Capstone Project-Reviewed

Running head: LAW ENFORCEMENT UNDER 5G AND INTERNET OF THINGS 1
Capstone Project: Law Enforcement under 5G and Internet of Things
Student
September 2019
Institution
LAW ENFORCEMENT UNDER 5G AND INTERNET OF THINGS 2
Abstract
The 5G wireless technology is set to dominate the next generation of information technology
infrastructure. This latest iteration of cellular technology epitomizes lower latency, has greater
data transmission speed, and enhanced interconnectivity of digital devices. Besides the
innovative ideas that permeate the fifth generation ecosystem, there are serious implications for
law enforcement. In this paper, I examined the architecture of the 5G wireless technology and its
impact on the ability of the law enforcement officers to discharge their duties. In particular, the
paper sought to investigate how 5G network will affect surveillance capabilities in lieu of the
secured architecture underpinning the forthcoming technology. Furthermore, the investigation
sought to examine privacy concerns surrounding the new technology in the face of the highly
interconnectedness of digital devices brought about by the Internet of Things (IoT). It concluded
that lawful interception will be impossible under the 5G infrastructure. The findings and
recommendations of this research would be addressed to the Department of Homeland Security
for purposes of supporting effective policy-making.

Table of Contents
Abstract............................................................................................................................................2
INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................6
Purpose of Research....................................................................................................................7
Problem Statement.......................................................................................................................8
Methodology................................................................................................................................9
OVERVIEW OF 5G INFRASTRUCTURE..................................................................................10
Features of 5G Network.............................................................................................................11
How 5G Works..........................................................................................................................11
Benefits of 5G Network.............................................................................................................12
Internet of Things......................................................................................................................13
Security Aspects of IoT.............................................................................................................13
i. Device Architecture........................................................................................................14
ii. Network Connectivity.................................................................................................14
iii. Data Collection............................................................................................................15
PRIVACY AND IOT....................................................................................................................16
Data privacy...............................................................................................................................18
Location Privacy........................................................................................................................18
Identity Privacy..........................................................................................................................18
Forms of Privacy Concerns Under 5G and IoT.........................................................................19
End to End ((E2E) Data Privacy............................................................................................19
Loss of Data Ownership........................................................................................................19
Location of Legal Disputes....................................................................................................20
LITERATURE REVIEW..............................................................................................................20
Privacy Challenges in and Law Enforcement in 5G..................................................................23
Security Preparedness for 5G Network.....................................................................................28
ANALYSIS....................................................................................................................................30
5G-Related Law Enforcement Challenges................................................................................30
Lawful Interception of Communication................................................................................31
Fragmented and Virtual Architecture....................................................................................33
Authenticity of Evidence.......................................................................................................35
Mission Critical Communications.........................................................................................35
Threats to Privacy Rights.......................................................................................................36
Infrastructural Threats...........................................................................................................37
The Chinese Technology Factor............................................................................................38
Developing the 5G Infrastructure Locally.............................................................................39
RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................................................................41
i. Influencing the 5G Standardization Process.......................................................................41

ii. Dialogue with Operators.....................................................................................................43
iii. Federal Legislation......................................................................................................43
CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................44
References......................................................................................................................................47
Information technology has impacted security surveillance methods in the United States
and the world for a long time. The introduction of 5G technology in telecommunications
portends serious ramifications for law enforcement. Surveillance techniques traditionally used by
police are likely to become redundant, requiring policy makers to consider alternative effective
methods consistent with realities in the technological environment (Hollywood, Woods,
Goodison, Lauland, Wagner, Wilson, & Jackson, 2017). The ability of electronic devices to
communicate with each other significantly alters traditional parameters for electronic
surveillance. The 5G technologies threaten to cause major invasions of privacy, a challenge that
was deeply entrenched in the preceding 4G technology (Jones, 2019). Privacy invasions
compounded with the yet to be shift in the relationship between law enforcement agencies and
the public will be a major cause of concern. When compared to the 4G networks, the major areas
impacted by 5G technologies are increased data transfer speeds and expanded bandwidths. The
transformational nature of the technology will enhance the ability of security agencies to
discharge their duties (Carter, Grommon, & Frantz, 2014). However, like many technologies, the
new network carries significant challenges for agencies charged with responding to emergencies
occurring within the borders of the United States. The 5G technology will fundamentally alter
how law enforcement agencies conduct lawful interception of telecommunication. The
Department of Homeland Security should strategize on the best measures that would retain or
improve the capacity of the agency to effectively discharge its mandate under the 5G network
and its accompanying technologies. These measures would require active participation in the
standardization of the network to protect the interests of the law enforcement particularly in field
of surveillance.
The challenge of surveillance methods will be lessened when supporting technologies can
curb cyber-terrorism plans during preliminary stages. While this challenge existed even during
the 4G generation technologies, the advanced 5Gwill make the work of law enforcement
agencies more complicated (Carter et al., 2014). For example, the counter terrorism agencies
should retain the ability to intercept vehicles for possible inspection. Remotely-controlled
vehicles increase the invisibility of criminals and embolden them to target highly sensitive
installations that could not have been possible under previous technological conditions
(Hollywood et al., 2017). Once 5G network is fully operational, security agencies operating
under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will grapple with a myriad of challenges
including ensuring security surveillance for terror-related activities, keeping tabs on immigration
processes, providing secret services, offering effective deployment of coast guards, and
management of emergencies at the federal level. Additionally, they will be responsible for
supporting state and local level strategies for security enhancement, among other functions (Ejaz
et al., 2016). The effectiveness of the DHS in future operations will depend to a large extent on
how it responds to the wide-reaching technological shift posed by 5G.
