G.R. No. L-6277 February 26, 1954 proceeding with the trial and dismiss the case.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
JUAN D. CRISOLOGO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. PABLO
VILLALOBOS,Respondents.
REYES, J.:
The petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE during the last world war
and at the time of the filing of the present petition a lieutenant colonel in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, was on March 12, 1946, accused of treason under article
114 of the Revised Penal Code in an information filed in the People's Court. But
before the accused could be brought under the jurisdiction of the court, he was on
January 13, 1947, indicted for violation of Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise
known as the Articles of War, before a military court created by the authority of the
Army Chief of Staff, the indictment containing three charges, two of which, the first
and third, were those of treason consisting in giving information and aid to the
enemy leading to the capture of USAFFE officers and men and other persons with
anti-Japanese reputation and in urging members of the USAFFE to surrender and
cooperate with the enemy, while the second war was that of having certain civilians
killed in time of war. Found innocent of the first and third charges but guilty of the
second, he was on May 8, 1947, sentenced by the military court to life
imprisonment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic Act No. 311 abolishing the People's
Court, the criminal case in that court against the petitioner was, pursuant to the
provisions of said Act, transferred to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and
there the charges of treason were amplified. Arraigned in that court upon the
amended information, petitioner presented a motion to quash, challenging the
jurisdiction of the court and pleading double jeopardy because of his previous
sentence in the military court. But the court denied the motion and, after petitioner
had pleaded not guilty, proceeded to trial, whereupon, the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition was filed in this court to have the trial judge desist from
virtual law library
The petition is opposed by the Solicitor General who, in upholding the jurisdiction of
the trial judge, denies that petitioner is being subjected to double
jeopardy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As we see it, the case hinges on whether the decision of the military court
constitutes a bar to further prosecution for the same offense in the civil
courts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The question is not of first impression in this jurisdiction. In case of U.S. vs. Tubig, 3
Phil., 244, a soldier of the United States Army in the Philippines was charged in the
Court of First Instance of Pampanga with having assassinated one Antonio Alivia.
Upon arraignment, he pleaded double jeopardy in that he had already been
previously convicted and sentenced by s court-martial for the same offense and had
already served his sentence. The trial court overruled the plea on the grounds that a
the province where the offense was committed was under civil jurisdiction, the
military court had no jurisdiction to try the offense. But on appeal, this court held
that "one who has been tried and convicted by a court martial under circumstances
giving that tribunal jurisdiction of the defendant and of the offense, has been once in
jeopardy and cannot for the same offense be again prosecuted in another court of
the same sovereignty." In a later case, Grafton vs. U.S. 11 Phil., 776, a private in the
United States Army in the Philippines was tried by a general court martial for
homicide under the Articles of War. Having been acquitted in that court, he was
prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for murder under the general laws
of the Philippines. Invoking his previous acquittal in the military court, he pleaded it
in bar of proceedings against him in the civil court, but the latter court overruled the
plea and after trial found him guilty of homicide and sentenced him to prison. The
sentence was affirmed by this Supreme Court, but on appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States, the sentence was reversed and defendant acquitted, that court
holding that "defendant, having been acquitted of the crime of homicide alleged to
have been committed by him by a court martial of competent jurisdiction
proceeding under the authority of the United States, cannot be subsequently tried
for the same offense in a civil court exercising authority in the
Philippines."chanrobles virtual law library
There is, for sure, a rule that where an act transgresses both civil and military laws
subjects the offender to punishment by both civil and military authority, a conviction
or an acquittal in a civil court cannot be pleaded as a bar to a prosecution in the
military court, and vice versa. But the rule "is strictly limited to the case of a single
act which infringes both the civil and the military law in such a manner as to
constitute two distinct offenses, one of which is within the cognizance of the military
courts and the other a subject of civil jurisdiction" (15 Am. Jur., 72), and it does not
apply where both courts derive their powers from the same sovereignty. (22 C.J.S.,
449.) It therefore, has no application to the present case the military court has
convicted the petitioner and the civil court which proposes to try him again derive
their powers from one sovereignty and it is not disputed that the charges of treason
tried in the court martial were punishable under the Articles of War, it being as a
matter of fact impliedly admitted by the Solicitor General that the two courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over the offense
