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Arbitration Court Reckoner - April & May 2021
Arbitration Court Reckoner - April & May 2021
Arbitration Court Reckoner - April & May 2021
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By way of the present column, an attempt is made to briefly review the salutary
judgments pronounced by the Courts in the month of April & May 2021 under the
Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). While as many
judgments as possible are sought to be reviewed, owing to the limited column space,
some judgments would invariably be left out. Further, while an attempt is made to include
and review some judgments of various other High Courts, the emphasis is essentially on
the judgments of the High Court of Delhi and Supreme Court of India. The judgments
have been compiled for review with reference to the Section of the Act that they are
primarily dealing with and a detailed analysis has been forgone in favour of
succinctness.
Section 2(4)
• S. 2(4) would not offer protection against rigors of limitation if the relevant
that in view of S. 2(4) of the Act, period of limitation for arbitration was not applicable to
the transactions entered into between the appellant and the respondent, being an
arbitration under a different enactment, prior to 29th August, 1998 when the provisions of
Limitation Act, 1963 were extended to the arbitral proceedings under the Stock Exchange
Bye-laws. However, it rejected appellant's contention that even after applicability of the
period of limitation in view of S. 2(4). The Court held that since the period of limitation
was prescribed by amendment to Bye-laws on 29th August, 1998, the appellant ought to
have filed arbitral proceedings within three years from the date of amendment of the Bye-
laws framed by the Stock Exchange, Mumbai which are statutory bye-laws. Held, alleged
rights, if any, in favour of the appellant in view of S. 2(4) of the Act to file claim without
period of limitation stood abrogated in view of the amendment to Bye-law 252(2). Court
held that even though cause of action arose before the said amendment but as no
arbitration had been instituted, the provisions of amendment would apply with respect to
limitation.
Section 7
• Doctrine of estoppel, implied consent & alter ego pressed into service to bind
non-signatory to arbitration
In Shapoorji Pallonji and Co. Pvt. Ltd. v Rattan India Power Ltd. and Ors.[2] High Court of
agreement could be made parties to arbitration under certain circumstances. In the facts
of the case before it, the Court found that the non-signatory had fully participated in
contract formation and had in fact invited tenders and bank guarantees were issued in its
favour; the non-signatory was the direct beneficiary of the contract and the signatory was
an alter ego of the non-signatory. The Court further found that even doctrine of estoppel
would apply to make the non-signatory a party to arbitration in as much as the non-
signatory had not objected to certain amendments in the contract that made reference to
it and in fact even final bills under the contract were submitted to non-signatory. The
Court observed that estoppel principles have frequently been applied by Courts in the
United States of America to hold that a party is bound by the arbitration clause
associated with the substantive contractual agreement. Thus, applying the alter ego,
implied consent and estoppel principles, the Court held the non-signatory bound by the
arbitration agreement.
Section 8
In Sagar Ratna Restaurants Pvt. Ltd. v D S Foods & Ors.[3], High Court of Delhi was
dealing with a petition under Article 227 against the order of the District Court allowing
the application u/s 8. The Court took note of the fact that the Respondent/applicant itself
had stated that the disputes were not arbitrable which had constrained the Petitioner to
withdraw arbitration proceedings and institute a suit. The Court held arbitration is an
Alternate Dispute Resolution mechanism which is resorted to by the parties with their
consent. It observed that the respondents have, in the earlier instance, clearly envisaged
an intent not to be bound by the Arbitration Agreement stating claim is not arbitrable and
the petitioner has now accepted that opposition and has invoked the ordinary jurisdiction
of a Civil Court seeking enforcement of its rights in the trademark. It held that where both
the parties have become ad idem that the dispute raised by the petitioner is not arbitrable
in nature, the parties could not have been referred to arbitration. The Court further made
Court, noting that while in the former limited judicial interference is called for but in case
where the order is passed by Civil Court referring parties to arbitration, without taking
Section 9
• Arbitration Act not subject to provisions of Companies Act- NCLAT cannot pass
Act
In Bay Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd. v IL & FS Financial Services Ltd. and Ors.[4], High Court
premised on the order of the NCLAT passed u/s 241 and 242 of Companies Act staying
court of law/tribunal/arbitration/arbitration authority. The Court held that the NCLAT can
have no jurisdiction over the High Court and indeed not even over arbitral tribunals and
no provision of the Arbitration Act is made subject to the provisions of Companies Act.
