Canon 8
corrupt on its face and it lays bare
Surigao Mineral Reservation
Board vs. Cloribel
[G.R. No. L-27072 January 9,
1970]
FACTS:
The first contempt proceeding
arose from third motion for
reconsideration signed by Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf
and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R.
Uy, Graciano Regala and
Associates, and Jose B. Sotto,
that the petitioners, who,
according to the Solicitor General
and based on their submitted and
signed memorandum, alleged that
petitioners:
To have made false, ridiculous
and wild statements in a desperate
attempt to prejudice the courts
against MacArthur International
(such efforts could be accurately
called “scattershot desperation”);
To have such a proposition is
arose when respondent
the immoral and arrogant attitude
of the petitioners, and petitioners
… opportunistically change their
claims and stories not only from
case to case but from pleading to
pleading in the same case. Atty
Santiago further alleged that the
Supreme Court] has overlooked
the applicable law due to the
misrepresentation and obfuscation
of the petitioners’ counsel and
And the Supreme Court in the
effect:
“Never has any civilized,
democratic tribunal ruled that such
a gimmick (referring to the “right to
reject any and all bids”) can be
used by vulturous executives to
cover up and excuse losses to the
public, a government agency or
just plain fraud…”. Atty. Santiago
also filed a motion to inhibit
against Chief Justice Concepcion
and Justice Castro.
The second contempt proceeding
MacArthur, through new counsel,
Atty. Juanito M. Caling who
entered a special appearance for
the purpose, lodged a fourth
motion for reconsideration without
express leave of court. Said
motion reiterated previous grounds
raised, and included citing the
New Rules of Court Section 1 Rule
51 and that alleged injustice may
cut off all aid and benefits to the
Philippine Government by invoking
the Hickenlooper Amendment after
making it known to the World
Court. Meads, for his part tried to
reason out why such a distorted
quotation came about — the
portion left out was anyway
marked by “XS” which is a
common practice among lawyers.
Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal
Ethics reminds the lawyer to
characterize his conduct with
candor and fairness, and
specifically states that “it is not
candid nor fair for the lawyer
knowingly to misquote.”.
ISSUES:
Whether or not:
a) Atty. Vicente L. Santiago;
Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto; Graciano
C. Regala; and Associates; and
Atty. Erlito R. Uy; are guilty of
contempt on the filed Third Motion
for Reconsideration;
b) Atty. Vicente L. Santiago;
Atty. Juanito M. Caling, and Mr.
Morton F. Meads are guilty of
contempt on the filed Fourth
Motion for Reconsideration;
HELD:
Yes
a) On the Third Motion for
Reconsideration
The Supreme Court finds
language that is not to be
expected of an officer of the
courts. Atty. Santiago pictures
petitioners as “vulturous
executives” and speaks of this
[Supreme] Court as a “civilized,
democratic tribunal”, but by
innuendo would suggest that it is
not. Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has
misbehaved, under Section 3 (a),
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and
that he too has committed, under
Section 3 (d) of the same rule,
improper conduct tending to
degrade the administration of
justice. Atty. Regala did not even
know that his name was included
as co-counsel in this case. Finally,
borne out by the record is the fact
that Atty. Uy was not also involved
in the preparation of any of the
pleadings subject of the contempt
citation.
b) On the Fourth Motion for
Reconsideration
Atty. Santiago is a lawyer of record
for respondent MacArthur in this
case. He has not resigned from his
position as such lawyer. He has
control of the proceedings.
Whatever steps his client takes
should be within his knowledge
and responsibility. Indeed, Canon
16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics
should have reminded him that “[a]
lawyer should use his best efforts
to restrain and to prevent his
clients from doing those things
which the lawyer himself ought not
to do, particularly with reference to
their conduct towards courts,
judicial officers, jurors, witnesses
and suitors. If a client persists in
such wrongdoing the lawyer
should terminate their relation.”
Atty. Caling lifted Section 1. Rule
51, Rules of Court, out of context.
He has not shown to the
satisfaction of this Court that he
should be exempted from the
contempt charge against him. He
knows that he is an officer of this
Court. He admits that he has read
the fourth motion for
reconsideration before he signed
it. While he has been dragged in
only at the last minute, still it was
plainly his duty to have taken care
that his name should not be
attached to pleadings
contemptuous in character.