charged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military court is different from
that charged in the civil court and that even granting that the offense was identical
the military court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same because the
People's Court had previously acquired jurisdiction over the case with the result that
the conviction in the court martial was void. In support of the first point, it is urged
that the amended information filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
contains overt acts distinct from those charged in the military court. But we note
that while certain overt acts specified in the amended information in the Zamboanga
court were not specified in the indictment in the court martial, they all are embraced
in the general charge of treason, which is a continuous offense and one who
commits it is not criminally liable for as many crimes as there are overt acts, because
all overt acts "he has done or might have done for that purpose constitute but a
single offense." (Guinto vs. Veluz, 1 44 Off. Gaz., 909; People vs. Pacheco,2 L-4570,
promulgated July 31, 1953.) In other words, since the offense charged in the
amended information in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga is treason, the fact
that the said information contains an enumeration of additional overt acts not
specifically mentioned in the indictment before the military court is immaterial since
the new alleged overt acts do not in themselves constitute a new and distinct
offense from that of treason, and this Court has repeatedly held that a person
cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same time also guilty of overt acts
specified in the information for treason even if those overt acts, considered
separately, are punishable by law, for the simple reason that those overt acts are not
separate offense distinct from that of treason but constitutes ingredients thereof.
Respondents cite the cases of Melo vs. People, 3 47 off. Gaz., 4631, and People vs.
Manolong, 4 47 Off. Gaz., 5104, where this court held:
Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts
existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be
said to be second jeopardy if indicted for a new offense.
But respondents overlook that in the present case no new facts have supervened
that would change the nature of the offense for which petitioner was tried in the
military court, the alleged additional overt acts specified in the amended
information in the civil court having already taken place when petitioner was
indicted in the former court. Of more pertinent application is the following from 15
American Jurisprudence, 56-57:
Subject to statutory prohibitions and the interpretation thereof for the purpose of
arriving at the intent of the legislature enacting them, it may be said that as a rule
only one prosecution may be had for a continuing crime, and that when a n offense
charged consists of a series of acts extending over a period of time, a conviction or Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador
acquittal for a crime based on a portion of that period will bar a prosecution and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
covering the whole period. In such case the offense is single and indivisible; and
whether the time alleged is longer or shorter, the commission of the acts which
constitute it within any portion of the time alleged, is a bar to the conviction for
other acts committed within the same time. . . .

As to the claim that the military court had no jurisdiction over the case, well known
is the rule that when several courts have concurrent jurisdiction of the same offense,
the court first acquiring jurisdiction of the prosecution retains it to the exclusion of
the others. This rule, however, requires that jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall have first been obtained by the court in which the first charge was
filed. (22 C.J.S., pp. 186-187.) The record in the present case shows that the
information for treason in the People's Court was filed on March 12, 1946, but
petitioner had not yet been arrested or brought into the custody of the court - the
warrant of arrest had not even been issued - when the indictment for the same
offense was filed in the military court on January 13, 1947. Under the rule cited,
mere priority in the filing of the complaint in one court does not give that court
priority to take cognizance of the offense, it being necessary in addition that the
court where the information is filed has custody or jurisdiction of the person of
defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It appearing that the offense charged in the military court and in the civil court is the
same, that the military court had jurisdiction to try the case and that both courts
derive their powers from one sovereignty, the sentence meted out by the military
court to the petitioner should, in accordance with the precedents above cited, be a
bar to petitioner's further prosecution for the same offense in the Court of First
Instance of Zambales.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted and the criminal G.R. No. 117472 June 25, 1996
case for treason against the petitioner pending in that court ordered dismissed.
Without costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,  COMPLAINT
vs.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty
is indeed a deterrent as far as the commission of heinous crimes is concerned and
while the attendant details pertaining to the execution of a death sentence remain
as yet another burning issue, we are tasked with providing a clear-cut resolution of
whether or not the herein accused-appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human
society for the infliction of the primitive and bestial act of incestuous lust on his own
blood.
