Industry Releasable Threat Assessment

Issued on 1st June 2021

ICOD 15 May 2021

This Threat Assessment has been released to the maritime community in confidence. It
should not be further disseminated without permission.

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Introduction

1. This Industry Releasable Threat Assessment (IRTA) has been jointly written by
the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EU
NAVFOR).

2. The purpose of the IRTA is to articulate the threat to merchant and large fishing
vessels transiting the Red Sea, Bab al Mandeb Strait (BAM), Gulf of Aden (GOA) and the
Western Indian Ocean. It updates the previous IRTA released on 01 Mar 21, which had
an Information Cut-off Date (ICOD) of 15 Feb 21.

3. One (1) IRTB was issued during the reporting period (possible attack on the MV
HIPERION RAY).

Executive Summary

4. The threat to merchant and large fishing vessels transiting the Red Sea, BAM,
GOA and the Western Indian Ocean is classified as follows :

a. Piracy is LOW (an attack is unlikely).

b. Conflict-related activity

i. MODERATE for KSA and SLC-flagged vessels, an attack is possible

but unlikely

ii. LOW for the other countries, an attack is unlikely.

c. Terrorism – LOW, an attack is unlikely.

5. The following section on Somalia, Yemen and Mozambique contain summary

information, drawn from open source reporting, in order to provide an appreciation of the
security situation in the region.

Situation in Somalia

6. The Presidential election is still dominating the political sphere within Somalia.
The Lower House of Parliament had passed a law re-introducing the one-person-one-
vote elections and extended the mandate of federal institutions (and the presidential term
of President Farmajo) for another 2 years. The opposition and international partners
strongly condemned this move and as a consequence armed clashes took place in
Mogadishu and eventually this decision was then nullified. Prime Minister Roble is
currently in charge of the pre-election process but still no date is set. The capital
witnessed military mobilizations involving both Government and opposition aligned
forces. Negotiations between the International Community and Somali stakeholders
continue without any significant progress.

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7. Given the fact that the Government’s term in office has expired, Somalia is still
undergoing major political changes accompanied with the risk of further conflict which in
turn raised the threat of insecurity. The consequences of any further deterioration in the
rule of law would serve to exacerbate both the freedom and impunity of criminal networks
in the region. Although maritime security related events have been widely reported by a
variety of media outlets and stakeholders, they are often taken out of proportion or
inaccurate.

8. Cumulatively, COVID-19, food shortages, the effects of droughts or floods and the
locust infestation continue to worsen the economic situation of the country in the short to
mid-term.

9. As per UN Migration Agency reporting, in March 21, there was a drastic increase
of 92% migration when compared to February 21, which brings a total of 1,967 migrants
(Jan-Mar 21). The main departure point is reported to be Bossaso. Most of the registered
migrants were Ethiopian nationals destined for the Arabian Peninsula.

10. Islamic State in Somalia (IS-S) remains active in the Bari region in the North
Eastern area of Puntland.

11. Al-Shabaab (AS) terrorist group remains active in Puntland and maintains linkages
to actors able to facilitate access to the sea for trafficking purposes (weapons, foreign
combatants, immigration and maritime smuggling). Notwithstanding the ongoing
pressure from African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somalia National
Army (SNA), which has managed to neutralize a significant number of the terrorist group
commanders, AS has largely been able to maintain its freedom of manoeuvre and
capabilities in the South-Central regions but there has been limited activity in Mogadishu.
AS has taken advantage of the political impasse and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Somalia to recruit fighters. AS is further intensifying attacks against senior officials and
military figures. The latest complex attack was carried out on 05 March 21, where the
Bosasso Central Prison was successfully attacked by approximately 140 AS terrorists
allowing 400 prisoners to escape.

Situation in Yemen

12. During the reporting period, Houthi forces continued to target Saudi military and
civilian infrastructure with Ballistic Missiles (BM), explosive-laden Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAVs) and explosive-laden Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) throughout
the Southern Red Sea and Saudi Arabia. In addition to the aforementioned attacks,
Houthi forces initiated a significant ground offensive against the city of Mar’ib in Central
Yemen. Indicators that terrorist organizations were becoming involved in the conflict have
also surfaced. Finally, indicators of food staple shortages are becoming commonplace,
with prices rising incrementally.

