G.R. No.

125055 October 30, 1998

A. FRANCISCO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ROMULO S.A. JAVILLONAR
and ERLINDA P. JAVILLONAR, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered on

February 29, 1996 by the Court of Appeals 1 reversing, in toto, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case No.
62290, as well as the appellate court's resolution of May 7, 1996
denying reconsideration.

Petitioner A. Francisco Realty and Development Corporation

granted a loan of P7.5 Million to private respondents, the spouses
Romulo and Erlinda Javillonar, in consideration of which the latter
executed the following documents: (a) a promissory note, dated
November 27, 1991, stating an interest charge of 4% per month for
six months; (b) a deed of mortgage over realty covered by TCT No.
58748, together with the improvements thereon; and (c) an undated
deed of sale of the mortgaged property in favor of the mortgagee,
petitioner A. Francisco Realty. 2

The interest on the said loan was to be paid in four installments:

half of the total amount agreed upon (P900,000.00) to be paid in
advance through a deduction from the proceeds of the loan, while
the balance to be paid monthly by means of checks post-dated
March 27, April 27, and May 27, 1992. The promissory note
expressly provided that upon "failure of the MORTGAGOR (private
respondents) to pay the interest without prior arrangement with the
MORTGAGEE (petitioner), full possession of the property will be
transferred and the deed of sale will be registered. 3 For this
purpose, the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 58748 was delivered to
petitioner A. Francisco Realty.

Petitioner claims that private respondents failed to pay the interest

and, as a consequence, it registered the sale of the land in its favor
on February 21, 1992. As a result, TCT No. 58748 was cancelled and
in lieu thereof TCT No. PT-85569 was issued in the name of
petitioner A. Francisco Realty.4
Private respondents subsequently obtained an additional loan of
P2.5 Million from petitioner on March 13, 1992 for which they
signed a promissory note which reads:

PROMISSORY NOTE

For value received I promise to pay A. FRANCISCO

REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, the
additional sum of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P2,500,000.00) on or before April 27, 1992, with
interest at the rate of four percent (4%) a month until
fully paid and if after the said date this note and/or the
other promissory note of P7.5 Million remains unpaid
and/or unsettled, without any need for prior demand or
notification, I promise to vacate voluntarily and willfully
and/or allow A.FRANCISCO REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION to appropriate and
occupy for their exclusive use the real property located
at 56 Dragonfly, Valle Verde VI, Pasig, Metro Manila. 5

Petitioner demanded possession of the mortgaged realty and the

payment of 4% monthly interest from May 1992, plus surcharges.
As respondent spouses refused to vacate, petitioner filed the
present action for possession before the Regional Trial Court in
Pasig City.6

In their answer, respondents admitted liability on the loan but

alleged that it was not their intent to sell the realty as the undated
deed of sale was executed by them merely as an additional security
for the payment of their loan. Furthermore, they claimed that they
were not notified of the registration of the sale in favor of petitioner
A. Francisco Realty and that there was no interest then unpaid as
they had in fact been paying interest even subsequent to the
registration of the sale. As an alternative defense, respondents
contended that the complaint was actually for ejectment and,
therefore, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to try the
case. As counterclaim, respondents sought the cancellation of TCT
No. PT-85569 as secured by petitioner and the issuance of a new
title evidencing their ownership of the property. 7

On December 19, 1992, the Regional Trial Court rendered a

decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
as legal and valid, the right of ownership of A. Francisco
Realty Find Development Corporation, over the property
subject of this case and now registered in its name as
owner thereof, under TCT No. 85569 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, situated at No. 56 Dragonfly Street, Valle
Verde VI, Pasig, Metro Manila.

Consequently, defendants are hereby ordered to cease

and desist from further committing acts of
dispossession or from withholding possession from
plaintiff of the said property as herein described and
specified.

Claim for damages in all its forms, however, including

attorney's fees, are hereby denied, no competent proofs
having been adduced on record, in support thereof. 8

Respondent spouses appealed to the Court of Appeals which

reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint
against them. The appellate court ruled that the Regional Trial
Court had no jurisdiction over the case because it was actually an
action for unlawful detainer which is exclusively cognizable by
municipal trial courts. Furthermore, it ruled that, even presuming
jurisdiction of the trial court, the deed of sale was void for being in
fact a pactum commissorium which is prohibited by Art. 2088 of the
Civil Code.

Petitioner A. Francisco Realty filed a motion for reconsideration,

but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its resolution, dated
May 7, 1996. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the
following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE
PETITIONER.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

RULING THAT THE CONTRACTUAL DOCUMENTS
SUBJECT OF THE INSTANT CASE ARE CONSTITUTIVE
OF PACTUM COMMISSORIUM AS DEFINED UNDER
 ARTICLE 2088 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

On the first issue, the appellate court stated:

Ostensibly, the cause of action in the complaint

indicates a case for unlawful detainer, as contra-
distinguished from accion publiciana. As contemplated
by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, an action for unlawful
detainer which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, is defined as
withholding from by a person from another for not more
than one year, the possession of the land or building to
which the latter is entitled after the expiration or
termination of the supposed rights to hold possession
by virtue of a contract, express or implied. (Tenorio vs.
Gamboa, 81 Phil. 54; Dikit vs. Dicaciano, 89 Phil. 44). If
no action is initiated for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer within the expiration of the 1 year period, the
case may still be filed under the plenary action to
recover possession by accion publiciana before the
Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court)
(Medina vs. Valdellon, 63 SCRA 278). In plain language,
the case at bar is a legitimate ejectment case filed within
the 1 year period from the jurisdictional demand to
vacate. Thus, the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction over the case. Accordingly, under Section 33
of B.P. Blg. 129 Municipal Trial Courts are vested with
the exclusive original jurisdiction over forcible entry and
unlawful detainer case. (Sen Po Ek Marketing Corp. vs.
CA, 212 SCRA 154 [1990])9

We think the appellate court is in error. What really distinguishes

an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion
publiciana) and from a reivindicatory action (accion reivindicatoria)
is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto.

An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together

with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit
that may be filed to recover possession of real property.
Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion
publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of
possession and accion reivindicatoria or the action to
 recover ownership which includes recovery of
possession, make up the three kinds of actions to
judicially recover possession.

Illegal detainer consists in withholding by a person from

another of the possession of a land or building to which
the latter is entitled after the expiration or termination of
the former's right to hold possession by virtue of a
contract, express or implied. An ejectment suit is
brought before the proper inferior court to recover
physical possession only or possession de facto and
not possession de jure, where dispossession has lasted
for not more than one year. Forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are quieting processes and the one-year time
bar to the suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of
the action. The use of summary procedure in ejectment
cases is intended to provide an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or right to possession of
the property. They are not processes to determine the
actual title to an estate. If at all, inferior courts are
empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised
by the defendant in such suits, only to resolve the issue
of possession. Its determination on the ownership issue
is, however, not conclusive.10

The allegations in both the original and the amended complaints of

petitioner before the trial court clearly raise issues involving more
than the question of possession, to wit: (a) the validity of the
Transfer of ownership to petitioner; (b) the alleged new liability of
private respondents for P400,000.00 a month from the time
petitioner made its demand on them to vacate; and (c) the alleged
continuing liability of private respondents under both loans to pay
interest and surcharges on such. As petitioner A. Francisco Realty
alleged in its amended complaint:

5. To secure the payment of the sum of 7.5 Million

together with the monthly interest, the defendant
spouses agreed to execute a Deed of Mortgage over the
property with the express condition that if and when
they fail to pay monthly interest or any infringement
thereof they agreed to convert the mortgage into a Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of the plaintiff by executing
Deed of Sale thereto, copy of which is hereto attached
and incorporated herein as Annex "A";

6. That in order to authorize the Register of Deeds into

registering the Absolute Sale and transfer to the plaintiff,
defendant delivered unto the plaintiff the said Deed of
Sale together with the original owner's copy of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 58748 of the Registry of Rizal,
copy of which is hereto attached and made an integral
part herein as Annex "B";

7. That defendant spouses later secured from the

plaintiff an additional loan of P2.5 Million with the same
condition as aforementioned with 4% monthly interest;

8. That defendants spouses failed to pay the stipulated

monthly interest and as per agreement of the parties,
plaintiff recorded and registered the Absolute Deed of
Sale in its favor on and was issued Transfer Certificate
of Title No. PT-85569, copy of which is hereto attached
and incorporated herein as Annex "C";

9. That upon registration and transfer of the Transfer

Certificate of Title in the name of the plaintiff, copy of
which is hereto attached and incorporated herein as
Annex "C", plaintiff demanded the surrender of the
possession of the above-described parcel of land
together with the improvements thereon, but defendants
failed and refused to surrender the same to the plaintiff
without justifiable reasons thereto; Neither did the
defendants pay the interest of 4% a month from May,
1992 plus surcharges up to the present;

10. That it was the understanding of the parties that if

and when the defendants shall fail to pay the interest
due and that the Deed of Sale be registered in favor of
plaintiff, the defendants shall pay a monthly rental of
P400,000.00 a month until they vacate the premises, and
that if they still fail to pay as they are still failing to pay
the amount of P400,000.00 a month as rentals and/or
interest, the plaintiff shall take physical possession of
the said property; 11
It is therefore clear from the foregoing that petitioner A. Francisco
Realty raised issues which involved more than a simple claim for
the immediate possession of the subject property. Such issues
range across the full scope of rights of the respective parties under
their contractual arrangements. As held in an analogous case:

The disagreement of the parties in Civil Case No. 96 of

the Justice of the Peace of Hagonoy, Bulacan extended
far beyond the issues generally involved in unlawful
detainer suits. The litigants therein did not raise merely
the question of who among them was entitled to the
possession of the fishpond of Federico Suntay. For all
judicial purposes, they likewise prayed of the court to
rule on their respective rights under the various
contractual documents — their respective deeds of
lease, the deed of assignment and the promissory note
— upon which they predicate their claims to the
possession of the said fishpond. In other words, they
gave the court no alternative but to rule on the validity or
nullity of the above documents. Clearly, the case was
converted into the determination of the nature of the
proceedings from a mere detainer suit to one that is
"incapable of pecuniary estimation" and thus beyond
the legitimate authority of the Justice of the Peace Court
to rule on. 12

Nor can it be said that the compulsory counterclaim filed by

respondent spouses challenging the title of petitioner A. Francisco
Realty was merely a collateral attack which would bar a ruling here
on the validity of the said title.

A counterclaim is considered a complaint, only this time,

it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff
(Valisno v. Plan, 143 SCRA 502 (1986). It stands on the
same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if
it were an independent action. Hence, the same rules on
jurisdiction in an independent action apply to a
counterclaim (Vivar v. Vivar, 8 SCRA 847 (1963); Calo v.
Ajar International, Inc. v. 22 SCRA 996 (1968); Javier v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 605 (1989);
Quiason, Philippine Courts and Their Jurisdictions, 1993
ed., p. 203). 13
On the second issue, the Court of Appeals held that, even "on the
assumption that the trial court has jurisdiction over the instant
case," petitioner's action could not succeed because the deed of
sale on which it was based was void, being in the nature of
a pactum commissorium prohibited by Art. 2088 of the Civil Code
which provides:

Art. 2088. The creditor cannot appropriate the things

given by way to pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them.
Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.