On merits, however, the Court rejected the S. 9 petition as it sought to restrain the
Respondent from enforcing its contractual obligations against Petitioner. The Court held
S. 9 is not meant to aid parties clearly in breach of their contracts. It held that everything
in the Arbitration Act is founded on a contract; and this necessarily means that to claim
an equitable and discretionary relief, a S. 9 petition is not to be handled like a regular civil
contractual rights will suffer no injunction unless it is shown that the Respondent itself is
in breach or has acted contrary to the contract. Once a breach by the Petitioner is not
only demonstrated but is accepted, equity will not operate in its favour. Conversely, where
seek an equitable relief in the court's discretion. The Court further held that while S. 28(2)
does not constrain or limit the power of a S.9 Court but it must certainly inform the
nature of the relief that the S. 9 Court moulds and the relief must be one that the arbitral
In Savita Jain Sole Proprietor Of M S Navkar Sales v M/s Krishna Packaging[5], High
Court of Delhi held that discretion under S. 9 of Act should be exercised in exceptional
cases when there is adequate material on record leading to a definite conclusion that the
there is an admitted liability. Held, that though exercise of such powers is premised on
the underlying principles of Orders XXXVIII and XXXIX of the C.P.C, yet it is settled law
that the Court is not unduly bound by the text of these provisions. The Court set aside the
order of the Trial Court refusing injunction u/s 9 to secure claimed amount on the ground
reflected in respondent's own balance sheets and statement of accounts without any
caveat/explanation and thus its claim was to be secured especially as the same balance
sheets reflected that the Respondent's financial health was poor. The Court further
rejected the Respondent's plea of counter claim and held that the balance sheets and
statement of accounts of a company are in law supposed to reflect the true and correct
Creditor. The Court accordingly directed the Respondent to furnish a bank guarantee of
the admitted amount, which was to be kept alive till the award of the arbitrator and
In Arnav Enterprises v IOSIS Spa & Wellness Private Limited[6] Division Bench of High
Court of Bombay upheld the grant of ad-interim measure u/s 9 enforcing the negative
covenant in the agreement between the parties subject to final outcome of principal
proceedings and dismissed the appeal against the same. The Court accepted the
shared with the Appellant various sensitive and confidential documents and information
including the list of their customers, the negative covenant in the contract would not be a
• No powers are vested with the Registrar of Cooperative Societies to pass any
interim orders while exercising powers under Section 84 of the MSCS Act
In National Federation of Fishermen Co-operative Ltd. v Union of India and Ors.[7] High
Court of Delhi set aside the order of Central Registrar of Co-operative Societies, who had
passed certain interim orders, while referring the parties to arbitration u/s 84 of Multi
States Cooperative Societies Act, 2002 (MSCS Act). The Court held that while S. 84
empowers the Registrar to refer certain disputes to arbitration, the same section also
provides that the provisions of A & C Act shall apply to arbitration under the MSCS Act. It
further held that under the A & C Act, the powers to grant interim orders or protection are
either available with the Court under S. 9 of the Act or with the Arbitrator under S. 17 of
the Act and it is clear that no powers are vested with the Registrar to pass any interim
orders while exercising its powers under S. 84 of the MSCS Act to refer the disputes to
Arbitration.
