SMART COMMUNICATIONS v.

NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,

GR No. 151908, 2003-08-12

This case is pursuant to the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) its rule-making
and regulatory powers, issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000,
promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications services

Facts:

On June 16, 2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on
the billing of telecommunications services.

Among its pertinent provisions are the following:

(1) The billing statements shall be received by the subscriber of the telephone service not
later than 30 days from the end of each billing cycle. In case the statement is received
beyond this period, the subscriber shall have a specified grace period within which to
pay the bill and the public telecommunications entity (PTEs) shall not be allowed to
disconnect the service within the grace period.

(2) There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a voice mailbox, voice prompt,
recorded message or similar facility excluding the customer's own equipment.

(3) PTEs shall verify the identification and address of each purchaser of prepaid SIM
cards. Prepaid call cards and SIM cards shall be valid for at least 2 years from the date of
first use. Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall be given 45 days from the date the prepaid
SIM card is fully consumed but not beyond 2 years and 45 days from date of first use to
replenish the SIM card, otherwise the SIM card shall be rendered invalid. The validity of
an invalid SIM card, however, shall be installed upon request of the customer at no
additional charge except the presentation of a valid prepaid call card.

(4) Subscribers shall be updated of the remaining value of their cards before the start of
every call using the cards.

(5) The unit of billing for the cellular mobile telephone service whether postpaid or
prepaid shall be reduced from 1 minute per pulse to 6 seconds per pulse. The authorized
rates per minute shall thus be divided by 10.1

On October 6, 2000 released a Memorandum addressed to all public telecommunications

entities, which reads:

This is to remind you that the validity of all prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and
beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use pursuant to MC 13-
6-2000.
 In addition, all CMTS operators are reminded that all SIM packs used by subscribers of
prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2)
years from date of first use. Also, the billing unit shall be on a six (6) seconds pulse
effective 07 October 2000.

For strict compliance.4

This was questioned by petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino
Telephone Corporation who filed against the National Telecommunications
Commission, an action for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-
6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order.

Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the
sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the
Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the
Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against
deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the
impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity
and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of
prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that
the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Thereafter, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Ruling of the RTC

Defendants' motion to dismiss is hereby denied for lack of merit.

Thereafter, respondent NTC thus filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
the Court of Appeals,

Ruling of CA

Premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED,

Now this case is filed to the Supreme Court resolving:

ISSUE:
Petition for review filed by Smart and Piltel:

1. W/n THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO EXHAUST AN AVAILABLE
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY.

Globe and Islacom filed a petition for review

1. W/n THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED BECAUSE THE

DOCTRINE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES DOES NOT
APPLY WHEN THE QUESTIONS RAISED ARE PURELY LEGAL QUESTIONS.

2. W/n THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED BECAUSE THE

DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES DOES NOT APPLY
WHERE THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IS COMPLETE AND EFFECTIVE, WHEN
THERE IS NO OTHER REMEDY, AND THE PETITIONER STANDS TO SUFFER
GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY.

The two petitions were consolidated.

Ruling:

1. Yes, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation

issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function,
the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government

In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and
its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-
making power

In a case with the same facts decided by the SC, petitioners were justified in invoking the
judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of
the said issuances.