As to Mr. Meads, having admitted
having prepared the fourth motion
for reconsideration, he cannot beg
off from the contempt charge
against him even though he is not
a lawyer.
In Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562
FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a
“Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s
Certificate of Title” to the Supreme
Court as a sign of his protest as
against to what he call a tribunal
“peopled by people who are
calloused to our pleas for
justice…”. He also expressed
strong words as against the
judiciary like “justice… is not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb.” .
The petition rooted from the case
he lost due to the absence of time
and place in his motion in the trial
court. His appeal was dismissed in
the Court of Appeals by reason of
jurisprudence.
In a petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court, it was again
dismissed thru a minute resolution.
With the disappointments, he
thought of this sacrificial move. He
claimed that this petition to
surrender his title is only in trust,
and that he may obtain the title
again as soon as he regained
confidence in the justice system.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen
should be given disciplinary
actions for his acts.
HELD:
YES. Indefinite suspension
imposed. It has been pointed out
by the Supreme Court that there is
no one to blame but Atty. Almacen
himself because of his negligence.
Even if the intentions of his
accusations are so noble, in
speaking of the truth and alleged
injustices,so as not to condemn
the sinners but the sin, it has
already caused enough damage
and disrepute to the judiciary.
Since this particular case is sui
generis in its nature, a number of
foreign and local jurisprudence in
analogous cases were cited as
benchmarks and references.
Between disbarment and
suspension, the latter was
imposed. Indefinite suspension
may only be lifted until further
orders, after Atty. Almacen may be
able to prove that he is again fit to
resume the practice of law.
 unable to proceed with his offer of or witness unless required by the
JOSE M. CASTILLO, evidence. justice of the cause with which he
Complainant, -versus- ATTY. In his defense, while is charged.
SABINO. PADILLA, JR, respondent admitted the Whether the remark was directed
Respondent. utterance, he denied that it was at the complainant or his manner
directed at the complainant, of offering evidence, the remark
A.C. No. 2339, February 24, 1984, claiming that what he was “Ay, “bobo” or “Ay, que bobo” was
que bobo”, referring to “the offensive and uncalled for.
PLANA,J. manner complainant was trying Respondent had no right to
to inject wholly irrelevant and interrupt complainant which such
FACTS: highly offensive matter into the cutting remark while the latter was
record” while in the process of addressing the court. In so doing,
Atty. Jose M. Castillo making an offer of evidence. he exhibited a lack of respect not
(Complainant) was the counsel for only to a fellow lawyer but also to
the defendants in a cause for ISSUE: the court. By the use of
forcible entry before the intemperate language, respondent
Metropolitan Trial Court of Whether or not respondent may be failed to measure up to the norm
Caloocan while Atty. Sabino held administratively liable for his of conduct required of a member
Padilla Jr. (Respondent) was utterance of the legal profession.
counsel for the plaintiff. At the
hearing of the case, while RULING:
complainant was formally offering
his evidence, he heard respondent Yes. Among the duties of an
say “bobo”. When complainant attorney are to observe and
turned toward the respondent, he maintain the respect due to the
saw the latter looking at him courts of justice; and to abstain
menacingly. Embarrassed and from all offensive personality and
humiliated in the presence of to advance no fact prejudicial to
many people, complainant was the honor or reputation of a party

IN RE CLEMENTE SORIANO
(G.R. No. L-24114 June 30,
1970)
FACTS:
On October 10, 1969, Clemente
M. Soriano, a member of the
Philippine Bar entered his
appearance in the present case
(L-24114, PHHC and U.P. vs.
Mencias, Tiburcio, et al.) as "chief
counsel of record" for the
respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et
al. This act in itself would have
been innocuous were it not for the
fact that it was done one year and
eight months after the decision in
this case became final. Atty.
Soriano asked the Court to
exhume the case from the
archives.
Atty. Soriano's subsequent
explanation did not, however,
serve to dissuade this Court from
requiring him to show cause why
disciplinary action should not be
taken against him for entering an
appearance at such a late date.
He alleged that sometime during
the first week of October 1969, the
respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in
his own behalf and as attorney-in-
fact of the other respondents, went
to him to engage his professional
services in two cases, to wit: this
terminated case (L-24114) and the
Varsity Hills case (L-30546). Atty.
