CLAUSEWITZ

Classroom Graphics from C. Bassford,

National War College
Clausewitz drinkin’ with the boyz.

©C. Bassford 2007

WHO WAS CLAUSEWITZ?
Professional combat soldier.
Man of action:
Tauroggen, Waterloo Campaign.
Staff Officer in the German tradition.
One of us.
Also, BTW, PME guy, historian, and theorist.

©C. Bassford 2007

DEMO VIDEO

©C. Bassford 2007

Clausewitz’s Qualities
As a Thinker
 ruthless intellectual integrity
 profound realism
 dialectical approach
 description, not prescription
 exposure of his full thought process
 respect for the reader’s intelligence

©C. Bassford 2007

 WHAT IS ON WAR ABOUT?
The conduct of military operations in war.
Not about policy or politics, nor about human nature or the nature of reality
Practical theory about how to deal with the complexities of war (without
ignoring the Complexity)
Complexity of war – intrinsic, not extrinsic

©C. Bassford 2007

WINDOW or MIRROR?
©C. Bassford 2007
 SOME KEY CONCEPTS IN ON WAR

- the dialectical approach to military analysis

- War is an expression of Politik/Policy/Politics with the addition of other means
- the “remarkable/paradoxical/fascinating trinity" of war
- the methods of "critical analysis"
- the uses and abuses of historical studies
- the nature of the balance-of-power mechanism
- The relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war
- the asymmetrical relationship between attack (+) and defense (-)
- defense is inherently the stronger form of war
- the nature of "military genius"
- "absolute war" vice "real war"
- limited war vice war “to render [the enemy]
politically helpless or militarily impotent"
- the fundamentally social—rather than artistic or scientific—character of war
- the “moral elements” in war (vice the “bean-count”)
- the "fog" of war
- "friction"
- the essential unpredictability of war
- strategic and operational centers of gravity
- the "culminating point of the offensive"
- the "culminating point of victory"
©C. Bassford 2007
"The Apostle of Total War."
B.H. Liddell Hart, 1934

"The preeminent military and

political strategist of limited
war in modern times."
Robert E. Osgood, 1979

©C. Bassford 2007

 An unsettling truth:

Clausewitz is for losers.

 FLIGHT PLAN
My approach—give you the tools to do the job
TOPIC 7 Clausewitz’s historical context
Clausewitz’s subject
Clausewitz’s dialectical method
Purpose of theory
Categories of War: “ideal” vs “real” – “limited” vs …?
Politik, politics, policy
War as an “instrument” of policy, of politics
Clausewitz and “humanity” or morality

The “trinity of” war

emotion and violence
interplay of chance and probability
rationality in war
PAGanism

war of “limited objectives” vs war to “disarm” the enemy--to

“render [the enemy] politically helpless or militarily impotent”
“Destruction of the enemy”

©C. Bassford 2007

PURPOSE
OF
THEORY
THE PURPOSE OF THEORY:

[A] satisfactory theory of war … will never conflict with reality…. The
primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have
become, as it were, confused and entangled…. Theory will have fulfilled its
main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to
distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the
properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to
define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of
warfare in a thorough critical inquiry. Theory then becomes a guide to
anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease
his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls…. Theory
exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material
and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is
meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to
guide him in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just
as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man's intellectual
development, but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his
life.
THE PURPOSE OF THEORY:

“The conception of war defined here will be the first ray of light into the
fundamental structure of theory, which first sorts out the major components
and allows us to distinguish them from one another.”

“The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that
have become, as it were, confused and entangled…. Theory will have
fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of
war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full
the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to
define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of
warfare in a thorough critical inquiry.”
Everybody has a theory.
 THE
DIALECTIC
 CLAUSEWITZ’S DIALECTIC

THESIS BLACK R
ANTITHESIS WHITE CONNECTICUT
SYNTHESIS GRAY 137
Joe Sixpack’s A More Realistic
Dialectic Dialectic

Platonic, not Hegelian or Marxist

The tensions between thesis and antithesis are seldom resolved, because
these tensions continue to exist in nature, politics, and war.
Examples: Offense/Defense, limited and unlimited objectives, etc.
Seldom explicit.
Special case: The nature of war
THESIS: War is nothing but an act of force….
ANTITHESIS: War is merely the continuation of policy
SYNTHESIS: The dynamic interactions of the Trinity

