Intl Journal of Public Administration

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Patron-Client Politics and Its Implications for Good

Governance in Bangladesh

Abu Elias Sarker

To cite this article: Abu Elias Sarker (2008) Patron-Client Politics and Its Implications for
Good Governance in Bangladesh, Intl Journal of Public Administration, 31:12, 1416-1440, DOI:
10.1080/01900690802194966

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Intl Journal of Public Administration, 31: 1416–1440, 2008
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN 0190-0692 print / 1532-4265 online
DOI: 10.1080/01900690802194966

Patron-Client Politics and Its Implications for

1532-4265
0190-0692
LPAD
Intl Journal of Public Administration
Administration, Vol. 31, No. 12, August 2008: pp. 1–48

Good Governance in Bangladesh

Abu Elias Sarker

Patron-Client Politics
Sarker

Associate Professor, Department of Management, Marketing and Public

Administration, University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates

Abstract: Currently, good governance is a major concern of all politicians, adminis-

trators, academics, the international donor agencies and even common people. It is
now increasingly being realized that without good governance, developing countries
have little chance to progress. While its importance cannot be over-emphasized, many
developing countries are facing difficulties in implementing the good governance
agenda. Therefore, the factors constraining the good governance initiatives have to be
carefully identified and analyzed. This paper identifies patron-client politics as a criti-
cal factor in the analysis of good governance initiatives in Bangladesh. In this paper, it
is argued that patron-client politics is very much entrenched in Bangladesh and it has
had a constraining effect on the institutionalization of good governance initiatives.

Keywords: Bangladesh, governance, good governance, clientelism, developing countries

INTRODUCTION

Good governance has become a catchword all over the world. However, its
appeal has become more pronounced in the developing world. Internal prob-
lems in the governing system as well as the pressures of the international
donor agencies, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund
(IMF), have contributed to the renewed interests in good governance. Most
developing countries adopted the statist approach in managing state affairs.
Although some countries demonstrated success, most countries fell short of
the expectations of state-led development. There was a call for rethinking the role
of the state. Hence the concept of governance attained prominence which tended
to emphasize the role of different institutions in socio-economic development.

Address correspondence to Abu Elias Sarker, Associate Professor, Department of

Management, Marketing and Public Administration, University of Sharjah, P.O. Box
27272, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates; E-mail: elias@sharjah.ac.ae
Patron-Client Politics 1417

There is a plethora of studies about governance and good governance in

the developing world. Scholars have identified many factors for the failure in
governance and good governance initiatives. This paper identifies patron-
client politics as a critical variable in the analysis of governance and good
governance. The concept itself is not new. It has been used for many years in
anthropological and political discourses. This could be a powerful analytical
tool in the analysis of success/failure of governance and good governance ini-
tiatives. In this article, the success/failure of governance and good governance
initiatives will be analyzed within the framework of patron-client politics.
This article argues that most initiatives, in the direction of governance and
good governance in Bangladesh, have been influenced by patron-client politics.
Therefore, this paper intends to focus on the following objectives:

• To review literature on governance, good governance, and patron-client

politics and to develop an analytical framework for interpreting the relation-
ship between patron-client politics and good governance.
• To identify and analyze good governance initiatives in Bangladesh.
• To elucidate how the pervasiveness of patron-client politics has eroded the
noble attempts and/or stopped the policy makers from undertaking good
governance measures.

GOVERNANCE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

In the past, the term governance meant something similar to government in

the act of governing. Accordingly, the past form of governing was based on
authoritarian states and hierarchical structures.[1] However, the contemporary
meaning of governance is fundamentally different from the past. Osborne and
McLaughlin[2] have discussed four distinctive stages of development of public
management: the minimal stage, the stage of unequal partnership between
government and the charitable and private sectors, the stage of welfare state
and the stage of the plural state.
The last stage is of particular importance. A dominant theme in con-
temporary public service reform is the merketization of public services.
Echoing the British experience, Osborne and McLaughlin[2] argue that the
new public sector reform did not end with the market-based model of
Thatcher. Recent developments have shifted the focus of the plural state
from the merketization of public services towards governance, hence mak-
ing it the pre-eminent task of public management.[2] Thus, the new perspec-
tive is based on networks where states and citizens, government and private
sectors, organizations and citizens form a web of relations.[1] In that sense,
governance is the process of policymaking through active and cohesive dis-
cussions among policy makers who are interconnected through a broad
range of networks.[3, 4]
1418 Sarker

