PECSON V. CORONEL, G.R. NO. L-17480, [MAY 4, 1922], 43 PHIL 358-364 "First.
"First. I declare that all the property which belongs to me as conjugal property, referred to in
FACTS: On April 7, 1920, the CFI Pampanga ordered the probate of the will alleged to have
been executed by the deceased Dolores Coronel.
On September 13, 1920, Eriberto Coronel and others who claimed to be heirs of the
deceased Dolores Coronel filed a motion in the said court, asking that the order probating
the said will be set aside and that, after a new hearing was had, the probate of the said will
be disallowed because the consent to the execution thereof was obtained through fraud
and illegal means.
That according to the said document the aforesaid deceased appointed as her only legatee
the said applicant, Lorenzo Pecson, to the exclusion of the herein movants and of all her
surviving brothers and nephews, the said Lorenzo Pecson not being related to the said
deceased in any way, except that he is married to one of her nieces.
That during her last years the said deceased, Dolores Coronel, entrusted all her business
money to the said Lorenzo Pecson, who, through abuse of confidence.
ISSUE:
1.
RULING:
JOSE V. USON, G.R. NO. 8927, [MARCH 10, 1914], 27 PHIL 73-76
The question involved in this appeal arises from the interpretation of the first and second clauses of a
rodicil to the will of Filomena Uson. They read as follows:
my said testament, shall be the property of my aforesaid husband, Don Rafael Sison; in case
all or part of said property exists at my husband's death, it is my will that at his death my
sisters and nieces hereinafter named succeed him as heirs.
"Second. I declare to be my sisters in lawful wedlock the persons named Doña Antonia Uson,
now deceased, who has left two daughters called Maria Rosario, widow, of Estanislao
Lengson; Ignacia Uson, married to Don Vicente Puzon; Eufemia Uson, now deceased, who is
survived by three daughters called Maria Salud, Maria Amparo, and Maria Asuncion; and
Maria Pilar Uson; Maria Manaoag Uson, unmarried, issue had by our deceased father Don
Daniel Uson with one Leonarda Fernandez, alias Andao de Lingayen, so that they may have
and enjoy it in equal parts as good sisters and relatives."
The court below found that the children of the deceased sisters should take only that portion which
their respective mothers would have taken if they had been alive at the time the will was made; that
the property should be divided into six equal parts corresponding to the number of sisters; that each
living sisters should take one-sixth, and the children of each deceased sister should also take one-
sixth, each one-sixth to be divided among said children equally.
This appeal taken from the judgment entered upon that finding, appellants asserting that under a
proper construction of the paragraphs of the codicil above-quoted the property should be divided
equally between the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters, share and share alike, a
niece taking the same share that a sister receives.
We are of the opinion that the appellant's contention is well founded. We see no words or phrases in
the clauses quoted which lead necessarily to the construction placed upon those paragraphs by the
learned court below. On the other hand, we find expression which seem to indicate with fair
clearness that it was the intention of the testatrix to divide her property equally between her sisters
and nieces. The court below based its construction upon the theory that the other construction
would be "an admission that the testatrix desired to favor her deceased sister Eufemia Uson, who left
three children, more than her other deceased sister Antonia Uson, who left two children, and
moreover both would be more favored than any of the other four surviving sisters, one of whom was
married at the time of the execution of the said codicil and without doubt had children."
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As we look at the codicil we observe, first, that the testatrix, in the first paragraph thereof, declares
that after her husband's death she desires that "my sisters and nieces, as hereinafter named, shall
succeed him as heirs."
We note, in the second place, that the testatrix, in the second paragraph of the codicil, names and
identifies each one of her heirs then living, or each one of the persons whom she desires shall
succeed her husband in the property. Among those mentioned specifically are the nieces as well as
the sisters. The nieces are referred to in no way different from the sisters. Each one stands out in the
second paragraph of the codicil as clearly as the other and under exactly the same conditions.
In the third place, we note, with interest, the last clause of the second paragraph of the codicil which,
it seems to us, taken together with the last clause of the first paragraph of the codicil, is decisive of
the intention of the testatrix. In the last clause she says that she names all of the persons whom she
desires to take under her will by name "so that they may take and enjoy the property in equal parts
as good sisters and relatives."
We have then in the first paragraph a declaration as to who the testatrix desires shall become the
owners of her property on the death of her husband. Among them we find the names of the nieces as
well as of the sisters. We have also the final declaration of the testatrix that she desires that the
sisters and nieces shall take and enjoy the property in equal parts. That being so, it appears to us that
the testatrix's intention is fairly clear, so clear in fact that it is unnecessary to bring in extraneous
arguments to reach a conclusion as to what she intended.
The judgment appealed from is hereby modified by declaring that, of the property passing under the
codicil hereinabove referred to, the living sisters and the children of the deceased sisters shall take
per capita and in equal parts, and as so modified the judgment is affirmed. No costs in this instance.
AUSTRIA V. REYES, G.R. NO. L-23079, [FEBRUARY 27, 1970], 142 PHIL 646-655
FACTS: On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The
probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro
Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This
opposition was, however, dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of
whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
On April 23, 1969, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The
respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the same court in accordance
with the provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the
petitioner Ruben Austria.
Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in
intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the
five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance
with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and without any right
to succeed as heirs.
Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor of the estate, the court a
quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its order of December 22, 1959.
On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the petitioners
Ruben Austria, et al., moved the lower court to set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the
adoption of the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the late Basilia. Before the date set by the court
for hearing arrived, however, the respondent Benita Cruz-Meñez, who entered an appearance
separately from that of her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the
lower court, by way of alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should it be
permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent.
On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion. Both sides subsequently
submitted their respective memoranda, and finally, the lower court issued an order on June 4, 1963,
delimiting the petitioners' intervention to the properties of the deceased which were not disposed of
in the will.
ISSUE: WON the entire estate should descend to the deceased’s brothers and sisters by intestacy by
reason of the intrinsic nullity of the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent's will.
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RULING: NO. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the
following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will;
second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that
the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana"
(compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the
institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do
otherwise.
One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a specific or
unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on
the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications.
And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent instituted the
respondents perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed that the law commanded her
to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of these respondents was valid, still such
institution must stand.
Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false
cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution
may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the
testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be
false.
The phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the
language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to de scribe the class of heirs
instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that
the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that
she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free
portion of her estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz,
the latter's children, and the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible
inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law
enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the relatively small devise of land which the
decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta
and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al, from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other
nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the estate by intestacy — a result which
would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these explicit
injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will
give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred
which will prevent intestacy."
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an
intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done
in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and
the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the
will for the purpose of giving it effect. A probate court has found, by final judgment, that
the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will
executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it
becomes our duty to give full expression to her will.
At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed
only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral
attack.
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