©C. Bassford 2007

CATEGORIES
OF
WAR
 ABSOLUTE
OR “IDEAL”
WAR
ABSTRACTION,
“LOGICAL
FANTASY”
REAL WAR
i.e., war as we actually experience it
Interaction between
generic opponents
logically leads to
extremes
Political and military interaction in real-
time and real-space between actual
opponents with real characteristics
imposes practical constraints on the
conduct of war

©C. Bassford 2007

 ABSOLUTE
OR “IDEAL”
WAR
ABSTRACTION,
“LOGICAL
FANTASY”
REAL WAR
i.e., war as we actually experience it
Interaction between
generic opponents
logically leads to
extremes
Political and military interaction in real-
time and real-space between actual
opponents with real characteristics
imposes practical constraints on the
conduct of war

Overlap: Sometimes the real-world

political and military objectives
approach the absolute, in that we
actually do seek the complete military
and/or political overthrow of the enemy.

©C. Bassford 2007

 REAL WAR
i.e., war as we actually experience it
“Limited War”

War to achieve
limited aims
War to render the
?
“________ War”
enemy politically
helpless
or militarily
impotent

Clausewitz does
not use the term
“total war.”

©C. Bassford 2007

 “LIMITED” and “NOT LIMITED”
usually apply to objectives, not means.
Examples: Bosnia, Panama, Iraq, Japan

©C. Bassford 2007

 POLITIK
POLITICS,
and
POLICY
POLITIK/POLICY/POLITICS
(Bassford’s definitions)

Politik – “Statecraft” (but this isn’t limited to the “state”)

Politics: “The highly variable process by
which power is distributed in any
society.” Multilateral, Interactive.
Policy: The conscious and one-sided
subcomponent of politics; the reasoned
purposes and actions of each of the
various individual actors in the political
struggle. Unilateral, Rational.

©C. Bassford 2007

POLITIK/POLICY/POLITICS

©C. Bassford 2007

 POLITIK/POLICY/POLITICS
[W]ar is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means. If this is firmly
kept in mind throughout it will greatly facilitate the study of the subject and the
whole will be easier to analyze. Although the main application of this point will
not be made until Book Eight.
(p.69, prefatory note)

From Chapter 6B. “War is an Instrument of Policy” (Should be “politics”)

We maintain, on the contrary, that war is simply a continuation of political
intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase
"with the addition of other means" because we also want to make it clear that
war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something
entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the
means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to
which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout the war into
the subsequent peace. How could it be otherwise? Do political relations between
peoples and between their governments stop when diplomatic notes are no
longer exchanged?
(p.605 – Book Eight)
That it [policy] can err, subserve the ambitions, private
interests, and vanity of those in power, is neither here nor
there.... here we can only treat policy as representative of all
interests of the community.
Clausewitz
 THE
TRINITY
 THE TRINITY (BASSFORD)

28. THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THEORY (Bassford translation; Compare to p.89 of Howard/Paret translation)

War is thus more than a mere chameleon, because it changes its nature to some extent in each concrete case. It is
also, however, when it is regarded as a whole and in relation to the tendencies that dominate within it, a fascinating
trinity—composed of:

1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force;
   2) the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and
   3) its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason.

The first of these three aspects concerns more the people; the second, more the commander and his army; the
third, more the government. The passions that are to blaze up in war must already be inherent in the people; the scope
that the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of probability and chance depends on the particular
character of the commander and the army; but the political aims are the business of government alone.
These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their
relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship among
them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.
The task, therefore, is to keep our theory [of war] floating among these three tendencies, as among three points of
attraction.
What lines might best be followed to achieve this difficult task will be explored in the book on the theory of war
[i.e., Book Two]. In any case, the conception of war defined here will be the first ray of light into the fundamental
structure of theory, which first sorts out the major components and allows us to distinguish them from one another.

Violent Emotion – Chance & Probability – Rational Calculation

People – Army – Government (PAG)
©C. Bassford 2007
 Irrational
EMOTION

Human
Intent
Concrete
RATIONAL Reality
CALCULATION CHANCE and
Rational PROBABILITY
Nonrational
©C. Bassford 2007
 PEOPLE
EMOTION
PASSION and
ENERGY

POLITICAL
MILITARY
LEADERSHIP
LEADERSHIP
RATIONAL and FORCES
CALCULATION CHANCE and
Intelligent PROBABILITY
Analysis and
CREATIVITY
Policy Design
and SKILL ©C. Bassford 2007
 Multiple players,
multiple interpenetrating
trinities.
PEOPLE
EMOTION
PASSION and
ENERGY

POLITICAL
MILITARY
LEADERSHIP
LEADERSHIP
RATIONAL and FORCES
CALCULATION CHANCE and
Intelligent PROBABILITY
Analysis and
CREATIVITY
Policy Design
and SKILL ©C. Bassford 2007
+ Technology
+ Economics

©C. Bassford 2007

=

©C. Bassford 2007

THE TRINITY: VISUAL METAPHORS

©C. Bassford 2007

THE TRINITY: VISUAL METAPHORS

©C. Bassford 2007

 POLITICAL
and
MILITARY
OBJECTIVES
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY
OBJECTIVES IN WAR
SURVIVAL High-end

LIMITED or HIGH-END
HIGH-END MILITARY
MILITARY
OBJECTIVES
Two forms of military objective: OBJECTIVE
(DISARM)

Coercion (PAPE) Compellance (PAPE)

Exhaustion (DELBRÜCK) Overthrow (CLAUSEWITZ)
Attrition (TRAD.) Incapacitation
Erosion (USMC-MCDPs) Annihilation (DELBRÜCK)
Disarm (CLAUSEWITZ)

War to achieve “limited aims” War to “disarm” the enemy

- offensive war with a limited aim “to render [the enemy] politically helpless
- defensive war or militarily impotent"
©C. Bassford 2007
 SURVIVAL High-end

LIMITED Coercion Compellance HIGH-END

MILITARY MILITARY
OBJECTIVE Exhaustion Overthrow OBJECTIVE
(Inflict Stress) Attrition Incapacitation (DISARM)

Erosion Annihilation
Coercion

EROSION } MILITARY
OBJECTIVE { DISARM

INCAPACITATE
or

TARGET: TARGET:
The adversary’s The adversary’s
WILL to continue MILITARY CAPACITY
the struggle to continue the struggle
©C. Bassford 2007
 SURVIVAL High-end

LIMITED HIGH-END
MILITARY MILITARY
OBJECTIVE OBJECTIVE
(Inflict Stress) Coercion Compellance (DISARM)

Exhaustion Overthrow
Attrition Incapacitation
Erosion Annihilation
Coercion These two things DISARM

} {
or
EROSION are not easily INCAPACITATE
MILITARY
distinguishable from
OBJECTIVE
each other. TARGET:
TARGET:
The adversary’s The adversary’s
WILL to continue MILITARY CAPACITY
the struggle to continue the struggle
©C. Bassford 2007
 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY
OBJECTIVES IN WAR
SURVIVAL High-end

LIMITED or HIGH-END
HIGH-END MILITARY
MILITARY OBJECTIVE
OBJECTIVES (DISARM)

CONTAIN

(Military is not the

decisive instrument)
©C. Bassford 2007
 TOPIC 8

Fog/Friction
Attack & Defense
Military genius
Center(s) of Gravity
Culminating point of the offensive
“Art of War” or “Science of War” – or….
Uses and abuses of historical studies

Revisit the Trinity

Revisit the relationship between political and military objectives

©C. Bassford 2007

THEY EXCLUDE GENIUS FROM THE RULE

Anything that could not be reached by the meager wisdom of such one-sided
points of view was held to be beyond scientific control: it lay in the realm of
genius, which rises above all rules.
Pity the soldier who is supposed to crawl among these scraps of rules, not
good enough for genius, which genius can ignore, or laugh at. No; what genius
does is the best rule, and theory can do no better than show how and why this
should be the case.

Don’t forget that Clausewitz can

be a sarcastic SOB. You have to
pay attention to his discussion—if
you’ve ripped one sentence out of
context, you’ve missed the point.
The last line, in red, is his actual
argument.

©C. Bassford 2007

 SURVIVAL High-end

LIMITED or HIGH-END
HIGH-END MILITARY
MILITARY
OBJECTIVES
Two forms of military objective: OBJECTIVE
(DISARM)

EROSION DISARMING/
INCAPACITATION
These are objectives, not
methods (ways or means),
time-lines, intensity levels,
or casualty ratios.

©C. Bassford 2007

 US allies
ROK

KOREA 1950-53
Anti-Gov’t Actual “structure” of CHINA
Guerrillas in
ROK the war?

USA
DPRK

USSR
©C. Bassford 2007