Before us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction, dated September 7,
1994, for the crime of Rape, rendered after marathon hearing by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LEO
ECHEGARAY Y PILO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
RAPE as charged in the complaint, aggravated by the fact that the
same was commited by the accused who is the father/stepfather of
the complainant, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH, as provided for under RA. No. 7659, to pay the complainant
Rodessa Echegaray the sum
of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all the accessory penalties provided
by law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.1
We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner:
The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of
RAPE, committed as follows:
That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned complainant, his daughter, a minor, 10
years of age, all against her will and without her consent, to her
damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW2
Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted by his
counsel de oficio, entered the plea of "not guilty."
These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-General in
his brief:
This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter.
Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a ten-year old girl and a fifth-
grader, born on September 11, 1983. Rodessa is the eldest of five
siblings. She has three brothers aged 6, 5 and 2, respectively, and a 3-
month old baby sister. Her parents are Rosalie and Leo Echegaray, the
latter being the accused-appellant himself. The victim lives with her
family in a small house located at No. 199 Fernandez St., Barangay
San Antonio, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City (pp. 5-9, Aug. 9,
1994, TSN).
Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking
after her three brothers in their house as her mother attended a
gambling session in another place, she heard her father, the accused-
appellant in this case, order her brothers to go out of the house (pp.
10-11, ibid). As soon as her brothers left, accused-appellant Leo
Echegaray approached Rodessa and suddenly dragged her inside the
room (p. 12, ibid). Before she could question the appellant, the latter
immediately, removed her panty and made her lie on the floor (p.
13, ibid). Thereafter, appellant likewise removed his underwear and
immediately placed himself on top of Rodessa. Subsequently,
appellant forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's organ causing
her to suffer intense pain (pp. 14-15, ibid). While appellant was
pumping on her, he even uttered. "Masarap ba, masarap ba?" and to
which Rodessa answered: "Tama na Papa, masakit" (p. 16, ibid).
Rodessa's plea proved futile as appellant continued with his act. After
satisfying his bestial instinct, appellant threatened to kill her mother if
she would divulge what had happened. Scared that her mother would
be killed by appellant, Rodessa kept to herself the ordeal she
suffered. She was very afraid of appellant because the latter, most of
the time, was high on drugs (pp. 17-18, ibid.). The same sexual assault
happened up to the fifth time and this usually took place when her
mother was out of the house (p. 19, ibid.). However, after the fifth
time, Rodessa decided to inform her grandmother, Asuncion Rivera,
who in turn told Rosalie, Radessa's mother. Rodessa and her mother
proceeded to the Barangay Captain where Rodessa confided the
sexual assaults she suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was brought to the
precinct where she executed an affidavit (p. 21, ibid.). From there, she
was accompanied to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
for medical examination (p. 22, ibid.).
Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during
the time when her mother was pregnant. Rodessa added that at first,
her mother was on her side. However, when appellant was detained,
her mother kept on telling her. "Kawawa naman ang Tatay mo,
nakakulong" (pp. 39-40, ibid.).
When Rodessa was examined by the medico-legal officer in the
person of Dra. Ma. Cristina B. Preyna,3 the complainant was described
as physically on a non-virgin state, as evidenced by the presence of
laceration of the hymen of said complainant (TSN, Aug. 22, 1995, pp.
8-9).4
On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:
. . . the defense presented its first witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She
asserted that the RAPE charge against the accused was only the
figment of her mothers dirty mind. That her daughter's complaint was
forced upon her by her grandma and the answers in the sworn
statement of Rodessa were coached. That the accusation of RAPE was
motivated by Rodessa's grandmother's greed over the lot situated at
the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project, Barangay San Antonio, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, which her grandmother's
paramour, Conrado Alfonso gave to the accused in order to persuade
the latter to admit that Rodessa executed an affidavit of desistance
after it turned out that her complaint of attempted homicide was
substituted with the crime of RAPE at the instance of her mother.
That when her mother came to know about the affidavit of
desistance, she placed her granddaughter under the custody of the
Barangay Captain. That her mother was never a real mother to her.