Soriano allegedly relied upon the
assurance of a mutual
acquaintance and representation
of Marcelino Tiburcio that the two
cases were pending in the Court.
He then agreed to render
professional services in the two
cases in consideration of a
contingent fee of 143.33 hectares
of land out of the 430 hectares
(more or less) involved in the two
cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Soriano is
guilty of negligence.
HELD:
YES. Before taking over a case
handled by a peer in the Bar, a
lawyer is enjoined to obtain the
conformity of the counsel whom he
would substitute. And if this cannot
be had, then he should, at the very
least, give notice to such lawyer of
the contemplated substitution. His
entry of appearance in the case
without the consent of the first
lawyer amounts to an improper
encroachment upon the
professional employment of the
original counsel.
Atty. Soriano violates Rule 8.02,
Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall
not, directly or indirectly,
encroach upon the
professional employment of
 another lawyer; however, it
is the right of any lawyer,
without fear or favor, to give
proper advice and
assistance to those seeking
relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.
The Court finds Atty. Clemente M.
Soriano guilty of gross negligence
in the performance of his duties as
a lawyer and as an officer of this
Court. This inexcusable
negligence would merit no less
than his suspension from the
practice of the law profession,
were it not for his candor, at the
hearing of this incident, in owning
his mistake and the apology he
made to this Court. It is the sense
of this Court, however, that he
must be as he is hereby severely
censured. Atty. Soriano is further
likewise warned that any future
similar act will be met with heavier
disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in
the present case, to forthwith
withdraw the appearance that he
has entered as chief counsel of
record for the respondents
Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.
Canon 9
THE UNITED STATES vs. C.W.
NEY and JUAN GARCIA
BOSQUE
G.R. No. 3593 March 23,
1907
FACTS:
In 1902, this court decided that J.
Garcia Bosque, was not entitled to
admission to practice law in the
Philippine Islands, upon the
ground that after the change of
sovereignty he had elected to
remain a Spanish subject and as
such was not qualified for
admission to the bar (In re
Bosque, 1 Phil. Rep., 88), and an
order was entered accordingly.
In 1904 he made an arrangement
with the defendant Ney, a
practicing attorney, to carry on
business together, sending out a
circular signed "Ney & Bosque,"
stating that they had established
an office for the general practice of
law in all the courts of the Islands
and that Bosque would devote
himself especially to consultation
and office work relating to Spanish
law. The paper was headed "Law
Office — Ney & Bosque. Juan G.
Bosque, jurisconsulto español —
C.W. Ney, abogado americano."
Since that time the Bosque has
not personally appeared in the
courts, and with one exception,
occuring through an inadvertance,
papers from the office were signed
not with the firm name alone nor
with any designation of the firm as
attorneys, but with the words "Ney
& Bosque — C.W. Ney, abogado."
ISSUE:
WON either of the defendants
should be punished for contempt.
HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled that both
the defendants are guilty of
contempt.
The Court cited that Section 232 of
the Code of Civil Procedure
describes contempt as follows:
1. Disobedience of or
resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment, or
command of a court, or
injunction granted by a court
or judge;
2. Misbehavior of an officer
of the court in the
performance of his official
duties or in his official
transactions.
Hence, where the law defines
contempt, the power of the courts
is restricted to punishment for acts
so defined.
As to the first subdivision of this
section, no direct order or
command of this court has been
disobeyed or resisted by the
defendant Ney. The only order that
the defendant Bosque can have
disobeyed is the one denying him
the right to practice law. This
order, however, was directly
binding upon him, notwithstanding
proceedings taken for its review,
and any hope on his part of
ultimately reversing it furnished no
excuse for its violation. Even had
he been entitled under the statute
to practice law without any license
from the court and without an
application to it, yet its order made
on his own petition. A mandate of
the court, while in force, must be
obeyed.
The irregular signature to papers,
though affixed by his associate,
had his authorization and
constitutes a substantial attempt to
engage in practice.
Under the second subdivision of
the section cited, Bosque is
obviously not answerable. On the
other hand, Ney, as an admitted
attorney, is liable if his conduct
amounted to misbehavior. The
Court are of the opinion that it did.
