Compilation Cases 41 100

FOOTNOTE 41
CASE TITLE Ishmael Himagan v People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Hilario Mapayo
DATE October 7, 1994; G.R. No. 113811
PONENTE Justice Santiago M. Kapunan
FACTS 1. Petitioner is Ishmael Himagan, a policeman and was implicated in the

killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe
Machitar. He was suspended until the termination of the case against
him.
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner assailed the suspension averring that under

Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service decree, suspension should be
limited to 90 days. The suspension was contrary to the Civil Service Law
and violative of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
3. Subject/Object: Section 47 of RA 6975 provides, Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension

Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave
felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or
more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the
case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
4. Respondents are the State and Hon. Judge Hilario Mapayo of RTC Branch
11, Davao City.
5. Action of Respondents: The trial court issued an Order suspending

petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Sec. 47, RA
6975 (DILG Act of 1990)
ISSUE Whether or not Section 47 of RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed

by the Constitution.
RULING No, Section 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the equal protection clause.
The Constitution states that no person shall be denied of equal protection of

laws.
In the case at bar, the reason why members of the PNP are treated differently
from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively
insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is
that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the
legislative discussions. If the suspended policeman criminally charged with a
serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim
and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and
thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform
and armed.
Thus, the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec. 47
of RA 6975 does not violate the petitioner’s constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws.
FOOTNOTE 42
CASE TITLE Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo v The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
DATE December 7, 2010; G.R. No. 192935
PONENTE Justice Jose C. Mendoza
FACTS 1. Petitioner is Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo instituting this case in his capacity as
a citizen and a taxpayer.
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner assailed the validity and constitutionality of

E.O. No. 1, entitled “Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.”
Petitioner also maintained that it is violative of the power of the
Congress usurping its constitutional authority by creating a public office
and appropriating funds therefor.
3. Subject/Object: Then President Benigno Aquino established the Truth Commission

under E.O. 1. Section 1 thereof states, “xxx investigate reports of graft and
corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and
ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees,
their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any,
during the previous administration…”
4. Respondent is the Philippine truth Commission of 2010. It was created as a

mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President. Although
described as an independent, it is an entity within the Office of the
President Proper and subject to his control. It is not a quasi-judicial
body. All it can do is gather, collect, assess evidences, and recommend.
5. Action of Respondents: Respondent in its consolidated comment argued

that Truth Commission does not arrogate the powers of the Congress,
nor usurp the latter’s power, nor supersede the power of the
Ombudsman, nor violate the equal protection clause.
ISSUE Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING Yes, E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

laws.
In the instant case, no sufficient and compelling state interest appears to be

served by E.O No. 1 to justify the differential treatment of the past
administration’s officials from the others. It should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration
only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent, and
manifest.
Hence, E.O No 1 violates the equal protection clause and is unconstitutional.

FOOTNOTE 43
CASE TITLE Commissioner Jose T. Almonte, et. al. v Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez, et. al.
DATE May 23, 1995; G.R. No. 95367 (244 SCRA 28)
FACTS 1. Petitioners are Jose T. Almonte, former Commissioner of Economic

Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), Villamor C. Perez, Nerio
Rogado, and Elisa Rivera.
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioners sought to annul the Subpoena duces tecum

and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman requiring petitioners
Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, chief accountant and record custodian,
respectively, of EIIB, to produce all evidence, and to enjoin the
Ombudsman from enforcing his orders.
3. Subject/Object: An anonymous letter was sent to several government offices,

including the Office of the Ombudsman, exposing fund misrepresentation and
corruption in the EIIB. That EIIB had a syndicate manipulating funds, such as,
presence of ghost agents or emergency intelligence agents, and that the
Commissioner had the biggest share thereof.
4. Respondents are Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez of the Office of the

Ombudsman and concerned citizens.
5. Action of Respondents: Respondent Ombudsman instituted an

investigation against the petitioners in relation to an anonymous letter
alleging that funds representing savings from unfilled positions had
been illegally disbursed.
ISSUE Whether or not an Anonymous letter, as basis for investigation, a violation of

the equal protection clause.
RULING No. There was no violation of petitioners’ right to the equal protection of the
laws.
Under the Constitution, no person shall be denied of equal protection of laws.
In the instant case, petitioners complain that “in all forum and tribunals… the
aggrieved parties… can only hale respondents via their verified complaints or
sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed,” however, in the
proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman, anonymous letters suffice
to start an investigation. The can be no objection to this procedure because it
is provided in the Constitution itself. Second, it is apparent that in permitting
the filling of complaints “in any form and in any manner,” the framers of the
Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which
keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had
occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the
other investigatory and prosecutor agencies of the government because
those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official
pressure and influence, can quash, delay, or dismiss investigations held
against them.
Hence, petitioners’ right to equal protection is not violated.

FOOTNOTE
44
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) v HON. LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of
CASE TITLE
Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the
Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL,
INC.
June 1, 2000; GR No. 128845
DATE
Justice Santiago M. Kapunan
PONENTE
FACTS 1. Petitioners: International School Alliance of Educators (ISAE)
2. Action of Petitioner: The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification

employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant
of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
Petitioner filed a notice of strike.
3. Subject/Object: International School Alliance of Educators (the School)

hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded

local-hires including housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes,
home leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25% more than local
hires based on “significant economic disadvantages”
The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all

faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary rates
between foreign and local-hires. When negotiations for a new collective
bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International
School Alliance of Educators, contested the difference in salary rates
between foreign and local-hires. This issue eventually caused a deadlock
between the parties. The failure of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the
DOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute.
4. Respondents: HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the

Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in
his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR.
BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of
International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC.
5. Action of Respondents: DOLE Acting Secretary, issued an Order resolving
the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE
Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997.
Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection clause to justify its
ISSUE claim of parity.
RULING Yes, discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the

Labor Code. The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of “equal pay for equal work.”
Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
The Constitution states that no person shall be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
In the case at bar, the employer accords employees the same position and
rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. If the
employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to
explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be
adding insult to injury. The employer in this case has failed to discharge this
burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar
functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working
conditions.
Therefore, the practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-

hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy
of the Court.
FOOTNOTE
45
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner,
CASE TITLE vs.
MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, respondent.
July 14, 2004; GR No. 146494
DATE
Justice Antonio Carpio
PONENTE
FACTS 1. Petitioners: Government Service Insurance System
2. Action of Petitioner: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the

Decision1 dated 13 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 48784. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Cebu City ("trial court"), which held that
Milagros Orbiso Montesclaros is entitled to survivorship pension.
3. Subject/Object: The trial court rendered judgment declaring Montesclaros

eligible for survivorship pension and ordered GSIS to pay respondent
the benefits including interest. Citing Articles 115 and 117 of the Family
Code, the trial court held that retirement benefits, which the pensioner
has earned for services rendered and for which the pensioner has
contributed through monthly salary deductions, are onerous
acquisitions. Since retirement benefits are property the pensioner
acquired through labor, such benefits are conjugal property. The trial
court held that the prohibition in Section 18 of PD 1146 is deemed
repealed for being inconsistent with the Family Code, a later law. The
Family Code has retroactive effect if it does not prejudice or impair
vested rights.
4. Respondents: Milagros O. Montesclaros
5. Action of Respondent: Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD

1146 being violative of due process and equal protection clause. When
her husband died, she filed in GSIS for claim for survivorship pension.
GSIS denied claim, it said surviving spouse has no right of survivorship
pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the
pension.
Whether or not the proviso in Section 18 of PD 1146 is constitutional.
ISSUE
RULING NO. The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional .

The Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
In the case at bar, Section 18 of PD 1146 is unduly oppressive in outrightly

denying a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent
spouse contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited
period. There is outright confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse
without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. It undermines
the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure comprehensive and integrated
social security and insurance benefits to government employees and their
dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the
government employees.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the

constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements
for a valid and reasonable classification are:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class
provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class
from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso
discriminates against the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.
Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more
than three years before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse would
still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three
years before the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any
reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is to
prevent deathbed marriages, then we do not see why the proviso reckons the
three-year prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and
not from the date the pensioner died. The classification does not rest on
substantial distinctions. Worse, the classification lumps all those marriages
contracted within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension as
having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of pension
benefits.
Therefore, the proviso in Section 18 of Presidential Decree No. 1146 is VOID
for being violative of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the law.
FOOTNOTE
46
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CASE TITLE THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY,
HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY,
defendants-appellees.
February 17, 1968
DATE
Justice Jose Bengzon
PONENTE
FACTS 1. Petitioners: Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
2. Action of Petitioner: On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed
before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon
the Solicitor General, a complaint 3 against the City of Ormoc as well as
its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated
ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of
taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution), aside from being an export
tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code. It
further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license tax
which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2
of Republic Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is
authorized to impose; and that the tax amounts to a customs duty, fee
or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264
because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.
3. Subject/Object: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City

passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%)
per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign
countries."
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964
for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.
4. Respondents: The Treasurer of Ormoc City, The Municipal Board of Ormoc

City, Hon. Esteban C. Conejos as Mayor of Ormoc City and Ormoc City.
5. Action of Respondent: The defendants asserted that the tax ordinance

was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy
Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional
limitations.
Whether constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the equal
ISSUE protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed.
Yes. Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964 is violative to the provision of equal
RULING protection of the law.
The Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
In Felwa vs Salas, the SC ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to
persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable
where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies
not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies
only to those who belong to the same class.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar
produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other.
At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.,
it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future
conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive
as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as
plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance
expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be
levied upon.
Therefore, the challenged ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude

arbitrariness and is unconstitutional.
FOOTNOTE 47
CASE TITLE Chamber of Real Estate and Builder's Association, petitioner vs. The Hon.
Executive Secretary of Finance Juanita Amatong, and the Hon. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue Guillermo Parayno, respondents.
DATE March 9, 2010
PONENTE Justice Renato Corona
FACTS 1. Chamber of Real Estate and Builder's Association, petitioners
2. Petitioner is an association of real estate developers and builders in the
Philippines. It impleaded the former executive secretary Alberto Romulo,
then acting Secretary of Finance Juanita Amatong and Commissioner of
Internal Revenue Guillermo Parayno. Petitioner assails the validity of the
imposition of Minimum Corporate Tax (MCIT) on corporations and
creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified as
ordinary assets.
3. Petitioner claims that the revenue regulations are violative of the equal
protection clause because the CWT is levied only on real estate
enterprises. Specifically, petitioner points out that manufacturing
enterprises are not similarly imposed with CWT on their sales even if their
manner of doing business is not much different from that of a real estate
enterprise.
4. The Hon. Executive Secretary of Finance Juanita Amatong, and the Hon.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Guillermo Parayno, respondents.
5. Respondents argued that petitioners in insisting that its industry should be
treated similarly as manufacturing enterprises, fails to realize that what
distinguishes the real estate business from another manufacturing
enterprises, for purposes of the imposition of CWT, is not their production
processes but the prices of their goods sold and the number of
transactions involved.
ISSUE Whether or not the revenue regulations specifically Section 27(E) of RA 8424
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
RULING
No, the revenue regulations were not violative of the equal protection clause.
The Constitution provides that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty and
property without due process of law nor shall be denied equal protection of the
laws.
In the case at bar, the taxing power of the state has the authority to make
reasonable classifications for the purpose of taxation. Inequalities which result
from a singling act of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation. The real estate industry, by itself, a class and can be
validly treated differently from other business enterprises. It follows that the
guarantee of the equal protection of laws is not violated by legislation based in a
reasonable classification.
Therefore, the revenue regulations stated in Section 27 (E) of RA 8424 is not
violative of the equal protection clause.
FOOTNOTE 48
CASE TITLE Conrado L. Tiu, Juan T. Montelibano Jr. and Isagani M. Jungco, petitioner, vs.
Court of Appeals, Hon. Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., Bases Conversion and
Development Authority, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, BIR, City Treasurer of
Olongapo and Municipal Treasurer of Subic Zambales, respondents.
DATE January 20, 1999
PONENTE Justice Panganiban
FACTS 1. Conrado L. Tiu, Juan T. Montelibano Jr. and Isagani M. Jungco, petitioners.
2. The petitioners seek the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeaks
promulgated on August 29, 1996 and the Resolution dated November 13,
1996, in CA G.R. No. 37788. The challenged decision upheld the
constitutionality and validity of EO No. 97~A according to which the grant
and enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives authorized under RA No.
7227 were limited to the business enterprises and residents within the
fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone.
3. On March 13, 199, Congress, with the approval of the President, passed
into law RA 7227 entitled “An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military
Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases Conversion
and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and
for Other Purposes”.
4. Court of Appeals, Hon. Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., Bases Conversion and
Development Authority, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, BIR, City
Treasurer of Olongapo and Municipal Treasurer of Subic Zambales,
respondents.
5. The appellate Court contended that the petitioners could not claim that EO
97~A is unconstitutional, while at the same time maintaining the validity of
RA 7227.
ISSUE Whether or not the EO No. 97-A is violative of the equal protection clause
RULING
No, EO No. 97-A is not violative of the equal protection clause.
The Constitution provides that, No one shall be deprived of life, liberty and
property without due process of law nor shall be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
In the case at bar, an Executive Order, issued pursuant to law, granting tax and
duty incentives only to businesses and residents within the “secured area” of the
“Subic Special Economic Zone” and denying those who live within the zone but
outside such “fenced-in” territory. The Constitution does not require absolute
equality among residents; it is enough that all persons under like circumstances or
conditions are given the same privileges and required to follow the same
obligations.
Therefore, a classification based on valid and reasonable standards do not violate
the equal protection clause.
FOOTNOTE 49
CASE TITLE Francisco I. Chavez, petitioner vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) and Magtanggol Gunigundo, respondents
DATE December 9, 1988
PONENTE Justice Panganiban
FACTS 1. Francisco I. Chavez, petitioner
2. Petitioner as taxpayer, citizen and former government official who initiated
the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who committed
"unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation
of the country's economy", alleges that what impelled him to bring this
action were several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets in
September 1997. These news items referred to (a) the alleged discovery of
billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in
Swiss banks and (b) the reported execution of a compromise between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share
these assets.
3. Chavez claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten
wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest", since it has a
"debilitating effect on the country's economy", that would be greatly
prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the
people in general have a right to know the transactions or deals being
contrived and effected by the government.
4. PCGG and Magtanggol Gunigundo, respondents
5. Respondents do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioners claim is premature,
because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the
negotiations and agreement.
ISSUE Whether or not the PCGG's commitment to exempt the Marcoses from all forms
of taxes violative of the Constitution
RULING
Yes, the PCGG's commitment to exempt the Marcoses from all the taxes violates
the Constitution.
The Constitution dictates that No one shall be deprived of life, liberty and
property without due process of law nor shall be denied equal protection of the
laws.
In the case at bar, the compromise agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos
heirs providing that the assets to be retained by the Marcos family are exempt
from all taxes violates the equal protection clause. Any special grant of tax
exemption in favor of the Marcos family would constitute class legislation.
Therefore, the compromise agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos family
granting them of tax exemption is violative of the Constitution.
Footnote No. 50
Case Title: ERNESTO G. GONZALES et al. plaintiffs-appellees, vs.

CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION, represented by PACIFICO P.
MILLO, President, and CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC, INC., defendants-
appellants.
Date: December 1, 2009
Ponente: Justice Felix Makasiar
1. (Defendants-appellants) CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION, represented by PACIFICO

P. MILLO, President, and CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC, INC.
2. Defendants-Appellants filed a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac (now Regional Trial Court) in Civil Case No. 4017 dated October 29, 1964. The
decision of the lower court is that the defendant Tarlac Development Corporation is enjoined from
dismissing the plaintiffs upon demand of its co-defendant, the Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union.
Likewise, the Central Azucarera de Tarlac Labor Union is enjoined from demanding from its co-
defendant Tarlac Development Corporation, the dismissal of the plaintiffs.
3. Appellants state that Republic Act No. 3350 is a discriminatory legislation, since it grants to the
members of certain religious sects undue advantage over other workers, thus violating Section I of
Article Ill of the 1935 Constitution which forbids the denial to any person of the equal protection of the
laws.
4. ERNESTO G. GONZALES et al. (plaintiffs-apellees)
5. Upon being informed of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3350, which exempts them from the
effects of Section 4 of the Exclusive Collective Bargaining Agreement due to their religion the plaintiffs
resigned from the defendant labor Union, who in turn demanded from its co-defendant, the Tarlac
Development Corporation, the dismissal of the plaintiffs from their work under the above-quoted
provision of Section 4 of the bargaining agreement.
ALAC
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 3350 is a discriminatory legislation and violative of the equal
protection of laws .
A-No. Republic Act No. 3350 is not discriminatory legislation and is not violative of the equal protection
of laws.
L-Constitution dictates that no person shall be denied the equal protection of laws.
A-In the instant case, exempting members of Iglesia Ni Cristo in joining membership in Central Azucarera
de Tarlac Labor Union as provided in RA 3350 is a valid classification because the law classifies
employees as to the effect and coverage of union security agreements .
C- Thus RA 3350 is not a discriminatory legislation and is not violative of the equal protection of laws
because there is reasonable classification which rest on real and not imaginary distinction.
Footnote No. 51
Case Title: ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Ponente: Justice Antonio Eduardo Nachura
1. (Petitioners) ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR.,
2. Petitioners contend that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from office upon the
filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.
3. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent
4. Respondent argued that petitioners have no legal standing to institute the suit." Petitioners have not
yet filed their CoCs, hence, they are not yet affected by the assailed provision in the COMELEC resolution
5. The Solicitor General further claims that the petition is premature or unripe for judicial
determination. Their interest in the present controversy is thus merely speculative and contingent upon
the filing of the same. The Solicitor General likewise contends that petitioners availed of the wrong
remedy. They are questioning an issuance of the COMELEC made in the exercise of the latter's rule-
making power. Certiorari under Rule 65 is then an improper remedy.
ALAC
Issue- Whether or not the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of Comelec Resolution No. 8678 is
discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.
A-Yes, the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of Comelec Resolution No. 8678is discriminatory and
violates the equal protection clause.
A-In the instant case, in considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from
their post upon the filing of their CoCs but not considering as resigned all other civil servants specifically
the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class.
C- Thus , the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding
elective ones is not germane to purpose of the law and therefore not a valid classification.
Footnote No. 52
Case Title: TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE
TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION , petitioners,
vs.
THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND
TRANSPORTATION, respondents
Date: September 30, 1982
Ponente: Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
1. (Petitioners) TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE
TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION
2. Petitioners seeks to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, 1977,
of the Board of Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, of the Bureau
of Land Transportation
3. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND

TRANSPORTATION, Respondent
4. On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No.
77-42 which SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
5. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT)
issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV
Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular,
and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as
public conveyances
ALAC
Issue-Whether or not BOT Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 and BLT Implementing Circular No. 52
denied the right to equal protection of the laws of petitioners.
A- No. Said memorandum Circulars did not denied the equal protection of laws of the petitioners.
A-In the instant case, considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial
distinction exists so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
C- Thus, the phasing out in Metro Manila of Taxi Units six (6) years old and above is a valid classification.
The equal protection clause bows to the more superior police power of the state.
Footnote 53.
Case Title: Tablarin V. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 736
Date: July 31, 1987
Ponente: Justice Florentino Feliciano

FACTS:
1. The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year
1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public
respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement
(CEM).
2. On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction.
3. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of
Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of
Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and
from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility
for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering
the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future.
4. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said
petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
5. Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for Certiorari with this Court to set aside
the Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the
constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative and whether MECS Order No.
52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
RULING:
No. Prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for
admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
Under the law, setting of different cut-offs for different years is dictated by different conditions
like the number of students, number of schools with available places, and the level of difficulty of the
test.
In the case at bar, the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like NMAT as a
means for achieving its stated objective of “upgrading the selection of applicants into medical schools”
and of “improving the quality of medical education in the country”.
Thus, prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain scores as a condition for admission to medical
schools do not constitute unconstitutional imposition.
FOOTNOTE 54
CASE TITLE Philippine Judges Association, et. al. v Hon. Pete Prado, et. al.
DATE November 11, 1993; G.R. No. 105371 (227 SCRA 703)
PONENTE Justice Isagani Cruz
FACTS 1. Petitioners are the Philippine Judges Association, duly represented by its
President, the National Confederation of the Judges Association of the
Philippines, the Municipal Judges League of the Philippines, and all the Judges
of the RTC, MeTC, MTC throughout the country.
2. Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7354 on the ground that it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary. It
withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary but it retained the same for
the President and the Vice-President, Members of the Congress, COMELEC,
former presidents, NSO, and the general public in the filing of complaints
against public offices and officers.
3. Section 35 of RA 7354, implemented by Circular No. 92-28, withdrew the
franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MeTC, MTC, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government
offices.
4. Respondents are the Hon. Pete Prado, in his capacity as Secretary of the DOTC,
and Jorge V. Sarmieto, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the
Philippine Postal Corporation.
5. Respondents countered that there is no discrimination because the law is
based on a valid classification.
ISSUE Whether or not Section 35 of RA 7354 is discriminatory thereby violating the equal
protection clause.
RULING Yes. Section 35 of RA 7354 is discriminatory and a violation of the equal protection
clause.
The Constitution provides that no person shall be denied the equal protection
clause.
In the case at bar, the provision which withdrew the Philippine Postal
Corporation franking privileges formerly granted to the judiciary but remained
with the executive and legislative department is unconstitutional because the
three branches of the government are similarly situated. The equal protection
clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction. What the clause requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from all others in these same particulars. The distinction made by the
law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. This
is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It
is a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
Hence, Section 35 of RA 7354 is a violation to the equal protection clause.
Footnote 55
Case Title: Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, petitioner, V. Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho and Judge Francisco Arca,
respondents. G.R. No. L-29646
Date: November 10, 1978
Ponente: Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, Jr.
FACTS:
1. The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on
February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila
on March 27, 1968.
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY
KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST
SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
2. On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila,
filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil
Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining
order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring
said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void.
3. In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the
ordinance declared null and void:
1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No.
6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity in taxation;
2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful
occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, which is out of proportion to the
cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action
of the Mayor, thus, violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative
powers:
3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus,
deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
4. On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on
September 17, 1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making
permanent the writ of preliminary injunction.
5. Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void
on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the rule on uniformity of
taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or
revenue measure but is an exercise of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory
measure in nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 6537 violates the due process and equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. The Ordinance No. 6537 violates the due process and equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Under the law, requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City
Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of
the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a
State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived
of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of
protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.
In the instant case, the ordinance imposing a work permit of 50.00 upon all aliens desirous of
obtaining employment in the City of Manila was declared unconstitutional. The fee that was imposed
was unreasonable and excessive and it failed to consider valid substantial differences in situation among
individual aliens who were required to pay it.
Hence, the ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of
the Constitution.
FOOTNOTE 56
CASE TITLE Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Employees Association, Inc. v
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary
PONENTE Justice Reynato Puno
FACTS 1. Petitioners: Petitioner is the Central bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
Employees Association, Inc.
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against BSP

and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President to restrain
respondents from further implementing the last provision in Sec 15(c),
Art II of RA 7653 on the ground of invidious discrimination of the 2,994
rank-and-file employees.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Section 15,

Art II of RA 7653 for making a cut between two classes of employees:
the BSP officers and the rank-and-file with Salary Grade 19 and below.
Such classification is not based on substantial distinction but solely on
position.
4. Respondents: Respondents are the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the

Executive Secretary.
5. Action of Respondents: Respondent BSP contended that it does not violate

the equal protection clause and can stand the constitutional test.
Respondent is also mandated by the Monetary Board to "establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound
principles of management.
ISSUE Whether or not the legislative classification in Section 15 (c) of Article II of

R.A. 7653 violates the rational basis test to be declared unconstitutional.
RULING NO. the legislative classification in section 15 (c) of Art. 2 of R.A. 7653 DOES NOT
violate the rational basis test.
Section 1 of Art. III of the Constitution states that no person shall be deprived
of equal protection of the law.
In the case at bar, legislative classification of the BSP employees is valid
because it is warranted by the rational basis test. To pass the rational basis
test means that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest
and it ascribes a “deferential” attitude towards legislative classifications. This
deference comes from the recognition that classification is often an
unavoidable element of the task of the legislation which, under the
separation of power embodied in our Constitution, is primarily the
prerogative of Congress. The classification is not impressed with the vice of
irrationality.
Thus, the legislative classification in the proviso is valid.

FOOTNOTE 57
CASE TITLE White Light Corporation, et. al. v City of Manila
DATE January 20, 2009; G.R. No. 122846
PONENTE Justice Dante O. Tinga
FACTS 1. Petitioners: Petitioners are White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation

and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation.
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioners sought the reversal of the Decision of the

CA on the validity of Manila City’s Ordinance No. 774 albeit said
ordinance was declared null and void in the RTC. Petitioners contended
that all of them cannot be similarly classified as some were authorized,
by virtue of P.D. 259, to admit customers on short time basis or wash up
stays. The Ordinance was not a valid exercise of the police power
considering that it infringed the private rights of the patrons.
3. Subject/Object: Manila Ordinance No. 774 is entitled “An Ordinance

Prohibiting Short-time admission, short-time admission rates, and wash-
up rates schemes in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension
houses, and similar establishments in the city.”
4. Respondents: Respondent is the City of Manila represented by De Castro

and Mayor Alfredo S. Lim.
5. Action of Respondents: Respondent City asserted that the ordinance is a

valid exercise of police power pursuant to the Local Government Code
and it was enacted to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and
the morality of the constituents.
ISSUE Whether or not Ordinance No. 774 falls short of the rational basis test thus to
be declared unconstitutional.
RULING Yes. Ordinance No. 774 falls short at the rational basis test.
In the case at hand, legislative classification of the establishments is not valid

because it is not warranted by the rational basis test. To pass the rational
basis test means that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest and it ascribes a “deferential” attitude towards legislative
classifications. The SC could not perceive the legitimate government interest
behind the classification in Ordinance No. 774. It also recognizes the capacity
of the petitioners to invoke the constitutional rights of their patrons or clients
which is the latter’s liberty as a fundamental right. This fundamental freedom
is what the people could reflexively exercise any day without being impaired.
Thus, the legislative classification in the ordinance is unconstitutional.