With respect to this question, the ruling of the appellate court

should be affirmed. Petitioner denies, however, that the promissory
notes contain a pactum commissorium. It contends that —

What is envisioned by Article 2088 of the Civil Code of

the Philippines is a provision in the deed of mortgage
providing for the automatic conveyance of the
mortgaged property in case of the failure of the debtor to
pay the loan (Tan v. West Coast Life Assurance Co., 54
Phil. 361). A pactum commissorium is a forfeiture clause
in a deed of mortgage (Hechanova v. Adil, 144 SCRA
450; Montevergen v. Court of Appeals, 112 SCRA 641;
Report of the Code Commission, 156).

Thus, before Article 2088 can find application herein, the

subject deed of mortgage must be scrutinized to
determine if it contains such a provision giving the
creditor the right "to appropriate the things given by way
of mortgage without following the procedure prescribed
by law for the foreclosure of the mortgage" (Ranjo v.
Salmon, 15 Phil. 436). IN SHORT, THE PROSCRIBED
STIPULATION SHOULD BE FOUND IN THE MORTGAGE
DEED ITSELF.14

The contention is patently without merit. To sustain the theory of

petitioner would be to allow a subversion of the prohibition in Art.
2088.

In Nakpil v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 15 which involved the

violation of a constructive trust, no deed of mortgage was
expressly executed between the parties in that case: Nevertheless,
this Court ruled that an agreement whereby property held in trust
was ceded to the trustee upon failure of the beneficiary to pay his
debt to the former as secured by the said property was void for
being a pactum commissorium. Itwas there held:

The arrangement entered into between the parties,

whereby Pulong Maulap was to be "considered sold to
him (respondent) . . ." in case petitioner fails to
reimburse Valdes, must then be construed as
tantamount to a pactum commissorium which is
expressly prohibited by Art. 2088 of the Civil Code. For,
there was to be automatic appropriation of the property
by Valdez in the event of failure of petitioner to pay the
value of the advances. Thus, contrary to respondent's
manifestations, all the elements of a pactum
commissorium were present: there was a creditor-
debtor relationship between the parties; the property
was used as security for the loan; and, there was
automatic appropriation by respondent of Pulong
Maulap in case of default of petitioner.16

Similarly, the Court has struck down such stipulations as contained

in deeds of sale purporting to be pacto de retro sales but found
actually to be equitable mortgages.

It has been consistently held that the presence of even

one of the circumstances enumerated in Art. 1602 of the
New Civil Code is sufficient to declare a contract of sale
with right to repurchase an equitable mortgage. This is
so because pacto de retro sales with the stringent and
onerous effects that accompany them are not favored. In
case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with the
right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable
mortgage.

Petitioner, to prove her claim, cannot rely on the

stipulation in the contract providing that complete and
absolute title shall be vested on the vendee should the
vendors fail to redeem the property on the specified
date. Such stipulation that the ownership of the property
would automatically pass to the vendee in case no
redemption was effected within the stipulated period is
void for being a pactum commissorium which enables
the mortgagee to acquire ownership of the mortgaged
property without need of foreclosure. Its insertion in the
 contract is an avowal of the intention to mortgage rather
that to sell the property. 17

Indeed, in Reyes v. Sierra 18 this Court categorically ruled that a

mortgagee's mere act of registering the mortgaged property in his
own name upon the mortgagor's failure to redeem the property
amounted to the exercise of the privilege of a mortgagee in
a pactum commissorium.

Obviously, from the nature of the transaction,

applicant's a predecessor-in-interest is a mere
mortgagee, and ownership of the thing mortgaged is
retained by Basilia Beltran, the mortgagor. The
mortgagee, however, may recover the loan, although the
mortgage document evidencing the loan was
nonregistrable being a purely private instrument. Failure
of mortgagor to redeem the property does not
automatically vest ownership of the property to the
mortgagee, which would grant the latter the right to
appropriate the thing mortgaged or dispose of it. This
violates the provision of Article 2088 of the New Civil
Code, which reads:

The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way

of pledge or mortgage, or dispose by them. Any
stipulation to the contrary is null and void.

The act of applicant in registering the property in his

own name upon mortgagor's failure to redeem the
property would to a pactum commissorium which is
against good morals and public policy.19

Thus, in the case at bar, the stipulations in the promissory notes

providing that, upon failure of respondent spouses to pay interest,
ownership of the property would be automatically transferred to
petitioner A. Francisco Realty and the deed of sale in its favor
would be registered, are in substance a pactum commissorium.
They embody the two elements of pactum commissorium as laid
down in Uy Tong v. Court of Appeals,20 to wit:

The prohibition on pactum commissorium stipulations is

provided for by Article 2088 of the Civil Code:
 Art. 2088. The creditor cannot appropriate the things
given by way of pledge or mortgagee, or dispose of the
same. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.

The aforequoted provision furnishes the two elements

for pactum commissorium to exist: (1) that there should
be a pledge or mortgage wherein a property is pledged
or mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the
principal obligation; and (2) that there should be a
stipulation for an automatic appropriation by the creditor
of the thing pledged or mortgaged in the event of non-
payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated
period.21

The subject transaction being void, the registration of the deed of

sale, by virtue of which petitioner A. Francisco Realty was able to
obtain TCT No. PT-85569 covering the subject lot, must also be
declared void, as prayed for by respondents in their counterclaim.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED,

insofar as it dismissed petitioner's complaint against respondent
spouses on the ground that the stipulations in the promissory
notes are void for being a pactum commissorium, but REVERSED
insofar as it ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over this
case. The Register of Deeds of Pasig City is hereby ORDERED to
CANCEL TCT No. PT-85569 issued to petitioner and ISSUE a new
one in the name of respondent spouses.

SO ORDERED.

SHEN V. ANTI-TERRORISM (G.R. NO.

178552; OCTOBER 5, 2010)
CASE DIGEST: SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT
NETWORK, INC. and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. v. ANTI-
TERRORISM COUNCIL, et al.

CONSOLIDATED WITH: G.R. No. 178554; G.R. No. 178581; G.R. No.

178890; G.R. No. 179157; G.R. No. 179461

FACTS: Six petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed challenging

the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security
Act. Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-
Terrorism Councilcomposed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions,
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary
Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary
Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser
Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo
Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the
petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and
Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

ISSUE: Should the petition prosper?

HELD: Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1.

Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of

particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their
respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy;
(b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which
are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two
superfluous. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it

must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened
injuryas a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being

suspected "communist fronts" by the government, especially the military;
whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental
importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 178890 allege that they have been subjected to
"close security surveillance by state security forces," their members
followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields,"
and their offices monitored by "men with military build." They likewise
claim that they have been branded as "enemies of the State. Even
conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any
connection between the purported"surveillance" and the implementation
of RA 9372.

Petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take

judicial notice of respondent's alleged action of tagging them as militant
organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging,
according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription
without following the procedure under the law.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material

requisites: (1) the matter must be oneof common and general
knowledge; (2) it must bewell and authoritatively settledand not doubtful
or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts
may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records
and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be
one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of
judicial notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate
their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has
been filed against them, three years after its effectivity,belies any claim
of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called
tagging.

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No.
178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP
and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific
provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization
and members.

The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary

Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo
Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and
NPA as terrorist organizations. Such statement notwithstanding, there is
yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and
NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under
RA 9372. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations
have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of,
much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any
appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of the
individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest
in the implementation of the law. It bears to stress that generalized
interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not
establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy

that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.

Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and

supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way approximate a
credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being
lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function. Without any
justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory
relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again,
declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both
the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated
reaction to it of a public official aremerely theorized, lie beyond judicial
review for lack of ripeness.

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad

the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like
"widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and
"coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous,
leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the
prohibited acts.

A statute or act suffers from the defect ofvaguenesswhen it lacks

comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile,
decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area
of protected freedoms.

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine

assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will
accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected.

Distinguished from anas-applied challenge which considers only extant

facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the
entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its
actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction
that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain
from constitutionally protected speech or activities.

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring

opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines,as grounds for a
facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus
successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds. Since a penal statute may only be
assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes

speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the
definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some
form of expression protected by the free speech clause.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must
first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of
the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including
the coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful demand."
Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot
recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.

Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate,

as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime.
Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on
the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts
against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in
negotiating a deceitful transaction.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual

charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a
limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus
legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power
neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect
on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an
extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress. DISMISSED.

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 226679               August 15, 2017
 
TOPIC: Section 23 of RA 9165, rule-making power of Supreme Court,
equal protection clause

PONENTE: Peralta

FACTS:
Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA
9165.
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter
into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea
and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE:
should have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of
rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal
quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea

bargaining in all violations of said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal
branches of the government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it

encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules of procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being
violative of the Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer
shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.

The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-
equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that
keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
within the sole province of this Court.  The other branches trespass upon
this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal,
alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts
on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to
amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the

Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken
to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the
Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc. – The Cooperative Code provisions on notices
cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.

3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS

from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors
MultiPurpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge
Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the National Power
Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of
the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. – Despite statutory
provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt
from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.

4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first

paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts
except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it
contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this
Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new
rules of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive
branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to
promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and
one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.

SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED

The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of
the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the
policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in

toto or a qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare
as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and
unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular duly issued for the purpose.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule
is substantive or procedural in nature.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the

practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or
modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy
and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a
vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the
right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it
operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule
deals merely with procedure.

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule

violates substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the provision
of a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a
way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea
bargaining is considered to be an “important,” “essential,” “highly
desirable,” and “legitimate” component of the administration of justice.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process

whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.” There is
give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining.  The essence of
the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make
concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea
bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system –
speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the accused, the offended
party, the prosecution, and the court.
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on
plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested
right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by
regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic

rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty;
the prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial.  Under the
present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a
demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and
the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to
a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense charged.  The
reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of
criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not
any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can
sustain.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even

up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s

exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to

a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow
such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence
to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the
prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the
former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the
evidence on record. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength
or weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the
weight of the evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of the
defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.