She stated that her complaint against accused was for attempted
homicide as her husband poured alcohol on her body and attempted
to burn her. She identified the certification issued by the NHA and Tag
No. 87-0393 (Exh. 2). That the Certification based on the Masterlist
(Exh. 3) indicates that the property is co-owned by accused and
Conrado Alfonso. That Rodessa is her daughter sired by Conrado
Alfonso, the latter being the paramour of her mother. That Conrado
Alfonso waived his right and participation over the lot in favor of the
accused in consideration of the latter's accepting the fact that he is
the father of Rodessa to simulate the love triangle and to conceal the
nauseating sex orgies from Conrado Alfonso's real wife.
Accused testified in his behalf and stated that the grandmother of the
complainant has a very strong motive in implicating him to the crime
of RAPE since she was interested to become the sole owner of a
property awarded to her live-in partner by the Madrigal Estate-NHA
Project. That he could not have committed the imputed crime
because he considers Rodessa as his own daughter. That he is a
painter-contractor and on the date of the alleged commission of the
crime, he was painting the house of one Divina Ang of Barangay
Vitalis, Parañaque, Metro Manila (Exh. 4). The travel time between his
work place to his residence is three (3) hours considering the
condition of traffic. That the painting contract is evidenced by a
document denominated "Contract of Services" duly accomplished
(see submarkings of Exh. 4). He asserted that he has a big sexual
organ which when used to a girl 11 years old like Rodessa, the said
female organ will be "mawawarak." That it is abnormal to report the
imputed commission of the crime to the grandmother of the victim.
Accused further stated that her (sic) mother-in-law trumped-up a
charge of drug pushing earlier and he pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense of using drugs. The decretal portion of the judgment of
conviction ordering the accused to be confined at the Bicutan
Rehabilitation Center irked the grandmother of Rodessa because it
was her wish that accused should be meted the death penalty.
Accused remain steadfast in his testimony perorating the strong
motive of Rodessa's grandmother in implicating him in this heinous
crime because of her greed to become the sole owner of that piece of
property at the National Housing Authority-Madrigal Project, situated
at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, notwithstanding rigid cross-
examination. He asserted that the imputed offense is far from his
mind considering that he treated Rodessa as his own daughter. He
categorically testified that he was in his painting job site on the date
and time of the alleged commission of the crime.
Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third defense witness. She said that
she is the laundry woman and part time baby sitter of the family of
accused. That at one time, she saw Rodessa reading sex books and
the Bulgar newspaper. That while hanging washed clothes on the
vacant lot, she saw Rodessa masturbating by tinkering her private
parts. The masturbation took sometime.
This sexual fling of Rodessa were corroborated by Silvestra Echegaray,
the fourth and last witness for the defense. She stated that she tried
hard to correct the flirting tendency of Rodessa and that she scolded
her when she saw Rodessa viewing an X-rated tape. Rodessa
according to her was fond of going with friends of ill-repute. That (sic)
she corroborated the testimony of Mrs. Punzalan by stating that she
herself saw Rodessa masturbating inside the room of her house.5
In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape, the lower court dismissed the defense of alibi and lent credence to the
straightforward testimony of the ten-year old victim to whom no ill motive to testify
falsely against accused-appellant can be attributed. The lower court likewise
regarded as inconsequential the defense of the accused-appellant that the
extraordinary size of his penis could not have insinuated itself into the victim's
vagina and that the accused is not the real father of the said victim.
The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in his attempt to seek a reversal of
the lower court's verdict through the following assignment of errors:
1. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE
SINISTER MOTIVE OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S
GRANDMOTHER? THAT PRECIPITATED THE FILING OF
THE CHARGE OF RAPE, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING
ACCUSED GUILTY AS CHARGED.
2. THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT
THE HEALED LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7 O'CLOCK
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE PUMPING OF THE
PENIS OF ACCUSED TO THE VAGINA OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED,
NOTWITHSTANDING VEHEMENT DENIAL.
3. THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE
DEFENSE OF ALIBI THAT ACCUSED WAS IN PARAÑAQUE
ON THE DATE AND TIME OF THE IMPUTED CRIME
HENCE, IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALIBI IS NOT
SUSTAINABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR.6
Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the reimposition of the death penalty,
requires a thorough and judicious examination of the circumstances relating thereto,
this Court remains guided by the following principles in evaluating evidence in cases
of this nature: (a) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to
prove but more difficult for the accused though innocent to disprove; (b) In view of
the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are involved, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The
evidence for the prosecution must stand and fall on its own merits, and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 7
Anent the first assigned error, no amount of persuasion can convince this Court to
tilt the scales of justice in favor of the accused-appellant notwithstanding that he
cries foul insisting that the rape charge was merely concocted and strongly
motivated by greed over a certain lot situated at the NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing
Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The accused-
appellant theorizes that prosecution witness Asuncion Rivera, the maternal
grandmother of the victim Rodessa, concocted the charge of rape so that, in the
event that the accused-appellant shall be meted out a death sentence, title to the
lot will be consolidated in her favor. Indeed, the lot in question is co-owned by the
accused-appellant and Conrado Alfonso, the live-in partner of Asuncion Rivera,
according to the records of the National Housing Authority (Exh. "3"). The accused-
appellant would want us to believe that the rape charge was fabricated by Asuncion
Rivera in order to eliminate the accused-appellant from being a co-owner. So, the
live-in partners would have the property for their own.8
We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so callous as
to instigate her 10-year old granddaughter to file a rape case against her own father
simply on account of her alleged interest over the disputed lot.9
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is
credible where she has no motive to testify against the accused. 10
We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year old
Rodessa which the trial court found convincing enough and unrebutted by the
defense. The trial court not surprisingly noted that Rodessa's narration in detail of
her father's monstrous acts had made her cry.11 Once again, we rule that:
 . . . The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time
of the rape as to the circumstances of the rape must be given weight,
for testimony of young and immature rape victims are credible
(People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 [1993]). No woman especially one of
tender age, practically only a girl, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter
expose herself to a public trial, if she were not motivated solely by the
desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People v.
Guibao, supra). 12
The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses in his attempt to bolster his claim that the rape accusation
against him is malicious and baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's testimony that the accused-
appellant was already naked when he dragged her inside the room is inconsistent
with her subsequent testimony that the said accused-appellant was still wearing
short pants when she was dragged inside the room. Secondly, Rodessa's sworn
statement before the police investigator which indicated that, while the accused was
executing pumping acts, he uttered the words "Masarap ba?", differ from her
testimony in court wherein she related that, when the accused took out his penis
from her vagina, the accused said "Masarap, tapos na." Thirdly, the victim's
grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, recounted in her sworn statement that it was the
accused who went to see her to apprise her of the rape committed on her
granddaughter. However, in her testimony in court , Asuncion Rivera claimed that
she was the one who invited the accused-appellant to see her in her house so as to
tell her a secret.13These alleged discrepancies merely pertain to minor details which
in no way pose serious doubt as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
Whether or not the accused was naked when he dragged Rodessa inside the room
where he sexually assaulted her bears no significant effect on Rodessa's testimony
that she was actually raped by the accused-appellant. Moreover, a conflicting
account of whatever words were uttered by the accused-appellant after he
forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's private organ against her will cannot
impair the prosecution's evidence as a whole. A determination of which version
earmarks the truth as to how the victim's grandmother learned about the rape is
inconsequential to the judgment of conviction.
As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin: 14
This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the
narration of the witness do not detract from its essential credibility as
long as it is on the whole coherent and intrinsically believable.
Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witness is telling the truth
and has not been rehearsed as it is not to he expected that he will be
able to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or
total recall.
After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses deserves our utmost respect in the absence
of arbitrariness.