Purpose of Research
The research will focus on how the policing agencies across the United States should
align its practices in the face of changing informational technologies. Privacy and security are
two critical elements that 5G and IoT portend for law enforcement. Cyber security in the
increasingly intelligent and autonomous world will be weakened (Hollywood et al., 2017).
Currently, the cyber space is hardly sufficiently protected against distributed denial of services
attacks.Numerous stories dotting the mainstream media about privacy challenges and illegal data
access is likely to increase as 5G is rolled out. Without conscious planning initiatives, public
safety will be more exposed to unprecedented threats in cyber space.
The role of automated systems caused by IoT will create new threats, not only to
properties, but also to human life. Carter, Grommon, and Frantz (2014) argue that the 5G
infrastructure inherently makes cyber offense easier than defense. Potential targets for attack that
must be protected by law enforcement agencies are growing large, adding technical and financial
pressure on policing in general and surveillance in particular. As multiple systems become
increasingly connected under the 5G network and IoT, the risk of unanticipated systemic attacks
and failure grows significantly (Hollywood et al., 2017). The purpose of this research is to
determine how the law enforcement agencies working under the Department of Homeland
Security can adequately respond to the revolution brought about by 5G and IoT to remain
effective in discharging the fundamental duty of protecting the United States particularly in the
cyber space.
Problem Statement
Currently, electronic communication interceptions, also called wiretapping, form the
lifeline of accessing critical security information from criminal suspects and are used to fight
crime as an integral aspect of policing (Carter et al., 2014). Identification and locating criminal
suspects is bound to change dramatically. The existing technology allows law enforcement
agencies to identify every individual mobile phone device through technology known as
international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI). This technology relies on unique codes that are
attached to mobile phones, and sendsinformation that is used to identify the location and identity
of thedevices (Hollywood et al., 2017). However, the 5G technology is built around devices that
are encrypted, meaning existing surveillance methods will not be sufficient in identifying and
locating devices using the IMSI. Importantly, security authorities will not assign any electronic
device to a specific individual.
In the past, IMSI has been described by privacy activists as an intrusive technology that
has been used to track mobile devices using telecommunication data. IMSI tricks a mobile
device into thinking it is a mobile tower and thereby connects and sends critical data, including
the location which is used by police to make arrests and for intelligence gathering (Jones, 2019).
The owner of the device is unaware as the phone continues relaying data to security authorities.
Instead of IMIS, the 5G technology will rely on false-base detection, a feature that allows mobile
network providers as well as mobile device users to detect unwanted base stations including the
IMSI that previously served law enforcement agencies effectively (Carter et al., 2014). How to
respond to these challenges effectively will require thorough review of existing security policies
by the DHS.
Methodology
The researcher proposes to conduct secondary research aimed at seeking effective
measures that the DHS should take to keep law enforcement effective in the face of 5G
technological impacts on policing. Research data will be collected from primary and secondary
sources. Data collected from the secondary sources will be collated according to their similarities
and analyzed using qualitative descriptive design that links the fundamentals of 5G networks to
policing in the United States. Attention will be given to the relevance and timeliness of the
sources to ensure that the conclusion drawn from the data is representative of the realities in the
cyber space and law enforcement. All data sources will be peer-reviewed academic and scholarly
articles published within the last ten years. Data will be vouched from online scholarly
repositories as well as the university library.
This research proposes ways the DHS can respond to challenges surrounding law
enforcement in the age of 5G and IoT. Traditional surveillance methods are bound to become
obsolete, paving the way for more sophisticated surveillance methods. The integrity of IMSI for
surveillance will no longer be viable as 5G adopts encryptions in end-to end data transfer, access,
and dissemination. Besides the need for new surveillance methods, the DHS may be forced to
adopt advocacy roles of influencing standardization of devices that will be integral to the 5G
platform.
Overview of 5G Infrastructure
Research and innovation has enhanced wireless technology through years of investment.
The world is now on the cusp of global transformation driven by information technology and in
particular the 5G network (Liyanage, Ahmad, Abro, Gurtov & Ylianttila, 2018). The fifth
generation platform is set to dominate the next phase of global communications. Given that it
will be a completely new proposition compared to previous versions, Kumar, Liyanage, Ahmad,
Braeken and Ylianttila (2018) argue that the implications are bound to be felt in nearly every
facet of governance.
The most distinguishing features of 5G network is the high throughput and reduced
latency compared with previous platforms. The network is also distinguished for improved
mobility support, better spectrum efficiency, and higher density for connectivity (Ahmad,
Shahabuddin, Kumar, Okwuibe, Gurtov & Ylianttila, 2019). Like 4G, the next generation also
supports internet, video, voice, interactive multimedia, and extended broadband services. The
assignment of a new spectrum in mmWave bands is designed to facilitate increased throughput
requirements (Liyanage et al., 2018). Another significant development in the new network is the
use of Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) to boost the capacity of provider networks (Van
Chien & Björnson, 2017).
The development of 5G network is in part due to the proliferation of the Internet of
Things. Additionally, the increasing demand for video content and other wireless broadband
services has pushed innovators within the industry to consider the parameters of expanding
available services under the 4G network (Ahmad et al., 2019).Major companies such as
Samsung, Intel, AT&T, and Ericsson are already developing 5G products in readiness for full
implementation of the next generation network.