FOOTNOTE 58
CASE TITLE Antonio M. Serrano v Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et. al.
DATE March 24, 2009; G.R. No. 167614
PONENTE Justice Maria Alicia Austria-Martinez
FACTS 1. Petitioner is Antonio Serrano, a Filipino seafarer.
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner assailed the Decision and Resolution of the

CA on the constitutionality of Par. 5 of Sec. 10 of RA 8042. Petitioner
maintained that the OFWs should be entitled for protection from illegal
dismissal in case of termination of overseas employment.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of Par. 5,

Section 10 of RA 8042, to wit, Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of
termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.
4. Respondents are Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation

Co., Inc., a navigation company offering overseas-approved contracts of
employment.
5. Action of Respondents: Respondents offered to petitioner a contract in

March 1998 with the assurance that the latter would be made Chief
Officer after a month. Respondents did not deliver the promise.
Consequently, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer, thus, was
repatriated to the Philippines in May, 1998.
ISSUE Whether or not the last clause of par. 5, Section 10 of RA 8042 is

unconstitutional depriving the petitioner equal protection of the law.
RULING Yes. The subject clause is unconstitutional.
In the case at bar, the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against and
an invidious impact on OFWs. The legislative classification states that the first
category, the OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of less than one
year who, in case of illegal dismissal, are entitled to their salaries for the
entire unexpired portion of their contract; while the second category, the
OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of one year or more who, in
case of illegal dismissal, are entitled to monetary award equivalent to only 3
months of the unexpired portion of their contracts. There is, therefore, an
unfair disparity. A legislative classification which impermissibly interferes
the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage
of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.
Thus, the legislative classification in the proviso is valid.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a
NOTE: classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the
challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate
state interest; b) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show
that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that the classification is
at least substantially related to serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a
legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional,
and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve
a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.
Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech,
gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights of expansion from earlier application to
equal protection.
FOOTNOTE 60
CASE TITLE Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo v The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
PONENTE Justice Catral Mendoza
FACTS 1. Petitioner is Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo instituting this case in his capacity as
a citizen and a taxpayer.
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner assailed the validity and constitutionality of

E.O. No. 1, entitled “Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.”
Petitioner also maintained that it is violative of the power of the
Congress usurping its constitutional authority by creating a public office
and appropriating funds therefor.
3. Subject/Object: Then President Benigno Aquino established the Truth Commission
under E.O. 1. Section 1 thereof states, “xxx investigate reports of graft and
corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and
ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by public officers and employees,
their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any,
during the previous administration…”
4. Respondent is the Philippine truth Commission of 2010. It was created as a

mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President. Although
described as an independent, it is an entity within the Office of the
President Proper and subject to his control. It is not a quasi-judicial
body. All it can do is gather, collect, assess evidences, and recommend.
5. Action of Respondents: Respondent in its consolidated comment argued

that Truth Commission does not arrogate the powers of the Congress,
nor usurp the latter’s power, nor supersede the power of the
Ombudsman, nor violate the equal protection clause.
ISSUE Whether or not E.O. No. 1 is warrant by the intermediate scrutiny test to be
declared as a valid classification.
RULING No. E.O. No 1 is not warranted by the intermediate scrutiny test to be

declared as a valid classification

laws.
In the instant case, for a classification to meet the requirements of

constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong
to the class. The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of
the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute
symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the
same characteristics in equal degree. The intermediate scrutiny test is used
as a test for evaluating classification based on gender and legitimacy. The
government must show that the challenged classification serves an
important interest and that the classification is at least substantially related
to serving that interest.
Hence, E.O No 1 violates the equal protection clause and is unconstitutional.
NOTE [I]n the area of equal protection analysis, the judiciary has developed a ‘level of scrutiny’
analysis for resolving the tensions inherent in judicial review. When engaging in this analysis,
a court subjects the legislative or executive action to one of three levels of scrutiny,
depending on the class of persons and the rights affected by the action. The three levels are
rational basis scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. If a particular legislative or
executive act does not survive the appropriate level of scrutiny, the act is held to be
unconstitutional. If it does survive, it is deemed constitutional. The three tensions discussed
above and, in turn, the three judicial responses to each, run parallel to these three levels of
scrutiny. In response to each tension, the court applies a specific level of scrutiny.
The first level of scrutiny, rational basis scrutiny, requires only that the purpose of the
legislative or executive act not be invidious or arbitrary, and that the act’s classification be
reasonably related to the purpose. Rational basis scrutiny is applied to legislative or executive
acts that have the general nature of economic or social welfare legislation. While purporting
to set limits, rational basis scrutiny in practice results in complete judicial deference to the
legislature or executive. Thus, a legislative or executive act which is subject to rational basis
scrutiny is for all practical purposes assured of being upheld as constitutional.
The second level of scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, requires that the purpose of the
legislative or executive act be an important governmental interest and that the act’s
classification be significantly related to the purpose. Intermediate scrutiny has been applied
to classifications based on gender and illegitimacy. The rationale for this higher level of
scrutiny is that gender and illegitimacy classifications historically have resulted from invidious
discrimination. However, compared to strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny’s presumption of
invidious discrimination is more readily rebutted, since benign motives are more likely to
underlie classifications triggering intermediate scrutiny.
The third level of scrutiny is strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires that the legislative or
executive act’s purpose be a compelling state interest and that the act’s classification be
narrowly tailored to the purpose. Strict scrutiny is triggered in two situations: (1) where the
act infringes on a fundamental right; and (2) where the act’s classification is based on race or
national origin. While strict scrutiny purports to be only a very close judicial examination of
legislative or executive acts, for all practical purposes, an act subject to strict scrutiny is
assured of being held unconstitutional.
FOOTNOTE 61
CASE TITLE HILARIO CAMINO MONCADO v THE PEOPLE'S COURT AND JUAN M. LADAW,
80 Phil 1
PONENTE Justice Guillermo Pablo
FACTS 1. Petitioners: HILARIO CAMINO MONCADO
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner stands accused of treason before the

people’s Court, the information against him having been filed by
Prosecutor Ladaw on February 28, 1946. He was arrested by members
of the ICC of the United States Army, without an arrest warrant. A week
after their house was ransacked and important documents were missing
without the search warrant.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioner filed a motion before the People's Court

requesting the return of such documents, alleging as a reason that they
had been obtained from his residence without a search warrant, and
said court, with serious abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction and
following the doctrine established in the matter ofAlvero vs. Dizon (76
Phil., 637),is denied.Thereupon, petitioner filed with this Supreme Court
on August 10, 1946, a petition praying that the lower court's order of
July 9, 1946, be set aside, that said court be required to order the return
of the documents and things in question to petitioner , and that the
prosecutor be restrained from using and presenting them as evidence at
the trial of the criminal case for treason.
4. Respondents: THE PEOPLE'S COURT AND JUAN M. LADAW
5. Action of Respondents: Respondent’s contention that the decision in the

case of Alvero against Dizon is well founded(76 Phil., 637) is not
applicable to the particular case.
ISSUE Whether or not the protection guaranteed by Section 2 , Article III

RULING No. The protection guaranteed by Sec. 2, Article III was violated.
Section 2 of Art. III of the Constitution states the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause.
In the case at bar, obtaining the documents does not alter their probative
value. If a search warrant had been issued, the documents would be
admissible evidence. There is no constitutional or legal provision that frees
the accused from all criminal responsibility because there was no search
warrant. The public vindictment demands that violators of criminal law be
punished. Releasing the guilty for the simple fact that the evidence against
him has not been legally obtained is to judicially punish the crime
Therefore, Sec.2, Artcle III was not violated.

FOOTNOTE 62
CASE TITLE Stonehill v Diokno 20 SCRA 383
DATE June 19, 1967
PONENTE Justice Roberto Conception
FACTS 1. Petitioners: HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and

KARL BECK
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioners and the corporations they form were

alleged to have committed acts in “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
3. Subject/Object: : Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for
being violative of the constitution and the rules of court by:
*not describing with particularly the documents, books and things to be
seized
*money not mentioned I the warrants were seized
*the warrants were ‘issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against
the petitioner
*the searches and seizures were made an illegal manner and
*the documents paper and cash money were delivered to the issuing courts
for disposal in accordance with law.
4. Respondents: HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF

JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National
Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON,
EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City
Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City
5. Action of Respondents: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search

warrants against petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which
they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of
petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences
to search for personal properties “books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and profit
and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarette wrappers)” as the subject of
the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE Whether or not the search warrant is valid.
RULING No. The search warrant is not valid.
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, officers of certain corporations, from which the documents,
papers, things were seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of
action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have
their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of
herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can
be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties.
Therefore, the search warrant issued was void.
FOOTNOTE 63
CASE TITLE Lopez v Commisioner of Customs, 68 SCRA 320
PONENTE Justice Enrique Fernando
FACTS 1. Petitioners: JOSE G. LOPEZ and TOMAS VELASCO
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioners claim that the 1,408 sacks of copra and 86
sacks of coffee in question were purchased in Kiamba, Lumatin, and
Lumasal, all in the province of Cotabato, from a certain Osmeña
Juanday. Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the said goods were not
imported and of foreign origin, they are not legally subject to seizure
and forfeiture.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioner contend that the forfeiture made by the
Collector of Customs of Davao was invalid because the said forfeiture
was based on documents and papers which were illegally seized by
agents of the Government through violence and intimidation.
4. Respondents: COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS

OF DAVAO, CHAIRMAN OF THE ASAC, ACTING DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CITY FISCAL OF DAVAO, SENIOR NBI
AGENT OF DAVAO, EARL REYNOLDS, AND/OR ANY OF THEIR
AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVES
5. Action of Respondents: Respondent denies petitioners' claim. He contends

that the evidence is sufficient to hold that the goods in question came
from Indonesia and subsequently brought to the Philippines in violation
of our laws and, therefore, subject to forfeiture; and that the
Indonesian documents and papers allegedly secured illegally by the
combined team of NBI, PC and RASAC agents stationed in Davao, were
in fact lawfully and validly secured by them. Consequently, said
documents and papers are admissible in evidence in the forfeiture
proceedings instituted administratively by the Collector of Customs of
Davao."
Whether or not there was consent to allow the warrantless search and
ISSUE seizures of Velasco’s rent hotel apartment
RULING Yes, the search is valid.
under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witnesses he may
In the case at bar, the wife of petitioner Tomas Velasco, upon being informed
of the purpose of the search by the officers, invited them to enter and search
the hotel room and even voluntarily gave the documents and things
requested by said officers. Immunity from unwarranted intrusion is a personal
right which may be waived either expressly or impliedly.
Therefore, the search in Velasco’s rent hotel room was valid.
FOOTNOTE 64
CASE TITLE The People of the Phil. Islands, plaintiff-appellee vs. Kagui Malasugui, defendant-
appellant
DATE July 30, 1936
PONENTE Justice Diaz
FACTS 1. The People of the Phil. Islands, plaintiff-appellee
2. At about 5 o'clock in the morning of March 5, 1935, Tan Why, a Chinese
Merchant, a resident of Cotabato was found lying on the ground with
several wounds in the head.
3. The death of Tan Why was imputed to the herein accused who was
charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. Kagui Malasugui was
searched by the investigating police without any protest or opposition
from his part.
4. Kagui Malasugui, defendant-appellant
5. The accused appealed therefrom and assigned five errors as committed by
the lower court, which may be briefly summarized as follows:
a) In not having granted him twenty-four hours to prepare his defense;
b) In having denied his petition for the return of the articles taken from him
during the search of his person, without the corresponding judicial
warrant.
c) In having admitted exhibits a,b,c, d, f, L and l-1 as evidence in the case
d) In having denied his petition to dismiss for lack of evidence, filed
immediately after the fiscal had finished presenting his evidence; and
e) In having found him guilty of robbery with homicide instead of acquitting
him.
ISSUE Whether or not the conducted search on the accused was legal.
RULING
Yes the conducted search was legal.
The Constitution provides that the right of the people to be secured of their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature shall be inviolable.
In the present case, the appellant had to be searched after he voluntarily
produced the bracelets. When one voluntarily submits to a search consents to
have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded from complaining thereof.
The right to be secure from unreasonable search, may like every right, be waived
and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. When the search of
the person detained or arrested and the seizure of the effects found in his
possession are incidental to an arrest made in conformity with the law, they
cannot be considered unreasonable, much less unlawful.
Therefore, the conducted search on the accused was legal.
FOOTNOTE 65
CASE TITLE The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Basilio Damaso @ Bernardo/
Bernie Mendoza, KA DADO, accused-appellant.
DATE August 12, 1992
PONENTE Justice Medialdea
FACTS 1. The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee.
2. On June 18, 1988, Lt. Candido Quijardo, a Philippine Constabulary officer
connected with the 152nd Company at Lingayen, Pangasinan and some
companions were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in
Catacdang, Arellano-Bani, Dagupan City. In said place, the group
apprehended Gregorio Flameniano, Berlina Aritumba, Revelina Gamboa
and Deogracias Mayaoa. When interrogated, the persons apprehended
revealed that there was an underground safehouse at Gracia Village in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan. After coordinating with the Station Commander of
Urdaneta, the group proceeded to the house in Garcia Village where they
found subversive documents, a radio a 1x7 caliber 0.45 firearm and other.
Items.
3. The Phil. Constabulary Officers confiscated the items found and brought
them to their headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought the
persons found in the house to the headquarters for investigation.
4. Bernardo/ Bernie Mendoza, KA DADO, accused-appellant.
5. The accused-appellant contended that the Lower Court erred in
considering as evidence the firearms, documents and other items after
they were declared inadmissible with finality by another branch of the
same Court and the said evidence are the fruits of an illegal search.
ISSUE Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure conducted.
RULING
No, there was no valid search and seizure in this case.
Under the law, The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and
seizures, being a personal one cannot be waived by anyone except the person
whose rights are invaded or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her
behalf.
In the instant case, the records show that the appellant was not in his house at
that time Luz Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed to enter his
house in his absence. The prosecution failed to establish the fact that the
appellant had given Morados authority to open the door. Likewise, they failed to
show if Luz Tanciangco has such authority. Without this evidence, the authorities’
intrusion into the appellant’s dwelling cannot be given any color of legality.
Therefore, there was no valid search and seizure in this case.
FOOTNOTE 66
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines v Andre Marti
DATE January 18, 1991; G.R. No. 81561
PONENTE Justice Abdulwahid Bidin

