FOOTNOTE 401

FOOTNOTE 402
FOOTNOTE 403 (NOT A CASE)
FOOTNOTE 404
Footnote No 404
Case Title Mejia vs. Pamaran
Date April 15, 1988 GR No. L56741–42
Ponente Justice Emilio A. Gancayco
Facts 1. Petitioner is Aurora Mejia
2. The Petitioner was found guilty of violation of the Anti–Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for using her position as branch clerk of court to demand
and receive money from the persons involved in certain cases in
consideration of a promise that she will help in getting them a favorable
judgment.
3. Mejia contended that the proceedings taken by respondent
Sandiganbayan in the case at bar is void ab initio. She argued that only
one stage of appeal is available to the petitioner under PD No. 1606
which effectively deprived her of the intermediate recourse to the Court
of Appeals and that in said appeal to this Court, only issues of law may be
raised and worse still the appeal has become a matter of discretion rather
than a matter of right. Petitioner contends that this is a denial of the
equal protection of the law.
4. Hon. Manuel Pamaran, Hon. Romeo Escareal, Hon. Conrado Molina,
Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the First Division
Sandiganbayan, and the People of the Philippines, respondents.
5. Sandiganbayan contends that the requirement for compliance with the
due process mandate in criminal proceedings according to Arnault vs.
Pecson is a “fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the
preparation of defense”
Issue Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process.
Ruling No, the petitioner was not denied of due process.

The Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial.

In the case at bar, the court has had a frequent occasion to consider the
requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure, and
generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of
competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of
law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with
an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a
constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.

Therefore, the petitioner was not denied of due process.

FOOTNOTE 405

FELICIDAD M. ROQUE and PRUDENCIO N. MABANGLO, petitioners,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; HON. OMBUDSMAN ANIANO DESIERTO; and
HON. MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao, respondents.

G.R. No. 129978 May 12, 1999

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:

1. Petitioners: Felicidad M. Roque and Prudencio N. Mabanglo, were all Schools

Division Superintendents of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports,
assigned in Koronadal, South Cotabato and in Tagum, Davao Province,
respectively.
2. Petitioners instituted the instant petition for mandamus premised on the
allegation that after the initial Orders finding the cases proper for preliminary
investigation were issued on June 1991 and the subsequent submission of
their counter-affidavits, until the present or, more than six (6) years, no
resolution has been issued by the Public Respondent and no case has been
filed with the appropriate court against the herein Petitioner.
3. The petitioners alleged that there was undue and unjustifiable delay in
resolving complaints which violated their constitutional rights to a speedy
disposition of cases.
4. The respondents are the OMBUDSAN DESIERTO and Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao Gervacio, Jr.
5. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found the complaints proper for a
preliminary investigation. The case involving petitioner Mabanglo was
docketed as OMB-MIN-91-0201 while that involving petitioner Roque was
docketed as OMB-MIN-91-0203, and eventually resolved that all cases were
guilty of violation of Sec. 3(e) and (g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.

ISSUES:

Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving complaints
against petitioners which violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of
cases.

RULING:

Yes, there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving complaints against
petitioners which violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.

As provided in the Constitution, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right to have a speedy, impartial and public trial.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that there has already been a long and
unwarranted delay in the resolution of the graft charges against the two petitioners and
the said delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsman's duty, as mandated
byblic Act No. 6770, 13 to act promptly on complaints before him.

Thus, there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving complaints aganst
petitioners which violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
FOOTNOTE 406
FOOTNOTE 407
Footnote 408
SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner, vs.
Case Title SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Date February 20, 1996; G.R. Nos. 116259-60
Ponente Justice Florenz D. Regalado
1. Salvador P. Socrates, petitioner.

2. Petitioner Salvador P. Socrates assailing the orders and resolution issued by

respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028, both
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Salvador P. Socrates." In G.R. Nos.
116259-60, petitioner assails the legality of (a) the order dated February 9, 1994
denying petitioner's Amended and Consolidated Motion to Quash the
Informations; 1 (b) the order dated May 24, 1994 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; 2 and (c) the order dated July 20, 1994
denying the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order of May 24, 1994. On
the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 118896-97, petitioner seeks the annulment of the
Resolution dated December 23, 1994 ordering the preventive suspension of
petitioner as Provincial Governor of Palawan for a period of ninety (90) days,
and to enjoin respondent court from enforcing the same.

3. In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, the validity of the informations filed in Criminal Cases
Nos. 18027-28 is being contested on three grounds, viz.: (1) the respondent
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case on the ground that an inordinate
delay of six (6) years between the conduct of the preliminary investigation and
Facts
the subsequent filing of the informations against petitioner constitutes a violation
of his constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the case and due process of
law pursuant to the Tatad doctrine; (2) the facts charged do not constitute an
offense; and (3) since the acts charged in the complaints filed before the
Tanodbayan are different from the charges contained in the informations,
another preliminary investigation should have been conducted, in the absence of
which there is a denial of due process.

4. Sandiganbayan, Third Division, and People of the Philippines, respondents.

5. Based on the Resolution dated August 27, 1992 of Special Prosecution

Officer I Wendell Barreras-Sulit (Annex "F-2", ibid.), which affirmed the
Resolution dated February 21, 1992 rendered by Ombudsman Investigator
Ernesto Nocos recommending the filing of appropriate charges against
petitioner, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed on September 16, 1992 with
the respondent Court two (2) Informations against petitioner, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028. The first was for violation of Section 3(h)
of Republic Act No. 3019, and the second for violation of Section 3(e) of the
same law.
Whether or not the six-year delay in the termination of the preliminary
Issue investigation is a violation of the petitioner’s right to due process of law or of his
right to speedy disposition of the case.
Ruling No. The six-year delay on the termination of the preliminary investigation is not a
violation of the petitioner’s right to due process of law or of his right to speedy
disposition of the case.

The Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial.

In the case at bar, the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of
cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. The Court said that We have only to reiterate the
declaration made in Tatad to the effect that in the application of the constitutional
guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also
be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. It is palpably
clear that the application of the Tatad doctrine should not be made to rely solely
on the length of time that has passed but equal concern should likewise be
accorded to the factual ambiance and considerations. It can easily be deduced
from a complete reading of the adjudicatory discourse in Tatad that the three-
year delay was specifically considered vis-a-vis all the facts and circumstances
which obtained therein. A speedy trial is one conducted according to the law of
criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays. The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to
prevent the oppression of an accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an
indefinite period of time. In the present case, while there may have been some
delay, it was petitioner himself who brought about the situation of which he now
complains.

Therefore, the six-year delay on the termination of the preliminary investigation

is not a violation of the petitioner’s right to due process of law or of his right to
speedy disposition of the case.
Footnote: 409

CASE TITLE: HUBERT WEBB V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DATE: July 24, 1997; G.R. No. 127262
PONENTE: Justice Reynato S. Puno

FACTS:
1. Petitioners were Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter
Estrada and Michael Gatchalian. They were charged with the crme of rape with homicide
allegedly raping Carmela Vizconde, the mother Estrellita and sister Jennifer.

2. They assail the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 21, 1996 as well as the Resolution
dated November 15, 1996. It is to denythe petition for the inhibition of respondent Judge Amelita
G. Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95-404 pending before Branch 274 of the Regional TrialCourt.