How 5G Works
The fifth generation network will comprise of cells divided into smaller chambers called
sectors. The minute sectors send electronic data through radio waves. Cells under the network
are wired to a network backbone. The fifth generation can transmit data through frequencies that
Wi-Fi ordinarily uses. The new network promises more efficient and faster process compared
with any previous platform. The network is configured to increase efficiency by subdividing the
cell into pico and micro cells (Ahmad et al., 2019). Other important features of the network are
that it will provide gigabit-per-second data transmission rates at any given time or place.
Furthermore, every mobile phone is expected to have an IPv6 address if the network provider
and location supports the feature. The network utilizes user-centric network protocol called
worldwide wireless web, www. This is a departure from the 4G network which is service-centric.
The platform will support critical services and applications that will interconnect globally. Some
of the aspects of 5G will include nanotechnology, internet of things, cloud computing, and
cognitive radio.
Benefits of 5G Network to Law Enforcement
Three main advantages are expected to accrue from 5G network from the perspective of
industry consumers. The first is faster data transmission speed. Under the fifth generation
network, the rate of data transfer is expected to be at least ten times faster than the 4G. Video and
image sharing will be significantly faster (Ahmad et al., 2019). Secondly, there will be reduced
latency which is the time taken between an action and its effect. The implications for this feature
include rapid transmission of data that criminals can quickly share in pursuit of their criminal
goals. Watching high-speed virtual reality motion pictures without any unnecessary delay will
become possible. Furthermore, there will be increased connectivity compared with 4G. For law
enforcement, this may mean enhanced risks of cyber attacks and data theft. Connections under
the fifth generation network will be more reliable and faster, but not necessarily more secure
(Ahmad et al., 2019). The implication for this feature is that more than ever before, people
around the world will be connected to each other, with the ability to communicate at the same
time.
Internet of Things
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a form of a distributed system that creates value from
data. It enhances the ability of heterogeneous physical objects to share information. In the
commercial world, IoT has significantly improved efficiency, profitability, and outcomes by
supporting the decision-making process in an objective way (Siboni, Sachidananda, Meidan,
Bohadana, Mathov, Bhairav, & Elovici, 2018). This technology is transforming the manner in
which companies develop and distribute products and services as well as modes of managing and
maintaining infrastructure. More importantly from the law enforcement perspective, the IoT is
redefining how man and machine interact. IoT removes the need for a central server for
communication between two communication devices. This feature was particularly crucial for
interception of electronic communications (Liyanage et al., 2018). Ahmad et al. (2019) avers that
commercialization of IoT has optimized equipment performance and by extension improved the
safety of workers.IoT is projected to reach more than 50 billion connected devices over the next
couple of years (Liyanage, Salo, Braeken, Kumar, Seneviratne & Ylianttila, 2018). Essentially,
all systems and machines around us will be automated.
Security Aspects of IoT
The range of functionality and processes underpinning IoT devices poses security threats.
Data processing, collection, storage, and transfer are some of the common processes utilizing IoT
technology (Siboni et al., 2018). These processes go to or from smart devices. The smart devices
are also integrated within the company networks that are deployed on various public. Some are
worn on individual’s body while being operated continuously to collect data from the immediate
surroundings (Fraga-Lamas, Fernández-Caramés, Suárez-Albela, Castedo& González-López,
2016). These aspects make the devices highly accessible and visible to attackers who can access
data collected by the devices for criminal goals including identity theft. As a result there are
various security concerns surrounding network connectivity, device architecture, and the nature
of data that smart devices collect.
Device Architecture
The security aspect of a smart device includes both software and hardware. IoT devices are
generally low resource with respect to memory size, power source, computational capabilities,
and bandwidth communication (Ahmad et al., 2019). This scenario may occasion severe
vulnerabilities given that only minor encryption and authentication mechanisms may be used to
encrypt collected and stored data during transmission. From the perspective of IoT software,
proprietary and open source operating networks are often applied (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016).
This measure can easily expose the device to known and zero-day attacks. It is notable that the
security features of applications that run on IoT are low on the ability to withstand attacks.
Whenever bugs are identified in the device software, accountability for the bugs is often lacking
(Liyanage et al., 2018). This is compounded by lack of upgrades and continuity of the IoT
devices by manufacturers unlike the standard practice in computing systems.
IoT also automates certain performance processes with limited configuration from users. A
good example of this weakness is found in Google Glass devices that allow for automatic setting
up of Wi-Fi connections as soon as they view QR codes (Liyanage et al., 2018). This process,
when applied in the IoT under the 5G network, will expose users to additional cyber risks
beyond the traditional security vulnerabilities of computing devices.
Network Connectivity
IoT devices may remain connected to the internet by use of cellular networks or Wi-Fi
connections. The downside is the smart devices operating under IoT are not always designed
with security in mind, mainly because of the limited resources and the attendant cost
implications (Borgaonkar, Hirschi, Park & Shaik, 2019). This reality exposes devices to
traditional internet attacks, including denial of service attacks, phishing attacks, data leaks, side-
channel attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). Furthermore, the
application of lightweight authentication algorithms in IoT devices makes it easy to manipulate
and remotely direct the devices at their weakest joints particularly during transmission of data
(Liyanage et al., 2018).
Other potential network security risks that Cyber-security and Infrastructure Security Agency
CISA must grapple with relate to network overload and disruption (Borgaonkar et al., 2019). The
proliferation of smart devices within private networks and public spaces allows for production
and broadcasting of information which contributes to narrowing of the bandwidth (Liyanage et
al., 2018). Many private networks lack the strong security architecture necessary to thwart
unlawful attempt to access and steal sensitive personal data. The tendency of these devices to
increase the attack surface because of additional entry points in the network increases the
vulnerability of device to cyber attacks.
Data Collection
One of the major concerns relating to IoT devices revolve around the nature of data the
devices collect. The smart devices collect personal data that can easily be shared with third
parties resulting in violation of personal privacy as well as potential theft of information (Siboni
et al., 2018).In the digital age where data is gaining greater importance, numerous data vendors
collect personal information about target organizations or customers including from IoT devices
(Borgaonkar et al., 2019). There is the risk the data collected may be too personal and sensitive
as it could relate to an individual’s habits, behaviors and medical history. Organizations may
exploit data while violating basic privacy rights of their employees with the integration of IoT
into organizational environments for commercial purposes. Liyanage et al. (2018) note this
outcome is made ever more possible than before because employers have the capability under the
functionality of IoT to track and record employee movements and actions (Fraga-Lamas et al.,
2016). In the same way, sensitive corporate information could be made accessible to third
parties, exposing them to unintended adverse outcomes particularly from competitors.
Thefts, loss of device and ransom-ware attacks are issues surrounding IoT devices. The risk
associated with these possibilities relate to personally identifiable information (PII) that is
usually stored on the device (Liyanage et al., 2018). Once the devices are lost, it becomes easy
for third parties to access the information because of the lightweight encryption ordinarily used
in these devices (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). Attackers can use the information gleaned from
these devices for malicious goals including identity theft.
Privacy and IoT
The fifth generation network architecture will be based on new technologies and concepts
including Network Function Virtualization (NFV), Software-Deﬁned networking (SDN), and
cloud computing (Siboni et al., 2018). The SDN feature will require separating data planes from
control. The NFV functionality allows for the implementation of the control functions in the
form of virtualized tasks in a mobile cloud (Ahmad et al., 2019). It would then support the
process of sharing the data through a pool of network hardware whenever it is required. The
cloud computing technology allows for on-demand network access for a range of mobile service
providers to log into the pool of storage resources and hardware that can be configured
(Borgaonkar et al., 2019). This process is fraught with serious loopholes that can be exploited by
unauthorized third party actors.

The United Nations and the United States acknowledge that privacy is a basic human
right. Privacy refers to the right of every individual to determine the kind of personal information
other people can access (Liyanage et al., 2018). Equally important is the right of a person to
decide the circumstance under which personal information would be accessible by third parties.
By this paradigm, unapproved auxiliary access and utilization of personal data including illegal
access of securely stored personal information constitute privacy violations (Fraga-Lamas et al.,
2016). The more individuals and societies become connected, the more concerns surrounding
privacy are expected to gain added importance.
The development of 5G network architecture and supporting technologies will
undoubtedly exacerbate privacy concerns (Liyanage et al., 2018). Current users of mobile
technology have some forms of arrangement for cyber security that would be important to
sustain even in the upcoming network (Borgaonkar et al., 2019). Although 5G is expected to
implement different security mechanisms from those currently adopted by 4G, there is need to
sustain or improve on current security arrangement. Future mobile phones are expected to store
more personal information than current ones (Ahmad et al., 2019). This calls for enhanced
protection of data under the 5G network. Various privacy categories of privacy rights will
manifest under the 5G infrastructure
Data privacy
Data privacy underscores the need to keep data, especially personal data, in confidence.
5G network will be rapid and concrete with high speeds for data accompanied by low latency
(Liyanage et al., 2018). The result will be large scale storage of data. One area that will garner
added scrutiny will be in the healthcare industry where sensitive data will be generated from
patient information (Kumar et al., 2018). The storage of such sensitive data is a major concern
for the public and law enforcement agencies.
Location Privacy
Location-based services have gained greater significance because of certain services that
require identification of the mobile device’s geographic location. Some gadgets can track and
position which generates additional online applications such as suggestions about the nearest
hospitals, shopping malls, and direction to specific places (Kumar et al., 2018). Recent features
such as ‘check-in’ which was introduced by technology company Facebook are important in
enhancing socialization by determining their respective locations (Borgaonkar et al., 2019).
However, continuous tracking of individuals using their devices is a major concern as it may also
compromise their security.
Identity Privacy
Identity privacy encompasses protection of a subscriber’s identity information as well as
the User Equipment (UE). The integrating nature of 5G and IoT is expected to significantly
increase interconnectivity (Kumar et al., 2018). Every device user will be required to have some
identity that can be used to identify them prior to accessing certain services (Borgaonkar et al.,
2019). Borgaonkar et al. (2019) further aver that notable online healthcare services require
access to patient information and other personal data including banking. The standardization
process of devices would be crucial in ensuring that each device has unique ways in which to
identify its data.

Forms of Privacy Concerns Under 5G and IoT
The integration of prominent technologies such as NFV, SDN, and cloud computing into
the fifth generation will open up privacy challenges. The privacy concerns may relate to threats
originating from the cloud computing platform because of the inherent security weaknesses in
cloud computing technology (Liyanage et al., 2018). They may also be connected to other
concepts such as NFV and SDN since the rollout of these two technologies is dependent on cloud
technology.