FACTS 1. Accused-appellant is Andre Marti.
2. Appellant appealed the decision of the Special Criminal Court of Manila

convicting appellant for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. Appellant was
found guilty for sending packages which contained several pieces of
marijuana leaves to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
3. Subject/Object: Appellant contended that the evidence subject of the

imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights
against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication
and the same should be held inadmissible in evidence.
4. Plaintiff-appellee is the State.
5. Appellee argued that the evidence sought to be excluded was discovered

and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without
the intervention and participation of the State authorities. There was no
transgression as to the rights of the appellant against unreasonable search
and seizure.
ISSUE Whether or not the search and seizure committed by the private individual
violated the constitutional right of the accused against unlawful searches and
seizures.
RULING No. The search and seizure committed by the private individual did not
violate the constitutional right of the accused against unlawful search and
seizures.
Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution provides for the right of the people
to be secure… against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose.
In the present case, the constitutional proscription against unlawful

searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against
the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint
against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed. However,
if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual,
not the law enforcers, is involved.
Thus, the search and seizure committed by the private individual did not
violate the constitutional right of the accused against unlawful search and
seizures.
FOOTNOTE 67
CASE TITLE Sony Music v. Judge Espanol (GR No. 156804)

DATE March 14, 2005
PONENTE Garcia, J.
FACTS 1. Petitioners : Sony Music Entertainment (Phils.), Inc. And IFPI (Southeast
Asia), Ltd
2. Action of Petitioner: Complaint was filed to charge herein private

respondents James Uy, David Chung, Elena Lim and other officer of
respondent Solid Laguna Corporation for copyright infringement
3. Subject/Object: the respondent judge issued Search Warrant No. 219-00

for violation of Section 208 of R.A. No. 8293 and Search Warrant No.
220-00 for violation of Section 6 of PD No. 1987.
4. Respondents: Hon. Judge Dolores L. Espanol of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, Dasmarinas, Cavite, Elena S. Lim, Susan L. Tan, David S. Lim,
James H. Uy, Wilson Alejandro, Jr., Joseph de Luna, Maria A. Vela Cruz,
David Chung, James Uy, John Does and Jane Does, and Solid Laguna
Corporation
5. Action of Respondents: The respondent judge issued two search warrants
to the four private respondents for violation of Section 208 of RA No.
8293 and for violation of Section 6 of PD No. 1987
ISSUE Whether or not the search warrant was valid.
RULING No, the search warrant issued was not valid
The constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall be issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complaint and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
In the case at bar, The issuance of Search Warrant No. 219-00 was, at
bottom, predicated on the sworn testimonies of persons without personal
knowledge of facts they were testifying on and who relied on a false
certification issued by VRB.
Tto prevent stealth encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the

right to privacy, a liberal construction is search and seizure cases is given in
favor of the individual. Based as it were on hearsay and false information, its
issuance was without probable cause and, therefore, invalid.
FOOTNOTE 68
CASE TITLE Valmonte vs. General De Villa (GR No. 83988)

DATE September 29, 1989
PONENTE Padilla, J.
FACTS 1. Petitioners: Ricardo C. Valmonte and Union of Lawyers and Advocates for
People’s Rights (ULAP)
2. Action of Petitioner: The Petitioner filed for a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, seeking the
declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or elsewhere, as
unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the
alternative, to direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the
implementation of checkpoints, for the protection of the people
3. Subject/Object: Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said

checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed
and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints,
considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular
searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the
benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.
4. Respondents: General Renato de Villa and National Capital Region District

Command
5. Action of Respondents: the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the
Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas,
for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive
to the social, economic and political development of the National
Capital Region.1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the
NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.
ISSUE Whether or not the installing of checkpoints without search warrants is a

violated the constitution.
RULING No, the installing of checkpoints did not violate the constitution
The constitution provides that the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
be seized.
In the case at bar, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of

Valenzuela, Metro Manila as part of its duty to maintain peace and order
pursuant to the letter of instruction of the Philippine General Headquarters,
AFP.
Therefore, not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those with which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by
any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
FOOTNOTE 70
CASE TITLE People vs. Escano (GR No. 129756-58)

PONENTE Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS 1. Plaintiff appellee: People of the Philippines
3. Action of Petitioner:
3. Subject/Object: Law enforcers of Makati Police was manning a checkpoint
at the corner of Sen Gil Puyat Avenue and SLEX. They were checking the
cars going to Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious, and
imposing merely a running stop on others.
4. Respondents: Julian Deen Escano, Virgilio Tome Usana and Jerry Casabaan
Lopez
5. Action of Respondents: Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the
checkpoint in question was conducted. They contend that the
checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati Police should have been
announced. They also complain of its having been conducted in an
arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
Whether or not unannounced checkpoints is a violation of the constitutional
ISSUE rights of accused-appellants
RULING No, unannounced checkpoints is not a violation of the constitutional rights

of accused-appellants
The constitution provides that The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause t
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
be seized.
In the case at bar, law enforcers of Makati Police was manning a checkpoint
at the corner of Sen Gil Puyat Avenue and SLEX. They were checking the cars
going to Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing
merely a running stop on others.
No need for checkpoints to be announced. Not only would it be impractical, it

would also forewarn those who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badges of
legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred form their fixed location and
the regularized manner in which they were operated. Thus, the unannounced
checkpoints is not a violation of the constitutional rights of accused-
appellants
FOOTNOTE 72
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines, plaintiff-apelle vs Santiago Syjuco,defendant and

Teofisto B. Remo, apellant
DATE August 28,1937; G.R. No. L-41957
PONENTE Justice Diaz
FACTS 1. Plaintiff: People of the Philippines
2. Action of Plaintiff: The agent and representatives of the Bureau of Internal

Revenue, named Narciso Mendiola, who alleged that, according to
information given him by a person whom he considered reliable, certain
fraudulent bookletters and papers or records were being kept in the
building marked No. 482 on Juan Luna Street, Binondo, Manila,
occupied by Santiago Sy Juco, a warrant to search the building in
question was issued against said person on March 7, 1933, by the Court
of First Instance of Manila, through Judge Mariano A. Albert.
3. Subject/Object: the peace officers to whom it was directed for execution
were required to seize the above-stated articles for the purpose of
delivering them to the court, for the proper action to be taken in due
time. After making the required search the officers concerned seized,
among things, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by Attorney Teopisto
B. Remo to be his and to contain some letters, documents and papers
belonging to his clients.
4. Respondents: Santiago Syjuco and Teofisto B Remo
5. Action of Respondents: Filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of

Manila, praying that the Collector of Internal Revenue and his agents be
prohibited from opening said art metal filing cabinet and that the sheriff
of the City of Manila likewise be ordered to take charge of said property
in the meantime, on the ground that the warrant by virtue of which the
search was made is null and void, being illegal and against the
Constitution
Is the search warrant in question valid or not, taking into consideration the
ISSUE provisions of the law and of the Constitution relative thereto?
NO. The search warrant is not valid
RULING
Section 2 of Art. III of the Constitution states that The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
In the case at bar, the agent and representatives of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, rely only to the information by a person whom he considered
reliable, Facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant
that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and
act in pursuance thereof.
Therefore, the search warrant issued is not valid
FOOTENOTE 73 (A)
CASE DIGEST PAPER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
CASE TITLE: JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE
ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents. G.R. No. L-64261
DATE: December 26, 1984

PONENTE: ESCOLIN, J.:
FACTS:
1. Petitioners; Jose Burgos, Sr., Jose Burgos, Jr., Bayani Soriano and J. Burgos Media Services, Inc.,
2. Petitioner filed for a petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on
December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses
of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
3. Petitioners averred that the search warrant should be declared illegal because:
a. The judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court.
b. There are two (2) search warrants issued but pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed.
c. That the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos
Media Services, Inc. were seized although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. Alone.
d. That real property was seized under the disputed warrants like machinery, receptacles,
instruments, etc.
e. The search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s that they conducted
surveillance of the premises could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable
cause.
4. Respondents; The chief of staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the chief, Philippine
Constabulary, the chief legal officer, Presidential Security Command, the judge advocate general, et
al.
5. Respondents insinuates that petitioners are estopped by laches that they only impugned the
search warrant six months later.
for postponement was, however, denied because it was filed on the very date of the hearing sought
to be rescheduled.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
RULING: NO. The search warrant is in the nature of general warrants.
Constitution states that the right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches, and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall be issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath of affirmation of the complaint
and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized.
At the case at bar, probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application
and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
Therefore, there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
FOOTENOTE 73 (B)
CASE TITLE: ROMMEL CORRO, petitioner, vs.
HON. ESTEBAN LISING Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch XCV HON.
REMIGIO ZARI Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 98; CITY FISCAL'S OFFICE, Quezon City;
LT. COL. BERLIN A. CASTILLO and 1ST LT. GODOFREDO M. IGNACIO, respondents, G.R. No. L-
69899
DATE: July 15, 1985
PONENTE: RELOVA, J.:
FACTS:
1. Petitioner (Rommel Corro) was a publisher and editor of the Philippine Times
2. Petition for certiorari and mandamus, with application for preliminary injunction and restraining order
to enjoin respondent RTC from proceeding with the trial praying that search warrant issued by respondent
judge be declared null and void;
that a mandatory injunction be issued to return immediately the documents/properties illegally seized;
that final injunction be issued enjoining respondents from the utilizing said document/properties as
evidence;
and that respondent be directed to re-open the padlocked business office of the Philippine Times.
3. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return documents/personal properties alleging,
among others that said seized properties were not in any way connected with the offense of inciting to
sedition.
4. HON. ESTEBAN LISING Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch XCV HON.
REMIGIO ZARI Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 98; CITY FISCAL'S OFFICE, Quezon City;
LT. COL. BERLIN A. CASTILLO and 1ST LT. GODOFREDO M. IGNACIO, respondents,
5. Upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary-Criminal
Investigation Service respondent (RTC Judge Esteban Lising of Quezon City) issued a search warrant
authorizing the search and seizure of: (a) printed copies of Philippine Times, (b) manuscripts/drafts of
articles for publication in the Philippine Times, (c) newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times, (d)
subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners, and (e) typewriters,
duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines and tapes.
Said items/articles were used and

being used as instrument or means of
committing the crime of inciting to
sedition
under (Article 142) of the Revised
Penal Code.
Said items/articles were used and
being used as instrument or means of
committing the crime of inciting to
sedition
under (Article 142) of the Revised
Penal Code.
Respondents also padlocked and
sealed the business office of the
"Philippine Times" of which petitioner
was the
publisher-editor.
Respondents also padlocked and
sealed the business office of the
"Philippine Times" of which petitioner
was the
publisher-editor.
Respondents also padlocked and sealed the business office of the "Philippine Times" of which petitioner
was the publisher-editor.
ISSUE: Was there sufficient probable cause for the issuance of search warrant?
RULING: No, there was no sufficient probable cause for the issuance of search warrant
SEC. 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons,houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of printed
copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper dummies,
subversive documents articles, etc., and even typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape
recording machines.
Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records and equipment
of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal.
The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is
constitutionally objectionable.
Therefore, an application for search warrant must state with particularly the alleged subversive
materials published or intended to be published by the publisher and editor of the Philippine Times,
Rommel Corro.
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant issued by the respondent judge is declared null and void and,
accordingly, SET ASIDE.
FOOTENOTE 73 (C)