In the offense of Bosque in holding
himself out as a general
practitioner Ney participated, and
for the improper signature of the
pleadings he was chiefly and
personally responsible.
Moreover, the court regrets to add
that his persistent and rash
disregard of the rulings of the court
has not commended him to its
indulgence, while the offensive
character of certain papers
recently filed by him forbids us
from presuming on the hope of his
voluntarily conforming to the
customary standard of members of
the bar.
 The complaint was allegedly
signed on behalf of Divinagracia
by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of
the Jarder Bancolo Law Office.
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and In a chance meeting by Atty.
ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, vs. ATTY. Bancolo and Rustia, the latter
CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and informed Atty. Bancolo of the case
ATTY. JANUS JARDER filed against them but Atty.
Bancolo denied that he
A.C. No. 9604, SECOND represented Divinagracia since he
DIVISION, March 20, 2013, had yet to meet Divinagracia in
person. When Rustia showed him
FACTS: the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo
declared that the signature
Tapay and Rustia, both employees appearing above his name as
of the Sugar Regulatory counsel for Divinagracia was not
Administration, received an Order his. Following this, Atty. Bancolo
from the Office of the Ombudsman executed an affidavit denying his
requiring them to file a counter- supposed signature appearing in
affidavit to a complaint for the Complaint.
usurpation of authority, falsification
of public document, and graft and The Office of the Ombudsman
corrupt practices filed against provisionally dismissed the
them by Nehimias Divinagracia complaint but the Office ordered
(Divinagracia), a co-employee in that separate cases of falsification
the Sugar Regulatory of public document be filed against
Administration. Divinagracia. However,
Divinagracia denied that he
falsified the signature of Atty.
Bancolo. He presented evidence
showing that the Complaint filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman
was signed by the office secretary
per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions.
With this knowledge, Tapay and
Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint to disbar Attys. Bancolo
and Jarder, partners from the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The
complainants alleged that they
were subjected to a harassment
Complaint filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman with the forged
signature of Atty. Bancolo. It was
also alleged that Atty. Bancolo has
his forged signature attached in
other letter-complaints for other
clients. Documents proving such
were attached to the complaint.
In their answer, Attys. Bancolo and
Jarder admitted that their law
office accepted Divinagracia’s
case which was assigned to Atty.
Bancolo. Due to some minor
lapses in the assignment of cases,
Atty. Bancolo permitted that
pleadings and communications be
signed in his name by the
secretary of the law office.
The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating
Commissioner found that Atty.
Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility while
Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the same Code. The
Investigating Commissioner
recommended that Atty. Bancolo
be suspended from the practice of
law for two years while his partner,
Atty. Jarder be admonished for his
failure to exercise certain
responsibilities in the law firm. The
IBP Board of Governors adopted
the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner but modified the
penalty suspending Atty. Bancolo
from the practice of law for one
year.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Bancolo may
be held administratively liable for
violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD:
YES. The admission of Atty.
Bancolo that the Complaint he
filed for a former client was signed
in his name by a secretary of his
law office is in clear violation of
Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The
rule states that:
CANON 9 - A LAWYER
SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN
THE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall
not delegate to any
unqualified person the
performance of any task
which by law may only be
performed by a member of
the bar in good standing.
As stated by the court in
Cambaliza vs Cristal-Tenorio, the
lawyer’s duty to prevent or at the
very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and
policy. Public policy required that
the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly
qualified in education and
character. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the
client, and the bar from
incompetence or dishonesty of
those unlicensed to practice law
and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the Court. It devolves
upon a lawyer to see that this
purpose is attained.

Sophia Alawi v. Ashary M.
Alauya
A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February
24, 1997
FACTS:
Ashary Alauya transacted with
Sophia Alawi to avail of a contract
for the purchase of one housing
unit from EB Villarosa & Partner
Co. Ltd., a real estate and housing
company. Shortly thereafter
Alauya wrote to the company
expressing his intent to render the
contract void ab initio.
Several correspondences ensued,
all of which were signed by Alauya
as ATTY. ASHARY M. ALAUYA.