G.R. No. 187231               June 22, 2010

MINERVA GOMEZ-CASTILLO Petitioner,
vs.
COMISSION ON ELECTIONS and STRIKE B. REVILLA, Respondents.
 DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioner Minerva Gomez-Castillo (Castillo) hereby seeks to nullify the
orders dated January 30, 2009 and March 11, 2009 1 issued in EAC No.
A-01-2009 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Antecedents
Castillo and respondent Strike P. Revilla ran for Municipal Mayor of
Bacoor, Cavite during the May 14, 2007 local elections. After the
Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Revilla as the elected
Municipal Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, Castillo filed an Election Protest Ad
Cautelam2 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Bacoor, Cavite, which
was eventually raffled to Branch 19.
Through his Answer, Revilla sought the dismissal of the election protest,
alleging that it was filed in the wrong Branch of the RTC. He pointed out
that Supreme Court Administrative Order (SCAO) No. 54-2007
designated Branch 22 of the RTC in Imus, Cavite and Branch 88 of the
RTC in Cavite City to hear, try and decide election contests involving
municipal officials in Cavite; and that contrary to SCAO No. 54-2007,
Castillo filed his protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite, which was not the
proper court.
On November 21, 2008, Branch 19 dismissed Castillo’s election protest
for being violative of SCAO No. 54-2007.
On December 23, 2008, Castillo presented a notice of
appeal.3 Thereupon, the RTC ordered that the complete records of the
protest be forwarded to the Election Contests Adjudication Department
(ECAD) of the COMELEC.41avvphi1
The First Division of the COMELEC dismissed the appeal for being
brought beyond the five-day reglementary period, noting that although
Castillo had received the November 21, 2008 order of the RTC on
December 15 , 2008, she filed her notice of appeal on December 23,
2008, a day too late to appeal, to wit:
Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which requires the appellant to file her notice of appeal "within five (5)
days after promulgation of the decision of the court xxx" and considering
further that jurisprudence holds that perfection of an appeal in the
manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but
JURISDICTIONAL, this Commission, First Division, RESOLVES to
DISMISS the instant appeal for appellant's failure to file her Notice of
Appeal within the five (5) day reglementary period.
SO ORDERED.5
Castillo moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal of her appeal, but
the COMELEC denied the motion because she did not pay the motion
fees required under Sec. 7(f), Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 02-0130, viz:
The "Motion for Reconsideration" filed by protestant-appellant Minerva
G. Castillo, thru registered mail on 13 February 2009 and received by
this Commission on 4 March 2009, seeking reconsideration of the
Commission's (First Division) Order dated 30 January 2009, is hereby
DENIED for failure of the movant to pay the necessary motion fees
under Sec. 7(f), Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure 6 as
amended by Comelec Resolution no. 02-0130. 71avvphi1
Castillo has brought the present recourse, contending that the
COMELEC’s orders dismissing her appeal and denying her motion for
reconsideration were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Parties’ Arguments
Castillo insists that her notice of appeal was seasonably filed; otherwise,
the RTC would not have given due course to his appeal; that Section 3,
Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, cited in the assailed order
dated January 30, 2009, did not apply to her case, because Section 2 of
Rule I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that:
Sec. 2. Applicability.- These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all
actions and proceedings brought before the Commission. Part VI shall
apply to election contests and Quo Warranto cases cognizable by courts
of general jurisdiction.
that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure applied only to actions and
proceedings brought before the COMELEC, not to actions or
proceedings originating in courts of general jurisdiction; that even
assuming that the appeal was belatedly filed, the rules on election
contests should be liberally construed to the end that mere technical
objections would not defeat the will of the people in the choice of public
officers; that the Court relaxed on numerous occasions the application of
the rules in order to give due course to belated appeals upon strong and
compelling reasons; that an electoral contest like hers was imbued with
public interest, because it involved the paramount need to clarify the real
choice of the electorate; that Section 4 of Rule I of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure even allows the COMELEC to suspend its own rules of
procedure in order to obtain a speedy disposition of all matters pending
before the COMELEC; and that the COMELEC should not have
dismissed her motion for reconsideration for her mere failure to pay the
corresponding filing fee, but should have considered the soundness of
her argument to the effect that SCAO No. 54-2007 continued to vest
jurisdiction to try and decide election contest involving elective municipal
officials in the RTC as a whole, rendering the designation of the RTC
branches to handle election protests akin to a designation of venue.
Castillo further insists that Section 12 of Rule 2 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure provides that assignment of cases to the specially
designated courts should be done exclusively by raffle conducted by the
executive judge or by the judges designated by the Supreme Court; and
that her protest was thus duly raffled to the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite,
considering that SCAO 54-2007 should be construed as a permissive
rule that cannot supersede the general rule that jurisdiction over election
contests is vested in the RTC.
In his comment,8 Revilla submits that the COMELEC correctly dismissed
Castillo’s appeal for being filed beyond the five-day reglementary period
prescribed in Section 3 of Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
thus:
Section 3. Notice of Appeal. - Within five (5) days after promulgation of
the decision of the court, the aggrieved party may filed with said court a
notice of appeal, and serve a copy thereof upon the attorney of record of
the adverse party.
that A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, otherwise known as The Rules of Procedure
in Election Contests Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials,
clearly and categorically directed:
Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the
commission on Elections, within five days after promulgation, by filing a
notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy
served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
that the period for filing an appeal is not a mere technicality of law or
procedure and the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege that may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the law; that the notice of
appeal, even on the assumption that it was filed on time, still remained
futile due to the petitioner’s failure to pay the corresponding fee for the
motion for reconsideration; that the failure to pay the filing fee rendered
the motion for reconsideration a mere scrap of paper, because it
prevented the COMELEC from acquiring jurisdiction over the protest;
and that the COMELEC could not be faulted for applying its procedural
rules to achieve a just and expeditious determination of every
proceeding brought before it.

Issues
Does Section 13 of Rule 2 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC designate the RTC
Branch that has jurisdiction over an election contest, or does it merely
designate the proper venue for filing?
In case the RTC was incorrect, is the error enough to warrant the
reversal of its order of dismissal despite its having attained finality?
Ruling
The petition has no merit.
 A
Error of Petitioner in filing the protest in RTC in Bacoor, not jurisdictional
It is well-settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. As such, jurisdiction
cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; nor be acquired through waiver
nor enlarged by the omission of the parties; nor conferred by any
acquiescence of the court. The allocation of jurisdiction is vested in
Congress, and cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the
Government.
The Rules of Court does not define jurisdictional boundaries of the
courts. In promulgating the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court is
circumscribed by the zone properly denominated as the promulgation of
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts;9 consequently, the Rules of Court can only determine the means,
ways or manner in which said jurisdiction, as fixed by the Constitution
and acts of Congress, shall be exercised. The Rules of Court yields to
the substantive law in determining jurisdiction. 10
The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal
officials has been vested in the RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code).11 On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-
15-SC, by specifying the proper venue where such cases may be filed
and heard, only spelled out the manner by which an RTC with
jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other rules on venue, A.M.
No. 07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly
administration of justice,12 and is permissive, because it was enacted to
ensure the exclusive and speedy disposition of election protests and
petitions for quo warranto involving elective municipal officials.13
Castillo’s filing her protest in the RTC in Bacoor, Cavite amounted only
to a wrong choice of venue. Hence, the dismissal of the protest by
Branch 19 constituted plain error, considering that her wrong choice did
not affect the jurisdiction of the RTC. What Branch 19 should have done
under the circumstances was to transfer the protest to Branch 22 of the
RTC in Imus, Cavite, which was the proper venue. Such transfer was
proper, whether she as the protestant sought it or not, given that the
determination of the will of the electorate of Bacoor, Cavite according to
the process set forth by law was of the highest concern of our
institutions, particularly of the courts.
B
Castillo’s tardy appeal should be dismissed
Section 8 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC provides that:
Section 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the
Commission on Elections within five days after promulgation by filing a
notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision with copy
served on the adverse counsel or party if not represented by counsel.
Although Castillo had received the November 21, 2008 order of the RTC
on December 15, 2008, she filed her notice of appeal only on December
23, 2008, or eight days after her receipt of the decision. Her appeal was
properly dismissed for being too late under the aforequoted rule of the
COMELEC.
Castillo now insists that her appeal should not be dismissed, because
she claims that the five-day reglementary period was a mere technicality,
implying that such period was but a trivial guideline to be ignored or
brushed aside at will.
Castillo’s insistence is unacceptable. The period of appeal and the
perfection of appeal are not mere technicalities to be so lightly regarded,
for they are essential to the finality of judgments, a notion underlying the
stability of our judicial system.14 A greater reason to adhere to this notion
exists herein, for the short period of five days as the period to appeal
recognizes the essentiality of time in election protests, in order that the
will of the electorate is ascertained as soon as possible so that the
winning candidate is not deprived of the right to assume office, and so
that any doubt that can cloud the incumbency of the truly deserving
winning candidate is quickly removed.
Contrary to Castillo’s posture, we cannot also presume the timeliness of
her appeal from the fact that the RTC gave due course to her appeal by
its elevating the protest to the COMELEC. The presumption of timeliness
would not arise if her appeal was actually tardy.
It is not trite to observe, finally, that Castillo’s tardy appeal resulted in the
finality of the RTC’s dismissal even before January 30, 2002. This result
provides an additional reason to warrant the assailed actions of the
COMELEC in dismissing her appeal. Accordingly, the Court finds that
the COMELEC’s assailed actions were appropriate and lawful, not
tainted by either arbitrariness or whimsicality,
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the
Philippines [G.R. No. 164195. April 5, 2011]
FACTS:
Petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the government under
Republic Act 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL). Government took petitioners’ lands on December
9, 1996. Land Bank valued the properties atP165,484.47 per hectare,
but AFC-HPI rejected the offer of that amount. Consequently, on
instruction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Land Bank
deposited for AFC and HPI P26,409,549.86 and P45,481,706.76,
respectively, or a total of P71,891,256.62. Upon revaluation of the
expropriated properties, Land Bank eventually made additional deposits,
placing the total amount paid at P411,769,168.32 (P71,891,256.62
+ P339,877,911.70), an increase of nearly five times. Both petitioners
withdrew the amounts. Still, they filed separate complaints for just
compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), where it was
dismissed, after three years, for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a
case with the RTC for the proper determination of just compensation.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners fixing the valuation of petitioners’
properties at P103.33/sq.m with 12% interest plus attorney’s fees.
Respondents appealed to the Third Division of the Supreme Court where
the RTC ruling was upheld. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Third
Division deleted the award of interest and attorney’s fees and entry of
judgment was issued. The just compensation of which was only settled
on May 9, 2008. Petitioners filed a second motion for reconsideration
with respect to denial of award of legal interest and attorney’s fees and a
motion to refer the second motion to the Court En Banc and was granted
accordingly, restoring in toto the ruling of the RTC. Respondent filed
their second motion for reconsideration as well for holding of oral
arguments with the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to admit for
Reconsideration in-Intervention by the Office of the Solicitor General in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
 
Political Law (Constitutional Law)
 
(1)  Whether or not the “transcendental importance” does not apply to
the present case.

(2)  Whether or not the standard of “transcendental importance” cannot

justify the negation of the doctrine of immutability of a final judgment and
the abrogation of a vested right in favor of the Government that
respondent LBP represents.

(3)  Whether or not the Honorable Court ignored the deliberations of the
1986 Constitutional Commission showing that just compensation for
expropriated agricultural property must be viewed in the context of social
justice.

Civil Law:
 
Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration of respondent
deleting interest and attorney’s fees amount to unjust enrichment in its
favor.

Remedial Law
 
(1)  Whether or not the rules on second motion for reconsideration by the
Supreme Court should be strictly complied with by a vote of two-thirds of
its actual membership.

(2)  Whether or not the holding of oral arguments would still serve its
purpose.