CASE TITLE : DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC Manila, Branch 33 and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 82870
DATE: December 14, 1989
PONENTE: PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
1. Petitioners; DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE,
2. Petitioner filed for petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge
dated 9 March 1988 which denied the petitioner's motion to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14, as
well as his order dated 20 April 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier
order.
3. Petitioner moved to squash the search warrant. He claimed that
a. the complainant’s lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts
which formed the basis for the issuance of the issuance of the search warrant;
b. the examination of the said witness was not in the form of searching question and answers;
c. the search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that did not particularly describe the
place to be searched and that it failed to change one specific offense; and
d. the search warrant was issued in violation of circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the
complainant failed to allege under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was
urgent.
4. Respondents; The Hon. Executive Judge Abelardo M. Dayrit, RTC Manila, Branch 33 and People of
the Philippines,
5. Respondents Judge issued an order, denying the petitioner’s motion and supplemental motion to
squash. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration 10 was likewise denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is probable cause to satisfy the issuance of the search warrant.
RULING: NO. The search warrant is in the nature of general warrants.
Constitution states that the right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches, and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall be issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath of affirmation of the complaint
and the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized.
At the case at bar, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances which became the basis for issulting the questioned search warrant, but the aquired
knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons. Respondent Judge did
not examine the witness “in the formof searching questions and answers”. The question asked were
leading as they called for simple “yes” or “no” answer.
Thus, Petition is granted. The questioned as well as the assailed search warrant are annulled and
set aside.
FOOTNOTE 74
CASE TITLE Hubert Webb, petitioner vs HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 258, Respondent
DATE January 29,1937; G.R. No. L-45358
PONENTE Puno J
FACTS 1. Petitioner: Hubert Webb
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary

investigation that he did not commit the crime at bar as he went to the
United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on
October 27, 1992.
3. Subject/Object: In their petitions at bar, petitioners contend: (1)
respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before
issuing warrants of arrest against them
4. Respondents: HON. Raul E. De Leon
5. Action of Respondents: On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page

Resolution "finding probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and
recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed
against petitioners and their co-respondents. On the same date, it filed
the corresponding Information against petitioners and their co-accused
with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused
ISSUE their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before
issuing warrants of arrest against them
NO. Respondent Judges did preliminary examination before issuing warrant
RULING of arrest.
In the case at bar, Facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense had been committed,
the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2)
sworn statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and
Lolita Birrer35 as well as the counter-affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently,
the painstaking recital and analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ
Panel Report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue
warrants of arrest against petitioners.
Therefore, the respondent judges did not violate the preliminary procedure
before issuing the warrant of arrest
FOOTNOTE 75
CASE TITLE Aisan Surety Insurance Company Inc., petitioner vs HON. JOSE HERRERA, as
Judge, City Court of Manila, NBI Agent CELSO J. ZOLETA, JR. and MANUEL
CUARESMA, respondents. G.R. No. L-25232
PONENTE Esguerra J
FACTS 1. Petitioner: Aisan Surety Insurance Company Inc.
2. Action of Petitioner: Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by

respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of Manila, and to
command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers,
receipts and records alleged to have been illegally seized thereunder by
agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent
Celso Zoleta, Jr.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant,

claiming that it was issued in contravention of the explicit provisions of
the Constitution and the Rules of Court, particularly Section 1, of Art. III
of the 1935 Constitution, now Section 3, of Art. IV of the new
Constitution,
4. Respondents: HON. JOSE HERRERA, as Judge, City Court of Manila
5. Action of Respondents: On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera,

upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by
the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search
warrant in connection with an undocketed criminal case for estafa,
falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety
and Insurance Co.
Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid?
ISSUE
NO. The Search warrant issued by the judge in City of Manila not valid.
RULING
In the case at bar, The Probable cause must refer to one specific offence. the
search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1)
estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud.
Therefore, the warrant issued is not valid.
FOOTNOTE 75B
CASE TITLE MARIA CASTRO and CO LING petitioners, vs HONORABLE JAVIER PABALAN,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of La Union, and SGT. ERNESTO
LUMANG, respondents.
DATE G.R. No. L-28642 April 30, 1976
PONENTE Fernando J
FACTS 1. Petitioner: MARIA CASTRO and CO LING petitioners
2. Action of Petitioner: claim that a search warrant issued without complying

with the requisites of the Constitution 1 and the Rules of Court 2 should
have been nullified,
3. Subject/Object: it was the failure of the application for the search warrant as
well as the search warrant itself to specify the specific offense, to examine the
applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of respondent Judge, and to
describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, that were singled out to justify the assertion of illegality.
4. Respondents: HONORABLE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court of First

Instance of La Union, and SGT. ERNESTO LUMANG, respondents.
5. Action of Respondents: July 10, 1967, the search warrant was issued for
illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband.
Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid?
ISSUE
NO. The Search warrant issued is not valid.
RULING
In the case at bar, the respondent failed to comply with the basic procedural
requisite that a search warrant "shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense.
Therefore, the search warrant will be nullified.
FOOTNOTE 72b
CASE TITLE NARCISO ALVAREZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-USURY BOARD,
respondents.
DATE G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937
PONENTE Imperial J
FACTS 1. Petitioner: NARCISO ALVAREZ, petitioner,
2. Action of Petitioner: The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936,
issued by the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, be declared illegal and
set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.
3. Subject/Object: In his oath at the and of the affidavit, the chief of the secret
service stated that his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his
knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his
own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a
reliable person
4. Respondents: THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE ANTI-

USURY BOARD,
5. Action of Respondents: Respondent judge issued the warrant which is the
subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's
house at nay time of the day or night, the seizure of the books and
documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to
him to be disposed of in accordance with the law.
Whether or not there was a sufficient probable cause in the issuance of
ISSUE warrant
NO. There was no sufficient probable cause in the issuance of Search warrant
RULING
In the case at bar, such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of
the warrant is not sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act
in pursuance, it is base only to the knowledge of an agent which had no
knowledge of the facts
Therefore, the search warrant issued is illegal .
FOOTNOTE 76 A
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines v Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag, et. al.
Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag, accused-appellant
DATE June 4, 1993; G.R. No. 101216-18 (223 SCRA 174 )
PONENTE Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.
FACTS 1. Petitioner is accused-appellant Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag.
2. Action of Petitioner: The petitioner appealed from the decision, dated June
11, 1991, of the RTC of San Pablo City where he was convicted for violating
Sec. 15 and Sec. 4, Art. II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, its accessory
penalties, pay P20,000, and the cost of the suit.
3. Subject/Object: The petitioner said that accusation of illegal possession of

dangerous drugs had been framed up or planted evidence. He contended
that the search warrant is a general warrant which does not satisfy the
particular offense. The search conducted was unconstitutional and the
items obtained inadmissible, and that the trial court erred in not quashing
the search warrant and dismissing the case against the petitioner.
4. Respondent is the State.
5. Action of Respondents: The Narcotics Command of San Pablo City applied

for a search warrant to be issued on the house of spouses Redentor and
Sonia Dichoso located at Farconville Subd., San Pablo City. After searching
questions on the applicant and his deponent the Court was satisfied that
there is probable cause to believe that said spouses were keeping, selling
and using an undetermined quantity of shabu and marijuana in said
residence. Consequently, Search Warrant No. 028 was issued by the Court.
ISSUE Whether or not the search warrant against them was valid?
RULING Yes. The search warrant issued against them was valid.
The Constitution provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall

issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In the instant case, it was held that the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a
special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed
into prohibited and regulated drugs, and defines and penalizes categories of
offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or
species. One search warrant may be validly issued for several violations
thereof.
Thus, the issuance of the search warrant against accused-appellant was valid.
FOOTNOTE 76 B
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines v Roberto Salanguit y Ko
DATE April 19, 2001; G.R. No. 133254-55
FACTS 1. Accused-appellant is Roberto Salanguit y Ko.
2. Action of Petitioner: Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime

charged. Upon presentation of evidence, Salanguit testified that the team
from NARCOM ransacked their house; that he was not properly shown a
search warrant and had no chance to red it.
3. Subject/Object: Accused appealed the decision of the RTC, Quezon City

finding him guilty for violating RA 6425. The accused assailed the validity of
the search warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no probable cause
to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for
more than one specific offense; (3) that the place to be searched was not
described with sufficient particularity.
4. Respondent is the State.
5. Action of Respondents: Senior Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in RTC

Branch 90 of Cavite to search the residence of accused-appellant Salanguit
at Novaliches, Quezon City on the ground that SP01 Badua, as a poseur-
buyer, was able to purchase shabu from Salanguit and the sale took place in
accused-appellant's room, and the shabu was taken from a cabinet inside
his room. The search warrant was issued by Presiding Judge Español. The
search was executed and illegal drugs were seized.
ISSUE Whether or not the search warrant issued was valid?
RULING Yes, the search warrant issued was valid.
The Constitution provides that, no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall

In the instant case, it was held that the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a
special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed
into prohibited and regulated drugs, and defines and penalizes categories of
offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or
species. The search warrant was properly issued, such warrant being founded
on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or
affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. The location of accused-appellant's
house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that
the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
Therefore, the search warrant issued was valid.

FOOTNOTE 77
CASE TITLE Bernard R. Nala a.k.a “Rumolo Nala alias Long” v Judge Jesus M. Barroso, Jr.
DATE August 7, 2003; G.R. No. 153087
PONENTE Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago

FACTS 1. Petitioner is Bernard R. Nala.
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner sought to annul the Orders of RTC, Branch

10, Malaybalay City for denying petitioner’s Omnibus Motion to Quash
search and seizure warrant.
3. Subject/Object: petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to – (1) quash

Search and Seizure Warrant No. 30-01 on the ground that it was a warrant
against an unnamed party containing no description personae that will
enable the officer to identify the accused and that the examination
conducted by the respondent judge fell short of the required probing and
exhaustive inquiry for the determination of the existence of probable
cause; (2) declare inadmissible for any purpose the items allegedly seized
under the said warrant; and (3) direct the release of the air rifle seized by
the police officers.
4. Respondent is Judge Jesus M. Barroso, Jr., Presiding Judge of RTC Branch

10, Malaybalay City.
5. Action of Respondents: PO3 Alcoser applied for the issuance to search the
person and residence of the petitioner in connection with illegal possession
of two pistols in violation of R.A. 8294. After examining Alcoser and his
witnesses, respondent Judge issued the search and seizure warrant.
ISSUE Whether or not there was a probable cause for the issuance of a search and
seizure warrant against the petitioner?
RULING No, there was no probable cause for the issuance of a search and seizure
warrant against the petitioner.
The Constitution provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall

In the instant case, probable cause as applied to illegal possession of firearms

should be such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that a person is in possession of a firearm
and that he does not have the license or permit to possess the same.
Nowhere in the affidavit of the witness or the applicant was it mentioned that
the petitioner had no license to possess a firearm. Neither was there a
certification from the appropriate government agency that petitioner was not
licensed to possess a firearm.
Therefore, there was no probable cause for the issuance of a search and
seizure.
FOOTNOTE 78
CASE TITLE 20th Century Fox v. Court of Appeals
DATE August 19, 1988; 162 SCRA 655, G.R. No. 76649-51
PONENTE Justice Hugo Gutierrez Jr.
FACTS 1. Petitioners: 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner through counsel sought the NBI’s assistance

in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the latter’s
anti-film piracy campaign. In which the lower court issued the desired
search warrants.
3. Subject/Object: That certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila are
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in
videotape form which constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential
Decree No.49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property)
4. Respondents: Court of Appeals, Eduardo M. Barreto, Raul Sagullo and

Fortune Ledesma
5. Action of Respondents: Private Respondents filed a motion to lift search

warrants and release seized properties which the lower court granted.
ISSUE Whether or not the requirements of probable cause were satisfied on the
issued search warrants.
RULING NO. It did not satisfied the requirements on the issued search warrants.
According to Art. III, Section 2 of the Constitution, that the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
In the case at bar, In cases involving violation of PD 49 (Protection of

Intellectual Property), a basic requirement for the validity of the search
warrant is the presentation of the master tape of the copyrighted films from
which the pirated films are supposed to have been copied. In which mere
allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis
for the issuance of a search warrant.
Therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower
court when it lifted the search warrants issued against the private
respondents.
FOOTNOTE 79
CASE TITLE Columbia Pictures v. Court of Appeals
DATE October 6, 1994; 237 SCRA 367, G.R. No. 96597-99
PONENTE Justice Jose C. Vitug
FACTS 1. Petitioners: Columbia Pictures Inc., Orion Pictures Corp., Paramount

Pictures Corp., 20th Century Fox Film Corp., United Artists Corp.,
Universal City Studios Inc., Walt Disney Company and Warner Bros Inc.
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioners though NBI filed with the RTC of Pasig 3
applications for Search Warrants against 3 respondents charging them
with violations of Sec. 56 of PD 49 (Decree on the Protection of
Intellectual Property) as amended by PD 1988
3. Subject/Object: Finding just and probable cause of the issued search

warrants. Wherein the Judge reversed her former stand initially finding
probable cause for the issuance of the search warrants and ordered
their quashal:
 Private complainants uncertain of their ownership over the titles
 Complainants did not comply with the requirement that master
tapes should be presented during application for search warrants
 Complainants failed to comply with the deposit and registration
requirements of PD 49 as amended by PD 1988
4. Respondents: Court of Appeals, Tube Video Enterprises & Edward Cham,

Blooming Rose Tape Center & Ma. Jajorie T. Uy, and Video Channel &
Lydia Nabong.
5. Action of Respondents: Private Respondents filed their “Motion to Quash”

the search warrant citing as grounds that there was no probable cause.
ISSUE Whether or not the search warrants were issued with probable cause.
RULING NO. There was no probable cause.
In the case at bar, Basic requirement for the validity of search warrants In
cases involving violation of PD 49 (Protection of Intellectual Property), a basic
requirement for the validity of the search warrant is the presentation of the
master tape of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films are
supposed to have been copied (20th Century Fox v CA, 162 SCRA 655). But this
decision, which was promulgated on Aug. 19, 1988, should apply only
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine
and acted on good faith.
Therefore, there was no probable cause on the issued search warrants.
FOOTNOTE 80
CASE TITLE People v. Salanguit