13. As of early Feb 21, Houthi forces have made a concerted push to capture Mar’ib,
which is the last strong-hold of both the Federal and SLC troops. While the battle lines
around the city have shifted since the offensive began, Houthi forces have not been able
to capture this strategic city and make use of the natural resources located within the
governorate city.
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14. On 22 Mar 21, Saudi Arabia announced a wide-ranging initiative to end the 6
years civil war, and bring peace to Yemen while allowing for the delivery of aid to the
population affected by the conflict. While new talks between the parties involved in the
conflict would be restarted, Saudi Arabia also proposed that a cease-fire would be
monitored by the United Nations. Economically, the proposal would also open up the port
of Hudaydah allowing for critical supplies to be brought into Western Yemen. Lastly, all
revenue from the port would be pushed to the central bank in Hudaydah as per the
Stockholm agreement. The initiative was not accepted by the Houthis.

Situation in Mozambique

15. Since early Oct 17, when the terrorist group identified as ‘Ansar al-Sunna’ (AaS),
[also known as Ansar al-Sunna Wa Jamma (ASWJ) or locally as Al Shabaab (no relation
with the Somalia’s Al-Shabaab)] and affiliated with the Islamic State of Central Africa
Province (ISCAP), launched their first attacks in the villages and towns of Mozambique’s
northern province of Cabo Delgado, insurgency and conflict has continued to escalate
through targeting civilians, public infrastructure and government buildings. Although the
government of Mozambique continues to make concerted efforts to fight and subdue the
terrorist insurgency through its national defence forces, a series of battles with the
terrorist militants has resulted in widespread violence, insecurity, resulting in the death of
over 2.500 people and the displacement of over 700.000 civilians. It has also disrupted
economic activities, especially farming, thereby worsening food insecurity.

16. Palma has been an indirect target for the terrorists for months, as frequent attacks
had cut off land access routes necessary to supply the town. By the first week of March,
the government and the energy company TOTAL had worked out a method for
resupplying the town by sea. Moreover, the lack of insurgent attacks near the TOTAL
LNG project site since early January and a modified security agreement between the gas
company and the government seemed to suggest a return to normal operations around
Palma town might be possible.

17. On Mar. 24th, the day that TOTAL was scheduled to resume operations, AaS
terrorists attacked again. The attack was the first major insurgent operation since the end
of the rainy season and it appeared to catch government forces by surprise. The full death
toll is not yet clear, but a subsequent claim by IS said that insurgents had killed 55 in the
fighting. The government has estimated that rebuilding the infrastructure damaged in the
town will cost over $113 million. The attack displaced over 45.000 people, some to other
districts and most to the area around the TOTAL site, where humanitarian agencies have
had great difficulties in reaching them. TOTAL has abandoned its plans to return to work
on the site for now and has evacuated the vast majority of its employees from Palma
district.

18. The US government announced its intent to increase its involvement in the conflict
with sanctions designations against the Cabo Delgado terrorists and Joint Combined
Exchange Training (JCET) programs bringing US Special Operations Forces to
Mozambique to train local troops in counterterrorism tactics. On Apr. 12 th, Southern
African Development Community (SADC) sent a technical team to Mozambique to
assess the threat posed by the terrorists following a meeting by regional leaders. On Apr.
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27th, SADC recommended the deployment of 3.000 troops in northern Mozambique. On
May 10th, Portugal and Mozambique signed a five-year cooperation agreement and within
this frame, Portugal will send a further 60 troops to conduct a 3 to 4 month-long training
package with Mozambican troops to support the government’s counterinsurgency efforts.
In addition, the EU could send a military training mission, similar to the EU's involvement
in West Africa's Sahel region, where its experts provide training and advice to national
security forces. EU clarified that the mission to Mozambique, if agreed, would be a military
rather than civilian mission.

19. On Apr. 26th, TOTAL declared force majeure on its LNG Project and withdrew all
personnel from the Afungi site. The next day TOTAL declared that it will only return to
work in Cabo Delgado when the Mozambique government puts in place permanent
solutions to restore security and stability.