(3)  Whether or not the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to admit for
Reconsideration in-Intervention from the Office of the Solicitor General
may still be granted.

RULINGS:
 
Political Law (Constitutional Law)
(1)  No. The present case goes beyond the private interests involved; it
involves a matter of public interest – the proper application of a basic
constitutionally-guaranteed right, namely, the right of a landowner to
receive just compensation when the government exercises the power of
eminent domain in its agrarian reform program.

Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution expresses the constitutional

rule on eminent domain – “Private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.” While confirming the State’s inherent
power and right to take private property for public use, this provision at
the same time lays down the limitation in the exercise of this power.
When it takes property pursuant to its inherent right and power, the State
has the corresponding obligation to pay the owner just compensation for
the property taken. For compensation to be considered “just,” it must not
only be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken; it must also be
paid to the landowner without delay.
(2)  No. The doctrine “transcendental importance,” contrary to the
assertion it is applicable only to legal standing questions, is justified in
negating the doctrine of immutability of judgment. It will be a very myopic
reading of the ruling as the context clearly shows that the phrase
“transcendental importance” was used only to emphasize the overriding
public interest involved in this case. The Supreme Court said in their
resolution:
That the issues posed by this case are of transcendental importance is
not hard to discern from these discussions. A constitutional limitation,
guaranteed under no less than the all-important Bill of Rights, is at stake
in this case: how can compensation in an eminent domain case be “just”
when the payment for the compensation for property already taken has
been unreasonably delayed? To claim, as the assailed Resolution does,
that only private interest is involved in this case is to forget that an
expropriation involves the government as a necessary actor. It forgets,
too, that under eminent domain, the constitutional limits or standards
apply to government who carries the burden of showing that these
standards have been met. Thus, to simply dismiss the case as a private
interest matter is an extremely shortsighted view that this Court should
not leave uncorrected.

xxxx

More than the stability of our jurisprudence, the matter before us is of

transcendental importance to the nation because of the subject matter
involved – agrarian reform, a societal objective of that the government
has unceasingly sought to achieve in the past half century.

From this perspective, the court demonstrated that the higher interests of
justice are duly served.

(3)  Yes. In fact, while a proposal was made during the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission to give a lower market price per
square meter for larger tracts of land, the Commission never intended to
give agricultural landowners less than just compensation in the
expropriation of property for agrarian reform purposes.

[N]othing is inherently contradictory in the public purpose of land reform

and the right of landowners to receive just compensation for the
expropriation by the State of their properties. That the petitioners are
corporations that used to own large tracts of land should not be taken
against them. As Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz eloquently put it:

[S]ocial justice – or any justice for that matter – is for the deserving,
whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is
true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the
balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its
sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor
simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they
are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike,
according to the mandate of the law.

Civil Law
 
Yes. In the present case, it is undisputed that the government took the
petitioners’ lands on December 9, 1996; the petitioners only received full
payment of the just compensation due on May 9, 2008. This
circumstance, by itself, already confirms the unconscionable delay in the
payment of just compensation.
An added dimension is the impact of the delay. One impact – as pointed
out above – is the loss of income the landowners suffered. Another
impact that the LBP now glosses over is the income that the LBP earned
from the sizeable sum it withheld for twelve long years. From this
perspective, the unaccounted-for LBP income is unjust enrichment in its
favor and an inequitable loss to the landowners. This situation was what
the Court essentially addressed when it awarded the petitioners 12%
interest.

Remedial Law
 
(1) No. When the Court ruled on the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration by a vote of 12 Members (8 for the grant of the
motion and 4 against), the Court ruled on the merits of the
petitioners’ motion. This ruling complied in all respects with the
Constitution requirement for the votes that should support a ruling of
the Court. Admittedly, the Court did not make any express prior
ruling accepting or disallowing the petitioners’ motion as required by
Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules. The Court, however, did not
thereby contravene its own rule on 2nd motions for reconsideration;
since 12 Members of the Court opted to entertain the motion by
voting for and against it, the Court simply did not register an express
vote, but instead demonstrated its compliance with the rule through
the participation by no less than 12 of its 15 Members. Viewed in
 this light, the Court cannot even be claimed to have suspended the
effectiveness of its rule on 2nd motions for reconsideration; it simply
complied with this rule in a form other than by express and separate
voting.

(2)  No. The submissions of the parties, as well as the records of the
case, have already provided this Court with enough arguments and
particulars to rule on the issues involved. Oral arguments at this point
would be superfluous and would serve no useful purpose.

(3)  No. The interest of the Republic, for whom the OSG speaks, has
been amply protected through the direct action of petitioner LBP – the
government instrumentality created by law to provide timely and
adequate financial support in all phases involved in the execution of
needed agrarian reform. The OSG had every opportunity to intervene
through the long years that this case had been pending but it chose to
show its hand only at this very late stage when its presence can only
serve to delay the final disposition of this case. The arguments the OSG
presents, furthermore, are issues that this Court has considered in the
course of resolving this case. Thus, every reason exists to deny the
intervention prayed for

SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 212623, January 11,

2016 ENRIQUE G. DE LEON, PETITIONER, VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SPO3 PEDRITO
L. LEONARDO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside
the November 14, 2013 Decision[1] and the May 20, 2014 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35390, which affirmed the
September 28, 2012 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27,
Manila (RTC), sustaining the conviction of accused Enrique De Leon
(De Leon) for Grave Oral Defamation by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 6, Manila (MeTC).

Records show that De Leon was charged with Grave Oral Defamation in
the Information filed before the MeTC, docketed as Criminal Case No.
453376-CR, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That, on or about April 17, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, with the deliberate intent to besmirch the honor and
reputation of one SPO3 PEDRITO L. LEONARDO, did and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously publicly proffer against the latter slanderous
words and expressions such as "WALANGHIYA KANG
MANGONGOTONG NA PULIS KA, ANG YABANG YABANG MO
NOON. PATAY KA SA AKIN MAMAYA [,]" and other words and
expressions of similar import, thereby bringing the said SPO3 PEDRITO
L. LEONARDO into public contempt, discredit and ridicule.

Contrary to law.[4]

Upon arraignment, De Leon entered a plea of not guilty. Pursuant to the

Supreme Court Circular No. 20-2002, De Leon and private respondent
SPO3 Pedrito Leonardo (SPO3 Leonardo) appeared before the
Philippine Mediation Center to settle the civil aspect of the case. The
conciliation meeting, however, bogged down. Hence, the proceedings
before the lower court continued. During the pre-trial, the parties pre-
marked their respective exhibits and moved for the trial to commence.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: private respondent

SPO3 Leonardo, Carlito Principe (Principe) and Jennifer Malupeng
(Malupeng). Their combined testimonies narrated that De Leon and his
son, John Christopher De Leon (John), filed a complaint for Grave
Misconduct against SPO3 Leonardo before the People's Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB), docketed as Administrative Case Nos. 06-
02-060 (291) II and 06-02-061 (292)11.

The first hearing was scheduled on April 17, 2006 at the PLEB office on
the 5th Floor of the Manila City Hall; At around 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon, while waiting outside the PLEB office on the 5 th floor of the
Manila City Hall, SPO3 Leonardo noticed De Leon and several of his
companions approaching. Before entering the PLEB office, De Leon
uttered these words to SPO3 Leonardo, "Walanghiya kang
mangongotong na pulis ka, ang yabang yabang mo noon. Patay ka sa
akin ngayon."

The words uttered by De Leon caused SPO3 Leonardo embarrassment

because there were several persons present at the PLEB premises. He
could have arrested De Leon but he did not want to make a scene.
Afterwards, De Leon's wife, Concepcion, emerged from the said office
and apologized to Leonardo for her husband's actuations. SPO3
Leonardo calmly proceeded to the Special Operations Group of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) located at the Manila City Hall to have
the incident entered in its blotter. On the same day, SPO3 Leonardo filed
his complaint at the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) together with
Principe.[5]

Version of the Defense

The defense presented Fernando Manalo (Manalo), Ruperto Molera

(Molera), Concepcion De Leon (Concepcion) and the accused himself as
witnesses.

From their testimonies, the defense claimed that there was a prior
incident that took place on the morning of February 27, 2006 when De
Leon, with his son John, while having breakfast with their fellow joggers
at the Philippine National Railroad-Tutuban Station, were approached by
SPO3 Leonardo who arrived on his scooter. With his gun drawn, SPO3
Leonardo walked fast towards the group and at a distance of two meters,
more or less, he said, "Putang ina mo, tapos ka na Ricky Boy, referring
to De Leon." He pressed the trigger but the gun did not fire, when he
was to strike again, De Leon was able to escape with the help of John. [6]

Consequently, De Leon and John filed an administrative complaint for

grave misconduct against SPO3 Leonardo before the PLEB and the first
hearing was set on April 17, 2006. In his Sinumpaang Salaysay sa
Paghahabla filed before the PLEB, De Leon narrated that he and SPO3
Leonardo were former jogging buddies and that the latter wanted to
borrow money from the former in the amount of P150,000.00, but he
declined. SPO3 Leonardo became upset with him, culminating in the
gun-pointing incident.[7]

On April 17, 2006, at around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, De Leon, in

the company of his wife Concepcion, Manalo, Molera, and several others
went to the PLEB office to attend the hearing. When De Leon and his
companions arrived at the PLEB, they saw SPO3 Leonardo seated on
the bench alone; that they were about to pass when SPO3 Leonardo
stood up, badmouthed and threatened De Leon by uttering the words,
"Putang-ina mong mayabang ka, pag di mo inurong demanda mo sa
akin, papatayin kita."
Moments later, they caused the incident to be entered in the police
blotter. From there, they returned to the PLEB office where they were
advised to file charges against SPO3 Leonardo in Camp Crame.
Malupeng and Principe were not seen at the PLEB office premises.
Molera even tried to pacify SPO3 Leonardo by saying, "Itok (referring to
SPO3 Leonardo), ano ka ba naman andito na tayo sa husgado, ayaw
mo pang tigilan ang kamumura kay Ricky, referring to De Leon." De
Leon did not do anything, he simply entered the PLEB office and sat
down there because he got nervous. He also denied apologizing to
SPO3 Leonardo.

Also on April 17, 2006, De Leon utilized the police blotter to file a case
against SPO3 Leonardo in Camp Crame. He filed the said case only
after he received the subpoena from the OCP for the case filed against
him by SPO3 Leonardo. Although he was with his lawyer when he went
to Camp Crame, the latter did not advise him to file a complaint in the
OCP right away. According to De Leon, he also saw SPO3 Leonardo
deposit his service firearm while at the PLEB office. [8]

The Ruling of the MeTC

In its Decision,[9] dated April 15, 2011, the MeTC found De Leon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Grave Oral Defamation. The trial court
considered SPO3 Leonardo's police blotter as prima facie evidence of
the facts contained therein. His actuations on the day of the incident
were spontaneous. As borne by the records, he immediately reported
the incident and filed his complaint on that very same day. Considering
the animosity between him and De Leon, it was contrary to human
experience to expect him to arrest the latter right there and then when
his motives would necessarily be met with doubt later on. Neither was
there any ill-motive on the part of witness Principe whose testimony was
given great probative consequence.10 The MeTC found De Leon's
defense as only an afterthought and self-serving as he merely filed the
counter-charges against Leonardo after he had received the subpoena
from the OCP. The dispositive portion of the MeTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, with the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Enrique
De Leon y Garcia GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and is hereby SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as minimum penalty, to 1 year,
1 month and 11 days of prision correccional in its minimum period, as
maximum penalty.
On the civil aspect ex delicto, the accused is ORDERED to pay the
private complainant P10,000 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[11]

The verdict being unacceptable to him, De Leon filed his Notice of

Appeal,[12] dated April 18, 2011.