With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case are bereft
of clear and concrete proof of the accused-appellant's claim as to the size of his
penis and that if that be the fact, it could not have merely caused shallow healed
lacerations at 3:00 and 7:00 o'clock. 15 In his testimony, the accused-appellant stated
that he could not have raped Rodessa because of
the size of his penis which could have ruptured her vagina had he actually done
so. 16 This Court gives no probative value on the accused-appellant's self-serving
statement in the light of our ruling in the case of People v. Melivo, supra,17 that:
The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs
capable of varying degrees of distensibility. The degree of
distensibility of the female reproductive organ is normally limited only
by the character and size of the pelvic inlet, other factors being
minor. The female reprodructive canal being capable of allowing
 passage of a regular fetus, there ought to be no difficulty allowing the
entry of objects of much lesser size, including the male reproductive
organ, which even in its largest dimensions, would still be
considerably smaller than the full-term fetus.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various
parts of he vaginal wall, though not as extensive as appellant might
have expected them to be, indicate traumatic injury to the area
within the period when the incidents were supposed to have
occurred. (At pp. 13-14, emphasis supplied)
In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof. 18A mere
knocking at the doors of the pudenda, so to speak, by the accused's penis suffices to
constitute the crime of rape as full entry into the victim's vagina is not required to
sustain a conviction. 19 In the case, Dr. Freyra, the medico-legal examiner,
categorically testified that the healed lacerations of Rodessa on her vagina were
consistent with the date of the commission of the rape as narrated by the victim to
have taken place in April, 1994. 20
Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-appellant
erroneously argues that the Contract of Services (Exhibit 4) offered as evidence in
support of the accused-appellant's defense of alibi need not be corroborated
because there is no law expressly requiring so. 21 In view of our finding that the
prosecution witnesses have no motive to falsely testify against the accused-
appellant, the defense of alibi, in this case, uncorroborated by other witnesses,
should be completely disregarded. 22 More importantly, the defense of alibi which is
inherently weak becomes even weaker in the face of positive identification of the
accused-appellant as perpetrator of the crime of rape by his victim, Rodessa. 23
The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself to do
some painting job at the house of one Divina Ang in Parañaque, Metro Manila,
within 25 days from April 4, 1994, is not proof of the whereabouts of the accused-
appellant at the time of the commission of the offense.
The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the basis of the
complaint, dated July 14, 1994. The gravamen of the said offense, as stated in
paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is the carnal knowledge of a
woman below twelve years old. 24 Rodessa positively identified his father accused-
appellant, as the culprit of Statutory Rape. Her account of how the accused-
appellant succeeded in consummating his grievous and odious sexual assault on her
is free from any substantial self-contradiction. It is highly inconceivable that it is
rehearsed and fabricated upon instructions from Rodessa's maternal grandmother
Asuncion Rivera as asserted by the accused-appellant. The words of Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the Court, more than two decades ago, are
relevant and worth reiterating, thus:
. . . it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the
offended parties are young and immature girls like the victim in this
case, (Cited cases omitted) there is marked receptivity on its, part to
tend credence to their version of what transpired. It is not to be
wondered at. The state, as parens patria, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their minority,
are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender
years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of
rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim alone. The
consternation it causes her family must also be taken into account It
may reflect a failure to abide by the announced concern in the
fundamental law for such institution There is all the more reason then
for the rigorous application of the penal law with its severe penalty
for this offense, whenever warranted. It has been aptly remarked that
with the advance in civilization, the disruption in public peace and
 order it represents defies explanation, much more so in view of what
currently appears to be a tendency for sexual permissiveness. Where
the prospects of relationship based on consent are hardly minimal,
self-restraint should even be more marked. 25
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death Penalty
Law, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code was amended, to wit:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eigthteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim.
mandated by law. Considering that the accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of
Rodessa's mother, 29 he falls squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death
Penalty Law under the term "common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."
The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is
reason enough to conclude that accused-appellant is either the father or stepfather
of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated by the accused on his young
victim has become all the more repulsive and perverse. The victim's tender age and
the accused-appellant's moral ascendancy and influence over her are factors which
forced Rodessa to succumb to the accused's selfish and bestial craving. The law has
made it inevitable under the circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant
face the supreme penalty of death. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104.
SO ORDERED.

xxx xxx xxx Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
(Emphasis supplied) concur.

Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the penalty

imposed by the trial court by declaring that he is neither a father, stepfather or
grandfather of Rodessa although he was a confirmed lover of Rodessa's
mother. 26 On direct examination, he admitted that before the charge of rape was
riled against him, he had treated Rodessa as his real daughter and had provided for
her food, clothing, shelter and education. 27 The Court notes that Rodessa uses the
surname of the accused-appellant, not Rivera (her mother's maiden name) nor
Alfonso (her grandmother's live-in partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated
during the cross-examination that she, the accused-appellant, and her five children,
including Rodessa, had been residing in one house only. 28 At any rate, even if he
were not the father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot
save him from the abyss where perpetrators of heinous crimes ought to be, as