Significant events 15 Feb 21 to 15 May 21

Piracy

20. There have been no incidents of piracy during the reporting period, although it is
not unusual for MVs to initially report suspicious approaches by skiffs as possible pirate
attempts. The last confirmed, yet unsuccessful pirate attacks were conducted in the
Somali Basin against the FV ADRIA (South Korea flag) and the FV TXORI ARGI (Spain
flag) on 19 Apr 19.

Conflict Related

21. There have been no conflict related incidents during the reporting period. The last
confirmed conflict related incident was the explosion in MT BW RHINE (Singapore flag)
on 13 Dec 20.

Terrorism

22. No terrorism incidents in the maritime domain have been reported during the
reporting period.

Maritime Security Events – Suspicious Activity

23. 25 Feb 21 RO-RO HELIOS RAY (IMO: 9690547, Bahamas flag) experienced an
unidentified explosion in the Gulf of Oman. No country or group has claimed responsibility
for this explosion at this time.

24. 06 Apr 21. MV SAVIZ (IMO: 9167253, Iran flag) experienced an unidentified
explosion in the Southern Red Sea. No country or group has claimed responsibility for
this explosion at this time.

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 Figure 1 Maritime Security Events – Suspicious Activity

Non-Maritime Security Events

25. 19 Feb 21. MV NORD SUMMIT (IMO: 9529504, Singapore flag) reported being
approached by 1 skiff, CPA was 2 cables. No tripwire was observed due to darkness.
The skiff altered course. Ship and crew were reported safe.

26. 26 Feb 21. SB GIOKI D’ACQUA (Italian flag) reported being followed by 2 skiffs.
There was no attempt to board from the skiffs. The skiffs changed their course after
sunset. Ship and crew were reported safe.

27. 03 Mar 21. MV MOONBEAM (IMO: 9493987, Liberia flag) received a call on
channel 16 that a fishing vessel was asking for fuel. MV MOONBEAM asked the fishing
vessel’s location, but no reply was given. MV MONNBEAM decided to ignore the call, no
vessel was identified either approaching or following MV MONBEAM. Ship and crew were
reported safe.

28. 06 Mar 21. MV DAIMONGATE (IMO: 9806354, Liberia flag) reported that there
was no AIS information from MV AL RAFFE and it was not possible to identify the flag or
activity on board. No suspicious activity was observed. Ship and crew were reported safe.

29. 08 Mar 21. MV MAGNUM FORCE (IMO: 9488956, Marshall Islands flag) reported
being approached by a group of 4 skiffs with 2 POB each, CPA was 0.25NM. The skiffs
altered course after PCASP showed their weapons. Ship and crew were reported safe.

30. 22 Mar 21. MV NORD PEAK (IMO: 9566564, Singapore flag) reported being
approached by 1 grey skiff with 3 armed POB wearing masks. There was no attempt to
board or approach. Ship and crew were reported safe.

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31. 25 Mar 21. MV LORI (IMO: 9631125, Liberia flag) reported an internal explosion.
No suspicious activity was detected around the area.

32. 01 Apr 21. MV CELSIUS RAVENNA (IMO: 9402809, Marshall Islands flag)
reported being approached by a group of 9 skiffs. There was no attempt to board, and
the skiffs altered course after PCASP showed their weapons. Ship and crew were
reported safe.

33. 02 Apr 21. MV NEW YORK EXPRESS (IMO: 9501332, German flag) reported that
2 unknown contacts were spotted by radar. No suspicious activity was detected from the
contacts. There was no attempt to board or approach. Ship and crew were reported safe.

34. 03 Apr 21. MT MALIHA (IMO: 9194804, Panama flag) reported being followed by
5 small crafts. There was no attempt to board, no tripwires were observed. The skiffs
altered the course after 1 hour. Ship and crew were reported safe.

35. 05 Apr 21. MV CHEMROAD JOURNEY (IMO: 9414254, Panama flag) reported
being approached by 6 skiffs, CPA was 0.5NM. There was no attempt to board, no
tripwires were observed. The skiffs altered course. Ship and crew were reported safe.

36. 13 Apr 21. Open sources reporting indicated that MV HYPERION RAY (IMO:
9690559, Bahamas flag) has been involved in an incident, allegedly an attack. But there
is no evidence to suggest that this merchant vessel was attacked and neither the
company nor the vessel confirmed an attack. This case was reported in IRTB 026
released on 15 Apr 21.

37. 03 May 21. MT AL ORAIQ (Marshall Islands flag) reported being approached by
2 skiffs with 6 armed POB each, CPA was 15 yards. The skiffs were later identified as
Yemeni coast guard boats.

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 Figure 2 Non Maritime Security Events

Assessment

Piracy – LOW (an attack is UNLIKELY)

38. It is assessed that Piracy is currently DETERRED / SUPPRESSED (but not

eradicated) due to:

a. Widespread implementation of Best Management Practice (BMP).

b. The embarkation of PCASP.

c. The continued presence and monitoring of CMF, EU NAVFOR, other

warships and maritime patrol aircraft in the region particularly to deter.

d. The prospect of a prison sentence for pirates.

e. The adoption by former pirates of lower risk, yet profitable, criminal activities
such as smuggling.

f. Improvements in the capabilities and competence of Somali maritime

security forces, such as the Somaliland Coast Guard.

39. However, the causal factors of piracy still endure in Somalia and include but are
not limited to poverty, unemployment, the lack of effective governance, elections
stalemate, corruption, conflict, Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and over-

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fishing.

40. Moreover, it is assessed that criminal / piracy networks retain the capability to
seize opportunities and mount attacks with little to no notice, albeit at the cost of in-depth
planning.

41. It is possible that piracy could re-emerge if some or all the following conditions
are met:

a. The shipping industry ceases to fully implement BMP or embark PCASP

following a risk assessment.

b. There is a significant decrease in the presence of warships and local

maritime security forces in the area.

c. The decline in the economic and political situation persists, further

exacerbating poverty and instability in Somalia and the wider region due to
COVID-19, famine, the ripple effects of droughts, floods and locust infestation.

d. If the local maritime law enforcement, namely the reach and capability,
remains limited to protecting port facilities and the immediate littoral areas.

e. Lack of cooperation between international entities safeguarding the seas.

f. Lack of bridge-to-bridge information sharing and reporting.

g. International monetary retribution persist.

h. Somalia Security Services are left autonomous without international

guidance.

Conflict Related – LOW to MODERATE (an attack is possible but unlikely)

42. It is assessed that the Houthis are HIGHLY UNLIKELY to agree to any proposed
ceasefire arrangements while negotiating from a position of power. So it is HIGHLY
LIKELY that the conflict in Yemen will continue during the next reporting period, thus
Houthi forces will HIGHLY LIKELY still have the intention to attack SLC related interests.

43. Therefore, the threat to KSA or SLC flagged vessels transiting the Red Sea, BAM
and GOA remains MODERATE. However, it is assessed that such a threat is LOW for
any vessels in transit under another flag.

44. There is a REALISTIC POSSIBILITY that SLC tankers and warships in coastal
waters south of Jeddah could be attacked by Houthi missiles or unmanned surface
vessels or WBIEDs, and that SLC flagged tankers in the GOA IRTC could be attacked by
explosive skiffs or by skiffs with small arms. MVs not associated with nations involved in
the regional conflict are UNLIKELY to be attacked, although there is always a risk that
vessels might be misidentified by combatants (e.g. MV INCE INEBOLU in May 18) or
struck by accident.

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45. While in the past Houthi forces have ALMOST CERTAINLY deployed naval mines
in Yemeni coastal waters and are alleged to have done so as recently as 05 Feb 20 (see
IRTB 017), such mines are LIKELY of low quality and are HIGHLY UNLIKELY to drift into
international shipping lanes. Therefore, the threat from mines in international waters
including the Maritime Security Transit Corridor (MSTC) continues to be LOW.

Terrorism – LOW (an attack is unlikely)

46. Conflicts in Somalia and Yemen continue to provide operating bases and freedom
of manoeuvre for regional terrorist organizations such as AS, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) and IS in Yemen, Somalia and Mozambique.

47. CMF and EU NAVFOR have agreed to maintain the assessed threat from
terrorism as LOW.

Operations / Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa) Analysis

48. EU NAVFOR continues to analyse behaviour regarding BMP compliance of

vessels registered to MSCHOA Voluntary Registration Scheme. The registration levels
with MSCHOA VRS in vessels transiting across the HRA are at normal levels, with a
maximum of 83% in the Gulf of Aden (See fig. 3). Also, data on the use of PCASP derived
from MSCHOA registrations shows similar levels as the observed figures in the same
period last year. On average, 65% of vessels participating in MSCHOA VRS report
PCASP on board (See fig. 4).

Figure 3 Registrations with MSCHOA Voluntary Registration Scheme, per sub-areas in Apr 21

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 Figure 6 Declared use of PCASP in Apr 21

49. Traffic across the region based on LRIT has been increasing since September,
and is now at pre-COVID19 levels, which is LIKELY due to a recovery in global demand
and an increase in e-commerce. The obstruction of the Suez Canal on the 23rd of March
did not have a significant impact on the traffic. Vessels that had not transited through the
strategic straits diverted around South Africa. EU NAVFOR assesses that there was no
impact on maritime security. However, in liaison with industry we monitored traffic flows
and the availability of PCASP. This event has reminded us of our vulnerabilities and the
need to keep a robust maritime domain awareness, and therefore it is very important to
keep registration and reporting at the maximum possible levels.

50. CMF and EU NAVFOR strongly encourage MVs to register with MSCHOA before
entering the VRA (as indicated in Maritime Security Chart Q6099) and to implement
protection measures as contained in BMP 5. This will allow EU NAVFOR ATLANTA to
allocate risk profiles to vessels transiting the area and permit efficient use of naval assets,
as well as a full understanding of traffic behaviour and BMP compliance.

51. Also, it is kindly reminded that immediately reporting incidents to MSCHOA,

UKMTO and IMB will allow a faster and more efficient response by our naval assets
patrolling the region.

CMF activity

52. In the midst of this COVID 19 pandemic, Combined Maritime Forces (CMF)
continues to engage regional partners and international organizations to promote
regional maritime security and provide assurance to the international maritime industry.
On 12th Apr 21, Egypt has become the 34th member of the CMF. CMF is honored to
welcome Egypt’s partnership in CMF’s mission focused on making the region a safer
place.

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53. During the reporting period, CTF 150 transitioned from the command of the Saudi
Naval Forces to the Canadian/Australian command on 27th Jan 21. Since the turnover,
CTF 150 has achieved narcotics seizures totaling 27,606 kg (22,808 kg of hashish, 3,190
kg of heroin and 1,608 kg of methamphetamine). These seizures are indicative of
ongoing illicit activity in the maritime domain.

54. CTF 151 continued to conduct counter piracy operations in the AOR. During the
reporting period no piracy attacks have happened and there has been only one
suspicious event on 14th Jan 21. Focused Operation TAHAFFUZ has been conducted
from 26th February to 5th March 2021. Of note, Pakistani Naval Forces will hand over
CTF-151 Command to Brazil Naval Forces on 10th June 2021.

55. CTF 152, under the command of the Saudi Arabian Border Guards (SABG), has
conducted six joint patrols. On 1st Feb 21, CTF 152 conducted a three day exercise
named Falcon Response which involved several regional coalition partners. CTF 152
executed one Focused Operation from 9th to 11th Mar 21, and will continue to conduct
maritime operations with the regional GCC nations. All CMF Task Forces continue to
observe patterns of life in the region, share information with coalition and international
partners, and observe varying levels of illicit or suspicious activity.

EU NAVFOR activity

56. EU NAVFOR has continued to operate in the Gulf of Aden and in the Somali Basin
preventing, deterring and continuously suppressing piracy whilst protecting World Food
Program (WFP) ships and vulnerable vessels. Indeed, Somali based piracy is actively
prevented, deterred and countered by CMF and EU NAVFOR’s active and reassuring
posture across the area of operation (AoO).

57. EU NAVFOR has continued to monitor vulnerable vessels transiting/operating in

the area, with a specific focus on protecting those chartered by the WFP to provide aids
into the region. In this light, EU NAVFOR has continued to provide our own military team
permanently embarked, as an autonomous vessel protection detachment (AVPD), on
board the merchant vessel time-chartered by the WFP to tranship aid from the regional
food hubs into the Somali ports, thus predominantly operating in the coastal area of
Somalia.

58. EU NAVFOR continue to conduct multiple Focused Operations specifically

oriented at the causal factors of piracy. Piracy derives from interrelated features and
circumstances of specific areas, such as the presence of criminal networks associated
with piracy, fishing activities conducted by a variety of illegal and illicit actors and the
presence of localised maritime law enforcement actors.

59. Throughout the whole period, numerous flights from the EU NAVFOR Somalia’s
air assets have taken place. These flights covered both the high seas and the whole coast
of Somalia, with the aim of enhancing the overall situational awareness, comprising the
littorals, and providing indicators of a possible resurgence of pirate activity.

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60. EU NAVFOR is continuously adapting procedures to contribute to suppressing
piracy and increasing maritime security in a safe and effective manor during the COVID-
19 pandemic.

61. On the 13th of May, the 10th Industry Strategic Meeting took place, hosted by EU
NAVFOR and attended by, CMF, International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC),
AGENOR and representatives of the Shipping Industry and IBM. During the meeting
there was a clear emphasis on cooperation amongst all participants and during all
operations in the region with a strong commitment to the safety and security of seafarers.

Conclusion

62. Regional piracy continues to be suppressed by the combined efforts of naval

forces in theatre and the continued implementation of BMP 5 by the maritime community.
However, it is crucial that this collaboration and commitment is maintained to ensure that
past gains are not lost. The next reporting period will see less favourable conditions for
smaller boats, particularly in the Somali Basin and Arabian Sea, when the Southwest
Monsoon period starts in June.

63. The ongoing conflict in Yemen continues to pose a LOW threat to shipping in the
BAM, GOA and the Red Sea. For SLC and KSA flagged or associated vessels, the threat
remains at MODERATE. There is still a risk that vessels not directly linked to the SLC
could be misidentified and attacked when alongside in a KSA or SLC port, although it is
assessed as UNLIKELY that Houthi forces will deliberately target them. Consequently,
both CMF and EU NAVFOR have agreed upon an assessed LOW conflict-related threat
to merchant shipping not directly linked to the SLC.

64. The threat to shipping from terrorism remains LOW (an attack is unlikely).

65. Masters, operators and owners of merchant vessels are encouraged to continue
to report all incidents and suspicious activity to UKMTO and MSCHOA at their earliest
convenience1. When reporting, it is requested that reports are accurate and
comprehensive, providing as much evidentiary information as possible e.g. event logs,
photographs, video, radar information and physical samples.

1
https://eunavfor.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/BMP5-PP.pdf, p. 23.

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 Annex to IRTA
Dated 01 Jun 21

Glossary of terms

AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia

AOO Area of Operation
AQAP Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula
AS Al Shabaab: Terrorist group operating in Somalia
AVPD Autonomous Vessel Protection Detachment (military detachment)
BAM Bab-al-Mandeb strait
BMP 5 Best Management Practice (Version 5): IMO and industry
sponsored suggested planning and operational practices for ship
operators and Masters of ships transiting the Indian Ocean
CMF Combined Maritime Forces: 34 nation multi-national maritime force
operating in Indian Ocean, Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman,
and Gulf of Aden.
COCOA Concept for Cooperation ATALANTA
CTF Combined Task Force
EU NAVFOR European Union Naval Forces, Op ATALANTA
GOA Gulf of Aden
GOO Gulf of Oman
GoY Government of Yemen
HRA High Risk Area: Industry defined area where it is considered there
is a higher risk of piracy and within which self-protective measures
are most likely to be required
IMSC International Maritime Security Construct
IRG Internationally Recognized Government
IRTA Industry Releasable Threat Assessment
IRTB Industry Releasable Threat Bulletin
IRTC Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor
ISCAP Islamic State Central African Province
MSCHOA Maritime Security Centre (Horn of Africa): The maritime industry
control centre for the EU's Op ATALANTA.
MSTC Maritime Security Transit Corridor
PAG Piracy Action Groups (group of pirates formed to capture a vessel)
PCASP Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
POB Persons on board
SHADE Shared Awareness and De-confliction

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SLC Saudi Led Coalition
SNA Somali National Alliance
SRS Southern Red Sea
STC Southern Transitional Council
TTPs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UKMTO United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, based in Dubai
VRA Vessel registration Area
WBIED Water Borne Improvised Explosive Device

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