and Paris recognised the Provisional
Government in Salonika.[48][54] By the end of the year most of Romania had
been overrun and Allied hopes of imminent Austro-Hungarian collapse had been
disappointed. The Germans were referring to Salonika as an “internment camp”
and Sarrail was highly sensitive to comparisons to Bazaine’s encirclement in
Metz in 1870.[47] At Christmas 1916 Christmas cards – in French and bearing a
portrait of Sarrail – were sent to the families of British, French and Italian troops
at Salonika.[48][54]

1917

On 3 January 1917 Sarrail and Milne arrived at the Rome Conference,

independently of one another. Hankey thought Sarrail “a man of quite
exceptional charm”. Lloyd George, now British Prime Minister and keen to
avoid a repetition of the Battle of the Somme, thought him “a remarkable,
fascinating character, handsome, impulsive, full of fire”, although fearful about
the effect on US opinion he rejected Sarrail’s suggestion that he be given a
fortnight to crush the royalists in Athens. Sarrail was confirmed as
“Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Army of the Orient” with the national
contingent commanders having right of appeal to their own governments.[59]

By January 1917 Sarrail’s force at Salonika included British divisions, eight

French divisions (including fifteen Senegalese battalions, some of which were
used in front line combat), six Serbian divisions, two Russian brigades and an
Italian division.[36] Sarrail was sent two colonial divisions in December and two
more in January. The weather was appalling – rain and then the Great Vardar
Blizzard at the end of February. Sarrail was not given permission to attack until 9
March.[60][61] By the time of St-Jean-de-Maurienne (Anglo-Franco-Italian
talks on 19–20 April) Sarrail had still not launched the offensive promised three
months earlier, and Lloyd George had lost patience with him and come
reluctantly to agree with Robertson that the British contingent at Salonika might
be better employed in Palestine.[62]

Sarrail launched a general offensive between 22 April and 23 May 1917, to

coincide with Nivelle’s offensive on the Aisne. The British attacked around Lake
Doiran at a cost of 5,000 dead and seriously wounded, one quarter of all British
casualties throughout the entire Salonika Campaign. Another British attack in
the Struma Valley was more successful, although in the centre of the line the
French offensive under Grossetti, launched from Monastir on 9 May, failed
amidst disease and logistical failures (severe penalties were inflicted on those
caught scrounging food). Sarrail’s “Spring Offensive in the Orient” had incurred
14,000 casualties for little gain.[63][64]

Morale suffered badly and friction broke out amidst the different Allied
nationalities, with troops having had no home leave in a year, or nearly two in
the case of men who had been at the Dardanelles. Unlike the concurrent mutinies
in France, those in this theatre were led by French NCOs. There were no
executions, and leaves were granted as a concession, although some ringleaders
were sentenced to prison and forced labour. In May the Allied governments
authorised Jonnart, French High Commissioner, to remove King Constantine. On
11 June a stronger Allied naval force, accompanied by 13,000 troops, forced
King Constantine’s abdication in favour of his son, whilst Sarrail sent a division
into Salonika. Venizelos became Prime Minister again and declared war on the
Central Powers at the end of June.[64]

Sarrail launched another offensive, this time into Albania, between 27 August
and 25 October. In September 1917 he ordered a small force to take Pogradec,
and recognised the former Turkish general Essad Bey Pasha, seen as little more
than a bandit, as “President of the Provisional Albanian Government”. He had
thus infuriated Italy (who saw Albania as her sphere of influence, and lobbied
Paris to have the incursion stopped), Serbia, whose Prime Minister Pasic came to
Sarrail’s headquarters to complain, and Greece, whose Prime Minister Venizelos
complained to the Supreme War Council about Sarrail. In September Regnault
replaced Grossetti in command of the French troops under Sarrail, and was then
in turn succeeded by Henrys.[64][65]

Dismissal

With France narrowly surviving political and military crisis in 1917, Sarrail’s
association with the socialist politicians Caillaux and Malvy, now suspected of
treasonable contacts with the Germans, sealed his fate.[66]

On becoming Prime Minister Clemenceau moved quickly to sack Sarrail. He

made Salonika the main topic of discussion at the first meeting of the War
Committee (6 December), saying “Sarrail cannot remain there”. Clemenceau and
Philippe Petain (Commander-in-Chief of French forces on the Western Front)
preferred Franchet d’Esperey as Sarrail’s successor, but Foch (Chief of Staff)
argued for Guillaumat to be given the job, and first Petain and then the Prime
Minister were persuaded. Clemenceau informed Sarrail of his dismissal on 10
December.[67]

A press release on 11 December announced that Sarrail “has had to contend with
great difficulties and has rendered great services”.[66] There were no political
consequences from his dismissal, and he took no further part in the war.[68]

Later career

Sarrail went into retirement at his country home at Montauban to write his
memoirs.[66] This account of the Salonika operations was published soon after
the end of World War I under the title Mon Commandement en Orient.[5]

When his political allies returned to power in 1924 he was despatched to Syria as
high commissioner. He was recalled on October 30, 1925, after he ordered the
shelling of Damascus during the Great Syrian Revolt.[69][70]

He became a Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour in November 1914 and was
awarded a Grand Cross of the same Order in January 1916. He was given the
Médaille militaire in September 1917.[5]

He died on 23 March 1929 in Paris, a few days after Marshal Foch.[1][71]

Clayton describes Sarrail as “a competent if not outstanding general”.[36]