On May 4, 2011, the RTC issued the Order[13] directing De Leon to file

his appeal memorandum. De Leon, however, failed to comply. For his
failure to file the same, the RTC issued another Order, [14] dated
December 28, 2011, dismissing his appeal. De Leon then filed a motion
for reconsideration[15] on January 30, 2012, which was granted by the
RTC in its Order,[16] dated May 22, 2012.

On June 15, 2012, De Leon filed his appeal memorandum [17] and

argued, among others, that the MeTC decision lacked the necessary
constitutional and procedural requirements of a valid decision.

The Ruling of the RTC

On September 28, 2012, the RTC rendered its decision affirming

in toto the ruling of the MeTC. It opined that where the issue was the
extent of credence properly given to the declarations made by
witnesses, the findings of the trial court were accorded great weight and
respect. In appreciating the evidence of the prosecution, the RTC
observed that the MeTC properly discussed in seriatim how it arrived at
De Leon's conviction. Thus, contrary to his contentions, the findings of
the MeTC were clearly elucidated.[18]

On October 30, 2012, De Leon filed his motion for reconsideration, [19] but
it was denied by the RTC in its November 27, 2012 Order.

Aggrieved, De Leon filed a petition for review under Rule 42 before the
CA.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification as to the imposed

penalty. The CA stated that the issue of credibility was already raised
with the RTC and was resolved against De Leon. The CA found that he
had not shown any sufficient reason to justify a departure from the
factual findings of the MeTC, which were affirmed by the RTC. [20]

According to the CA, to call SPO3 Leonardo a "walanghiya,"

"mayabang" and "mangongotong" in public unquestionably constituted
grave oral defamation. These words seriously attacked SPO3
Leonardo's character. The term "mangongotong" actually imputed a
crime that was dishonorable to him as a police authority. There having
been no provocation on the part of SPO3 Leonardo and that the
utterances complained of were not made in the heat of unrestrained
anger or obfuscation, the RTC did not err in upholding the judgment
against De Leon for the crime of grave oral defamation. [21] The decretal
portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision

of the RTC is AFFIRMED except that the minimum sentence of
imprisonment is modified to the extent that the penalty to be served shall
be: four (4) months as minimum [minus the one (1) day] to a maximum
of one (1) year, one (1) month and eleven (11) days, (as imposed by the
trial court).

IT IS SO ORDERED.[22]

De Leon moved for partial reconsideration of the CA decision but to no

avail.

Hence, this petition, where De Leon raises matters in question that can
be summarized as follows:

ISSUES

WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE MeTC FAILED TO INCLUDE THE

FACTS AND THE LAW UPON WHICH THE DECISION WAS BASED

1. WHETHER DE LEON'S GUILT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT.

In his Petition for Review,[23] De Leon again argues that the MeTC
decision suffers from constitutional infirmity. The lower court should have
decided the case on the basis of the testimonies of the witnesses for the
defense. Also, the conviction was based simply on De Leon's conduct
during trial and not on the merits of the case. [24]

In its Comment,[25] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered

that the testimonies of SPO3 Leonardo and Principe were credible and
competent. Further, in the absence of clear and convincing extrinsic
evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality on the part of MeTC
Judge Teresa Soriaso (Judge Soriaso), the presumption of regularity in
the performance of the judge's function will stand. [26]

In his Reply,[27] however, De Leon insisted that the prosecution failed to

prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The intent on his part to
diminish the esteem, goodwill or confidence of SPO3 Leonardo or to
excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinion of others
against him was lacking as his testimony was made in good faith,
without malice. He also reiterated his stand that there was no finding of
clear and distinct facts and law to serve as a basis for its conclusion of
convicting him for the crime charged and that the MeTC decision was
not based on the merits, rather on the personal sentiments harbored by
Judge Soriaso against him.[28]

The Court's Ruling

The MeTC Decision clearly

stated the facts and the law
on which it was based

Under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, no decision shall be

rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based. Section 1 of Rule 36 of the
Rules of Court provides that a judgment or final order determining the
merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by
the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it
is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk of the court.

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the

Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and
fair play. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how
it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is
unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher
tribunal.

More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in

arriving at a judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal
reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge,
preventing him from deciding ipse dixit.[29]

The standard "expected of the judiciary" is that the decision rendered

makes clear why either party prevailed under the applicable law to the
facts as established. Nor is there any rigid formula as to the language to
be employed to satisfy the requirement of clarity and distinctness. The
discretion of the particular judge in this respect, while not unlimited, is
necessarily broad. There is no sacramental form of words which he must
use upon pain of being considered as having failed to abide by what the
Constitution directs.[30]

It is understandable that courts, with heavy dockets and time constraints,

often find themselves with little to spare in the preparation of decisions to
the extent most desirable. Judges might learn to synthesize and to
simplify their pronouncements. Nevertheless, concisely written such as
they may be, decisions must still distinctly and clearly express, at least in
minimum essence, its factual and legal bases. [31]

In this case, there was no breach of the constitutional mandate that

decisions must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on
which they are based. The CA correctly stated that the MeTC clearly
emphasized in its decision, the factual findings, as well as the credibility
and the probative weight of the evidence for the defense vis-a-vis the
evidence of the prosecution. The MeTC presented both the version of
the prosecution and that of the defense. De Leon was not left in the
dark. He was fully aware of the alleged errors of the MeTC. The RTC, as
an appellate court, found no reason to reverse the decision of the MeTC.

Likewise, when it comes to credibility of witnesses, this Court accords

the highest respect, even finality, to the evaluation by the lower court of
the testimonies of the witnesses presented before it. [32]

Although De Leon claims that the testimony of Principe is incredible, the

MeTC, the RTC and the CA perceived it otherwise. First, there was no ill
motive on the part of Principe for him to weave a tale of lies against De
Leon. Second, Judge Soriaso was able to observe Principe's demeanor
during trial. He was observed to be candid and composed and his
conduct on the witness stand did not mirror that of an insincere or false
witness.

No bias and partiality on

the part of Judge Soriaso

Unless there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal interest in the
proceedings and that his bias stems from an extra-judicial source, this
Court shall always presume that a magistrate shall decide on the merits
of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts. [33] Bias and prejudice
cannot be presumed, in light especially of a judge's sacred obligation
under his oath of office to administer justice with impartiality. There
should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere
suspicion of partiality is not enough.[34]

De Leon posits that Judge Soriaso harbored ill feelings towards him
which eventually resulted in his conviction. No evidence, however, was
ever adduced to justify such allegation. Thus, such argument must also
fail.

The crime committed is only

Slight Oral Defamation

Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means,

instead of in writing. It is defined as "the speaking of base and
defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation,
office, trade, business or means of livelihood." [35] The elements of oral
defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, status or
circumstances; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5)
directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead; (6) which
tends to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of the person defamed.
Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It becomes grave when it
is of a serious and insulting nature.

An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the

commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which
tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine whether a
statement is defamatory, the words used in the statement must be
construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons
reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in
another sense.[36] It must be stressed that words which are merely
insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of
general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether
written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation
in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the
language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
[37]

In this case, the Court agrees that the words uttered by De Leon were
defamatory in nature. It is, however, of the view that the same only
constituted simple oral defamation.

Whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation,

depends not only upon the sense and grammatical meaning of the
utterances but also upon the special circumstances of the case, like the
social standing or the advanced age of the offended party. [38] "The
gravity depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal
relations of the accused and the offended party; and (3) the special
circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the
offended party and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of
the offender at the time. In particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory
words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the
offended party constitutes only a light felony." [39]

There are cases where the Court considered the circumstances of the
concerned parties and held that the defamation was grave serious in
nature.

In U.S. v. Tolosa,[40] where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive

and scurrilous epithets including words imputing unchastity against a
respectable married lady and tending to injure the character of her young
daughters, the Court ruled that the crime committed was grave slander.
In Balite v. People,[41] the accused was found guilty of grave oral
defamation as the scurrilous words he imputed to the offended party
constituted the crime of estafa.

In some cases, the Court has declared that the defamatory utterances
were not grave on the basis of the peculiar situations obtaining.

In the case of People v. Arcand,[42] a priest called the offended party a

gangster in the middle of the sermon. The Court affirmed the conviction
of the accused for slight slander as there was no imputation of a crime, a
vice or immorality. In Pader v. People,[43] the Court ruled that the crime
committed was only slight oral defamation as it considered the
expression, "putang ina mo," as expression to convey anger or
displeasure. Such utterance was found not seriously insulting
considering that he was drunk when he uttered those words and his
anger was instigated by what the private complainant did when the
former's father died. Also in Jamilano v. Court of Appeals,[44] where
calling someone "yabang" (boastful or arrogant) was found not
defamatory, the complainant's subsequent recourse to the law on oral
defamation was not sustained by the Court.

Considering the factual backdrop of this case, the Court is convinced

that the crime committed by De Leon was only slight oral defamation for
the following reasons:

First, as to the relationship of the parties, they were obviously

acquainted with each other as they were former jogging buddies. Prior to
the purported gun-pointing incident, there was no reason for De Leon to
harbor ill feelings towards SPO3 Leonardo.

Second, as to the timing of the utterance, this was made during the first
hearing on the administrative case, shortly after the alleged gun-pointing
incident. The gap between the gun-pointing incident and the first hearing
was relatively short, a span of time within which the wounded feelings
could not have been healed. The utterance made by De Leon was but a
mere product of emotional outburst, kept inside his system and
unleashed during their encounter.

Third, such words taken as a whole were not uttered with evident intent
to strike deep into the character of SPO3 Leonardo as the animosity
between the parties should have been considered. It was because of the
purported gun-pointing incident that De Leon hurled those words. There
was no intention to ridicule or humiliate SPO3 Leonardo because De
Leon's utterance could simply be construed as his expression of dismay
towards his actions as his friend and member of the community.

The defamatory remarks were

not in connection with the
public officer's duty

Finally, the Court finds that even though SPO3 Leonardo was a police
officer by profession, his complaint against De Leon for oral defamation
must still prosper. It has been held that a public officer should not be too
onion-skinned and should be tolerant of criticism. The doctrine,
nevertheless, would only apply if the defamatory statement was uttered
in connection with the public officer's duty. The following cases are
illustrative:
In the case of Evangelista v. Sepulveda,[45] petitioner lawyer made the
follow ing statements in his appeal brief:

THIS BLUNDER of the TRIAL COURT, AT ONCE SHOCKING AND

UNPARDONABLE, BETRAYS BOTTOMLESS IGNORANCE OF LEGAL
FUNDAMENTALS AND IS A BLACK REFLECTION ON THE
COMPETENCE OF ITS INCUMBENT. IT COULD BE A GROUND FOR
PROSECUTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION.

This shocking, colossal blunder deserves condemnation no end and

cries for immediate relief in order to avoid repetitions of miscarriages of
justice.

Appalled by the contents of the brief, the trial court judge charged the
petitioner for indirect contempt. In absolving the latter, this Court
recognized that lawyers sometimes get carried away and forget
themselves especially if they act as their own counsel. Hence, if the
judge had felt insulted, he should have sought redress by other means
as it was not seemly for him to be a judge of his own cause.

In Yabut v. Ombudsman[46] petitioner vice mayor was directing traffic as

he was concurrently the commander of the Traffic Management Division
at that time. On board his vehicle was private respondent Doran, who
was impatient about the traffic. Angry words turned into an exchange of
punches and Doran stuck a dirty finger at petitioner. Charged with an
administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner vice
mayor was suspended. The attendant circumstances served no excuse
for the mauling incidents that followed. Though the acts of Doran were
no less than "an act of spite, degradation and mockery," it did not justify
an equally abhorrent reaction from petitioner. This Court wrote that
public officers, especially those who were elected, should not be too
onion-skinned as they are always looked upon to set the example how
public officials should correctly conduct themselves even in the face of
extreme provocation.

In both cases, the criticisms directed towards the public officer were
made in connection with the dissatisfaction of the performance of their
respective duties. Here, however, the malicious imputations were
directed towards the public officer with respect to their past strained
personal relationship. To note, De Leon's displeasure towards SPO3
Leonardo could be traced to a gun-pointing incident where the latter was
angered when the former failed to grant him a private loan transaction in
the amount of P150,000.00.

One of man's most prized possessions is his integrity. There lies a thin
line between criticism and outright defamation. When one makes
commentaries about the other's performance of official duties, the
criticism is considered constructive, then aimed for the betterment of his
or her service to the public. It is thus, a continuing duty on the part of the
public officer to make room for improvement on the basis of this
constructive criticism in as much as it is imperative on the part of the
general public to make the necessary commentaries should they see
any lapses on the part of the public officer. In this case, however, the
criticism was more destructive than constructive and, worse, it was
directed towards the personal relations of the parties.

To reiterate, their altercation and De Leon's subsequent defamation

were not in connection with SPO3 Leonardo's public duties. Taking into
account the circumstances of the incident, calling him "walanghiya" and
"mangongotong na pulis" was evidently geared towards his reputation as
a private individual of the community. Thus, the defamation committed
by De Leon, while only slight in character, must not go unpunished.

Accordingly, De Leon should be meted out only the penalty of arresto

mayor or a fine not exceeding P200.00 pesos, for committing slight oral
defamation as prescribed under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

April 15, 2011 Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 6, Manila,
is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding Enrique De Leon guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime of Slight Oral Defamation, the Court hereby sentences him
to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.

On the civil aspect ex delicto, the accused is ordered to pay the private

complainant P5,000.00 as moral damages.

EN BANC G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012 DOUGLAS R.

CAGAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, AND CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an election protest may not
directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil action for
certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order
during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due course.

For resolution is the petition for certiorari brought under Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the order dated August 13, 2010 (denying the
affirmative defenses raised by the petitioner),[1] and the order dated
October 7, 2010 (denying his motion for reconsideration),[2] both issued
by the COMELEC First Division in EPC No. 2010-42, an election protest
entitled Claude P. Bautista, protestant v. Douglas R. Cagas, protestee.
[3]

Antecedents

The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista (Bautista) contested

the position of Governor of the Province of Davao del Sur in the May 10,
2010 automated national and local elections. The fast transmission of
the results led to the completion by May 14, 2010 of the canvassing of
votes cast for Governor of Davao del Sur, and the petitioner was
proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering
159,527 votes.[4]

Alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of

election laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest on
May 24, 2010 (EPC No. 2010-42).[5] The protest was raffled to the
COMELEC First Division.

In his answer submitted on June 22, 2010,[6] the petitioner averred as

his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite
cash deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed
specification of the acts or omissions complained of.

On August 13, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued the first
assailed order denying the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner,
[7] viz:
After careful examination of the records of the case, this Commission
(First Division) makes the following observation:

Protestant paid the cash deposit amounting to one hundred thousand

pesos (P100,000.00) on June 3, 2010 as evidenced by O.R. No.
1118105; and

Paragraph nos. 9 to 28 of the initiatory petition filed by the Protestant set

forth the specific details of the acts and omissions complained of against
the Protestee.

It is therefore concluded that the payment by the Protestant on June 3,

2010 is a substantial compliance with the requirement of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804, taking into consideration Section 9(e), Rule 6 of
said Resolution. Furthermore, the Protestant has likewise essentially
complied with Section 7(g), Rule 6 of the above-mentioned Resolution.

In view of the foregoing, this Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to

DENY the Protestee's special affirmative defenses.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The petitioner moved to reconsider on the ground that the order did not
discuss whether the protest specified the alleged irregularities in the
conduct of the elections, in violation of Section 2, paragraph 2,[9] Rule
19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804,[10] requiring all decisions to
clearly and distinctly express the facts and the law on which they were
based; and that it also contravened Section 7(g),11] Rule 6 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 requiring a detailed specification of the
acts or omissions complained of. He prayed that the matter be certified
to the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Section 1,[12] Section 5,[13] and
Section 6,[14] all of Rule 20 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.

The petitioner insisted that COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 had

introduced the requirement for the "detailed specification" to prevent
"shotgun fishing expeditions by losing candidates;"[15] that such
requirement contrasted with Rule 6, Section 1 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure,[16] under which the protest needed only to contain
a "concise statement of the ultimate facts" constituting the cause or
causes of action; that Bautista's protest did not meet the new
requirement under COMELEC Resolution No. 8804; and that in Peña v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,[17] the Court upheld the
dismissal of a protest by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) for not specifically alleging the electoral anomalies and
irregularities in the May 8, 1995 elections.

In his opposition,[18] Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being

merely interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC en banc
pursuant to the ruling in Panlilio v. COMELEC;[19] that the rules of the
COMELEC required the initiatory petition to specify the acts or omissions
constituting the electoral frauds, anomalies and election irregularities,
and to contain the ultimate facts upon which the cause of action was
based; and that Peña v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal did
not apply because, firstly, Peña had totally different factual antecedents
than this case, and, secondly, the omission of material facts from Peña's
protest prevented the protestee (Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.) from being
apprised of the issues that he must meet and made it eventually
impossible for the HRET to determine which ballot boxes had to be
collected.

On October 7, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued its second

assailed order,[20] denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for
failing to show that the first order was contrary to law, to wit:

The Protestee's August 28, 2010 "Motion for Reconsideration with

Prayer to Certify the Case to the Commission En Banc" relative to the
Order issued by the Commission (First Division) dated August 13, 2010
is hereby DENIED for failure to show that the assailed order is contrary
to law

Without going into the merits of the protest, the allegations in the
protestant's petition have substantially complied with the requirements of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 that will warrant the opening of the
ballot boxes in order to resolve not only the issues raised in the protest
but also those set forth in the Protestee's answer. When substantial
compliance with the rules is satisfied, allowing the protest to proceed is
the best way of removing any doubt or uncertainty as to the true will of
the electorate. All other issues laid down in the parties' pleadings,
including those in the Protestee's special and affirmative defenses and
those expressed in the preliminary conference brief, will best be
threshed out in the final resolution of the instant case.

The prayer to elevate the instant Motion for Reconsideration to the

Commission En Banc is DENIED considering that the 13 August 2010
Order is merely interlocutory and it does not dispose of the instant case
with finality, in accordance with Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil action directly in
this Court.

ISSUE
The petitioner submits that:
THE RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE PROTEST FOR INSUFFICIENCY IN
FORM AND CONTENT.

The petitioner argues that Section 9,[21] Rule 6 of COMELEC

Resolution No. 8804 obliged the COMELEC First Division to summarily
dismiss the protest for being insufficient in form and content; and that the
insufficiency in substance arose from the failure of the protest to: (a)
specifically state how the various irregularities and anomalies had
affected the results of the elections; (b) indicate in which of the protested
precincts were "pre-shaded bogus-ballots" used; (c) identify the
precincts where the PCOS machines had failed to accurately account for
the votes in favor of Bautista; and (d) allege with particularity how many
additional votes Bautista stood to receive for each of the grounds he
protested. He concludes that the COMELEC First Division gravely
abused its discretion in allowing the protest of Bautista despite its
insufficiency.

Moreover, the petitioner urges that the protest be considered as a mere

fishing expedition to be outrightly dismissed in light of the elections being
held under an automated system. In support of his urging, he cites
Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[22] where the Court took judicial
notice of the accuracy and reliability of the PCOS machines and CCS
computers, such that allegations of massive errors in the automated
counting and canvassing had become insufficient as basis for the
COMELEC to entertain or to give due course to defective election
protests.[23] He submits that a protest like Bautista's cast doubt on the
automated elections.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
Bautista both posit that the COMELEC had the power and prerogative to
determine the sufficiency of the allegations of an election protest; and
that certiorari did not lie because the COMELEC First Division acted
within its discretion. Additionally, the OSG maintains that the assailed
orders, being interlocutory, are not the proper subjects of a petition for
certiorari.

As we see it, the decisive issue is whether the Court can take
cognizance of the petition for certiorari.

Ruling

We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution,

which provides:

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its

Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission
or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to review any
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such power to a final
decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to
an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise
stated, the Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.
The following cogent observations made in Ambil v. Commission on
Elections[24] are enlightening, viz:

To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of the
Comelec is prescribed in the Constitution, as follows:

"Section 7. Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its

members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is
deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the commission
or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided bythis
constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." [emphasis
supplied]

"We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and
decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final decision or
resolution of the Comelec en banc,not of a division, certainly not an
interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to
review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a
Division of the Commission on Elections.

The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc

may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, now
expressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.

Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires

that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedyin
the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plainand
adequate remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural
requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.

In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the

Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a motion for
reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory.xxx[25]

There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take

cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the
COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the
petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the
COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if
the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special
affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with the other
errors committed by the Division upon the merits. It is true that there may
be an exception to the general rule, as the Court conceded in Kho v.
Commission on Elections.[26] In that case, the protestant assailed the
order of the COMELEC First Division admitting an answer with counter-
protest belatedly filed in an election protest by filing a petition for
certiorari directly in this Court on the ground that the order constituted
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC First Division.
The Court granted the petition and nullified the assailed order for being
issued without jurisdiction, and explained the exception thuswise:

As to the issue of whether or not the case should be referred to the

COMELEC en banc, this Court finds the respondent COMELEC First
Division correct when it held in its order dated February 28, 1996 that no
final decision, resolution or order has yet been made which will
necessitate the elevation of the case and its records to the Commission
en banc. No less than the Constitution requires that election cases must
be heard and decided first in division and any motion for reconsideration
of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc. Apparently,
the orders dated July 26, 1995, November 15, 1995 and February 28,
1996 and the other orders relating to the admission of the answer with
counter-protest are issuances of a Commission in division and are all
interlocutory orders because they merely rule upon an incidental issue
regarding the admission of Espinosa's answer with counter-protest and
do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they leave something
to be done before it is finally decided on the merits. In such a situation,
the rule is clear that the authority to resolve incidental matters of a case
pending in a division, like the questioned interlocutory orders, falls on the
division itself, and not on the Commission en banc. Section 5 (c), Rule 3
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure explicitly provides for this,

Sec. 5. Quorum; Votes Required xxx

xxx

(c) Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a

Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions
on interlocutory orders of the division which shall be resolved by the
division which issued the order. (emphasis provided)

Furthermore, a look at Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of

Procedure confirms that the subject case does not fall on any of the
instances over which the Commission en banc can take cognizance of. It
reads as follows:

Section 2. The Commission en banc. The Commission shall sit en banc

in cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in pre-proclamation cases
upon a vote of a majority of the members of a Commission, or in all other
cases where a division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a
unanimous vote of all the members of a Division, an interlocutory matter
or issue relative to an action or proceeding before it is decided to be
referred to the Commission en banc.

In the instant case, it does not appear that the subject controversy is one
of the cases specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure in which the Commission may sit en banc. Neither is it shown
that the present controversy a case where a division is not authorized to
act nor a situation wherein the members of the First Division
unanimously voted to refer the subject case to the Commission en banc.
Clearly, the Commission en banc, under the circumstances shown
above, can not be the proper forum which the matter concerning the
assailed interlocutory orders can be referred to.

In a situation such as this where the Commission in division committed

grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in
issuing interlocutory orders relative to an action pending before it and the
controversy did not fall under any of the instances mentioned in Section
2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the Commission en
banc as this is not permissible under its present rules but to elevate it to
this Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
(Bold emphasis supplied)

Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a

petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order
issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance
being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit
and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of
the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of
necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because
the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter
concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed.

However, the Kho v. Commission on Elections exception has no

application herein, because the COMELEC First Division had the
competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or
omissions complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the outright
dismissal of the protest. For sure, the 1987 Constitution vested in the
COMELEC broad powers involving not only the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
elections but also the resolution and determination of election
controversies.[27] The breadth of such powers encompasses the
authority to determine the sufficiency of allegations contained in every
election protest and to decide based on such allegations whether to
admit the protest and proceed with the hearing or to outrightly dismiss
the protest in accordance with Section 9, Rule 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804.

The Court has upheld the COMELEC's determination of the sufficiency

of allegations contained in election protests, conformably with its
imperative duty to ascertain in an election protest, by all means within its
command, who was the candidate elected by the electorate.[28] Indeed,
in Panlilio v. Commission on Elections,[29]we brushed aside the
contention that the election protest was insufficient in form and
substance and was a sham for having allegations couched in general
terms, stating:

In Miguel v. COMELEC, the Court belittled the petitioner's argument that

the protestant had no cause of action, as the allegations of fraud and
irregularities, which were couched in general terms, were not sufficient to
order the opening of ballot boxes and counting of ballots. The Court
states the rules in election protests cognizable by the COMELEC and
courts of general jurisdiction, as follows:

The rule in this jurisdiction is clear and jurisprudence is even clearer. In a

string of categorical pronouncements, we have consistently ruled that
when there is an allegation in an election protest that would require the
perusal, examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the
ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the ballot boxes
and the examination and counting of ballots deposited therein.

In a kindred case, Homer Saquilayan v. COMELEC, the Court

considered the allegations in an election protest, similar to those in this
case, as sufficient in form and substance.

Again, in Dayo v. COMELEC, the Court declared that allegations of fraud

and irregularities are sufficient grounds for opening the ballot boxes and
examining the questioned ballots. The pronouncement is in accordance
with Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code, which reads:
Judicial counting of votes in election contest. Where allegations in a
protest or counter-protest so warrant, or whenever in the opinion of the
court in the interests of justice so require, it shall immediately order the
book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and other documents
used in the election be brought before it and that the ballots be
examined and the votes recounted.

In this case, the COMELEC Second Division found that the allegations in
the protest and counter-protest warranted the opening of the contested
ballot boxes and the examination of their contents to settle at once the
conflicting claims of petitioner and private respondent.

The petitioner adds that with the Court havingnoted the reliability and
accuracy of the PCOS machines and consolidation/canvassing system
(CCS) computers in Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[30]
Bautista's election protest assailing the system and procedure of
counting and canvassing of votes cast in an automated system of
elections should be immediately dismissed.

We are not persuaded.

Roque, Jr. v. Commission on Elections does not preclude the filing of an

election protest to challenge the outcome of an election undertaken in an
automated system of elections. Instead, the Court only ruled there that
the system and procedure implemented by the COMELEC in evaluating
the PCOS machines and CCS computers met the minimum system
requirements prescribed in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8436.[31] The
Court did not guarantee the efficiency and integrity of the automated
system of elections, as can be gleaned from the following
pronouncement thereat:

The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing
would go wrong, that a successful automation election unmarred by
fraud, violence, and like irregularities would be the order of the moment
on May 10, 2010. Neither will it guarantee, as it cannot guarantee, the
effectiveness of the voting machines and the integrity of the counting
and consolidation software embedded in them. That task belongs at the
first instance to Comelec, as part of its mandate to ensure clean and
peaceful elections. This independent constitutional commission, it is true,
possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable latitude in
the discharge of its functions. The road, however, towards successful
2010 automation elections would certainly be rough and bumpy. The
Comelec is laboring under very tight timelines. It would accordingly need
the help of all advocates of orderly and honest elections, of all men and
women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist Comelec personnel
address the fears expressed about the integrity of the system. Like
anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated elections to
succeed, credibly.[32]

In view of the foregoing, we have no need to discuss at length the other

submissions of the petitioner.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of

merit.

PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE v. RAMON C. JAVELLANA,

GR No. 158239, 2012-01-25
Facts:
Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita) sold for consideration of
P160,000.00 to respondent Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale
two parcels of land
They... agreed that Javellana would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution
of the deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the registration of the
parcels of land under the Torrens System (the registration being
undertaken by Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and that
should
Margarita become incapacitated, her son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal
M. Alma Jose (Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M. Alma
Jose, would receive the payment of the balance and proceed with the
application for registration.
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having predeceased Margarita
without issue, the vendor's undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla,
being Margarita's sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did not comply
with the undertaking to cause the registration of the... properties under
the Torrens System, and, instead, began to improve the properties by
dumping filling materials therein with the intention of converting the
parcels of land into a residential or industrial subdivision.[4] Faced with
Priscilla's refusal to... comply, Javellana commenced on February 10,
1997 an action for specific performance, injunction, and damages
against her in the
RTC
Priscilla filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint was already
barred by prescription; and that the complaint did not state a cause of
action.
The RTC initially denied Priscilla's motion to dismiss on February 4,
1998.[8] However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the RTC
reversed itself on June 24, 1999 and granted the motion to dismiss,
opining that Javellana had no cause of action against... her
Javellana moved for reconsideration... the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of any reason to disturb the order of June 24,
1999.
Javellana filed a notice of appeal from the June 21, 2000 order,[14]
which the RTC gave due course to, and the records were elevated to the
Court of Appeals (CA).
It appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA to assail the June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders
dismissing his complaint
On August 6, 2001, however, the CA dismissed the petition for...
certiorari,[17] finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the orders... the CA promulgated its decision...
reversing and setting aside the dismissal... and remanding the records to
the RTC "for further proceedings in accordance with law."... that the
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action; that Priscilla, as sole heir,
succeeded to the rights and obligations of Margarita with respect to the
parcels of land; that Margarita's undertaking under the contract was not
a purely... personal obligation but was transmissible to Priscilla, who was
consequently bound to comply with the obligation;  that the action had
not yet prescribed due to its being actually one for quieting of title that
was imprescriptible brought by Javellana who had actual... possession of
the properties; and that based on the
Issues:
Priscilla then brought this appeal, averring that the CA thereby erred in
not outrightly dismissing Javellana's appeal because: (a) the June 21,
2000 RTC order was not appealable; (b) the notice of appeal had been
filed belatedly by three days; and (c)
Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for filing in the CA a petition for
certiorari to assail the orders of the RTC that were the subject matter of
his appeal pending in the CA.  She posited that, even if the CA's
decision to entertain the appeal was affirmed, the
RTC's dismissal of the complaint should nonetheless be upheld because
the complaint stated no cause of action, and the action had already
prescribed.
Ruling:
The petition for review has no merit.
I
Denial of the motion for reconsideration of the... order of dismissal was a
final order and appealable
Indeed, the Court has held that an appeal from an order denying a
motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an
appeal from the final order or judgment itself; and has expressly clarified
that the prohibition  against appealing an ... order  denying a  motion 
for... reconsideration referred only to a denial of a motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order.[
II
Appeal was made on time pursuant to Neypes v. CA
The fresh period rule may be applied to this case, for the Court has
already retroactively extended the fresh period rule to "actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate
any right of a person who may feel that he is... adversely affected,
inasmuch as there are no vested rights in rules of procedure."
Procedural law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and
forms of procedure in order that courts may be able to administer justice.
Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against the retroactive... operation of statues
they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch
as there are no vested rights in rules of... procedure.
The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period
of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the
motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the
rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period... rule" should
be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.
Consequently, we rule that Javellana's notice of appeal was timely filed
pursuant to the fresh period rule. No forum shopping was committed.
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT (SAMASA
H-NUWHRAIN) 
vs. HON. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR BUENAVENTURA C. 
MAGSALIN and HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINE
S, INC. G.R. No. 164939, 6 June 2011
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT (SAMASA
H-NUWHRAIN)
vs. HOTEL ENTERPRISES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R.
No. 172303
 FACTS:

The Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that the dismissal was valid. However, due 
to humanitarian considerations, it ordered financial assistance. Petitioner 
assailed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator before the CA in a petiti
on for certiorari which was dismissed outright for being the wrong remed
y. The CA explained that Rule 43, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Pr
ocedure explicitly provides that the proper mode of appeal from judgmen
ts, final orders or resolution of voluntary arbitrators is through a Petition f
or Review which should be filed within fifteen (15) days from the receipt 
of notice of judgment, order or resolution of the voluntary arbitrator. Con
sidering that petitioner intended the petition to be a Petition for Certiorari, 
the Court hereby resolves to dismiss the petition outright for being an im
proper mode of appeal.

 ISSUE:

Whether or not the proper remedy for assailing the decision of Voluntary 
Arbitrator is a petition for certiorari.

 RULING:

 No. Decision or award of a voluntary arbitrator is appealable to the CA v
ia petition for review under Rule 43. Hence, upon receipt of the Voluntar
y Arbitrator’s Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, 
petitioner should have filed with the CA, within the fifteen (15)-day regle
mentary period, a petition for review, not a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner insists on a liberal interpretation of the rules but we find no cog
ent reason in this case to deviate from the general rule. Verily, rules of pr
ocedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard such rules in the gui
se of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural ru
les are not to be disdained as mere technicalities. They may not be ignor
ed to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law ensures the effective 
enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and speedy admini
stration of justice. Rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complica
te litigation. But they help provide for a vital system of justice where suito
rs may be heard following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Pu
blic order and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious o
bservance by the parties of the procedural rules.

GSIS V. HEIRS OF CABALLERO GR. No. 158090 October 4,

2010
SECOND DIVISION G. R. No. 154061, January 25, 2012
PANAY RAILWAYS INC., PETITIONER, VS. HEVA
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
PAMPLONA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, AND
SPOUSES CANDELARIA DAYOT AND EDMUNDO DAYOT,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
SERENO, J.:
The present Petition stems from the dismissal by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo City of a Notice of Appeal for petitioner's failure to
pay the corresponding docket fees.

The facts are as follows:

On 20 April 1982, petitioner Panay Railways Inc., a government-owned

and controlled corporation, executed a Real Estate Mortgage Contract
covering several parcels of lands, including Lot No. 6153, in favor of
Traders Royal Bank (TRB) to secure P20 million worth of loan and credit
accommodations. Petitioner excluded certain portions of Lot No. 6153:
that already sold to Shell Co., Inc. referred to as 6153-B, a road referred
to as 6153-C, and a squatter area known as 6153-D. [1]

Petitioner failed to pay its obligations to TRB, prompting the bank to

extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged properties including Lot No.
6153. On 20 January 1986, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of
the bank as the highest bidder and purchaser. Consequently, the sale of
Lot No. 6153 was registered with the Register of Deeds on 28 January
1986 and annotated at the back of the transfer certificates of title (TCT)
covering the mortgaged properties.

Thereafter, TRB caused the consolidation of the title in its name on the
basis of a Deed of Sale and an Affidavit of Consolidation after petitioner
failed to exercise the right to redeem the properties. The corresponding
TCTs were subsequently issued in the name of the bank.

On 12 February 1990, TRB filed a Petition for Writ of Possession against

petitioner. During the proceedings, petitioner, through its duly authorized
manager and officer-in-charge and with the assistance of counsel, filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Motion for Suspension of the
Petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. [2] The pertinent portions
of the Manifestation and Motion state:

3. That after going over the records of this case and the case of Traders
Royal Bank vs. Panay Railway, Inc., Civil Case No. 18280, PRI is
irrevocably withdrawing its Motion for Suspension referred to in
paragraph 1 above, and its Motion for Reconsideration referred in
paragraph 2 above and will accept and abide by the September 21,
1990 Order denying the Motion For Suspension;

4. That PRI recognizes and acknowledges petitioner (TRB) to be

the registered owner of Lot 1-A; Lot 3834; Lot 6153; Lot 6158; Lot
6159, and Lot 5 covered by TCT No. T-84233; T-84234; T-84235; T-
84236; T-84237, T-84238 and T-45724 respectively, free of liens and
encumbrances, except that portion sold to Shell Co. found in Lot 5.
That Petitioner (TRB) as registered owner is entitled to peaceful
ownership and immediate physical possession of said real
properties.

5. That PRI further acknowledges that the Provincial Sheriff validly

foreclosed the Real Estate Mortgage erected by PRI due to failure
to pay the loan of ?20,000,000.00.That TRB was the purchaser of
these lots mentioned in paragraph 4 above at Sheriff's Auction Sale as
evidenced by the Certificate of Sale dated January 20, 1986 and the
Certificates of Titles issued to Petitioner;

6. That PRI further manifests that it has no past, present or future

opposition to the grant of the Writ of Possession to TRB over the
parcels of land mentioned in paragraph 4 above and subject of this
Petition and even assuming "arguendo" that it has, PRI irrevocably
waives the same. That PRI will even assist TRB in securing
possession of said properties as witness against squatters, illegal
occupants, and all other possible claimants;

7. That upon execution hereof, PRI voluntarily surrenders physical

possession and control of the premises of these lots to TRB, its
successors or its assigns, together with all the buildings,
warehouses, offices, and all other permanent improvements
constructed thereon and will attest to the title and possession of
petitioner over said real properties. (Emphasis supplied)

TCT No. T-84235 mentioned in the quoted portion above is Lot No.
6153, which is under dispute.

It was only in 1994 that petitioner realized that the extrajudicial

foreclosure included some excluded properties in the mortgage contract.
Thus, on 19 August 1994, it filed a Complaint for Partial Annulment of
Contract to Sell and Deed of Absolute Sale with Addendum;
Cancellation of Title No. T-89624; and Declaration of Ownership of Real
Property with Reconveyance plus Damages.[3]

It then filed an Amended Complaint[4] on 1 January 1995 and again filed

a Second Amended Complaint[5] on 8 December 1995.

Meanwhile, respondents filed their respective Motions to Dismiss on

these grounds: (1) petitioner had no legal capacity to sue; (2) there was
a waiver, an abandonment and an extinguishment of petitioner's claim or
demand; (3) petitioner failed to state a cause of action; and (4) an
indispensable party, namely TRB, was not impleaded.

On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order [6] granting the Motion to

Dismiss of respondents. It held that the Manifestation and Motion filed by
petitioner was a judicial admission of TRB's ownership of the disputed
properties. The trial court pointed out that the Manifestation was
executed by petitioner's duly authorized representative with the
assistance of counsel. This admission thus operated as a waiver barring
petitioner from claiming otherwise.

On 11 August 1997, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal without paying the

necessary docket fees. Immediately thereafter, respondents filed a
Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees.

In its Opposition,[7] petitioner alleged that its counsel was not yet familiar
with the revisions of the Rules of Court that became effective only on 1
July 1997. Its representative was likewise not informed by the court
personnel that docket fees needed to be paid upon the filing of the
Notice of Appeal. Furthermore, it contended that the requirement for the
payment of docket fees was not mandatory. It therefore asked the RTC
for a liberal interpretation of the procedural rules on appeals.

On 29 September 1997, the RTC issued an Order [8] dismissing the

appeal citing Sec. 4 of Rule 41[9] of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner thereafter moved for a reconsideration of the Order [10] alleging

that the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case after the former had filed
the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner also alleged that the court erred in failing
to relax procedural rules for the sake of substantial justice.

On 25 November 1997, the RTC denied the Motion. [11]

On 28 January 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a

Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 alleging that the
RTC had no jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal, and that the trial
court had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it strictly applied
procedural rules.

On 29 November 2000, the CA rendered its Decision [12] on the Petition. It

held that while the failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful
fees within the reglementary period was a ground for the dismissal of the
appeal pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
jurisdiction to do so belonged to the CA and not the trial court. Thus,
appellate court ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the appeal and set aside the latter's assailed Order dated
29 September 1997.

Thereafter, respondents filed their respective Motions for

Reconsideration.

It appears that prior to the promulgation of the CA's Decision, this Court
issued Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 00-2-10-SC which took effect on
1 May 2000, amending Rule 4, Sec. 7 and Sec. 13 of Rule 41 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Court. The circular expressly provided that trial
courts may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss an appeal for being
filed out of time or for nonpayment of docket and other lawful fees within
the reglementary period. Subsequently, Circular No. 48-2000 [13] was
issued on 29 August 2000 and was addressed to all lower courts.

By virtue of the amendment to Sec. 41, the CA upheld the questioned

Orders of the trial court by issuing the assailed Amended Decision [14] in
the present Petition granting respondents' Motion for Reconsideration.

The CA's action prompted petitioner to file a Motion for Reconsideration

alleging that SC Circular No. 48-2000 should not be given retroactive
effect. It also alleged that the CA should consider the case as
exceptionally meritorious. Petitioner's counsel, Atty. Rexes V. Alejano,
explained that he was yet to familiarize himself with the Revised Rules of
Court, which became effective a little over a month before he filed the
Notice of Appeal. He was thus not aware that the nonpayment of docket
fees might lead to the dismissal of the case.

On 30 May 2002, the CA issued the assailed Resolution [15] denying

petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition.

Petitioner alleges that the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of

the Notice of Appeal. Petitioner contends that the CA had exclusive
jurisdiction to dismiss the Notice of Appeal at the time of filing.
Alternatively, petitioner argues that while the appeal was dismissible for
failure to pay docket fees, substantial justice demands that procedural
rules be relaxed in this case.

The Petition has no merit.

Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered

applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a
litigant may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
This retroactive application does not violate any right of a person
adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The
reason is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to or arise
from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that "a person has no
vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the
application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other
than the existing rules of procedure."[16] More so when, as in this case,
petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the docket fees on time.
Clearly, there were no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC
dismissed the Notice of Appeal.

The argument that the CA had the exclusive jurisdiction to dismiss the
appeal has no merit. When this Court accordingly amended Sec. 13 of
Rule 41 through A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, the RTC's dismissal of the action
may be considered to have had the imprimatur of the Court. Thus, the
CA committed no reversible error when it sustained the dismissal of the
appeal, taking note of its directive on the matter prior to the promulgation
of its Decision.

As early as 1932, in Lazaro v. Endencia,[17] we have held that the

payment of the full amount of the docket fees is an indispensable step
for the perfection of an appeal. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any
case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. [18]

Moreover, the right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due
process. It is merely a statutory privilege, which may be exercised only in
accordance with the law.[19]

We have repeatedly stated that the term "substantial justice" is not a

magic wand that would automatically compel this Court to suspend
procedural rules. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed
simply because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party's
substantive rights. Like all other rules, they are required to be followed,
except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be
relaxed to relieve litigants of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of their thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.[20]

We cannot consider counsel's failure to familiarize himself with the

Revised Rules of Court as a persuasive reason to relax the application
of the Rules. It is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the
client. This principle is based on the rule that any act performed by
lawyers within the scope of their general or implied authority is regarded
as an act of the client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the
counsel of petitioner may result in the rendition of an unfavorable
judgment against it.[21]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED for lack

of merit.

SO ORDERED

LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. V. O. RAMOS,

Secretary Department of Environment and Natural Resources; H.
RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB-DENR); R.
TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC. 

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is an

exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against
their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.

RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the
effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under
Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment
Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later
repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the
government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully
foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine
mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the
Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration
company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is
owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an
Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in
Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still
pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to
accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign
investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial
assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which
upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may
execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment
of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which
provides for the protection of Australian investments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully
foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service
contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine
mineral resources.

HELD:

First Issue: 

RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully
foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which
states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution
authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration,
exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the
utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or
lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment
for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The
concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s
natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular
resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other
forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only
―technical and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the
mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts
was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an
exception to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved
exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly
against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the
said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
―financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its
pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant
beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor
manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract.
By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining
operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nation‘s
mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title
thereto.

The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of

the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or
associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine
natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are
unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected,
must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are
limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral
oils.

Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract

The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise
unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the
exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products
that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement
provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and
personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together,
grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the
State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent
to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks
to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which
they spring must be struck down