3. Petitioner relied on the ground that respondent Judge allegedly told the media that “failure of the
accused to surrender following the issuance of the warrant of arrest is an indication of guilt.
Second motion of the petitioner is to disqualify the Judge as the latter allegedly told the media
that the accused “should not expect the comforts of Home.” A.nother Motion on the ground of
bias and partiality

4.  Hon. Amelita G. Tolentino, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274,
and Lauro Vizconde.

5.  The motions by the petitioner was denied for lack of merits

ISSUE: Whether or not the Presiding Judge should inhibit herself from hearing Criminal Case no. 95-
404 on the ground of bias and prejudice.
RULING: No, the Presiding Judge should not inhibit herself from hearing Criminal Case no. 95-404
on the ground of bias and prejudice.
Under the Constitution, no person shall be held to answer criminal offense without due process of law.
In the instant case, Petitioner Motion was denied for lack of merits. A perusal of the records reveal that
petitioners failed to adduce any intrinsic evidence to prove that respondent Judge was motivated with
malice and lean on the alleged series of rullings.
Thus, Presiding Judge should not inhibit herself from hearing Criminal Case 95-404 on the ground of bias
and prejudice.
FOUND ALREADY IN THE BOOK OF DEAN NAVAL
PAGE: 147 PARAGRAPH __1__
FOOTNOTE 410
CASE TITLE IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS V SANDIGANBAYAN
DATE OCTOBER 6, 1998 ; GR.NO. 126995
PONENTE Justice Purisima
FACTS 1. IMELDA R. MARCOS
2. On June 8, 1984, IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS, as Chairpersom and
Vice Chairperson of the Light Railway Transit Authority entered into a
lease Contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc.
which petitioner Marcos was also Chair of its Board of Trustees involving
an LRTA property in Pasay City for P102,760.00 per month for 25 years.
3. Petitioner then filed a Motion for " Reconsideration and at the same time
prayed that her Motion be heard by the Supreme court en banc
claiming that her right to due process of law, both substantive and
procedural was violated
4. Respondents are The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPINES
5. Sandiganbayan decision rendered convicting the petitioner and Dans
violation of Sec. 3 of R.A 3019 ( Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

ISSUE Whether or not the cross examination by court indicated bias

RULING Yes, the cross examination by court indicated bias.

The Constitution provides that no person shall be held to answer a criminal

offense without due process of law.

In the case at bar, the court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of Presiding
Justice Garchitorena against the petitioner as shown by his leading,
misleading and baseless hypothetical questions of the said justice to the
witness of the petitioner. Said justice asked 179 questions to the witness as
against the prosecutor who cross-examined the witness which was 73. Said
number of questions could no longer be described as “clarification
questions.”

Therefore, the cross examination by court indicated bias.

FOOTNOTE 411
CASE TITL People of the Philippines v Robert Castillo y Mones
DATE April 20, 1998, G.R. No. 120282, 275 SCRA 441
PONENTE Justice Artemio V. Panganiban

FACTS 1. Subject/Object: Subject of this petition is the allegation of the

appellant that the trial judge was biased against him for
propounding questions that were well within the prerogative
of the prosecution to explore and ask.
2. Appellant is Robert Castillo y Mones. He was charged with and
convicted of murder and was sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
3. Appellant contended that the court showed prejudiced against the
accused for several instances asking question that were within
the duty of the prosecution and never appreciated matters
favourable to the accused.
4. Appelle is the State. The victim was Antonio Dometita, one of the
customers of Cola Pubhouse, who was stabbed to death on
May 25, 1993.
5. The trial court was even lenient to the accused that although the
killing was qualified by treachery, it considered the
circumstance absorbed by abuse of superior strength.

ISSUE 411 Whether or not clarificatory questions by the court will constitute
bias.

RULING 411 No, clarificatory questions by the court will not constitute bias.

Under the Constitution, no person shall be held to answer for a

criminal offense without due process of law.

In view of the case, it is a judge's prerogative and duty to ask

clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. On the whole, the
Court finds that the questions propounded by the judge were
merely clarificatory in nature. Questions which merely clear up
dubious points and bring out additional relevant evidence are
within judicial prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that
allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received
with caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not
prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judge's queries is
determined not necessarily by their quantity but by their quality
and, in any event, by the test of whether the defendant was
prejudiced by such questioning. In this case, appellant failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the questions propounded by
the trial judge. In fact, even if all such questions and the answers
thereto were eliminated, appellant would still be convicted.

Hence, clarificatory questions by the court will not constitute bias.

Footnote 412
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE @ "JUN
TAGAY" and NONITO JAMILA, JR., y CANTO, JULIO HERIDA y BERNABE @ "JUN
TAGAY”
DATE: March 5, 2001
PONENTE: Justice Leonardo Quisumbing

FACTS:
1. Petitioner is Julio Herida y Bernabe.
2. The petitioner appeals the decision of of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78,
in Criminal Case No. Q-95-61405, convicting appellant Julio Herida y Bernabe, alias "Jun
Tagay," of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
3. Petitioner contends there is neither treachery nor evident premeditation in this case; he also
claims that there is absolutely no showing the assailants conspired to kill Delara; he also avers
that the trial court judge exhibited bias or prejudice against him because 70% of the testimonies
of the prosecution were elicited by the judge and he questions the award of damages in favor of
victim’s common-law wife. 4. Respondent is the State.
5. The City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged him with murder for conspiring together and
confederating with two other persons to kill Herlito Delara.

ISSUE:
1. WON the Lower Court seriously erred when it denied the accused-appellant [with] his
constitutional right to due process of law by acting with obvious bias and prejudice during the
trial of this case.

RULING:
No, the Lower Court was seriously erred when it denied the accused-appellant [with] his
constitutional right to due process of law by acting with obvious bias and prejudice during the
trial of this case.
Under the constitution, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In the case at bar, thus in the trial court intensively questioned the witnesses and the accused
(approximately 43% of the questions asked of prosecution witnesses and the accused were
propounded by the judge), the Supreme Court held that the questioning was necessary. Judges
have as much interest as counsel in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence, and
have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on the issues involved, clarify
ambiguous remarks by witnesses, and address the points overlooked by counsel.
Therefore, the Lower Court was seriously erred when it denied the accused-appellant [with] his
constitutional right to due process of law by acting with obvious bias and prejudice during the
trial of this case.
FOOTNOT 413
E
CASE TITLE Alonte v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131652
DATE March 9, 1998
PONENTE Justice Jose Vitug
FACTS 1. Accused-appellant: Bayani M. Alonte, incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, was
accused of raping Juvie Lyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura
Concepcion.

2. Action of Accused-appellant: Accused argued that respondent Judge Savellano

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
They alleged that there was no trial on the facts aside from that conducted to
determine the validity of the affidavit of desistance and that they were not given
an opportunity to cross-examine the affiants.

3. Subject/Object: Petitioners were accused of rape. Victim filed for a change of

venue, then executed an affidavit of desistance. The trial continued. According
to respondent, petitioners waived his right to due process when he did not cross
examine victim when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the
rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.

Court ruled that petitioners were denied due process, and that the affidavit of
desistance does not necessarily mean dismissal of the case. The case was
remanded to the trial court.

4. Plaintiff-appellee: Hon. Maximo A. Savellano Jr., National Bureau of

Investigation and People of the Philippines

5. Action of Plaintiff-appellee: The case was raffled to the Manila Regional Trial
Court under Judge Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had
ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution
presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same
being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life
elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both
accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his
right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory
questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of
her desistance.

ISSUE Whether or not the accused-appellant were denied of due process.

RULING Yes, the accused-appellant were denied of due process.

The Constitution provides that, no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard
of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be
so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against a waiver.
Therefore, the accused-appellant were denied of due process.
FOOTNOTE 414

CASE TITLE: Defensor-Santiago v Sandiganbayan, GR No. 123792

DATE: March 8, 1999

PONENTE: Pardo, J.

FACTS:
1. Miriam Defensor Santiago was charged with violation of R.A. 3019.Accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO, a public officer, being the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

2. The Accused approve the application for legalization of the stay of aliens in violation of Executive Order No. 324
which does not allow the said legalization.

3.  Sandiganbayan gave the parties fifteen (15) days within which to formally offer their respective documentary
evidence.

4. Sandiganbayan issued a resolution ordering a reopening of the case, and allowing the prosecution to present the
testimony of complainant Rodolfo Pedellaga to show the accused’s "evident bad faith and manifest partiality.”

5. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s resolution to reopen the case.

