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Some Reflections on Aristotle's Concept of Justice

Research · April 2017

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.30492.49285

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Wilson Villones
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SOME REFLECTIONS ON ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF JUSTICE

Wilson Villones

[The ethical framework of Aristotle is centered on the idea that virtue is a mean.
In Book II wherein the debut of the concept had been established, scholars have
interpreted virtues within that scheme. In Book IV, he cited the examples of
courage, generosity, magnificence, highmindedness, gentleness, friendliness, etc.
as virtues that can be interpreted in the scheme of the mean. But surprisingly in
Book V, justice and later on in Book VIII, friendship as virtues that cannot be
categorized into that spectrum; it is quite challenging for Aristotle himself to
interpret and think of justice and friendship as a mean between extremes.
Focusing on Book V, Aristotle recognizes that justice have in fact many different
senses. Given the different senses from which justice can be understood, it does
not mean that there is no point of talking about justice albeit the virtue can be, in a
manner of speaking, is relative. There is a need to talk of justice in Aristotle’s
theory because justice is indispensable to happiness. My aim in this paper is to
elucidate his concept of justice and in what sense its relativity can be properly
talked about. This paper will reflect only on the concept of justice in Aristotle; his
notion of friendship shall be treated in a separate paper.]

§ 1. Background. Recognizing the plurality of different principles and goals of justice.

In the history of ideas especially in the area of political theory, there is a long of train
of thought that attempted to define the essence of justice. Plato, Marx, Rawls and many more
thinkers attempted to define the essence of justice. But not so for Aristotle. In one sense,
there is something within Aristotle’s idea that suggests that there is no Platonic form of
justice because if only we really know what justice is essentially, then we can conform our
actions to what is just. We cannot really know or talk of the haecceity of justice; Aristotle
argued that justice is a relational virtue par excellence and the way we relate to people in
which justice can be manifested is not always the same. There, we see a glimpse that justice
is relative and at the same time has a lot to do with the way we relate and regulate our claims
to one another in the society; hence political relationship. I shall have the opportunity to
dwell more on this later.

In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle got it right when he affirmed the different senses
from which justice can be understood. Aristotle started Book V by the different kinds of
justice and it is quite a revolutionary to recognize the different senses from which justice can
be interpreted. For instance (a.) justice is usually interpreted as that which is fair because
people usually equate justice with fairness and even sometimes talk about those two
interchangeably. Everyone wanted to be treated fairly and people think that is justice. It is not
surprising; Greeks refer to justice as dikaiosune, perhaps derived from fair as ison (balance)
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and just as dikaios (orderly). Surely, fair and just are two different things but I get the
impression that they have a great overlap; Rawls got it right in that respect. Another sense of
justice (b.) can be seen in economic setting wherein justice is interpreted by simple
reciprocity. Justice is delivered when goods with relatively same value are traded in
reciprocal manner. Also, justice in (c.) legislation is relatively interpreted as dispensing some
sort of proportionality between the breech of the law and its punishment. In politics, (d.)
justice is manifested by the manner by which people relate and regulate their claims against
one another. This brings us to the point that certainly, there are such discrepancies in which
human interprets justice. Aristotle recognizes that.1

§ 2. Situating justice in political framework.

At this juncture, we find the idea that for Aristotle, to talk of the essence of justice is
irrelevant because justice like any other virtues cannot be patterned by some preconceived
metaphysical notion, as in Plato. Again, justice is a relational virtue par excellence and the
way we relate to people in which justice can be manifested is not always the same. This idea
encourages me to think that it is logical to discuss Aristotle’s concept of justice within the
sphere of politics. As far as I understand it, justice from point of view of Aristotle is
analogical to political justice because it is only in political setting that justice as a relational
virtue can be operationalized; we cannot be just by ourselves alone, we need others to
exercise such virtue. We see this idea more vividly in Politics. As such, it gives me the
impression that the straight gate to understand Aristotle’s concept of justice is by situating it
in a political sphere. I am always inclined to think that justice has a lot to do with political
affairs because there is a sense in which very often, justice is understood as being treated
equally while dealing with forms of involuntary inequality; this, we do so in politics.

Interpreting justice in political lens also brings the idea that justice is something that is
within the means of everyone and can “actually” be pursued by humans. The idea is
somewhat similar when Aristotle claims that happiness is not a metaphysical concept but is
an actual good and thereby can be pursued. The same thing with justice; and precisely, justice
should be pursued because it is indispensable to happiness; without which human life is not

1
To clarify this citation, Aristotle recognizes the relativity of justice interpretation. Being relative is
different from being arbitrary. Justice is relative in the sense that justice between states of affairs
cannot differ totally. In fact, albeit Aristotle does not correlate the differences directly, there is a sense
in which he seems to be tying a common thread in all such different senses.
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worth living. Certainly, a good life cannot be achieved when people in the society are unjust
in their dealings with one another. Indeed, no one has to live his life in an unjust political set
up. History proves this. The world experienced more than enough bloody revolutions, wars
and other forms of violence in attempt to re-structure the “unjust” society. There is a sense in
which it is natural to human to recognize a form of injustice when he/she sees one. Think for
instance of the immediacy of human reaction the moment they discovered that those who
receive state subsidy are able-bodied, able-minded and below of retirement age. That is
unjust to those who their work, paying taxes only to be used by abled-people. Or, a better
example, think for instance of the public outrage against those involved in PDAF scam. The
immediacy to recognize the injustice done to those who pay their taxes faithfully, only to be
succumbed by corrupt politicians comes somewhat naturally. Aristotle ascribes this to natural
justice.2

Such immediacy of recognition of injustice commands an action to deliver justice. In

here, Aristotle gives us a glimpse on how human could deliver justice while avoiding forms
of injustice in our affairs. Humans have the rational faculty of the soul which will enable
them to structure society in such a way that human conduct will be regulated by the state.
Humans do so through politics. Aristotle early remarked in Book II that politics is the master
science and even there we see that to make a society work, citizens must construct a political
set up wherein they citizens can regulate the claims against one another. Political goods such
as justice is necessary in such goals and we formalize justice through political goods, like
laws.