Alauya is a member of the Sharia
Bar and for that matter he is a
counselor-at-law. Alauya claims ti the Integrated Bar of the
that he does not use the title of Philippines and remain members
counselor-at-law for fear of being thereof in good standing.
mistaken as a local legislator, i.e.
councilor. Hence, he affixed the Persons who passed the Sharia
title of attorney before his name. Bar are not full-fledged members
Alawi filed a verified complaint of the Bar and may only practice
against Alauya, alleging, among law before a Sharia Court,
others, that Alawi usurped the title Alauya's disinclination to use the
of an attorney which is reserved title of counselor-at-law does not
only for the members of the warrant his use of the title of an
Philippine Bar. attorney.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alauya's
membership in the Sharia Bar
endows him the title of an attorney
HELD:
No. Alauya is hereby reprimanded
for usurping the title of an attorney
reserved for those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in
the study of law and had
successfully passed the bar
examinations, have been admitted

G.R. No. L-46537 July 29, 1977
JOSE GUBALLA vs. THE HON.
EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA,
RICARDO G. CARLOS and
DOMINGO FORTEZA, JR.
FACTS:
Petitioner is an operator of a public
utility vehicle which was involved,
on October 1, 1971, in an accident
resulting to injuries sustained by
private respondent Domingo
Forteza Jr. As a consequence, a
complaint for damages was filed
by Forteza against petitioner with
the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan.
Because petitioner and counsel
failed to appear at the pretrial
conference, despite due notice,
petitioner was treated as in default
and private respondent was
allowed to present his evidence ex
parte. A decision was thereafter
rendered by the trial court in favor
of private respondent Forteza.
A Motion for Reconsideration was
then filed by petitioner seeking the
lifting of the order of default but
was denied by both lower court
and CA.
Thereafter, petitioner, through
Atty. Isabelo V.L. Santos 11, filed
a Petition for Relief from Judgment
alleging his discovery that Irineo
W. Vida Jr., who prepared his
Answer to the Complaint is not a
member of the Philippine Bar and
that consequently, his rights had
not been adequately protected and
his properties are in danger of
being confiscated and/or levied
upon without due process of law.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is guilty of
violating Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
Yes. The Court finds the
petitioner guilty of violating Tule
9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Therefore this petition must be
denied for lack of merit.
The alleged fact that the person
who represented petitioner at the
initial stage of the litigation, i.e.,
the filing of an Answer and the
pretrial proceedings, turned out to
be not a member of the Bar 8 did
not amount to a denial of
petitioner's day in court.
The Court states that it should be
noted that in the subsequent
stages of the proceedings, after
the rendition of the judgment by
default, petitioner was duly
represented by bona fide
members of the Bar in seeking a and Gilberto Sabsalon their
reversal of the judgment for being accumulated deposits and car
contrary to law and jurisprudence wash payments, plus interest
and the existence of valid, legal thereon at the legal rate from the
and justifiable defenses. date of promulgation of judgment
to the date of actual payment, and
10% of the total amount as and for
attorney's fees.
The private respondents filed a
G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994 complaint with the Manila
Arbitration Office of the National
FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. Labor Relations Commission
ARMAMENTO vs. NATIONAL charging petitioners with illegal
LABOR RELATIONS dismissal and illegal deductions.
COMMISSION, DOMINGO That complaint was dismissed, the
MALDIGAN and GILBERTO labor arbiter holding that it took
SABSALON private respondents two years to
file the same and such
FACTS: unreasonable delay was not
consistent with the natural reaction
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan of a person who claimed to be
S. Armamento filed this special unjustly treated, hence the filing of
civil action for certiorari to annul the case could be interpreted as a
the decision 1 of respondent mere afterthought.
National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) ordering ISSUE:
petitioners to pay private
respondents Domingo Maldigan
Whether or not the representative
of the of the respondents is
entitled to attorney’s fee.
HELD:
No. The Court held that while it
may be true that Guillermo H.
Pulia was the authorized
representative of private
respondents, he was a non-
lawyer who did not fall in either
of the foregoing categories.
Hence, by clear mandate of the
law, he is not entitled to
attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that
an attorney shall be entitled to
have and recover from his client a
reasonable compensation for his
services necessarily imports the
existence of an attorney-client
relationship as a condition for the
recovery of attorney's fees, and
such relationship cannot exist
unless the client's representative
is a lawyer.