AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION CASE

DIGESTS

1.
Natalia Realty Inc. vs DAR
G.R. No. 103302, August 12, 1993

Facts:

PP 1637 set aside several hectares of land in Antipolo, San Mateo, and
Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the
metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite, where
Natalia Realty’s properties were situated. Estate Developer and Investor
Corporation (EDIC), the developer of Natalia properties, was granted
approval to develop the said properties into low-cost housing subdivisions.
The Natalia properties then became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.

When CARL came into effect, the DAR issued a notice of coverage on the
underdeveloped portion of Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia immediately
registered its objection to the said notice and requested the DAR Secretary
to cancel the same. However, members of the samahan ng Magsasaka sa
Bundok ng Antipolo (SAMBA) filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC
before the DAR Regional Adjudicator (RA) to restrain them from developing
areas under their cultivation. The RA issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Natalia and EDIC both appealed to the DARAB but the latter merely
remanded the case to RA. Natalia then requested DAR Secretary to set aside
the notice of coverage. Neither the DAR Secretary nor the DAR Director
concerned action on the protest letters.

ISSUE:

1.) Is the Natilia properties were validly converted from agricultural to

residential land?
2.) Is the Natilia Properties covered by CARL?
RULING:

1.) YES. Natalia and EDIC complied with all the requirement of law, even
securing prior approval from DAR. As a matter of fact, there was no need for
Natalia and EDIC to do so because the Natalia properties were within the
areas set aside for Lungsod Silangan Reservation since PP1637 created the
townsite reservation for the purpose of providing additional housing to the
burgeoning population Metro Manila, it can effect converted for residential
use what were erstwhile agricultural lands provided all requisites were met.

2.) No. the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot
be considered “Agricultural Lands” these lots were intended for residential
use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon the approval of their inclusion
in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.
2.

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs Secretary of

DAR
G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, 79777

Facts:

• Cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal

questions. They will be subject to one common discussion and resolution.
G.R. No. 79777:
• The petitioners are Nicolas Manaay and his wife who own a 9-hectare
riceland worked by four tenants and Augustin Hermano, Jr. who owns a 5-
hectare riceland worked by four tenants. They question the constitutionality
of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 & 229, and R.A. No. 6657 since their tenants
were declared full owners of the mentioned lands.
G.R. No. 79310
• Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental and Planters’ Committee Inc., with 1400 planter-
members, submitted a petition seeking to prohibit the implementation of
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
• Aug. 27, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by the National
Federation of Sugarcane Planters, which claim 20 000 members). It was
granted by the court.
• Sept. 10, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by Manuel
Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. It was granted
by the court.
G.R. No. 79744
• Sept. 3 1986 – The petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his
small landholding under Operation Land Transfer accusing the then
Secretary of DAR of violation of due process and the requirement for just
compensation. Certificates of Land Transfer were issued to the private
respondents who then refused to pay lease rentals. The petitioner is asking
for the recall and cancellation of these certificates.
• Dec. 24, 1986 – Petitioner claims his petition was denied without
hearing.
• Feb. 17, 1987 – A motion for reconsideration was filed which had not
been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 & 229 were issued which rendered his
motion moot.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 conforms to the requirements of a valid
appropriation as specified in the Constitution
2. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated
because they do not provide for retention limits required by Article 13,
Section 4 of the Constitution
3. Whether or not the content and manner of the just compensation
provided for in the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution
4. Whether or not there is contravention of a well- accepted principle of
eminent domain by divesting the landowner of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just compensation

RULING
1. NO. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure for that is not its
principal purpose and therefore is not required to conform to the
requirements.
2. NO. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the
law.
3. NO. It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of
payment, other modes of payment shall be permitted as compensation. The
court accepts the theory that payment of the just compensation is not
always required to be made fully in money, they find further that the
proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total
payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated,
is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. The other modes, which are
likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable
because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or
assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of
just compensation.
4. NO. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership
of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with
the landowner.

3. Hacienda Luisita Inc. vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council

GR No. 171101 July 5, 2011

FACTS

Tadeco Cojuangco Sr. bought hacienda luisita from the Spaniards.

Several years after, the martial law administration filed a case before the
RTC against Tadeco for them to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the then
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The Manila RTC rendered judgment
ordering Tadeco to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR. On March 17,
1988, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to withdraw the
government’s case against Tadeco, et al. By Resolution of May 18, 1988, the
CA dismissed the case the Marcos government initially instituted and won
 against Tadeco, et al. The dismissal action was, however, made subject to
the obtention by Tadeco of the PARC’s approval of a stock distribution plan
(SDP) that must initially be implemented after such approval shall have been
secured. Several negotiations occurred and the SDP was implemented. After
several years, Hacienda Luisita claimed that they have spent a huge amount
for the benefits of the farm workers but a group of workers denied the claim.
These workers prayed the revocation of the SDOA (stock distribution option
agreement). Upon the investigation of DAR, they concluded that Hacienda
Luisita did not complied with its obligation as required. Subsequently, PARC
revoked the SDOA.

ISSUES

(1)  WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENTS PARC AND SECRETARY

PANGANDAMAN HAVE JURISDICTION, POWER AND/OR AUTHORITY TO
NULLIFY, RECALL, REVOKE OR RESCIND THE SDOA.

(2 whether or not PARC gravely abused its discretion in revoking or recalling the
subject SDP and placing the hacienda under CARP’s compulsory acquisition
and distribution scheme

(3)  WHETHER THE PETITIONS TO NULLIFY, RECALL, REVOKE OR RESCIND THE

SDOA HAVE ANY LEGAL BASIS OR GROUNDS AND WHETHER THE
PETITIONERS THEREIN ARE THE REAL PARTIES-IN-INTEREST TO FILE SAID
PETITIONS.

THE RULING

1. Yes, Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the

authority to approve the plan for stock distribution of the corporate
landowner belongs to PARC. However, contrary to petitioner HLI’s
posture, PARC also has the power to revoke the SDP which it
previously approved. It may be, as urged, that RA 6657 or other
executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC
with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or
authority, however, is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle
of necessary implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a
statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.
 2. No, The findings, analysis and recommendation of the DAR’s Special
Task Force contained and summarized in its Terminal Report provided
the bases for the assailed PARC revocatory/recalling Resolution. The
findings may be grouped into two: (1) the SDP is contrary to either the
policy on agrarian reform, Sec. 31 of RA 6657, or DAO 10; and (2) the
alleged violation by HLI of the conditions/terms of the SDP. Taking into
account the above discussion, the revocation of the SDP by PARC
should be upheld for violating DAO 10. It bears stressing that under
Sec. 49 of RA 6657, the PARC and the DAR have the power to issue
rules and regulations, substantive or procedural. Being a product of
such rule-making power, DAO 10 has the force and effect of law and
must be duly complied with.143 The PARC is, therefore, correct in
revoking the SDP. Consequently, the PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2
dated November 21, l989 approving the HLI’s SDP is nullified and
voided.

4.

URBANO F. ESTRELLA, Petitioner, v. PRISCILLA P.
FRANCISCO, Respondent. G.R. No. 209384, June 27, 2016

FACTS:
Lope Cristobal was the owner of a twenty-three thousand nine
hundred and thirty-three square meter (23,933 sqm.) parcel of agricultural
riceland in Cacarong Matanda, Pandi, Bulacan, covered by TCT No. T-248106
of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Estrella was the registered agricultural
tenant-lessee of the subject landholding.
 On September 22, 1997, Cristobal sold the subject landholding to
respondent Priscilla Francisco P500,000.00, without notifying Estrella. Upon
discovering the sale, Estrella, sent a demand letter to Cristobal and
Francisco for the return of the subject landholding, but neither of them
responded to his demands. After 4 years of the sale, he filed a case for legal
redemption. He alleged that the sale was made secretly and in bad faith and
insisted that he never waived his rights for the sale of the property. He also
manifested his willingness to deposit P 500,000.00 as a redemption price for
the said property.
On June 23, 2002, the PARAD rendered its decision recognizing
Estrella's right of redemption. The PARAD found that neither Cristobal nor
Francisco notified Estrella in writing of the sale. In the absence of such
notice, an agricultural lessee has a right to redeem the landholding from the
buyer pursuant to Section 12 of the Code.
On February 23, 2009, the DARAB reversed the PARAD's decision and
denied Estrella the right of redemption. Estrella moved for reconsideration
but the DARAB denied again the motion. On May 9, 2013, Estrella filed his
Motion for Reconsideration arguing that his right of redemption had not yet
prescribed because he was not given written notice of the sale to Francisco.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner is
meritorious.

RULING:
The petition lacks merit.
Originally, the lessee had a redemption period of two years from
registration of the sale:
Sec. 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption - In case the landholding is sold to a
third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall
have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration:
Provided, That the entire landholding sold must be redeemed: Provided,
further, that where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be
entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually
cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be
exercised within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have
priority over any other right of legal redemption.anroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Padasas v. Court of Appeals, we held that a lessee's actual
knowledge of the sale of the landholding is immaterial because the Code
specifically and definitively provides that the redemption period must be
counted from the registration of the sale. This ruling was subsequently
affirmed in Manuel v. Court of Appeals.hanrobleslaw
The exercise of the right of redemption must be made in accordance
with the law. Tender of the redemption price or its valid consignation must
be made within the prescribed redemption period. The reason for this rule is
simple:
“Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem
is one made seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to
entertain an offer of redemption without attendant evidence that the
redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the repurchase immediately.
A different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators or
crackpots as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period,
contrary to the policy of the law”. While consignation of the tendered price is
not always necessary because legal redemption is not made to discharge a
pre-existing debt, a valid tender is indispensable, for the reasons already
stated. Of course, consignation of the price would remove all controversy as
to the redemptioner's ability to pay at the proper time. Unfortunately, even
after the lapse of the 240 days, there was neither tender nor judicial
consignation of the redemption price. Even though Estrella repeatedly
manifested his willingness to consign the redemption price, he never actually
did.
5.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, REPRESENTED BY OIC-

SECRETARY NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND BASILAN AGRICULTURAL TRADING
CORPORATION (BATCO), Respondents.

G.R. No, 170018               September 23, 2013

FACTS:

BATCO was the owner of several parcels of agricultural land, with an

aggregate area of 206.5694 hectares, situated in Malo-ong Canal, Lamitan,
Province of Basilan and covered by TCT Nos. T-7454, T-7455, and T-7456.
The aforesaid lands were voluntarily offered for sale (VOS) to the
government pursuant to “Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,” for
a consideration of P12,360,000.00. In 1992, BATCO was notified that,
portion of the land is subject for the compulsory acquisition scheme by the
DAR.
On Jan. 6, 1993, BATCO reiterated its VOS, but this time to include the
improvements thereon and for a higher consideration. On May 6, 1997,
BATCO received a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition from the DAR
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), but rejected it. Despite of
BATCO’s rejection, DAR had identified beneficiaries of the said portion of
land.
On March 6, 1998, BATCO filed before the DAR Regional Office a
petition for the exemption of the subject portion from the coverage of the
government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) because
they alleged that said subject land was devoted to cattle and livestock
production since acquisition in 1987.

The DAR Regional Director’s Ruling

Based on the DAR's ocular inspection/investigation, the subject portion
was “not exclusively, directly and actually used for livestock, poultry, and
swine raising as of June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of RA 6657, and
contrary to the spirit and intent of [DAR AO 09-93]. Hence, the subject
portion is not exempt from CARP coverage. Moreover, under DAR AO 09,
Series of 1990, VOS of lands to the government, with the exception of lands
within the retention limits, may no longer be withdrawn.

The DAR Secretary’s Ruling

 DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. issued an order denying the
appeal on the ground that BATCO failed: 1) to present substantial evidence
to show that the subject portion was exclusively, directly and actually used
for livestock, poultry, and swine raising prior to June 15, 1988; and 2) to
comply with the livestock and infrastructure requirements under DAR AO 09-
93.Secretary Morales observed that: (a) none of the certificates of livestock
ownership appended to the records predates the effectivity of RA 6657; (b)
more than half of the cattle “was registered and presumably brought into the
property only on March 13, 1998 onwards, barely three months before
[BATCO] filed its application for exemption with the DAR Provincial Office on
May 6, 1998”,and (c) BATCO's act of submitting the subject lands under the
VOS scheme is an admission that they were subject to CARP
coverage. Finding that the act of changing or converting the lands to
livestock, poultry and swine raising after June 15, 1988 was without an
approved conversion.

The Proceedings Before the CA

The CA issued a Decision reversing and setting aside Secretary
Morales order. It ruled that estoppel does not lie against BATCO considering
that the pertinent law and regulations did not provide for a prescriptive
period for the filing of exemption from CARP coverage. Moreover, in the light
of Luz Farms, a petition for exemption is not even necessary so long as the
landholdings are devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising, thus,
rendering DAR AO 09-93 ineffective and inconsequential.

The CA likewise condemned the cancellation of BATCO's certificates of

title prior to full payment of the compensation and prior to the decision on
the petition for exemption as violative of BATCO's right to procedural and
substantive due process. The CA cancelled also TCT Nos. T-1012, T-1013
and T-1014 in the name of MCFARMCO and directed the Basilan RD to issue
a new set of titles in BATCO's favor. cralaw virtualary

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in

excluding/exempting the subject lands from CARP coverage despite BATCO's
admission that only a portion thereof was devoted to livestock raising and
considering its previous voluntary offer of the lands to the government
under the VOS scheme.

2. Whether or not BATCO is denied of due process.

RULING:

1.The petition is meritorious. It is settled that in order to be entitled to

exclusion/exemption, it must be shown that the land is exclusively devoted
to livestock, swine or poultry raising. The land must be shown to have been
used for such purposes as of the effectivity of RA 6657, or on June 15,
1988, in order to prevent any fraudulent declaration of areas supposedly
used for these purposes as well as to protect the rights of agrarian
beneficiaries therein. This is in consonance with Section 73(c) of RA 6657
which prohibits the conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into
any non-agricultural use with intent to avoid the application of RA 6657 to
his landholdings and to dispossess his tenant farmers of the land tilled by
them.

2.  The Court cannot give credence to BATCO's claim of denial of due

process when its certificates of title were cancelled and new ones were
issued in favor of the Republic prior to the issuance of the DAR Regional
Director's August 12, 1998 Order. While the final resolution of petitions for
exemption, as a rule, should precede the placing of the property under the
CARP and the issuance of the CLOA to the beneficiaries, it bears stressing
that the subject lands had already been placed under the CARP coverage in
1992, or long before the petition for exemption was filed by BATCO on May
6, 1998. In the meantime, the actions undertaken by BATCO such as the
VOS on January 6, 1993, the counter-offer of valuation for the subject lands
according to their declared land uses as contained in the afore-mentioned
landowner’s reply dated May 6, 1997, the letter-protest dated May 23, 1997,
and the identification of the beneficiaries grounded on its alleged failure to
choose the retention area, all affirmed the coverage of the subject lands
under the CARP. Considering further that the claim of denial of due process
was never raised in the proceedings before the DAR but belatedly brought
up only in its Memorandum dated July 28, 2005 filed before the CA and in
the absence of showing that the same prevented it from presenting its case
before the DAR officials, it cannot be said that BATCO was denied due
process. Neither was it deprived of its properties without just compensation
given that after it rejected the DAR's valuation on May 6, 1997, the DAR
immediately caused the deposit of the compensation in cash and in agrarian
reform bonds on June 11, 1997. All told, the denial of BATCO’s petition for
exemption was proper. In view of its contrary ruling, and the absence of any
substantial bases therefor, the Court finds that the CA gravely abused its
discretion in reversing the DAR Secretary's February 25, 1999 Order.

6.

REPUBLIC vs. SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRI-BUSINESS CORP. G.R. No.

178895 & G.R. No. 179071, January 10, 2011

FACTS:

Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate
area of 160.1161 hectares registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez
AgriBusiness Corporation.
On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro
C. Salga issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioner with regards (sic) to the
aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently placed under
Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law).
On December 10, 1992, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Office (PARO), Davao Oriental, an Application for Exemption of the
lots covered by TCT No. T12637 and T12639 from CARP coverage. It alleged
that pursuant to the case of Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary said parcels of land
are exempted from coverage as the said parcels of land with a total area of
110.5455 hectares are used for grazing and habitat of petitioners 105 heads
of cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads of goats and 18 heads of swine,
prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
On December 13, 1992 and March 1, 1993, the MARO conducted an
onsite investigation on the two parcels of land confirming the presence of
the livestock as enumerated. The Investigation Report dated March 9, 1993
stated:
On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T12635 covering Lots 1454A & 1296 was
cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines under RP T16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner through its
President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a letter affidavit addressed to the
respondent Secretary requesting for the exclusion from CARP coverage of
Lots 1454A and 1296 on the ground that they needed the additional area for
its livestock business. On March 28, 1995, petitioner filed before the DAR
Regional Director of Davao City an application for the exemption from CARP
coverage of Lots 1454A and 1296 stating that it has been operating grazing
lands even prior to June 15, 1988 and that the said two (2) lots form an
integral part of its grazing land.
The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an
Order dated March 5, 1997 denying the application for exemption of Lots
1454A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly shown that the same
were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its
application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional
grazing area. The application for exemption, however of the other two (2)
parcels of land was approved.
On its partial motion for reconsideration, petitioner argued that Lots
1454A & 1296 were taken beyond the operation of the CARP pursuant to its
reclassification to a Pollutive Industrial District (Heavy Industry) per
Resolution No. 39 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mati, Davao Oriental,
enacted on April 7, 1992. The DAR Regional Director denied the Motion.
The petitioner appealed the Regional Directors Orders to respondent
DAR. On June 10, 1998, the latter issued its assailed Order affirming the
Regional Directors ruling on Lots 1454A & 1296 and further declared Lots
1298 and 1293B as covered by the CARP.
On October 17, 2002, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by respondent prompting the former to file the instant petition.
The Court of Appeals partially granted the SNLABC Petition and
excluded the two (2) parcels of land (Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] Nos.
T12637 and T12639) located in Barrio Don Enrique Lopez (the Lopez lands)
from coverage of the CARL.
However, it upheld the Decisions of the Regional Director and the DAR
Secretary denying the application for exemption with respect to Lots 1454A
and 1296 (previously under TCT No. T12635) in Barrio Limot (the Limot
lands). These lots were already covered by a new title under the name of the
Republic of the Philippines (RP T16356). The DAR and SNLABC separately
sought a partial reconsideration of the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, but their motions for reconsideration were subsequently denied.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered
grazing lands for its livestock business and are thus exempted from the
coverage of the CARL under the Courts ruling in Luz Farms v. DAR.