By its nature, governance is a multi-stakeholder process. As a process,

governance includes real multiplicity or plurality of institutions which are
supposed to be acting in unison to influence development at and from differ-
ent levels. All these actors are to coordinate and network with each other
more though horizontal linkages which are both non-hierarchical and non-
bureaucratic.[5] Governance thus is no longer defined solely in relation to the
presence of the government as a planner or service provider. Rather, the
planning, management and provision of public services is seen as something
to be negotiated between a number of actors, including the government, the
civil society organizations and the private sector.[2]
There are different views about the relationships between different actors.
Rhodes[6] observes that there are multiple centers of the governance process
and there is no sovereign authority. For Albrow,[7] this trend entails govern-
ment transformed into governance. Offe[8] asserts that governance comple-
ments rather than replaces government. Despite the differences of opinions,
one common element is that there must be a plurality of institutions that works
in tandem with each other to realize specific goals.
The plurality of the state for development is basically a major feature
when governance is conceptualized from the descriptive point of view. The
prescriptive point of view of governance becomes visible in the approaches
advocated by multilateral agencies like the World Bank, the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP), the Development Advisory Committee
(DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and
other bilateral agencies. At this time, the notion of “good governance” came
into prominence.
In fact, good governance is a core concept in the governance paradigm.
According to UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the
Pacific,[1] good governance entails the following characteristics: transpar-
ency, participation, consensus orientation, accountability, responsiveness,
effectiveness and efficiency, and equity and inclusiveness in accordance
with the rule of law. To the World Bank,[4] good governance is character-
ized by “predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy
imbued with professional ethos; an executive arm of government account-
able for all its actions and a strong civil society participating in public
affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law. The DAC[9] has defined
good governance as including “the rule of law, responsible leadership and
effective systems for public management, transparency and accountability.”
The DAC has combined this with participatory development, democratiza-
tion and human rights to form its concept of “participatory development
and good governance.”[9] Many actors in the international donor commu-
nity appear to have accepted the whole package under the rubric of “good
governance.”
In recent years, the international development agencies have further
refined the concept of good governance and come up with a new set of
Patron-Client Politics 1419

indicators covering almost 200 countries from 1996 to 2002. These indica-
tors focus on six dimensions:

(a) voice and accountability;

(b) political stability and absence of violence;
(c) government effectiveness;
(d) regulatory quality;
(e) rule of law; and
(f) control of corruption.[10]

The sixth global forum on reinventing government has identified the follow-
ing key aspects of good governance: government reform and innovation,
local governance, transparency, participation, and social integration and
development.[1]

PATRON-CLIENT POLITICS

Patron-clientage is a concept that was first used in anthropology. Over the

years, the concept has been extensively used in other forms of social, eco-
nomic, and political enquiries. Scott[11] defined it as a special case of
dyadic (two persons) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in
which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his or
her own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both,
for a person of lower status (client) who, for his or her part, reciprocates by
offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the
patron. According to Kaufman,[12] clientelism always manifests the follow-
ing characteristics:

• the relationship occurs between actors of unequal power and status;

• it is based on the principle of reciprocity; that is, it is self-regulating
form of interpersonal exchange, the maintenance of which depends on
the return that each actor expects to obtain by rendering goods and ser-
vices to each other and which ceases once the expected rewards fail to
materialize;
• the relationship is particularistic and private, anchored only in public law
and community norms.[12]

Clientelism is not a blind personal loyalty that creates bonds between

patrons and clients. There is rational economic calculation in building this
dyadic relationship. Schedler[13] cites the Mexican case where voters came up
with an impressive list: cash, caps, pencils, lighters, bags of basic foodstuff
and so forth for the electoral support that the party leaders wanted from them.
Clapham[14] summarizes the phenomenon:
1420 Sarker

Political party leaders at the national level look around for local
leaders who command appropriate support within their own areas.
They offer the local leader . . . a place in the party, perhaps a candi-
date in his home constituency. The local leader gets out the vote,
essentially through his own contacts and authority, and delivers it to
the national party. The national party in turn assuming that it wins
power delivers benefits to its local representative, in the form either
of economic allocations from the centre to the constituency . . . or of
a purely personal pay-off, or of central government support in local
political conflicts.[14]

What was once considered a phenomenon in peasant economy has

now found its presence in all sectors of society. In the equation, the state is
a patron and numerous clientelist groups emerge in the society. These cli-
entelist groups engage themselves with the state actors to get favor. In
return, they provide the valuable support to the state actors. Very often
they act as a support base and a control mechanism for establishing the
legitimacy of the government. Such clientelist strategy is also the balance
of social forces. The state elites always try to develop countervailing polit-
ical forces in order to neutralize the force threatening the legitimacy of the
state. In the process, the force to be used as countervailing is patronized by
the state.
In their ideal forms, democratic institutions are very different from cli-
entelist ones. Democratic institutions adhere to the transparent and legal
procedures. There are periodic elections that give legitimacy to the political
leaders to hold power. Elections also hold political elites accountable to the
electorates.
What seems to be evident from the above discussion is the existence of
clientelist networks prevailing within the society and the susceptibility of state
decision-makers to the pressures of the clientelist networks. The state indulges
in clientelist politics for various purposes. Creating a support base, using cli-
ents as vote banks, neutralizing opposing forces for social balance and using
the clients for social control purposes are the main reasons why the govern-
ment goes for clientelist politics. Social norms in the political economy of
Bangladesh provide an excellent ground for clientelist politics. M.H. Khan[15]
aptly argues:

In a context where the emerging capitalist system does not enjoy

political stability and general acceptance, where the state is not strong
enough to enforce order by force and where civil society is failing to
create the ideological support for the emergence of capitalism,
patron-client networks which organize payoffs to the most vociferous
opponents of the system are an effective if costly way of maintaining
political stability.[15]
Patron-Client Politics 1421