End to End (E2E) Data Privacy
Under the fifth generation network, service providers and operators will have access to
and storage of vast consumer data even when the consumer does not approve access to this
information(Ahmad et al., 2019).Significantly, numerous stakeholders and vendors will be used
in implementing the 5G ecosystem. They will be providing different support services that
eventually integrate to culminate into successful 5G functionality (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016).
This means personal data of consumers will travel through several actors within the 5G
ecosystem. Securing end to end data confidentiality assumes greater importance under the next
generation network.
Loss of Data Ownership
There are multiple players within the 5G network including cloud service providers,
network operators, and third party applications. Loopholes may exist in the roles of each
stakeholder and legal responsibility over ownership and securing of personal information and
data (Borgaonkar et al., 2019). In the same way, loss of data between the stakeholders may be
exacerbated by lack of accountability structure among the various vendors and service providers
in the 5G ecosystem. There would be a need to define ownership of user data across the various
stakeholders to minimize potential misuse of sensitive consumer information (Siboni et al.,
2018). Use of well thought-out privacy service agreements would be essential in minimizing data
lose and ownership gap. Protection of user data is dependent upon the bylaws of the host
country(Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). Given the global nature of user data and the
interconnectedness under the 5G network, at least three possible locations can be identified for
the potential basis for jurisdiction (Liyanage et al., 2018). The locations include that of the
offender, the victim or the service provider.
Literature Review
The fifth generation network for mobile technologies is set to dominate the next
technological innovations. The legal and ethical implications of 5G network revolution is likely
to be felt across the law enforcement circles. The vast amount of data will undoubtedly cause
additional privacy concerns (Shariatmadari, Ratasuk, Iraji, Laya, Taleb, Jäntti, & Ghosh, 2015).
The interoperability of the 5G network and its accompanying IoT will allow for rapid sharing of
vast amount of information much faster than any previous information technologies (Hollywood
et al., 2017). Some of the information could be acquired illegally through cyber-attacks and
shared with criminal elements. Some of the challenges facing future law enforcement officers
will entail the widespread application of facial and geo-location recognition technologies and the
integration of artificial intelligence technologies in the surveillance and policing system (Verma
& Dombrowski, 2018). All these trends portend security threats to public safety. Police officers
will have added responsibility of fighting crimes emanating from data sourced directly between
two entities without a third party medium such as telecommunication companies as has
previously been the case (Shariatmadari, et al., 2015).
The 5G network and IoT are anticipated to herald new policing strategies in the United
States. The ability to train the police force to respond to emerging threats to public safety will
gain added importance as security threats increase with advancing technology (Shariatmadari, et
al., 2015). Cyber security will take a more central concern among policy makers at the
Department of Homeland Security. Different experts in the security field have suggested
alternative viewpoints to aligning security organs with the demands and realities of 5G
technology and the IoT. Hollywood et al. (2017) argues policymakers will need to influence the
international standard-setting bodies to adopt similar parameters for devices working in the 5G
environment. This suggestion is dependent on the hope that wiretapping can still be made
possible in the full implementation of 5G and the subsequent emerging technologies (Verma &
Dombrowski, 2018). The 5G technology is also expected to form the artery of the IoT meaning
large amounts of data are likely to become available to law enforcement (Kumar et al., 2018).
The advantage, however limited, is law enforcement agencies will have new data troves from
which to work out important security information for intelligence and other emerging criminal
trends including counterterrorism (Kumar et al., 2018).
The ability of 5G network to support Internet of Things will impact how the protection of
American nationals is accomplished by multi-agency teams working under the DHS. Verma and
Dombrowski (2018) note 5G technology has the functionalities to promote interconnectivity
between several devices with each working independently. Unlike the 4G network that laid the
foundation for the development of software applications, 5G opens the physical world to
transformations that will undoubtedly shape the future(Borgaonkar et al., 2019).A whole new
range of abilities is born in the transport and communication sector (Borgaonkar et al.,
2019).Self-driving cars, new industrial machinery, and highly dynamic robotic systems, driven
by artificial intelligence, will shape how individuals and organizations interact. Carter,
Grommon, and Frantz (2014) argue while in the past terrorists had to walk or drive to their
targets to deliver bombs, self-driving cars could be used to carry out this role will limited ability
to intercept the individuals involved.
The impact of 5G is anticipated to shift roles between security agencies. It is apparent
that the disruptive nature of the emerging technology will be felt in the sharing of roles and
duties (Carter, Grommon, & Frantz, 2014). As policing and other functions such as emergency
response become more dependent on technologies, more resources will be invested in
preventative measures rather than fighting emergencies once they happen (Ejaz et al., 2016).
Over the long term, critical infrastructure in the United States will be more reliant on the wireless
technology (McKinnon, 2018). Unlike the previous IT changes that were incremental or
evolutionary, the 5G network represent technological shift in that completely new infrastructure
and way of thinking will be necessary for all stakeholders involved (Carter et al., 2014).
Privacy Challenges in and Law Enforcement in 5G
The DHS previously stated the United States requires taking the global leadership of 5G
development to enhance the security programs for American citizens. China has dominated
initial efforts aimed at developing, implementing and commoditizing the use of 5G networks
(Verma & Dombrowski, 2018). Chinese leadership over such an important technology will
expose American citizens to potentially illegal intrusion to private data by foreign players. Xu et
al. (2016) note the ability of the DHS to protect Americans from cyber-crime will be
compromised if the U.S loses the 5G technology leadership race.