HELD:

NO. The Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to

coconut trees and rubber and are thus not subject to exemption from CARP
coverage.
In the Report dated 06 April 1994, the team that conducted the
inspection found that the entire Limot lands were devoted to coconuts
(41.5706 hectares) and rubber (8.000 hectares) and recommended the
denial of the application for exemption. Verily, the Limot lands were actually,
directly and exclusively used for agricultural activities, a fact that necessarily
makes them subject to the CARP. These findings of the inspection team were
given credence by the DAR Regional Director who denied the application,
and were even subsequently affirmed by the DAR Secretary and the Court of
Appeals.
The MARO itself in the Investigation Report cited by no less than
SNLABC, found that the livestock were only moved to the Limot lands
sporadically and were not permanently designated there. The DAR Secretary
even described SNLABCs use of the area as a seasonal extension of the
applicants grazing lands during the summer. Therefore, the Limot lands
cannot be claimed to have been actually, directly and exclusively used for
SNLABCs livestock business, especially since these were only intermittently
and secondarily used as grazing areas. The said lands are more suitable and
are in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used for agricultural
purposes.
7.
LUZ FARM VS SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM GR NO. 86889
DECEMBER 4, 1990

Facts:

On 10 June 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines,

which includes, among others, the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in
its coverage. Petitioner Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock
and poultry business, avers that it would be adversely affected by the
enforcement of sections 3(b), 11, 13, 16 (d), 17 and 32 of the said law.
Hence, it prayed that the said law be declared unconstitutional. The
mentioned sections of the law provies, among others, the product-sharing
plan, including those engaged in livestock and poultry business.

Luz Farms further argued that livestock or poultry raising is not similar with
crop or tree farming. That the land is not the primary resource in this
undertaking and represents no more than 5% of the total investments of
commercial livestock and poultry raisers. That the land is incidental but not
the principal factor or consideration in their industry. Hence, it argued that it
should not be included in the coverage of RA 6657 which covers “agricultural
lands.
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they
are made to apply to it:
(a)     Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in
the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.
(b)     Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural
lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c)     Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing
plan.
(d)     Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian
Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be
paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law

(e)     Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in

Section 13
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of
such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year
as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and
above the compensation they currently receive

Issue: 
Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as
the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith
are constitutional.

Held:
NO. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of
1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was
never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock
and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated
agrarian reform program of the Government. The Committee adopted the
definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844,
as land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, salt
beds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM, August 7,
1986, Vol. III, p. 11).The intention of the Committee is to limit the
application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert
the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such
lands as commercial and industrial lands and residential properties because
all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural".
This proposal, however, was not considered because the Committee
contemplated that agricultural lands are limited to arable and suitable
agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and
residential lands.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which
includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry
and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the
extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered
by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to
include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform
8.
DANAN VS COURT OF APPEALS GR NO. 132759
OCTOBER 5, 2005

Facts:
Sometime in 1976, a certain Rustico Coronel leased the subject property for
a period of twelve (12) years or until the crop year 1987 to 1988.1 On
September 27, 1986, persons claiming to be farmers and residents
of Barangay Lourdes and Barangay San Rafael signed a joint resolution as
members of the Aniban ng mga Manggagawa sa Agrikultura ("AMA") to
enter and lease the subject property from the Arrastia heirs. Then Pampanga
Governor Brien Guiao favorably endorsed the resolution to then Minister of
Environment and Natural Resources Heherson Alvarez. On the basis of said
resolution but without the consent of the landowners, the AMA members,
who are herein petitioners, entered the disputed land, cleared portions
thereof and planted various crops thereon. This culminated in a violent
confrontation on May 21, 1988 that led to the filing of criminal charges
against AMA members.2
On June 2, 1988, the AMA filed a complaint with petitioner DARAB, docketed
as DARAB Case No. 0001, praying that respondent Arrastia be prevented
from destroying standing crops on the disputed property and from fencing
said property and that petitioners be allowed to continue with their farming
thereon. On August 15, 1988, the DARAB ordered the DAR Regional Director
to conduct an ocular inspection on the disputed property.3 The inspection
team submitted an Ocular/Investigation Report with the observation that
there were no substantially significant plantings on the disputed property.
The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer ("MARO") of Lubao, Pampanga also
submitted a report dated September 21, 1989, recommending the
disqualification of private petitioners from availing of the benefits under the
CARP.
Issue:
Whether or not private petitioners are qualified beneficiary under CARP

Held:
The appellate court ruled in the negative mainly on the basis of the report of
MARO Josefina Vidal which was quoted at length in its Decision. In the said
report, the MARO recommended the disqualification of private petitioners
from the coverage of the CARP in view of their continued violation of
Sections 22 and 23 of Executive Order No. 229, under which persons,
associations, or entities which prematurely enter lands covered by agrarian
reform shall be permanently disqualified from CARP coverage and cited for
contempt, respectively. 
The Court affirms factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court’s conclusion that private petitioners committed particular
violations warranting their disqualification from the CARP is based on the
MARO report which has not been disputed by all the private petitioners. The
MARO who prepared the report enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of her functions. Absent any showing that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion in giving evidentiary weight to said
report, said factual findings are generally deemed conclusive on this Court,
which is not a trier of facts.13
Anent DARAB’s contention that the MARO report was made unilaterally and
without giving private petitioners the opportunity to be heard, the
circumstances not nullify said report for lack of due process. The essence of
due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.14 Private petitioners cannot claim denial of due process simply because
they had ample opportunity to rebut the MARO’s findings and present
contrary evidence in the proceedings before the PARAD, the DARAB, or the
Court of Appeals.
Private petitioners insist that they are bona fide agricultural tenants of the
disputed property. It is unnecessary to pass upon this issue in the light of
the categorical finding of the appellate court that private petitioners are no
longer entitled to avail of the benefits under the CARP. In any event,
however, the claim is not well-founded.

9.

Heirs of Daez vs CA, G.R. No. 133507, February 17, 2000

FACTS:
Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685hectare riceland in
Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by
respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and
Manuel Umali under a system of sharetenancy. The said land was subjected
to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 27 as amended by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474. Thus, the
then Ministry of Agrarian Reform acquired the subject land and issued
Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) on December 9, 1980 to private
respondents as beneficiaries.
In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband,
Lope, declared ownership over 41.8064 hectares of agricultural lands located
in Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14) hectares of riceland, sixteen (16)
hectares of forestland, ten (10) hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares
of residential lands in Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in their
41.8064hectare landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685hectare
riceland in Meycauayan.
On July 27, 1987, DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an Order
denying Eudosia Daezs application for exemption upon finding that her
subject land is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner being owner of the
aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares.
On June 29, 1989, Eudosia Daez wrote a letter to DAR Secretary Benjamin
T. Leong requesting for reconsideration of Undersecretary Medinas order.
But on January 16, 1992, Secretary Leong affirmed the assailed order upon
finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants of the subject land.
Undaunted, Eudosia Daez brought her case on February 20, 1992 to the
Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals, however,
sustained the order of Secretary Leong.
Eudosia pursued her petition before this court but we denied it and also
denied her motion for reconsideration.
On August 6 and 12, 1992, the DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to
private respondents. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).
Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been
finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the
same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657.
In an order dated March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OICDirector Eugenio B.
Bernardo allowed Eudosia Daez to retain the subject riceland but he denied
the application of her eight (8) children to retain three (3) hectares each for
their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof
as required by law. Aggrieved, they appealed to the DAR.
On August 26, 1994, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, set aside the
order of Regional Director Bernardo in a Resolution.
Eudosia Daez filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied on January
19, 1995.
She appealed Secretary Garilaos decision to the Office of the President which
ruled in her favor. The dispositive portion of the Decision of then Executive
Secretary reads:
"WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are hereby SET ASIDE
and
judgment is rendered authorizing the retention by Eudosia Daez or her heirs
of the
4.1685 hectare landholding subject thereof.
SO ORDERED."
Aggrieved, private respondents sought from the Court of Appeals, a review
of the decision of the Office of the President. On January 28, 1999, the said
Decision of the Office of the President was reversed.
ISSUE(S):

1. W/N the finality of judgment in exemption (PD27) does preclude the

subsequent institution of application for retention (RA 6657).
2. W/N the heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over
the subject 4.1685 riceland.
3. W/N the land awards made pursuant to the governments agrarian reform
program are subject to the exercise by a landowner of his right of retention.

HELD:
1. NO

Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts.
P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage
under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to
rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of sharecrop or
leasetenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner
may apply for exemption. If either of these requisites is absent, the land is
not covered under OLT. Hence, a landowner need not apply for retention
where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.
Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is
not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is
untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops.
On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his
right of retention are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or
corn crops; (2) there must be a system of sharecrop or leasetenancy
obtaining therein; and (3) the size of the landholding must not exceed
twentyfour (24) hectares, or it could be more than twentyfour (24) hectares
provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and
more than seven (7) hectares of it consist of "other agricultural lands".
Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption
from coverage of OLT an those for the grant of an application for the
exercise of a landowners right of retention, are different.
Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an
application for retention are one and the same thing. Being distinct
remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent
institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the
application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject
4.1865hectare riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same
land was denied in a decision that became final and executory.
2. YES.

The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject

to qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of
compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the
tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant
to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.
In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, we held that landowners who have not yet
exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new
retention rights under R.A. No. 6657.
Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land
despite even the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) to
farmerbeneficiaries. What must be protected, however, is the right of the
tenants to opt to either stay on the land chosen to be retained by the
landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with similar or
comparable features.
3. YES.

The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the
landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under Administrative
Order No. 2, series of 1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land
covered is later found to be part of the landowners retained area.
A certificate of title accumulates in one document a comprehensive
statement of the status of the fee held by the owner of a parcel of land. As
such, it is a mere evidence of ownership and it does not constitute the title
to the land itself. It cannot confer title where no title has been acquired by
any of the means provided by law.
In the instant case, the CLTs of private respondents over the subject
4.1685hectare riceland were issued without Eudosia Daez having been
accorded her right of choice as to what to retain among her landholdings.
The transfer certificates of title thus issued on the basis of those CLTs cannot
operate to defeat the right of the heirs of deceased Eudosia Daez to retain
the said 4.1685 hectares of riceland.
10.

HEIRS OF TEODORO CADELIÑA v. FRANCISCO DIAZ

GR NO. 194417, November 23, 2016

FACTS:
Respondents filed complaints for reinstatement of possession as
farmer tenants against petitioners with the DARAB-Region 2, San Fermin,
Cauayan, Isabela docketed as DARAB Cases Nos. II-2063-ISA 2000 and II-
2064-ISA 2000. Respondents alleged that they were the farmers/tillers of
portions of Lot No. 7050, Cad. 211, Santiago Cadastre (properties).
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
respondents cannot be considered as tenants under land reform law because
they were instituted by Nicanor Ibuna, Sr. (Ibuna) whose rights were
declared by the court illegal and unlawful in CA-G.R. CV No. 42237 and that
the DARAB has no jurisdiction to entertain the case for lack of tenancy
relationship between the parties.
In its Decision dated October 24, 2000, the DARAB, Region 2, San
Fermin, Cauayan, Isabela ruled in favor of respondents. The DARAB declared
Ibuna as legal possessor of the properties who had the right to institute
respondents as tenants of the properties. The DARAB said, “while the title of
the late Nicanor Ibuna was subsequently declared null and void by the [CA in
CA-G.R. CV No. 42237], he is deemed considered as legal possessor of the
subject land" and "as legal possessor, the late Ibuna has the right to grant
to the herein plaintiffs the cultivation of the land pursuant to Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, otherwise known as the Agricultural
Land Reform Code." As a result, respondents are entitled to security of
tenure in working on the properties
On May 25, 2009, the CA dismissed the petition for not being sufficient
in form and in substance. Hence, this petition filed on November 26, 2010,
where petitioners argue that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition based on procedural grounds, and for ignoring the
merits of the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
petition for review based on procedural grounds
RULING:
Yes. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion.
The record shows that the facts of this case are undisputed and we are
only presented with questions of law which we are readily able to decide.
The issues only involve the determination of whether respondents are de
jure tenants entitled to security of tenure under our land reform laws, and
consequently, of the jurisdiction of the DARAB to order the restoration of
possession of petitioners' properties to respondents. After review, the Court
hold that since the merits of the petition far outweigh the rigid application of
the rules, there is a need to suspend the rules in this case to achieve
substantial justice.
We first address petitioners' claim that there is inconsistency between
respondents' position of claiming ownership in CA-G.R. CV No. 42237, and
their claim of tenancy relationship in this case. While we have previously
held that "tenancy relationship is inconsistent with the assertion of
ownership”, this is not applicable in the case of respondents. Records show
that respondents were previously issued title (albeit nullified in CA-G.R. CV
No. 42237) under Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 152, which gives a
share tenant actually tilling the land the preferential right to acquire the
portion actually tilled by him. Respondents' assertions of ownership over the
properties in CA-G.R. CV No. 42237 were only but a consequence of their
previous status as alleged tenants of Ibuna; their claims of tenancy status
and ownership were successive, and not simultaneous. Thus, particular to
the circumstances of their case, there was no conflict between their
assertion of ownership in CA-G.R. CV No. 42237 and of tenancy in this case.
In this case, Ibuna's institution of respondents as tenants did not give
rise to a tenure relationship because Ibuna is not the lawful landowner,
either in the concept of an owner or a legal possessor, of the properties. It is
undisputed that prior to the filing of the complaint with the DARAB, the
transfers of the properties to Ibuna and his predecessor, Andres Castillo,
were declared void in separate and previous proceedings. Since the transfers
were void, it vested no rights whatsoever in favor of Ibuna, either of
ownership and possession.
There being no agricultural tenancy relationship between petitioners
and respondents, the DARAB acted beyond its jurisdiction when it ordered
petitioners, among other things, to restore possession of the lands to
respondents.

11.
RODRIGUEZ v. SALVADOR
GR No. 171972, June 8, 2011

FACTS:
On May 22, 2003, respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint
for Unlawful Detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 330, against petitioners
Lucia (Lucia) and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter, respectively
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dalaguete, Cebu. Respondent
alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P27140 issued by virtue of Free Patent No.
(VII5) 2646 in the name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by
Teresita Salvador; that petitioners acquired possession of the subject land
by mere tolerance of her predecessors in interest; and that despite several
verbal and written demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the
subject land.
On July 10, 2003, the preliminary conference was terminated and the
parties were ordered to submit their respective position papers together with
the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence to support their
respective claims.
On September 10, 2003, the MTC promulgated a Decision finding the
existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties, and
thereby, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal with the Regiona Trial Court
(RTC). On January 12, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision remanding the
case to the MTC for preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy
relationship exists between the parties. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration arguing that the purpose of a preliminary hearing was
served by the parties submission of their respective position papers and
other supporting evidence.
 On June 23, 2004, the RTC granted the reconsideration and affirmed
the MTC Decision dated September 10, 2003. Respondent sought
reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC.
Thus, respondent filed a Petition for Review with the CA. the CA
rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It ruled that no tenancy
relationship exists between the parties because petitioners failed to prove
that respondent or her predecessors in interest consented to the tenancy
relationship. The CA likewise gave no probative value to the affidavits of
petitioners witnesses as it found their statements insufficient to establish
petitioners status as agricultural tenants. If at all, the affidavits merely
showed that petitioners occupied the subject land with the consent of the
original owners. And since petitioners are occupying the subject land by
mere tolerance, they are bound by an implied promise to vacate the same
upon demand by the respondent. Failing to do so, petitioners are liable to
pay damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not agricultural tenancy relationship exists between the
petitioners and the respondent

RULING:
No. Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are
present:

a. the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;
b. the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;
c. there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
d. the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production;
e. there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and
f. the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural
lessee

The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not

sufficient to prove the existence of an agricultural tenancy.
 As correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is lacking. Except
for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia, no other evidence was submitted to
show that respondents’ predecessors in interest consented to a tenancy
relationship with petitioners. Self-serving
statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner;
independent evidence is necessary.

Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest.

The affidavits of petitioners’ neighbors declaring that respondent and her
predecessors in interest received their share in the harvest are not
sufficient. Petitioners should have presented receipts or any other evidence
to show that there was sharing of harvest and that there was an agreed
system of sharing between them and the landowners.

As we have often said, mere occupation or cultivation of an

agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an agricultural tenant. It is
incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove
by substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy.
12.
Alita vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989

FACTS:
This is a petition seeking the reversal of the decision rendered by the
respondent Court of Appeals on March 3, 1987 affirming the judgment of the
court declaring that Presidential Decree No. 27 is inapplicable to lands
obtained thru the homestead law; declaring that the four registered co-
owners will cultivate and operate the farm holding themselves as owners
thereof; and ejecting from the land tenants Gabino Alita, Jesus Julian, Sr.,
Jesus Julian, Jr., Pedro Ricalde, Vicente Ricalde and Rolando Salamar, as the
owners would want to cultivate the farmholding themselves.

The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land,
acquired by private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through
homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. The
subject lands are situated at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur.
Private respondents wanted to personally cultivate these lands but
petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D.
316 issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform.

Private respondents instituted a complaint against Hon. Conrado

Estrella, who was then the Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as
Regional Director of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners for the
declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and
General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to homestead
lands.
 On July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the
defendants from declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land
Transfer and from being issued land transfer certificates to which the
defendants filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.

On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th

Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian City rendered its decision dismissing
the said complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.

On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of

dismissal however the RTC issued the decision prompting defendants to
move for reconsideration but the same was denied in its Order dated June 6,
1986. On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was
sustained in its judgment. Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are

covered by the Agrarian Reform under P.D. No. 27.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Lands obtained through
homestead patent are not covered by P.D. No. 27.

The contention of the petitioner that P.D. 27 decreeing the

emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to
them ownership of the land they till cannot be invoked to defeat the very
purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No.
141.

The Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the

homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the
Agrarian Reform statute. In addition, Republic Act No. 6657 likewise
contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands covered
by homestead patents like those of the property in question. Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6657 provides that “original homestead grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to
cultivate said homestead.”

13.
ALMERO V HEIRS OF PACQUING

FACTS:
Miguel Pacquing acquired agricultural lands (the property) with a total area
of 23.6272 hectares in Cuambogan, Tagum City.
On August 5, 1991, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) sent
Miguel’s representative a Notice of Coverage placing the Pacquing Estate
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Miguel failed to
reply to the notice and, instead filed a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) with the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on August 31, 1991. Miguel, however,
died during the pendency of the VOS proceedings.
In January 1992, respondent Linda Pacquing-Fadrilan, sole heir of the
spouses Pacquing, executed an affidavit adjudicating to herself ownership of
the property. In August of the sameyear, she filed an application for
retention with the DAR Regional Directorwho denied Linda’s application in an
order dated December 14, 1993. The order denying Linda’s application for
retention later became final and executory.
On June 25, 1994, certain individuals, including the present petitioners who
were earlier identified as farmer-beneficiaries of the subject land, were
issued CLOAs over their respective cultivated portions of the property.
On October 20, 1999, Linda, through her attorney-in-fact, Samuel Osias,
filed with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator in Tagum City a petition to
cancel the petitioners’ CLOAs. The Provincial Adjudicator later dismissed the
petition due to Linda’s failure to file her position paper. She appealed the
dismissal with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) covering portions of the property were
issued to Napoleon Villa Sr., et al. who had been contracted by Linda, under
an agricultural leasehold agreement, to cultivate the lands.
In a resolution dated June 29, 2001, the DARAB nullified the TCTs issued to
Napoleon Villa Sr. et. al. and reinstated Linda’s title to the property. At the
same time, the DARAB ordered the generation and issuance of titles to the
petitioners and other farmer-beneficiaries of the subject land. In a
subsequent resolution dated September 28, 2001, the DARAB validated the
TCTs issued to the following individuals: Danilo Almero, Celia Bulaso, Ludy
Ramada, Isidro Lazarte, Cepriano Lazarte, Thelma Emorque, Domingo
Juanico, Candido Labeste and Renato Benimate.
Linda again sought to recall and cancel the petitioners’ CLOAs by filing a
petition with the DAR, which the latter endorsed to the DAR Regional Office.
Linda argued that the DARAB erred in distributing portions of the land to the
petitioners because the entire property was supposed to be exempt from
CARP coverage. The petitioners opposed Linda’s petition.
In an order dated December 18,2008, the DAR Regional Director ruled that
the Pacquing Estate was subject to CARP and that the CLOAs issued to the
petitioners were valid. Linda filed an appeal to the DAR Secretary.
In an order dated August 18, 2009, former DAR Secretary Nasser C.
Pangandaman denied Linda’s appeal
Linda appealed the DAR Secretary’s August 18, 2009 order to the OP. In a
decision dated February 16,2011, the OP, through Executive Secretary
Paquito N. Ochoa Jr., reversed the DAR Secretary’s August 18, 2009 Order
and recalled and cancelled the petitioners’ CLOAs.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision, but the OP denied their
motion in a resolution5 dated July 19, 2011.
On November 14, 2011, the petitioners directly filed with this Court a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the subject OP’s
decision and resolution.
ISSUES:
WON the he rights of a homesteader prevail over the rights of the tenants
guaranteed by agrarian reform laws.