GOVERNANCE IN BANGLADESH

Bangladesh emerged as an independent nation in 1971 after a bloody war

with West Pakistan. After independence, it adopted a parliamentary form of
government with the Prime Minister as the head of the government and the
President as the head of the state. Facing mounting economic, social and
political crises the then government, through a constitutional amendment,
established one-party rule with the President at the pinnacle of the state
power.[16] The experiment was short-lived as the government was violently
overthrown by a group of military officers in August, 1975. From August
1975 to November, 1991, the military and quasi-military regimes ruled the
country.
The military government of General Ershad was overthrown by a popular
upsurge in December, 1991. Again, through a constitutional amendment in
1991, Bangladesh went back to a parliamentary form of government[17,18]
From 1991 to 2007, avowedly democratic regimes, elected through impartial
elections, were in power. Under the constitutional provisions, a caretaker gov-
ernment (CTG) was constituted in October, 2006 to conduct the parliamentary
polls and handover power to the new government.
However, due to political confrontations, elections to the national
assembly were not held. A state of emergency was declared in January
2007 and a CTG with the backing of the army was constituted to conduct
free and fair elections. The new CTG has embarked on a number of
reforms and given a roadmap for the parliamentary election. The analyses
here relating to the state of governance mostly focus on pre-October 2006
events.
Despite the resurrection of the democratic polity, governance and good
governance remain an illusive phenomenon. Attempts have been made during
the tenure of all these regimes to re-organize the governing system. All these
endeavors have, however, largely failed to make the administrative system
responsive, transparent and efficient. A review of contemporary literature[17–21]
suggests the following legacies:

• Pervasive role of the state;

• Ineffective political institutions;
• Inefficiency and ineffectiveness of public officials;
• Centralized decision-making system;
• Lack of political and administrative accountability;
• Lack of transparency;
• Inefficient public employment system, inter-cadre rivalry, and a lack of
linkage between rewards and performance.
• Extensive corrupt practices in all spheres;
• High degree of politicization of the civil service;
• Inefficient public enterprise management.
1422 Sarker

GOVERNANCE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES

AND THE PERVASIVENESS OF CLIENTELIST POLITICS

Different regimes in Bangladesh have attempted to reorganize the governing

system but have failed miserably. Particularly since the early 1990s, a number
of good governance initiatives have been undertaken. Incessant failure has
been a systematic phenomenon. Governance initiatives undertaken over the
years have been overridden by the very clientelist politics in Bangladesh.
First, the stakeholders of clientelist network tried their best to put their priorities
on the reform agenda. So the very beginning of the reform initiative was
inflicted with clientelist nexus. Second, even if the stakeholders failed to
insert their priorities on the reform agenda, they would try to maneuver the
process whilst having their own priories in mind. In the following paragraphs,
we analyze a few reform initiatives which have been influenced by the patron-
clientage politics in Bangladesh.

GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES IN CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

Governance initiatives in civil administration gathered momentum in the

1990s, though some of them were undertaken in the 1980s. Appendix A pro-
vides a summary of the recommendations of important reform committees/
commissions and study groups. The table shows that some commissions/
committees were constituted by national governments. The table also shows
that three reports were sponsored by international donor agencies. In two
studies, “Public Administration Efficiency Study” sponsored by the United
States Agency for International Development and the World Bank-sponsored
“Government That Works: Reforming the Public Sector,” expatriate consult-
ants were also directly involved in preparing these reports.
A majority of the reports focused on the civil service structure. The Public
Administration Efficiency Study, the World Bank Study and the Public
Administration Reform Commission focused on the entire public sector.
A few reports concentrated on segments of the civil service system. The Com-
mittee for Administrative Reform and Reorganization dealt exclusively with
field administration.
The reports emphasized diverse issues. The issues of the rationalization
of the civil service structure, efficiency, managerial dynamism, a merit-based
system, solving intra-service conflict, openness, accountability, and decentral-
ization have long been on the agenda of reforms. All the reports have ade-
quately addressed these issues.
By early 1980s, the Bangladesh public administration system had reached
an unprecedented level of inefficiency. This worried not only national plan-
ners but also international donor agencies, which were financing different
projects under structural adjustment plans. The pressures from them were
Patron-Client Politics 1423

mounting. The Public Administration Sector Study, the World Bank Study
and Public Administration Reform Commission report have been categorical
about the necessity of new public management (NPM)-style reforms. Of
these, the World Bank Study and Public Administration Reform Commission
reports are very comprehensive and have covered almost all aspects of the
NPM model.[17–19]
In terms of implementation, a sorry state of affairs is observed. Reports of
the Pay and Services Commission, 1977 and the Committee for Administra-
tive Reform and Reorganization achieved comprehensive implementation,
although lots of distortions were observed on the ground. Recommendations
of a few commissions/committees (the Martial Law Committee on Examining
Organizational Set Up of Ministries, Divisions, Directorates and other Organi-
zations and the Martial Law Committee on Examining Organizational Set up
of Public Statutory Corporations) were partially implemented. It appears that
the recommendations of a majority of commissions/committees/study groups
have never been implemented. Again, the clientelist lobbies operating at
different levels of the state structure posed serious threats to proper implemen-
tation of the recommendations. For instance, the rationalization of the service
structure meant to cut back the privileges that public sector employees had
been enjoying for years. State decision-makers became susceptible to these
clientelist pressures to maintain their support base in civil administration.
These clientelist groups also took the advantage of state decision-makers’
weaknesses.[22]
Civil administration is an arena which was inflicted with the worst form
of clientelist politics. Subsequent reform efforts were undermined at the
behest of the clientelist lobbies. In fact, politicization turned out to be a very
popular and indispensable weapon for the governments in Bangladesh.[23,24]
Subsequent governments resorted to clientelism in the recruitment process,
promotion and posting matters to serve their respective political purposes.
A new trend has emerged in recent years. A number of senior members of
civil administration were directly related to the political party hierarchy. This
affiliation gave them both short-term and long-term benefits. They received
short-term favors in the form of good postings, rapid promotion flouting gov-
ernment rules and extension of services. In the long-run, many of them aspired
to be inducted into influential positions in the party and the cabinet. The
whole state machinery including law enforcement and the judiciary was
degenerated into politicized instruments of the ruling party.[25,26]
Corruption is widely evident in Bangladesh. While it is not a new phe-
nomenon, its intensity has increased in recent years. Despite the existence of
all the ingredients of the national integrity system, corruption remains
unabated. Success of anti-corruption efforts is a function of the degree of
strength, independence and effectiveness of key institutions of the national
integrity system that comprises the parliament, the executive, the judiciary,
the anti-corruption commission and the media. Most of these institutions have
1424 Sarker

been in existence for long and there have been periodic reforms to make these
institutions effective. The most recent initiative was the establishment of the
Independent Anti-corruption Commission (ACC). Unlike the previous one,
the Bureau of Anti-Corruption, the ACC is a constitutional body and autono-
mous. On paper, it has been given extensive powers and authority to combat
corruption. However, given the contemporary political culture, most efforts by
the institutions of the national integrity system, including the ACC remained
rather ineffective in combating corruption during the term of the last political
government.

GOOD GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE

Although the Administrative Reform and Reorganization Committee in 1982

dealt with field administration, it had wider implications for the entire public
administration system in Bangladesh. As per the recommendations of the
Committee, Thanas (administrative sub-districts) were renamed “Upazilas.”
An elected local government was installed at the Upazila level. A large number
of developmental functions were transferred to this elected local body. A large
number of government officials were deputized and placed under the elected
Chairman of the local body. For the first time, democratic governance, though
limited in scope, was introduced at the Upazila level.[27,28] However, the
newly elected government in 1991, abolished the system.
The government appointed a Local Government Structure Review Com-
mission in late 1992. A two-tier local government system was instituted:
directly elected Union Parishads (council) and indirectly elected district-
based Zila Parishads (district councils).[29] The Thana Development Coordi-
nation Committee (TDCC) was also instituted comprising chairmen of all the
Union Parishads, three Union Parishad women members and deputed gov-
ernment officials at the Upazila level. The chairmanship of the Committee
rotated among the Union Parishad chairmen. The Upazila Nirbahi Officer,
the chief administrator, was the secretary to the committee. The TDCC
decided on the allocation of the Annual Development Program Annual Block
Grant for Union and Upazila development.
After the parliamentary elections in 1996 the new Awami League govern-
ment followed the practice of earlier governments. It took steps to change the
local government system. A Local Government Commission was set up, and
in 1997 it recommended a four-tier system, which also included the reintro-
duction of local government at the Upazila level.[30] As such, it revived the
law in 1998. It was prescribed in the law that the election of the Upazila Par-
ishad (sub-district council) (UZP) would be held within 180 days after the
gazette notification of the law. The Election Commission took initiatives to
hold elections of this local body but backtracked due to the unwillingness of the
government to cooperate.[31]
Patron-Client Politics 1425

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) took over power in October

2001. It formed a five-member sub committee in November, 2001 to review
the Upazila system. The committee submitted its recommendations in favor of
the reintroduction of the UZP. Among other new provisions the committee
recommended the role of Member of Parliament as advisor to the UZP.
However, the government did not take the final decision about the UZP. The
government constituted Gram Sarkars (village government) at the village
level. The Union Parishad at the Union level and Zila Parishad at the District
level have remained intact. Though the Gram Sarkar was not a layer of local
government, its significance could not be overemphasized. The Gram Sarkar
was intended to play a supportive role to Union Parishads. It was responsible
for participatory planning, and for harnessing local leadership to mobilize
individuals at the grassroots level.[32]
The failure of decentralized reforms has to be seen in the wider socio-
economic and political dynamics of Bangladesh. At this point, clientelism is
identified as a major force in Bangladesh politics and it has wide implications
for decentralized reforms.[33] Again, the rise of clientelism as a dominant
mode of politics has to be seen in the context of socio-economic structures in
Bangladesh. Reviewing the available literature Wood[34] has identified a num-
ber of social norms in Bangladesh’s political economy:

• Rural class relations are based on landholding, and there is a trend of con-
centrated possession of key resources such as water, forests, fisheries etc.
• Elite domination is profound over resources and opportunities distributed
by the state and through the imperfect markets of the private sector.
• Historically, state decision-makers have controlled the allocation of
resources causing widespread corruption.
• A system of patron-clientelism is pervasive based on kinship relationships.
• Networks, linkages and interlocked transactions define necessary behavior
in terms of deference to arbitrary and non-bureaucratic authority based on
personal as well as official position.
• Extended families for richer classes very often are capable of operating in
imperfect, non-transparent markets and flouting state policies.
• There is severe competition for scare resources in the context of widespread
poverty, population growth and low resource endowments.
• There is a growing morality of plunder signifying the priorities of family,
wider kin and friendship networks over the public good.

Wood[34] argues that the above-mentioned processes and relations underpin

formal political behavior in Bangladesh. At this point, I will emphasize the
patron-clientage mode of politics, which has been, to a large extent, influenced
by the dimensions of social norms in the political economy of Bangladesh.
This is an important factor to be reckoned with in analyzing the non-
implementation of decentralized reforms in Bangladesh.
1426 Sarker

Historically, local government offices have been under the control of the
rural elites. These rural elites are aligned with central-level political leaders.
These central political leaders consider these rural elites as junior partners and
use them for legitimizing power, creating a power base and engage them as
vote banks as these elites have effective control over the poor sections of the
population.[14,33,35] Moreover, central-level political leaders use these rural
elites to neutralize the urban-based opposition threatening the legitimacy of
the government. In return, the rural elites are allowed to engage in private
accumulation of wealth from government-sponsored development programs
undertaken by local government offices. Let us substantiate the arguments
with concrete examples.
Different strategies have been used by political leaders in post-independent
Bangladesh. The basic objective was to seek political support for the regime
and to minimize the hold of opposition parties over the local society.[36] Like
other military regimes, Ziaur Rahman used the local government system to
legitimize the regime through patronage and the channeling of development
funds through the Union Parishads and Gram Sarkars.[37] More importantly,
Gram Sarkars were supposed to reduce dependence on urban political constit-
uencies and to infuse party ideology among its members, thus completing the
task of social control.[37,38]
Although the declared objective of the Ershad regime was to bring
administration to the door-step of the common people, the implicit agenda
of the reform was to counter the urban political opposition that exploded in
the very beginning of military rule and to create an effective support base.
There is evidence to show that enormous resources were poured into the
rural areas in the name of Upazila development which attracted the attention
of the rural notables who became very active in their placement in and
around the UZP.
A number of case studies reveal that the majority of Upazila chairmen
elected for the first time had allegiance to the ruling Jatya Party. Again it
implies that a direct linkage was established between the state elites and
the rural notables where the decentralizing reform played a crucial role.
The UZP, instead of playing the role of participatory institution, turned
itself into a forum of patronage distribution and private accumulation of
wealth which went uninterrupted in the absence of a strong structure
of accountability. Empirical evidence exposed private accumulation of
wealth by the Upazila chairmen and patronage distribution among those
who clearly showed their loyalty to the ruling party. The Gram Sarkar
introduced during the rule of the last political government was also an
attempt to create the support base of the ruling party. While the necessity
of grassroots organizations cannot be overemphasized, the way they were
formed and manipulated was questionable.[27,28,33,39,40]
What seems to be evident from the above discussion is the existence of
networks prevailing within the society. Within the local society, the rural
Patron-Client Politics 1427

elites are quite dominant and keep the under class people under their control.
It is much easier for them to hold formal power structure at the local level.
The central level leaders make relationships with these elites for specific polit-
ical purposes. It is ultimately the state that acts as the guardian of the rural
power elite. The rural elite do have degrees of autonomous action but this
authority fast erodes if and when confronted with the state machinery. More
often by acting as an intermediary in controlling class struggles in the country-
side, the rural elite serve the function of the extension of state power. In fact,
the rural elites benefit from a system of patronage that is intricately related to
the maintenance of state authority.[11]
The state’s relationship with local government offices in most of the
developing countries is not beyond question. In many cases, so-called democ-
ratization efforts have in fact extended the state’s authority in the countryside
and cemented the relationship between the state and rural elites. In fact, there
are ample empirical evidences to show local government offices render ser-
vices as clients for the state. Local government is not an alternative system of
governance, rather it is very much part of the state. The nature of the state and
the class structure determine the dependent relationship between the state
power holders and local government in developing countries. The state can
exert bureaucratic control over the local government which in fact provides a
cloak for increased state dominance.
Even apparent democratization in the local government system does not
imply effective decentralization of power as the rural elites are incorporated
and co-opted into the larger center of power as a means of legitimating the
political system, ensuring compliance with the decision making system and
garnering votes. In the process, key individuals become linking pins in the
articulation of the village and the state. In other words, the devolution of
power to the local government is a reflection of class alliance between the
urban and rural elites.[41,42]
In recent years, NGOs and the private sector have emerged as important
actors in the development process in Bangladesh. State-led development strat-
egies pursued in the 1970s produced undesirable effects. Eventually, the poor
performance of the public sector and pressures from international donor agen-
cies have paved the way for NGOs and the private sector to play an important
role in society. NGOs in particular have been quite successful in such rural
development activities as employment, education, health and family planning,
agricultural development, infrastructure development, women in develop-
ment, and environment.
However, despite the great potentials, NGOs have failed to act as autono-
mous civil society organizations. There are now glimpses of the incorporation
of NGOs within the prevailing patronage network. Major NGOs are divided
along the political lines and affiliated with the mainstream political parties.
These have effectively diminished the autonomous actions of NGOs in
Bangladesh.[17,29,43–46]
1428 Sarker

It is interesting to note that all regimes in Bangladesh have taken lots of

interest in decentralized reforms. While all of them came to power with the
avowed objective of reforming the administration and the economy, in reality
all regimes resorted to clientelist politics. Their governance initiatives clearly
vindicate the proposition that these regimes undertook these programs for
their legitimacy, regime consolidation and social control purposes.[47–51]

GOOD GOVERNANCE INITIATIVES IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE

MANAGEMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT

After independence the Bangladesh government pursued state-led develop-

ment strategies. The government nationalized major industrial and commer-
cial enterprises. However, the failure of the government became apparent as
plundering and mismanagement were the order of the day. Since 1976, dif-
ferent regimes have pursued the policy of economic liberalization. Along
with denationalization, there has been substantial deregulation that has paved
the way for private sector participation in the economic sphere. The govern-
ment has also pursued a reform regime in the agricultural sector. Under the
reform program liberalization of trade in the irrigation sector, privatization of
trade in fertilizer, liberalization of production, processing, distribution and
import of seeds and liberalization of agro-machines are important measures
the government has undertaken to strengthen private sector participation in
agriculture.[52,53]
However, the presence of the patron-clientage politics was also strongly
felt in denationalization and the private sector development programs. There is a
web of inter-locked exchanges among political elites, business, and intermediate
or middle class organizers, who organize and mediate social discontent.[47,54]
Quadir[48] has provided a systematic analysis of how different regimes in
Bangladesh have endeavored to consolidate political power by embarking on
economic liberalization programs. In order to legitimize its unconstitutional
power base, the military regimes of Ziaur Rahman and General Ershad sought
support from different coalitions, including the civil bureaucracy and the
business elites. The business community offered them political and financial
support. In return, they received from the state legal and illegal, formal and
informal economic and political concessions, including discouraging relevant
financial institutions from effectively designing and implementing tighter credit
policy, overlooking large-scale tax evasions and non-enforcement of legal
provisions from the state.
More importantly, the way public enterprises were sold to the industrial
groups at a give-away price clearly signifies patron-clientage relationships.
Empirical evidence suggests that the buyers received subsidized credit from
government financial institutions. Eventually, they became willful defaulters.
The situation did not change even during democratic governance over the last
Patron-Client Politics 1429

16 years. The number of willful defaulters has increased over the years, virtu-
ally crippling government financial institutions.[48,55,56] These defaulters are
directly or indirectly involved in political party activities and receive political
favors in dodging financial institutions in their loan repayment. Rehman
Sobhan,[54] a leading political economist, observed:

The country’s political institutions are being increasingly dominated by

a section of the affluent elite who exercises considerable influence on
major political parties and the parliament. This in turn influences bank
boards and their management to condone default by repeatedly resched-
uling defaulted loans. Since a number of defaulters are now sitting in
parliament, they have the capacity to bring their concerns directly
before our legislators. A recent incident in which a parliamentary com-
mittee intervened to argue for a defaulter is a demonstration of the influ-
ence on the political system.[54]

Interestingly, despite repeated cries within the civil society, no governments

over the years took any initiatives to prevent black money holders or defaulters
from participating in elections. The mainstream political parties always patron-
ized these defaulters, black money holders and patrons of terrorism. Many of
them received nominations in participating in national elections.[57]

CLIENTELIST POLITICS AND ELECTORAL REFORMS

Since 1991, electoral politics has been a permanent feature in Bangladeshi life.
Despite its great significance electoral politics has suffered a serious jolt in recent
years. Vote rigging and the use of election machineries by the ruling party had
been common phenomena. Major political parties came to a consensus in mid
1990s of having a non-partisan CTG for holding free and fair elections. Three
parliamentary elections were held under the caretaker government. However,
the pervasiveness of clientelist politics has cast doubts on the effective role of the
CTG in holding free and fair elections in Bangladesh. Interestingly, there have
been three different political governments since 1991, and none took any system-
atic initiatives to address the pressing electoral issues. Rather, they took measures
to undermine the significance of competitive electoral politics.
The Election Commission was politicized by inducting party loyalists
as its members. The appointment of election officers was based on party
loyalty. Moreover, the postings of those in the police force, Upazila admin-
istration, schools, and now the armed forces were being politicized to sway
the electoral verdict in favor of the ruling party. In such circumstance, the
scope for a free and fair election where the role of money, defaulters and
mastaans (hoodlums) could be contained is becoming progressively more
untenable.[23]
1430 Sarker

CLIENTELIST POLITICS AND THE RULE OF LAW

In Bangladesh, clientelist politics has undermined the rule of law severely,

resulting in distortions of effectiveness of good governance initiatives. The
rule of law is the extent to which people have confidence in and abide by
rules.[58] These include the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and
the enforceability of contracts. In the past, Bangladesh has faced enormous
amounts of difficulties in establishing the rule of law. The judiciary remained
under the tutelage of the bureaucracy, leaving the rule of law in danger. Lower
echelons of the judicial system were seriously corrupted.[24,59] The use of
gangsters or hoodlums, under the patronage of dominant political leaders, in
killing political opponents was also widespread. The number of extortionists
was increasing day by day under the tacit support of the law enforcing agen-
cies and dominant political leaders. Even the top brass of political leaders was
directly involved in extortion in some cases. This was essentially the criminal-
ization of politics. Many political leaders increasingly used these hoodlums as
political resources in contention for political office and state patronage to
access public resources. The efficiency of the legal environment was further
decreased as the courts were understaffed and lacking basic infrastructural
facilities.
In addition to the integrity of the lower courts which was in question, for the
common people the justice system was hardly accessible and affordable.[24,54,60]
However, there are some glimpses of hope as the new CTG (which has taken
over power under the constitutional provision to hold a general election) has
taken some initiatives to separate the judiciary from the executive.
Sbragia[61] observes that the rule of law and well-defined legal and judi-
cial mechanisms for resolving conflicts among parties are essential for a mar-
ket economy. However, there is a serious concern pertaining to the presence
of the market economy in Bangladesh.[60,62] Schick[63] observes that most
developing countries “tend to have an informal economy with relatively
weak specification of property rights and other formal processes to regu-
late economic activity.”[63] This applies to Bangladesh as well. Hughes[64]
raises an important issue: “. . . it is one thing to adopt a market and managerial
approach, but yet another to have markets work.”[64] There are a number of
factors inhibiting the operations of the market. Of them, the rule of law
remains the most important ingredient.
The scenario has been described by Soto[63] as a phenomenon of infor-
mality in the Peruvian economy that also resembles that of Bangladesh. It is “a
grey area which has a long frontier with the legal world and in which individuals
take refuge when the cost of obeying the law outweighs the benefits.”[63]
Therefore, the enforceability of contracts is a problem. The situation further
reduces the government’s plan to contract out public services and privatize
state-owned enterprises. In fact, this acts as deterrence to the private sector
development and foreign private investment in Bangladesh.[24,62]
Patron-Client Politics 1431

THE NEW MILITARY-BACKED CARETAKER GOVERNMENT

AND GLIMPSES OF HOPE

It has been stated that under the constitutional provision, a non-partisan CTG
has to be instituted to conduct a free and fair poll. As per the constitutional
provision, the last political government relinquished power on 27 October,
2006. The new CTG was supposed to arrange for parliamentary elections
within 90 days. However, things did not move in the right direction. The then
major opposition political party accused the then ruling party of orchestrating
politicization of vital institutions, including the formation of the CTG to rig in
the parliamentary polls. There was a total chaotic situation in the political
arena and many innocent people lost their lives in the street battles between
the two major political parties. Amidst this chaotic situation, the president,
with the backing of the army declared a state of emergency on 11 January,
2007 and a new CTG was instituted on 12 January 2007. The Chief Advisor of
the CTG in his first address to the nation on 21 January 2007 laid down an
ambitious agenda of sweeping reforms of the state’s institutions, including a
streamlining of the electoral process, and a crackdown on corruption and
political muscle.[65] Since then a significant number of steps have been under-
taken to revamp the governing institutions.
The issue of the separation of the judiciary from the executive has been
around for a long time. The CTG took the initiative, promulgated four rules to
initiate giving effect to that verdict and amended the Code of Criminal proce-
dure. The government has completed the establishment of the Judicial Service
Commission and the Judicial Pay Commission and set in motion the infra-
structure for institutionalizing the separation of the judiciary. An independent
judiciary is expected to work impartially and not under any undue influence
from ministers, parliament members, political leaders, media or any powerful
person or association.[66]
The new CTG has taken measures to revamp the election commission
and introduce massive changes in electoral laws to facilitate free and fair
elections for good governance. Though comprehensive legal frameworks are
not ready yet, the CTG is contemplating granting the election commission
complete autonomy. Previously, the commission was under the office of the
Prime Minister. Once it is granted autonomy other residual matters such as
personnel and finance would be streamlined accordingly. The commission
has already started to work on preparing a flawless voter list and identifica-
tion card system to stop vote rigging. Registration of political parties is
another important item on the reform agenda. The commission is adamant to
find out modalities to ban corrupt politicians, bank loan defaulters and ille-
gal money-holders from contesting in the national elections.[67]
For five consecutive years, Bangladesh had been on top of the list of cor-
rupt countries according to the Transparency International. Though the ACC
came into being a long time ago, the then political government kept it spineless
1432 Sarker

intentionally. The CTG has reinvigorated the ACC with the appointment of a
new chairman and commissioners and made necessary changes in its legal
framework to make it a genuine autonomous institution. Within a short span
of time, the ACC has achieved discernible progress in its drive toward curbing
corruption. A large number of corrupt political leaders, businessmen and
bureaucrats have been nabbed, charge-sheeted and are being tried in the court
of law. The CTG has also taken initiatives in revamping the Public Service
Commission by appointing qualified and honest people as the chairman and
members of the commission. The CTG is particularly keen to keep the com-
mission away from the interference of the executive government.[68]
It should be kept in mind that the concept of CTG is a temporary mea-
sure. No doubt, it has taken some commendable steps. But the most pressing
issue is whether these measures could be sustained over a long period of
time. The success of good governance initiatives rests ultimately with the
elected political government that would be assuming power in the years
ahead. In the mean time, debates about the reform of political parties have
also cropped up. There is a strong allegation that there is no intra-party
democracy in Bangladesh. One sort of dictatorial system exists in the main-
stream political parties in Bangladesh. Now there is a clamor for sweeping
reforms within the political parties, including collective leadership, transpar-
ency in financial transaction, electoral competition within the party, keeping
away the corrupt elements from political party activities and so forth. This is
indeed necessary as without intra-party democratic practices, democratic
governance practices cannot be ensured within the state structure. However,
it will not be an easy task to bring about significant changes within the politi-
cal party system in Bangladesh as clientelist networks are very much
ingrained within the party system.

CONCLUSION

In this article, the intricacies of the clientelist politics and its implications for
governance and good governance have been analyzed with particular refer-
ence to Bangladesh. In recent years, governance has become a catchword all
over the world. Bangladesh is no exception. Over the last two decades, gov-
ernments in Bangladesh have taken some measures along the current thinking
of governance and good governance. However, those initiatives have been
marred by the vagaries of clientelist politics in Bangladesh. Civil administra-
tion is an important arena where one can see the pervasiveness of clientelist
politics. The attempts to rationalize the service structure and manpower, and
establish merit principles have been sacrificed in favor of serving the narrow
interests of clientelist groups.
Decentralized governance has been an avowed objective of all regimes in
Bangladesh. However, attempts at decentralizing the local governance system
Patron-Client Politics 1433