ISSUE: WON the re-opening of the case is a denial of due process of law.
RULING: Yes. The re-opening of the case is a denial of due process of law.
Under the Constitution, no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.
In this case, the re-opening of the case to present the prosecution’s testimony to show the accused’s
"evident bad faith and manifest partiality without giving the accuse the opportunity to rebut the evidence
to be introduced by the prosecution is a virtual denial of due process that will obviously prejudice the
substantial rights of the accused.
Therefore, the re-opening of the case is a denial of due process of law.
FOUND ALREADY IN THE BOOK OF DEAN NAVAL
PAGE: 148 PARAGRAPH _2__
FOOTNOTE 415

CASE TITLE: People of the Philippines vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb

DATE: August 17, 1999
PONENTE: Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago
FACTS:
1. Respondents: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb
2. The respondent is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 95-404 for Rape with Homicide
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque.
3. Respondent filed a Motion To Take Testimony By Oral Deposition praying that he be allowed
to take the testimonies of the following: Steven Bucher, Debora Farmer, Jaci Alston, Ami
Smalley, John Pavlisin, before the general consul, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of
the Philippines in lieu of presenting them as witness in court alleging that the said persons
are all residents of the United States and may not therefore be compelled by subpoena to
testify since the court had no jurisdiction over them.
4. Petitioner: People of the Philippines
5. The trial court denied the motion of the respondents on the ground that it is not allowed in
the rules of court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s motion should be granted

RULING: Page 148 Paragraph 3
No. The respondent’s motion should not be granted
The constitution states that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law.
In the case at bar, the refusal to grant the petition of Webb to take the deposition of the witnesses
residing abroad considering the testimony would be merely corroborative, does not denied him from his
constitutional right to due process before the court.
Therefore, court’s refusal is not a denial of due process.
Footnote No 416
Case Title Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
Date November 19, 2001 GR No. 148560
Ponente Justice Josue Bellosillo
Facts 1. Petitioner is former President Joseph Estrada.
2. Section 2 of RA No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder) as amended by RA No. 7659 substantially provides that any
public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least 50 million shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder. Former President and co-accused were charged for Plunder
under the said act.
3. On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of
pesos through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts,
or similar acts, or similar schemes thereby unjustly enriching himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines. Petitioner contends that the Plunder Law
requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and
therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process.
4. Sandiganbayan (third division) and the people of the Philippines,
respondents.
5. The Sandiganbayan believes that the legislature did not in any manner
refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The
burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of
doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
Issue Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional and is violative of due
process.
Ruling No, the Plunder Law is not unconstitutional is not violative of due process.

The Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and the cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial.

In the case at bar, the Court ruled that every legislative measure is presumed to
be constitutional, and the petitioner failed to discharge the burden to overcome
the presumption of constitutionality.

Therefore, Plunder Law is not unconstitutional and is not violative of due process.
FOOTNOTE 417
FOOTNOTE 418
CASE TITLE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO OSTIA @”ROBERT”
DATE February 26, 2003; G.R. No. 1131804
PONENTE Justice Callejo Sr
FACTS 1. Petitioner/s: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

2. Action of Petitioner:

3. Subject/Object: Appellant was charged with rape with homicide against a

minor four years old girl, Beverly Onato.

4. Respondents: Roberto Ostia

5. Action of Respondent/s: During the trial, appellant withdrew his plea of not
guilty to murder. The trial court accepted his plea, convicted him of
murder and sentenced him to death.

Whether or not the trial court failed to comply with its mandatory duties
ISSUE when appellant pleaded guilty to murder.
YES. The trial court failed to comply failed to comply its mandatory duties
RULING when appellant pleaded guilty.

According to Art. III, Section 14 of the Constitution, (1) No person shall be

held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused:
Provided, that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.

In the case at bar, the trial court failed to probe into the reasons why
appellant’s change of plea from “not guilty” to “guilty” and did not even
bother asked if appellant sought an advice from his counsel before pleading
guilty. When an accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, the trial
court is mandated to: 1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of
the plea and the accused’s full comprehension of the consequences thereof;
2) require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and 3) ask the accused if he
desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.

Therefore, the trial court failed to comply with its duties.

FOOTNOTE 419
FOOTNOTE 420
FOOTNOTE 421
FOOTNOTE 422
FOOTNOTE 423
FOOTNOTE 424
FOOTNOTE 425
Footnote 426

People of the Philippines v. Dionisio Tapeda

May 26, 1995
Justice Josue Bellosillo

Facts:
1. Petitioner is the People of the Philippines
2. Petitioner accused Tapeda for engaging an illicit trade of selling Marijuana to a peace officer.
3. Buy-Bust Operation Team Leader of NARCOM, Region 8, Ormoc City, Sgt. Luis Alfiller, acting on
tip from an informer, organized a three-man buy-bus team to entrap Dionisio Tapeda.
4. Respondent is Dionisio Tapeda
5. The accused narrated denying the allegation thrown at him. He insisted that somebody gave him
money and ordered to give the same to a certain “Jojo” who, in return, handed him something
wrapped in a stappled newspaper.

Issue: WON accused Tapeda is to be presumed innocent.

Ruling: Yes. Accused Tapeda is presumed innocent.

The Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved.
Here, the prosecution fails to present as witness the alleged poseur-buyer for which such
omission casts serious doubt on appellant’s guilt since there is no convincing evidence to show that
accused was a marijuana peddler and not merely a victim of instigation.
Hence, Tapeda is presumed innocent.
FOOTNOTE 427
FOOTNOTE 428
FOOTNOTE 429
FOOTNOTE 430
FOOTNOTE 431
FOOTNOTE 432
FOOTNOTE 433
FOOTNOTE 433
CASE TITLE Monteverde v People, G.R. No. 139610
DATE August 12, 2002
PONENTE Justice Artemio Panganiban
FACTS 1. Petitioner: Petitioner Aurea A. Monteverde was from 1991 to 1993 the
Barangay Chairman of Barangay 124 of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya,
Balut, Tondo, Manila. In that capacity, she received the amount of
P44,800.00 from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR).
2. Action of Petitioner: She received the amount of P44,800.00 from the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). The amount
was spent for lighting, cleanliness and beautification programs of the
Barangay. To liquidate the amount, she submitted a financial statement
with copies of sales invoices/receipts to PAGCOR.
3. Subject/Object: This case originated from the Information, signed by Special
Prosecution Officer Gualberto J. dela Llana with the approval of then
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez. Charging petitioner with estafa through
falsification of commercial documents. During her arraignment, petitioner,
assisted by her counsel  pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the
Sandiganbayan acquitted petitioner of the crime of estafa, but convicted her of
falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code.
4. Respondents: People of the Philippines
5. Action of Respondents: During her arraignment, petitioner, assisted by her
counsel pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan
acquitted petitioner of the crime of estafa, but convicted her of
falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code.

ISSUE Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in applying the presumption that
petitioner was the author of falsification in the absence of any proof that she
benefited from it?

RULING Yes, the Sandiganbayan erred in applying the presumption that petitioner was
the author of falsification in the absence of any proof that she benefited from
it?

The Constitution provides that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel.

In the instant case, in all criminal cases, mere speculations cannot substitute
for proof in establishing the guilt of the accused. Indeed, suspicion no matter
how strong must never sway judgment. Where there is reasonable doubt, the
accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may not have been
established. The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral
certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the presumption of
innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right.

Therefore, the Sandiganbayan erred in applying the presumption that

petitioner was the author of falsification in the absence of any proof that she
benefited from it.
FOOTNOTE 434
FOOTNOTE 435
FOOTNOTE 436
FOOTNOTE 437
FOOTNOTE 438
Footnote 439
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA,
Accused-Appellant, G.R. No. 122770
DATE: January 16, 1998
PONENTE: PER CURIAM

FACTS:
1. Plaintiff-Appellee is People of the Philippines.
2. On 12 September 1994, the Station Investigation and Intelligence Division of the National
Capital Regional Command, Philippine National Police (PNP), endorsed to the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City the complaint of Eden Agbayani (hereafter EDEN) for rape against her
father, herein accused-appellant Eduardo Agbayani y Mendoza.
3. Complainant desisted from pursuing the case. As Eden declared in open court that what she
said in her previous testimony and sworn statement were not true, the trial court held her in
direct contempt of court, reasoning that her “intentional falsehood” was “offensive to its dignity
and a blatant disrespect to the Court, and actually degrading to the administration of justice.”
She retracted her affidavit of desistance and claimed that she had signed it under coercion by
her mother and elder sister. Trial court gave full credence to the testimony of Eden and ruled
that she did not voluntarily execute the affidavit of desistance as it was procured “at the behest
of her mother and sister for whom the sanctity of the family and the family’s good name were
more important than demanding punishment for whatever injury the complainant might have
suffered in the hands of the accused.
4. Accused-Appellant is Eduardo Agbayani y Mendoza.
5. Accused was charged by his two daughters, Fedelina and Dodima Agbayani, with the crime of
rape. The case was, however, provisionally dismissed after the complainants desisted from
pursuing the same in May 1994. Eduardo Agbayani was thus released from jail on July 13, 1994.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court failed to apprise the accused of his right to have counsel of his
own choice.