RULING:
the more paramount and superior policy consideration is to uphold the right
of the homesteader and his heirs to own and cultivate personally the land
acquired from the State without being encumbered by tenancy relations.
Presidential DecreeNo. 27 cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of
the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. It was
further pointedout that even the Philippine Constitution respects the
superiority of the homesteaders’ rights over the rights of the tenants
guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute."
in order for the homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs to
retain or keep their homestead, the following conditions must first be
satisfied: (a) they must still be the owners of the original homestead at the
time of the CARL's effectivity, and (b) they must continue to cultivate the
homestead land
Indisputably, homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs can own
and retain the original homestead, only for "as long as they continue to
cultivate" them. That parcels of land are covered by homestead patents will
not automatically exempt them from the operation of land reform. It is the
fact of continued cultivation by the original grantees or their direct
compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands from land reform coverage."
14.
Republic v CA

FACTS:
The five parcels of land in issue have a combined area of approximately
112.0577hectares situated in Bgy. Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala, Province
of Rizal. The Tax declaration classified the properties as agricultural. When
petitioner DAR subjected the lands to compulsory acquisition pursuant to the
CARL, private respondent applied for exemption therein. The same was
denied, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals created a commission to
conduct ocular inspection and survey the land. Later, based on the report
submitted by the commission, the Court of Appeals reversed the Order of
the DAR and exempted the lands from CARL.

ISSUE:
WON the land classification embodied in the tax declarations is conclusive
and final.

RULING:
We are unable to sustain petitioner’s contention. There is no law or
jurisprudence that holds that the land classification embodied in the
tax declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further
inquiry. Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis
of the classification of a land. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 6
lists other documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be
 submitted when applying for exemption from CARP.8 In Halili vs. Court
of Appeals9 , we sustained the trial court when it ruled that the
classification made by the Land Regulatory Board of the land in
question outweighed the classification stated in the tax declaration.
The classification of the Board in said case was more recent than that
of the tax declaration and was based on the present condition of the
property and the community thereat.10
In this case, the Court of Appeals was constrained to resort to an ocular
inspection of said properties through the commission it created
considering that the opinion of petitioner DAR conflicted with the land
use map submitted in evidence by private respondent. Respondent
court also noted that even from the beginning the properties of private
respondent had no definite delineation and classification.11 Hence, the
survey of the properties through the court appointed commissioners
was the judicious and equitable solution to finally resolve the issue of
land classification and delineation.
The OSG stresses that to be exempt from CARP under DOJ Opinion No. 44,
the land must have been classified as industrial/residential before June
15, 1988. 12 Based on this premise, the OSG points out that no such
classification was presented except the municipality’s alleged land use
map in 1980 showing that subject parcels of land fall within the
municipality’s forest conservation zone.13 The OSG further argues that
assuming that a change in the use of the subject properties in 1980
may justify their exemption from CARP under DOJ Opinion No. 44,
such land use of 1980 was, nevertheless, repealed/amended when the
HLURB approved the municipality’s Comprehensive Development Plan
for Barangay Punta for the years 1980 to 2000 in its Resolution No.
33, series of 1981.14 The plan for Barangay Punta, where the parcels
of land in issue are located, allegedly envision the development of the
barangay into a progressive agricultural community with the limited
allocation of only 51 hectares for residential use and none for
commercial and forest conservation zone use.15

The foregoing arguments are untenable. We are in full agreement with

respondent Court when it rationalized that the land use map is the
more appropriate document to consider.
As pointed out earlier, the crux of the controversy is whether the subject
parcels of land in issue are exempt from the coverage of the CARL.
The determination of the classification and physical condition of the
lands is therefore material in the disposition of this case, for which
purpose the Court of Appeals constituted the commission to inspect
and survey said properties. Petitioner DAR did not object to the
creation of a team of commissioners21 when it very well knew that the
survey and ocular inspection would eventually involve the
determination of the slope of the subject parcels of land. It is the
protestation of petitioner that comes at a belated hour. The team of
commissioners appointed by respondent court was composed persons
who were mutually acceptable to the parties.22 Thus, in the absence
of any irregularity in the survey and inspection of the subject
properties, and none is alleged, the report of the commissioners
deserves full faith and credit and we find no reversible error in the
reliance by the appellate court upon said report.
15.
Ong vs. Imperial, G.R. No. 197127, July 15, 2015

Facts:
Petitioners are the registered owners of a 40.5645 hectares parcel of land in
Barangay Dogongan, Daet, Camarines Norte.
In 1994, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Daet issued a
Notice of Coverageto petitioners.
Petitioners protested for the following reasons:
1) The entire area of had been used as grazing area for cattle and
carabao long beforethe passage of R.A. 6657, and is therefore,
excluded from the coverage of CARL;
2) After deducting the retention area of the individual landowners, the
excess area of each is only 8.5215 has.;
3) Considering that there are several bills pending in Congress to
increase the retention area of landowners, to cover lands below 20
hectares will result only in confusion and needless paperwork should
the retention area be increased in answer to the clamor of majority of
landowners.
Further, petitioners claimed that the property had already been reclassified
as a residential built-up area pursuant to the Town Plan and Zoning
Ordinance of Daet dated September 21, 1978 and Zoning Ordinance No. 04,
series of 1980.
MARO in reply stated that the petitioners had confirmed that the entire
40.5645 hectares was actually being used for coconut production, so
petitioners had failed to comply with the requirement that the property must
be actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock, poultry, and swine-
raising purposes. Also, subject property was covered by CARL because the
retention area for landowners is five hectares, and the excess area in this
case is 8.5214 hectares.
Also, respondents allege that the Certification issued by the HLURB as
compared with the one issued by the Deputized Zoning Administrator would
show "glaring inconsistencies which cast doubt as to the land use
classification of petitioners’ landholding."
Further, they claim that HLURB approval is required for reclassification of
land through local ordinance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject landholding of the petitioners is exempted from
the coverage of the government’s Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

HELD:
YES. The subject property having already been validly reclassified to
residential land by the municipality of Daet prior to June 15, 1988, when the
CARL took effect, is exempt from the coverage of CARP.
As to what is a "duly authorized government agency," the DAR Handbook for
CARP Implementors recognizes and discusses the LGU’s authority to
reclassify lands under Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44 series of 1990 has ruled that with
respect to the conversion of agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657 to
non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to approve such conversion may
be exercised from the date of its effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all
lands that are already classified as commercial, industrial or residential
before 15 June 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.
Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of
CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses
prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than
respondent DAR. In its Revised Rules and Regulations Governing Conversion
of Private Agricultural Lands to Non Agricultural Uses, DAR itself defined
"agricultural land".
"x x x Agricultural land refers to those devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in R.A. 6657 and not classified as mineral or forest by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and its
predecessor agencies, and not classified in town plans and zoning ordinances
as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and its
preceding competent authorities prior to 15 June 1988 for residential,
commercial or industrial use."

16.
BUKLOD NANG MAGBUBUKID SA LUPAING RAMOS, INC.,
PETITIONER,
vs
E. M. RAMOS AND SONS, INC., RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 131481, March 16 , 2011
x--------------------------------------------------------------------x

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, PETITIONER,

vs
E. M. RAMOS AND SONS, INC., RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 131624

FACTS:
 At the core of the controversy are several parcels of unirrigated land
(303.38545 hectares) which from part of a larger expanse with an area of
372 hectares situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite. Originally
owned by the MAnila Golf and Country Club, he property was aquired by the
[herein repondent EMRASON] in 1965 for the purpose of developing the
same into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes".
 Sometime in 1971, the Municipal Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite,
acting pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2264, otherwise known as the
"Loval Autonomy Act", enacteed Municipal Ordinance No. 1, hereinafter
referred to as Ordinance No. 1, enitled "An Ordinance Providing Subdivision
Regulation and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof."
 In May, 1972, [respondent] E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., applied for an
authority to convert and development its aforementioned 372-hectare
property into a residential subdivision, ataching to the apllication detailed
development plans and development proposals from Bancom Development
Corporation and San Miguel Corporation. Acting thereon the Municipal
Council of Dasmariñas, Cavite passed on July 9, 1972 Municipal Ordinance
No. 29-A (Ordinance "No. 29-A, for brevity), approving [EMRASON's]
application. Subsequently, [EMRASON] paid the fees, dues and licenses
needed to proceed with property development.
 It appears, however, that the actual implementation of the subdivision
project suffered delay owing to the confluence of events. Among these was
the fact that the property in question was then mortgaged to, and the titles
thereto were in the possession of, the Overseas Bank of Manila, which
during the period material was under liquidation.
 On June 15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL, took effect, ushering in a new
process of land classification, acquisition and distribution.
 On September 23, 1988, the Municipal Mayor of Dasmariñas, Cavite
(approved the application)addressed a letter to [EMRASON], stating in part,
as follows:

"In reply to your letter of June 2, 1988, we wish to clarify that the
Municipality of Dasmarinas, Cavite, has approved the development of your
property situated in Barrios Bukal and Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite, with a
total area of 372 hectares, more or less, into residential, industrial,
commercial and golf course project. This conversion conforms with the
approved Development Plan of the Municipality of Dasmarinas Cavite".

 On August 29, 1990, then OAR Secretary Benjamin Leong sent out the
first of four batches of notices of acquisition, each of which drew protest
from [EMRASON]. All told, these notices covered 303.38545 hectares of land
situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite owned by [EMRASON].
 In the meantime, [EMRASON] filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region IV, Pasig, Metro Manila,
separate petitions to nullify the first three sets of the above notices.
Collectively docketed as DARAB Case No. IV-Ca-0084-92, these petitions
were subsequently referred to the Office of the Regional Director, Region IV,
which had jurisdiction thereon. In his referral action, the Provincial Agrarian
Adjudicator directed the DAR Region IV, through its Operations Division, to
conduct a hearing and/or investigation lo determine whether or not the
subject property is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) and, if not, to cancel the notices of acquisition.
 Forthwith, the DAR regional office conducted an on-site inspection of
the subject property.
 In the course of the hearing, during which [EMRASON] offered Exhibits
:'A" to "UU-2" as documentary evidence, [EMRASON] received another set of
notices of acquisition. As lo be expected, [EMRASON] again protested.
 On August 28, 1992, the Legal Division of DAR, Region IV, through
Hearing Officer Victor Baguilat, rendered a decision declaring as null and
void all the notices of acquisitions, observing that the property covered
thereby is, pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, series
of 1990, exempt from CARP.
 The DOJ Opinion adverted to, rendered by then Justice Secretary
Franklin Drilon, clarified that lands already converted to non-agricultural
uses before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP.
 On September 3, 1992, the Region IV DAR Regional Director motu
propio elevated the case to the Office of the Agrarian Reform Secretary, it
being his view that Hearing Officer Baguilat's decision ran contrary to the
department's official position "to pursue the coverage of the same properties
and its eventual distribution to qualified beneficiaries particularly the
Langkaan farmers in fulfillment of the commitment of the government to
deliver to them the balance of thirty-nine hectares x x x".
 On January 6, 1993, the herein respondent DAR Secretary Ernesto
Garilao [(DAR Secretary Garilao)] issued an order affirming the Notices of
Acquisition and Directing the OAR field officials concerned to pursue (he
coverage under RA 6657 of the properties of E.M. Ramos & Sons, Inc. for
which subject Notices of Acquisition had been issued.
 Its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been
denied by the [DAR Secretary Garilao] in his subsequent order of January 6,
1993, [EMRASON] appealed to the Office of the President.
 On February 7, 1996, the Office of the President, through herein
respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona [(Deputy
Executive Secretary Corona)], rendered the herein assailed decision x x x,
dismissing [EMRASON's] appeal.
 Undaunted, [EMRASON] interposed a motion for reconsideration,
followed later by another motion whereunder it invited attention to legal
doctrines involving land conversion recently enunciated by no less than the
Office of the President itself.
 On May 14, 1996, the [Deputy Executive Secretary Corona] came out
with his second challenged issuance denying [EMRASON's] aforementioned
motion for reconsideration x x x.
 From the denial of its Motion for Reconsideration by the OP, EMRASON
filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals.
 On July 3, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), which enjoined then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao and
Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona from implementing the OP
Decision of February 7, 1996 and Resolution of May 14, 1996 until further
orders from the court. On September 17, 1996, the appellate court issued a
Resolution granting the prayer of EMRASON for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
 The DAR Secretary filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated September 17, 1996 of the Court of Appeals, with the prayer that the
writ of preliminary injunction already issued be lifted, recalled and/or
dissolved.
 At this juncture, the DAR had already prepared Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOAs) to distribute the subject property to farmer-
beneficiaries. However, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court
of Appeals enjoined the release of the CLOAs. Buklod, on behalf of the
alleged 300 farmer-beneficiaries of the subject property, filed a
Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, wherein it moved that it be allowed to
intervene as an indispensable party in CA-G.R. SP No. 40950; that the writ
of preliminary injunction be immediately dissolved, having been issued in
violation of Section 55 of the CARL; and that the Petition for Review of
EMRASON be dismissed since the appropriate remedy should have been a
petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
 The Court of Appeals allowed the intervention of Buklod because -the
latter's participation was "not being in any way prejudicial to the interest of
the original parties, nor will such intervention change the factual legal
complexion of the case." The appellate court, however, affirmed the
propriety of the remedy availed by EMRASON given that under Section 5 of
Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 dated May 16,
1995, appeals from judgments or final orders of the OP or the DAR under
the CARL shall be taken to the Court of Appeals, through a verified petition
for review; and that under Section 3 of the same Administrative Circular,
such a petition for review may raise questions of facts, law, or mixed
questions of facts and law.
 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of EMRASON because
the subject property was already converted/classified as residential by the
Municipality of Dasmarinas prior to the effectivity of the CARL.. The Court of
Appeals further observed that the subject property has never been devoted
to any agricultural activity and is, in fact, more suitable for non-agricultural
purposes.

ISSUE:
 W/N the subject property could be placed under the CARP.

HELD:
NO. Section 4, Chapter II of the CARL, as amended,24 particularly defines
the coverage of the CARP, to wit:

SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall

cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131
and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture: Provided, That landholdings of landowners with a
total area of five (5) hectares and below shall not be covered for acquisition
and distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the CARP:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or
suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to
agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until
Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public
domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as
determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;

(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for
agriculture; and

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless

of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.

A comprehensive inventory system in consonance with the national land use

plan shall be instituted by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), in
accordance with the Local Government Code, for the purpose of properly
identifying and classifying farmlands within one (1) year from effectivity of
this /Vet. without prejudice to the implementation of the land acquisition
and distribution." (Emphases supplied.)
Section 3(c), Chapter I of the CARL further narrows down the definition of
agricultural land that is subject to CARP to "land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest,
residential, commercial or industrial land."

The CARL took effect on June 15, 1988. To be exempt from the CARP, the
subject property should have already been reclassified as residential prior to
said date.

Zoning is governmental regulation of the uses of land and buildings

according to districts or zones. It is comprehensive where it is governed by a
single plan for the entire municipality and prevails throughout the
municipality in accordance with that plan. It is partial or limited where it is
applicable only to a certain part of the municipality or to certain uses. Fire
limits, height districts and building regulations are forms of partial or limited
zoning or use regulation that are antecedents of modern comprehensive
zoning, (pp. 11-12.)

The term "zoning," ordinarily used with the connotation of comprehensive or

general zoning, refers to governmental regulation of the uses of land and
buildings according to districts or zones. This regulation must and does
utilize classification of uses within districts as well as classification of
districts, inasmuch as it manifestly is impossible to deal specifically with
each of the innumerable uses made of land and buildings. Accordingly,
(zoning has been defined as the confining of certain classes of buildings and
uses to certain localities, areas, districts or zones.) It has been stated that
zoning is the regulation by districts of building development and uses of
property, and that the term "zoning" is not only capable of this definition but
has acquired a technical and artificial meaning in accordance therewith.
(Zoning is the separation of the municipality into districts and the regulation
of buildings and structures within the districts so created, in accordance with
their construction, and nature and extent of their use. It is a dedication of
districts delimited to particular uses designed to subserve the general
welfare.) Numerous other definitions of zoning more or less in accordance
with these have been given in the cases, (pp. 27-28.)

The concept that concerns this Court in the instant cases is the
reclassification of agricultural lands. In Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, the
Court had the occasion to define and distinguish reclassification from
conversion as follows:
Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural
land into some other use as approved by the Department of Agrarian
Reform. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject
to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion, x x x. (Italics
supplied.)

Reclassification also includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands to

agricultural use.

Under the present Local Government Code, it is clear that the authority to
reclassify agricultural lands primarily resides in the sanggunian of the city or
municipality.

Resolution No. 29-A is a valid ordinance, which, upon its approval on July 9,
1972, immediately effected the zoning and reclassifying of the subject
property for residential use. It need not comply with any of the requirements
or conditions which DAR and Buklod are insisting upon.