B.P. 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a
criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is
charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they
contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests
in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower
courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
Hence, it this instant case, it is the Regional Trial Court who has jurisdiction to hear and
decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of
the trial court and in dismissing the case.
 HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, GR
NO. 163980, 2006-08-03
Facts:
Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association
It is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own
personal capacity and on behalf of the... association.
Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center
Administration Committee (Committee).
Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized the creation
and development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC).
On March 5,... 1972,... former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826,
reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440
hectares... as a national government site to be known as the NGC.
1987,... then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440
hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing
instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the... bona fide residents therein.
In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No.
137... former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248... authorizing the vertical
development of the... excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively
become beneficiaries of the government's socialized housing program.
2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207.
Among the salient provisions of the law are the following:
Sec. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site to Bona Fide
Residents. Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby amended by excluding from the
coverage thereof, 184 hectares on the west side and 238 hectares on the east side of
Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the same open for disposition to bona fide residents
therein:
In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207,[4] the Committee formulated the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207
Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition, raising the following issues:
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003"
SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING
INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAW IT SEEKS TO IMPLEMENT.
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003"
SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ARBITRARY,... CAPRICIOUS AND
WHIMSICAL.
Ruling:
First, the procedural matters.
"Legal standing" or locus standi... defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged
We cannot, therefore, agree with the OSG on the issue of locus standi. The petition does not
merit dismissal on that ground.
other procedural impediments to the granting of the instant petition
The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ
of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
Since in issuing the questioned IRR... of R.A. No. 9207,... the Committee was not exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function
The cited breaches are mortal. The petition deserves to be spurned as a consequence.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the confines... of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court.
his principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency... concerned was
performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its
rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly
authorized by R.A. No. 9207.
Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts
have jurisdiction to pass upon the... same.
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by
the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its
validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Although the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,
such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice... of court forum.
A direct invocation of the Court's original... jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in
the petition.
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of
a quasi-legislative function.
Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-
legislative functions.
Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a... lower court within the limits of its
jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.
Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an ordinary
action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court.
In like manner, the instant petition may be dismissed based on... the foregoing procedural
grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on the merits of this petition to
facilitate the speedy resolution of this case. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or
suspended in the interest of substantial justice. And the... power of the Court to except a
particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be questioned.
Now, we turn to the substantive aspects of the petition. The outcome, however, is just as dismal
for petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.
 BPI LEASING CORP. vs. CA, et al.
GR No. 127624, 18 Nov. 2003

FACTS:

BLC is a corporation engaged in the business of leasing properties. For the

calendar year 1986, it paid Commissioner of Internal Revenue a total of P1,139,041.49 representing 4% c
ontractor’s percentage tax as imposed by theNational Internal Revenue Code. However, in November
1986, CIR issued a Revenue Regulation which provides that companies registered under RA 5980, like
BLC, are no longer liable for contractor’s percentage tax, instead, subject only to gross
receipts tax. Thereafter, BLC filed a claim for refund before the CIR and simultaneously filed a petition
for review before the Court of Tax Appeal in order to stop the running of the prescripti ve period
for refunds. Both cases were denied, despite motion for reconsideration by BLC, hence, they
appealed before the Court of Appeals, which the latt er affi rmed the decision of CTA and
CIR. Aggrieved by the decision, BLC instituted a petition before the SC. 

Issue:

1. W/N Revenue Regulation 19-86 is legislative rather than interpretative in

character and hence, should retroact to the date of effectivity of the law it seeks
to interpret.

Ruling.

Supreme Court in ruling this case distinguished first the concept of Administrative issuances
according to their nature and substance: legislative and interpretative.

A legislative rule is in the matter of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a

primary legislation by providing the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on the other
hand, is designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in
charge of enforcing.

Here, The Court finds the questioned revenue regulation to be legislative in

nature. Section 1 of Revenue Regulation 19-86 plainly states that it was promulgated
pursuant to Section 277 of the NIRC. Section 277 (now Section 244) is an express
grant of authority to the Secretary of Finance to promulgate all needful rules and
regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC. In Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 16 the Court recognized
that the application of Section 277 calls for none other than the exercise of quasi-
legislative or rule-making authority. Verily, it cannot be disputed that Revenue
Regulation 19-86 was issued pursuant to the rule-making power of the Secretary of
Finance, thus making it legislative, and not interpretative as alleged by BLC.

Further, The principle is well entrenched that statutes, including administrative rules
and regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary
is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication. 19 In the present case, there
is no indication that the revenue regulation may operate retroactively. Furthermore,
there is an express provision stating that it "shall take effect on January 1, 1987," and
that it "shall be applicable to all leases written on or after the said date." Being clear on
its prospective application, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
further interpretation.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.

 G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA),
MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL
BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.
FACTS:
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow filed a
complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, based
on a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated death
benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned the
validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given
the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such
authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA
assumed jurisdiction and decided the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of
non-delegation of powers.

HELD:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of
Executive Order No. 797. … “The governing Board of the Administration
(POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).”

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law

cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine
how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of
the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general
are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of
specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national
legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative
agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the
statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by “filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have
the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their
promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the
implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor
Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power:

1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions
when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only
thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or stations in
the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority
to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature
and exercise a power essentially legislative.