Section 11
S. 11 stage
In Sanjiv Prakash v Seema Kukreja and Ors.[8] Supreme Court held that issue of a
were entered into, and a full consideration of the law on the subject. It held that such
exercise cannot be done given the limited jurisdiction of a court u/s 11 of the Act Further
has or has not been novated cannot possibly be decided in exercise of a limited prima
facie review as to whether an arbitration agreement exists between the parties. On the
contrary, a Section 11 court would refer the matter when contentions relating to non-
arbitrability are plainly arguable, or when facts are contested. Held, the court cannot, at
this stage, enter into a mini trial or elaborate review of the facts and law which would
Court of Delhi held that mere fact that the judgment of Supreme Court in Central
a larger bench by order dated 11.01.2021 passed in Union of India v. M/s. Tantia
Constructions Limited[10], would not mean that the judgment in CORE (supra) ceases to
be good law. The Court held that until a larger bench answers the reference made to it
one way or the other, the decision of the three-judge bench in CORE (supra) will continue
to be operative. The Court thus upheld the arbitration clause providing from appointment
In SPML Infra Ltd. v NTPC Limited[11], High Court of Delhi rejected the contention of the
Respondent that the arbitration clause in the contract between the parties came to an
agreement.. The Court held that only question to be examined was whether the Petitioner
had been compelled to enter into the Settlement Agreement by economic coercion and
undue influence. The Court held that a Court at the S. 11 stage is not required to give a
held that in one sense, the Court would require to take a negative view if it finds that ex
facie there is no Arbitration Agreement between the parties, and accordingly, the Court
would reject the application under S. 11 of the Act but in all other cases where an
arguable case is made out by the applicant, the parties are required to be referred to
arbitration. Court held that once it is apparent that the parties had entered into an
agreement to refer the disputes to arbitration, the dispute whether the same has been
by the claimant with regard to the validity of the settlement is bereft of any merit; is not
bona fide; or is a frivolous one, the Court must relegate the parties to resolve the
disputes in arbitration.
correspondence
In The Waterbase Limited v Rising Tide and Ors.[12] the High Court of Madras held that
court can decide the existence of an arbitration agreement by taking into consideration
the surrounding circumstances including the conduct of the parties and the evidence
such as exchange of correspondence between the parties. In the facts of that case, the
Court found out that the correspondence exchanged between the parties through e-mails
would prima facie show that the respondents have executed the impugned dealership
agreement which contained arbitration agreement. The Court thereafter, dealing with
Respondent's contention that there was some dispute as to signatures on the agreement,
held that once the existence of agreement is made from emails, merely because the
Respondents signatures on other documents, the Court cannot jump to the conclusion
that the respondents have not signed in the dealership agreement. The Court noted that
the Respondents may have purposely signed in the said documents by changing the
pattern of their signatures or they may have subsequently changed the pattern of their
signatures and that however, it is open to the Arbitral Tribunal to decide the said issue
also.
petition for appointment of arbitrator as it found that agreement for sale of immoveable
property executed between the parties, which contained the arbitration clause, was in
contravention of a stay order qua the said property passed before execution of said
agreement. The Court held that an agreement enforceable by law is a contract defined in
S. 2(h) of Indian Contract Act whereas an agreement not enforceable in law is void as per
S. 2(g) of the Indian Contract Act. The Court held that the agreement for sale is in
violation of stay order, and is therefore, not enforceable and is void in terms of S. 2(g) of
the Contract Act. The Court held that u/s 11 the Court has to consider existence and
validity of the arbitration agreement and was of the view that an arbitrator cannot be
In Geo Chem Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. v United India Insurance Co. Ltd.[14] High Court of
Delhi was seized with a petition for appointment of arbitrator where the arbitration clause
respect of the policy. It was the case of the Respondent that petition was premature as
the Respondent had not admitted any liability yet where as the Petitioner sought to
contend it was a case of deemed admission and as a matter of fact there had not been
any rejection/denial. The Court held that for limited purpose of determining arbitrability
under the limited scope of S. 11 , it is found that bar contained in the arbitration clause is
not attracted Respondent has neither denied nor disputed the liability till date and the
Petitioner cannot be left remediless while the Respondent delays the decision and
proceeded to appoint the arbitrator. However, it sought to protect the Respondent's rights
under the contractual clause by recording Petitioner's concession that in the event
Respondent ultimately repudiates the claim of Petitioner, the consequences in law, as per
the bar contained in arbitration clause as upheld in judgment in United India Insurance
Company Ltd. & Anr v v. Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company Ltd.[15], and
Section 17
In Supertech Ltd. v B.E. Billimoria and Co. Ltd. and Ors.[16] High Court of Delhi upholding
the order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal u/s 17 rejected the Appellant's contention that
mandatory injunction cannot be granted except to maintain status quo. The Court held
that it is apparent from the plain language of Clause (e) of S. 17(1)(ii) of the Act that it is
of a wide import. The said provision enables the Arbitral Tribunal to pass such orders as
may be passed by the Court for the purposes of and in relation to the proceedings before
it and S. 17(1)(ii)(e) cannot be read in a restricted manner. The Court upheld the interm
order of the AT allowing the respondents to remove its plant and machinery from site but
modified it to the extent that Respondents would not sell, transfer or in any manner
encumber its subject machinery till the conclusion of the arbitral proceedings, thus
balancing equities in view of the Appellant's contention that it had lien over the same in
Section 33
unlike S. 34, S. 33(1) does not contain any provision permitting condonation of the period
of limitation stipulated therein. The Court held that it cannot read into S. 33(1), a power
of condonation of delay, where none exists. Further held, the fact that delay cannot be
automatically condoned by the Arbitral Tribunal, in the case of application under S. 33(1),
also stands underscored by the stipulation contained by the words "unless another
period of time has been agreed upon by the parties" in S. 33(1). It held, clearly, the intent
of the legislature is that, the period of 30 days, stipulation in S. 33(1), is relaxable only if,
ad idem, the parties agree to another period for filing the application thereunder and de
hors any such mutual agreement between the parties, therefore, the period of 30 days in
Section 34
• Different view taken by same AT not enough ground to interfere with award
In Delhi State Industrial & Infrastructure Development Corporation v Mapsa Tapes Pvt.
Ltd.[18] High Court of Delhi, while rejecting the petition as time barred due to inordinate
delay in re-filing, also proceeded to consider challenge on merits and, inter alia, rejected
the Petitioner's contention that the very same AT had taken a contrary view in another
case and therefore, the impugned award is liable to be set aside. The Court held that said
and Court has to merely examine whether the Arbitral Award falls foul of the fundamental
policy of Indian law or is patently illegal on the face of the record and not to review the
stipulated in agreement
In Inox Renewables Ltd. v Jayesh Electricals Ltd.[19] Supreme Court held that an order of
the Arbitrator recording change of venue from the one provided in agreement constitutes
change of place of arbitration and does not require a written agreement by the parties
unless the agreement provided that it could only be amended by an instrument in writing
signed by both the parties. The Court held that in the facts of the case shifting of venue
is really a shifting of the venue/place of arbitration with reference to Section 20(1), and
not with reference to Section 20(3). The Court held that once venue changes, the courts
at the new venue would have exclusive jurisdiction even though the clause in agreement
In Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v N.S. Publicity (i) Pvt. Ltd.[20], High Court of Delhi
set aside the award to the extent it sought to limit the loss of profit claimed by the party
to its gross profit as disclosed in its audited balance sheet for the relevant year which
was not a part of the arbitral record. The Court held that the AT could have proceeded to
reject or allow the claim to the extent it considered reasonable but it could not direct that
it be calculated on the basis of accounts for the year, which were neither produced nor
relied upon by parties. The Court further set aside the award rejecting the claim for
overheads on the ground that it stood covered by loss of profits. The Court held that
claim of overheads was over and above the claim for loss of profits and the decision of
the Arbitral Tribunal that such overheads had been absorbed in profits is patently
Evidence Act
In Megha Enterprises & Ors. v Haldiram Snacks P. Ltd.[21], High Court of Delhi rejected
the Petitioner's contention that the Arbitrator could not have accepted electronic
evidence in the form of email evidence without an affidavit under S. 65B of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872. It did so because of two reasons. First, in terms of S. 1 of the Indian
Evidence Act 1872, the said Act is not applicable to proceedings before the arbitrator and
second, no such objection was taken on behalf of the petitioners at the appropriate
In Oriental Structural Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v State of Kerala,[22] Supreme Court upheld the
award passed by the Arbitrator and set aside the judgments of the District Court and
High Court which had set aside the award. The Court held that once there was a specific
term of the agreement executed between the parties which provided for payment of
interest on delayed payment, mere fact that rate of interest was not specified or that
blank space has been left where rate was to be provided cannot be construed as
cancellation of the Clause providing for payment of interest of delayed release of funds.
The Court held that that to come to such an inference, active exclusion of payment of
interest under that head was necessary to have been incorporated in the agreement. The
Court upheld the award granting interest on delayed payments but reduced the rate of
In Airports Authority of India v Bentwood Seating System (p) Ltd.,[23] High Court of Delhi
set aside the award granting specific performance of the contract, on the ground that the
Arbitral Tribunal had failed to return a finding on one of the principal issues i.e. whether
the contract had been obtained by fraud. The Court held that if it was proved that
contract was procured by fraud, specific performance of the said contract could not be
granted notwithstanding that the same was not one of the reasons stated in the letter of
termination. The Court rejected the contention of the Respondent that in absence of
reasons on the aforesaid issue of fraud, the present proceedings are required to be
adjourned to enable the parties to resume arbitration. The Court held that it is not a case
where reasons for the conclusion are sketchy and require clarification but rather is a case
where the Arbitral Tribunal has not decided one of the principal disputes between the
parties and this defect cannot be cured by adjourning the present proceedings to enable
the Arbitral Tribunal to issue any clarification/reasons. The Court set aside the award
giving liberty to Respondent refer the disputes to arbitration and even clarifying that it
would be open for the arbitral institution to appoint the same learned arbitrator to
• Grant of compound interest per se not against fundamental policy of Indian law
In Steel Authority of India Limited v Jaldhi Overseas Pvt. Ltd.[24], High Court of Delhi
rejected the contention that award of interest at the rate of 12 percent per annum
compounded with quarterly rests falls foul of the fundamental policy of Indian law. The
Court took note of the fact that there are several Indian legislations that provide for
compound interest including the Micro, Small and Medium Development Act, 2006.
Further observed that in cases, where the contract, common trade practice, or statute
contemplates payment of interest on compound basis, the same is required to be paid. It,
thus, held that per se, compound interest cannot be held to be falling foul of the
Section 37
In Avon Healthcare Private Limited v Trade International and Ors.,[25] the appellant was
aggrieved by the vacation of the ad interim order passed post award in S. 9 proceedings
by which there was a restraint order against the property of the Respondent. The interim
order had been vacated and the S. 9 proceedings dismissed in view of the fact that
execution of the award had been stayed subject to deposit of 75% of the Award amount
and which had been deposited; in the petition under S. 34 of the Act preferred by the
respondent. The Appellant filed appeal against the said dismissal on the ground unless
will not be able to recover the entire awarded amount and would be entitled to only
recover 75% thereof, which has been deposited in the Court, especially as Respondent
had already transferred the property to his son. The Court held that there was no infirmity
in the order dismissing S. 9 as once the Court seized of the S. 34 proceedings with
respect to the Arbitral Award has deemed it fit to grant stay of execution of the Arbitral
Award subject to deposit only of 75% and not 100% of the Award Amount, if at the same
time another Court, in Section 9 proceedings, comes to the conclusion that the entire
Award Amount and not only 75% thereof, is required to be secured, the same would result
in conflicting orders on the same matter and would not behave well for the principle of
comity of different Benches of the same Court. With regards to fraudulent transfer by the
Respondent, the Court held that such plea could only be examined in execution
proceedings.