DAR and Buklod aver that Resolution No. 29-A was not reviewed and
approved by the NPC, in violation of the line in Section 3 of the Local
Autonomy Act of 1959, stating that "[c]ities and municipalities may,
however, consult the National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to
planning and zoning." Consideration must be given, however, to the use of
the word "may" in the said sentence. Where the provision reads "may," this
word shows that it is not mandatory but discretionary. It is an auxiliary verb
indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and possibility. The use of the
word "may" in a statute denotes that it is directory in nature and generally
permissive only. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory
construction is thus applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. Since consultation with the
NPC was merely discretionary, then there were only two mandatory
requirements for a valid zoning or subdivision ordinance or regulation under
Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Act of 1959, namely, that (1) the ordinance
or regulation be adopted by the city or municipal board or council; and (2) it
be approved by the city or municipal mayor, both of which were complied
with byl Resolution No. 29-A.
17.
Central Mindanao University vs DARAB
GR No. 100091

FACTS:
 CMU is an agricultural university. From its beginning, the school was
the answer to the crying need for training people in order to develop the
agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. Those who planned and
established the school had a vision as to the future development of that part
of the Philippines.
 Pres. Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from
sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site
which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU.
 In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for
registration of the aforementioned grant of agricultural land, several tribes
belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership
of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of the
claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school
was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.
  In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood
program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land
resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This
arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this program the
faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and
the CMU provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of
assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the
lowland rice project. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a land
use participant's fee. The contract prohibits participants and their hired
workers to establish houses or live in the project area and to use the
cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly
stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and
the faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a
multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to
utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology and at
the same time give the faculty and staff opportunities within the confines of
the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries.
 When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the CMU in
July 1986, he discontinued the Agri-Business Management and Training
Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU
personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this
project was discontinued.
 Another project was launched o develop unutilized land resources,
mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and
technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the
income of the faculty and the staff. This has the same nature as of the
Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program with an express provision that there would
be no tenant-landlord relationship.
 The contract expired. Some were renewed, some were not. The non-
renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane
project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service
and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and
precipitated the filing of the complaint.
 DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and
cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the
DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and
contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for
distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
 Complainants Obrique, et al. claimed that they are tenants of the CMU
and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a part or portion of the CMU.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the complainants are tenants of CMU, hence,
beneficiaries of CARP
  Whether or not CMU is subject to CARP
 Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No.
005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and coverage of land under the
CARP
HELD:
First Issue:
 We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are not
tenants. Under the terms of the written agreement signed by Obrique, et.
al., pursuant to the livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap
Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship
existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants in the
project). The CMU did not receive any share from the harvest/fruits of the
land tilled by the participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal service
fee and land use participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of
assistance given to the participants by the CMU. Again, the agreement
signed by the participants under the CMU-IEP clearly stipulated that no
landlord-tenant relationship existed, and that the participants are not share
croppers nor lessees, and the CMU did not share in the produce of the
participants' labor.
 Obrique is not a landless peasant. The facts showed he was Physics
Instructor at CMU holding a very responsible position was separated from
the service on account of certain irregularities he committed while Assistant
Director of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may,
at the moment, own no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so
destitute in their places of origin. No proof whatsoever appears in the record
to show that they are landless peasants.
 In view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor
proven to be landless peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the
CARP.
 The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine Packing
Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) was leased long before the CARP
was passed. The agreement with the Philippine Packing Corporation was not
a lease but a Management and Development Agreement, a joint undertaking
where use by the Philippine Packing Corporation of the land was part of the
CMU research program, with the direct participation of faculty and students.
Said projects were directly connected to the purpose and objectives of the
CMU as an educational institution.
Second Issue:
  It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the
DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August 20,
1990, is not covered by the CARP because:
 1.    It is not alienable and disposable land of the public
domain;
2.    The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific
limits as determined by Congress;
3.    It is private land registered and titled in the name of its
lawful owner, the CMU;
4.    It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A.
6657 because the lands are actually, directly and
exclusively used and found to be necessary for school site
 and campus, including experimental farm stations for
educational purposes, and for establishing seed and
seedling research and pilot production centers
Third Issue:
 DARAB has no jurisdiction. Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A.
6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to
matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is
restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within
the coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not include those
which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary
for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up
experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers, etc
 In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants are not
share tenants or lease holders of the CMU, yet it ordered the "segregation of
a suitable compact and contiguous area of Four Hundred hectares, more or
less", from the CMU land reservation, and directed the DAR Regional
Director to implement its order of segregation. Having found that the
complainants in this agrarian dispute for Declaration of Tenancy Status are
not entitled to claim as beneficiaries of the CARP because they are not share
tenants or leaseholders, its order for the segregation of 400 hectares of the
CMU land was without legal authority.
18.

Milestone Farms, Inc. vs Office of the President G.R. No. 182332 Feb.
23, 2011

FACTS:

Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. was incorporated with the SEC. On June 10,
1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect,
which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage.
However, on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting en banc, ruled in Luz
Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform that agricultural
lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its

316.0422-hectare property. Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9), setting forth rules and regulations to
govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and
swine raising from CARP coverage. Thus, on January 10, 1994, petitioner re-
documented its application pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9.

Acting on the said application, the DARs Land Use Conversion and
Exemption Committee (LUCEC) of Region IV conducted an ocular inspection
on petitioners property and arrived at the following findings:

The LUCEC, thus, recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422-

hectare property from the coverage of CARP. Adopting the LUCEC's findings
and recommendation, DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Director
Dalugdug) issued an Order dated June 27, 1994, exempting petitioners
316.0422-hectare property from CARP.

The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (Pinugay

Farmers), represented by Timiano Balajadia, Sr. (Balajadia), moved for the
reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by Director
Dalugdug in his Order dated November 24, 1994.Subsequently, the Pinugay
Farmers filed a letter-appeal with the DAR Secretary.
Correlatively, on June 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry
against Balajadia and company before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Teresa-Baras, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case No. 781-T.The MCTC
ruled in favor of petitioner, but the decision was later reversed by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, of Tanay, Rizal. Ultimately, the case
reached the CA, which, in its Decision dated October 8, 1999, reinstated the
MCTCs ruling, ordering Balajadia and all defendants therein to vacate
portions of the property covered by TCT Nos. M-6013, M-8796, and M-8791.
In its Resolution dated July 31, 2000, the CA held that the defendants
therein failed to timely file a motion for reconsideration, given the fact that
their counsel of record received its October 8, 1999 Decision; hence, the
same became final and executory.

In the meantime, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881,which was
approved on February 20, 1995. Private agricultural lands devoted to
livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded from the coverage of the
CARL.

On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an

Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422
hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646
hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.

On February 4, 2000, the Office of the President rendered a decision

reinstating Order declared the entire 316.0422-hectare property exempt
from the coverage of CARP.

Consequently, petitioner sought recourse from the CA. the CA found that,
based on the documentary evidence presented, the property subject of the
application for exclusion had more than satisfied the animal-land and
infrastructure-animal ratios under DAR A.O. No. 9. The CA also found that
petitioner applied for exclusion long before the effectivity of DAR A.O. No. 9,
thus, negating the claim that petitioner merely converted the property for
livestock, poultry, and swine raising in order to exclude it from CARP
coverage. Hence, the instant petition is hereby granted. Finally, petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.

ISSUE: Is the land exempted from CARL coverage?

HELD: In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it
contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by
including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a
maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of
the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter
alia,all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The
Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising
are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or
"agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different
from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A
great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial
fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage,
waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts
and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other
supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants
augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks,
pump houses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have
been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It
has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

While it is true that an issue which was neither alleged in the complaint nor
raised during the trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due
process,the same is not without exception,such as this case. The CA, under
Section 3,Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, can, in the interest of
justice, entertain and resolve factual issues. After all, technical and
procedural rules are intended to help secure, and not suppress, substantial
justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may thus be
allowed to attain the prime objective of dispensing justice, for dispensation
of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.Moreover, petitioner
cannot validly claim that it was deprived of due process because the CA
afforded it all the opportunity to be heard.The CA even directed petitioner to
file its comment on the Supplement, and to prove and establish its claim
that the subject property was excluded from the coverage of the CARP.
Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings before the CA by
submitting pleadings and pieces of documentary evidence, such as the
Investigating Teams Report and judicial affidavits. The CA also went further
by setting the case for hearing. In all these proceedings, all the parties
rights to due process were amply protected and recognized.
19.

Sta. Rosa vs. CA, GR 112526,

Oct. 12, 2001   121 SCRA 254

Facts:

Petitioner was the registered owner of two parcels of land, MARO issued a
notice of coverage to petitioner and invited its officials or representatives to
a conference. During the meeting It was the consensus and recommendation
of the assembly that the landholding of SRRDC be placed under compulsory
acquisition. Petitioner filed a “Protest and Objection” to the compulsory
acquisition of the property. Secretary of Agrarian Reform sent two notices of
acquisition to petitioner. Secretary of Agrarian Reform sent two 2 notices of
acquisition to petitioner, stating that petitioner’s landholdings covered by
TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800
hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93, respectively, had
been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. petitioner
SRRDC in two letters 2 separately addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad
and the Director, Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, sent its formal
protest, protesting not only the amount of compensation offered by DAR for
the property but also the two (2) notices of acquisition. Secretary Abad
referred the case to the DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just
compensation. Petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines
stating that its property under the aforesaid land titles were exempt from
CARP coverage because they had been classified as watershed area and
were the subject of a pending petition for land conversion. Office of the
Secretary, DAR, through the Undersecretary for Operations (Assistant
Secretary for Luzon Operations) and the Regional Director of Region IV,
submitted a report answering the two issues raised. According to them,
firstly, by virtue of the issuance of the notice of coverage on August 11,
1989, and notice of acquisition on December 12, 1989, the property is
covered under compulsory acquisition. Secondly, Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 1990, Section IV D also supports the DAR position on the coverage
of the said property. During the consideration of the case by the Board,
there was no pending petition for land conversion specifically concerning the
parcels of land in question. The Board sent a notice of hearing to all the
parties interested, setting the hearing for the administrative valuation of the
subject parcels of land. However, SRRDC submitted a petition to the Board
for the latter to resolve SRRDC’s petition for exemption from CARP coverage
before any administrative valuation of their landholding could be had by the
Board. The initial DARAB hearing of the case was held and subsequently,
different dates of hearing were set without objection from counsel of
SRRDC. Adrian Avilado Antazo

Issue:

Whether the respondents complied with the procedural requirement of the

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law?Adrian Avilado Antazo

Held:

No, we held that failed to comply with the requirements of the CARP Law. for
its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to
the government on receipt of the landowner of the corresponding payment
or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No
outright change of ownership is contemplated either. DAR has executed the
taking of the property in question. However, payment of just compensation
was not in accordance with the procedural requirement. The law required
payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done by DAR.
20.
DAR VS ROBLES (GR No. 190482)

Facts:
Eduardo Reyes married to Nenita Reyes owns several lands in Ambling,
Magdalena, Laguna with areas of about 195, 366 and 7, 431 square meters
respectively.
On April 17, 1997, Eduardo sold the said properties to respondents, as
follows:

1. Igmidio D. Robles - Lot 6-B-1 of TCT No. T-85055, 38,829 sq. m.;

2. Randy V. Robles - Lot 6-B-2 of TCT No. T-85055, 39,896 sq. m.;

3. Mary Krist B. Malimban - Lot No 6-B-3 of TCT No. T-85055, 38,904 sq.
m.;

4. Anne Jamaca G. Robles - Lot No. 6-B-4 of TCT No. T-85055, 38,595 sq.
m.;

5. John Carlo S. Robles - Lot No. 6-B-5 of TCT No. T-85055, 39,142 sq. m.;
and

6. Christine Anne V. Robles - Lot No. 3-1-2-C-2-G-3 of TCT No. T-116506,

7,431 sq. m.
On May 3, 2005, the deeds of absolute sale covering the properties were
duly registered with the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Laguna in the
names of respondents under the following TCT Nos.:

1. Igmidio D. Robles - TCT No. T-238504;

2. Randy V. Robles - TCT No. T-238305;

3. Mary Krist B. Malimban - TCT No. T-238506:

4. Anne Jamaca G Robles - TCT No. T-238507;

5. John Carlo S. Robles - TCT No. T-238503; and

6. Christine Anne V. Robles - TCT No. 238502.

DAR contends that Reyes sold these properties without first obtaining
clearance from the CARL.
On October 10 and 23, 2006, Julieta R. Gonzales and Nenita Reyes, the
surviving spouse and the daughter of Eduardo, respectively, filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the nature
of the action and the subject matter of the case, and that the DAR has no
cause of action against them.
In this case before us, the DAR's petition before the PARAD sought to annul
the deeds of absolute sale as well as the subsequently issued torrens titles.
Surprisingly, however, the said petition was not brought for or on behalf of
any purported tenants, farmworkers or some other beneficiaries under RA
6657. While the said petition claimed, without any supporting
documents/evidence however, that DAR was in the process of generating
CLOAs for the said landholding, it did subsequently admit that the same
petition does not seek to place the subject land "immediately under CARP"
but rather to annul the conveyance of the original owner in favor of the
petitioners since this was allegedly in violation of RA 6657. Without any
averment of some tenurial arrangement/relationship between the original
owner and some definite leaseholder, tenant or CARL beneficiary plus the
admission that the land has not yet been placed under CARP, neither DARAB
nor its adjudicators would have jurisdiction over a simple case of annulment
of sale and cancellation of title. Considering that the subject landholding
were sold to petitioners way before any notice of coverage was ever issued
and torrens titles have subsequently been issued in their favor, it is the
regular courts who should determine if indeed there were certain violations
of the law which would justify annulment of the sales and cancellation of the
titles.

DAR petitioned for review of certiorari

Issue/s:
WHETHER OR NOT THE DAR ADJUDICATION BOARD HAS JURISDICTION
OVER ANNULMENT OF DEEDS OF ABSOLUTE SALE AND THE SUBSEQUENT
CANCELLATION OF TITLES INVOLVING LANDS UNDER THE
ADMINISTRATION AND DISPOSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM
Held:
The petition is meritorious.

In resolving the sole issue of whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over
the DAR's petition for annulment of deeds of sale and cancellation of titles,
the Court is guided by the following rules on jurisdiction laid down in Heirs of
Julian dela Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz:[14]

It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial

officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a
petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and
the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner
or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. . Jurisdiction over the
nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and
the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court
otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of
the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission
of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a
tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to
challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from
addressing the issue, especially where the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction is
apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.

, it can be gathered from the allegations in the petition that the subject
properties Eduardo conveyed and transferred to respondents are agricultural
lands in excess of the 5-hectare (50,000 sq. m.) retention limit of the CARL,
It is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB in this case is anchored on
Section 1, paragraph (e), Rule II of the [1994] DARAB New Rules of
Procedure covering agrarian disputes involving the sale, alienation,
mortgage, foreclosure, preemption and redemption of agricultural lands
under the coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws. There is nothing in
the provision from which it can be inferred that the jurisdiction of the DARAB
is limited only to agricultural lands under the administration and disposition
of DAR and LBP.
The said Adjudicator is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in the resolution
of the Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale and Cancellation of TCT Nos.
T-238504, T-238505, T-238506, T-238507, T-238503, and T-238502,
docketed as DARAB Case No. R-0403-0032-0037-06.

22.
VICTORIA P. CABRAL, v. HEIRS OF FLORENCIO ADOLFO AND HEIRS
OF ELIAS POLICARPIO, G.R. No. 191615, August 02, 2017

Facts:
Petitioner claims that she is the registered owner of several parcels of land
situated, at Barangay Purok, Meycauayan, Bulacan, originally covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1670, subsequently renumbered as
OCT No. 0-220 (M). The property subject of the instant case are portions of
Lot 4 of Plan Psu-164390 covered by the said OCT No. 0-1670.
On October 21, 1972, the Ministry of Agrarian Reform subjected the said
land under the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) program of
the government under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.
In July 1973, petitioner sought to convert her landholdings, which include
not only the subject property but also her lands in Marilao and Meycauayan,
to non-agricultural purposes. In his 2nd Endorsement Letter to the DAR
Secretary dated October 1, 1973, DAR District Officer Fernando Ortega,
stated that per the reports of the Agrarian Reform Team, the subject
property was not included in the OLT program under P.D. No. 27, nor has
any portion thereof been transferred to a tenant. Thus, District Officer
Ortega recommended the conversion of the same into residential,
commercial, industrial, or other purposes.
On April 25, 1988, Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to Gregoria
Adolfo, Gregorio Lazaro, Florencio Adolfo, and Elias Policarpio pursuant to
the OLT program covering the subject property. Corresponding Transfer
Certificates of Titles (TCTs) were then issued to herein respondents Florencio
Adolfo on October 24, 1989 and Elias Policarpio on November 8, 1989 upon
registration of their respective EPs with the Register of Deeds.
On January 16, 1990, petitioner filed a petition before the Barangay Agrarian
Reform Council (BARC) for the cancellation of the EPs issued in favor of
Florencio Adolfo, Gregorio Lazaro, Gregoria Adolfo, and Elias Policarpio. On
January 19, 1990, petitioner filed another petition for cancellation of the said
EPs and TCTs before the DAR. The said petition was, however, forwarded to
the DAR Regional Director, who dismissed the case. In a case decided by
this Court in 2001 entitled Victoria P. Cabral v. CA, however, this Court held
that the Regional Director had no jurisdiction over the case as it is the
PARAD who has jurisdiction over cases involving cancellation of EPs.
In 1994, petitioner filed an OLT Letter Protest before the DAR Regional
Director, questioning the coverage of her landholdings under P.D. No. 27, on
the ground that the same had already been classified as either residential,
commercial, or industrial. The DAR Regional Director denied the said OLT
protest, finding that despite the reclassification of the subject parcels of
land, the same will not be a bar in placing the said lands under the OLT
program, considering that petitioner's landholdings exceeded 24 hectares.
On appeal, the then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, affirmed the DAR
Regional Director's Order, declaring that the subject landholdings are
covered by the OLT program under P.D. No. 27 as it was only after the
landholdings were placed under the OLT program on October 21, 1972 when
it was classified as within the residential zone.
On August 16, 2003, petitioner filed a Petition for Cancellation of
Emancipation Patents and Torrens Title before the Office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). Petitioner contended that the
issuance of the said EPs and TCTs were violative of applicable agrarian laws
considering that the subject property was already classified as residential,
hence, not covered by P.D. No. 27. Petitioner also averred that the said EPs
were issued without due process and without payment of just compensation.
The Provincial Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a Decision in favor of
the petitioner. Respondents appealed the said decision to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), and the DARAB affirmed
PARAD's Decision.
Undaunted, respondents elevated the case to the CA for review. The CA
reversed and set aside the DARAB Decision. The CA found that the subject
land was never converted into a residential land and, therefore, not exempt
from the coverage of the government's OLT program under P.D. No. 27.
Issue(s):
WON the CA erred in reversing the PARAD and DARAB's order of cancellation
of EPs/TCTs.
Ruling:
Yes, the CA erred in reversing the PARAD and DARAB's order of cancellation
of EPs/TCTs.
The resolution of the instant controversy is primarily anchored upon the
determination of whether the subject lands are covered by the OLT program
under P.D. No. 27. Lot 4 had already been reclassified to non-agricultural
uses and was, therefore, already outside the coverage of the OLT program
under P.D. No. 27.
The Court has often stressed, factual findings of administrative bodies
charged with their specific field of expertise, such as the PARAD and the
DARAB, are afforded great weight, nay, finality by the courts, and in the
absence of substantial showing that such findings were made from an
erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in
the interest of stability of the governmental structure, should not be
disturbed. Contrary to the CA's conclusion, the Court find no cogent reason
to disturb the said quasi-judicial agency's findings.
It bears stressing that P.D. No. 27, which implemented the OLT program,
covers only tenanted rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under
the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or
com crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease tenancy
obtaining therein.
Neither of these requisites is present in this case.
The subject property is not covered by the OLT because of its residential
nature.
As found by both the PARAD and the DARAB, the DAR, through District
Officer Ortega, already declared that the subject property is suited for
residential, commercial, industrial, or other urban purposes considering its
potential for national development.
As to whether a tenancy relationship exists, petitioner insists that
respondents are not her tenants. On the other hand, the respondents,
anchoring their rights upon P.D. No. 27, necessarily claim that there is a
system of share-crop between them and the petitioner.
This Court has, time and again, held that occupancy and cultivation of an
agricultural land will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant. Independent
and concrete evidence is necessary to prove personal cultivation, sharing of
harvest, or consent of the landowner. Tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed; the elements for its existence are explicit in law and cannot be
done away by conjectures. Thus, as petitioner denies such tenancy
relationship and it is respondents who assert the same, the latter has the
burden to prove their affirmative allegation of tenancy. Again, the
respondents failed to discharge such burden as there is nothing on record
that will provide this Court factual basis to determine that indeed a crop-
sharing agreement exists between the parties.
(c) Farmer-beneficiaries cannot be deemed full owners when there is no
compliance with the procedure for the issuance of an EP under P.D. No. 27
and related rules.
Thus, neither do the Court subscribe to Sec. Garilao's reasoning and
respondents' argument that since the reclassication of the property was
made after the effectivity of P.D. No. 27, tenant-farmers enjoy a vested
right and should be deemed as "full owners" of the property.
Indeed, under P.D. No. 27, tenant-farmers of rice and corn lands were
deemed owners of the land they till as of October 21, 1972 or the effectivity
of the said law. This policy was intended to emancipate the tenant-farmers
from the bondage of the soil. However, the provision declaring tenant-
farmers as owners as of October 21, 1972 should not be construed as
automatically vesting upon them absolute ownership over the land they are
tilling. Certain requirements must also be complied with before full
ownership is vested upon the tenant-farmers. The steps to be undertaken
before an EP can be issued to effectively transfer the land to the tenant-
farmers, to wit: first, the identification of tenants, and the land covered by
OLT; second, land survey and sketching of the actual cultivation of the
tenant to determine parcel size, boundaries, and possible land use; third,
the issuance of the CLT. To ensure accuracy and safeguard against
falsification, these certificates are processed at the National Computer
Center (NCC) at Camp Aguinaldo; fourth, valuation of the land covered for
amortization computation; fifth, amortization payments of tenant-tillers
over a fifteen (15) year period; and sixth, the issuance of the EP.
Foremost, there was no CLT issued prior to the issuance of the subject EPs.
In recognition of the said inchoate right, a CLT is issued to a tenantfarmer to
serve as a provisional title of ownership over the landholding while the lot
owner is awaiting full payment of just compensation or for as long as the
tenant-farmer is an amortizing owner. The CLT proves inchoate ownership of
an agricultural land primarily devoted to rice or com production.
To bolster the finding that the subject landholding was not covered by the
OLT program, the Court echo the PARAD and DARAB pronouncement that
the fact that no CLTs were previously issued to the respondents signifies the
non-inclusion of the subject lands under the coverage of the OLT. Indeed,
there is nothing in the records that will show that CLTs were issued in favor
of the respondents before the issuance of the subject EPs considering that,
to reiterate, the issuance of a CLT is a proof that the property was previously
covered by the OLT program and proof of the government's recognition of
the farmer-beneficiary's inchoate right over the same.
Likewise, there is no showing that petitioner was notified of the placement of
her landholdings under the OLT program and, more importantly, there was
no proof that petitioner was paid just compensation therefor.
Land acquisition partakes of the nature of expropriation. In fact,
jurisprudence states that it is an extraordinary method of expropriating
private property. As such, the law on the matter must be strictly construed.
Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate to
procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be
observed. In expropriation proceedings, as in judicial proceedings, notice is
part of the constitutional right to due process of law. It informs the
landowner of the State's intention to acquire private land upon payment of
just compensation and gives him the opportunity to present evidence that
his landholding is not covered or is otherwise excused from the agrarian law.
The respondents and the DAR failed to adduce evidence to prove actual
notice to the petitioner and payment of just compensation for the taking of
the latter's property.
In this issue of compliance with the procedure, it must be remembered that
the burden of proof lies with the party who asserts a right and the quantum
of evidence required by law in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of credible evidence".
Moreover, parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon
the weakness of that of their opponent's.
The issue on the validity of EPs is not barred by prescription.
Respondents argue that the EPs and subsequent TCTs issued to them,
registered with the Register of Deeds, have already become indefeasible
upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance thereof and
can no longer be cancelled. Respondents point out that their EPs were issued
in 1988 and the instant case was filed only in 2003 or 15 years after such
issuance.
This Court has already ruled that the mere issuance of EPs and TCTs does
not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and
scrutiny. EPs issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries may be corrected and
cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules, and regulations.
Thus, the decision and resolution of the Court Of Appeals are reversed and
set aside. Decision and resolution of DARAB are reinstated.
23.
Heirs of Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines

FACTS:

Spouses Gregorio Nanaman and Hilaria Tabuclin – owners of a parcel of

agricultural land in Tambo, Iligan City; they were childless and only had
Virgilio Nanaman (son of Gregorio by another woman). Gregorio died in
1945, Hilaria and Virgilio administered the Iligan property and subsequently
sold this to Dr. Jose Deleste. Hilaria died in 1954, Gregorio’s brother – Noel
was appointed as regular administrator of the estate, he then filed an action
for reversion of the title of the property, this case went up to the SC where it
was ruled that the property was the conjugal property of Nanaman spouses
and so Hilaria can only sell ½ of the land
Deleste and the intestate estate of Gregorio were then held to be co-owners
of the property. PD 21 was issued in 1972 - DECREEING THE
EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL,
TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND
PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISM THEREFOR – property was
placed under the Operation Land Transfer program, however only the heirs
of Gregorio were identified by Department of Agrarian Reform as
landowners. In 1975, the City of Iligan passed an ordinance -- “Zoning
Regulation of Iligan City” which reclassified the land into
commercial/residential
In 1984, the DAR issued Certificates of Land Transfer in favor of private
respondents who were the tenants and actual cultivators of the land. In
2001, Emancipation Patents and Original Certificates of Title were issued to
the private respondents
City of Iligan expropriated a part of the property – as the issue of ownership
was pending, the just compensation was deposited with the Development
Bank of the Philippines held in trust for the RTC of Iligan City. Petitioners
Heirs of Deleste filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) a petition seeking to nullify the EP’s issued to the private
respondents. Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) declared the
EP’s null and void, in view of the pending issues of ownership, the
subsequent reclassification of the property into a residential/commercial land
and the violation of petitioner’s constitutional right to due process of law.
Private respondents filed a Notice of Appeal, while the petitioners filed a
Motion for Writ of Execution. DARAB reversed the ruling of PARAD and held
the EP’s were valid and that the petitioners Heirs of Deleste should have
been the one informed by DAR at the time the property was placed under
the OLT program. Petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA which
was denied for failure to attach the writ of execution, a subsequent motion
for reconsideration was filed and denied. Petitioners filed with the SC a
petition for review which was denied as no reversible error was shown, they
then filed an MR which the SC granted and gave due course – hence this
proceeding.

ISSUE(S):

1) Were the petitioner’s constitutional right to due process violated by DAR

(for failure to send notice)?

2) Is the property covered by the agrarian reform program?

3) Is the property covered by PD 27?

HELD:
1) YES. DAR violated the petitioner’s right to due process when it failed to
notify them that the property will be covered by the agrarian reform
program
The importance of actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian
reform program cannot be underrated, as noncompliance with it “trods
roughshod” with the essential requirements of due process
The Court underscored the significance of notice in implementing the
agrarian reform program when it stated that “notice is part of the
constitutional right to due process of the law. It informs the landowner of
the State’s intention to acquire private land upon payment of just
compensation and gives him the opportunity to present evidence that his
landholding is not covered or is otherwise excused from agrarian law”
DAR should have sent notices to the petitioners Heirs of Deleste as the tax
declarations were already in the name of Dr. Jose Deleste
Petitioner’s right to due process of the law was indeed violated when DAR
failed to notify them that it is subjecting the property under the coverage of
the agrarian reform program (OTL)

2) NO. It is outside the coverage of the agrarian reform program in view of

the enactment of the local zoning ordinance.
In light of the enactment of the local zoning ordinance reclassifying the
property from agricultural into commercial/residential, the property became
exempt from the coverage of the agrarian reform program
The local government has the power to reclassify agricultural into non-
agricultural land

3) NO. Even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are deemed owners as of

October 21, 1972, this is not to be construed as automatically vesting upon
these tenant-farmers absolute ownership over the land. They need to
comply with certain requirements first.

It should be clarified that even if under PD 27, tenant-farmers are deemed

owners as of October 21, 1972, this is not to be construed as automatically
vesting upon these tenant-farmers absolute ownership over the land they
were tilling. Certain requirements must also be complied with, such as
payment of just compensation, before full ownership is vested upon the
tenant-farmers

Prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements, tenant-farmers have,

at most, an inchoate right over the land they were tilling

* In the case at bar, the CLTs were issued in 1984 therefore, for all intents
and purposes, it was only in 1984 that private respondents, as farmer-
beneficiaries, were recognized to have an inchoate right over the subject
property prior to compliance with the prescribed requirements. Considering
that the local zoning ordinance was enacted in 1975, and subsequently
approved by the HSRC in 1978, private respondents still had no vested
rights to speak of during this period, as it was only in 1984 that private
respondents were issued the CLTs and were deemed owners.
24.

Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, et al. vs. Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, et al.

G.R. No. 170346
March 12, 2007

FACTS:

On September 28, 1997, an Emancipation Patent (EP) was issued to Nicolas

Jugalbot based on the latter's claim that he was the tenant of the subject
property located at Brgy. Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, registered in the
name of Virginia A. Roa under TCT No. T-11543. The property was originally
registered in the name of Marcelino Cabili from whom Virginia A. Roa
purchased the same sometime in 1966.

On August 10, 1998, the heirs of Virginia A. Roa, herein private

respondents, filed before the DARAB Provincial Office of Misamis Oriental a
Complaint for cancellation of title (TCT No. E103), Recovery of Possession
and Damages against Nicolas Jugalbot.

On October 23, 1998, a Decision was rendered dismissing private

respondents' complaint and upholding the validity of the Emancipation
Patent. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

On appeal, the DARAB Central Office affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator's

decision on the sole ground that private respondents' right to contest the
validity of Nicolas Jugalbot's title was barred by prescription.
On November 10, 2003, the DARAB denied private respondents' motion for
reconsideration, hence they filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals which was granted. The appellate court reversed the Decision and
Resolution of the DARAB Central Office on the following grounds: (1) the
absence of a tenancy relationship; (2) lack of notice to Virginia Roa by the
DAR; (3) the area of the property which was less than one hectare and
deemed swampy, rainfed and kangkong-producing: and (4) the classification
of the subject property as residential, which is outside the coverage of P.D.
No. 27.

Petitioners allege that they are bona fide tenants of private respondents

under Presidential Decree No. 27. Private respondents deny this, citing inter
alia, that Virginia A. Roa was not given a notice of coverage of the property
subject matter of this case; that Virginia A. Roa and the private respondents
did not have any tenant on the same property; that the property allegedly
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 was residential land; that the lot was
paraphernal property of Virginia A. Roa; and the landholding was less than
seven (7) hectares.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between petitioners Heirs of

Nicolas Jugalbot, and private respondents, Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, under
Presidential Decree No. 27? Or are the petitioners de jure tenants of private
respondents?

RULING:

The petitioners are not de jure tenants of Virginia A. Roa, to which

Presidential Decree No. 27 is found to be inapplicable; hence, the DARAB
has no jurisdiction over this case. The DARAB not only committed a serious
error in judgment, which the Court of Appeals properly corrected, but the
former likewise committed a palpable error in jurisdiction which is contrary
to law and jurisprudence. For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
appellate court decision and likewise hold that the DARAB gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the subject
matter of the present action is residential, and not agricultural, land, and
that all the essential requisites of a tenancy relationship were sorely lacking
in the case at bar.

Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern the extraordinary method of
expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful
compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the
procedure for acquisition of expropriated lands should therefore be
observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to Virginia A. Roa
by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and
investigation. Hence, any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies
that results from its failure to comply with the proper procedure for
expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and should
be deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.

There is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that the

petitioners personally cultivated the property under question or that there
was sharing of harvests except for their self-serving statements. The fact of
sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. As declared
in Castillo v. Court of Appeals, absent the element of personal cultivation,
one cannot be a tenant even if he is so designated in the written agreement
of the parties.

The taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due

process. The CA was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied
due process because the DAR failed to send notice of the impending land
reform coverage to the proper party.

Likewise, the property under dispute is residential property and not

agricultural property. Zoning Certification No. 98-094 issued on September
3, 1998 clearly shows that the subject property is located within the
Residential 2 District in accordance with paragraph (b), Section 9, Article IV
of Zoning Ordinance No. 880, Series of 1979 issued by the City Planning and
Development Office of Cagayan de Oro City.

The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

No. 81823 promulgated on October 19, 2005 is AFFIRMED.
25.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 

vs.
JOSEFINA R. DUMLAO, A. FLORENTINO R. DUMLAO, JR., STELLA
DUMLAO-ATIENZA, and NESTOR R. DUMLAO, represented by
Attorney-In-Fact, A. Florentino R. Dumlao, Jr., respondents.
G.R. No. 167809, November 27, 2008

FACTS:
The heirs of the deceased Florentino G. Dumlao, were the co-owners
of parcels of agricultural land with an aggregate area of 32.2379 hectares in
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya which were placed under Operation Land Transfer
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
A preliminary valuation was made by the DAR on two (2) landholdings
with a total area of 16.3939 hectares and subsequently, payments were
then deposited in the name of the landowners.
As the respondents claimed they were not paid just compensation,
they filed a Complaint before RTC in Nueva Vizcaya to determine the just
compensation of the subject properties. They likewise prayed for the
appointment of three (3) competent and disinterested commissioners to
make the determination.
DAR moved to dismiss the complaint due to lack of cause of action and
lack of RTC’s jurisdiction. The case was recognized by the RTC and ordered
for the payment of P6,912.50/ha for one lot and concurs with the value
determined by the Land Valuation Summary and Farmers Undertaking for
the other which is contrary to the claims of respondents that they be paid
P109,000.00/ha.
The heirs of Dumlao, appealed to the CA which ruled in their favor as it
cited that the definite time of the taking of the property was not certain.
Further, CA asserted that the formula on valuation under PD No. 27 no
longer applies due to the passage of RA 6657: Land Value or Price per
Hectare=2.5xAGPxGSP. Thus, the CA assigned the lower value of
P109,000.00/ha as just compensation of the subject property.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the formula under PD 27 and EO No. 228 is
applicable in determining just compensation.
2. Whether or not October 21, 1972, issuance of PD 27, be deemed as
the actual date of taking of the properties.

HELD:
1. No, the law applicable should be RA No. 6657. The Court repeatedly
held that if just compensation was not determined and settled prior to the
passage of RA No. 6657, it should be computed in accordance with the said
law, although property was acquired under PD No. 27. Further, PD No. 27
and EO No.228 will only have suppletory effect.
Section 17 of RA No. 6657 provides for: (A) one basic formula for the
valuation of lands covered by [Voluntary Offer to Sell] or [Compulsory
Acquisition] regardless of the date of offer or coverage of the claim:
LV= (Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) + (Comparable Sales x 0.3) + (Market
Value per Tax Declaration)
(A.1) When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
(A.2) When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable,
the formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
 (A.3) When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable,
the formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2

2. No, the taking of the properties for the purpose of computing the
just compensation should be reckoned from the date of issuance of
emancipation patents contrary to the petitioner’s contentions that it should
be on October 21, 1972. Likewise, the nature of the land at that time
determines the just compensation to be paid.
Emancipation patents were indeed issued to the beneficiaries however;
the date of issuances are not indicated. Thus, the trial courts should
determine the date of issuance of said patents to ascertain the date of the
taking and proceed to the computation pursuant to RA No. 6657.
26.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
Spouses Antonio and Carmen Avencena, respondents.
G.R. No. 190520, May 30, 2016

FACTS:
Respondents-spouses Antonio and Carmen Avanceña were the
registered owners a 205.0074 ha of agricultural land in Sanghan,
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte covered by TCT No. RT-2937. In 1988,
respondents voluntarily offered to sell subject land under CARP, which was
initially valued by the petitioner at P1, 877,516.09.
The land was revalued at P3, 337,672.78 but respondents rejected the
valuation. Petitioner deposited the difference in the cash portion between
the revalued amount and the initial valuation of P1, 877,516.09 in trust for
the respondents. The parties brought the matter of valuation to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Caraga
Regional Office, which affirmed petitioner's second valuation.
Respondents filed a complaint for determination of just compensation
with the RTC praying for a valuation of not less than P200,000.00/ha; the
appointment of commissioners for the determination; and consent for the
spouses to withdraw the deposited amount. On the pendency of complaint,
another revaluation under DAR AO No. 5 amounting to P9, 057, 180.32 was
determined for just compensation.
 The RTC rendered a decision directing LBP and DAR to pay P20, 475,
775.00 for the 160has of subject land.
The CA set aside the above decision as the valuation of the subject
property should be determined per factors provided under Sec 17 of RA
6657 in accordance with the formula prescribed in DAR AO No. 5. Relative
thereto, the just compensation payable to respondent spouses should bear
12% interest per annum reckoned from the time the property titled was
transferred in the name of the government up to the time LBP deposited the
valuation amount.

ISSUE:
WON the awarding of the 12% per annum interest rate reckoned from
the time the property titled was transferred in the name of the government
up to the time LBP allegedly deposited the valuation amount was correct.
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the awarding of the 12% per
annum interest to the respondent spouses was correct due to the delay in
the payment of just compensation. However, the Court ordered that it shall
be computed up to the full payment of just compensation.
The petitioner’s contented that the deposited cash and bonds for the
initial valuation shall serve as the basis for DAR to take the possession of the
property resulting to the subsequent issuance of title in the name of the
government in December 1991.
The CA found that there was no showing that the LBP made the
payments prior taking of the land resulting. Such delay entitles the spouses
to the payment of interest from the time the property was transferred in the
name of the government in December 1991 up to the time LBP deposited
the valuation in the account of the Spouses Avancena in July 1996.
The SC affirmed the decision of the CA that an interest for the delay in
the full payment of just compensation is proper and reiterated that the
payment of such shall be in bonds and not by trust account as provided by
the law. According the Court, the payment of full compensation of a property
taken must be promptly paid to achieve fair exchange for the property and
the potential income lost at the time of the taking.
 In Republic vs. CA, it was held that the final compensation must
include interests on its just value to be computed from the time the property
is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with
the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual
payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as
good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking
occurred.
However, the interest should be computed from December 1991 up to
the full payment of just compensation and not only up to the time petitioner
deposited the valuation in 1996 as the CA ruled. The concept of just
compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to
be paid to the owners of the land, but also payment within a reasonable time
from its taking to prevent the owner from suffering the consequences of the
immediate deprivation of his land.
Wherefore, the SC granted the appeal and assailed RTC decision set
aside. Consequently, the case is remanded to the court a quo for the
recomputation of just compensation as the interest should be computed
from December 1991 up to the payment of the lull amount of just
compensation less whatever amounts received by the respondents-spouses.
27.