Fears stem from the suspicion that state-sponsors of terrorism and cybercrimes are likely
to gain such technologies and use them for selfish interests (Carter, Grommon, & Frantz, 2014).
Additionally, initiatives taken to combat cybercrime in America will be weakened in the face of
weak engineering associated with something of foreign production (Ejaz et al., 2016). However,
the major threat would relate to the inherent risks associated with purchasing an integral network
from a rival. Given the great rivalry between China and the United States, it is possible
developers may leave vulnerabilities to be exploited, not only by protectors of Chinese interests,
but also by other capable actors such as Iran, Russia, and North Korea (Rob & Negishi, 2018). It
is against this backdrop the United States regarded trade between American companies and
Chinese company Huawei to represent a significant threat to the security of American interests
(Carter et al., 2014). Huawei is a leading Chinese telecommunication company that
manufacturers and sells smartphones. The company is also leading in the development and
export of 5G technologies. A major element of these fears is the potential intrusion of privacy of
Americans by foreign nationals through different components of the 5G network.
Threats to the integrity of American privacy have been associated with the policies
adopted by Chinese authorities when expanding their infrastructures abroad. The standard
practice has been to send its nationals to foreign countries for the purposes of managing
equipment (Hollywood, 2017). Positioning foreigners at critical national security infrastructures
represents an intolerable risk to the protection of American nationals and their infrastructure.
The National Communications System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the DHS is
charged with investigative services based on the national communication systems (Carter,
Grommon, & Frantz, 2014). However, their ability would be compromised if the
communications systems delivered for the purposes of domestic surveillance are weakened and
compromised (Carter et al., 2014). The threat to data privacy is not restricted to potential foreign
intrusion.
Hollywood (2017) notes illegal access to private data could be accomplished through
cyber-attacks spread across criminal networks. While this weakness was manifest in 4G and
other preceding technologies, the interconnectedness under 5Gmakes this possibility more
troublesome for the DHS. The widespread application of facial recognition and geo-location
parameters under 5G complemented by advanced forms of artificial intelligence should be
managed responsibly (Carter et al., 2014). Lapses in the administration of these vital
technologies can result in litigations against agencies working under DHS and calls for the need
to train officers on data ethics and responsibility under the new technology (Ejaz et al., 2016).
Traditional reliance on a third party as a medium for communication will be missing and the IoT
will require new intrusive methods that can intervene between two independent communications
without the requirement of the medium such as the service provider.
The 5G network compounded with the IoT promises to generate vast amounts of data
traffic. A major component of data will relate to video streaming. As several devices become
highly interconnected, the risk of exposure of data to unauthorized entities increases significantly
(Verma & Dombrowski, 2018). Vulnerability in one device exposes other parties in the network
to potential illegal access. Automated systems are bound to create additional threats extending
beyond the integrity of devices to the safety of the American people. Carter, Grommon, and
Frantz (2014) noted it is easier to attack than to defend under the 5G engineering. IoT increases
the amount of devices that become potential targets for cyber criminals.
In effect, the scope of surveillance, for the purposes of protecting Americans and their
properties, will increase significantly under the IoT (Borgaonkar et al., 2019). The additional
expectations from major agencies such as the secret services will be evident. More worrisome is
the potential for systemic failures as downtime in one device leads to cyclical failure in other
players along the network (Ji et al., 2016). Unanticipated attacks based on devices outside the
control of the officers charged with protecting critical infrastructures and senior government
officials cannot be ruled out. The dangers will be potent in the cyber space where limitations of
4G could be replicated under the new 5G (Ji et al., 2016).
The risk of cyber-attacks is projected to increase substantially under the 5G network. In
recent past, hackers managed to compromise important installation using inferior technologies to
what we anticipate under the 5G. Fraga-Lamas, Fernández-Caramés, Suárez-Albela, Castedo,
and González-López (2016) argued that hackers used sophisticated systems to take control of
municipal dams. There were other instances where self-driving vehicles were commandeered by
hackers and stopped midway an interstate (Borgaonkar et al., 2019).Given these frailties, it is
noteworthy that the DHS takes important measures to develop contingency plans to guide
potential failures in case of massive attacks. This measure is significant given 5G is projected to
usher in the fourth industrial revolution and the development of smart cities (Carter et al., 2014).
Potential cyber-attacks manifested through identity theft, malware, and crypto-jacking presents
major challenges that will require significant investment in technologies and man power to
surmount (Carter et al., 2014). The adverse impact on public safety under the more
interconnected 5G environment is significant.
The disruptive nature of 5G will fundamentally alter how legal interception of
telecommunication has been accomplished under past technologies. Surveillance methods
designed to empower security agencies working under the DHS with quality information have
largely depended on wiretapping (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). The information gleaned from this
procedure has formed an important basis to develop strategies to fight crime across the country.
However, these methodologies used to identify and locate criminals operating within American
borders are bound to change in dramatic fashion with the introduction of 5G (Kumar et al.,
2018). Wiretapping has traditionally relied on international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI).
The technology utilizes codes that are strategically attached to communication devices. The
codes can send the location of a device as well as give away important messages in the
communication(Ji et al., 2016). The 5G infrastructure is designed to overcome such
vulnerabilities that data protection activists are considered to be entry points for unsolicited
access to private data (Akpakwu et al., 2017). The 5G network enhances encryption of data and
disables the use of IMSI. It would also become impossible for security agencies to assign a
device to any individual using the traditional surveillance methods (Jones, 2019). Traditional
surveillance relied on methods that tended to trick mobile devices to imagine they are
communicating with a telephone tower. The device would then begin transmitting data in the
same way they communicate with mobile towers (Ji et al., 2016). During the exchange of
information, the owner of the device is left unaware giving law enforcement agencies an
advantage in apprehending suspects. The complexities of 5G and IoT use a more advanced
technology that utilizes false-base detection (Palattella et al., 2016). The new feature allows
devices to detect any attempts by DHS officers to intrusively gain access to the mobile device
regarding location and other important data.
Making arrests based initiatives advanced under previous technologies will not succeed.
Importantly, failure to develop new surveillance systems may render prevention of crime
impossible (Shariatmadari et al., 2018). Yet the primary role of any officer working under the
DHS is to ensure the safety of Americans and their properties are protected beforehand. The
coast guards need to have adequate information to trouble shoot any underlying dangers before
they manifest dangerously in communities (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). Likewise immigration
officers should have sufficient information to guide enforcement at the borders. The ability to
stay ahead of provocateurs in terms of information sharing and countering criminal activities is
fundamental in effective administration of law and order (Ji et al., 2016). Yet, these core
milestones cannot be attained when existing procedure and infrastructures are used under the
dynamics of IoT. The role played by 5G will transcend beyond fighting crime.
Preventing and responding to emergencies is a core function for the DHS. The
organization is responsible for coordinating federal response to declared emergencies. Sharing
critical information is essential during these times to prevent major disasters from happening on
American soil (Akpakwu et al., 2017). Poor communication channels have bedeviled previous
response mechanisms. Notable among major failures in American history was the emergency
response to hurricane Katrina. Ineffective communication between various agencies at the local,
state, and federal level was cited as a major contribution to the delayed and largely
uncoordinated response measure (Palattella et al., 2016). The integration of 5G promises to
revolutionize how communication can be effected for the purposes of rapid response to disasters
(Jones, 2019). Sharing of data is projected to be much faster than we know today, with some
estimates predicting it to be a hundred times faster (Jones, 2019). While multi-agency teams
responsible in the emergency scheme of things will be required to have seamless communication,
there will be added possibility that the agencies could engage communities directly in the rescue
mission (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). Search and rescue stand to be improved as various
communication devices communicate with others enabling faster detection of incapacitated
persons seeking immediate intervention during emergencies (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016).
Security Preparedness for 5G Network
Security experts have noted the need to enhance cyber security when shifting from the
current 4G platform to the 5G network. Central to achieving these goals will be the ability to
train officers working under the DHS toward responding effectively to rapidly developing issues
(Akpakwu et al., 2017). Alternative and sometimes competing opinions have been advanced in a
bid to develop an effective response mechanism to effective working of the DHS. Aligning
security agencies and educating them on the wide ranging effects of the 5G network should be
the basis for an integrated response measure (Akpakwu et al., 2017). Given the transformative
nature of the 5G, it is anticipated that all agencies under the DHS will be impacted by the new
technology.
Organizational policies may have to be redrawn to reflect the changing technological and
operational environment. More precisely, Palattella et al. (2016) argues policy makers must be
prepared to influence the process of developing the 5G network and its dimensions. The ability
to influence outcomes of the technology will go a long way in ensuring important surveillance
options remain available for the purposes of law enforcement rather than for ulterior motives of
accessing third party information (Shariatmadari et al., 2018). Standard-setting bodies should be
incorporated into the decision-making process to ensure all devices working under 5G have
similar features (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). By having comparable parameters for
communication, the DHS would be empowered to develop effective surveillance methods based
a narrow range of determinants, rather than infinite numbers given the potential of 5G to support
such great variety of instrumentation (Shariatmadari et al., 2018). A partnership between
developers and security agencies will strengthen the understanding of the DHS in formulating
appropriate measures to influence progressive surveillance while protecting the privacy of
American citizens. However, this proposition is challenged by other experts.
Ji et al. (2016) argue that deliberately creating weakness in the network for the purpose of
aligning with the needs of the security agencies may compromise value for other end users of the
system including general citizens (Akpakwu et al., 2017). Such initiatives may also form the
basis for other network weaknesses that can be exploited by cyber criminals and endanger the
lives of many people (Borgaonkar et al., 2019). Although the dynamics of 5G makes it difficult
for law enforcement agencies to eavesdrop on communication between two or more individuals
on the network, these difficulties are not entirely new (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). Under 4G,
many networks adopted end-to- end encryptions on common messaging platforms. The
challenges experienced by the DHS under such circumstances should be used to develop a more
effective method of surveillance and counter terrorism measures (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016).
Other suggestions have revolved around the need to utilize the vast amount of data
generated under 5G for the purposes of advancing surveillance methods. The IoT is expected to
benefit greatly from the availability of data and full adoption of the 5G network (Ji et al., 2016).
One of the outcomes of the technology would be vast data traffic from both voice and video
streams. Agencies working under the DHS could exploit this opportunity by developing analytics
that skim through vast data for specific information. This suggestion is based on big data
technologies (Ejaz et al., 2016). The vast data can form an important source of information that
would prove critical to effective planning, securing vital installations, and responding to
emergencies before they occur. However, this methodology is also noted for some weaknesses
that manifested in the current 4G network (Carter et al., 2014). Access to vast data does not
guarantee the DHS would be in a position to collect actionable intelligence. The large amount of
data may present problems of determining which information is credible and which is not.