• Award converting claim for damages under S. 73 of the Contract Act into the
claim for liquidated damages under S, 74 of the Contract Act without any pleading
In Ratnam Sudesh Iyer v Jackie Kakubhai Shroff[26], Division Bench of High Court of
Bombay upheld the judgment of the Ld. Single Judge setting aside the award u/s 34
holding that since the view of the learned arbitrator was not a possible view, Ld. single
Judge was right in setting aside such interpretation of contract which disclosed patent
illegality and impossible view and which overlooked the crucial and vital part of evidence.
In the facts of this case also neither there was any provision for payment of any
liquidated damages nor it was fixed as a genuine pre-estimate damages by both the
parties and thus was required to be pleaded and proved by the claimant that the said
amount claimed by him was in the nature of liquidated damages was a genuine pre-
estimate of damage fixed by both the parties and such loss was suffered by him. Court
held that arbitrator has converted the claim for damages under S. 73 of the Contract Act
into the claim for liquidated damages under S. 74 of the Contract Act without any
rejected the Appellant's contention that scope of judicial interference u/s 37(2) would be
wider than that u/s 34. The Court held that on the contrary the scope of interference
against interlocutory orders, classically, is far more circumscribed than the scope of
interference against the final decision of the authority below. Furter, it noted that S. 37
like S. 34 was in Part I of the Act and thus subject to the discipline of S. 5, which
under S.37(2)(a) over the impugned order of the Arbitrator, would only examine whether
the order suffers from any patent illegality or perversity, or is otherwise unconscionable
in law on facts. It held, Court does not, therefore, "re- arbitrate" the application decided by
the learned Arbitrator. The Court upheld the order passed by the Arbitrator u/s 16 in
which it had been held that only those disputes had been referred to the him which had
already arisen on the date of reference by Court and not disputes which had arisen later
Relief of final nature cannot be granted u/s S. 9 – S. 9 does not empower the Court to,
even before the Arbitral Tribunal has had an occasion to adjudicate the claim, allow the
claim.
Division Bench of High Court of Delhi held that mere increase in number of pages or
addition of grounds in S. 37 appeal, upon re-filing, will not make the re-filing a new filing if
the original filing was otherwise substantially compliant. The Court held the test to be
applied, is not quantitative i.e. of number of pages, but qualitative i.e. of what was
originally filed. It held that though Appellant had added grounds to the memorandum of
appeal as well as documents while re-filing but it cannot be said that what was originally
appeal, to be totally ignored. Further held, that the Courts, even otherwise in appeals are
known to adopt a liberal approach qua grounds of appeal and are not known to shut out
an argument, otherwise borne out from the record, merely for the reason of having not
been pleaded in the grounds of appeal and held that in fact, filing of copies of documents
on the file of the Court of Original Jurisdiction, along with the appeal, is only a practice,
evolved to expedite the hearing and to enable the Appellate Court to, on the very first
date, if does not find any merit in the appeal, dismiss the same. On merits, the Court held
that direction in the nature of directing Appellant to deposit amounts under termination
payment clause of contract was not in the nature of interim relief but as an enforcement
of contractual clause and was in the nature of final relief and could only be granted by
Arbitral Tribunal and not court. Court held that in exercise of power under S. 9(1)(ii)(e), no
relief of final nature can be granted, no monetary claim allowed, howsoever urgent the
same may be and howsoever just and convenient it may be to grant the same and even if
it were to be the contention of the applicant in a S. 9 application, that the opposite party
has admitted the entitlement of the applicant to the final relief. The Court further held
that merely because S. 9 Court had made release of money subject to furnishing a bank
guarantee and subject to the award, would not change the nature of the relief granted.