DATE April 19, 2001; G.R. No. 133254-55
PONENTE Justice Vicente v. Mendoza
FACTS 1. Petitioners: People of the Philippines
2. Action of Petitioner: Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant in the RTC
Branch 90, Dasmarinas, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-
appellant.
3. Subject/Object: It is an appeal from the decision of the RTC, finding the

accused-appellant guilty of violation of Sec 16 of RA No. 6465, as
amended (Known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
4. Respondents: Roberto Salanguit y Ko
5. Action of Respondents: The accused-appellant contended that the

evidence against him was inadmissible because the warrant used in
obtaining it was invalid.
ISSUE Whether or not the search warrants was invalid for failure of providing
evidence to support the seizure of drug paraphernalia.
RULING NO. The fact that there was no probable cause to support for the seizure of
drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant
is void.
In the case at bar, A search warrant was issued for the seizure of shabu and
drug paraphernalia, but probable cause was found to exist only with respect
to the shabu, the warrant cannot be invalidated in toto, it is still valid with the
respect to the shabu. Wherein RA 6465, as amended, defines and penalizes
categories of offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same
class or species,
Thus, one search warrant may validly issued for several violations thereof.
FOOTNOTE 81A
CASE TITLE City Fiscal Nestorio M. Placer, et. al. v Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villaneuva
DATE December 29, 1983; G.R. No L-60349-62
PONENTE Justice Vinicio T. Escolin
FACTS 1. Petitioners: Petitioners are the City Fiscal Nestorio M. Placer, Asst. City Fiscals
Agelio L. Bringas, Ernesto M. Brocoy, Rafael V. Flores, Felixberto L. Guiritan,
Macario B. Balansag, and Rosario F. Dabalos, all of Butuan City and the People of
the Philippines.
2. Action of Petitioner: The City Fiscals of Butuan City and his assistants filed
several information, all of which were certified to by the respective investigating
fiscal. Petitioners maintained that under P.D. 77 and 911, they are authorized to
determine probable cause and that their findings constitute sufficient basis for
issuance of warrants of arrest by the court.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioners filed a motion to the SC (petition for certiorari and
mandamus) to compel respondent, take cognizance of all informations, and issue
warrants of arrest contending that Fiscal’s certification binds the judge.
4. Respondents: Respondent is Hon. Judge Napoleon D. Villanueva in his capacity
as City Judge of Butuan. Respondent was also additional assignment to preside
over Branch II after Judge Ruiz retired from the service.
5. Action of Respondents: Respondent Judge set the cases for hearing and after
the hearing, required the petitioners to submit affidavits and documentary
evidence for the exercise of judicial power for the finding of probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrest.
ISSUE ISSUE Whether or not the findings of the investigating fiscal obligates the Judge to
issue a warrant of arrest.
RULING No. The Judge is not obligated to issue a warrant of arrest based on the findings of
the investigating fiscal. Under the Constitution, the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court ruled that
the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial function of the judge. While he
could rely on the findings of the fiscal, he is not bound thereby. Thus, the
determination of probable cause depends to a large extent upon the findings or
opinion of the judge who conducted the required examination of the applicant and
the witnesses. Therefore, the investigating fiscal cannot obligate the Judge.
FOOTNOTE 81B
CASE TITLE Vicente Lim, S.r and Mayor Susana Lim v Hon. Nemesio S. Felix, et. al.
DATE February 19, 1991; G.R. No. 94054-57
PONENTE
FACTS 1. Petitioners: Petitioners are Vicente Lim, Sr. and Mayor Susana Lim. Both were
accused of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with
the assassination of Congressman Espinosa and his security escorts at the Masbate
Domestic Airport.
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioners reiterated that respondent Judge Felix should
conduct a hearing to determine if there really was prima facie evidence against
them for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
3. Subject/Object: The SC, in a resolution, issued a temporary restraining order to
the respondent judge to cease and desist from enforcing the warrants of arrest
against the petitioners until further orders.
4. Respondents: Respondents are Hon. Nemesio S. Felix, presiding Judge of RTC
Branch 56, Quezon City, and Hon. Antonio Alfane, provincial prosecutor of
Masbate.
5. Action of Respondents: Respondent Judge Felix, after recognizing the en banc
Resolution of the SC to change the venue of trial from RTC of Masbate to RTC of
Makati, acted and issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners based on the
preliminary investigation of the judge of MTC Masbate and the certification of
respondent Fiscal Alfane
ISSUE Whether or not the warrants of arrest without bail issued by respondent Judge Felix
was valid after relying on the prosecutor’s certification that a probable cause exists
was valid.
RULING No. The respondent Judge committed grave error by relying solely on the
prosecutor’s certification. Under the Constitution, the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. In the case at bar, the
determination of probable cause depends to a large extent upon the findings or
opinion of the judge who conducted the required examination of the applicant and
the witnesses. The Court underscores the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, the
Judge cannot issue a warrant of arrest without determining the probable cause.
FOOTNOTE 82 A
CASE TITLE Bejamin V. Kho, et. al. v Hon. Roberto L. Makalintal, et. al.
DATE April 21, 1999; G.R. No. 94902-06
PONENTE Justice Fidel Purisima
FACTS 1. Petitioners: Petitioners are Benjamin V. Kho and Elizabeth Alindogan.

2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioners questioned the search warrants, theorizing that
upon the absence of any probable cause, the surveillance and investigation
conducted by NBI agents were not sufficient to cause for the issuance of the same.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioner assailed the Order of the MTC of Parañaque in denying
their Motion to Quash Search Warrants issued by the same court. Petitioners also
sought to restrain respondent NBI from using the objects seized by virtue of the
search warrants in any case or cases filed.
4. Respondents: Respondents are Hon. Roberto L. Makalintal and National Bureau of
Investigation.
5. Action of Respondents: NBI Agent Salvador applied for a search warrant by the
respondent judge against petitioner Kho in his residence in BF Homes, Parañaque and
NBI agent Arugay also applied for petitioner’s residence in Moonwalk Parañaque on
the basis that these houses were used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and
“chop-chop” vehicles. After the simultaneous searches, the confiscated firearms,
radio transceivers, and motor vehicles were found out to be unlicensed per
verification from the government agencies.
ISSUE Whether or not the issued search warrant by respondent Judge Makalintal was valid.
RULING Yes. The search warrants issued by Judge Makalintal was valid. Under the
Constitution, the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. In the instant case, the determination of probable cause depends
to a large extent upon the findings or opinion of the judge who conducted the
required examination of the applicant and the witnesses. The judge had the singular
opportunity to assess the testimonies and find out their personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances enough to create a probable cause. Therefore, the issuance of the
search warrant was valid.
FOOTNOTE 82 B
CASE TITLE In the Matter of the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Simon Luna v Hon.
Lorenzo M. Plaza, et al.
DATE November 29, 1968; G.R. No. L-27511
PONENTE Justice Calixto Zaldivar
FACTS 1. Petitioners: Petitioner-Appellant is Simon Luna who was charged with murder in
a criminal case.
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner moved to bail which the respondent judge
granted, however, it was later revoked. After the information was filed for the
crime of murder, petitioner was detained at the provincial jail. He claimed that he
was deprived of liberty without due process.
3. Subject/Object: Petitioner assailed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Surigao del Sur dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Respondents
answered that a motion to quash was the proper remedy and that the petitioner’s
application for bail was a waiver of his right to question the validity of his arrest.
4. Respondents: Respondents-Appellees are Judge Lorenzo M. Plaza of Surigao del
Sur, Provincial Fiscal Santos B. Beberino, and the Provincial Warden of Surigao del
Sur.
5. Action of Respondents: Respondent judge examined the prosecution witnesses
and the latter declared that the questions in their affidavits were propounded by
T-Sgt Candido and the answers made by them. After considering the sworn
statements, post-mortem and autopsy report, death certificate, and other
exhibits, Judge Plaza issued the order and warrant of arrest against the accused.
ISSUE Whether or not the issuance of warrant of arrest was valid using the set of questions
used by the previous investigator to the prosecution witnesses.
RULING Yes. The Judge can issue warrant of arrest and use the set of questions used by the
investigator to the prosecution witnesses. Under the Constitution, no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. In the instant case, the
existence of probable cause depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of
the judge conducting the examination. MTC Judge may issue a warrant of arrest
under the foregoing provisions, the following conditions must be fulfilled: (1) he must
examine the witness personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) The
examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and
answer. R.A. No. 3828 does not prohibit the MTC Judge from adopting the questions
asked by the investigator. Therefore, the issuance of the warrant of arrest was valid.
FOOTNOTE 83
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines v Hon. Enrique B. Inting, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 38,
Dumaguete City, et. al.
DATE July 25, 1990; G.R. No. 88919 (187 SCRA 788)
PONENTE: Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr.
FACTS
1. Petitioner is the State.
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner COMELEC, through Atty. Lituanas, conducted a preliminary

investigation of the case of Editha Barba, who was transferred to a remote barangay without obtaining
prior permission or clearance from the COMELEC as required by law. Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie
case which led him to file a criminal case against respondent OIC Mayor Regalado.
3. Subject/Object: Respondent trial court justified its stand on the ground that the COMELEC through its
Provincial Election Supervisor lacked jurisdiction to determine the existence of probable cause in an
election offense pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
4. Respondents are Hon. Judge Enrique B. Inting and OIC Mayor Dominador S. Regalado, Jr.
5. Action of Respondents: Respondent Judge initially issued an order for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest against OIC Mayor Regalado but was later set aside on the ground that Atty. Lituanas was not
authorized to determine probable cause in filing a case. Atty. Lituanas was ordered by the same court to
file an information with the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal, however, it was not complied with.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Provincial Election Supervisor is vested with power to determine probable cause in
an election offense.
RULING
No, the Provincial Supervisor is not authorized to determine probable cause. Under the Constitution, no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized In
the instant case, the Supreme Court emphasized that the probable cause is not for the Provincial Fiscal
nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. The determination of probable cause is the function of the
Judge. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination. The same rule applies in election
offenses even if, in such cases, the preliminary investigation is done by the COMELEC. Therefore, the
Provincial Election Supervisor is not authorized to determine probable cause.
Footnote No. 84: People v Delgado, G.R. No. 93419-32

Date: September 18, 1990
Ponente: Justice Emilio A. Gancayco
Facts:
1. The petitioner was Atty. Lauron E. Quilatan, election registrar of Toledo City.
2. The petioner sought to nullify the order of the respondent court requiring the COMELEC
to conduct reinvestigation of the case to determine probable cause.
3. The petitioner asserted that the COMELEC is an independent constitutional body. It’s
actions on election matters may be reviewed only by the Supreme Court.
4. The respondents are Hon. Gualberto P. Delgado, presiding judge, Branch 29, Toledo City
and others.
5. The respondents contended that since the cases were filed in the trial court by
COMELEC as public prosecutor, and not in the exercise of its power to decide election
contests, the said court has authority to order reinvestigation.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent court has the authority to order the COMELEC to
conduct reinvestigation for his satisfaction to determine whether there is probable
cause or none.
Ruling: Yes. The respondent court has the authority to order the COMELEC to conduct
reinvestigation.
The Constitution provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination.
In the case at bar, preliminary investigation or reinvestigation shall be at the satisfaction

of the judge in order to determine probable cause.
Therefore, the judge has the authority to order the conduct of reinvestigation by the
COMELEC to determine probable cause.
Footnote No. 85: Nemesio Prudente v Judge Abelardo M. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870
Ponente: Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
Facts:
1. The petitioner was Dr. Nemesio Prudente, university president of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines (PUP).
2. The petition sought to annual the RTC decision denying his motion to quash search
warrant.
3. Petitioner assailed the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it was issued on
the basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the personal knowledge of
the applicant and his witness but based on hearsay evidence.
4. The respondent was Judge Abelrdo M. Dayrit of RTC Manila Brach 33.
5. The respondent denied the motion to quash the search warrant contending that the
applicant and the witness conducted surveillance at the place to be searched and had
reliable resources.
Issue: Whether or not the judge’s examination of the applicant and the witness was probing.
Ruling: No. The Judge’s determination of probable cause was not probing.
The Constitution provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the Judge after examination.
In the instant case, the oath required to be based on truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of applicant or his witness, not the facts merely reported by a
person considered to be reliable.
Therefore, the Judge’s determination of probable cause is not probing.
Footnote No. 86: Narciso Alvarez v The Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury
Board, G.R. No. L-45358
Date: January 29, 1937
Ponente: Justice Carlos A. Imperial
Facts:
1. The petitioner was Narciso Alvarez.

2. The petitioner sought that the search warrant against him be declared illegal and prays
that all articles in question be returned to him.
3. The petitioner claimed that search warrant was illegal because it has been based upon
the affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no
personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance of
warrant but he had knowledge thereof through information secured from a person
whom he considered as reliable.
4. The respondents were the Court of First Instance of Tayabas and Anti-Usury Board.
5. The respondent court contended that the search warrant was obtained and issued in
accordance with law.
Issue: Whether or not there was a proper issuance of search warrant.
Ruling: No. There was no proper issuance of search warrant.

