CASE REPORT

SUBJECT – MOOT COURT CLINIC

Submitted To - Submitted By -
Miss. Manini syali Vimal anand
15/ILB/052

Case. 1

Case name - Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal

Court - supreme court of india
Case no. - SLP (C) 9036-9038/2016 [Diary No. 8700/2016]
Date of judgement – March 06, 2020

Facts
In March 2019, the Supreme Court formed a Constitution Bench to examine the
correctness of two 3 judge Bench decisions dealing with lapsing land acquisition due
to compensation disputes.
 
The controversy arose on 8 February, 2018, when a three judge Bench by a 2:1
majority in Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra (Dead) set aside a 2014
decision in Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand Misirmal Solanki (2014) by
another three judge Bench.
 
In Pune Municipal Corporation, the Court had held that land acquisition can void
under section 24(2) of the Land Acquisition Act of 2013, if compensation has not
been deposited in the bank accounts of the land owners or with the court. It was
categorically clarified that money in the government treasury will not be treated as
a payment to a landowner.
 
But by a 2:1 judgment in Indore Development Authority, the Court held that land
acquisitions could not lapse due to a land-owner's refusal to accept compensation
within 5 years. It held that once compensation has been tendered, but the person
refuses to accept it, this amounts to a discharge of obligation under section 31(1) of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In addition, the majority judges -
Justices Mishra and AK Goel held the previous 2014 Pune Municipal
Corporation judgment to be ‘per incuriam’, while Justice Shantanagoudar dissented.
 
The new judgment created chaos as it meant reopening the various High Court
decisions that were settled under the principle evolved in Pune Municipal
Corporation.
 
Following Indore Development Authority, when a similar land acquisition matter
came up before a 3 judge Bench on 21 February, 2018 in Haryana v. GD Goenka
Tourism Corporation, Jutices Madan Lokur and Kurian Joseph raised judicial
impropriety concerns. They also sat on the Pune Municipal Corporation Bench.
 
Following the eruption of the controversy, the then CJI Dipak Misra on February 26,
2018 formed a Constitution Bench to decide if the 2018 Bench could have invalidated
the earlier decision of the 2014 Bench. The matter was not taken up during the
remainder of his tenure and was only subsequently listed by the succeeding Chief
Justice Ranjan Gogoi.
 
On 12 October 2019, the court listed the matter for 15 October before a Bench
comprising Justices Arun Mishra, Indira Banerjee, Vineet Saran, M.R. Shah and
Ravindra Bhat. 
 
Before final arguments could begin, various counsels argued that Justice Arun Mishra
ought to recuse himself from the Bench. They submitted that as he had led the the
Bench that delivered in the 2018 Indore Development Authority judgment, he suffered
from a perceived bias. On 24 October 2019, he delivered a more than 60-page order
dismissing these arguments.

Issue
1.  Can a Supreme Court decision on a question of law be overruled by a
subsequent Supreme Court bench of the same strength? Or does the subsequent
bench need to refer the matter to the Chief Justice for formation of a larger
bench?
2. Does the government's land acquisition lapse on non-deposit of compensation
under the 2013 Land Acquisition Act?

Judgement
In Pune Municipal Corporation, the Court had held that land acquisition can void
under section 24(2) of the Land Acquisition Act of 2013, if compensation has not
been deposited in the bank accounts of the land owners or with the court. It was
categorically clarified that money in the government treasury will not be treated as
a payment to a landowner.
The judgment does not address the issue of whether a Bench can set aside a judgment
of an earlier Bench of the same strength. 
 

Case. 2
Case name - Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India
v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal
Court – supreme court of india
Case no - CA 10044/2010
Date of judgement - 13 November

Issue
1. Does public disclosure of information held by the office of the CJI and collegium
curtail the independence of the judiciary?

2. Does Section 8(i)(e) and/or (j) of the RTI Act exempt the CJI from public
disclosure of information, on the grounds of protecting fiduciary and personal
information?

3. Would disclosing information pertaining to Collegium decision-making, prevent

Collegium members from deliberating freely and frankly?

facts
In November 2009, the Central Information Commission (CIC) ordered the Supreme
Court of India to disclose information regarding the Collegium's decision making. The
CIC order pertains to a Right to Information request made by activist
Subhash Chandra Agarwal. In particular, the CIC ordered the Central Public
Information Office (CPIO) of the Supreme Court to disclose correspondences between
the Collegium and the government regarding the appointment of Justices HL Dattu,
AK Ganguly and RM Lodha. At the time of appointment, these three judges were less
senior than Justices AP Shah, AK Patnaik and VK Gupta.
Note that the CIC is a legislative body constituted by the Right to Information Act,
2005, designed to autonomously ensure the execution of the RTI Act. The CIC
comprises a Chief Information Commissioner and up to 10 Information
Commissioners. Section 12(3) stipulates that the CIC members are appointed by the
President on the recommendation of:

 the Prime Minister (who is also the Chairperson of the CIC)

 the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha 
  a Union Cabinet Minister appointed by the Prime Minister
 The Supreme Court appealed the November 2009 CIC order to itself.
 On 4 December 2009, the Supreme Court stayed (temporarily halted) the CIC
order. The stay order is still in-effect. 
 The legitimacy of a similar CIC order had come before the Delhi High Court.
On 6 January 2009, the CIC ordered the Supreme Court to disclose information
regarding judges' personal assets, putting into effect Subhash Chandra
Agarwal's RTI request. Agarwal sought to find out if Supreme Court justices
had declared their assets to the Chief Justice of India. The Supreme Court's
CPIO challenged this CIC order in the Delhi High Court (HC). On 2 September
2009, a single-judge Bench comprising Justice Ravindra Bhat upheld the CIC
order. The Supreme Court CPIO appealed and in January 2010 a three-
judge Delhi HC Bench referred it to the Supreme Court.
On 26 November 2010, a two judge Supreme Court Bench led by now retired Justice
B Sudershan Reddy referred the matter to a three judge Bench. Justice BS Reddy
framed the central issues at the heart of the case:

1. Would disclosing the information requested by Subhash Chandra Agarwal

interfere with the independence of the judiciary? Is it therefore not in the public
interest to disclose this information?
2. Would disclosing the information requested erode (i) the credibility of the
Collegium's decision and/or (ii) curtail the future "free and frank expression" of
Collegium members, when appointing judges to the Supreme Court?
3. Does Section 8(i)(j) of the RTI Act, exempt the CPIO from providing the
requested information? Section 8(i)(j) exempts the disclosure of "personal
information" that has "no relationship to any public activity or interest".

On 17th August 2018, a three judge Bench comprising now CJI Ranjan Gogoi, retired
Justice Prafulla C Pant and Justice AM Khanwilkar referred the matter to a five judge
Constitution Bench. They held that the matter involved constitutional questions
relating to the separation of powers (independence of the judiciary) and the right to
privacy

Judgement
the Supreme Court pronounced its judgment. It held that judicial independence does
not stand in contradiction with the need for transparency. It observed that whether or
not information is subject to public disclosure must be decided on a case-by-case
basis, by weighing competing public interest claims. For example, the right to
information may have to be weighed against the right to privacy. On the first CIC
order pertaining to Collegium decision-making, it directed its CPIO to re-examine the
request, but by taking into account the objections, if any, by third parties, as stipulated
under Section 11(1) of the RTI Act. On the second CIC order pertaining to personal
assets, the Court upheld the Delhi High Court judgment and directed the CPIO to disclose the
relevant information to SC Agarwal.

Case. 3

Court – supreme court of india

Case name - Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. UOI
Case number - WP (C) 1015/2018
Date of judgement - 10 February 2020

Facts
The petitioners have challenged the constitutional validity of the Section 18A of
the Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,1989,
introduced by the 2018 Amendment to the Act. The Court will assess whether Section
18A violates the fundamental rights to equality, life and liberty guaranteed by Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution.
 
Further, the Court will examine if the Amendment violates the principle of judicial
review, a basic feature of the Constitution. The Amendment directly undid a Supreme
Court order.
 
In 2018, Parliament introduced Section 18A to overturn safeguards introduced by the
Supreme Court in its Kashinath Mahajan judgment. Section 18A undoes all three of
the following safeguards introduced by the judgment:

1. Conduct a preliminary inquiry prior to the registration of a First

Information Report (FIR)
2. Investigation officer must receive further approval prior to effectuating an
arrest
3. Grant anticipatory bail to any accused, ‘notwithstanding any judgment or order
or direction of any Court’

 
The safeguards from the Kashinath Mahajan judgment were intended to prevent
people from abusing the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. They were a
response to the allegedly rising number of false charges being filed using the Act. The
safeguards aimed to ensure that people accused under the Prevention of Atrocities Act
are not presumed guilty and denied due process.
 
Immediately after the judgment was delivered, Parliament moved to undo it. The
judgment caused violent protests. Dalit and Adivasi groups organised massive rallies
that unfortunately resulted in several deaths. Fearing the fall out, the State pushed
through the 2018 Amendment. The outcry was so severe that Parliament did not even
wait for the Supreme Court to hear a review petition challenging the judgment.
 
On 7 September 2018, a Supreme Court Bench comprising Justices AK Sikri and
Ashok Bhushan issued a notice to the Centre to file their response to this petition. On
29 October 2018, the Central Government filed an affidavit stating that the Parliament
is competent to bring about the amendment to the Act. The Affidavit further records
that high rates on acquittals in cases filed under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act cannot be the basis for the assumption that a majority of the cases filed under it
are false. 

 Issue
1. Is the absolute bar on grant of anticipatory bail for the accused arbitrary and unjust,
violating Article 14 of the Constitution?

2. Does the bar on anticipatory bail infringe the personal liberty of an individual who
has been booked under the Act without any ground?

3. Does the power of automatic arrest violate the safeguards under sections 41 and
41A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1908? Does it violates the protection of
reasonable procedure under Article 21 of the Constitution?

Judgement
On 24 January 2019, the Court clubbed the petitions challenging the 2018
Amendment with the review petitions challenging Kashinath Mahajan. It is unusual
for writ petitions to be heard together with review petitions, as review petitions have a
much narrower scope.
 
On 1 May 2019, the Court reserved judgment in the review petition, with the rest of
the oral arguments in the writ petition deferred to a later date. Then on 13 September
2019, in an unexpected move, Justices Arun Mishra and UU Lalit referred the review
petition to a three judge bench, comprising Justices Mishra, Shah and Gavai, citing the
'importance of the matter'. Soon after, the writ petition was tagged with the review
petition.
 
On 1 October 2019, the Court recalled its directions in Kashinath Mahajan, in effect
endorsing the 2018 Amendment and rejecting the prayers in the writ petitions. In a
brief hearing on 3 October 2019, the Court reserved the judgment in the writ petitions,
noting that the issues raised in them have been answered in the judgment in the review
petition. 

On 10 February 2020, the Court formally upheld the constitutionality of the 2018

Amendment. Justice Arun Mishra wrote the majority on behalf of himself and Justice
Vineet Saran. Justice S.R. Bhat wrote a concurring opinion.

Case. 4

Court – supreme court of india

Case name - Gujarat High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India
Case number - WP (C) 841/2019
Date of judgement - 5 September

Facts
After his appointment as a judge of the Gujarat High Court in 2004, Justice Akil
Kureshi served in the Gujarat High Court till November 2018, when he was
transferred to the Bombay High Court. On 10 May 2019, the Supreme Court
collegium recommended his appointment as Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court. At the same time, the collegium recommended three other judges for
appointment to the offices of Chief Justice of the Telangana, Himachal Pradesh and
Delhi High Courts.
 
On 22 May, the Union Government issued notifications appointing all of the
Collegium’s 10 May recommendations, except Justice Kureshi’s. Furthermore, on
5 June, it appointed Justice Ravi Shanker Jha as the Acting Chief Justice of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court. 
 
On 3 July, the Gujarat High Court Advocates Association (GHCAA) filed a Public
Interest Litigation before the Supreme Court. It requested the court to direct the Union
government to appoint Justice Kureshi as the Madhya Pradesh Chief Justice. Second,
it prayed for the court to direct that the Union must conduct the process of reviewing
all future recommendations within six weeks.
 
In its petition, the GHCAA contended that the Union was deliberately withholding its
response to the collegium’s recommendation. It submitted that:

1. The Union is failing to follow the Memorandum of Procedure (MoP) dictating

High Court appointments and has thereby violated Article 217 of the
Constitution.
2. The Union’s actions are in conflict with the precedent established in
the Second Judges Case

 
The MoP flows from Article 217 and empowers the Supreme Court collegium to
recommend judges for the role of Chief Justice of a High Court. The collegium
comprises the Chief Justice of India and his/her two senior most fellow Supreme
Court Justices. The collegium makes its recommendation to the Union Law Ministry,
which obtains the concerned state government’s views and then submits a proposal to
the Prime Minister. The Union may request the collegium to reconsider its
recommendation. However, if the collegium reiterates its recommendation, it becomes
a binding obligation on the Union to appoint the recommended judge.
 
The Second Judges Case established the collegium system in 1993. The majority
verdict held that the Chief Justice of India has primacy over judicial appointments and
transfers, not the executive. It mandated that the Chief Justice must only consult with
his/her two senior most fellow Justices.  
 
The GHCAA submitted that Justice Kureshi’s appointment was being stalled due to
political reasons. In 2010, Justice Kureshi had reversed a Special CBI court’s order in
the Sohrabuddin Sheikh encounter case and remanded the present Home Minister
Amit Shah to two days of police custody.
 
Furthermore, in 2018, when the office of the Chief Justice of the Gujarat High Court
lay vacant, Justice Kureshi was overlooked. According to the convention of seniority,
he would have been appointed to the post. However, he was transferred to the Bombay
High Court and a junior judge was appointed as the Acting Chief Justice of Gujarat
High Court.
 
On 22 July, the Union government stated that Justice Kureshi’s appointment was
under consideration. It sought an additional two weeks to respond. Finally, on 28
August Chief Justice Gogoi stated he had received a reply from the Department of
Justice. The Chief Justice directed the matter to be listed after the collegium had
responded to Department of Justice's reply.
 

Issue
1. Does the Union Government’s delay in withholding advice on Justice Kureshi’s
appointment violate the precedent established in the Second Judges Case?

2. Does the Union Government’s delay in withholding advice on Justice Kureshi’s

appointment subvert the Memorandum of Procedure and thereby violate Article 217
of the Constitution?

Judgement
the Collegium recommended Justice Kureshi as the Chief Justice of the Tripura High
Court, taking into consideration the Department of Justice's reply. In early November,
the Union notified the appointment. Finally, on 13 November, the Supreme Court
disposed of the case.

Case. 5
Court – supreme court of india
Case name - State of Gujarat v. Islamic Relief Committee of Gujarat
Case number - CA 3249/2016
Date of judgement - 29 August, 2017

Facts
Background
During the communal riots in Gujarat in 2002, 567 places of worship were damaged.
This included 545 Islamic places of worship. The legal dispute began with the filing
of a writ in the High Court in 2003, by an NGO called Islamic Relief Committee of
Gujarat(IRCG). IRCG sought compensation for restoration of damaged and desecrated
places of worship from the Gujarat Government during the Gujarat Riots.
IRCG invoked the principle of ‘res ipsa loquitur‘ ((Latin for “the thing speaks for
itself”) It is a doctrine that infers negligence from the very nature of the accident).
They argued that the inaction by the State inaction led to the destruction of religious
shrines, thus the State has the duty to compensate for violation of fundamental rights.
IRCG focused on the conjoint reading of Article 21 and Article 25, to contend that
state’s inaction in preventing the destruction of religious places violate their
fundamental right. It argued that destruction of shrines belonging to a minority group
by the dominant group inflicts humiliation, and infringes upon the dignity of the
group. It pointed out that the dignity is an underlying facet of the Right to Life. It
further contended that destruction of religious places of a minority group is an attack
on religious symbols and a violation of the freedom of religion under Article 25.
The Gujarat High Court, accepting the weight of IRCG submissions, directed the State
Government to give compensation for the restoration of religious places damaged
during the communal riots of 2002.
In pursuance of the Gujarat HC order, a scheme was framed by the State of Gujarat in
2012. The Gujarat Government agreed to provide ex gratia assistance to all religious
places damaged/destroyed in communal riots as but put a ceiling limit up to Rs.
50,000/- to all religious places damaged/destroyed during the communal riots. The
IRCG appealed to the Supreme Court alleging that putting a ceiling of 50,000 on
restoring the shrines would be “travesty of justice”. The case was before the 2 judge
bench of Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justice P C Pant through civil appeal.

Issue
1. Does compensating for the repair of shrines violate Article 27, which prohibits tax
proceeds from being diverted for the promotion of any particular religion?

2. Can compensation be awarded for the violation of fundamental rights?

3. Whether the destruction of religious shrines by a dominant group amounts to a

violation of the fundamental right to life?

Judgement
The Court held that diversion of tax proceeds for restoring religious shrines destroyed
even due to State's negligence violates the principles of Secularism. The court
underlined a conception of Secularism based on Strict Separation principle. 
Additionally, the court further hinted that compensation can be sought only for
violation of Right to Life and not for other fundamental rights.