The Court distinguished the judgment in case of Jetpur Somnath Tollways Ltd. Vs.
National Highways Authority of India[29] where similar claim had been allowed.
Section 43
• Order of court referred in S. 43(4) refers to the final order setting aside an
arbitral award or confirming such setting aside of the award, as the case may be
In Siddhivinayak Realties Pvt. Ltd. v V. Hotels Limited and Ors.[30] High Court of Bombay
was called upon to decide 'order of the court' referred to in S. 43(4) of the Act, for
purposes of exclusion of period for purposes of limitation, refers to the first order of the
original or the appellate court, as the case may be, setting aside the arbitral award, or
whether it refers to the final order in a challenge petition setting aside an arbitral award
or confirming such setting aside of the award, as the case may be. The Court held it to be
the latter and held that the principle of merger would most certainly operate for
computing the exclusion period under S, 43(4) of the Act for reckoning the limitation
where an award is set aside by the court. Court, thus held, "order of the court" referred to
in S. 43(4) of the Act is the final order of the court-whether the first order setting aside
the award, which is not subjected to further challenge or the order in appeal, if the
original order setting aside the arbitral award is carried in appeal and affirmed.
Anti-arbitration suit
specific trade, would not lead to the conclusion that it is not a neutral institution
In ADM International Sarl A One Business Centre and Ors. v Sunraja Oil Industries
Private Limited and Ors.,[31] High Court of Madras allowed the application filed by the
Defendant seeking vacation of anti-arbitration injunction granted to the plaintiff and
dismissed the anti-arbitration suit filed by the Plaintiff. The Court, inter alia, rejected the
contention of the plaintiff that the arbitral institution nominated in the contract between
the parties is not a neutral institution and is controlled by oil seed producers such as
Defendant, and it does not qualify as a neutral arbitral institution. The Court held while
"justifiable doubts of bias" may be a valid test when an arbitral tribunal is challenged
either before such tribunal or before a jurisdictional court; a higher threshold should be
satisfied for an anti-arbitration injunction because the plaintiff should justify the
departure from the contractual dispute resolution mechanism. The Court further held
that there are several arbitral institutions spread across the world which are established
by organisations or entities that represent the interest of the specific trade and the
rationale for the same is that expertise is necessary to effectively adjudicate such
disputes and trade practice and the knowledge thereof is also significant. The Court held
that the material on record does not support a conclusion that the arbitral institution is
organisation representing the interest of traders in oil seeds and fats. With regards to the
plea of the plaintiff that even though arbitral institution does not permit a party to be
such assistance, the Court held that the law applicable to arbitration was English law and
that provisions of English Arbitration Act providing for equal opportunity etc ensure the
grounds of challenge raised before it by the Plaintiff could have been and may still be
raised before the arbitral tribunal or the English courts and can be no ground to continue
[1] Appeal No. 989 of 2005 in Arbitration Petition No. 36 of 2004 decided on 4th May
2021
[4] Arbitration Petition (L) No. 10089 of 2020 decided on 9th April 2021
[6] Arbitration Appeal (L) No. 7255 of 2020 decided on 20th April 2021
[8] Civil Appeal Nos. 975 and 976 of 2021 decided on 6th April 2021
[19] Civil Appeal No. 1556 of 2021 decided on 13th April 2021
[22] Civil Appeal No. 3454 of 2011 decided on 22nd April 2021
[26] Arbitration Appeal (L) No. 4901 of 2020 in Arbitration Petition No. 167/2015 decided
[30] Notice of Motion No. 119 of 2016 in Commercial Suit No. 133 of 2018 decided on
[31] Application Nos. 5723 to 5730 of 2019, O.A. Nos. 644, 645 of 2019 in C.S. Nos. 406
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