RULING:
No, the lower court did not fail to apprise the accused of his right to have counsel of his own
choice.
Under the Constitution, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.
In the instant case, it is true that the transcript of the stenographic notes of the proceedings of
22 December 1994 and the order issued by the trial court after the conclusion of said proceedings only
state that the court appointed de oficio counsel with the consent of the said accused. They do not
categorically disclose that the trial informed appellant of his right to counsel of his own choice.
However, this does not mean that the trial court failed to inform appellant of such right. Since appellant
has miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right to counsel, the presumptions that the
law has been obeyed and official duty has been regularly performed by the trial court stand.
Thus, the trial court is presumed to have complied with its four-fold duties which is to inform
the accused that he has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned.
FOOTNOTE 440
FOOTNOTE 441
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines v Felipe Malunsing, Manuel Villegas, et. al.
DATE April 29, 1975; G.R. No. L-29015
PONENTE Justice Enrique Medina Fernando
FACTS 1. Subject/Object: Subject of this petition is the failure of the lower court to
respect the constitutional right of accused to obtain counsel of his
choice. That it proceeded with the trial even if accused already
dispensed with the services of the counsel-de-officio.
2. Defendant-appellant is Manuel Villegas, an old man, ignorant and
unlettered. That  the appellant, while present did not know what was
going on; the trial court never apprised the appellant of his
fundamental right to be assisted by a lawyer nor bother inquiring why
he did not take the witness stand.
3. Appellant contended that It is not enough that a counsel de oficio was
appointed, especially so as here, where the accused had indicated that
he wanted a lawyer of his choice, a decision prompted moreover by the
fact that he had lost confidence in the member of the bar thus
designated. 
4. Plaintiff-appellee is the State.
5. The prosecution during the trial presented its witnesses, and likewise all
the defendants, except the appellant Manuel Villegas, took the witness
stand and testified for and in their defense.

ISSUE Whether or not it is not enough that a counsel de oficio is appointed,

especially so where the accused indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his
choice.

RULING No, it is not enough that a counsel de oficio is appointed, especially so where
the accused indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his choice.

Under the Constitution, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel.
In the instant case, the accused had indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his
choice, a decision prompted moreover by the fact that he had lost confidence
in the member of the bar thus designated. Nor is it to manifest respect for
this right if the counsel de oficio thus named, instead of conferring with the
accused, would just blithely inform the judge that he was already fully
prepared for his exacting responsibility. It was unintended, of course, but the
result could not rightly be distinguished from pure travesty.

The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because
he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional
right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court
to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one  de oficio for
him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of
his own.

Therefore, it is not enough that a counsel de oficio is appointed, especially so

where the accused indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his choice.
Footnote 442
CASE TITLE: People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Antolin Cuizon y Ortega, Steve Pua y Clofas
Alias “Stephen p y Uy” or “Tommy Sy” and Paul Lee y Wong alias “Paul Leung”, Accused-
Appellants; 256 SCRA 325, G.R.No. 109287.
DATE: April 18, 1996
PONENTE: Justice Artemio V. Panganiban

FACTS:

1. Plaintiff-Appellee is People of the Philippines.

2. In January 1992, the Reaction Group of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) gathered an
information regarding the drug activities of accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega and his wife, Susan
Cuizon. A surveillance was conducted on them.
3. In the morning of February 21, 1992, the Reaction Group received a report from its informant
in Hong Kong that accused Cuizon, together with his wife, was arriving on the same day at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro Manilaa, from the British crown
colony, carrying with him a big quantity of “shabu”. A team was organized to intercept the
suspects. Heading the team was Jose Yap, with Ernesto Dino, Marcelino Amurao, Jose Bataller
and Alfredo Jacinto, as members.
4. Accused-Appellants are Antolin Cuizon y Ortega, Steve Pua y Clofas alias “Stephen p y Uy” or
“Tommy Sy” and Paul Lee y Wong alias “Paul Leung”
5. Accused-appellant questions the validity of the warrantless search made at his residence
subsequent to his warrantless arrest. Accused-appellant contends that the shabu seized is
inadmissible as evidence against him. Unfortunately, appellant Paul Lee, who does not speak or
understand a word of English or Filipino and only knows Chinese-Cantonese, was not able to
take a witness stand for lack of an interpreter who would translate his testimony to English. His
counsel, although notified of the proceedings, did not appear. The trial court deemed him and
Pua to have waived their right to present additional evidence, and the case was considered
submitted for decision after the filing of memoranda.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not giving accused Paul Lee the opportunity to present
his evidence in his defense in violation of his constitutional right to due process.

RULING:
Yes, the trial court erred in not giving accused Paul Lee the opportunity to present his evidence
in his defense.
Under the Constitution, no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law. Where the accused could not understand language of the court and lawyer a violation.
In the case at bench, where the accused, a Cantonese, could not understand English, Filipino or
any Philippine dialect and was not able to take a witness stand for lack of an interpreter who would
translate his testimony to English.
Thus, it was held that he was denied the right to counsel because although he was provided
with one, he could not understand or communicate with his counsel concerning his defense.
FOOTNOTE 443
FOOTNOTE 444
Amion V Chongson AM No. RTJ-97-1371
Janaury 22, 1999
Martinez, J.:
Facts:
1 Baltazar D. Amion
2 Complainant-accused asserts that there was clear violation of his right to due process and a
deprivation of his constitutional and statutory right to be defended by counsel of his own
choice.
3 Judge Roberto S. Chiongson proceeded with the scheduled hearing against Balatzar Amion
while represented by an appointed counsel of the Judge and not by a counsel of his choice.
4 Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Bacolod City
5 Judge Choingson asserts that his appointment of a counsel de oficio to represent the accused
is justified because of vexatious and oppressive delay on the latter’s part who has been
represented by a counsel de parte who refuses to or fails to appear during hearings.

Issue: WON Mr Balatazar Amion was deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to be
defended by counsel of his own choice.?

Ruling: No, Mr Balatazar Amion was not deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to be
defended by counsel of his own choice
As stated in the constitution, No Person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law
In the case at hand, Mr. Amoin was rovided a Counsel de oficio since his Counsel of choice
refuses to or fails to appear during hearings which does not violate the constitution.
Therefore, Mr Balatazar Amion was not deprived of his constitutional and statutory right to be
defended by counsel of his own choice
FOOTNOTE 445
FOOTNOTE 446
FOOTNOTE 447
FOOTNOTE 448
FOOTNOTE 449
CASE TITLE Zenaida Reyes v Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines
DATE February 6, 1997; G.R. No. 111682
PONENTE Justice Jose C. Mendoza
FACTS 1. Subject/Object: Subject of this petition is the motion for reconsideration
affirming the conviction of petitioner for Falsification of public
document. Petitioner contended that her counsel abandoned her
defense without explanation.
2. Petitioner is Zenaida P. Reyes who was charged with and convicted for
falsifying a deed of sale of 4 parcels of land by feigning and signing the
name of the owner, Pablo Floro.
3. Appellant disputed that because of her counsel’s unexplained absences at
the trial, she was prevented from presenting evidence in her defense
and therefore denied the due process of law. That she is invoking as
ground for new trial is the police of liberality in the application of the
rules and the alleged negligence of her counsel.
4. Respondents are the CA and the State. Both contended that petitioner
could not have been unaware of the absences of her lawyer but despite
that, she did nothing to protect her interests.
5. The trial court declared petitioner to have waived the right to present her
evidence then 2 months after, convicted. The CA resolved that accused
appellant was not at all deprived of her day in court or denied due
process.

ISSUE Whether or not a new trial, invoked by the petitioner, for the alleged
negligence of her counsel can be granted.

RULING Yes, a new trial, invoked by the petitioner, for the alleged negligence of her
counsel can be granted.