have only fulfilled the interests of the clientelist groups. For almost two
decades, privatization and private sector development have been on the board.
Clientelist politics has again diminished the prospect of the success of major
economic reforms. People with connection within the ruling party had been
able to buy state-owned enterprises at lower prices, receive loans from state
commercial banks, default in repayment at their will, sway legal procedures in
their favor and receive contracts violating tender rules. In addition, there has
been widespread criminalization of politics over the years. Hoodlums were
patronized by the mainstream political parties. They remained outside the
orbit of the rule of law. Interestingly, hoodlums, bank defaulters, and black
money holders enjoyed the privileges of participating in national elections.
Of late, the CTG has undertaken some reform initiatives. These include
the separation of the judiciary from the executive, revamping the Election
Commission and the ACC, selling public enterprises to prospective buyers
and awarding large contracts to genuine contractors. The CTG has been doing
quite well in resisting the pressures of the clientelist lobbies. However, the
ultimate success of good governance initiatives rests with the efficacy of the
elected political government. The initiatives taken by the CTG have to be sus-
tained and this depends on the democratic practices of the future political
leadership.

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1438
Table 1. Major Civil Service Reforms in Bangladesh
Committees/Commissions/Study Group
Administrative and Services
Reorganization Committee, 1972.
Pay and Services Commission, 1977.
Martial Committee on Examining
Organizational Set up of
Ministries, Divisions, Directorates
and other Organizations, 1982.
Committee for Administrative Reform
and Reorganization, 1982.
Martial Law Committee for Examining
Organizational Set-Up of Public
Statutory Corporations, 1983.
Special Committee to Review the
Structure of SSP, 1985.
APPENDIX A
Focus
Civil Service Structure
Civil Service Structure and
Pay Issues
Reorganization and
Rationalization of
Manpower in Public
Organization
Reorganization of Field
Administration
Public Enterprise
SSP
Recommendations
Unified civil service structure with a continuous grading system
from top to bottom.
28 services under 14 cadres created within the civil service;
Establishment of Senior Services Pool (SSP).
Reduction of the size of the government; Reduction of layers for
decision making; Delegation of administrative and financial
powers down the hierarchy.
Upgradation of thanas into upazilas with upazila parishad as the
focal point of local administration; Empowerment of the local
authority in relation to rural service delivery system.
Delegation of more financial and administrative powers down the
hierarchy; Timely release of funds from ministries; Rational-
ization of manpower; Preparation of organization charts,
manuals, annual activity reports; Merit-based promotion.
Continuation of SSP as a cadre; Entry into SSP at the level of
Deputy Secretary only through examinations to be conducted
by the Public Service Commission; Promotion within SSP is to
be strictly on the basis of merit; Fixed tenure for Secretaries.
 Cabinet Sub-Committee, 1987.
Council Committee on Senior
Appointments and Services
Structure, 1987.
USAID-sponsored Public
Administration Efficiency
Study, 1989.
UNDP-sponsored Public
Administration Sector Study, 1993
Four Secretaries’ Report, 1993,
sponsored by Overseas
Development Administration, UK.
Administrative Reorganization
Committee, 1993.
1439
SSP Endorsement of the recommendations of the Special Committee
except the fixed tenure of Secretaries.
SSP Abolition of the SSP; Filling up positions of Deputy Secretaries
and Joint Secretaries by promotion on the basis of quota
reservation for various cadres.
Secretariat System; Reducing Secretariat’s operational activities through delegation;
Relationship between Reducing layers in decision-making; Enhancing O&M capacity;
Ministries and Depart- Modernization of office equipment; Increasing incentives for
ments and Ministries higher performance; Enforcement of merit principle in
and Corporation promotion; Expanding practical, problem-solving training; Pro-
viding appropriate compensation structure for public officials.
Civil Service Performance management system; Rationalization of civil service
structure; Elimination of redundant government functions;
Merit-based selection and promotion; Strengthening Public
Service Commission.
Civil Service Merit-based recruitment and promotion; Improvement of
financial management system; Incentives for better
performance; Improvement of accountability and transparency;
Establishment of Ombudsman; Strengthening of the audit
office; Improvement of training programs.
Structure and Reorganization Reduction of ministries, department and agencies; Elimination of
of Manpower Across unnecessary units; Separation of accounts from audit;
Ministries, Departments Establishment of a secretariat for the Supreme Court;
& Directorates. Reduction of the size and role of Planning Commission.
(Continued)
 Table 1. (Continued)
1440
Committees/Commissions/Study Group
World Bank Study – Government
That Works: Reforming the Public
Sector, 1996.
Public Administration Reform Com-
mission, 2000.
Source: GoB[18] Khan, M.M.,[17] World Bank,[16] Sarker,[21]
Focus Recommendations
Civil Service, Public Redefining frontiers of the public sector; Enhancing level and
Enterprise, Non- nature of accountability and responsiveness of public
Governmental organizations to different stakeholders; Streamlining
Organizations regulations, laws and processes; Maintaining an efficient,
committed and professional public service.
Administrative Structure Determination of missions of public offices; Improving the
for Improving the Quality delivery of services; Reforming the civil service; Formation of
and Standard of Service, professional policy making group “Senior Management Pool”;
Transparency and Reorganizing institutions and rationalizing manpower;
Efficiency. Restructuring field administration and decentralization; Estab-
lishment of an Independent Commission Against Corruption;
Establishment of Criminal Justice Commission; Establishment
of the Office of Ombudsman; Reducing wastage and promoting
value for money; Strengthening parliamentary oversight;
Facilitating private investment