Hon. Court of Appeals, Hon. DARAB, ARB Associations of San

Francisco, Gen. Trias, Cavite, Register of
Deeds for the Province of Cavite Heirs of Francisco R. Tantoco, Sr.,
Maria R. Tantoco, Zosimo Tantoco,
Margarita R. Tantoco, and Pacita R. Tantoco vs The
DAR Region IV Director G.R. No. 149621 (May 5,
2006)

Facts:

• The case involves an action for cancellation of TCT No. CLOA-1424 and
the reinstatement of TCT No. T-402203 with prayer for issuance of
preliminary injunction filed by petitioners before the DARAB Region IV
on November 11, 1994. Subject land was offered by Petitioner for sale
under the VOS scheme for 5M/hectare, title was cancelled and TCT
CLOA 1424 was issued by the ROD in favor of ARBA. DARAB Region IV
rendered a decision declaring the subject property as covered under
the CARP without prejudice to the exercise of petitioners of their
respective right of retention upon proper application; voiding and
annulling TCT CLOA 1424; directing ROD of Cavite to effect the
cancellation of TCT No. CLOA 1424 and reinstatement of TCT No. T-
402203 in the joint names of Petitoners/Co-owners subject to its
eventual coverage under CARP; and directing the MARO to re-screen
ARBs and generate individual CLOAs.
• Both petitioners and respondent ARBA separately appealed to the
DARAB in Quezon City. Said appeal was consolidated. In resolving the
controversy, DARAB condensed the issue posed by respective parties
 by addressing the question: Can a Collective Certificate of Land
Ownership Award validly issued pursuant to a Voluntary Offer to Sell
scheme acquisition of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) be cancelled on the petition of the former owner on the mere
suspicion that some of the names listed therein are not really qualified
farmerbeneficiaries?
• DARAB rendered its Decision modifying the appealed decision of the
Regional Adjudicator by approving the validity and efficacy of TCT-
CLOA No. 1424. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by DARAB for lack of merit. On appeal to Court of Appeals.
Petitioners appeal dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration but was likewise denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.

Issu
Whethror not the CLOA that had been issued by DAR to ARBA may be
cancelled on the following grounds:

• The land in question is exempt from the coverage of CARP by reason

of its inclusion in the industrial zone of CALABARZON;
• The DAR failed to conform strictly to the procedure for the acquisition
of private agricultural lands laid down in RA 6657, hence, violating due
process and consequently denying petitioners just compensation; and
• ARBA and all its members have not paid the amortizations for the
landholdings awarded to them as required under RA 6657 and DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1993.

1. Whether or not DAR's failure to comply with the requisites prescribed

by law in the acquisition proceeding gives the courts the power to nullify the
CLOA issued to ARBA?

Held:

• The Court accords respect to the findings of the Regional Adjudicator

who has the primary jurisdiction and competence to establish the
agricultural character of the land in question which is properly within
the coverage of CARP. It was not re-classified nor converted from
agricultural to
non-agricultural use with the approval of the HLURB prior to the
effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) on June
15, 1988.
• The DAR officials or its employees failed to comply strictly with the
guidelines and operating procedures provided by law in acquiring the
property subject to CARP.
• Firstly, there were certain inconsistencies in the manner of selection by
the DAR of the CARP beneficiaries who are members of ARBA.
• Secondly, the TCT No. CLOA-1424 was directly issued by the DAR in
the name of ARBA without: (a) payment of just compensation; and,
(b) initial transfer of title to the land in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, in contravention to Section 16(e) of R.A. No. 6657.
• In the implementation of the CARP, the Special Agrarian Courts which
are the Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners; and, (2) the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657. What
agrarian adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a
preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to the
 landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide the
question.
• The failure of the DAR to comply with the requisites prescribed by law
in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to
nullify the CLOA that had been issued to ARBA. To assume the power
is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its
regular course. DAR must be given a chance to correct its
administrative and procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings.
• The resolution of this case by the DAR is to the best advantage of
petitioners since it is in a better position to resolve agrarian disputes,
being the administrative agency possessing the necessary expertise on
the matter and vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform controversies. Further, the proceedings
therein are summary and the department is not bound by technical
rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform
disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and
inexpensive action or proceeding.
28.
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Marcos Sr. G.R. No. 175726 March
22, 2017

FACTS:
The deceased Antonio Marcos, Sr. (Antonio) was the owner of two parcels of
agricultural land or landholdings located at Malbog, Pilar, Sorsogon,
consisting of 14.9274 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 2552 and 9.4653 hectares covered by TCT No. 2562.

On April 3, 1995, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 , Ramiro Marcos

(Ramiro), authorized representative of the heirs of Antonio, namely: Anita
Rubio, Lolita M. Pelino, Antonio Marcos, Jr. and Ramiro, offered to sell the
landholdings to the Republic of the Philippines through its implementing arm,
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
On July 10, 1996, petitioner LBP valued the lands covered by TCT Nos. 2552
and 2562 at P195,603.70 and P79,096.26, respectively.
On August 11, 1997, Ramiro filed with the DAR two (2) Landowner's Reply
to Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition forms pertaining to the
landholdings. In the said forms, Ramiro indicated that the respondents were
accepting LBP's valuation of the landholdings. On the same date, the DAR
Regional Director sent a memorandum to the LBP requesting the preparation
of a deed of transfer over the landholdings and payment of the purchase
price to respondents based on petitioner's valuation.
While the payment of the purchase price is pending, the DAR brought the
matter of valuation to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on
June 15, 2000 requesting that summary administrative proceedings be
conducted to determine the just compensation for the landholdings.
After proper proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered Decisions LV
Cases Nos. 084'00 and 085'00, both dated November 29, 2000, the
dispositive portions of which read:

LV Case No. 084'00.-

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the prior valuation of the LBP is hereby
set aside and a new valuation is fixed at FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-SIX
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX PESOS and .03 Centavos
(P446,786.03) for the acquired area of 14.9274 hectares at Twenty-Nine
Thousand, Nine Hundred Thirty Pesos and .60 Centavos (P29,930.60) per
hectare is adopted. The Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to
pay the same to the landowners in the manner provided for by law.

SO ORDERED.

LV Case No. 085'00.-

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the prior valuation of the LBP is hereby
set aside and a new valuation is fixed at TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWO PESOS and .10 Centavos (P283,302.10)
for the acquired area of 9.4653 hectares at Twenty-Nine Thousand, Nine
Hundred Thirty Pesos and .60 Centavos (P29,930.60) per hectare is
adopted. The Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the
same to the landowners in the manner provided for by law.

SO ORDERED.

Disagreeing with the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator, the LBP filed a
petition for judicial determination of just compensation for the landholdings
with the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC).

On January 23, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the

respondents.
LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision, but was denied per
Order dated March 30, 2004.

LBP appealed to the CA. It argued that the RTC failed to consider the
documentary evidence showing that a contract of sale over the landholdings
was perfected and that the RTC erred in adopting the valuation of the
Hacienda de Ares properties for the purpose of fixing the value of the
landholdings.

The CA ruled in favor of the respondents.

ISSUES:
1. CAN THE COURT OF APPEALS OR THE SAC DISREGARD THE
VALUATION FACTORS UNDER SECTION 17 OF R.A. 6657 WHICH ARE
TRANSLATED INTO A BASIC FORMULA IN DAR ADMINISTRATIVE
ORDER AND AFFIRMED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASES OF
SPS. BANAL AND CELADA, IN FIXING THE JUST COMPENSATION FOR
SUBJECT PROPERTIES?

2. CAN THE PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATOR (PARAD)

ABROGATE, VARY OR ALTER A CONSUMMATED CONTRACT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT AND RESPONDENTS IN REGARD TO SUBJECT
PROPERTIES?
RULING:
This Court finds this petition partly meritorious.

The LBP averred that the subject property was acquired by the government
pursuant to Republic Act No. (R.A. No.) 6657, thus, in determining the just
compensation, Section 17 of the said law is applicable.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation, this Court
essentially pointed out that the "just compensation" guaranteed to a
landowner under Section 4, Article XIII of the Constitution is precisely the
same as the "just compensation" embodied in Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution. The just compensation due to an owner should be the "fair and
full price of the taken property," whether for land taken pursuant to the
State's agrarian reform program or for property taken for purposes other
than agrarian reform.
It was further stressed in Honeycomb that just compensation paid for lands
taken pursuant to the State's agrarian reform program refers to the "full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator x x x
[the measure of which] is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word
'just' is used to intensify the meaning of the word 'compensation' to convey
the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall
be real, substantial, full and ample.
The determination of just compensation is fundamentally a function of the
courts. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 explicitly vests in the RTC-SAC the
original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation for lands
taken pursuant to the State's agrarian reform program.
owever, this Court, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural
Enterprise, underscored that, in the exercise of the essentially judicial
function of determining just compensation, the RTC-SAC is not granted
unlimited discretion. The factors under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 were
already translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-
making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. The said factors and the
DAR formula provide the uniform framework or stucture by which just
compensation for property subject to agrarian reform should be determined.
Hence, aside from considering the factors provided by law, the courts should
apply the formula outlined in DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998, in the
computation of just compensation.
To reiterate, when acting within the parameters set by the law itself, the
RTC-SACs are not strictly bound to apply the DAR formula to its minute
detail, particularly when faced with situations that do not warrant the
formula's strict application; they may, in the exercise of their discretion,
relax the formula's application to fit the factual situations before them. They
must, however, clearly explain the reason for any deviation from the factors
and formula that the law and the rules have provided.

In the case at bar, the RTC-SAC did not clearly explain why the formula was
not applied although the factors enumerated were considered in determining
just compensation. There was no reasoned explanation grounded on
evidence on record why the court did not comply with the established rules.
Thus, this Court finds that the case does not warrant for deviation from the
factors and formula set forth by the law and rules applicable.
The implementation of R.A. No. 6657 is an exercise of the State's police
power and power of eminent domain. It was also settled that the taking of
private property by the Government in the exercise of its power of eminent
domain does not give rise to a contractual obligation. Thus, acquisition of
lands under the CARP is not governed by ordinary rules on obligations and
contracts but by R.A. No. 6657 and its implementing rules.
Therefore, we are compelled to remand the case to the court of origin for the
reception of evidence and the determination of just compensation with the
cautionary reminder for the proper observance of the factors enumerated
under Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and of the formula prescribed under the
pertinent DAR administrative orders.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

assailed Decision and Resolution, dated May 26, 2006 and December 6,
2006, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83711, are
REVERSED. The Civil Case is REMANDED to the RTC, Sorsogon City,
Branch 52, for trial on the merits with dispatch. The trial judge is DIRECTED
to OBSERVE strictly the procedures in determining the proper valuation of
the subject property.
29.
Landbank of the Philippines vs. Obias G.R. No. 184406 March 14,
2012

FACTS:
Pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of P.D. No. 27, an
aggregate area of 34.6958 hectares composing three parcels of agricultural
land located at Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur owned by Perfecto, Nellie, OFe,
Gil, Edmundo and Nelly, all surnamed Obias, (landowners) were distributed
to the farmers-beneficiaries namely: Victor Bagasina, Sr., Elena Benosa,
Sergio Nagrampa, Claudio Galon, Prudencio Benosa, Santos Parro, Guillermo
Breboneria, Flora Villamer, Felipe de Jesus, Mariano Esta, Benjamin
Bagasina, Andres Tagum, Pedro Galon, Clara Padua, Rodolfo Competente,
Roberto Parro, Melchor Brandes, Antonio Buizon, Rogelio Montero, Maria
Villamer, Claudio Resari, Victor Bagasina, Jr., Francisco Montero and Pedro
Montero.

As a result, the owners had to be paid just compensation for the property
taken.The Department of Agrarian Reform, using the formula under P.D. 27
and E.O. 228, came up with a computation of the value of the acquired
property atP1, 397,578.72.However, the amount was contested by the
landowners as an inadequate compensation for the land. Thus, they filed a
complaint for determination of just compensation before the RTC of Naga
City, as the assigned Special Agrarian Court (SAC).

To ascertain the amount of just compensation, a committee was formed by

the trial court.The Provincial Assessor recommended the above average
value ofP40,065.31 per hectare as just compensation;LBP Representative
Edgardo Malazarte recommended the amount ofP38,533.577 per hectare;
andthe representative of the landowners, Atty. Fe Rosario P.
Buevasubmitted aP180,000.00 per hectare valuation of the land.

However, none of these recommendations was adopted in the 3 October

2000 judgment of the trial court in fixing the just compensation at
(P91,657.50) per hectare or in the total amount of P3,180,130.29. thus,
directing the LBP to pay the said amount.

Both the landowners and LBP appealed before the CA.

On 31 January 2008, the appellate court vacated the decision of the trial
court. It relied heavily on the Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R.
No. 148223, 25 November 2004) ruling wherein the Court fixed the rate of
the government support price (GSP) for one cavan of palay at P35.00, the
price of the palay at the time of the taking of the land. Following the
formula,Land Value= 2.5 multiplied by the Average Gross Production (AGP)
multiplied by the Government Support Price (GSP),provided by P.D. No. 27
and E.O. 228, the value of the total area taken will beP371,015.20 plus
interest thereon at the rate of 6% interest per annum, compounded
annually, starting 21 October 1972,until fully paid.

ISSUE: Did the CA err in ruling that the payment of interest shall be
made until full payment of compensation?

HELD: It is correct that rules and regulations issued by administrative

bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the
force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative issuances
partake of the nature of a statuteand have in their favor a presumption of
legality.And a literal reading of A.O. No. 13, as amended, will be in favor of
the LBP.

However, these administrative issuances or orders, though they enjoy the

presumption of legalities, are still subject to the interpretation by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its power to interpret the law.While rules and
regulation issued by the administrative bodies have the force and effect of
law and are entitled to great respect, courts interpret administrative
regulations in harmony with the law that authorized them and avoid as much
as possible any construction that would annul them as invalid exercise of
legislative power.

***

To answer the contention of LBP that there should be no payment of interest

when there is already a prompt payment of just compensation, the Court
discussed that even though the LBP immediately paid the remaining balance
on the just compensation due to the petitioners after the Court had fixed the
value of the expropriated properties, it overlooks one essential fact from the
time that the State took the petitioners properties until the time that the
petitioners were fully paid, almost 12 long years passed. This is the rationale
for imposing the 12% interest in order to compensate the petitioners for the
income they would have made had they been properly compensated for their
properties at the time of the taking.
This Court is not oblivious of the purpose of our agrarian laws particularly
P.D. No. 27, that is, to emancipate the tiller of the soil from his bondage; to
be lord and owner of the land he tills.

Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the State
shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farm workers who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. It also provides that the State shall
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands subject
to the payment of just compensation.

HELD: 

It is correct that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to

interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law,
and are entitled to great respect. Administrative issuances partake of the
nature of a statuteand have in their favor a presumption of legality. And a
literal reading of A.O. No. 13, as amended, will be in favor of the LBP.

However, these administrative issuances or orders, though they enjoy the

presumption of legalities, are still subject to the interpretation by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its power to interpret the law.While rules and
regulation issued by the administrative bodies have the force and effect of
law and are entitled to great respect, courts interpret administrative
regulations in harmony with the law that authorized them and avoid as much
as possible any construction that would annul them as invalid exercise of
legislative power.

***

To answer the contention of LBP that there should be no payment of interest

when there is already a prompt payment of just compensation, the Court
discussed that even though the LBP immediately paid the remaining balance
on the just compensation due to the petitioners after the Court had fixed the
value of the expropriated properties, it overlooks one essential fact from the
time that the State took the petitioners properties until the time that the
petitioners were fully paid, almost 12 long years passed. This is the rationale
for imposing the 12% interest in order to compensate the petitioners for the
income they would have made had they been properly compensated for their
properties at the time of the taking.

This Court is not oblivious of the purpose of our agrarian laws particularly
P.D. No. 27, that is, to emancipate the tiller of the soil from his bondage; to
be lord and owner of the land he tills.

Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the State
shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farm workers who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. It also provides that the State shall
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands subject
to the payment of just compensation.

Further, the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on this

subject reveal that just compensation should not do violence to the Bill of
Rights, but should also not make an insurmountable obstacle to a successful
agrarian reform program. Hence, the landowner's right to just compensation
should be balanced with agrarian reform.

The mandate of determination of just compensation is a judicial function,

hence, the Court will exert all efforts to consider and interpret all the
applicable laws and issuances in order to balance the right of the farmers to
own a land subject to the award the proper and just compensation due to
the landowners. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
30.

Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation (G.R.

No. 169903; February 29, 2012)

FACTS: 
Honeycomb Farms Corporation (Honeycomb Farms) was the registered
owner of two parcels of agricultural land in Cataingan, Masbate. Honeycomb
Farms voluntarily offered these parcels of land, with a total area of 495.1374
hectares, to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for coverage under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). From the entire area
offered, the government chose to acquire only 486.0907 hectares.

The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as the agency vested with the
responsibility of determining the land valuation and compensation for parcels
of land acquired pursuant to the CARL, and using the guidelines set forth in
DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 17, series of 1989, as amended by DAR
AO No. 3, series of 1991, fixed the value of these parcels of land.

When Honeycomb Farms rejected the LBPs and the DARs valuation for being
too low, Honeycomb Farms filed a case with the RTC, acting as a Special
Agrarian Court (SAC), against the DAR Secretary and the LBP, praying that it
be compensated for its landholdings in the amount of P12,440,000.00, with
damages and attorneys fees.

The RTC constituted a Board of Commissioners to aid the court in

determining the just compensation for the subject properties. Since the
Board of Commissioners could not reach a common valuation for the
properties, the RTC made its own valuation. First, the RTC took judicial
notice of the fact that a portion of the land, measuring approximately 10
hectares, is commercial land, since it is located a few kilometers away from
Sitio Curvada, Pitago, Cataingan, Masbate, which is a commercial district.
The lower court thus priced the 10 hectares at P100,000.00 per hectare and
the remaining 476 hectares at P32,000.00 per hectare. Both parties
appealed to the CA.

The LBP argued that the RTC committed a serious error when it disregarded
the formula for fixing just compensation embodied in DAR AO No. 6, series
of 1992, as amended by DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994. The LBP also
argued that the RTC erred in taking judicial notice that 10 hectares of the
land in question is commercial land.

In contrast, Honeycomb Farms maintains that the DAR AOs were issued
merely to serve as guidelines for the DAR and the LBP in administratively
fixing the valuation to be offered by the DAR to the landowner for
acceptance or rejection. However, it is not mandatory for courts to use the
DAR AOs to fix just compensation as this would amount to an administrative
imposition on an otherwise purely judicial function and prerogative of
determination of just compensation for expropriated lands specifically
reserved by the Constitution to the courts.
The CA affirmed with modification the assailed RTC judgment with respect to
the computation of the amount fixed by the trial court and the award of
attorneys fees is deleted.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the CA commit a serious error of law when it failed to apply
the mandatory formula for determining just compensation fixed in DAR AO
No. 11, series of 1994

Whether or not the RTC correctly take judicial notice of the nature of the
subject land?

HELD: 
It is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the power to determine just
compensation for parcels of land acquired by the State, pursuant to the
agrarian reform program. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, the
DAR, as the administrative agency tasked with the implementation of the
agrarian reform program, already came up with a formula to determine just
compensation which incorporated the factors enumerated in Section 17 of
RA 6657. In Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court emphasized
the duty of the RTC to apply the formula provided in the applicable DAR AO
to determine just compensation, stating that: While [the RTC] is required to
consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like properties,
its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declaration and the assessments made by the government assessors to
determine just compensation, it is equally true that these factors have been
translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power
under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. As the government agency principally
tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty to
issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. [The] DAR
[Administrative Order] precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, R.A. No.
6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein
may be taken into account. The [RTC] was at no liberty to disregard the
formula which was devised to implement the said provision.

These rulings plainly impose on the RTC the duty to apply the formula laid
down in the pertinent DAR administrative regulations to determine just
compensation. Clearly, the CA and the RTC acted with grievous error when
they disregarded the formula laid down by the DAR, and chose instead to
come up with their own basis for the valuation of the subject land.

***

While the lower court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of certain
facts, it must exercise this right within the clear boundary provided by
Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.

The classification of the land is obviously essential to the valuation of the

subject property, which is the very issue in the present case. The parties
should thus have been given the opportunity to present evidence on the
nature of the property before the lower court took judicial notice of the
commercial nature of a portion of the subject landholdings. GRANTED.
31.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES [LBP], petitioner,vs

. DOMINGO AND MAMERTO SORIANO, Respondents, G.R. Nos. 180772

and 180776, May 6, 2010

Facts:

Domingo and Mamerto Soriano (respondents) are the registered owners of

several parcels of rice land situated in Oas, Albay. Out of the 18.9163
hectares of land3 owned by the respondents, 18.2820 hectares were placed
under the Operations Land Transfer and the CARP.

The LBP6 pegged the value of 18.0491 hectares of land at

₱482,363.95 (₱133,751.65 as land value plus ₱348,612.30 incremental
interest), while the remaining 0.2329 hectare was computed at ₱8,238.94.
Not satisfied with the valuation, respondents instituted a Complaint 9 for
judicial determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City. They alleged that they are entitled to an amount of not less
than ₱4,500,000.00 as just compensation.

On 21 February 2005, the SAC rendered a judgment, ordering LBP to pay

the respondents ₱894,584.94.

LBP moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals on
12 December 2007.

Consequently, two divergent formulae arose which prompted the Court to

come up with a categorical pronouncement that, if just compensation is not
settled prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, it should be computed
in accordance with the said law, although the property was acquired under
Presidential Decree No. 27. The fixing of just compensation should therefore
be based on the parameters set out in Republic Act No. 6657, with
Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 having only
suppletory effect.

While the subject lands were acquired under Presidential Decree No. 27, the
complaint for just compensation was only lodged on 23 November 2000 or
long after the passage of Republic Act No. 6657 in 1988. Therefore, Section
17 of Republic Act No. 6657 should be the principal basis of the computation
for just compensation. As a matter of fact, the factors enumerated therein
had already been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its
rule-making power under Section 49 of Republic Act No. 6657.

LBP assails the imposition of 6% interest rate on the 18.0491 hectares of lot
valued at ₱133,751.65. LBP relies on the provisions of DAR Administrative
Order No. 13, series of 1994, as amended, which substantially provides that
"the grant of 6% yearly interest compounded annually shall be reckoned
from 21 October 1972 up to the time of actual payment but not later than
December 2006." LBP stresses that under said Administrative Order, time of
actual payment is defined as the date when LBP approves the payment of
the land transfer claim and deposits the compensation proceeds in the name
of the landowner in cash and in bonds. Respondents counter that the award
of interest until full payment of just compensation was correctly adhered to
by the lower courts. The award of interest until full payment of just
compensation is to ensure prompt payment.

At any rate, we cannot subscribe to the arguments of LBP.

Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that the

redistribution of agricultural lands shall be subject to the payment of just
compensation. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on
this subject reveal that just compensation should not do violence to the Bill
of Rights, but should also not make an insurmountable obstacle to a
successful agrarian reform program. Hence, the landowner's right to just
compensation should be balanced with agrarian reform.

However, as embodied in its Prefatory Statement, the intent of the

Administrative Order was precisely to address a situation "where a number
of landholdings remain unpaid in view of the non-acceptance by the
landowners of the compensation due to low valuation. Had the landowner
been paid from the time of taking his land and the money deposited in a
bank, the money would have earned the same interest rate compounded
annually as authorized under banking laws, rules and regulations." The
concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also payment within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is made to
suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while
being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss.

The DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final
and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party. In the
exercise of their functions, the courts still have the final say on what the
amount of just compensation will be.

Petition is denied. The decision of the CA are affirmed without prejudice to

the right of the parties for additional claims that may arise in the application
of DAR Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998 in relation to R.A. No.
6657.
32.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. EDGARDO L.

SANTOS, represented by his assignee, ROMEO L. SANTOS,
Respondent, G.R. No. 213863, January 27, 2016

Santos owned three (3) parcels of agricultural land devoted to corn

In 1984, the subject lands were placed under the government's Operation
Land Transfer Program[9] pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27,[10]
and distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries who were issued the
corresponding
Emancipation Patents.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) fixed the just compensation
On May 25, 2000, the LBP received the claim folder covering the subject
lands[15] and allowed Santos to collect the initial valuation for Land 3. It
withheld the release of the valuation for Lands 1 and 2 until the submission
of the certificates of title... thereto... on August 30, 2000 and December 17,
2003, respectively, Santos was issued Agrarian Reform (AR) Bond No.
0079665 in the amount of P11,674.59 representing the initial valuation of
Land 3 and AR Bond No. 0079666 in the amount of P30,428.83 representing
the six percent (6%)... increment pursuant to PD 27 and EO 228, and paid
cash in the total amount ofP4,678.16.
Finding the valuation unreasonable, Santos filed three (3) petitions[20] for
summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just
compensation of the subject lands before the Office of the Provincial
Adjudicator (PARAD)
On March 27, 2001, the PARAD rendered separate decisions[21] fixing the
just compensation as follows: (a) P510,034.29[22] for Land 1; (b)
P2,532,060.31[23] for Land 2; and (c) P1,147,466.73
However, in arriving at such values, the PARAD used the recent government
support price (GSP) for corn of P300.00/cavan (P6.00/kilo) as certified by
the National Food Authority
Provincial Manager of Camarines Sur, instead of the P31.00/cavan provided
under Section 2[26] of EO 228. Hence, it no longer applied the six percent
(6%) annual incremental interest granted under DAR Administrative Order
(DAR AO) No. 13,[27] Series of 1994.
In a letter[28] dated September 5, 2001, Santos unconditionally accepted
and called for the immediate payment of the valuations for Lands 2 and 3.
Dissatisfied with the PARAD's valuation, the LBP instituted two (2) separate
complaints[29] for the determination of just compensation before the RTC,
averring that the computations were erroneous when they disregarded the
formula provided under EO 228.
Santos moved to dismiss[32] the complaints on the ground that the LBP has
no legal personality to institute such action, and that the complaints were
barred by the finality of the PARAD's Decision.
the RTC dismissed both complaints. Meanwhile, Branch 23 of the same RTC
was designated as the new SAC that gave due course to the LBP's notices of
appeal.[34] The appeals, however,... were set aside by the CA's Fifth and
Third Divisions, which remanded the cases to the RTC for appropriate
proceedings, and computation of just compensation, respectively.
On May 5, 2009, Santos filed before the RTC a motion to release the initial
valuation for Lands 1 and 2 as fixed by the DAR, which was granted on June
2, 2009, conditioned on the submission of several documentary
requirements.[36] Santos moved for... reconsideration, pointing out that
what was sought was the initial valuation only and not its full payment, but
nonetheless, committed (a) to submit two (2) valid ID cards, two (2) latest
ID pictures and his CTC for the current year, and (b) to execute a Deed of
Assignment,... Warranties and Undertaking in favor of the LBP.
In opposition, the LBP insisted that Santos must: (a) first establish his
ownership over the said properties, it appearing that a Decree covering Land
1 was issued in favor of a certain Mariano Garchitorena, hence, the owner's
duplicate of the said title must be surrendered to... the Registry of Deeds for
cancellation; and (b) submit a real estate tax clearance to prove that there
were no encumbrances burdening the property and that the taxes thereon
had been fully paid until 1972.
the RTC ruled in favor of Santos, holding that since Land 1 was processed as
an untitled property and the LBP had admitted in its petitions for just
compensation that Santos was the owner of the untitled... lands covered by
PD 27 as reflected in the tax declarations, the LBP cannot maintain an
inconsistent position by requiring Santos to prove his ownership thereto. It
added that the submission of the required documents may still be directed
upon full payment of the just... compensation.
The LBP's motion for reconsideration[40] was denied
The LBP elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition
The LBP's application for the issuance of a TRO having been denied,[46] it
was constrained to deposit the initial valuation for Lands 1 and 2 as directed
by the RTC[47] after Santos' assignee,[48] Romeo Santos,... signed the
required Deed of Assignment, Warranties and Undertaking[49] in favor of
the LBP.
he RTC directed the LBP to submit a revaluation for Lands 1, 2, and 3 in
accordance with the factors set forth under Republic Act (RA) No. 6657,[51]
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988
In compliance therewith, the LBP recomputed the valuation of the subject
lands as follows: P514,936.44[53] for Land 1, P2,506,873.43[54] for Land 2,
and Pl,155,223.41[55] for Land 3, which Santos accepted.
Considering, however, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 110779 involving
Lands 1 and 2, Santos moved for a separate judgment relative to Land 3.
The RTC Ruling... e RTC issued a Judgment[57] in Civil Case No. 2001-0315,
adopting and approving the LBP's uncontested revaluation for Land 3 in the
amount of P1,155,223.41, and ordering its payment to Santos in accordance
with Section 18 of RA 6657,... minus the initial valuation that had already
been paid to him.
Santos moved for reconsideration, contending that the RTC failed to order
the payment of twelve percent (12%) interest reckoned from the time the
property was taken from him by the government in 1972 and distributed to
the farmer beneficiaries until full payment of the just... compensation.
the RTC granted the motion and awarded twelve percent (12%) interest...
when the LBP approved the payment of the initial valuation for the property
up to... the date the decision was rendered, or a total amount of
P1,437,669.75.
Both parties moved for reconsideration.
he RTC modified its August 31, 2011 Order, holding that the twelve percent
(12%) interest should be reckoned from January 1, 2010 until full payment
since the revaluation of Land 3 already included the... required six percent
(6%) annual incremental interest under DAR AO No. 13, Series of 1994,[62]
DAR AO No. 2, Series of 2004,[63] and DAR AO No. 6, Series of 2008,[64]
from the time of taking until December 31,... 2009.
Dissatisfied, Santos filed a petition for review[65] before the CA,... he LBP
fully paid Santos the amount of PI, 155,223.41 representing the just
compensation for Land 3
The CA Ruling... he CA dismissed the petitions, and affirmed the RTC's
Orders
Issues:
the LBP contended that the CA committed reversible error in: (a) not finding
the RTC to have acted with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the release
of the initial valuation of Lands 1 and 2 without submitting the documents...
listed under DAR AO No. 2, Series of 2005; (b) ignoring the final decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 75010 that effectively barred the RTC from further
proceeding with the determination of just compensation relative to Lands 2
and 3; and (c) holding it liable for twelve percent
(12%) interest on the unpaid just compensation for Land 3.
antos raised in his petition in G.R. No. 214021 the sole question of whether
or not the CA erred in reckoning the award of twelve percent (12%) interest
from January 1, 2010 until full payment of the just compensation.
Ruling:
The Court's Ruling
The Court has repeatedly held that the seizure of landholdings or properties
covered by PD 27 did not take place on October 21, 1972, but upon the
payment of just compensation.[75] Thus, if the agrarian reform process is
still incomplete, as in this... case where the just compensation due the
landowner has yet to be settled, just compensation should be determined
and the process concluded under RA 6657.
Note that in case of rejection, RA 6657 entitles the landowner to withdraw
the initial valuation of the landholding pending the determination of just
compensation.[81] In this case, however, the LBP, citing DAR AO No. 2,
Series of 2005, posited that the... release of such amount is conditioned on
the submission of all the documentary requirements listed therein, and that
the RTC's failure to require Santos to comply therewith constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.
The Court is not persuaded.
Contrary to the LBP's assertion in G.R. No. 213863, nowhere from the said
administrative guideline can it be inferred that the submission of the
complete documents is a pre-condition for the release of the initial valuation
to a landowner. To hold otherwise would... effectively protract payment of
the amount which RA 6657 guarantees to be immediately due the landowner
even pending the determination of just compensation.
Thus, the leniency accorded by the RTC cannot be construed as a capricious
exercise of power as it merely expedited the procedure for payment which is
inherently fairer under the circumstances
Neither can the Court subscribe to the LBP's contention that the RTC was
barred by res judicata from conducting further proceedings to determine just
compensation for Lands 2 and 3 since the final and executory Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 75010 merely called for a remand... of the case for
computation purposes only.
As correctly observed by the CA, the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 75010 did
not preclude the RTC from proceeding with the determination of just
compensation of the subject lands since the issue raised in the said case
merely pertained to the LBP's legal standing to institute the... complaints for
just compensation and not the valuation of the subject lands.[92] The
pronouncement in the said decision on the matter of computation of just
compensation was a mere obiter dictum
Besides, it bears stressing that the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation is vested in the RTC,
[96] hence, it cannot be unduly restricted in the exercise of its... judicial
function.
With respect to the award of twelve percent (12%) interest on the unpaid
just compensation for Land 3 subject of G.R. No. 214021, the Court finds
untenable the LBP's contention that the same was bereft of factual and legal
bases, grounded on its having promptly paid
Santos the initial valuation therefor barely two months after it approved the
DAR's valuation on June 26, 2000.
Notably, while the LBP released the initial valuation in the amount of
P46,781.58 in favor of Santos in the year 2000, the said amount is way
below, or only four (4%)[98] of the just compensation finally adjudged by
the RTC. To be considered as just, the... compensation must be fair and
equitable, and the landowners must have received it without any delay.
in expropriation cases, interest is imposed if there is delay in the payment of
just compensation to the landowner since the obligation is deemed to be an
effective forbearance on the part of the State.  Such interest shall be pegged
at the rate of twelve... percent (12%) per annum on the unpaid balance of
the just compensation, reckoned from the time of taking,[102] or the time
when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property,
[103] such as when title is... transferred to the Republic,[104] or
emancipation patents are issued by the government, until full payment.
[105] To clarify, unlike the six percent (6%) annual incremental interest
allowed under DAR AO No. 13,... Series of 1994, DAR AO No. 2, Series of
2004 and DAR AO No. 6, Series of 2008, this twelve percent (12%) annual
interest is not granted on the computed just compensation; rather, it is a
penalty imposed for damages incurred by the landowner due to the delay in
its... payment.
Accordingly, the award of twelve percent (12%) annual interest on the
unpaid balance of the just compensation for Land 3 should be computed
from the time of taking, and not from January 1, 2010 as ruled by the RTC
and the CA, until full payment on October 12,... 2011.
However, copies of the emancipation patents issued to the farmer-
beneficiaries have not been attached to the records of the case. Hence, the
Court is constrained to remand the case to the RTC of Naga City for receipt
of evidence as to the... date of the grant of the emancipation patents, which
shall serve as the reckoning point for the computation of the interests due
Santos.
33.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs Enrique Livioco, G.R. No. 170685,

September 22, 2010

FACTS:

Enrique Livioco was the registered owner of a sugarland located in

Mabalacat, Pampanga. Sometime between 1987 and 1988, Livioco offered
his sugarland to the DAR for acquisition. The voluntary-offer-to-sell form he
submitted indicated that his property is adjacent to residential subdivisions
and an international paper mill.The DAR referred Livioco’s offer to the Land
Bank of the Philippines for valuation. Livioco was then informed of the
valuation and that the cash portion of the claim proceeds have been “kept in
trust pending his submission of ownership documents.” It appears, however,
that Livioco did not act upon the notices given by both agencies. LBP issued
a certification to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga as compensation for
Livioco’s sugarland.
It was only after two years that Livioco requested for a revaluation of
the compensation on the ground that it has already appreciated from the
time it was offered for sale. The request was denied by the Regional Director
Antonio Nuesa on the ground that there was already a perfected sale. The
DAR proceeded to take possession of Livioco’s property. The DAR awarded
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) covering Livioco’s property to
26 farmer-beneficiaries. Livioco filed separate complaints to cancel the
CLOAs and to recover his property but the same proved to be futile. Unable
to recover his property but unwilling to accept what he believes is an
outrageously low valuation of his property, Livioco filed for a determination
of just compensation against the DAR, LBP, and CLOA holders before the
RTC of Angeles City. He maintained that the area where his property is
located has become predominantly residential, hence, he should be paid for
his property’s value as such. To prove that his property is residential, Livioco
presented a certification from the Office of Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator of the Mabalacat, Pampanga that, per zoning
ordinance, Livioco’s land is located in an area where the dominant land use
is residential.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the compensation for respondent’s property was in
accordance with the law?

RULING:
 For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and price at the time of
taking. There are three important concepts in this definition of taking – the
character of the property, its price, and the time of actual taking.
The lower courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the
property has changed from agricultural to residential because there is no
allegation or proof that the property was approved for conversion to other
uses by the DAR. it is the DAR that is mandated by law to evaluate and to
approve land use conversion to prevent fraudulent evasion from the agrarian
reform coverage. Reclassification and plans by the local governments do not
ipso facto convert an agricultural property to residential, commercial or
industrial. In the absence of approval for conversion from the DAR or actual
expropriation by the LGU, the character of respondent’s property has not
ceased to be agricultural and should be valued as such.
The trial and appellate courts also erred in disregarding Sec 17 of RA
6657 in their determination of just compensation. The trial court revealed
the importance of said section and recognized insufficiency of evidence to
arrive at a just compensation; however, it still proceeded to rule on the case
without receiving such relevant evidence. The trial court, as affirmed by the
CA, ruled in favour of the respondent based on preponderance of evidence,
regardless of the fact the evidence presented was not relevant to the factors
mentioned in Sec 17 of RA 6657 namely, 1) cost of acquisition, 2) nature of
the property, 3) current value of like properties, and 4) actual use and
income of property.
The valuation of the lower court is not acceptable for irrelevant
evidence; however, the valuation of LBP is also not acceptable for lack of
proper substantiation. Since both parties failed to adduce evidence of the
property’s value as an agricultural land at the time of the taking, it is
premature for the Court to make a final decision on the matter. Not being a
trier of facts, the Court cannot also receive new evidence from the parties to
aid in the resolution of the case. Thus, the case must be remanded to the
trial court for reception of evidence and determination of just compensation
in accordance with Sec 17 of RA 6657.
34.

Ramon M. Alfonso v. Landbank, G.R. Nos. 181912 & 183347,

November 29, 2016

FACTS:
After the effectivity of RA 6657, the DAR sought to acquire the subject
lands. The owner prior to petitioner rejected the valuation of DAR, resulting
to land valuation cases subsequently being filed before the DAR Provincial
Adjudication Board. Subsequently, the Land Bank filed a motion seeking
reconsideration of the DAR PAB’s valuations. Both petitioner and respondent
filed separate actions for the judicial determination of just compensation of
the subject properties. The RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, found the
valuations of both the LBP and the Provincial Adjudicator to be unrealistically
low.

During the proceedings, the RTC adopted Commissioner Chua’s

valuation which utilized the Market Data Approach and the Capitalized
Income Approach, due to their “different actual land use”. He opined that
“the average of the two indicators reasonably represented the just
compensation (FMV) of the land with productive coconut trees”.