The constitution provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the Judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may produce.
In the case at bar, personal and not merely delegated examination by the Judge or by
proper officer is required. The purpose of examination was to convince the Judge and
not any other individual.
Thus, the issuance of search warrant was not proper.
FOOTNOTE 87
CASE TITLE People vs. Mamaril, 4 G.R. No. 147607, 20 SCRA 662
PONENTE Justice Adolfo Azcuna
FACTS 1. Accused-appellant: Benhur Mamaril
2. Action of Accused-appellant: Prays for his acquittal on the

ground that Search Warrant No. 99-51 was illegally issued
considering that there was no evidence showing that the
required searching questions and answers were made anent
the application for said search warrant.
3. Subject/Object: The required searching questions and

answers were was not made in writing before the issuance of
the arrest warrant of the accused-appellant Mamaril for
allegedly keeping marijuana.
4. Respondents: Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos
5. Action of Respondents: (no action of the respondent judge

found, kay nag Q and A ra sila sa supreme court regarding sa
case ug sa pag issue sa warrant of arrest dayon wala siyay
ikapakita na evidence na naay written form sa iya depositions
sa searching question and answers sa paghatag sa warrant of
arrest.)
ISSUE Whether or not the issued search warrant was Illegal.
RULING Yes. The search warrants issued was Illegal.
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, that The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
In the case at bar, Judge Ramos examined the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, the fact
remains that there is no evidence that the examination was put into
writing as required by law.
Thus, the search warrant issued to Benhur Mamaril is Illegal.
FOOTNOTE 88
CASE TITLE VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM, petitioners,

vs.
HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 94054-57
DATE Februrary 19, 1991
PONENTE Justice Hugo Guttierez Jr.
FACTS 1.Petitioners : Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim
2. Action of Petitioners: Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim

filed with the respondent court a motion; An order be issued
requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary
inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of
Masbate to any of the Regional Trial Courts at Quezon City or
Makati for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its
personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima
facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt,
pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no
warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself
been personally convinced of such probable cause.
3. Subject/Object: The preliminary investigation was conducted by

the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the
existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was
committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof,
which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who
properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate
informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent
officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the
existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form
and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court
finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification in
each information
4. Respondents: HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO
ALFANE
5. Action of Respondents: the respondent court issued an order

denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and issued
warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners
herein.
ISSUE Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by
simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation
that a probable cause exists..
RULING NO. The Judge could not issue a warrant of arrest without bail by
simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation
that a probable cause exists.. Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution, that The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
In the case at bar, The judge relied solely on the Prosecutor's

certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990
without having before him any other basis for his personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause.
Thus, the prosecutor’s certification of probable cause is ineffectual
and the warrants of arrest against the accused including the
petitioners is null and void.
FOOTNOTE 89
CASE TITLE BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E.

SEGGERMAN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ,
MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, ARTURO LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO
VELASQUEZ, MIMIR DELLOSA, NICANOR ALCORDO, JOHN
DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN DOE, Respondents.
PONENTE Justice Villamor
FACTS 1. Petitioner: BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E.

SEGGERMAN
2. Action of Petitioners: pray this Court to declare null and void

Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge on
February 25, 1970; to order respondents to desist from
enforcing the same and/or keeping the documents, papers
and effects seized by virtue thereof, as well as from enforcing
the tax assessments on petitioner corporation alleged by
petitioners to have been made on the basis of the said
documents, papers and effects, and to order the return of the
latter to petitioners.
3. Subject/Object: The search warrant does not particularly

describe the things to be seized.
4. Respondents: Judge VIVENCIO M. RUIZ
5. Action of Respondents: Respondents contend that certiorari does

not lie because petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration
of respondent Judge’s order of July 29, 1970.
ISSUE Whether or not the issued search warrant was valid.
RULING NO. The search warrants issued was not Valid.
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, that The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
In the case at bar, The search warrant does not particularly

describe the things to be seized. The warrants authorized the search
for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal
or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their
nature
Thus, the Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is

declared null and void.
FOOTNOTE 90
CASE TITLE Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines vs. Judge Maximiano C.
Asuncion, G.R. No. 122092
DATE May 19, 1999
PONENTE Justice Artemio Panganiban
FACTS 1. Petitioners: Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) et al.
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioners filed a “Motion to Squash” before the trial

court. They also filed a “Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash”
and a “Motion to Suppress Evidence” believing that the warrant of
arrest was invalid and the search was unreasonable after the police
enforced the search on February 4, 1995 at the PICOP compound and
seized a number of firearms and explosives.
3. Subject/Object: Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a

search warrant before the RTC of Quezon City for the alleged possession
or control of high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives which are
subject of the offense or used in committing the offense which are kept
and concealed in the premises of PICOP.
4. Respondents: Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, Presiding Judge, Branch 104,

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III;
and the Special Operations Unit of the PNP Traffic Management
Command
5. Action of Respondents: On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first
contested order which denied petitioners’ motion. On August 3, 1995,
the trial court rendered its second contested order denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE Whether or not the search warrant issued was valid.
RULING No, the search warrant is invalid.
Section 11 of Art. III of the Constitution states that , The right of the people to
In the case at bar, the trial court failed to examine personally the petitioners
and other deponents. SPO3 Ciero Bacolod who appeared during the hearing
as a witness for the issuance of search warrant had no personal knowledge
that that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms and
the place to be searched was not described with particularity, it only
authorizes a search of the aforementioned premises but it did not specify
such premises.
Therefore, the search warrant issued was not valid.

FOOTNOTE 91
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines vs. Tio Won Chua, G.R. No. 149878
DATE July 01, 2003
PONENTE Justice Reynato Puno
FACTS 1. Accused-appellant: Tio Won Chua a.k.a. Timothy Tiu and Qui Yaling y Chua
a.k.a. Sun Tee Sy y Chu who were convicted for their illegal possession
of a regulated drug, shabu.
2. Action of Accused-appellant: Accused appealed the decision of the lower

court questioning the legality of the search warrant.
3. Subject/Object: Accused contends that the search warrant issued in the

name of Timothy Tiu did not include appellant Qui Yaling, thus, making
the arrest illegal.
4. Respondents: People of the Philippines.
5. Action of Respondents: Argued by Solicitor General that a mistake in the

name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the warrant if
the authorities had personal knowledge of the drug-related activities of
the accused. A mistake also in the identification of the owner of the
place does not invalidate the warrant provided the place to be searched
is properly described.
RULING Yes, the search warrant is valid.
In the case at bar, the search warrant used by police authorities may not
contain the correct name of Tio Won or the name of Qui Yaling but will not
invalidate the arrest because the place to be searched was described
properly. The authorities conducted surveillance and a test-buy operation
before obtaining the search warrant and subsequently implementing it. The
police also presumed to have personal knowledge of the identity of the
persons and the place to be searched although they may not have specifically
known the names of the accused.
FOOTNOTE 92
CASE TITLE The People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Veloso, 48 Phil 169
G.R. No. L-23051
DATE October 20, 1925
PONENTE Justice George A. Malcom

FACTS 1. Plaintiff-appellant: The People of the Philippines Islands
2. Action of Plaintiff-appellant: Manila Police got a reliable information that

Parliamentary Club was a gambling house. Detective Andre Geronimo, a
secret service of City of Manila applied and obtained a search warrant
on May 25, 1923. Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Manila finding the accused, Jose Ma. Veloso, guilty of
the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority.
3. Subject/Object: Persons arrested in the raid were accused of gambling but

acquitted for lack of proof. Only Veloso was found guilty of maintaining
a gambling house and guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of
the authority.
4. Defendant-appellant: Jose Ma. Veloso
5. Action of Defendant-appellant: Veloso contented the resistance of police

force was justifiable on account of the illegality of the search warrant
since his name did not appear but instead a pseudonym “John Doe” was
used.
RULING Yes, the search warrant is valid.
In the case at bar, it is undeniable that the application for the search warrant,
failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to be seized but it did state that
"John Doe” has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him, and
which is under his control, namely, in the building numbered 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects used
in violation of the Gambling Law. The warrant in this case sufficiently
described the place and the gambling apparatus and contained a description
of the person to be seized.

STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO (footnote 93)
GR no. L-19550 June 19, 1967
PONENTE: Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
FACTS:
1. Stonehill et al, herein petitioners, and the corporations they form were alleged to have
committed acts in “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
2. Respondents, respondent-judges and respondent-prosecutors spearheaded by Hon.
Jose W. Diokno, issued 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or
corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of
petitioners and premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for
personal properties “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarette wrappers)” as the subject of the offense
for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and
Revised Penal Code. The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged
authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely (a) those
found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b) those found
seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
3. Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for being violative of the constitution
and the Rules of court by:
(1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against
the petitioner;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts
for disposal in accordance with law.
4. The petitioners also aver that the effect of the illegal search and seizure by the
respondents should result to inadmissibility of such effects to the courts;
5. The prosecution counters that the search warrants are valid and issued in accordance
with law; The defects of said warrants were cured by petitioners’ consent; and in any
event, the effects are admissible regardless of the irregularity.
ISSUE: Whether the search warrant issued is valid, and if it is invalid, should it be admissible in
courts?
HELD:
ANSWER: No, the search warrant is invalid and should not be admissible as evidences in the
Court.
LEGAL BASIS: The Bill of Rights protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and
seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describe the things to be seized.
APPLICATION: Applied to this case, none of the criteria abovementioned were met. There was
no specific offense in the said search warrants, as the averments were generally abstract, to
underscore “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code.” As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular
acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. The
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners.
To emphasize, the search warrants issued by the respondents were general warrants, which is
violative of Bill of Rights which requires things to be seized be particularly described.
The evidences hereto obtained which sprung from the violation of the constitution is not
admissible to the courts provided that the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.
CONCLUSION: Thus, the search warrant is invalid and its evidences inadmissible to the Court.
BURGOS vs. CHIEF OF STAFF, GR No. L-64261, December 26, 1984

Ponente: Justice Venicio T. Escolin
FACTS:
1. The petitioners were the editor-in-chief and owners of “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum”
newspaper printing press;
2. Respondent, Armed Forces of the Philippines, seized the said printing offices. The
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum” newspapers were searched and its office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized
based on the strength of the two [2] search warrants issued by respondent Judge Ernani
Cruz-Pano.
3. Petitioners contest that said search warrants lack substantial determination of probable
cause by issuing judge, thus it should be declared unconstitutional.
4. Petitioners, in addition, averred that the search warrant should be declared illegal because:
1. The judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional
provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
2. There are two (2) search warrants issued but pinpointed only one place where
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles
listed.
3. That the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano
and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized although the warrants were
directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. Alone.
4. That real property was seized under the disputed warrants like machinery,
receptacles, instruments, etc.
5. The search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s that they
conducted surveillance of the premises could not have provided sufficient basis
for the finding of a probable cause.
5. Respondents insinuates that petitioners are estopped by laches (omission to assert a right
within reasonable time) that they only impugned the search warrant six months later.
ISSUE: Whether there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
HELD: No, the search warrants are in the nature of general warrants.
The Bill of Rights states that probable cause should constitute facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.
Applied to this case, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in
possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications
and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause.
The Supreme Court, proclaimed, when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials,
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity
the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization
of the things to seize will not suffice.
Thus, bereft of such particulars to justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, the search
warrants is general in natured and such warrants issued by the respondent judge are
unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 140946 September 13, 2004
MICROSOFT CORPORATION and LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners,

vs.
MAXICORP, INC., respondent.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
1. Petitioner, MICROSOFT, filed a search warrant against respondent MAXICORP for