§ 3. Aristotle’s justice and the need for other political goods.

As far as I understand it, Aristotle’s theory of justice can be established through laws
because laws are articulation of justice. Laws must be less open to interpretation in
prescribing parameters on how social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that
they are both reasonably expected to everyone’s advantage. If a political society have all
these, then the state is considered able to provide a flourishing setting to everyone. However,
justice which is presumed to be articulated by the laws is not enough because to have laws
deliberated by the rational faculty of the soul, high level of political consciousness is further

2
Natural justice only recognizes prima facie injustice, and it does not mean that nature will correct
injustice.
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needed. We grasp it through education as it is presumed to upgrade the political

consciousness of the citizenry. In case that the citizenry does not have a high level of political
consciousness, then the state is doomed to fail catastrophically.3 People will not see the need
for laws, for political set up, for a justice system. Indeed, we need political goods such as
laws and education to have a grasp of justice which will lead citizens to form a contract
whereby they can decide on the basis of what is favorable to all and thereby regulating their
claims against one another. It will be a justice system that presumably will create a fair and
equal opportunity to all and will avoid forms of injustice.

§ 3.1. Clarification.

At this early juncture, albeit justice is commonly interpreted as that which dispenses a
sort of equality to equals and non-equals alike which makes everyone to be treated equal in
ability, Aristotle’s concept of justice does not move along this line. His concept of justice is
definitely not analogical to total equality because there is no such thing for Aristotle; he
recognized that people can never be really equal in all levels. Notice his views on the
superiority of the males over females as well as his approval of slavery in Politics. There we
see why he thought of women to be ruled by men and why slaves are to be kept as
‘instruments for the conduct of life’ is justifiable as they are necessary for the life and luxury
of their masters which are all together required by philosophy. 4 Aristotle even went as far as
claiming that there is such a thing as natural slavery. He says that some people are born to be
slaves because they lack the rational faculty and so they are to be governed by a master who
is intuitively someone who has the capacity of complete exercise of reason; some are born as
freemen and others as slaves. All these amplify Aristotle’s rejection of total equality.

Some of Aristotle’s theories recently mentioned may now not be acceptable but what
is important for our own purposes is to be cognizant that it is in his notions of slavery and the
like that we can see in higher resolution Aristotle’s recognition of fair5 inequalities. I think it
is always better than, say, a force equality present in a communist state – a notion of

3
Think of the Philippine politics. Most if not all of its citizenry elect politicians who, in Platonic
language, do not have the business to rule. In the Philippines, there are a considerable amount of
politicians whose expertise is acting, boxing and the like and without a tincture in political theorizing
and praxis. This is due to a low level of political consciousness of the Filipinos.
4
CHRISTOPHER SHIELDS, Aristotle, Routledge, New York, 2007, 368.
5
Fair in the sense that such kinds of inequality is already at work in nature.
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hypothetical equality that can only work in a hypothetical world.6 Robert Nozick for instance
argues in his How Liberty Upsets Patterns that libertarians would always creep into the
political system. Total equality, there is no such thing for inequality is a fact of life and it can
never be out of the equation. Notice as well why Aristotle himself does not explain why
mental faculties should be distributed thus unevenly.7 Recognition of inequality is crucial but
it does not mean that grasping justice as a virtue in the political society is impossible. In
Aristotle, there is a formal justice which recognizes “equality for the equals; inequality for
the unequals”8. Even in the midst of fair inequality which is in itself inevitable, people could
still pursue justice and ultimately the good life.

§ 4. Aristotle on equity.

Indeed it should be taken into consideration that inequalities are inevitable even in the
most ideal state. And corollary to § 3.1., Aristotle provided us with political mechanism to
deal with inequalities. There is a formal justice in view of this; in Rawls it is the difference
principle.9 Because Aristotle thinks of justice as a relational virtue which underscores
horizontal sensitivity, it is reasonable to say that justice in Aristotelian sense can still be
grasped in spite of inequalities. In Aristotle we see a recognition of inequalities and it can be
dealt with some sort of fair inequality. This is a proportionate equality done by treating equals
equally and unequals unequally.10 It is where equity (epieikes) comes in and this goes far
beyond the law. Indeed there are cases in which the administration of justice in the strictest
sense is definitely questionable but through equity, the administration of justice is given an
element of good sense, a leeway to correct the imbalance. It is through equity that justice can
be extended. I should stop at this point.

6
A force equality would only impede individuals to work hard and surplus goods due to lack of state
guidelines on distribution would create chaos.
7
C. SHIELDS, Aristotle, 368.
8
Cf. ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. by Martin Ostwald, Prentice Hall, Inc., New Jersey,
1999, Book V.
9
Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971.
10
Cf. ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, Book V.

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