LBP argued before the CA that there is nothing in Section 17 of RA

6657 which provides that capitalized income of a property can be used as a
basis in determining just compensation. Thus, when the RTC used that
capitalized income of the properties as a basis for valuation, “it actually
modified the valuation factors set forth by RA 6657”. The CA reversed the
findings off the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not courts are obliged to apply the DAR formula in cases
where they are asked to determine just compensation for property covered
by RA 6657.

RULING:
Yes. The factors listed under Section 17 of RA 6657 and its resulting
formulas provide a uniform framework or structure for the computation of
just compensation which ensures that the amounts to be paid to affected
landowners are not arbitrary, absurd or even contradictory to the objectives
of agrarian reform.
 Until and unless declared invalid in a proper case, the DAR formulas
partake of the nature of statutes, which under the 2009 amendment became
law itself, and thus have in their favor the presumption of legality, such that
courts shall consider, and not disregard, these formulas in the determination
of just compensation for properties covered by the CARP. When faced with
situations which do not warrant the formula's strict application, courts may,
in the exercise of their judicial discretion, relax the formula's application to
fit the factual situations before them, subject only to the condition that they
clearly explain in their Decision their reasons (as borne by the evidence on
record) for the deviation undertaken. It is thus entirely allowable for a court
to allow a landowner’s claim for an amount higher than what would
otherwise have been offered (based on application of the formula) for as
long as there is evidence on record sufficient to support the award.
36.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JESUS ALSUA, represented by BIBIANO C.
SABINO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 211351               February 4, 2015

The Facts

Jesus Alsua (Jesus) owned a 62.1108 has. parcel of unregistered agricultural

land known as Lot No. 8882, Cad-201, situated in Malidong, Pioduran, Albay,
covered by Tax Declaration No. 99-13-001-0067 in his name.

On March 6, 1994, respondents Heirs of Jesus Alsua and their representative

Bibiano C. Sabino (respondents) voluntarily offered to sell the entire parcel
of land to the government under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988," but
only 47.4535 has. thereof, consisting of 43.7158 has. of cocoland and
3.7377 has. of unirrigated riceland (subject lands), were acquired.

Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued the subject lands at
1,369,708.02 (LBP’s valuation) using the formula stated in DAR AO No. 5,
series of 1998, as follows:

Cocoland 43.7158 ha. x ₱29,018.46 ₱1,268,565.19

Unirrigated Riceland 3.7377 ha. x 27,060.18 101,142.83

₱1,369,708.02

The DAR then offered to respondents the LBP’s valuation as just

compensation for the lands, but the latter rejected the valuation
After summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just
compensation, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), fixed the
value of the subject lands at ₱5,479,744.15. The LBP moved for
reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated March 11, 2004.

Dissatisfied with the PARAD’s valuation, the LBP filed a petition for

determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 3 (RTC), averring that the PARAD’s valuation was
excessively high and is contrary to the legally prescribed factors in
determining just compensation.

In the interim, or on November 29, 2001, the Register of Deeds of Albay

issued Original Certificates of Title in the names of the agrarian reform
beneficiaries.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision dated August 17, 2012, the RTC rejected the valuation of both
the LBP and the PARAD and fixed the just compensation for the subject
lands at ₱4,245,820.53 as follows:

LV for Cocoland = ₱3,654,285.91

LV for Riceland = 350,072.98

LV for Trees = 241, 461.64

₱4,245,820.53
================

The RTC used the formula under DARAO No. 5, series of 1998.

The LBP dissatisfied with the valuation moved for reconsideration which was,
however, denied by the RTC in an Order dated October 25, 2012, prompting
it to elevate its case to the CA.

The CA Ruling

The CA affirmed the applicability of the provisions of DAR AO No. 5, series of

1998 in the computation of the just compensation for the subject lands but
declared that the RTC erred in fixing the date of taking on June 30, 2009

It pointed out that the taking of lands under the agrarian reform program
partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding; thus, just
compensation should be pegged at the price or value of the property at the
time it was taken from the owner.

CA’s Valuation:

LV for Cocoland = ₱1,936,892.34

LV for Unirrigated Riceland = 287,069.04

LV for Trees = 241,461.64

₱2,465,423.02

Still dissatisfied, the LBP filed a motion for reconsideration which was,

however, denied in a Resolution dated February 18,2014, hence, the instant
petition.

Issue: Whether or not the CA committed any reversible error in

fixing the just compensation for the subject lands.

DECISION:

Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete,
such as in this case where the just compensation due the landowner has yet
to be settled, just compensation should be determined and the process be
concluded under RA 6657.

For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market value of an

expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time
of taking, or the "time when the landowner was deprived of the use and
benefit of his property," such as when title is transferred in the name of the
beneficiaries, as in this case.

A. RTC AND CA VALUATION OF THE SUBJECT COCOLAND.

For its part, the RTC used production data or values within the 12-month
period preceding the presumptive date of taking of the subject cocoland on
June 30, 2009, in accordance with DAR AO No. 1, series of 2010. It is the
long-standing rule is that an expropriated property must be valued at the
time of taking, in this case, upon the issuance of the OCTs in the name of
the beneficiaries on November 29, 2001. Hence, the said AO cannot be
made to obtain and the RTC’s valuation cannot be sustained.

B. RTC AND CA VALUATION OF THE SUBJECT RICELAND.

The RTC used the one-factor formula under DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998,
utilizing unit market value (UMV) taken from the Schedule of Base Unit
Market Value as of 2002, pursuant to the pertinent ordinance of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay. Having been based on data or values
beyond the time of taking on November 29, 2001. To reiterate, just
compensation is the fair market value of an expropriated property at the
time of taking, in this case, the value of the subject lands upon the issuance
of the OCTs in the name of the beneficiaries on November 29, 2001. Thus,
on this score, the CA’s computation must equally be rejected.

C. RTC AND CA VALUATION OF THE TREES INCLUDED IN THE JUST

COMPENSATION.

It is relevant to point out that the RTC’s valuation of the standing trees in
the amount of ₱241,461.64, as affirmed by the CA, appears to have been
pegged according to the prevailing values within the 12-month period
preceding June 30, 2009. As mentioned, such date was long after the
subject lands’ taking on November 29,2001 and, hence, can neither be
countenanced.

D. THE PROPER VALUATION AND REMAND GUIDELINES.

In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the just compensation for the subject
lands should be computed based on the factors stated in Section 17 of RA
6657, as amended. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking,
or the "time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his
property, in this case, upon the issuance of OCT Nos. C-27721 and 27722 in
the names of the agrarian reform beneficiaries on November 29,
2001. Hence, the evidence to be presented by the parties before the trial
court for the valuation of the subject lands must be based on the values
prevalent on such time of taking for like agricultural lands.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as it seeks to sustain the

valuation of the subject lands made by petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines.  Accordingly, Agrarian Case No. 04-02 is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 3 for the proper determination of
just compensation in accordance with the guidelines set in this Decision.
37.

Heirs of Feliciano vs Landbank of the Philippines GR No. 215290,

January 11, 2017

FACTS:
Petitioners heirs of Pablo Feliciano, Jr., namely: Lourdes Feliciano
Tudla, Gloria Feliciano Caudal, Gabriela Feliciano Bautista, Angela Feliciano
Lucas, Donna Celeste Feliciano-Gatmaitan, Cynthia Celeste Feliciano, and
Hector Reuben Feliciano (Feliciano heirs) are co-owners of a 300-hectare
(ha.) parcel of agricultural land situated at Simeon, Ragay, Camarines Sur.
In 1972, a portion of the land was classified as un-irrigated riceland
(subject land), and placed under the coverage of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 27. The Certificates of Land Transfer were distributed to the 84 tenant-
beneficiaries in 1973 who were issued Emancipation Patents in 1989. The
claim folder covering the subject land was received by the LBP from the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on December 2, 1997. The DAR
valued the subject land at P 1,301,498.09, inclusive of interests, but the
Feliciano heirs rejected the said valuation, prompting the LBP to deposit the
said amount in the latter's name on January 26, 1998. On March 24, 2000,
the said amount was released to them.
After the summary administrative proceedings for the determination of
just compensation, the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
of Camarines Sur, Branch I rendered a Decision fixing the value of the
subject land at P4,64 l ,080.465 or an average of P34,302.375/ha. On
November 22, 2001, the LBP filed a petition for the determination of just
compensation before the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 23 (RTC)
which was initially dismissed, but eventually reinstated. In the interim, the
Feliciano heirs assigned their rights over the just compensation claims to
Espiritu. In an Order dated May 4, 2011, the RTC directed the LBP to revalue
the subject land in accordance with DAR Administrative Order No. (AO) 1,
Series of 2010.
In a Decision dated September 19, 2011, the RTC fixed the just
compensation at P7,725,904.05; and directed the LBP to pay Espiritu the
said amount, less amounts already paid to the Feliciano heirs, and to pay
12% interest p.a. on the unpaid balance, computed from January 1, 2010
until full payment. Both parties moved for reconsideration, which were
denied, modifying the reckoning of the 12% interest p.a. from the finality of
the Decision until its satisfaction. Aggrieved, the petitioners elevated the
matter before the CA. In a Decision, the CA fixed the just compensation at
P7,725,904.05, plus legal interest at twelve percent (12%) p.a., computed
from July 1, 2009 up to the finality of the Decision, or the total amount of P
7,316,876,97, and directed the LBP to pay the said amount to Espiritu.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the
CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA's determination of just compensation is correct.
HELD:
NO. Following the above dictum, since the claim folder covering the
subject land was received by the LBP on December 2, 1997, or prior to July
1, 2009, the RTC should have computed just compensation using pertinent
DAR regulations applying Section 17 of RA 6657 prior to its amendment by
RA 9700 instead of adopting the new DAR issuance. While the RTC, acting as
a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), is not strictly bound by the different formula
created by the DAR since the valuation of property or the determination of
just compensation is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the
courts, and not with administrative agencies, it must explain and justify
terms in clear the reason for any deviation from the prescribed factors and
the applicable formula.
In this case, the Court has gone over the records and found that
neither the RTC nor the CA considered the date when the claim folder was
received nor explained their reasons for deviating from the DAR formula.
Therefore, as it stands, the RTC and the CA should have utilized the basic
formula prescribed and laid down in pertinent DAR regulations existing prior
to the passage of RA 9700, in determining the just compensation for the
subject land.
Accordingly, while the parties did not raise as issue the improper
application of DAR AO 1, Series of 2010, the Court finds the need to remand
the case to the RTC for the determination of just compensation to ensure
compliance with the law, and to give everyone - the landowner, the farmers,
and the State - their due. To this end, the RTC is hereby directed to observe
the following guidelines in the remand of the case:
 Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking.
Just compensation must be arrived at pursuant to the guidelines set
forth in Section 17 of RA 6657, as amended, prior to its amendment by RA
9700.
Interest may be awarded as may be warranted by the circumstances
of the case and based on prevailing jurisprudence.
38.
Landbank of the Philippines vs Spouses Chu GR No. 192345, March
29, 2017
Facts:
Spouses Chu were registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land
located in San Antonio, Pilar, Sorsogon which were acquired by the
government pursuant to its agrarian reform program. The first land was a
PD 27-acquired land valued by the LBP at P177.657 98. The second land was
an RA 6657-acquired property at P263,928.57. The spouses rejected LBP's
valuation therefore summary administrative proceedings were conducted to
determine the just compensation.
On April 11, 2003, The PARAD recomputed the value of the RA 6657-
acquired property at P1,542,360.00 based on the comparable sales
transaction of similar nearby lots as well as Hacienda Chu was declared as
an industrial area. As regards the PD 27-acquired land, the PARAD valued
the subject property at P983,663.94 using the formula: Land Value= AGP X
ASP x 2.5 (or Average Gross Production of 75.2 x Actual Support Price of
P350.00 x 2.5).
However, LBP was dissatisfied, hence a petition for determination of
just compensation in Regional Trial Court. The RTC fixed the just
compensation at P2,313,478.00 for the RA 6657 - acquired property and
P1.155,173.00 for the PD 27-acquired land in consideration of the factors
laid down by the LBP and the PARAD, to wit: the land of the private
respondents including the subject landholding is the subject of Municipal
Expansion for Agri-Economic Cum Industrial Area, thus, it will provide
livelihood opportunities and tremendous economic multiplier effect not only
for residents of barangay San Antonio (Sapa) but also for the entire citizenry
of Pilar, Sorsogon.
On appeal, the CA modified the RTC's ruling. The CA noted that the
formula used by the PARAD in computing the valuation for the PD 27-
acquired land is correct but the amount used for the Actual Support Price
(ASP), which is P350, is erroneous since the mandated ASP in Executive
Order No. 228 is only P35, not P350. In addition, Interest at the rate of 12%
per annum must be imposed to compensate for the delay. As a result, it
upheld LBP's valuation for the PD 27-acquired land at P 177 ,657.98 but
awarded legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
On the other hand, for the property acquired under RA 6657, the CA
found that although the LBP used the formula in DAR Administrative Order
No. 5, it, however, failed to consider the rising values of the lands in Pillar,
Sorsogon which resulted from the economic developments and the current
assessment of industrial lands in the area - this, despite the fact that
evidence was presented to show that comparable sales (the CS in the
formula) have gone up to at least P200,000.00 per hectare. Thus, it affirmed
the estimate that the RA 6657-acquired property may be priced at
P200,000.00 per hectare as fixed by the PARAD. The LBP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied by the appellate court
Thus, the present petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
decision of the Court of Appeals over the amount of just compensation
awarded to Spouses Chu, as well as its Resolution which denied LBP's Motion
for Reconsideration of the said Decision
ISSUES
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it disregarded the valuation
factors under Section 17 of RA 6657 and the pertinent DAR
Administrative Orders in fixing its value at P1,542,360.00
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it refused to remand the
instant case to the trial court for a re-computation of its value
pursuant to section 17 of RA 6657, as amended
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it imposed the payment of
interest at 12% per annum on the value of the PD 27-acquired land
HELD:
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred. The court granted the petition partly.
The Court held that the LBP was not able to justify its valuation.
Although the LBP maintained that it strictly applied the pertinent law and
implementing rules in arriving at its computation, It failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to prove the truthfulness or correctness of its assertions.
The LBP used the formula LV = (CNI X. 90) + (MV x .10). It was able to
sufficiently establish the Capitalized Net Income (CNI) factor of the formula.
However, the same is not true regarding the Market Value (MV) component
thereof The valuations fixed by the PARAD and the RTC, which rulings were
subsequently affirmed in toto and with modifications, respectively, by the
CA, were arrived in clear disregard of the the formula setforth under DAR AO
05-98. As bome out by their respective Decisions, these tribunals considered
only the Comparable Sales (CS) factor to the exclusion of the other factors,
namely, the CNI and MV.
It must be reiterated that the factors laid down in Section 17 of
RA 6657 and the formula by DAR in its implementing rules, are
mandatory and may not be disregarded by the RTC. Both parties are
reminded that they ought to present evidence in accordance with the
requirements set forth in the relevant DAR issuances. For this reason, this
Court restates that even if the landowner fails to prove a higher amount as
just compensation, the LBP must substantiate its valuation and prove the
correctness of its claims. Naturally, it behooves the LBP to present clear and
convincing documentary and, if necessary, testimonial, evidence to justify its
valuation and how this was arrived at. The respective evidences of both
parties are insufficient to enable this Court to come up with a correct
computation on the just compensation to which respondents are entitled.
Thus, this Court is constrained to remand the case to the RTC for the
reception of evidence and the determination of Just compensation.
Finally, the RTC may not award compounded interest on the PD 27-
acquired land, considering that RA 6657, which is now applicable even to
landholdings covered by PD 27, does not itself expressly grant it, what is
allowed is the grant of Interest in the nature of delay in payment of just
compensation. Hence, the LBP is obliged to pay interest at 12% per annum
from the date of taking until June 30, 2013, and 6% per annum from July I,
2013 until fully paid, in the event it is found to be delay in payment of just
compensation.
39.

EDGARDO SANTOS v
LANDBANK G.R. No. 137431;
September 7, 2000 J.
Panganiban

FACTS:
Edgar Santos filed a case in the Regional Trial Court for the
determination of just compensation for the properties that were taken
by DAR under PD No. 27 in 1972. The RTC fixed the amount of P49,
241, 876 to be the just compensation for the 36.4152 hectares and
40.7874 hectares irrigated and unirrigated ricelands respectively.
Further, the court ordered Land Bank to pay Santos P45, 698, 805 in
the manner provided by RA No. 6657. Prior to this decision, Land
Bank already released P3, 543,070 to be paid to Santos in cash and
bond; thus deducting from the total amount. Land Bank complied with
this decision and released the amount of P3, 621, 023 in cash and
P41, 128,024.81 in Land Bank Bond. However, petitioner filed a
motion before the RTC and insisted that he be paid in cash or certified
check instead of the bond. RTC as a consequence, order Land Bank to
pay the balance in cash or certified check instead of a bond. Land
Bank moved for reconsideration. Through a new judge, the RTC
ordered Land Bank to pay Santos P5, 792,084.37 in cash and P35,
336,840.16 in bonds. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
I s th e p etitio ner co rrec t in ass erting that he b e p aid in c as h fo r
th e ju s t compensation?

HELD:
NO. It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional
method for the payment of just compensation is money and no other.
And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely
in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional
exercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary
expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area
is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and
perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation. With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that
the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the
afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the
Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this
Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and
demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The
Court is as acutely anxious as the rest our people to see the goal of
agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations
of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are
aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification
of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they
approach realization and resurrecting the specter of discontent and
dissent in the restless countryside.
40.

EDGARDO SANTOS v LANDBANK

G.R. No. 137431; September 7, 2000
J. Panganiban

FACTS:
Edgar Santos filed a case in the Regional Trial Court for the determination of
just compensation for the properties that were taken by DAR under PD No.
27 in 1972.The RTC fixed the amount of P49, 241, 876 to be the just
compensation for the36.4152 hectares and 40.7874 hectares irrigated and
unirrigated rice lands respectively. Further, the court ordered Land Bank to
pay Santos P45, 698, 805 inthe manner provided by RA No. 6657. Prior to
this decision, Land Bank already released P3, 543,070 to be paid to Santos
in cash and bond; thus deducting from the total amount. Land Bank
complied with this decision and released the amount of P3, 621, 023 in cash
and P41, 128,024.81 in Land Bank Bond. However, petitioner filed a motion
before the RTC and insisted that he be paid in cash or certified check instead
of the bond. RTC as a consequence, order Land Bank to pay the balance in
cash or certified check instead of a bond. Land Bank moved for
reconsideration. Through a new judge, the RTC ordered Land Bank to pay
Santos P5, 792,084.37 in cash and P35, 336,840.16 in bonds. The CA
affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner correct in asserting that he be paid in cash for the just
compensation?
LAW:
RA No. 6657, Sec. 18

HELD:
NO. It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional method for the
payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably,
has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium.
However, we do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of
eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific
property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its
owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a
revolutionary kind of expropriation. With these assumptions, the Court
hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation
provided for in the afore-quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative
of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of
pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court
is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of
society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely
anxious as the rest our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at
last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all
these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said
section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the
farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the
specter of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in
our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall
decree today.