alleged violation of Section 29 of Intellectual Property and Article 189 of the RPC (unfair
competition).
2. Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorp’s premises
and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants.
3. Respondent Maxicorp filed a motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there
was no probable cause for their issuance and that the warrants are in the form of
"general warrants."
4. The RTC held that they’ve found a probable cause to issue such warrant after examining
the NBI agent and the computer technician who visited Maxicorp. The RTC held that the
search warrants are valid.
5. The respondent Maxicorp appealed to the Court of Appeals where the CA reversed the
RTC decision; In its decision, the CA held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present
during the preliminary examination conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold
the counterfeit products. The sales receipt NBI Agent Samiano presented as evidence
that he bought the products from Maxicorp was in the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether there is s a probable cause to issue search warrants
2. Whether the search warrant is a general in nature
RULING:
I. Yes, there was a probable cause to issue search warrants.
The 1987 Constitution declared through the Bill of Rights that probable cause are
"such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man
in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and
proper."
In the case at bar, the RTC subjected the testimonies of the witnesses to the
requisite examination. NBI Agent Samiano testified that he saw Maxicorp display and
offer for sale counterfeit software in its premises. He also saw how the counterfeit
software were produced and packaged within Maxicorp’s premises. NBI Agent
Samiano categorically stated that he was certain the products were counterfeit
because Maxicorp sold them to its customers without giving the accompanying
ownership manuals, license agreements and certificates of authenticity. Sacriz
testified that during his visits to Maxicorp, he witnessed several instances when
Maxicorp installed petitioners’ software into computers it had assembled. Sacriz also
testified that he saw the sale of petitioners’ software within Maxicorp’s premises.
Petitioners never authorized Maxicorp to install or sell their software.
The judge determining probable cause must do so only after personally examining
under oath the complainant and his witnesses. The oath required must refer to "the
truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate,
not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause." (The applicant must have personal knowledge of the
circumstances.)
In addition, The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of
rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the
merits. The prosecution need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man,24 not the
exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial.
Thus, the RTC was correct in ruling that there was a probable cause to issue search
warrants.
II. No, the search warrants against the respondents Maxicorp are not general warrants.
Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution states that no warrants shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by a judge after examination under oath of
complainant and witnesses.
In the case at bar, the search warrants issued were specifically detailed, some of
which include reproductions of Microsoft softwares, instructional manuals and central
processing units. It is only required that a search warrant be specific as far as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow.38 The description of the property to be seized
need not be technically accurate or precise. The nature of the description should
vary according to whether the identity of the property or its character is a matter of
concern.39 Measured against this standard we find that paragraph (e) is not a
general warrant. The articles to be seized were not only sufficiently identified
physically, they were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the offense
charged. Paragraph (e) specifically refers to those articles used or intended for use
in the illegal and unauthorized copying of petitioners’ software. This language meets
the test of specificity.
Thus, the search warrants do not constitute general warrants.
FOOTNOTE 95
LEON TAMBASEN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 2ND ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
CASE TITLE
GLORIA LASTIMOSA MARCOS and HON. CICERO U. QUERUBIN in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental,
Branch 44, Bacolod City, respondents.
GR No. 89103
DATE July 14,1995 (Lawphil), July 4,1995 (Book ni Dean)
PONENTE QUIASON, J.:
FACTS 1. Petitioners: LEON TAMBASEN
petitioner filed before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and seizure
be declared illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. In his
answer to the motion, Lt. Col. Nicolas Torres, the station commander of
the Bacolod City Police, said that the amount of P14,000.00 had been
earmarked for the payment of the allowance of the Armed City Partisan
(ACP) and other "known NPA personalities" operating in the City of
Bacolod.
3. Subject/Object:
Petitioner contended that the search warrant covered three offenses: "(1)
illegal possession of armalite rifle and .45 cal. pistol; (2) illegal
possession of hand grenade and dynamite sticks; and (3) illegal
possession of subversive documents" (Rollo, pp. 3-4) in violation of
Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. He assailed the
legality of the seizure of the articles which were not mentioned in the
search warrant. Moreover, since a complaint against him was filed only
after his house had been searched, petitioner claimed that the police
were "on a fishing expedition."
4. Respondents:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 2ND ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL
PROSECUTOR GLORIA LASTIMOSA MARCOS and HON. CICERO U.
QUERUBIN in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 44, Bacolod City
5. Action of Respondents:
P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the issuance of a search warrant from
the MTCC, alleging that he received information that petitioner had in
his possession at his house at the North Capitol Road, Bacolod City, "M-
16 Armalite Rifles (Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal. Pistols
(Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and Subversive Documents," which
articles were "used or intended to be used" for illegal purposes (Rollo, p.
14).
Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
ISSUE
No, the search and seizure is invalid.
RULING The Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe
the things to be seized.
In the case at bar it very clear that the money which was not indicated in the
search warrant, had been illegally seized from petitioner. The fact that the
members of the police team were doing their task of pursuing subversives is
not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure.
Hence, the Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a
"scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void.
FOOTNOTE
96
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor
FAUSTINO T. CHIONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional
CASE TITLE Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD
SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM and MEHMOOD
ALI, respondents.
GR No. 126379
DATE June 26, 1998
PONENTE NARVASA, C.J
FACTS 1. Petitioners:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor
FAUSTINO T. CHIONG
A petition for certiorari has been file to invalidate the order of Judge
Casanova which quashed search warrants issued by Judge Bacalla and
declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the
warrant.
3. Subject/Object:
Those orders were handed down in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of
illegal possession of explosives, after the accused had been arraigned and
entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. More particularly, the Order of
February 9, 1996:
1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge

Marciano I. Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at
Quezon City on December 15, 1995, 4
2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized

under the warrant, and
3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the

Court within five (5) days "to be released thereafter in favor of
the lawful owner considering that said amount was not
mentioned in the Search Warrant."
4. Respondents:
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN,
MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM and
MEHMOOD ALI
On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search
warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar
Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at
Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang
Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
Whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as regard the apartment
ISSUE in which private respondents were then actually residing
RULING No. The search warrant was invalidly issued.
The constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe
the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
In the case at bar where the warrant designated the place to be searches as
“Abigail’s Variety Store, Apt. 1207, Area F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang
Palay, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan”, and the search warrant was made at Apt
No. I which was immediately adjacent to the store (but an independent unit),
Hence, it was held that there was an infringement of the constitutional
guarantee, the clear intention of the requirement being that the search be
confined to the place so described in the warrant.
FOOTNOTE
97
YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, ISAM MOHAMMAD ABDULHADI, WAIL RASHID AL-
KHATIB, NABEEL NASSER AL-RIYAMI, ASHRAF HASSAM AL-YAZORI, AND
CASE TITLE
MOHAMMAD ABUSHENDI, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
GR No. G.R. No. 126859
DATE September 4, 2001
PONENTE QUISUMBING, J.
FACTS 1. Petitioners:
YOUSEF AL-GHOUL, ISAM MOHAMMAD ABDULHADI, WAIL RASHID AL-
KHATIB, NABEEL NASSER AL-RIYAMI, ASHRAF HASSAM AL-YAZORI, AND
MOHAMMAD ABUSHENDI
As petitioners’ action before respondent appellate court also proved
futile, petitioners filed the instant petition on the ground that it had
acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. They present for our consideration the following
issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION ARE

ADMISSIBLE;
II. WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED HAVE THE RIGHT TO BAIL
3. Subject/Object:
petitioners said that the search warrants issued by the RTC, Branch 125,
Kalookan City on March 31, 1995, namely search warrant 54-95 16 and
search warrant 55-95, 17 specified the place to be searched, namely
Apartment No. 2, 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City.
There was no mention of Apartment No. 8..
4. Respondents:
COURT OF APPEALS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Judge Mangay issued search warrants 54-953 and 55-954 for the search
and seizure of certain items in Apartment No. 2, 154 Obiniana
Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City.
Whether the search and seizure orders in question are valid?

ISSUE
No, the search and seizure orders in question are valid.
RULING The constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe
the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, the search warrant authorized the search of apartment
no.2, Obinia Compound, Caloocan City, but the searching party extended the
search and seizure of firearms to Apartment No. 8 in the same compound, the
Supreme Court, while upholding the validity of the search of Apartment No.2,
invalidated the search done at Apartment No.8
Therefore, the search conducted at Apartment No. 8 is hereby declared
illegal.
Footnote : 98
CASE: FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION versus

BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE, GR No.
129651
Date: October 20, 2000
Ponente: Justice Santiago M. Kapunan
Facts:
1. Petitioners- FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION were allegedly

engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code.
2. Petitioners now assailed the validity of the warrants issued to them for the search of the
premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation.
3. Petitioners contended that there are several defects in the subject warrants and pointed
out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in Search Warrant A-1,
as well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom Search Warrants A-1
and A-2 were issued.
4. Respondents- BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES GOZO-
DADOLE.
5. The Court of Appeals ruled that the search warrants are valid.
Issue:
Whether or not the issued search warrant violates the constitutional right on the ground that there
are inconsistencies on the description of the place and name of person in the warrant.
Ruling:
If in a warrant for the search of the place there is a mistake in the identification of the owner of
the place but the place is properly described, the warrant is valid.
Page: 67 Paragraph: 3
ALAC METHOD
Issue:
Whether or not the issued search warrant is invalid on the ground that there are inconsistencies
on the description of the place and name of person in the warrant.
A- No, the issued search warrant is valid even if there are inconsistencies on the description
of the place and name of person in the warrant.
L- The Constitution states that “No search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.”
A- In the case at bar, caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates the address of Uy Chin Ho
alias Frank Uy as "Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City" while the body of the same warrant
states the address as "Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City", which consistently stated the
address of petitioner as "Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City."
C-Thus, the issued warrant is valid.

Case: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus YOLANDA GESMUNDO, G.R.
No. 89373
Date: March 9, 1993
Ponente: Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
Facts:
1. Appellant Yolanda Gesmundo who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972), as amended in the decision of RTC of San Pablo City Branch 30.
2. Appellant claimed that when the search was conducted, she was at the sala sitting
together with Sgt. Yte, when they heard someone in the kitchen uttered “ito na”.
3. Appellant assailed the RTC decision on the basis of an illegally seized and or planted
evidence.
4. The police team were allowed to enter inside the house of appellant on the strength of the
said search warrant shown.
5. The police recovered from a native "uway" cabinet dried marijuana flowering tops
wrapped separately in three (3) pieces of Komiks paper after the accused-appellant led
the team into her kitchen.
Issue: Whether or not the right of the accused-appellant to be secure against

unreasonable searches and seizure is violated.
Ruling: Sec. 7, Rule 126, Rules of Court, requires that no search of a house, room or any
of the the premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family, or in the absence of the latter, in the
presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion, residing in the same
locality. Failure to comply with this requirement invalidates the search.
Page: 67 Paragraph: 4 (continuation to page 68)
ALAC METHOD
A- YES. The right of the accused-appellant to be secure against unreasonable searches

and seizure was violated.
L- The Constitution states that, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable”.
A- In the case at bar, wherein members of a raiding party roamed around the raided
premises unaccompanied by any witness, because the only witness available, Angel
Capuno, the Barangay Chairman is made to witness a search conducted by the other
members of the raiding party in another part of the house.
C-Thus, The right of the accused-appellant to be secure against unreasonable searches

and seizure was violated.
Case: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES versus ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO, GR No.
133254-55
Date: April 19, 2001
Ponente: Justice Jose C. Mendoza
Facts:
1. Accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

violation of Sec 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, (possession or use of regulated drug) as
amended.
2. Thus, this appeal from the decision dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City,
3. Accused-appellant claimed that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the
searching party in effecting the raid.
4. In contrast, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar and PO3 Rolando Duazo claimed that they
had to use some force in order to gain entry.
5. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the house.
Issue: Whether or not the force used by police officers in entering the dwelling is
justified.
Ruling: The police officers may use force in entering the dwelling if the occupants of the
house refused to open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked
on the door several times, and the agents saw suspicious movements of the people
inside the house. These circumstances justified the searching party’s forcible
entry, as it was be frustrated unless they did so.
Page: 68 Paragraph: 1
ALAC METHOD
A- YES. The force used by police officers in entering the dwelling is justified.
L- The Constitution states that, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable”.
A- In the case at bar, the occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to
open the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several
times.
C-Thus, The force used by police officers in entering the dwelling is justified

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FOOTNOTE 41

DATE October 7, 1994; G.R. No. 113811

PONENTE Justice Santiago M. Kapunan

FACTS 1. Petitioner is Ishmael Himagan, a policeman and was implicated in the

2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner assailed the suspension averring that under

3. Subject/Object: Section 47 of RA 6975 provides, Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension

5. Action of Respondents: The trial court issued an Order suspending

ISSUE Whether or not Section 47 of RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed

The Constitution states that no person shall be denied of equal protection of

DATE December 7, 2010; G.R. No. 192935

PONENTE Justice Jose C. Mendoza

2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner assailed the validity and constitutionality of

3. Subject/Object: Then President Benigno Aquino established the Truth Commission

4. Respondent is the Philippine truth Commission of 2010. It was created as a

5. Action of Respondents: Respondent in its consolidated comment argued

RULING Yes, E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

The Constitution states that no person shall be denied of equal protection of

In the instant case, no sufficient and compelling state interest appears to be

Hence, E.O No 1 violates the equal protection clause and is unconstitutional.

PONENTE Justice Jose C. Mendoza

FACTS 1. Petitioners are Jose T. Almonte, former Commissioner of Economic

2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioners sought to annul the Subpoena duces tecum

3. Subject/Object: An anonymous letter was sent to several government offices,

4. Respondents are Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez of the Office of the

5. Action of Respondents: Respondent Ombudsman instituted an

ISSUE Whether or not an Anonymous letter, as basis for investigation, a violation of

Under the Constitution, no person shall be denied of equal protection of laws.

Hence, petitioners’ right to equal protection is not violated.

2. Action of Petitioner: The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification

Petitioner filed a notice of strike.

3. Subject/Object: International School Alliance of Educators (the School)

In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded

The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all

4. Respondents: HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the

RULING Yes, discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the

Therefore, the practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-

2. Action of Petitioner: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the

3. Subject/Object: The trial court rendered judgment declaring Montesclaros

4. Respondents: Milagros O. Montesclaros

5. Action of Respondent: Milagros assail unconstitutionality of section 18 PD

RULING NO. The sole proviso Sec. 18 of PD 1146 is unconstitutional .

In the case at bar, Section 18 of PD 1146 is unduly oppressive in outrightly

A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the

3. Subject/Object: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City

4. Respondents: The Treasurer of Ormoc City, The Municipal Board of Ormoc

5. Action of Respondent: The defendants asserted that the tax ordinance

The Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or

Therefore, the challenged ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude

Case Title: ERNESTO G. GONZALES et al. plaintiffs-appellees, vs.

Ponente: Justice Felix Makasiar

1. (Defendants-appellants) CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC LABOR UNION, represented by PACIFICO

4. ERNESTO G. GONZALES et al. (plaintiffs-apellees)

Ponente: Justice Antonio Eduardo Nachura

1. (Petitioners) ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR.,

Date: September 30, 1982

Ponente: Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera

3. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND