In the meantime, complainant, upon the facts above narrated, filed a
criminal complaint for estafa against the respondent before the Office
[A.C. NO. 7280 : November 16, 2006]
DAHLIA S. GACIAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ALEXANDER
BULAUITAN, Respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment instituted by the
herein complainant Dahlia S. Gacias against Atty. Alexander Bulauitan
on grounds of dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Herein respondent Atty. Alexander Bulauitan used to own a parcel of
land with an area of 1,242 square meters located at Tuguegarao City
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-79190. Sometime in
February 1996, complainant and respondent entered into an
agreement for the purchase, on installment basis, of a 92-square
meter portion of the 1,242-square meter lot at a unit price
of P3,500.00 per square meter. Out of the total consideration
of P322,000.00, complainant initially paid respondent, as down
payment, US$3,100.00, or its equivalent of P82,000.00, as evidenced
by a receipt dated February 28, 1996. Subsequent installment
payments were remitted, as mutually agreed upon, to the Bank of
Philippine Islands, Kamuning Branch, under the account of
respondent's daughter, Joan Christine. All told, complainant had, as
of November 1996, paid the respondent, in cash and in kind, the peso
equivalent of US$6,950.00, which, per complainant's computation,
using the $1:P43 dollar-peso rate of exchange, amounted
to P300,000.00.
As complainant would also allege in her affidavit-complaint dated
April 23, 2001,1 as amended,2 she asked for the copy of the title over
the 92-square meter portion upon learning about the mortgage the
respondent constituted over his Tuguegarao property. According to
complainant, respondent's inability to produce the desired title
impelled her not to complete payment anymore and to request the
return of the amount she had already paid the respondent.
Complainant further alleged that the respondent agreed, but has not
made good his undertaking, to make reimbursement. Her request for
assistance from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) proved
futile, too. Meanwhile, the mortgagee bank, China Bank, foreclosed
the mortgage constituted on the respondent's property, then
consolidated the title over it in its name.
In his answer in compliance with an order from the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline, respondent admitted entering into a land purchase
agreement with the complainant, but stressed the private nature of
the transaction between them. He described as premature the
complainant's demand for delivery of title inasmuch as the
aforementioned agreement was not consummated for complainant's
failure to pay in full the purchase price of the 92-square meter
portion. Respondent admitted, though, that he undertook to pay back
the amount of P300,000.00 as a measure to avoid scandal, given what
to him was complainant's penchant to make a scene whenever the
opportunity presented itself.
To the answer, complainant countered with a reply, to which
respondent filed a rejoinder.
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan.
Following several failed preliminary conferences and hearings, IBP Bar
Discipline Hearing Commissioner Wilfredo E.J. E. Reyes issued, on July
22, 2005, an order3 declaring the case as submitted for resolution on
the basis of the pleadings and position papers submitted by the
parties, with their attachments.
In its report dated November 8, 2005, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline recommends that respondent be adjudged guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct and meted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
The recommendation to suspend and the findings holding it together
commend themselves for concurrence.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl
lαω lιbrαrÿ
The Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct.4 The
complementing Rule 7.03 of the Code, on the other hand, provides
that "a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law." Another complementing provision is
found in the Rules of Court providing that a member of the bar may
be suspended or even removed from office as an attorney for any
deceit, malpractice, or misconduct in office.5 And when the Code or
the Rules speaks of "conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not
confined to one's behavior exhibited in connection with the
performance of the lawyer's professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his
profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law invest him with. To
borrow from Orbe v. Adaza.6 "[T]he grounds expressed in Section 27,
Rule 138, of the Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad
enough to cover any misconduct, including dishonesty, of a lawyer in
his professional or private capacity."
Like Atty. Adaza in Orbe, respondent Atty. Bulauitan also refused
without justifiable reason to comply with his just obligation under a
contract he entered into with the complainant. There can be no
quibbling as to the complainant having paid respondent the amount
of P300,000.00 out of the total contract cost of P322,000.00. In other
words, there had been substantial contract compliance on the part of
the complainant. A reciprocal effort towards complying with his part
of the bargain would have been becoming of respondent, as a man of
goodwill. It would appear, however, that this kind of gesture was alas
too much to hope for from the respondent. For, instead of going
through the motion of delivering the portion of his property to its
buyer after his receipt of almost the entire purchase price therefor,
the respondent mortgaged the whole property without so much as
informing the complainant about it. Like the IBP investigating
commissioner, the Court finds the respondent's act of giving the
property in question in mortgage bordering on the fraudulent and
surely dishonest. The Court, to be sure, takes stock of respondent's
attempt to make amends by promising to return the amount
of P300,000.00. But this promise strikes the Court, as it did the IBP
investigating commissioner, as a mere ploy by the respondent to
evade criminal prosecution for estafa, what with the fact that he has
yet to make good his commitment to return.
Respondent had shown, through his dealing with the complainant
involving a tiny parcel of land, a want of professional honesty. Such
misdeed reflects on the moral stuff which he is made of. His fitness to
continue in the advocacy of law and manage the legal affairs of others
are thus put in serious doubt too. The private nature of the
transaction or the fact that the same was concluded without the
respondent taking advantage of his legal profession is really of little
moment. For, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it
shows him wanting in honesty, probity or good demeanor.7

While the Court agrees with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
respecting the guilt of respondent and the propriety of a suspension,
it is not, however, inclined to impose the severe recommended
penalty of suspension for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, herein respondent, ATTY. ALEXANDER BULAUITAN, is

found guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty and ordered
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year
effective upon his receipt hereof. Let copies of this decision be spread
on his record in the Bar Confidant's Office and furnished the IBP and
the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all
courts.

SO ORDERED.
[A.C. NO. 7214 : November 30, 2006]
AILEEN A. FERANCULLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SANCHO M.
FERANCULLO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Tell the truth and shame the Devil
Shakespeare-Henry IV, Part I, III-1
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed
by Aileen Ferancullo (petitioner) against Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo,
Jr. (respondent) grounded on his alleged commission of estafa,
bigamy and violation of the lawyer's oath. Both parties have starkly
contrasting stories to tell. Hence, the necessity of presenting both
versions.
In a verified complaint dated December 17, 2004,1 complainant
narrated how respondent allegedly took advantage of their attorney-
client relationship to extort money from her in consideration of the
out-of-court settlement of her criminal cases and deceived her into
marrying him by concealing his previous marriage.
Her complaint-affidavit narrated that sometime in February 2004, a
certain SPO1 Lino Taytay referred her to respondent as she was in
need of legal aid concerning a string of complaints for estafa filed
against her. They allegedly agreed to a monthly retainer fee
of P10,000.00 in consideration for respondent's legal services; the
first payment thereof made in the same month of February at her
residence in Central Park Condominium, Pasay City. Respondent
purportedly advised complainant to stay for the meantime at his
office located at GF-7, Elenel Apt., 2243 Luna corner Mabolo Sts.,
Pasay City, to avoid arrest and to keep her safe from the people suing
and threatening her. He allegedly went to the extent of sending his
cousin, Felix Reyes, to fetch complainant from her residence. At night,
complainant and respondent, together with the latter's office staff,
went out for dining and relaxation.2
Complainant recounted further that respondent prodded her to move
into a more secure location, the Youth and Student Travel Association
of the Philippines in Parañaque.3 That allegedly became the start of
his courtship. Complainant averred that respondent would send her
breakfast and flowers. When asked about his personal circumstances,
respondent supposedly told complainant that he was still single
although he had a child out of wedlock. Complainant also maintained
that she saw no apparent indications suggesting that respondent was
married.4
As indicative of their romantic relationship, respondent and
complainant allegedly traveled to different places. According to
complainant, respondent took her to Antipolo to meet his relatives
and to Mindoro to attend the birthday celebration of his mother. They
also purportedly went to Cebu City to meet complainant's eldest
child.5
Complainant claimed that in the beginning, respondent diligently
attended to her cases and advised her not to appear at the hearings
before the Office of the Prosecutor, assuring her that he would
attempt at a compromise agreement with the adverse parties. For
this purpose, between February and July 2004, complainant
purportedly entrusted to respondent varying amounts of money
totaling Four Hundred Thirty One Thousand Pesos (P431,000.00)
based on his assurance that her cases merely involved money claims
which can be settled amicably. Complainant claimed that she had to
ask this amount from her parents. Complainant did not ask from
respondent for any receipt evidencing the transaction.6
Complainant further alleged that she and respondent moved to a unit
at Parrison Tower at F.B. Harrison, Pasay City sometime in April 2004,
where they started living together as husband and wife. The unit was
purportedly owned by a client of respondent who agreed to offset the
amount of rental with the legal fees due him.7
To corroborate her allegation that they lived together as husband and
wife, complainant annexed to her complaint-affidavit five (5)
photographs, three of which show intimate poses of complainant and
respondent.8 Complainant also recounted that during respondent's
birthday celebration held on May 28, 2004 at the rooftop of the
Parrison Tower, he supposedly introduced complainant as his wife to
his guests.9 Complainant attached a VCD copy documenting the event
to her reply to respondent's answer.10 As averred, at the start of the
video, complainant can be seen entertaining the guests and
overseeing the food preparation. Early in the party, complainant's
three children arrived. While respondent was walking around and
entertaining the guests, complainant stood behind the buffet table
supervising last minute preparation before the food was served. As
the guests started to get food from the buffet table, complainant
approached respondent. Respondent placed his hand on the hips of
complainant while the latter whispered at him. All throughout the
video, complainant was either standing behind the buffet table or
conversing with respondent and the guests.
Complainant found out that she was pregnant sometime in June
2004. On August 4, 2004, complainant and respondent allegedly wed
in a rite solemnized in Kawit, Cavite.11 In support of this averment,
complainant annexed to the complaint a photocopy of the marriage
certificate.12
Two (2) months thereafter, in a casual conversation with a certain
Teresita Santos, another client of respondent, Santos told
complainant that respondent was already married to a certain Marlin
M. Maranan. Complainant then confronted respondent who allegedly
admitted that he was married but assured complainant that he was
ready to leave his wife so that they can be together. The relationship
between complainant and respondent turned sour eventually leading
to their separation.13
Complainant sought assistance from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). In a letter dated 14 October 2006, Atty. Romarico
Ayson sent a demand letter to respondent, urging the latter to
shoulder complainant's hospitalization until her delivery and provide
monthly support for the child in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00) thereafter.14
Complainant averred that since their separation, respondent and his
agents had been threatening her with arrest and lawsuits. She also
discovered that the criminal complaints remained pending filed
against her with the Office of the Prosecutor. She claimed that
respondent himself had been exerting efforts so that the criminal
complaints against her would proceed.15
In compliance with the IBP Order dated 6 January 2005, respondent
filed an answer,16 denying the allegations that he committed estafa,
maintained an illicit relationship and contracted a bigamous marriage
with complainant. While admitting that complainant sought his legal
services in connection with the latter's cases for estafa and illegal
recruitment pending before the Office of the Prosecutor, respondent
insisted that his relationship with complainant was purely
professional. In particular, he claimed that the purpose of his visits to
complainant's residence was to show her court orders issued in
relation to her cases. He also averred that it was complainant who
sought refuge in his office and invited him and his legal staff for
dinners to discuss her cases.17
Respondent maintained that complainant insisted on skipping the
scheduled hearings before the Office of the Prosecutor. He also
denied receiving P431,000.00 from complainant, arguing that on the
alleged dates of payments, he was out for court appearances.18 He
admitted going to Cebu City upon the behest of complainant who
shouldered all his expenses, but the visit was only for the purpose of
discussing the cases with complainant's parents.19 Respondent
denied meeting complainant's eldest child in Cebu City and all the
other alleged trips they took together.20
Respondent likewise denied courting complainant asserting that the
latter had already known since February 2004 that he was
married.21 He claimed to be happily married to his legal wife. He
denied living in together with complainant or providing a residence
for complainant. According to him, complainant vacated her
residence at Central Park Condominium, Pasay City because her lease
application was denied.22 While he admitted that the unit at Parrison
Tower at F.B. Harrison, Pasay City belonged to his client, respondent
insisted that his relatives had been occupying the same since March
2004, thus making it impossible for complainant to have transferred
to said unit in April 2004.23
Respondent described as contrary to human experience the
allegation of complainant that he introduced her as his wife during his
birthday celebration on 28 May 2004, where his brothers and sisters
were also present. To support this claim, he submitted the affidavits
of fifteen guests in his party, stating that respondent did not
introduce complainant as his wife.24
Respondent also denied that a marriage celebration between him and
complainant took place on 4 August 2004 or that he signed the
marriage certificate and or that he got her pregnant. He had already
instituted corresponding criminal complaints against complainant for
the alleged falsification of his signature in the marriage certificate.
Respondent claimed that complainant was extorting money from
him, hence the filing of the administrative complaint.25
Complainant submitted a Reply26 to respondent's answer to rebut his
allegations. Annexed to her reply were receipts of payments on
utilities to prove that she actually lived at Parrison Tower and a VCD
copy showing the video clip of respondent's birthday celebration held
on 28 May 2004. Complainant and respondent also filed their
respective position papers. In addition, complainant filed a
Manifestation and Reply with the following annexes: (1) a blue polo
barong and pants allegedly worn by respondent during his birthday
celebration on 28 May 2004; (2) the original bank statement reciting
the deposits made by complainant's parents of the amount
of P431,000.00;27 (3) the original passbook in the names of
complainant
and respondent;28 and (4) the certified xerox copy from the original
of their marriage contract.29
In response thereto, respondent moved to expunge from the records
the annexes to complainant's Manifestation and Reply30 on the
ground that he was not furnished a copy of said annexes and that the
Manifestation and Reply was an unsigned pleading. Complainant filed
an opposition thereto.31
On 20 January 2006, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) issued its Report and
Recommendation to dismiss the complaint against respondent for
lack of merit. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said
Report and Recommendation in a Resolution32 dated 20 March 2006,
finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the
complaint lacked merit. The IBP believed that the complainant failed
to present a clear, convincing and satisfactory proof to warrant the
disbarment or suspension of respondent. The IBP also ruled that the
pictures and VCD not having been duly authenticated could not be
received in evidence.
As is usual in cases of this nature, the adverse parties presented
conflicting versions. The duty to examine the claims and
counterclaims and the evidence to support them ideally lies with the
IBP, but in the instant case, its evaluation leaves much to be desired.
Despite the numerous factual allegations presented by both parties
and the affidavits and documents to support them, the IBP made only
a general conclusion that complainant must be motivated by greed in
filing the instant administrative complaint. Thus, the Court reviewed
the records.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint.
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.33 For the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the
case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of the
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has
consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.34
Contrary to the IBP's opinion, there is a preponderance of evidence
that respondent maintained an illicit relationship with complainant
who was not his legal wife. It also appears that respondent contracted
a second marriage with complainant as evidenced by their marriage
certificate.
The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage
contract.35 Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as
follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record.' When the original of a document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by
a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
The certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer
in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its
contents.36 The marriage certificate plainly indicates that a marriage
was celebrated between respondent and complainant on 4 August
2004, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents. The marriage certificate should prevail over
respondent's claim that the marriage certificate or his signature
therein was falsified. The rule is that a notarized document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have
in their favor the presumption of regularity.37
Respondent contends that the certified true copy of the marriage
contract should be expunged from the records because he was not
furnished a copy thereof and the Manifestation and Reply to which it
was annexed was an unsigned pleading. The records show otherwise.
A copy of said marriage certificate, denominated as Annex "G,"
accompanied the initiatory complaint filed before the IBP and
furnished to respondent. In fact, respondent admitted in paragraph
61 of his answer that he received a copy of the marriage contract.38 A
copy of complainant's Manifestation and Reply, to which a certified
true copy of the questioned marriage certificate was annexed, was
also sent by registered mail to the IBP.
The proscription against unsigned pleadings laid down in Section 3,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in the instant case. In
view of its nature, administrative proceedings against lawyers are not
strictly governed by the Rules of Court. As we held in In re Almacen, a
disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely
criminal but is rather an investigation by the court into the conduct of
its officers.39 Hence, an administrative proceeding continues despite
the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same.40 Moreover, no defect in a complaint, notice,
answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator's Report shall be
considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon
considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or
may result in a miscarriage of justice.41 That the copy of the
Manifestation and Reply furnished to respondent was not signed by
either complainant or her counsel is merely an innocuous error. In any
case, the copy thereof forming part of the IBP records was signed by
complainant.
All told, the Court finds that complainant's version is more credible,
with the caveat that the Court is not accepting hook line and sinker
every allegation of complainant. There is substantial evidence
suggesting that more than a business or professional relationship
existed between complainant and respondent. Complainant
presented certain evidence either proving her claim or demonstrating
as incredible respondent's defense that complainant was merely
extorting money from him. For instance, to prove her allegation that
she and respondent lived together, complainant presented the
original of the retainer agreement between respondent and the
owner of the condominium building where they allegedly lived
together. Complainant also attached to her reply copies of receipts of
payments on utilities and the original passbook of an account in the
names of both complainant and respondent. These pieces of evidence
were supposed to be under the control or custody of respondent, but
the latter offered no explanation as to how complainant was able to
produce them. If respondent's claim is to be believed, complainant
must have gone to great lengths just to fabricate or steal these pieces
of evidence, a theory that is not even suggested by respondent.
Incidentally, vis - à-vis complainant's overwhelming allegations,
respondent offered only denials which are effectively self-serving and
weak under the law on evidence. Other than his general claim that
complainant only wanted money from him, respondent did not even
bother to create his own version of the supposed extortion.
Moreover, the VCD documenting respondent's birthday celebration
on 28 May 2004 belied respondent's claim that he acted as
complainant's legal counsel only and the concomitant assumption
that she was there herself as a guest only. In said party, complainant
entertained the guests and supervised the food preparation.
Obviously, these are not the usual actuations of a client or a guest
merely invited to a party.
Respondent would have this Court disregard the contents of the VCD
and of the intimate photos of respondent and complainant on the
ground that under the rules of evidence, the person who took the
pictures or videotaped the birthday party should identify and
authenticate the picture and VCD.
Respondent's objection will be sustained in civil or criminal litigation,
but not in an administrative proceeding as in the instant case. In
administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot
be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense. 42
The Court, however, finds no sufficient evidence indicating that
respondent falsely promised the settlement of complainant's criminal
cases in consideration of the amount of P431,000.00. The bank
statements showing the deposits made by complainant's parents are
not conclusive of said claim because they do not prove that said
amounts were received by respondent.
For what ethical breaches then may respondent be held
liable?cralawlibrary
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated
Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.
On several occasions, the Court has held that an illicit relation is
considered disgraceful and immoral conduct which is subject to
disciplinary action.43 In Tucay v. Atty. Tucay,44 it was held:
x x x x indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a
married woman, grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession.
This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and
undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license
confers upon him.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath,
a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming
of an attorney. The grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138, of
the Rules of Court, including deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice
of law, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case
without authority to do so, are not preclusive in nature even as they
are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that
a lawyer does or commits in his professional career or in his private
life. A lawyer at no time must be wanting in probity and moral fiber
which not only are conditions precedent to his entrance to, but are
likewise essential demands for his continued membership in, a great
and noble profession.45
In Dantes v. Dantes,46 the Court ordered the disbarment of a lawyer,
describing as grossly immoral his conduct of engaging in illicit
relationships and abandoning his family. The Court exhorted lawyers
to refrain from scandalous behavior, thus:
misappropriated her money. Thus, the Court finds that suspension
from the practice of law is adequate to penalize respondent for his
grossly immoral conduct.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. is found GUILTY of gross
immorality and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific
WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he
commit the same or a similar offense hereafter.
SO ORDERED.

In Barrientos v. Daarol, we ruled that as officers of the court, lawyers

must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically,
a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of
law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals,
those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and
principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to
them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater
import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession
of legal learning.

It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has

three ostensible purposes, namely: (i) to protect the public; (ii) to
protect the public image of lawyers; and (iii) to protect prospective
clients. A writer added a fourth: to protect errant lawyers from
themselves.47

Respondent's intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife

shows his moral indifference to the opinion of the good and
respectable members of the community.48 It is a time-honored rule
that good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law.49 However, the power
to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.
Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such
as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired. 50

The penalty for maintaining an illicit relationship may either be

suspension or disbarment, depending on the circumstances of the
case. In case of suspension, the period would range from one
year51 to indefinite suspension, as in the case of Cordova v.
Cordova,52 where the lawyer was found to have maintained an
adulterous relationship for two years and refused to support his
family.

In Dantes v. Atty. Dantes,53 disbarment was imposed as a penalty on

the lawyer who maintained illicit relationships with at least two
women during the subsistence of his marriage. And so was the case
in Toledo v. Toledo54 and Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,55 where the lawyers
subject of disciplinary actions were found to have abandoned their
legal wives and cohabited with other women.

The exacerbating circumstances present in the cited cases are absent

in this case. Moreover, complainant failed to prove that respondent
[ A.C. NO. 7136, August 01, 2007 ] laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final
moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until
the life in me is gone and until we are together again.
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL
EALA, RESPONDENT.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough
memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that
DECISION
in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

PER CURIAM: . . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND
for Disbarment[1] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
YOURS ALONE!
Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M.
Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M
unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"[2]
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
Eternally yours,
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's)
NOLI
then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her
friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly
Tantoco with whom he had three children. parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later
learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January
that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was
respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read pregnant.
"I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late card on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes
did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal
or she was busy with her work.
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent
ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social
together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted
functions together. For instance, in or about the third week
them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the
"Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday
Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their
celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her
attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila
family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he
Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21.
left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the
Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their
conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of
picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli
furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex
C.[4] (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social
the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship"
card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when
supplied),
unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the
day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking 4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an
down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph
in what you're about to do. 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their
relationship was low profile and known only to the
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting immediate members of their respective families, and that
happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned,
love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne
the two of us? Tantoco.[5] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make
your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I
 15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's
wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own
family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him
morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar.
He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage,
calling it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his
writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very
day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her
"until we are together again," as now they
are.[6] (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph
15 of the Complaint regarding his adulterous
relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral
depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership
in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship
with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and
that as far as his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful
relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally
meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special
friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the
institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere
piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant
and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality
of the marriage contract.[7] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted[8] paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a
ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.[11] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY, [12] alleging that
Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the
Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to
the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth[13] bearing
Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her
daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14,
2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO
DISMISS[14] dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he
denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth
attached to the complainant's Reply."[15] Respondent moved to
dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by
complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a
criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which
was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's
Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were adopted as his
testimony on direct examination.[16] Respondent's counsel did not
cross-examine complainant.[17]
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V.
San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION[18] dated
October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently
proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended[19] that respondent be
disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).[9] profession. (Underscoring supplied)

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading: The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly
dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28,
2006 briefly reading:
19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the
Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the CBD Case No. 02-936
complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the a.k.a. Noli Eala
legal profession.[10] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated: SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of
merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph
Hence, the present petition[21] of complainant before this Court, filed
19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the
pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 139[22] of the Rules of Court.
circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his
purely personal and low profile special relationship with
The petition is impressed with merit.
Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing
the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted
33-word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment[23] on the present petition of
complainant, that there is no evidence against him.[24] The contention
fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh.
"C") and the news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"),
even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is
carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there
are other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation
of complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002,
respondent through counsel made the following statements to
wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the
Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was
low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective
families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in
paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the
circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely
personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under
scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct . . ."
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that
there is indeed a "special" relationship between him and
complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate
of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1")
sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit
relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the
birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of
Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied
the information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the
fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with
Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any
misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be
underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is
the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.[25] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an
adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under
Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing
her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared
void."[26] (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having
flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and
known only to the immediate members of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the
pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect
an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with
it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to
the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as
so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that
the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.[27] (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal
knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's
Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent -
a "lawyer," 38 years old - as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT
MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND
PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to
Irene in the certificate[28] with her signature on the Marriage
Certificate[29] shows that they were affixed by one and the same
person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner
noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical
Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit[30] which he identified at the
witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel
Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.[31]
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and
Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant
evidence - that evidence adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore,
has greater weight than the other[32] - which is the quantum of
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof
beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that
is required.[33] (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because
his relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign
jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action
includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.[34]
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for
disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral conduct,"
not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under
scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised
Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in
the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under
scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has
sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or
without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly
immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding
circumstances."[35] The case at bar involves a relationship between a
married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is
immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is
the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had
an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and
which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to
merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of
sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all
forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:[38]
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the
respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the
records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors,
i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with
a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession.
This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and
undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license
confers upon him.[39] (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before
admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law
in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
(Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family)
of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which
echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the
wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support."[40]
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and
Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer
from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the
investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a
Manifestation[41] on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that
complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to
Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant
filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts
alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been,
on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting
complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final
resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the
same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July
3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the
appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is
finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as
though no appeal has been taken."[42] (Emphasis supplied by
complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently
declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took
place before the marriage was declared null and void.[43] As a lawyer,
respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven
otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [44] In
carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void,
and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect
for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his
unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the
DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant
filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for
Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September
22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's
Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City
Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant
would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish
all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to
complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala,
and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's
frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also
personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje
to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married
to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her
about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving
both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's
subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon
City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had
exchange marital vows with complainant.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06
passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made
part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all
courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited.

Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen
there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address
whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The
happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had
decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too
much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a
residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout
after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love
nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore
fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby
hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against
the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth
of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the
father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning
nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's
supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly
beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not
denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha Irene Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be

prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant
complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if
the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not
have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,[46] viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not

a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in
disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from
that which courts assume in trying criminal case[47] (Italics in the
original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty.

Naldoza,[48] held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.

They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.
[ A.C. No. 6622, July 10, 2012 ]
MANUEL G. VILLATUYA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. BEDE S.
TABALINGCOS, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the
Office of the Bar Confidant, complainant Manuel G. Villatuya
(complainant) charges Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos (respondent) with
unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or Professional
Responsibility for nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross
immorality for marrying two other women while respondent's first
marriage was subsisting.[1]
In a Resolution[2] dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this
Court required respondent to file a Comment, which he did on 21
March 2005.[3] The Complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the record.[4]
On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
(Commission) issued a Notice[5] setting the mandatory conference of
the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the conference,
complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent.
They submitted for resolution three issues to be resolved by the
Commission as follows:
1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to complainant
2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful
solicitation, and
3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for
having married thrice.[6]
The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective
verified Position Papers. Respondent filed his verified Position
Paper,[7] on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on 01
August 2005.[8]
Complainant's Accusations
Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by
respondent as a financial consultant to assist the latter on technical
and financial matters in the latter's numerous petitions for corporate
rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that
they had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to
P50,000 for every Stay Order issued by the court in the cases they
would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by
their clients. He alleged that, from February to December 2002,
respondent was able to rake in millions of pesos from the corporate
rehabilitation cases they were working on together. Complainant also
claimed that he was entitled to the amount of .900,000 for the 18 Stay
Orders issued by the courts as a result of his work with respondent,
and a total of P4,539,000 from the fees paid by their
clients.[9] Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes
supporting the computation of the fees he believes are due him.
Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation
of cases in violation of Section 27 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial consultancy
firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link,
Inc., and used them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit
cases. Complainant supported his allegations by attaching to his
Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane, [10] letter-
proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates[11] and
proofs of payment made to the latter by their clients.[12]
On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused
respondent of committing two counts of bigamy for having married
two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He
submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of
the Civil Registrar General-National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying
that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted marriage
thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in
Dasmarinas, Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma.
Rowena Garcia Piñon in the City of Manila; and the third on 07
September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita,
Manila.[13]
Respondent's Defense
In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He
asserted that complainant was not an employee of his law firm
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office[14] but of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., where the former is a major
stockholder.[15] Respondent alleged that complainant was
unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial
consultant, resulting in the latter's dismissal of many rehabilitation
plans they presented in their court cases.[16] Respondent also alleged
that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding the
payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his
clients. He proffered documents showing that the salary of
complainant had been paid.[17]
As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied
committing any. He contended that his law firm had an agreement
with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would handle
the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the
latter would attend to the financial aspect of the case' such as the
preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be presented in court. To
support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a
Joint Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by
Tabalingcos and Associates Law Offices and Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc.;[18] and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena,
Vice-President for Operations of the said company.[19]
On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit
submitted by William Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., as having no probative value, since it had been
retracted by the affiant himself.[20] Respondent did not specifically
address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages
with two other women.
On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3
Marriage Contracts.[21] To the said Motion, he attached the certified
true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the Certification
issued by the NSO.[22] The appended Marriage Contracts matched the
dates, places and names of the contracting parties indicated in the
earlier submitted NSO Certification of the three marriages entered
into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a
marriage that took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in
Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15 July 1980.[23] The second marriage contract
was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Piñon, and it took place
at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September
1987.[24] The third Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between
respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso, and it took place on 7
September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage
Contracts, respondent was described as single under the entry for civil
status.
On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the
Motion to Admit filed by complainant, claiming that the document
was not marked during the mandatory conference or submitted
during the hearing of the case.[25] Thus, respondent was supposedly
deprived of the opportunity to controvert those documents.[26] He
disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were filed against him by the
complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Respondent further informed the Commission that he had filed a
Petition to Declare Null and Void the Marriage Contract with Rowena
Piñon at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Biñan, Laguna, where it was
docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.[27] He also filed another Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the
RTC- Calamba, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3271. [28] In
both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there
were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name
and allegedly executed with Rowena Piñon and Pilar Lozano on
different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because they
were purportedly null and void.
On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission
scheduled a clarificatory hearing on 20 November 2007. [29] While
complainant manifested to the Commission that he would not attend
the hearing,[30] respondent manifested his willingness to attend and
moved for the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case
against the latter. Respondent cited two Petitions he had filed with
the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage Contracts
he discovered to be bearing his name.[31]
On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission
duplicate original copies of two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of
Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."[32] The first criminal case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage
contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena Garcia Piñon while his
marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid. [33] The other one, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having
committed bigamy for contracting marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin
Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still
subsisting.[34] Each of the Informations recommended bail in the
amount of P24,000 for his provisional liberty as accused in the
criminal cases.[35]
On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory
hearing. In the same proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion
to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the petitions for
nullification he had filed with the RTC Laguna. Thus, the Commission
resolved that the administrative case against him be submitted for
resolution.[36]
IBP's Report and Recommendation
On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and
Recommendation addressing the specific charges against
respondent.[37] The first charge, for dishonesty for the nonpayment of
certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the
proper courts since it was only empowered to determine
respondent's administrative liability. On this matter, complainant
failed to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.[38] On the
second charge, the Commission found respondent to have violated
the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal
services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be
reprimanded for the violation. It failed, though, to point out exactly
the specific provision he violated.[39]
As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty
of gross immorality for violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through
documentary evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by
marrying two other women while the latter's first marriage was
subsisting.[40] Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the
Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name
be stricken off the roll of attorneys.[41]
On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution
No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.[42] On 01
August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing
that the recommendation to disbar him was premature. He contends
that the Commission should have suspended the disbarment
proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed
for the annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name as
having entered into those contracts with other women. He further
contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish
that the latter committed bigamy was not substantial to merit the
punishment of disbarment. Thus, respondent moved for the
reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise moved to
archive the administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the
Petitions he separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment
of Marriage Contracts.[43]
On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for
Reconsideration and affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008
recommending respondent's disbarment.[44]
The Court's Ruling
The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.
First Charge:
Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees
While we affirm the IBP's dismissal of the first charge against
respondent, we do not concur with the rationale behind it.
The first charge of complainant against respondent for the
nonpayment of the former's share in the fees, if proven to be true is
based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.02[45] of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to
divide or agree to divide the fees for legal services rendered with a
person not licensed to practice law. Based on the allegations,
respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid
by clients that complainant solicited for the respondent.
Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing evidence to prove
the existence of that agreement.
We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David[46] that an agreement between a
lawyer and a layperson to share the fees collected from clients
secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the lawyer involved
may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that
complainant's allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP
correctly dismissed the charge against respondent on this matter.
Second Charge:
Unlawful solicitation of clients
Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients
and advertising legal services through various business entities.
Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that Jesi &
Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned
and used as fronts by respondent to advertise the latter's legal
services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP established the
truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the
rule on the solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific
provision that was breached.
A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the
business entities mentioned in the report to solicit clients and to
advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in corporate
rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule
2.03[47] of the Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for
the purpose of profit.
A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful
occupation. Impropriety arises, though, when the business is of such
a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be inconsistent with
the lawyer's duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises
when the business is one that can readily lend itself to the
procurement of professional employment for the lawyer; or that can
be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyer's behalf; or is
of a nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the
practice of law.[48]
It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant
that Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial
and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle used by respondent as a
means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate
rehabilitation cases. Annex "C"[49] of the Complaint is a letterhead of
Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the
engagement of legal services. The letter clearly states that, should the
prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent would
render legal services related to the former's loan obligation with a
bank. This circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the
Code, because the letter is signed by respondent as President of Jesi
& Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law
firm.
Rule 15.08[50] of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to
inform the client whether the former is acting as a lawyer or in
another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations related to
the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations
governing the attorney- client relationship may be operative in one
and not in the other.[51] In this case, it is confusing for the client if it is
not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal services.
Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of
prevalence of this practice by respondent, we affirm the
recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03 and
15.08 of the Code.
Third Charge:
Bigamy
The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious
accusation. To substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted
NSO- certified copies of the Marriage Contracts entered into by
respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the
introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted
after the administrative case had been submitted for resolution, thus
giving him no opportunity to controvert them.[52] We are not
persuaded by his argument.
We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its
focus is on the qualification and fitness of a lawyer to continue
membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities in filing
the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:[53]
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the
verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the
complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled
in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. First,
admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration
of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service
to the public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for
the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law. Second, lack
of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of
law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State
may inquire into through this Court.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the
case against the respondent must be established by convincing and
satisfactory proof.[54] In this case, complainant submitted NSO-
certified true copies to prove that respondent entered into two
marriages while the latter's first marriage was still subsisting. While
respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages,
he resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant.
He did not dispute the authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied
that he contracted those two other marriages. He submitted copies
of the two Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna
one in Biñan and the other in Calamba to declare the second and the
third Marriage Contracts null and void. [55]
We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.
We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He
has not disputed the authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the
NSO- certified copies of the Marriage Contracts presented by
complainant to prove the former's marriages to two other women
aside from his wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding,
these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of respondent are
competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed
bigamy, which renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar.
The documents were certified by the NSO, which is the official
repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage
and death of a person. Having been issued by a government agency,
the NSO certification is accorded much evidentiary weight and carries
with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent has not
presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.
According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S.
the third marriages, he filed civil actions to annul the Marriage Tabalingcos from the Roll of Attorneys.
Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment and
found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third SO ORDERED.
marriage contracts as ordinary agreements, rather than as special
contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code provisions on
marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions
on marriage, prior to its amendment by the Family Code.
Respondent's regard for marriage contracts as ordinary agreements
indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or
his gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to
annul a marriage under the old Civil Code provisions.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent
entered into marriage twice while his first marriage was still
subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,[56] we held thus:

[W]e have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom

we found guilty of misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that
good moral character required of them not only as a condition
precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their
continued membership therein. No distinction has been made as to
whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyer's professional
capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide
his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen
at another. He is expected to be competent, honorable and reliable
at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his
private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional
dealings nor lead others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor
are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and
dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the
lawyer plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands
a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his part so that
the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality

required of him as a member of the bar. He made a mockery of
marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity.[57] His
acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct
and are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court.[58]

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent

and order that his name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty.

Bede S. Tabalingcos as follows:

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal

advertisement and solicitation.

3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in

bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty.

Bede S. Tabalingcos in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another
copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
310 Phil. 652
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In the resolution of 26 September 1994, this Court required ATTY.
JOSE B. TIONGCO, as counsel for the petitioners, to show cause why
he should not be dealt with administratively for the violation of Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility considering:
"x x x the insinuation of counsel for the petitioners that this Court did
not read the petition as borne out by the following statement:
'x x x Truly, it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had read
the petition end the annexes attached thereto and hold that the same
has "failed to sufficiently show that the respondent Court had
committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned
judgment" ...'
which, as earlier noted, is unfounded and malicious, and considering
further his use of intemperate language in the petition, as exemplified
by his characterization of the decision of the respondent Judge as
having been 'crafted in order to fool the winning party'; as a
'hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor'; one 'you could have sworn
it was the Devil who dictated it'; or one with 'perfidious character,'
although the petitioners as plaintiffs therein and who were the
prevailing party in the decision did not appeal therefrom; and by his
charge that the respondent Judge was a bit confused with that
confusion which is the natural product of having been born, nurtured
and brought up amongst the crowded surroundings of the non-
propertied class; In fact, His Honor, Respondent Judge, the Honorable
Severino O. Aguilar had not owned any real property until March 5,
1974 when his Honor was already either Public-Prosecutor or RTC
Judge; in one scale of the balance, a 311 square meter lot, 6 houses
from the Provincial Road, about 6 kilometers from the Iloilo City Hall
of Justice, and, in the other scale, His Honor's brand-new car,
impeccable attire, and dignified 'mien'; and his charge that the
respondent Judge has 'joined the defendants and their counsel in a
scheme to unlawfully deprive petitioners of the possession and fruits
of their property for the duration of the appeal'; and with respect to
the Order of 30 May 1994, by describing the respondent Judge as a
'liar,' 'perjurer,' or 'blasphemer.' " First Division of the Court and put them to public contempt or ridicule;
In his 2-page Compliance, dated 11 October 1994, he alleges that:
"If the undersigned has called anyone a 'liar' 'thief' 'perfidious' and
'blasphemer' it is because he is in fact a liar, thief, perfidious and a
blasphemer; 'this Honorable [sic] First Division, however, forget, that
the undersigned alsp [sic] called him a 'robber' (Petition, pp. 13,
bottom; 14, bottom), a 'rotten manipulator' (Petition, p. 11, line 26)
and 'abetter' of graft and shady deals (Petition, p. 12, bottom, p. 13
top); On the other hand, if the undersigned called anybody 'cross-
eyed,' it must be because he is indeed cross-eyed - particularly when
he sees but five (5) letters in an eight (8) letter-word; Indeed, it must
be a lousy Code of Professional Responsibility and therefore stands in
dire need of amendment which punishes lawyer who truthfully
expose incompetent and corrupt judges before this Honorable
Supreme Court; It is therefore, respectfully submitted, that for all his
pains, the undersigned does not deserve or is entitled to the honors
of being dealt with administratively or otherwise."
and prays:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully
prays of this Honorable Supreme Court, that it forebear from turning
the undersigned into a martyr to his principles."
Yet, he adds the following:
"WITH THE UNDERSIGNED'S RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES - AND UNDYING
LOVE (Constitution, Preamble, 66 word)."
It must at once be noted that Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause
why he should not be dealt with administratively for violation of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in view of his
unfounded and malicious insinuation that this Court did not at all read
the petition in this case before it concluded that the petition failed to
sufficiently show that the respondent court had committed a grave
abuse of discretion. Moreover, while he tried to justify as true his
descriptions of the respondent judge as "liar," "thief," "perfidious,"
and "blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse for his use of the rest
of the intemperate words enumerated in the resolution. Worse,
feeling obviously frustrated at the incompleteness of the Court's
enumeration of the intemperate words or phrases, he volunteered to
point out that in addition to those so enumerated, he also called the
respondent judge a "robber," "rotten manipulator," "abettor" of graft
and corruption, and "cross-eyed."
Atty. Tiongco's Compliance is unsatisfactory and is entirely
unacceptable for the following reasons: first, he impliedly admitted
the falsity of his insinuation that this Court did not read the petition;
second, except as to the words "liar," "thief," "perfidious," and
"blasphemer," he failed to address squarely the other intemperate
words and phrases enumerated in the resolution of 26 September
1994, which failure amounts to an admission of their
intemperateness; third, he did not indicate the circumstances upon
which his defense of truth lies; and, fourth, he miserably failed to
show the relevance of the harsh words and phrases to his petition.
We do not then hesitate to rule that by falsely and maliciously
insinuating that this Court did not at all read the petition in this case,
Atty. Tiongco not only exhibited his gross disrespect to and contempt
for this Court and exposed his plot to discredit the Members of the
he, as well, charged them with the violation of their solemn duty to
render justice, thereby creating or promoting distrust in judicial
administration which could have the effect of "encouraging
discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation on which rests the bulwark called judicial
power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and
relief" (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 [1935]).
In using in the petition in this case intemperate and scurrilous words
and phrases against the respondent judge which are obviously
uncalled for and entirely irrelevant to the petition and whose glaring
falsity is easily demonstrated by the respondent judge's decision in
favor of Atty. Tiongco and his wife in their case for recovery of
possession and damages, and by the dismissal of the instant petition
for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion, Atty. Tiongco has equally
shown his disrespect to and contempt for the respondent judge,
thereby diminishing public confidence in the latter and, eventually, in
the judiciary, or sowing mistrust in the administration of justice.
Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made out a strong case for a serious
violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
reads as follows:
"CANON 11 -- A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE
RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND
SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS."
This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's oath "to
conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts"; his
duty under Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court "[t]o observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers"; and his duty under the first canon of the Canons of
Professional Ethics "to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (20 SCRA 441, 444 [1967]), this
Court said:
"By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court had become commonplace.
Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the
observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in
categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit
is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty
of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as
a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support
the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The
attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with
all good fidelity x x x to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the
duty of an attorney to the courts 'can only be maintained by rendering
no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is
bound to uphold.' [Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86, 92].
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief
that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison
the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He
should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and
men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility."
Expounding further on the lawyer's duty to the courts, this Court, in
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel (31 SCRA 1, 16-17
[1970]), stated:
"A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, 'like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.' [People ex rel.
Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855]. His duty is to uphold the dignity
and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, 'not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice.' [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595,
602]. Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice 'is disastrous to the continuity of the
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people.'
[Malcolm Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160]. Thus has it been
said of a lawyer that '[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high
esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.' [People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 580]. (See
also In re: Rafael C. Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974])."
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of
the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen,
and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right.
Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court
explicitly declared:
"Hence, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected
not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail
of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he 'professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which
would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen.' (Case of
Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).
'Above all others, the members of the bar have the best opportunity
to become conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges.
No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, or no other class has as
great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench.'
(State Board of Examiners in Law vs. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216).
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts
and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice
and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. 'Under
such a rule,' so far as the bar is concerned, 'the merits of a sitting
judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be
profound silence.' (State vs. Circuit Court (72 N.W. 196))."
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court
warned in Almacen:
"But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide
chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate
and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
xxx
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is
essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the
assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers - even those gifted with
superior intellect - are enjoined to rein up their tempers."
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the
freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries
with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not
freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility.
In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales (166 SCRA 316, 353-354 [1988]), it was held:
"Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of
free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this
Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech
and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and
that freedom of expression needs an occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is no antimony between free
expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.
For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself
can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly
system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of
viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are
accepted by the general community."

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in
judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the
members of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice
by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and
abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or
abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42
[1975]); or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and
malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge
(Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA 391 [1988], citing the resolution of 19
January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs.
Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295
[1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled- for remarks
(Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).

That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety
in making the false and malicious insinuation against this Court,
particularly the Members of the First Division, and the scurrilous
characterizations of the respondent judge is, indeed, all too obvious.
Such could only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given
what he wanted. Anger or hate could only come from one who
"seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in
accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in
his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not
accord with his views" (Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234, 238 [1974]).
When such anger or hate is coupled with haughtiness or arrogance as
when he even pointed out other intemperate words in his petition
which this Court failed to incorporate in the resolution of 26
September 1994, and with seething sarcasm as when he prays that
this Court "forebear[s] from turning ... [him] into a martyr to his
principles" and ends up his Compliance with the "RESPECTFUL
APOLOGIES - AND UNDYING LOVE" (Constitution - Preamble, 66th
word)," nothing more can extenuate his liability for gross violation of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of his other
duties entwined therewith as earlier adverted to.

WHEREFORE, for such violation, ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO is hereby

ordered to pay a Fine of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and
WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the record of Atty. Jose B.

Tiongco in this Court.

SO ORDERED.
[A.C. - CBD No. 471. June 10, 1999]
LT. LAMBERTO P. VILLAFLOR, complainant, vs. ALVIN T.
SARITA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This administrative case originated from a sworn affidavit-
complaint1 dated 14 March 1997, filed before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline, by Lt. Lamberto
P. Villaflor seeking the disbarment of Atty. Alvin T. Sarita for
disregarding the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by the
Court of Appeals in relation to the case entitled Lamberto Villaflor vs.
Biyaya Corporation, et al.2 now pending with the same court.
Respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is the counsel of Biyaya Corporation,
the plaintiff in the ejectment case3 filed against complainant Lt.
Lamberto P. Villaflor before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 53,
of Kalookan City. Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Romanito A.
Amatong decided the ejectment case in favor of Biyaya Corporation.
Complainant appealed this decision to the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City, Branch 131,4 which affirmed the decision of the MTC.
Not satisfied with the decision of the RTC, complainant brought the
case on appeal before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA
G.R No. 50623.5 Losing no time, complainant also filed with the Court
of Appeals an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order to prevent the impending demolition of his family
home.
In a Resolution dated 27 December 1996, the Court of Appeals
granted the prayer for a TRO, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a restraining order forthwith issue
against defendants-appellees including the public respondent Judge
or Sheriff or any person under him from evicting and demolishing the
family house of the movant, pending appeal. x x x
SO ORDERED.
The TRO was specifically addressed to, and personally served on, the
Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 131, Kalookan City; the Sheriff/Deputy
Sheriff, RTC Branch 131, Kalookan City; Atty. Alvin T. Sarita; and Atty.
Romeo F. Barza.6 Despite the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals,
respondent on 8 January 1997, filed before the MTC an Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for the Implementation and/or Enforcement of the Writ
of Demolition7 which had already been issued by the trial court as
early as 12 August 1996. In his motion which is quoted hereunder,
respondent stated the reason why he did not heed the TRO:
1. That last January 7, 1997, plaintiff received
a Resolution dated December 27, 1996 from the Thirteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals granting the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO).
2. A close scrutiny of the afore-said Resolution including the Notice of
Resolution and the Temporary Restraining Order show that it was
directed to the Honorable Presiding Judge (Honorable Antonio J.
Fineza) of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131 and
to the assigned (deputy) sheriff thereon and NOT to this Honorable
Court and its deputy sheriff.
3. The only conclusion therefrom is that the Honorable Metropolitan
Trial Court is not restrained nor prohibited from enforcing and/or
implementing its judicial process such as the subject writ of
demolition.
XXX
On 9 January 1997, Judge Amatong granted the motion of respondent
and issued an order8 for the implementation of the writ of
demolition. The demolition order was actually carried out the next
day, or on 10 January 1997, by the deputy sheriff of the lower
court.9cräläwvirtualibräry
In response to the situation, complainant filed before the Court of
Appeals an action for Indirect Contempt against respondent, Biyaya
Corporation, Judge Amatong, And the Register of Deeds of Kalookan
City.
The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 20 February 1997, found
respondent and his co-defendants, Judge Amatong and Biyaya
Corporation, guilty of indirect contempt. The dispositive portion of
the resolution states:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, defendants-
appellees Biyaya Corporation and MTC Judge Ramonito Amatong,
and their counsel, Atty. Alvin Sarita are hereby adjudged GUILTY OF
CONTEMPT OF COURT as they are hereby fined to pay the amount of
P30,000.00 each, as per SC Administrative Circular No. 22-95,
amending Section 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, with a warning that
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Alvin Sarita is likewise REPRIMANDED for his contemptuous or
improvident act despite receipt of Our Restraining Order, without
prejudice to any further administrative sanction the injured party
may seek in the proper forum.
Describing the unfortunate behavior of respondent, the Court of
Appeals said:
Specifically, the Court is convinced that Atty. Alvin Sarita should
answer for contempt of court for misleading if not deceiving the
defendant-appellee MTC Judge into doing a precipitate act of
implementing the writ of demolition of appellants family house which
is restrained by this Court, or for making false allegations that led his
clients to commit a contemptuous act. (Cu Unjieng vs. Mitchell, 58
Phil. 476.) His misinterpretation of the resolution is no defense
otherwise, all lawyers can effectively avoid restraining orders of the
higher court by arguing around the bush. 10
The Court of Appeals also granted the prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered Biyaya Corporation
and Judge Amatong to immediately restore the demolished family
house of complainant or, return to him the estimated value of the
same.
Thereafter, complainant filed a case for disbarment against
respondent before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. The
commissioner11 assigned to investigate the case issued an
order12 dated 3 September 1997, directing respondent to file his
answer or comment to the complaint. The period of time allotted to
answer the complaint lapsed without respondent submitting his
comment. On 8 December 1997, an order13 was issued by the
investigating commissioner requiring the parties to attend the
hearing of the case on 10 February 1998. Respondent failed to appear
therein. The hearing was postponed and reset to 6 March 1998. A
notice of hearing14 was sent to respondent but again he failed to
attend the proceeding. After giving respondent enough opportunity
to face the charges against him, which the latter did not avail, the case
was submitted for resolution on 6 March 1998.15cräläwvirtualibräry
The commissioners report dated 10 September 1998, recommending
the disbarment of Atty. Alvin T. Sarita stated in part:
As clearly established in the resolution of the Honorable Thirteenth
Division of the Court of Appeals in its disquisition on his culpability,
Atty, Sarita is liable not only for deliberately misleading if not
deceiving the defendant-appellee MTC Judge into violating the
appellate courts restraining order, but also for making false
allegations that led his clients to commit a contemptuous act;
As a member of the Bar, Atty. Sarita is mandated by his oath to obey
the laws as well as the duly constituted authorities therein and not to
do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court;
In filing his urgent ex-parte motion to implement the writ of
demolition issued against the residence of the complainant, Atty.
Sarita was well-aware that what he was seeking to do was specifically
restrained by the court of Appeals in no uncertain terms. Even if we
were inclined, in a gesture of utmost liberality, to hold for Atty. Saritas
(sic) and resolve any doubts in his favor, we are simply overwhelmed
by the thought that as a lawyer, Atty. Sarita knew quite well or must
have known quite well that what he was asking for in his motion was
violative not only of an order from the second highest court but more
personally was violative of his own oath as a lawyer;
The findings of the Court of Appeals says it all. What all the more
moves the undersigned to recommend the ultimate penalty of
disbarment against Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is the evident, even palpable
disdain, in which he clearly holds this Office in particular, and the
Integrated Bar in general. Nowhere is this disdain more felt than in
Atty. Saritas deliberate and pointed refusal, not only to file an Answer
to the complaint against him but also his unjustified refusal to appear
before this Office despite repeated notices. It appears that Atty. Sarita
is beyond caring for whatever sanctions this Office may recommend
against him. Surely, he cannot turn his back on the possibility that the
complainants prayer may be granted given the seriousness of his
(Saritas) misdeeds. But then, considering that Atty. Sarita has no
compunctions about misleading a judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court into disregarding and violating an order from the Court of
Appeals, it is no surprise that he would ignore the Commission on Bar
Discipline;
We recommend for the disbarment of Atty. Alvin T. Sarita.
In its 4 December 1998 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors
resolved to adopt the findings of the investigating commissioner, to
wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, Respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is DISBARRED from the practice
of law.
The facts and evidence obtaining in this case clearly reveal
respondents failure to live up to his duties as a member of the Bar in
accordance with the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Lawyers
Oath and Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, thus
warranting disciplinary sanction.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the
dignity and authority of the court, to which he owes fidelity, according
to the oath he has taken. It is his foremost responsibility to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers.16 The highest form of respect to the judicial authority is
shown by a lawyers obedience to court orders and processes.
Atty. Alvin T. Sarita committed an immeasurable disservice to the
judicial system when he openly defied the TRO issued by the Court of
Appeals. By such act, he deliberately disregarded or ignored his
solemn oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to the courts. He
neglected his duties to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers,17 and to act with candor, fairness
and good faith to the courts.18cräläwvirtualibräry
Moreover, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the TRO issued by
the Court of Appeals was ambiguous in its phraseology, respondent
should have carried out the intent and the spirit of the said TRO rather
than choose to be narrowly technical in interpreting and
implementing the same. In De Leon vs. Torres,19 this Court said:
We desire to call attention to the fact that courts orders, however
erroneous they may be, must be respected, especially by the bar or
the lawyers who are themselves officers of the courts. Court orders
are to be respected not because the judges who issue them should be
respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should
be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is
absolutely essential if our Government is to be a government of laws
and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the incumbents
to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.
Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch of the
Government to which they belong, as well as to the State which has
instituted the judicial system.
Not only did respondent disobey the order of the Court of Appeals,
he also misled the trial court judge into issuing the order to
implement the writ of demolition which led to the destruction of the
family home of complainant. In doing so, respondent violated his oath
of office and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood
nor consent to the doing of any in court. Surely, such conduct of
respondent is starkly unbecoming of an officer of the court.
Respondents behavior also exhibited his reckless and unfeeling
attitude towards the complainant. By disobeying the TRO issued by
the Court of Appeals, he inflicted deep physical and moral injury upon
complainant and his family by making them homeless. Obviously, it
did not matter to him whether complainant and his family would still
have a place to stay as long as he won the case for his client. We would
like to emphasize that a lawyers responsibility to protect and advance
the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action
propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other
party.20 Respondent failed to live up to this expectation.

We find the complaint against respondent fully substantiated by the

evidence. However, we believe that the penalty of disbarment
imposed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is too severe and, hereby reduce it to suspension for two
(2) years from the practice of law.21cräläwvirtualibräry

ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is hereby SUSPENDED

for two (2) years from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of
all rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine
Bar, effective immediately.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant, the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the
country.

SO ORDERED.
[A.C. NO. 6517 : December 6, 2006]
MARCOS V. PRIETO, Complainant, v. ATTY. OSCAR B. CORPUZ and
JUDGE FERDINAND A. FE, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Marcos V. Prieto,
against respondent Judge Ferdinand A. Fe, both as a member of the
bar and bench, and respondent Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz as a member of
the bar, for dishonesty, serious misconduct prejudicial to the integrity
and dignity of the Judiciary under Section 27, Rule 138 and Section 1,
Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court relative to the latter's
actuations in the handling of Civil Case No. 1081-BG entitled, Yolanda
M. Roque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al. and Civil Case No. 1518-BG
entitled, Yolanda Marquez Roque v. Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al.
Complainant implies that not only did the respondent lawyer had free
access to the records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG through the help of
respondent Judge, he was also given the liberty to copy what perhaps
would help him in his quest to win the case.
Invoking the principle of res ipsa loquitor, complainant objects to the
fact that Civil Case No. 1518-BG was raffled to the respondent Judge,
who was the former counsel of the plaintiff therein in Civil Case No.
1081-BG. Another reason for his objection is that, allegedly, some
paragraphs in the complaint in Civil Case No. 1518-BG were obviously
copied from Civil Case No. 1081-BG wherein the complaint was
prepared by respondent Judge in his capacity as then lawyer of herein
complainant (plaintiff therein). Complainant claims that the foregoing
constitute misconduct which imply malice or wrongful intent, not just
mere errors of judgment. He insists that the fact that respondent
Judge will try the case upon a complaint in which the plaintiff was his
former client and which complaint was copied from the complaint he
himself prepared does not speak well of his intention as to the
disposition of the case.
Complainant maintains that the act of respondent Judge in allowing
the respondent lawyer to copy the complaint in Civil Case No. 1081-
BG and to present it to court as the latter's work does violence to Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a judge should be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. Complainant also asserts that in placing
his signature in the complaint not written by him, respondent lawyer
committed deceit, which serves as a ground for his disbarment.
In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of this
Court referred the instant administrative case to Court of Appeals
Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation, report and
recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof.
Pursuant thereto, Justice Salonga set the case for hearing on 13
December 2005, and directed the complainant and the respondents,
and their witnesses, if any, to appear before her and to submit
documents relevant to the complaint.
During the scheduled hearing, the complainant and the respondent
Judge, after the marking and offering of their respective documentary
evidence, manifested that they would not be adducing any further
evidence. Upon their motion, they were given a period of thirty (30)
days within which to simultaneously file their Memoranda, after
which the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.
On 13 December 2005, complainant filed his Memorandum. The
respondent judge, on the other hand, filed his Memorandum on 18
January 2006 while the respondent lawyer filed his Memorandum on
20 January 2006.
In her report, Justice Salonga summarized the facts as follows:
In October 1992, Salud Andrada Marquez ("Marquez") mortgaged six
(6) parcels of land to the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc., one of
which is a parcel of land with an area of Twenty Two Thousand Five
Hundred Ninety Nine Square Meters (22,599 sq. meters) located at
Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. FP-15344 under a Free Patent granted on 5 July 1989.
Failing to pay her debt, the bank foreclosed the mortgage. On 2
August 1993, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction
the highest bidder of which was the petitioner. Consequently, OCT
No. FP-15344 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-40223 was issued in the name of the petitioner.
In the meantime, petitioner, through his attorneys-in-fact Antonio O.
Prieto and Monette O. Prieto, mortgaged the aforesaid properties to
Far East Bank and Trust Company.
Seeking the nullification of the mortgaged and the consequent
transfer of the mortgaged properties in the name of the petitioner,
Roque, Marquez' daughter, filed a complaint docketed as Civil Case
No. 1081-BG with the RTC Branch 67, for Declaration of Nullity of
Contracts with Damages against said petitioner, the Rural Bank of
Luna, La Union, Inc. and Far East Bank and Trust Company.
Respondent judge, then a practicing lawyer, was retained by Roque
as her counsel of record in said case and was the one who drafted said
complaint.
On 18 August 2000, the RTC Branch 67, through then Presiding Judge
Jose G. Pineda, issued an order dismissing the case on the ground that
Roque was not a real party in interest since her right of action has still
to ripen upon the death of her mother.
On 8 November 2001, respondent judge was appointed as the
presiding judge of RTC Branch 67. By reason of his appointment, he
completely severed all his professional relationships with his clients,
including Roque, and turned over or relinquished all case records of
his office to said clients.
Upon the demise of Marquez on 9 August 2002, Roque, who had now
acquired by way of succession her mother's right of action to pursue
the annulment of contracts executed over the property formerly
covered by OCT No. 15344, engaged the legal services of respondent
lawyer.
Thus, on 5 January 2004, respondent lawyer, as Roque's counsel, filed
a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Contracts, Reconveyance of
Property, and Damages against petitioner, his attorneys-in-fact
Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O. Prieto, the Rural Bank of Luna, La
Union, Inc. and Far East Bank and Trust Company, Inc., now merged
with the Bank of the Philippine Islands, before the Regional Trial Court
of Bauang, La Union.
On 7 January 2004, the case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1518-BG, was
raffled to the respondent judge. On 8 January 2004, RTC Branch 67,
through Atty. Jeovannie C. Ordo, its Branch Clerk of Court, issued
summons to the defendants. The summons and copy of the complaint
was duly served upon the petitioner on 20 January 2004.
Going over the individual case folders of the newly raffled cases to his
court, respondent judge came across Civil Case No. 1518-BG and
discovered that the plaintiff therein was Roque, his former client.
Immediately, without going over the allegations of the complaint, the
respondent judge issued an Order dated 23 January 2004 inhibiting
himself from the case and ordered that the record of said case be
transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33
("RTC Branch 33").
On 27 January 2004, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 67
transmitted the entire record of Civil Case No. 1518-BG to RTC Branch
33 through its Clerk of Court, Atty. Richard T. Domingo, which was
duly received by the latter.
On 30 January 2004, petitioner separately filed with the RTC Branch
67, an Objection to Competency and his Answer to the Complaint.
Since the records thereof were already transmitted to RTC Branch 33,
RTC Branch 67's Branch Clerk of Court had said pleadings forwarded
thereto. Since then, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1518-BG have
been conducted by RTC Branch 33.
In an Order dated 22 April 2004, after the parties therein filed their
Answers and the issues having been joined, Presiding Judge Rose
Mary R. Molina-Alim of RTC Branch 33 set the case for pre-trial
conference and ordered the submission of the parties' respective pre-
trial briefs.
On 24 May 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC Branch 33 an Amended
Answer together with the Authority given by his co-defendants
Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O. Prieto, in his favor to appear for
and in their behalf, and their Pre-Trial Brief.
In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of the
Supreme Court referred the instant administrative case to the
undersigned for investigation, report and recommendation within
ninety (90) days from receipt thereof. A copy of the said Resolution
was received by the undersigned on 18 November 2005.
Pursuant thereto, in an Order promulgated on 21 November 2005,
the undersigned set the case for hearing on 13 December 2005
directing the petitioner and the respondents, and their witnesses, if
any, to appear before her and to submit documents relevant to the
complaint.
During the scheduled hearing, the petitioner and the respondent
judge, after the marking and offering of their respective documentary
evidence, manifested that they will not be adducing any further
evidence. Upon their motion, they were given a period thirty (30) days
within which to simultaneously file their Memoranda, after which the
case will be deemed submitted for resolution.
On 13 December 2005, petitioner filed his Memorandum. The
respondent judge, on the other hand, filed his Memorandum on 18
January 2006 while the respondent lawyer filed his Memorandum on
20 January 2006.
In her report, Justice Salonga recommended the dismissal of the
complaint against respondents, and that complainant be admonished
for filing the frivolous complaint.
A reading of the records of this case clearly shows that the present
administrative case is unfounded, as it is devoid of factual and legal
basis. Stripped of all its verbosity, petitioner's allegations in support
of his complaint against the respondents should be treated for what
they really are, mere allegations founded on speculation and
conjecture. In this connection, it must be stressed that in
administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondents
committed the act complained of rests on the complainant. Failing in
this, the complaint must be dismissed.
First off, the allegation of the petitioner to the effect that the
respondent lawyer, through the intervention and assistance of the
respondent judge, had free access to the court records Civil Case No.
1081-BG fails to find evidentiary support. Without more, petitioner
deduced that the court records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG were made
available to the respondent lawyer at the instance of the respondent
judge simply because relevant and substantial portions of the
complaint filed by the latter were re-written and adopted in Civil Case
No. 1518-BG. Bare and conclusory as it is, the said allegation deserves
scant consideration.
Emphatically, the mere fact that respondent lawyer had adopted
relevant and substantial portions of the complaint filed by the
respondent judge does not in any way bespeak of any illegal or
unethical practice on his part.
For one, the respondent lawyer could have easily read and gained
access to the case record of Civil Case No. 1081-BG. As can be gleaned
from the records, respondent judge had already turned over and
relinquished his case records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG to Roque after
his appointment to the bench on 8 November 2001. Since she
intended to re-file the case against petitioner, it is expected, if not
necessary, for Roque to give the records of the previously dismissed
complaint to her newly retained counsel. What is more apparent is
the right of Roque and the respondent lawyer, as her retained
counsel, to request access to the court records for their reproduction
or certification.
For another, a perusal of the complaints separately and successively
filed by the respondent judge and the respondent lawyer belies
petitioner's claim that the latter merely copied, verbatim or
otherwise, the original complaint. True, some allegations contained
therein were substantially retained by respondent lawyer. However,
these allegations are essential and crucial to the cause of action of
Roque against the petitioner. Aside from the fact that there is hardly
a number of ways to construct a sentence, petitioner cannot plausibly
claim that respondent lawyer is legally restrained from retaining or
rewriting sentences earlier constructed by the respondent judge.
More importantly, petitioner's assertion that respondent judge
allowed the respondent lawyer to copy the complaint in Civil Case No.
1081-BG is unfounded. Aside from the petitioner's mere say so, there
is not even an iota of evidence to support this assertion. It is all too
obvious that there is a dearth of evidence that would in any way prove
petitioner's accusation against the Respondents.
In the same vein, petitioner's inference that respondent judge
intended to try Civil Case No. 1518-BG is a blatant fabrication. The
records of the case refute this. Reading his petition, it is evident that
petitioner cunningly attempted to mislead this court to believe that
respondent judge is still conducting the proceedings in Civil Case No.
1518-BG and had refused to inhibit himself therefrom. His intent to
deceive this court to achieve his end to vex and harass the
respondents is undeniable.
As asserted by the respondent judge, petitioner cannot feign
ignorance in this regard. He is well aware that the respondent judge
already issued an Order dated 23 January 2004 inhibiting himself from
the case and ordering the transmission of the record of said case to
the RTC Branch 33. In fact, petitioner has been actively participating
in the proceedings of said case before the RTC Branch 33 prior to the
institution of the instant administrative case as he had already filed
several pleadings therewith.
If truth be told, the allegations in the instant petition was ingeniously
written to deliberately and maliciously withhold and suppress the fact
that the respondent judge had already inhibited himself from taking
cognizance of Civil Case No. 1518-BG and that the records thereof had
in fact been transmitted to RTC Branch 33.
All told, it cannot be gainsaid that the instant administrative case in
itself is frivolous, calculated merely to harass, annoy, and cast
groundless suspicions on the integrity and reputation of both
the Respondents. The only piece of evidence that the petitioner has
offered in support of his claim is his bare assertions, which certainly
deserves scant consideration. It must be emphasized that a mere
charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not
synonymous with guilt. There must always be sufficient evidence to
support the charge. This brings to the fore the application of the age-
old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations.
Counter-Petition Against the Petitioner
Adopting the above-findings made in the petition against the
respondents, there is merit in the separate counter-petitions filed by
the latter to hold the petitioner administratively liable for filing an
unfounded and frivolous suit.
As already stated, petitioner's allegations in support of his complaint
against the respondents are baseless, as they are mere allegations
founded on pure speculation and conjecture. Sans evidence, his
petition was purposely written to mislead the Court and cast a doubt
on the integrity and dignity of the Respondents. Petitioner made the
said administrative case as a vehicle to unduly harass or otherwise
prejudice the Respondents. Worse, in selfishly satisfying his own
desire to vex the respondents, he had tarnished the integrity of the
entire judiciary and the bar.
For this reason, the petitioner should be cited in contempt, as what
the Supreme Court had pronounced in the recent case of Galman
Cruz v. Ali-Hormachuelos. Said the Court:
"Verily, this Court is once again called upon to reiterate that, although
the Court will never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission
that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the
peoples' faith in the judiciary, neither will it hesitate to shield those
under its employ from unfounded suits that only serve to disrupt
rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.
The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem
of the Philippines v. Ferrer are enlightening:cra:nad
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace.
Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the
observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in
categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit
is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that it is the duty
of the lawyer to maintain towards the Court a respectful attitude, not
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as
corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the
courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more, the attorney's
oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good
fidelity.to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an
attorney to the courts 'can only be maintained by rendering no
service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is
bound to uphold.'
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at
what he feels is other's lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such
frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief
that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison
the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He
should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and
men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, Justice Sanchez
further elucidated:cra:nad
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is. "like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice."
Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of
government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people."
Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "as an officer of the court, it is
his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily
that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice."
Petitioner's unfounded imputations against respondents are
malicious and offend the dignity of the entire judiciary. Scandalous as
his bare allegations are, the fact that petitioner maliciously insinuated
that the respondent judge allowed access to and assisted the
respondent lawyer in the filing of his complaint desecrates and mocks
the integrity of the judiciary. Equally insolent is petitioner's baseless
postulations that the respondent judge refused to inhibit himself
from Civil Case No. 1518-BG purposely to give leverage to his former
client and her lawyer.
Moreover, in filing a frivolous suit against his opposing counsel,
petitioner violated Canons 8 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates that "all lawyers must conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards their
colleagues and should avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel' and commands all lawyers "to observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."

We have reviewed the records, and after careful consideration

thereof, we find the conclusions of fact and the recommendations of
the Investigator in the above-quoted report to be well-taken and fully
supported by the evidence on record, except for the penalty imposed
on complainant.

Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded

complaint. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise
of the right to litigate, however, this right must be exercised in good
faith.1 cra

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the

proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by
filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.

A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like

the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends - the speedy,
efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and
the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only
help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid unethical or
improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization,
charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice.2 Canon 123 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very
explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and consider it their duty
to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is limited to

persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly
ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its
possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the
exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the
nature of a public trust.4 Thus, a lawyer should not use his knowledge
of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial
processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.5 We cannot countenance
complainant's act of misleading this Court into believing that
respondent judge was still conducting the proceedings in Civil Case
No. 1518-BG. What is evident is that even complainant was well
aware of respondent judge's inhibition therefrom. The respondent
judge, in fact, issued an Order dated 23 January 2004 inhibiting
himself from the case.

In Retuya v. Gorduiz,6 respondent-lawyer was suspended for six (6)

months for filing a groundless suit against a former client in order to
harass and embarrass her. In the case of Arnaldo v.
Suarin,7 complainant Atty. Arnaldo was fined P5,000.00 for filing
frivolous complaint. In this case, which we find analogous to Arnaldo,
we hold that a fine of P5,000.00 will suffice.

ACCORDINGLY, the above-quoted report of Justice Salonga

is APPROVED with modification asto the penalty imposed on
complainant Atty. Marcos V. Prieto. Respondents Judge Ferdinand A.
Fe and Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz are exonerated and the administrative
complaint against them is DISMISSED. Complainant Atty. Marcos V.
Prieto is FINED P5,000.00 for filing frivolous suit with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
[A.C. NO. 5653 : February 27, 2006]
JOHN SIY LIM, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARMELITO A.
MONTANO, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Atty. Carmelito A. Montano stands charged with gross misconduct
relative to his filing of Civil Case No. C-19928 entitled Spouses Tomas
See Tuazon and Natividad See Deecho v. John Siy Lim and the Register
of Deeds of Caloocan City.1
It appears that complainant John Siy Lim was the defendant in Civil
Case No. C-14542 for reformation of contract, quieting of title, with
damages, then pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City, Branch 131.2 The subject of the dispute was a 650-
square meter conjugal lot along A. del Mundo Street, 7th Avenue,
Caloocan City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 860.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of defendant (complainant herein),
and declared that the deed of sale the parties executed on July 15,
1987 was an absolute and unconditional conveyance of subject
property by the plaintiff in favor of such defendant. On motion for
reconsideration, however, the trial court reversed itself and declared
that the sale was in fact an equitable mortgage. It thus ordered the
cancellation of TCT No. 152621 and the reinstatement of the previous
title on the subject property.
The complainant appealed the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 40167. In its Decision dated March 31, 1995, the
appellate court reversed the ruling of the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order dated November 16, 1992, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the original Decision of the trial
court, dated December 2, 1991, hereby REINSTATED, with the
modification that plaintiff-appellee is ordered to pay defendant-
appellant the sum of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos a month as
reasonable rental for the use and occupation of Apartment No. 161
from July 15, 1988 until the premises shall have been vacated and
possession thereof peacefully turned over to defendant-appellant.
The counterclaim for attorney's fees of defendant-appellant is
DENIED. There is no clear showing that the action taken by plaintiff-
appellee was done in bad faith. There should be no penalty on the
right to litigate.3
The aggrieved party elevated the matter to this Court, and the
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 119794. On October 3, 2000, the
Court affirmed the ruling of the CA and denied the petition. 4 Entry of
judgment was made of record on October 3, 2000.5
On January 4, 2002, respondent filed a Notice of Appearance6 as
counsel of Tomas See Tuazon (the losing party) in the RTC of Caloocan
City, Branch 131 in Civil Case No. C-14542. On January 7, 2002, he
filed, in behalf of his client, a "Motion to Comply to [sic] Decision
without Writ,"7 worded as follows:
1. Plaintiff is aware that pursuant to the decision of the court, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the decision
on the present case had already become final and executory.
2. In order to avoid undue inconvenience on the part of herein
defendant, plaintiff shall voluntarily settle the money judgment as
stated in the decision sought to be enforced.
3. The plaintiff will be filing Eight Hundred Ten Thousand
(P810,000.00) Pesos, equivalent to 162 months of rent as per decision
and the same to be covered by supersedeas bond issued by a reliable
insurance company to answer for said obligation.
4. Every month starting February 15, 2002, plaintiff shall deposit to
the court the amount of P5,000.00 as monthly rent.8
On the same date, respondent, in behalf of his clients (the spouses
Tomas See Tuazon) filed the Complaint9 for nullity of TCT and other
documents, reconveyance, maintenance of physical possession
before the RTC of Caloocan City, eventually raffled to Branch 121
thereof (Civil Case No. C-19928).
Meantime, on February 19, 2002, Judge Luisito C. Sardillo of Branch
12610 issued an Order11 in Civil Case No. C-14542 granting the Motion
for Execution with Manifestation earlier filed by the prevailing party
(complainant herein), and denying for lack of merit, the "Motion to
Comply to [sic] Decision without Writ" filed by respondent counsel.
This prompted the complainant to file the instant complaint for
disbarment against respondent. In his Complaint-Affidavit 12 dated
March 20, 2002, complainant alleged that respondent filed the
complaint in Civil Case No. C-19928 out of malice, pointing out that it
involves "the same parties, the same causes of action and relief
prayed for as that of Civil Case No. C-14542." Thus, the complainant
prayed that the respondent be "disbarred and/or suspended from the
practice of law for his gross misconduct," on the following allegation:
6. Evidently, I have been subjected to harassment by the antics of the
respondent in filing a recycled case docketed as Civil Case No. C-
19928 on January 07, 2002. Respondent is guilty in abetting the
conduct of his clients, Sps. Tuazon. He has clearly violated his lawyer's
oath not to promote or sue groundless, false or unlawful suits among
others. Instead of counseling his clients to abide and obey the
decision of our Supreme Court, the final arbiter of all controversies
and disputes, he is showing disrespect to a final and executory
decision of our court.13
In his Comment,14 respondent denied the allegations against him.
While he admitted that he filed Civil Case No. C-19928 as counsel for
the plaintiff therein, he claimed that it was not filed with malicious
intent. Moreover, while the new case involved the same party, it was
for a different cause of action and relief, and, as such, the principle
of res judicata did not apply. He further explained that the complaint
in Civil Case No. C-14542 was for declaratory relief or reformation of
instrument, while Civil Case No. 19928 was for annulment of title. He
accepted the case based on "his professional appreciation that his
client had a good case."
In his Reply,15 the complainant stressed that the respondent was
guilty of forum shopping; Civil Case No. C-19928 was nothing but a
revival of the old complaint; and "the lame excuse of the respondent
that the present case is an action in rem while the other case is an
action in personam" did not merit consideration.
On November 25, 2002, the Court resolved to refer the matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.16
On September 1, 2003, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline assigned
the case to Commissioner Salvador L. Peña. Only the counsel for the
respondent appeared at the mandatory conference held on
September 30, 2003. Finding that there were no factual issues in the
case, Commissioner Peña terminated the mandatory conference and
ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position
Papers, and, thereafter, considered the case submitted for resolution.
The case was re-assigned to Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila who
submitted his Report and Recommendation dated May 9, 2005,
finding the respondent guilty of misconduct. It was recommended
that respondent be meted a two months' suspension from the
practice of law.
According to the Investigating Commissioner, the elements of res
judicata are present in this case as to bar the filing of Civil Case No. C-
19928 since (a) the judgment in Civil Case No. C-14542, upholding the
validity of the absolute deed of sale, had attained finality; (b) the
court which rendered the decision had the required jurisdiction; and
(c) the disposition of the case was a judgment on the merits.
On October 22, 2005, the Board of Governors of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-108, adopting said
Report and Recommendation with the modification that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
We agree that respondent is administratively
liable.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
In this case, it is clear that respondent is guilty of forum shopping. By
his own admission, he was aware that Civil Case No. C-14542 was
already final and executory when he filed the second case (Civil Case
No. C-19928). His allegation that he "was not the original counsel of
his clients" and that "when he filed the subsequent case for nullity of
TCT, his motive was to protect the rights of his clients whom he
believed were not properly addressed in the prior case for
reformation and quieting of title," deserves scant consideration. As a
responsible member of the bar, he should have explained the effect
of such final and executory decision on his clients' rights, instead of
encouraging them to file another case involving the same property
and asserting the same rights.
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously
or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It
exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase
the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in
determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the
parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the
same reliefs.17 Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in another.18 Thus, the following requisites
should concur:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the
identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
x x x19
The fact that the parties in the first and second cases are not identical
will not prevent the application of the principle of res judicata. Mere
substantial identity of parties, or a community of interests between a
party in the first case and a party in the subsequent case, even if the
latter was not impleaded in the first case, is sufficient.20 Moreover, a
party cannot, by varying the form of action or adopting a different
method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle
that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated
between the same parties or their privies. 21 This was what
respondent resorted to in order to give some semblance of merit to
the complaint for annulment of title. He should have realized that the
ruling of the Court in Tuazon v. Court of Appeals22 effectively
determined with finality the rights and obligations of the parties
under the questioned deed of sale.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense
of truth and the administration of justice.23 The filing of multiple
petitions constitutes abuse of the Court's processes and improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court.
Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious
petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and
executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of
his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and
to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are
consistent with truth and honor.24
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in
violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also
violated Rule 12.0225 and Rule 12.0426 of the Code, as well as a
lawyer's mandate "to delay no man for money or malice."27
Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the
courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to
delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes
such lawyer's duty. Indeed, the Court has time and again warned not
to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs the court dockets.28
While we rule that the respondent should be sanctioned for his
actions, we also note that the power to disbar should be exercised
with great caution, to be imposed only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Disbarment should
never be decreed where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end
desired.29
WHEREFORE, for violating Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, respondent Atty. Carmelito A. Montano is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. He is STERNLY
WARNED that any future violation of his duties as a lawyer will be
dealt with more severely. This Decision is immediately executory.
Atty. Montano is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of receipt
of this decision.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3294 February 17, 1993
MARIO S. MARIVELES, Complainant,
MALLARI, Respondent.
Rodolfo B. Ta-asan for complainant.
-->
PER CURIAM:
consideration of petitioner's appeal through a new counsel. (pp. 106-
107, Rollo).
vs. ATTY. ODILON C.
On February 15, 1989, the administrative complaint was referred to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The IBP's Committee on Bar Discipline investigated the complaint and
held hearings. On March 3, 1992, it submitted to this Court a
report/resolution finding:

On January 11, 1989, Mario S. Mariveles of Davao City filed an

administrative complaint against his former counsel, Attorney Odilon
C. Mallari, whose legal services he had engaged in 1984 to handle his
defense in Criminal Case No. 6608 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City where he was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise
known as the Bouncing Checks
Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
After an adverse decision was rendered on December 26, 1986,
Mariveles instructed Attorney Mallari to appeal the trial court's
decision to the Court of Appeals, which the respondent
did.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
However, in the Court of Appeals, despite numerous extensions of
time, totalling 245 days, which he obtained from the Court, Attorney
Mallari failed to file the appellant's brief, resulting in the dismissal of
the appeal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Complainant discovered his lawyer's desertion only when he was
subpoenaed by the trial court to appear before it for the execution of
the decision which had become
final.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Through new counsel, complainant filed a Petition for Reinstatement
of Appeal, Cancellation of Entry of Judgment and Admission of
Appellant's Brief in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, but it was denied by the
appellate court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
He sought relief in this court (G.R. No. 85964, "Mario S. Mariveles vs.
Court of Appeal, et al.") which, on March 13, 1989, granted his
petition, ordered the Court of Appeals to cancel the entry of judgment
in CA-G.R. CR No. 04482, reinstate the appeal, and admit the
appellant's brief filed by his new counsel. The Court said:
It is true that the failure of counsel to file brief for the appellant which
led to the dismissal of the appeal does not necessarily warrant the
reinstatement thereof. However, where the negligence of counsel is
so great that the rights of accused are prejudiced and he is prevented
from presenting his defense, especially where the appellant raises
issues which place in serious doubt the correctness of the trial court's
judgment of conviction, the aforesaid rule must not be rigidly applied
to avoid a miscarriage of justice. These teachings of jurisprudence are
present in the case at bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
In sum, what was committed by the respondent is a blatant violation
of our Code of Professional Responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to
file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Suffice it to state that a lawyer has no business practicing his
profession if in the course of that practice, he will eventually wreck
and destroy the future and reputation of his client and thus disgrace
the law profession. The last thing that his peers in the law profession
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines would do is to disrobe a
member of the profession, for he has worked for the attainment of
his career burning the midnight oil throughout school and passing the
bar. The undersigned, however, could not find any mitigating
circumstances to recommend a lighter penalty. Disbarment is the only
recourse to remove a rotten apple if only to instill and maintain the
respect and confidence of all and sundry to the noble profession. (pp.
249-250, Rollo)
The Court concurs with the above observations. The respondent
demonstrated not only appalling indifference and lack of
responsibility to the courts and his client but also a shameless
disregard for his duties as a lawyer. He is unfit for membership in this
noble profession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Attorney Odilon C. Mallari
guilty of abandonment and dereliction of duty toward his client and
hereby orders him DISBARRED from the legal profession and to
immediately cease and desist from the practice of law. Let the Office
of the Court Administrator and the Executive Judges of the Ninth,
Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Judicial Regions, be furnished with
copies of this resolution for dissemination to all the courts in those
regions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.

On the first aspect, the failure of petitioner's former counsel to file

the brief, for reasons unknown and without any cause imputable to
petitioner, amounted to deliberate abandonment of his client's
interest and justifies reinstatement with consequent due
[A.C. No. 2841. July 3, 2002.]
RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH IV, TAGBILARAN CITY, AGAINST ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
"Membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate to public
service of the highest order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of
society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of
law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the
quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless
crusader." 1 These were the eloquent words of the late Chief Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro in exalting the sacred and honorable legal profession.
But he laments the pathetic and deplorable fact that, "many a law
practitioner, forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant
and his exalted position as an officer of the court, has allowed himself
to become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict
instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise,
a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true
exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice, a mercenary
purveying the benefits of his enlightened advocacy in direct
proportion to a litigant’s financial posture instead of a faithful friend
of the courts in the dispensation of equal justice to rich and poor
alike." 2 Here, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as later shown by his
disgraceful and outrageous conduct, is one such lawyer who has
become an apostate to his exalted position as an officer of the court.
He thus deserves to be weeded out from the legal profession to
protect its sanctity and nobility.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate
of testator William C. Ogan which has since been pending in the Court
of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4,
Tagbilaran City, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 423. In 1976,
Judge Fernando S. Ruiz took over the case from Judge Paulino S.
Marquez who, in turn, inherited it from Judge Antonio Beldia. Noting
that the proceedings have been pending for thirteen (13) years, Judge
Ruiz then inquired into the principal causes of the delay. He found
out, as will be shown later in detail, that Atty. Samuel C. Occeña
caused the delay by disobeying lawful court orders and by willfully
prolonging the litigation through his various maneuvers, in gross
violation of his oath as a lawyer that he will not willingly sue any
groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or delay any man’s cause for
money or malice.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the terms of the
Last Will and Testament of the late William C. Ogan, his residuary
estate was divided among his seven children. One of them, Necitas
Ogan-Occeña, was named in the will as executrix of the estate. As
such, she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as her
lawyer.
The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the
United States of America), and real estate in Cebu City and in Ohio,
U.S.A. The deceased left no debt. Thus, the settlement of the estate
should have been simple and speedy. However, since the death of the
testator on February 1, 1963, the settlement of his estate has not yet
been terminated owing largely to the dilatory tactics of Atty. Occeña.
Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned that the
executrix, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, filed a project of partition on August
4, 1967. On September 22, 1967, the probate court approved the
project except certain portions. The executrix then interposed an
appeal. In view of the delay caused by the pendency of the appeal,
the other heirs filed several motions praying that the estate’s
remaining P250,000.00 cash as well as its shares of stocks in the
Philippines and in the United States be distributed among all the
heirs. The executrix, through her husband Atty. Occeña, vehemently
opposed the motions, asserting that the P250,000.00 cash had
already been earmarked for her husband’s attorney’s fee and other
expenses, and that the shares of stocks could not be distributed
among the heirs because the stock certificates were not in her
possession. The dispute between the executrix, on the one hand, and
the other heirs, on the other, which delayed the proceedings,
centered mainly on the P250,000.00 cash and the shares of stocks.
Records also show that the executrix, through Atty. Occeña,
interposed numerous appeals from the orders of the probate court.
For their part, the heirs repeatedly prayed in their motions for the
release of the shares of stocks and the remaining cash. But the
executrix and Atty. Occeña opposed the same, thus prolonging the
proceedings. In CA-G.R. No. 48716-R (December, 1974), the Court of
Appeals, in remanding the case to the probate court, had this to
say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is, however, earnestly hoped, and the parties are urged, to settle
their differences with the view to closing the estate which has been
pending since 1963. The executrix, the heirs, and the lawyers, are
reminded that the prolongation of administrative proceedings can
only benefit the executor or administrator or the counsels for the
contending parties. It always results in the diminution of the share of
each of the heirs because the estate is burdened with the expenses
of the administration proceedings, the heir must have to pay
attorney’s fee and the longer the proceedings the bigger the
attorney’s fee." 3
Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings
were Atty. Occeña’s claim for attorney’s fee in the amount of
P250,000.00 and the executrix’s refusal, through her husband, to
account for the shares of stocks belonging to the estate which,
according to her, were not in her possession. The other heirs could
not accept that explanation because as executrix, she was charged
with the responsibility of collecting all the assets of the estate.
Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the
executrix to comment why the securities were not in her possession.
She filed her comment, through her husband, that some Philippine
and American securities were not in her possession. To determine
which securities were in her possession, Judge Ruiz on October 22,
1977, issued an order requiring her to submit within 30 days the latest
inventory of all the securities of the estate. However, she failed to
comply with the order. Judge Ruiz then issued another order on
February 6, 1978, "directing her to take possession of all certificates
of stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate and to make
an up-to-date inventory thereof with a statement of their nature and
their value." Again, she did not comply with the order.
Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to the heirs, the
executrix, through Atty. Occeña, appealed the numerous
interlocutory orders of the probate court to the Court of Appeals,
hence, adding to the delay. Because of the propensity of the
executrix, through Atty. Occeña, to elevate interlocutory orders to the
Court of Appeals, Judge Ruiz issued an order on June 16, 1978
directing her to "refrain from instituting any action or proceeding
without first informing the court." The executrix and her husband
disobeyed this order. In fact, he filed six cases with the Court of
Appeals and one with this Court. knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders, in that without prior
notice and hearing, he punished the executrix for indirect contempt
On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy of court and censured her for non-compliance with the probate
Ogan-Gibson, one of the heirs, to go to Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., court’s order of October 16, 1979. For lack of merit, Atty. Occeña’s
to take proper action on the five parcels of land owned by the estate complaint was dismissed by then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez
and to submit a report to the probate court. To provide money for the in a Resolution dated November 19, 1984.
purpose, the court ordered the executrix to release to Nancy Ogan-
Gibson the sum of $1,000.00 from the estate fund, the same to be On November 13, 1979, Atty. Occeña filed with this Court
liquidated with supporting receipts upon her submission of her report Administrative Case No. 2345-CFI against Judge Ruiz for gross
on or before September 30, 1979. The executrix assailed the order inefficiency and dishonesty. In a Resolution dated October 11, 1982,
before the Court of Appeals in a petition for prohibition and certiorari, this Court dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty. Occeña to
docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. SP-10326. Dismissing the petition on substantiate his charges during the investigation.
January 13, 1981 for lack of merit, the Court of Appeals
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Unhappy with what Judge Ruiz stated in his comment on the said
administrative complaint, Atty. Occeña and his wife filed with the CFI
"Indeed it is surprising why petitioner as executrix should oppose of Davao City Civil Case No. 14957 for damages against the former.
such an order of the court which is and would be for the benefit of The couple alleged that they suffered damages upon reading the
the estate and the heirs. All the other heirs completely agreed with judge’s comment filed with the Supreme Court. On June 11, 1982, the
what the trial court did. . . CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, the comment
being an absolutely privileged communication.
"Thus, rather than accuse respondent judge of grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned orders he should be By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and administrative
complimented in finding ways and means of promptly and complaints, found to be groundless, Atty. Occeña further delayed
expeditiously determining the assets of the estate to be ultimately with malice the probate proceedings and inflicted hardship and pain
distributed among the heirs."cralaw virtua1aw library upon Judge Ruiz.

On May 12, 1981, Judge Ruiz cited the executrix for contempt of court
for her failure to obey the orders of October 22, 1977, December 8,
1977, February 6, 1978 and October 16, 1979 and directed her to
report to the court which securities were and were not in her
possession and to give the reason therefor.
On February 11, 1982, the executrix and Atty. Occeña were held in
contempt of court and fined P250.00 each for disobeying the court
order of August 15, 1979 requiring the executrix to release $1,000.00
to Nancy Ogan-Gibson. Both were given the chance to explain their
failure to comply with the order, but they did not submit any
explanation. On January 13, 1981, this order was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10326. It bears emphasis that this
incident delayed the proceedings for four (4) years.
On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order requiring the
executrix to distribute immediately among the heirs all the shares of
stocks of the estate in the Batangas-Laguna Transportation Co., the
Masonic Hall, Inc. and the Motor Service Co.; to report her
compliance within 10 days from notice; and within the same period,
to file a written report to the court stating (a) what other certificates
of stocks belonging to the estate are in her possession; and (b) which
certificates of stocks are not with her, giving the reasons therefor.
Again, the executrix and her husband, Atty. Occeña, did not comply
with the said order. The probate court thus ordered her to explain
why she should not be punished for contempt of court. After several
postponements at her instance and that of her husband, the incident
was set for hearing on April 20, 1981. But neither of them appeared,
thus delaying the proceedings for about a year and a half. Finding the
executrix unfaithful in the performance of her duties, the probate
court, on May 12, 1981, adjudged her in contempt of court.
Forthwith, Atty. Occeña and his wife, filed with the then CFI of Davao
City, Civil Case No. 14456 for damages (P200,000.00 as moral
damages and expenses of litigation) against Judge Ruiz. But, on
October 13, 1981, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
After the dismissal of Civil Case No. 14456, Atty. Occeña filed with the
Tanodbayan a letter-complaint against Judge Ruiz, charging him with
More telling is the fact that by deliberately delaying the proceedings,
Atty. Occeña has inflicted greater harm to the other heirs, with the
executrix herself as his willing partner.
From the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13
petitions were filed with this Court and the Court of Appeals by Atty.
Occeña, questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court.
But most, if not all, were without merit.
Aside from Judge Ruiz, his predecessor, the late Judge Antonio Beldia,
in the same probate proceedings, was also harassed by Atty. Occeña
with groundless administrative charges and suits, both criminal and
civil. These cases, while pending, were then utilized by Atty. Occeña
in securing restraining orders from the Court of Appeals or as grounds
for the judge’s inhibition.
Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
providing inter alia that the CFI may suspend an attorney from the
practice of law for cause, Judge Ruiz, on May 26, 1982, filed with the
same probate court Administrative Case No. 44 charging Atty. Occeña
with gross misconduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer and willful
disobedience of lawful court orders. Instead of filing an answer, he
submitted a motion praying for the inhibition of Judge Ruiz. This
motion was denied. Atty. Occeña was then directed to file his answer
within 15 days from notice which was extended to another 15 days
upon his motion. Still, he did not file an answer. What he submitted
was a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. But it
was denied for lack of merit.
Administrative Case No. 44 was set for hearing on December 2 and 3,
1982, morning and afternoon. Upon Atty. Occeña’s motion, he was
given an extension of 15 days from November 3, 1982 within which
to file his answer. However, he did not comply. Neither did he appear
during the hearing.
Eventually, further hearing of the case was suspended when this
Court issued a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 62453, "Samuel
Occeña v. District Judge Fernando S. Ruiz, CFI-4, Bohol" for
prohibition. However, on August 15, 1983, this Court dismissed Atty.
Occeña’s petition for lack of merit. The hearing of the administrative
case was set on January 30 and 31, 1984, but again, he did not appear.
The hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occeña failed to appear.
Upon his telegraphic request, the hearing was reset on December 13
and 14, 1984. On December 7, 1984, he filed his Answer and Motion
for Referral to the Solicitor General or the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. His motion was denied. The hearing was reset on May 8
and 9, 1985. Upon another telegraphic request of Atty. Occeña, the
hearing was postponed to August 14 and 15, 1985. Again, he did not
appear. Thus, in its order of August 15, 1985, the probate court
considered his failure to appear as a waiver of his right to present
evidence. 4 Respondent violated his lawyer’s oath of office by flagrantly
On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence presented ex parte,
showing that Atty. Occeña has "abused, misused and overused the
judicial system," 5 Judge Ruiz rendered a decision suspending 6 him
from the practice of law for three (3) years. The decision 7 unfolded a
long list of his administrative offenses, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
I No. 23345-CFI, Exh. "Z") filed by respondent against Judge Ruiz in the
Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the court; gross misconduct
in office
During the probate proceedings, respondent Occeña, on behalf of his
wife executrix, filed with the Court of Appeals six (6) cases; and with
the Supreme Court one (1) case, assailing the order of the probate
court directing the said executrix to provide Nancy Ogan, authorized
to determine the assets of the estate in the U.S., $1,000.00 to be
taken from the estate; and the order ordering the same executrix to
report to the probate court the securities belonging to the estate.
Atty. Occeña’s refusal to obey the said orders and elevating the same
to the higher courts unnecessarily delayed the probate proceedings.
II
Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued groundless suits and gave aid
or consent to the same; delayed persons for money or malice
Respondent, together with his wife, filed against the judge of the
probate court two actions for damages which were both dismissed
for lack of merit and lack of cause of action. Respondent also filed
with the Tanodbayan a letter-complaint charging the judge of the
probate court with knowingly rendering unjust interlocutory orders.
The complaint was likewise dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent
also filed with this Court an administrative complaint which was again
dismissed for failure of respondent to substantiate the charge.
By filing the above-cited civil actions for damages, administrative
complaint and criminal charge which were found to be groundless
and unsubstantiated, respondent unduly delayed the settlement of
the estate proceedings by harassing Judge Ruiz who had to spend
time, effort and money to defend himself against said frivolous and
unmeritorious cases.
In fact, respondent’s propensity to file groundless administrative
charges, as well as civil and criminal suits, harassed not only Judge
Ruiz but also the previous judges who handled the case. As a measure
of self defense, these judges were compelled to prepare and file
pleadings or comments thereby using time which could have been
devoted to expediting the closure of the estate proceedings.
Finally, since the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than
13 petitions were filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court.
Most, if not all of these petitions, were determined to be groundless
and without merit.
III
Disobeying the laws
disobeying the clear provision of Rule 140, Section 6, Revised Rules of
Court, entitled "Charges Against Judges of First Instance," which reads
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 6. Confidential — Proceedings against judges of first instance
shall be private and confidential."cralaw virtua1aw library
During the pendency of the administrative complaint (Adm. Matter
Supreme Court, he violated the private and confidential nature
thereof three (3) times, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. On April 1, 1980, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled "Estate of William C.
Ogan, Et. Al. v. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, Et Al., CA-G.R. No. SP-10604",
questioning an interlocutory order of the probate court (No. 2, Exh.
"V") to which he attached as Annex "AW" a complete copy of his
aforesaid administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz albeit the same
is completely immaterial to the issue raised in said petition.
2. In another petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled "Estate
of William C. Ogan, Et. Al. v. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, Et Al., CA-G.R. No.
SP-13162" (No. 4, Exh. "V"), impugning an interlocutory order of the
probate court, he attached as Annex "C" thereof a true and complete
copy of the said administrative complaint although not relevant to the
question therein raised; and
3. On March 29, 1982, when respondent filed a letter-criminal
complaint with the Tanodbayan (Exh. "Y"), he also attached as Annex
"A" thereof a true and complete copy of said administrative complaint
against Judge Ruiz even if said administrative complaint is not
germane to the charge (Page 2, No. 1, Exh. "Y").
By repeatedly violating said provision of the Rules of Court,
respondent, as an officer of the court, put to naught one of the
principal purposes thereof which is to protect the personal and
professional reputation of judges from the baseless charges of
disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible clients, litigants and counsels
(In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; Murillo v. Superable, Adm. Case No. 341,
March 23, 1960; Moran, Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol: VI, page 260).
Respondent committed gross misconduct in office and has not
conducted himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion.
IV
Did falsehood and consented to the doing of same in court.
In his complaint for damages against Judge Ruiz (Civil Case No. 14456
(Exh. "W"), respondent alleged in paragraph IV-7b thereof (Exh. "W-
1") that his wife-executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña was held in contempt
and censured, "without any hearing," for not obeying the probate
court’s order of October 16, 1979 (Exh. "N").
However, the records of the Ogan estate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No.
423) would show that in the order of February 26, 1980, the probate
court directed said executrix to explain within 5 days from notice why
she should not be cited for contempt (Exh. "O"). In the order of April
8, 1980, the contempt charge was set for hearing on June 23, 1980,
at 9:00 o’clock in the morning (Exh. "P") but was reset to October 22,
1980 after the lifting of the restraining order of the Court of Appeals
(Exh. "Q"). This was again reset to April 20, 1981, subsequent to the
denial by the Supreme Court of the respondent’s petition for review
impugning the Court of Appeals’ decision. As stated in the order of
May 12, 1981, page 2, paragraph 3 (Exh. "R"), copies of the order
setting the hearing of the contempt charge on said date (April 20,
1981) were received by the respondent and his wife-executrix on
March 24, 1981. On the date of the hearing, neither the executrix nor
respondent appeared. The following day (April 21, 1981), the court
received executrix’s motion for postponement of the hearing, which
was denied for lack of merit. Subsequently, the order of May 12, 1981
(Exh. "R") was rendered holding the executrix in contempt and
penalized with censure.
In fine, there was hearing with notice but the executrix and her
counsel did not attend.
Meanwhile, respondent once more, committed falsehood when he
subsequently alleged under oath in his letter-complaint to the
Tanodbayan, dated March 29, 1982, against Judge Ruiz (Exh. "Y") that
"without prior notice and without any hearing," Judge Ruiz adjudged
executrix Necitas Ogan Occeña guilty of contempt and censuring her
(page 2, paragraph 2, Exh. "Y-2" ; page 5, paragraph 9b, Exh. "Y-3").
Furthermore, in order to avoid complying with the probate court
order of August 15, 1979 (Exh. "C"), directing said executrix to remit
immediately the sum of $1,000.00 to her co-heir Nancy Ogan-Gibson
with which to meet whatever necessary expenses that she might
incur in inquiring into the status of the 5 parcels of land owned by the
estate at Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., respondent and his wife-
executrix committed falsehood when they stated in their petition
filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10326 that the said
order was issued "without hearing" and thus a violation of procedural
due process. The Court of Appeals, in its decision which has become
final (Exh. "E"), confirmed this falsehood when it held that the
petitioner-executrix "was not deprived of her right to be heard when
the respondent judge issued the two orders in question" (Page 6, Exh.
"E").
In accordance with the provisions of Section 29, Rule 138 8 and
Section 9, Rule 139 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, Judge Ruiz, on
November 26, 1985, transmitted to this Court a certified true copy of
the order of suspension and a full statement of facts. 10
On February 11, 1986, this Court, upon Atty. Occeña’s motion,
restrained Judge Ruiz from enforcing his decision of November 14,
1985. The case then has remained pending so that on May 30, 1989,
this Court issued an Order 11 requiring "the parties to move in the
premises, by informing the Court about the status of the decision or
order suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law,
Judge Ruiz particularly indicating if he still pursues the instant case,
within ten (10) days from notice."cralaw virtua1aw library
On June 2, 1989, Judge Ruiz filed a comment that he has been waiting
for this Court’s action on his decision suspending Atty. Occeña.
On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occeña filed an Explanation and Motion
praying that the case be referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation and recommendation. This Court denied
the motion and instead referred the case to Atty. Emilio Rebueno
(now deceased), then Bar Confidant, for evaluation, report and
recommendation. After going over the records, he recommended
"that the temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Fernando S.
Ruiz from enforcing the decision dated November 14, 1985
suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occeña from the practice of law for a
period of three years be forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty. Samuel C.
Occeña be DISBARRED from the practice of law for grave violation of
his oath of office as attorney; likewise, that his name be DROPPED
from the roll of attorneys."cralaw virtua1aw library
We sustain the evaluation, report and recommendation of the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the same being supported by the facts on
record.
Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct
showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor. 12 His guilt, however, cannot be
presumed. 13 It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done,
as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer
must have been given full opportunity upon reasonable notice to
answer the charges against him, produce witnesses in his own behalf,
and to be heard by himself and counsel. 14 All these requirements
have been complied with in the case at hand.
In fact, it was Atty. Occeña who did not bother at all to appear in the
hearing of the administrative case against him which was postponed
by Judge Ruiz so many times so that he could be accorded the full
measure of due process. The court a quo, therefore, appropriately
proceeded to hear the case ex parte as Atty. Occeña deliberately
failed to appear and answer the accusations against him.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a
member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for
any (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3) gross misconduct in office, (4)
grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath, (7) willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party without authority to do so. Not only did
Atty. Occeña commit deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct
and willful disobedience to a superior court. Beyond these
transgressions, he violated the lawyer’s oath whereby he imposed
upon himself the following duties, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I, _____________________, of ____________________, do
(place of birth)
solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money
or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best
of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the
court as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God."cralaw virtua1aw library
As shown by the records, Atty. Occeña gravely violated his oath of
office in his handling of Special Proceedings No. 423. The facts of the
case succinctly show that through his atrocious maneuvers, he
successfully delayed the disposition of the case for the last thirty-
eight (38) years, causing untold hurt and prejudice, not only to the
heirs, but also to Judges Ruiz and Beldia who heard the case. For
respondent’s part and that of his wife, such prolonged litigation
obviously benefited them. As aptly declared by the Court of Appeals,
the delay "can only benefit the executor or administrator" and "the
longer the proceedings, the bigger the attorney’s fees." But the more
tragic reality is the fact that Atty. Occeña has caused a mockery of the
judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the administration of
justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral
conduct. Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice
law.

This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of
recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that had
been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he use his knowledge of law
as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as
the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the cause of
his client, it should not be at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice. 15

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special

privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally. 16 A lawyer must at all times conduct
himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. 17 He
must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal
profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions by this
Court which includes suspension and disbarment.

Clearly, Atty. Occeña’s conduct has made him unfit to remain in the
legal profession even for a single moment.

It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a

condition precedent to admission to the practice of law. Its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the legal profession. 18
Atty. Occeña has definitely fallen below the moral bar when he
engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts.
This Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and
good moral character as part of a lawyer’s equipment in the practice
of his profession, 19 because it cannot be denied that the respect of
litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a
member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. 20 Thus, for his
serious administrative offenses, punishable under Section 27 of Rule
138, Atty. Occeña deserves the ultimate penalty, that of expulsion
from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEÑA is DISBARRED from the

practice of law. His name is STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys
EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts throughout the
country.cralaw : red

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015
DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant, v. ATTY.
ISIDRO L. CARACOL, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Domiciano F.
Villahermosa, Sr., against Atty. Isidro L. Caracol for deceit, gross
misconduct and violation of oath under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.
Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases3 involving cancellation
of emancipation patents and transfer certificates of title, cancellation
of special power of attorney and deeds of absolute sale and recovery
of ownership and possession of parcels of land derived from Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 433 which covered 23.3018 hectares of
land in Valencia, Bukidnon. Counsel on record for plaintiff was Atty.
Fidel Aquino.
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who
had two sons, Fernando and Efren. As legal heirs of Micael, Fernando
received 53,298 square meters while Efren received 33,296 square
meters. Subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued
in their respective names.
When the agrarian reform law4 was enacted on October 21, 1972,
emancipation patents and titles were issued to Hermogena and
Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in turn sold the
parcels of land to complainant’s spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. A
deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of Raymunda.
On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) issued a decision ordering the cancellation of the
emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that
it was not covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision was
appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court
of Appeals.
On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as “Add’l Counsel for the
Plaintiffs-Movant,” filed a motion for execution with the DARAB,
Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full implementation of the
March 2, 1994 decision.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of
Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition6 which he signed as
“Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela”7.
Villahermosa filed this complaint8 alleging that Atty. Caracol had no
authority to file the motions since he obtained no authority from the
plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren
could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion
because Efren had already been dead9 for more than a year. He
claimed that Atty. Caracol’s real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre,
who had allegedly bought the same parcel of land. Villahermosa
presented affidavits of Efren’s widow10 and daughter11 both stating
that Efren never executed a waiver of rights and that the parcel of
land was sold to Villahermosa through a deed of sale. Both also
stated that they were familiar with Efren’s signature. They state that
the signature in the waiver was different from his usual signature.
Villahermosa averred that Atty. Caracol committed deceit and gross
misconduct.
In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol introduced
falsified and manufactured evidence into the proceedings. Atty.
Caracol, in introducing a document denominated as Waiver of Rights
where Efren waived all his rights in favor of Ernesto Aguirre, was able
to secure the execution of the judgment in one of the cases12 in favor
of Ernesto Aguirre. Villahermosa also filed a case13 for falsification of
public document and use of falsified document against Ernesto
Aguirre and Atty. Caracol.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear
as “additional counsel”. He said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino
who advised him to go ahead with the filing. Moreover, he stated
that he was not aware that there was a waiver of rights executed in
Ernesto Aguirre’s favor.
In its Report and Recommendation,15 the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty.
Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct. It found that
respondent did not present credible evidence to controvert the
allegation that he was not authorized by plaintiff or counsel of
record. Respondent admitted that at the time of the filing of the
second motion, Efren was dead. It noted that Atty. Caracol did not
explain how he obtained the authority nor did he present any proof
of the authority. However, there was insufficient evidence to hold
him liable for falsification.
The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and
misrepresented to the DARAB, Region X that he was counsel of Efren
to protect the interest of Ernesto Aguirre, his real client, violating his
oath as a lawyer. It thus recommended that Atty. Caracol be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation
but modified the penalty to one year suspension from the practice of
law.16 Atty. Caracol moved for reconsideration17 but was
denied.18chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal19 which this Court returned to
him since no legal fees are required in administrative
cases.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We adopt the findings of the IBP.
The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a
presumption of a lawyer’s appearance on behalf of his client,
hence:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed
to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he
appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize
him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on
motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being
shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a
case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and
to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person
who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice
requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without
being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for
contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions. (Emphases supplied)
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Dev’t. Co.,21 this Court
said that while a lawyer is not required to present proof of his
representation, when a court requires that he show such
authorization, it is imperative that he show his authority to While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracol’s
act. Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary liability under the present circumstances, we would like to highlight
the important role of an attorney in our judicial system. Because of
A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the particular nature of an attorney’s function it is essential that they
the client. In fact, the absence of a formal notice of entry of should act with fairness, honesty and candor towards the courts and
appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his clients.30 Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
his client’s name. However, [a] court, on its own initiative or on Responsibility:
motion of the other party may require a lawyer to adduce
authorization from the client.22 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as
counsel for a person without being retained nor may he appear in
This flows out from the lawyer’s oath which each lawyer solemnly
court without being employed unless by leave of court.23 If an
swears to uphold the law and court processes in the pursuit of
attorney appears on a client’s behalf without a retainer or the
justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his demeanor
requisite authority neither the litigant whom he purports to represent
and attitude towards the public in general as agents of the judicial
nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his appearance
system.
unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed
authority.24 If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney
Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than
for a party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or
candid about his representation. We also observe that he has used
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved
underhanded means to attain his purpose. Atty. Caracol’s blatant
in his official transaction.25chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be countenanced. In view
of his actions of contravening his lawyer’s oath and in violation of
We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained
Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
by a client, an attorney-client relationship terminates upon death of
Responsibility we deem it proper to suspend him from the practice of
either client or the lawyer.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
law for a period of one year.chanrobleslaw
Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Isidro L.
appeared in the proceedings before the DARAB. The records are
Caracol GUILTY. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Isidro L.
unclear at what point his authority to appear for Efren was
Caracol from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective upon finality
questioned. Neither is there any indication that Villahermosa in fact
of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
questioned his authority during the course of the proceedings.
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
the time he filed the Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of
Confidant to be appended to respondent’s personal record as an
Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and conscientious
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of
lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his client’s passing and
Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
presented authority that he was retained by the client’s successors-
guidance.
in-interest and thus the parties may have been
substituted.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in People v.
Mendoza28 where he stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan

Magalop, presumably upon the advice of his counsel, Atty. Isidro L.
Caracol of the CLAO (now the PAO). It would seem that this lawyer
was less than conscientious when he advised his indigent client to
admit a crime the man did no[t] commit. As the ponencia observes,
“outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no
evidence against him – presented or forthcoming. From the evidence
of the prosecution, there is no way by which Magalop could have
been implicated.”

It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer
who, through an incredible lack of zeal in the discharge of his duties,
was apparently willing, without any moral compunctions at all, and
without proof, to consign an innocent man to prison.

The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them

without cause. The defense counsel in this case did not seem to
appreciate this responsibility when he prodded Magalop to plead
guilty and waived the right to submit evidence in his behalf.29