Under the Constitution, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel.
In the instant case, it was Atty. Tenorio's absences, rather than petitioner's,
which appear to be the cause for the defense's failure to present its evidence.
Atty. Tenorio's negligence did not consist in error of procedure or even a
lapse in strategy but something as basic as failing to appear in court despite
clear warning that such failure would amount to waiver of her client's right to
present evidence in her defense. It is better to allow petitioner another
chance to present her evidence than to let her conviction stand based solely
on the evidence of the prosecution. In accordance with Rule 121, Section 6 of
the Rules of Court, the evidence of the prosecution shall be understood
preserved, subject to the right of the prosecution to supplement it and/or to
rebut the evidence which petitioner may present. This case is should be
remanded to the RTC of Bulacan for a new trial for the purpose of allowing
petitioner to present evidence in her defense with directive to the court
thereafter to decide the case with all deliberate speed.

Hence, a new trial, invoked by the petitioner, for the alleged negligence of her
counsel can be granted.
FOOTNOTE 450
FOOTNOTE 451
FOOTNOTE 452
Footnote No. 452
Case Title People vs. Crisologo
Date June 17, 1987 GR No. 74145
Ponente Pricilla Baltazar Padilla
Facts 1. Zosimo Crisologo “AMANG”, defendant-appellant
2. This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Sur
convicting the defendant of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to death
penalty and ordering him to indemnity the heirs of Martin Francisco.
Defendant-appellant is a deaf-mute convicted of robbery with homicide. He
was informed of the charge against him through sign language but only by a
childhood acquaintance.
3. Despite the trial court’s repeated request for a sign language during the trial,
said expert was not provided even until the decision convicting accused-
appellant had been rendered.
4. The People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee
5. Counsel for the accused and the Solicitor General now ask for the reversal of
the judgment of conviction due to the failure of the trial court to safeguard the
accused’s right to due process of law and the insufficiency of the purely
circumstantial evidence presented to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
6.
Issue Whether or not the accused was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him.
Ruling Yes, the accused was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.

The Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.

In the case at bar, the absence of an interpreter in sign language and any other
means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against
him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy
and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was
determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at
stake.

Therefore, the accused was deprived of his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
FOOTNOTE 453

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARLON PARAZO Y FRANCISCO, accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 121176 July 8, 1999

PURISIMA, J.:

FACTS:

1. Petitioner is an accused Marlon Parazo, a deaf-mute, who is found guilty of a

2 separate crimes; a rape and a frustrated homicide.

2. Accused-appellant interposed the Motion for Reconsideration under

consideration, bringing to the attention of the Court facts and circumstances,
such as the absence of a sign language expert, which if true would warrant
the setting aside of his judgment of conviction.

3. Regional Trial Court, Cabanatuan City, imposed on accused-appellant Marlon

Paraza y Francisco the supreme penalty of death for the crime of rape and
frustrated homicide committed.

4. This Court handed down a Decision, affirming with modification subject Joint

Decision of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija, in Criminal
Case Nos. 6167 and 6168,
5. Tthe Court resolved to grant appellant's Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) to hold
in abeyance consideration of his motion for reconsideration pending his
medical examination; (2) to allow a supplemental motion for reconsideration
after his medical examination; and (3) to submit him (appellant) for
examination by a physician of the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the accused-appellant’s right to be informed of the nature and

caused of the accusation against him is violated.

RULING:

Yes, the accused-appellant’s right to be informed of the nature and caused of the
accusation against him is violated.

As stated in the Constitution, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

In the immediate case presented, the absence of a qualified interpreter in sign

language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the
accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due
process of law. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.

Thus, the accused-appellant’s right to be informed of the nature and caused of the
accusation against him is violated.
FOOTNOTE 454
FOOTNOTE 455
Footnote 456
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Case Title
DOMINADOR TABION, accused-appellant.
Date October 20, 1999; G.R. No. 132715
Ponente Justice Artemio Panganiban
1. Dominador Tabion, accused-appellant.

2. In his Brief, appellant pleads for acquittal on the anemic argument that the
private complainant instituted the criminal charge, merely because she hated
him so much for his having been a member of the NPA (New People Army).
Without much ado, he submits that the evidence of the prosecution was not
enough to overcome the constitutional presumption of his innocence.

3. Before us for automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61 of Bogo, Cebu in Criminal Case No. B-00121, convicting
Dominador Tabion of qualified rape and imposing upon him the supreme
Facts
penalty of death. The case arose from the Information dated October 30,
1996. The Information charging appellant with rape failed to allege the
minority of his daughter-victim. As a result, he cannot be convicted of
qualified rape and sentenced to death, consistent with the Court's ruling in
People v. Ramos 1 that both the age of the victim and her relationship with
the offender must be clearly alleged in the information.

4. People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee.

5. The appellant may be convicted only of simple, not qualified, rape. Hence,
his penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Whether or not the death penalty be imposed if the information has alleged
Issue and the evidence has proven both the age of the victim and her relationship to
the offender.
No. The death penalty cannot be imposed if the information did not alleged
and the evidence has not proven both the age of the victim and her
relationship to the offender.

The Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.

In the case at bar, pursuant to the above-mentioned constitutional right of the

accused and the extant jurisprudence on the subject, the court have held that
the death penalty may be imposed only if the information has alleged and the
Ruling
evidence has proven both the age of the victim and her relationship to the
offender. In People v. Perez, the Court ruled that because “the circumstance
that [the victim] was less than eighteen years of age at the time of the rape
was never, in any manner, stated in the Information,” the accused could be
convicted only of simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, not death.
We said that it was the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship with the offender that would have qualified the rape as heinous
and thus justified the imposition of the supreme penalty.

Therefore, the death penalty cannot be imposed if the information did not
alleged and the evidence has not proven both the age of the victim and her
relationship to the offender.
FOOTNOTE 457
CASE TITLE: People of the Philippine v. Ernesto Marcelo
DATE: March 22, 1999; G.R. No. 126714
PONENTE: Justice Jose C. Vitug

FACTS:
1. Ernesto Marcelo was charged with three counts of rape to a minor victim.
2. Accused was found guilty on two of the three counts of rape. He appealed the judgement of his
conviction.
3. The Court has held that rape can be committed even with the slightest penetration of the sex
organ of the women. The mere entry by the penis into the lips of the said organ, even without the
rupture or laceration of the hymen is enough. Laceration of the hymen, even if considered the
most telling and irrefutable evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to established the
consummation of the crime of rape.
4.  The state. Carmelita the mother of the victim AAA
5.  She reported to the City Hall in Novaliches and sought the help of Social Worker and after the
interview, referred the matter to Quezon City Hospital and endorsed the case to Camp Crame.
The child was examined in the PNP Crime Laboratory and findings revealed that there a
laceration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court due process of law is establish before render its decision towards
the accused.
RULING: Yes, the Court established the due process of law before rendering its decision to the
accused.
According to the Constitution, no person shall be held to answer for criminal offense without due process
of law.
In the instant case, the state presented the medical evidence and were able to established and revealed the
result of the victims laceration which cause of rape. The parties had given chance in trial and present
evidences and also submitted their respective propositions to the trial Court.
Thus, the Court established the due process of law before rendering its decision towards the accused.
FOUND ALREADY IN THE BOOK OF DEAN NAVAL
PAGE: 158 PARAGRAPH ____
FOOTNOTE 458
CASE TITLE PEOPLE V BOLATETE; GR.NO. 127570
DATE FEBRUARY 25,1999
PONENTE JUSTICE GONZAGA-REYES
FACTS 1. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
2. Reyah Lea Guivencan filed a separate complaint accusing her stepfather
Melanio Bolatete of three counts of statutory rape.
3. Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of all the crimes
of statutory rapes committed against the complaining witness 
4. MELANIO BOLATETE @ MELON, accused-appellant
5. The accused erred the trial court in not taking into account the
inconsistencies of the prosecutions witnesses which if given weight
could have either exonerated or mitigate his penalty.
ISSUE Whether or not the accused appellant was informed of his charges against
him.

RULING Yes, the accused appellant was informed of his charges against him.

The Constitution provides that the accused be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.

In the case at bar, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be

informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due
process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified
form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying
the offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the
indictment on which he was arraigned.

Therefore, the accused appellant was informed of his charges against him.
FOOTNOTE 459
CASE TITLE People of the Philippines v. ROMEO AMBRAY y LUTERIO
DATE February 25, 1999
PONENTE Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes
FACTS 1. ACCUSED: Romeo Ambray y Luterio
2. The accused is charged with statutory rape after
having carnal knowledge against one Melanie
Hernandez, a minor, eleven (11) years old, against
her will. He was convicted in the trial court and
was sentenced to suffer death penalty and an
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱100,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
3. The case was for automatic review. On appeal, the
accused argues that how can the brothers and
sisters of Melanie not notice the sexual assault,
when they were they were all lying on the floor and
the room was well lit. Records also adduce that
Melanie shouted when she was assaulted.
4. Plaintiff is Melanie Hernandez. She is the daughter
of the common law wife of the accused. Upon trial,
plaintiff disclosed that she had been raped when
she was still six (6) years old. She told the
brother and the sister of the accused, but they did
not believe her. Only when herein case was filed to
the police, she had the courage to tell her aunt
about the savagery that occurred on her.
5. Evidences show that the plaintiff shouted but was
prevented by the accused by covering her mouth.
Accused continued his felonious deed of having
illicit carnal knowledge.
ISSUE Whether or not accused was denied of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him?
RULING No, the accused was not denied of his constitutional right.

The constitution affords the right of the accused to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.

In the case at bar, the accused was formally informed of the

nature and the cause of his accusation when he was properly
arraigned in the trial court. Moreover, he was given the
opportunity to present his own defense. On appeal, he was
given the same opportunity to question the decision of the
trial court.

There is no doubt to the guiltiness of the accused for an

eleven (11) year old will not concoct a story so defamatory
on her honor. It is not impossible for the victim’s brothers
and sisters to be in deep slumber. The victim also was
prevented to shout by covering her mouth with a
handkerchief.

Thus, the accused was not denied of his constitutional right

to be informed of the nature and the cause of his
accusation. His conviction was affirmed.
Footnote 460
CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ILDEFONSO
PUERTOLLANO y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.
DATE: June 17, 1999. G.R. No. 122423

PONENTE: JUSTICE FLERIDA RUTH P. ROMERO

FACTS:
1. Plaintiff: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
2. That on or about July 19, 1994 at Brgy. Mayapa, Municipality of Calamba, Province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, thru force,
violence and intimidation and with lewd designs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mary Joy Puertollano @ Mary July Puertollano, his
daughter, a minor, against the latter’s will and consent.
3. PUERTOLLANO y DELA CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.
4. On July 19, 1994, at about one o’clock in the afternoon in Mayapa, Calamba, Laguna, Mary
Joy Puertollano, who was then ten years of age, was ordered by her father, appellant Ildefonso
Puertollano, who was drunk at the time, to stay at home and forego her afternoon classes.
5. Appellant removed his pants and underwear. Then he forced Mary Joy to take off her
clothes. When Mary Joy refused, appellant took them off. He then lifted Mary Joy and
touched her body. Attempting to insert his penis into her vagina, he encountered extreme
difficulty so he placed the girl on a bench, laid himself on top of her and held her thighs.
Five times, he attempted to have sexual intercourse with vigorous motions, all of which
inflicted excruciating pain on Mary Joy. As she could not take it anymore, she moved her
buttocks aside.

ISSUE: whether or not appellant was able to consummate the sexual act?

RULLING:
NO, the appellant was not able to consummate the sexual act.
Under the constitution, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
In the case at bar, the testimony of Jose Fernandez anent the assailed incident should not have
been taken hook, line and sinker. Peeping through a hole about one (1) centimeter, he allegedly
saw appellant "as if in a sitting position" moving his buttocks with a push and pull motions. The
reason is that he admitted in open court that without an eyeglass he could not read.  With such
defect, how could he accurately described what he allegedly saw, with his eyes focusing on a
distant object and the hole is only one (1) centimeter? During trial it was not shown that he was
wearing an eyeglass during the incident in question. Not only that. A certain Leonila @ Bilog
who allegedly called the attention of Jose Fernandez about the incident was not presented as
witness to corroborate the latter's testimony thereby weakening the prosecution's cause.
Whatever Jose Fernandez allegedly saw in that small opening in the wall is mere hazy
recollections which could not be denominated as clear, positive and convincing. Hence, the
crime committed is only Attempted Rape in view of the timely arrival of Jose Fernandez who
shouted at the appellant thereby preventing him from consummating the sexual act. 
Therefore, the contention of the appellant was not consummate the sexual act.
FOOTNOTE 461
CASE TITLE People v. Bonghanoy, G.R. No. 124097
DATE June 17, 1999
PONENTE Justice Flerida Ruth Romero
FACTS 1. Accused-appellant: Carlos Bonghanoy y Agrabiador alias "Caloy," armed with a stone,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, threats and
intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of the said offended part
against her will, a minor who is a (sic) fourteen (14) years old

2. Action of Accused-appellant: The accused-appellant contend that the lower court erred
in convicting the accused and imposing the death penalty the fact that the criminal
information filed against the accused did not allege relationship as an element of the
offense charged.

3. Subject/Object: Article 335, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 provides that the
death penalty shall be imposed if the rape victim is under eighteen years of age and the
offender is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree. Clearly believing that
the case of the People against accused-appellant fell within the above-mentioned
circumstance, the court a quo sentenced accused-appellant to death.

A reading of the information filed against accused-appellant would, however, reveal that
he was charged only with the simple crime of rape, punished under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, with the additional allegation that the victim was only 14 years of
age at the time of the incident.

4. Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines

5. Action of Plaintiff-appellee: Since the information filed against accused-appellant is

silent on the relationship between accused-appellant and his victim, we have to rule that
the former can be convicted only for simple rape. Even if relationship was duly proven
during the trial, still such proof cannot be taken into account so as to convict accused-
appellant of qualified rape and to subsequently impose upon him the death penalty since
he would thereby be denied his constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Accused-appellant cannot be charged
with committing the crime of rape in its simple form and then be tried and convicted for
rape in its qualified form.

ISSUE Whether or not the accused-appellant right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated.

RULING No, the accused-appellant right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him was not violated.

The Constitution provides that, in all prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

In the case at bar, the trial court detailed the evidence, both testimonial and
documentary, presented by the parties. Thereafter, it balanced the respective pieces of
evidence submitted by the prosecution and the defense and chose the one which
deserved credence. The trial court then discussed the law and penalty applicable to the
case. In fine, the trial court's decision substantially complies with the mandate of Article
VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution that a decision must express "therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."
Therefore, the accused-appellant right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was not violated.
FOOTNOTE 462
FOOTNOTE 463

CASE TITLE: People of the Philippines vs. Luisito Paglinawan

DATE: January 31, 2000
PONENTE: Justice Jose Mendoza
FACTS:
1. Accused-Appellant: Luisito Paglinawan
2. Appellant was alleged that did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault, shoot and fire with an Armalite, the house of Segundino Senados.
3. The firing of M16 Rifle Armalite of the appellant injured Segundino Senados’s wife,
Millianita, Junior his son and inflict mortal wounds to another son named Jerry, a seven (7)
year old child which directly caused his death
4. Plaintiff-Appelle: People of the Philippines
5. The court finds accused Luisito Paglinawan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and imposes penalty of reclusion perpetua, compensatory damages in the sum of
Ten Thousand Pesos (10,000.00) of the Spouses Segundino and Millianita, burial expenses,
and indemnify the heirs of Jerry of Jerry Senados in the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(50,000).

ISSUE: Whether or not the court violates the right of the accused to be informed
RULING: Page 158 Paragraph 6 (last par)
No. The court does not violates of the accused to be informed.
The constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence in attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
In the case at bar, though the prosecution established in the testimony of its witnesses that Millianita
Senados and Junior Senados were injured, the court hold the accused liable for the said injuries since he
was not properly charged. It is only murder in the case of Jerry Senados’s death. The constitution is clear
that an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Hence, a person cannot be convicted of a crime for which he has not been charged, otherwise, he would
be denied the due process of law.
Footnote No. 464
Case Title People vs. De Vera
Date June 9, 1999 GR No. 121462-63
Ponente Justice Jose Vitug
Facts 1. Cipriano De Vera Sr., accused-appellant
2. It was a celebration which started with revelry and ended in tragedy. The
fatalities were 13 year-old Gerardo Valdez and 29 year-old Perlita Ferrer.
Accused of having killed the two victims was Cipriano De Vera Sr., an uncle of
Gerardo, who was charged in three separate informations—one for the
murder of Gerardo Valdez, second for homicide for the death of Perlita
Ferrer, and third for illegal possession of firearms.
3. The accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of
a complex crime constituting crimes alleged in separate informations.
4. The people of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee
5. Solicitor General believes that appellant cannot be held liable for the complex
crime of murder with homicide but should be held liable separately for these
crimes.

Issue Whether or not the accused were deprived of their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.

Ruling Yes, the accused were deprived of their constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them.

The Constitution provides that, In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.

In the case at bar, while the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more criminal
cases and can render a consolidated decision, it cannot convict the accused of a
complex crime consisting of the various crimes alleged on the two informations. Their
conviction can only be limited to the crime alleged or necessarily included in the
allegations in the separate informations.

Therefore, the accused were deprived of their constitutional right to be informed of

the nature and cause of the accusation against them.
FOOTNOTE 465
FOOTNOTE 466
CASE TITLE ALFREDO ROMUALDEZ vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth
Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DATE July 29, 2004; G.R. No. 152259/ 435 SCRA 371
PONENTE Justice Panganiban
FACTS 1. Petitioner/s: ALFREDO ROMUALDEZ, brother-in-law of former President
Marcos and therefore related by affinity within the third degree civil
degree.

2. Action of Petitioner: the petitioner filed a motion for leave to file motion to
dismiss.

3. Subject/Object: Petitioner was charged in violation of Sec. 5, RA 3019 as

amended by intervening in a contract between the National Shipyard
and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government owned and controlled
corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company
(BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned
by former President Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and
conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests
aver all equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops,
quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets
located at the Engineer Island Shops including some of its equipment
and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by
BASECO in its ship building and repair program for the amount of
P5,000,000.00.

4. Respondents: THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

5. Action of Respondent/s: People of the Philippines through the PCGG, filed a

petition charging the Alfredo Romualdez with violation of Sec. 5, RA
3029 as amended.
Whether or not the constitutional right of petitioner to be informed of the
ISSUE nature and cause of the accusation against him is violated.
NO. His right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was
RULING not trampled.

According to Art. III, Section 12 of the Constitution, (1) Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado,
or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and
civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

In the case at bar, when allegations in the information are vague or indefinite,
the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash but a motion for a bill of
particulars. A cursory reading of the information shows that the elements of a
violation of Sec. 5 of RA 3019 have been stated sufficiently. Likewise, the
allegations descried the offense committed by petitioner with such
particularity as to enable him to prepare and intelligent defense. Details of
the acts he committed are evidentiary matters that need not to be alleged in
the information.

Therefore, His right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
was not trampled.
FOOTNOTE 467

467
Title: People of the Philippines v Bryan Ferdinand Dy y La Madrid and Giovan Bernardino y
Garcia, G.R. Nos. 115236-37
Date: January 29, 2002
Ponente: Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago
Facts:
1. Petitioner: People of the Philippines

2. Act of Petitioner: Accused-appellants were charged with Rape and Acts of

Lasciviousness in a complaint initiated by Gina Marie Mobley

3. Cause of Petitioner: Complainant Gina Marie Mobley, together with her companion
Helen Kathleen Tennican, both American nationals, went out with the respondents and
was drugged and while unconscious, respondents have carnal knowledge of the
complainant against their will and consent.

4. Respondents: Bryan Ferdinand Dy y La Madrid and Giovan Bernardino y Garcia

5. Act of Respondent: Respondent Dy and Bernardino filed a motion for reconsideration

affirming the decision of RTC Baguio City finding them guilty of rape and acts of
lasciviousness.
Issue: Whether or not, there was a valid arraignment when accused were not furnished a copy of
the complaint or information and the contents of the complaint or information was not read in a
dialect or language known to the accused
Ruling: Yes, there was a valid arraignment when accused were not furnished a copy of the
complaint or information and the contents of the complaint or information was not read in a
dialect or language known to the accused.
The Constitution states that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
In the instant case, the accused themselves refused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them.  The defense cannot hold hostage the court by their refusal to the
reading of the complaint or information. Indeed, the defense may waive their right to enter a plea
and let the court enter a plea of “guilty” in there behalf.
Therefore, there was a valid arraignment when accused were not furnished a copy of the
complaint or information and the contents of the complaint or information was not read in a
dialect or language known to the accused.
Page: 159
Paragraph: 4
FOOTNOTE 468
FOOTNOTE 469
FOOTNOTE 470
FOOTNOTE 471
FOOTNOTE 472
FOOTNOTE 473
Footnote 474

ROMULO DELA ROSA V. COURT OF APPEALS

February 9, 1996
Justice Artemio Panganiban

Facts:
1. Petitioner is Romulo Dela Rosa, charged for violation of BP Blg. 22
2. Petitioner objected to the postponement filed by private respondent and invoked his
constitutional right to a speedy trial.
3. There was delay on the trial of the case owing to a number of hearing schedules that were
postponed.
4. Respondents are Court of Appeals and Benjamin Magtoto
5. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision made by the trial court dismissing the cases against
the petitioner and reinstated and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.

Issue: WON there is violation of the petitioner’s right to speedy trial.

Ruling: No. There is no violation of the petitioner’s right to speedy trial.

The Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused have the right to a
speedy trial.
In the case presented, records show that the delay in trial of the case was mainly due to
petitioner’s fault. The several postponements sought and obtained by petitioner, in effect, amounted to
a waiver or abandonment of his right to a speedy trial.
Hence, there is no violation of the petitioner’s right to speedy trial.
FOOTNOTE 475
FOOTNOTE 476
FOOTNOTE 477
Footnote 478

CASE TITLE: IMELDA R. MARCOS V THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 126995.

DATE: October 6, 1998

PONENTE: PURISIMA, J.
FACTS: Limit to 5 IMPORTANT facts related to Constitutional Law

1. Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a
dubious transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light
Railway Transit.
2. The case was raffled to the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division was headed by
Justice Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices. No decision was
reached by the division by reason of Atienza’s dissent in favor of Imelda’s innocence.
Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as
additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his
manifestation.
3. On the date of Amores’ request, Garchitorena received manifestation from J Balajadia stating
that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J Atienza.
4. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special division and have
the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it would already be pointless to wait for Amores’
manifestation granted that a majority has already decided on Imelda’s favor.
5. The Sandiganbayan en banc ruled against Imelda.

ISSUE:.. Whether or not due process has been observed.

RULING: No, due process has been observed.

The Constitution provides that no person shall be held to answer for criminal offense without due
process of law.
In the case at bar, the SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was no strong showing
of Imelda’s guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due process by reason of
Garchitorena not waiting for Amores’ manifestation. Such procedural flaws committed by respondent
Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its “decision”convicting petitioner. Garchitorena had already
created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in
the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices,
especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different
view of the cases against her. At that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may
change their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot
deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true
that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in
the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But
what is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding
Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division. Therefore, there is no due process has been
observed.

PAGE 162 PARAGRAPH 2

FOOTNOTE 479
CASE TITL People of the Philippines v Robert Castillo y Mones
DATE April 20, 1998, G.R. No. 120282, 275 SCRA 441
PONENTE Justice Artemio V. Panganiban

FACTS 1. Subject/Object: Subject of this petition is the allegation of the

appellant that the trial judge was biased against him for
propounding questions that were well within the prerogative
of the prosecution to explore and ask.
2. Appellant is Robert Castillo y Mones. He was charged with and
convicted of murder and was sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
3. Appellant contended that the court showed prejudiced against the
accused for several instances asking question that were within
the duty of the prosecution and never appreciated matters
favourable to the accused.
4. Appelle is the State. The victim was Antonio Dometita, one of the
customers of Cola Pubhouse, who was stabbed to death on
May 25, 1993.
5. The trial court was even lenient to the accused that although the
killing was qualified by treachery, it considered the
circumstance absorbed by abuse of superior strength.

ISSUE 479 Whether or not clarificatory questions by the court will constitute
bias.

RULING 479 No, clarificatory questions by the court will not constitute bias.

Under the Constitution, no person shall be held to answer for a

criminal offense without due process of law.

In view of the case, it is a judge's prerogative and duty to ask

clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. On the whole, the
Court finds that the questions propounded by the judge were
merely clarificatory in nature. Questions which merely clear up
dubious points and bring out additional relevant evidence are
within judicial prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that
allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received
with caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not
prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judge's queries is
determined not necessarily by their quantity but by their quality
and, in any event, by the test of whether the defendant was
prejudiced by such questioning. In this case, appellant failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the questions propounded by
the trial judge. In fact, even if all such questions and the answers
thereto were eliminated, appellant would still be convicted.

Hence, clarificatory questions by the court will not constitute bias.

FOOTNOTE 480
FOOTNOTE 481
CASE TITLE Go v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106087, 221 SCRA 397
DATE April 7, 1993
PONENTE Justice Flerida Ruth Romero
FACTS 1. Petitioner: ROLITO GO Y TAMBUNTING
2. Action of Petitioner: Petitioner was arrested and booked for frustrated
murder but the information was upgraded to murder following the
victim’s death.
3. Subject/Object: Respondent judge initially allowed petitioner to post bail but
later recalled the order, directed petitioner to surrender and cancelled the
order granting leave for the prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation.
Petitioner then filed a motion to suspend proceedings and transfer venue
outside Metro Manila.
4. Respondents: THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO,
PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 168, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NCJR, PASIG,
METRO MANILA and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
5. Action of Respondents: Respondent judge denied the motion to suspend
proceedings and transfer of venue. Respondent judge also denied the
motion for recusation by the petitioner.

ISSUE Whether or not respondent judge should inhibit from the case for being
partial to the prosecution?

RULING No, respondent judge should not inhibit from the case for being partial to the
prosecution.

The Constitution provides that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial.

In the instant case, the difference of opinions between a judge hearing a case
and a party’s counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisdiction, is not a sufficient
ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case on the ground of bias
and manifest partiality. The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge,” although
required primarily for the benefit of the litigants, is also designed to preserve
the integrity of the judiciary and more fundamentally, to gain and maintain
the people's faith in the institutions they have erected when they adopted
our Constitution.

Therefore, respondent judge should not inhibit from the case for being partial
to the prosecution.
FOOTNOTE 482
FOOTNOTE 483
FOOTNOTE 484
FOOTNOTE 485
FOOTNOTE 486
FOOTNOTE 487
FOOTNOTE 488
FOOTNOTE 489
CASE TITLE Letecia Mil Caamic v Judge Victorio Galapon, Jr, MTC Dulag, Leyte
DATE October 7, 1994; A.M. No. MTJ-93-887 (237 SCRA 390)
PONENTE Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.
FACTS 1. Subject/Object: This is an administrative case filed by the complainant
against respondent Judge for grave coercion. She was sent a subpoena
by the respondent to appear which surprised her as she did not have
any pending case.
2. Complainant is Letecia Mil Caamic. She was served a subpoena issued by
the respondent commanding her to appear. She did not know of any
pending case or complaint against her. Upon appearance, she was
allegedly threatened and coerced to give him P8,000 as share in the life
insurance of her common-lawhusband.
3. Appellant disputed that as a consequence of the subpoena received and
the threats and coercsion, she suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety,
mental anguish and similar moral pains.
4. Respondent is Judge Victoriano Galapon, Jr. of MTC Dulag, Leyte. He
averred that the instant complaint was fabricated with SPO4 Asis as the
mastermind, who filed charges against him, which later was dismissed
by the SC but resulted to Asis’ suspension for 1 month.
5. Respondent denied the claims of the Caamic. He admitted, however, that
he “caused to be issued” to the complainant the subpoena in question
which was signed by his Clerk of Court Bautista, an uncle of the
complainant.

ISSUE Whether or not the subpoena sent to the complainant, not connected to any
pending case, valid.

RULING No, the subpoena sent to the complainant, not connected to any pending
case, is not valid.

Under the Constitution, no person shall be held to answer for a criminal

offense without due process of law.
In the instant case, in using the subpoena form for criminal cases, which was
never explained by respondent, nothing could have been intended but to sow
fear in the mind of the complainant and compel her attendance, for her
failure to do so would have subjected her to "the penalty of law." There was,
therefore, some element of intimidation, oppression or abuse of authority,
which aggravates his apparent ignorance of the law on issuance of
subpoenas. Considering that it was done upon request of a party which has
no case before his court, he invited legitimate criticism against his office as an
instrument of oppression. A subpoena is a process directed to a person
requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or
at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the
taking of his deposition.

Thus, the subpoena sent to the complainant, not connected to any pending
case, is not valid.
FOOTNOTE 490
ROCO v HON. EDWARD B. CONTRERAS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CAL'S POULTRY SUPPLY
CORPORATION, , GR no 158275
June 28, 2005
Garcia, J.:
Facts:
1 Petitioner Domingo Roco was engaged in the business of buying and selling dressed
Chicken. Sometime in 1993, he purchased his supply of dressed chicken from private respondent Cals
Poultry Supply Corporation
2 Petitioner filed with the MTCC a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena
Duces Tecum, requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, both of Cals Corporation or their duly
authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court and to bring with them certain documents,
records and books of accounts for the years 1993-1999.
3 Cal’s Corporation filed criminal complaints against petitioner for violation of Batas Pambasa Blg. 22 (BP
22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law after Cal’s Corporation deposited the above checks in
its account with PCIB but the bank dishonored them for having been drawn against a closed account.
4 HON. Edward B. Contreras, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CAL'S Poultry Supply Corporation, 
5 Presiding Judge, Judge Edward B. Contreras, denied petitioner’s request on the following grounds: (a)
the requested documents, book ledgers and other records were immaterial in resolving the issues posed
before the court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of the
criminal cases.
Issue: WON the denial of the request for the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena
duces tecum is violative of the constitutional right?
Ruling: No, the denial of the request for the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces
tecum is not violative of the constitutional right
As stated in the constitution, No Person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law
In the case at bar, the denial of the court of the request of Petitioner were under the grounds that the
requested documents, book ledgers and other records were immaterial in resolving the issues posed
before the court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of the
criminal cases. Which does not violate his right to answer for the criminal offense without due process
of law.
Therefore, the denial of the request for the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces
tecum is not violative of the constitutional right
FOOTNOTE 491
FOOTNOTE 492
Republic of the Phil vs Joselito Agbulos GR No 73875
May 18, 1993
Cruz, J.:

Facts:
1 Joselito Agbulos was charged with forcible abduction with rape. He pleaded not guilty when arraigned. Trial
ensued and the prosecution rested its case.
2 The counsel for the accused filed a notice of appeal after failing to appear during the subsequent hearings and for
the bonding company who failed to surrender the accused.
3 the trial court rendered its decision finding Agbulos guilty of forcible abduction with rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
4 Republic of the Philippines

Issue: WON trial in absentia valid?

Ruling: Yes, trial in absentia is valid.

As stated in the constitution, However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
In the case at hand, Joselito Agbulos has already been has already been arraigned and now the case
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused.
Therefore, trial in absentia is valid.
FOOTNOTE 493
FOOTNOTE 494

Gimenez v Nazareno (160 SCRA 1)

November 10, 2010

Ponente: Justice Emilio Angeles Gancayco

Facts:

1. Respondent de la Vega, along with five others, was charged with murder. He
was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Before the scheduled date of the first
hearing, he escaped from detention.

2. Prosecutors file a motion to proceed with the hearing in absentia, invoking Sec
19, Art IV of the 1973 Constitution. Þ SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified.

3. The lower court proceeded with the trial. The case was dismissed against the five
accused, while proceedings against de la Vega were held in abeyance.

4. The lower court denied recon of the “abeyance portion” of the decision.

Issue:

Whether or not an accused who has been tried in absentia retains his right to present
evidence and cross examine witnesses.

Ruling:

No. An accused who has been tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence and
cross examine witnesses.

Under the Constitution, No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.

In the present case, the lower court proceeded with the trial. The case was dismissed
against the five accused, while proceedings against de la Vega were held in abeyance.
Trial in absentia is mandatory upon the court whenever the accused has been
arraigned, notified of date/s of hearing, and his absence is unjustified. Rendering
judgment for a trial in absentia is not a violation of the right to be presumed innocent.
The accused is still presumed to be innocent, and his conviction must be based on
evidence showing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Therefore, accused who has been tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence
and cross examine witnesses.
FOOTNOTE 495
FOOTNOTE 496
FOOTNOTE 497
FOOTNOTE 498
FOOTNOTE 499
FOOTNOTE 500