Having too much information may prove to be a challenge as much as it could be a source for
further action.
Analysis
5G-Related Law Enforcement Challenges
Law enforcement will be fundamentally affected by the transformational nature of the 5G
network. The comfort enhanced under the 4G infrastructure is bound to disappear with the
transition to the new fifth generation network (Kumar et al., 2018). Policyholders within the
security and law enforcement sector will have to reevaluate procedures, protocols, and
techniques that have served so effectively under the 4G networks (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016).
Given that law enforcement, and in particular surveillance programs, are intricately connected to
the IT infrastructure, replacing the 4G ecosystem in totality has far-reaching implications for the
DHS and security agencies working under the umbrella of homeland security.
Lawful interception of communication. The nature of 5G infrastructure makes it hard
for judicial and law enforcement officers to adequately carry out lawful interception. The virtual,
high security and fragmented architecture takes away the capacity of law enforcement officers to
access valuable personal and commercial data that could be essential for maintenance of law and
order (Liyanage et al., 2018). One aspect of the fifth generation network is it will provide
exceptionally high security standards. Although the encryption that has characterized 4G
network is yet to be defined as an integral feature of the new network, it is likely to be included
into the standardization process for 5G network (Kumar et al., 2018). By adding the encryption
dimension to an already significantly secure network, access to electronic communicationswill
be severely compromised whether it is approved by relevant authorities or not. Upon the
encryption of the IMIS number, it will become impossible for law enforcement agents to identify
the device and its location (Law Enforcement and Judicial Aspects Related to 5G, 2019).
Criminals or other persons whose actions pose a serious threat to public safety would be
empowered to hide under the security features of the new network. More significantly, it would
also be difficult to identify potential victims or other persons who are under imminent attack.
Accessing information via IMIS is critical for police surveillance under current
technological posture. However, the privacy crusaders claim IMSI catchers are “indiscriminate
surveillance tools that could be used to track who attends a political demonstration or a public
event like a football match” (IMSI Catchers, 2019, p. 1). However, for surveillance purposes,
this technology has proved essential for tactical and operational purposes of investigations
particularly when dealing with surveillance of persons that routinely change subscriber
identification module (SIM). Lack of access to the IMSI number disables lawful interceptions
(Liyanage et al., 2018). The metadata that ordinarily becomes available through interceptions of
contact persons, location of the device, call duration, calling persons, time, and date will be lost.
5G will require a strict authentication process for the purposes of identifying a user prior
to allowing access. The authentication process may include false-base detection that seals an
important loophole extensively used by law enforcement authorities to probe necessary cases
through lawful interception (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). Under the 4G network, this process could
be completed without being detected. However, the 5G infrastructure is designed to detect IMSI
catchers that support interception of communications on mobile devices (Law Enforcement and
Judicial Aspects Related to 5G, 2019). The same catcher would trick the mobile device to
communicate the location of the victim or suspect. Although the encryption under 4G
significantly weakened interception of telecommunications, the proposition under 5G will make
the problem harder and widespread. The seriousness of the problem is likely to become apparent
as nearly all electronic communication devices under the network become interconnected and
encrypted (Liyanage et al., 2018). Today, only a few devices and applications such as WhatsApp
and Skype are encrypted (Kumar et al., 2018). More significantly, today the IMSI numbers are
decrypted allowing localization and identification of communicating devices and by extension
access to metadata interception. Besides the interception challenges, the large number of actors
within the 5G ecosystem makes it difficult to determine the quality of evidence to present before
the judiciary (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). Some of the information may be considered fake
especially when the ownership of data and accountability is not properly articulated among the
service and network providers

Fragmented and virtual architecture: Under the 4G network, lawful interception has been
achieved because of few parties that are notified pending interception.The authorities have had to
work with a few service and network providers making it quicker and easier to complete
interception on specific communications whenever necessary (Liyanage et al., 2018). The
network slicing technology that undercuts the fifth generation infrastructure will make it
impossible to facilitate interception. They will have complete information with them, but may
not be willing to serve the interests of the security agents unless compelled to do so (Kumar et
al., 2018). However, any initiative by the law enforcement agents outside of the service providers
is unlikely to bear any fruit. The fragmented services under the 5G ecosystem require one
company to provide cellular phones, another to provide enhanced mobile broadband while
another will provide low latency communication system (Law Enforcement and Judicial Aspects
Related to 5G, 2019). Under this arrangement, each service provider would apply bespoke virtual
layer of similar physical infrastructure using alternative technical specifications. This virtual
architecture robs relevant monitoring information from some of the network slice.
The complexity of network fragmentation under the 5G network is shown in the multi-
access edge computing otherwise called MEC (Law Enforcement and Judicial Aspects Related to
5G, 2019). MEC promotes timely response by allowing service provider’s storage and
processing of data stored in the cloud within the vicinity of other users of network as long they
can communicate directly with each other. Under this condition, no information will be directed
toward central nodes where traditionally surveillance and interception often take place
(McKinnon, 2018). There is no guarantee data will be available in these traditional central nodes
for the purposes of accessing and using it to make important policing decisions. Network
functions that existed in their physical world are being virtualized or moved to foreign locations.
Existing mechanisms meant to protect the confidentiality that should be associated with
communications interception will cease to work (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). Some of the
confidentiality measures have included protecting against altering lists by identifying certain
staff to implement the necessary measures. Additionally, the vetted staff would also ensure
physical protection of measures including restricting access to certain locations. All these
measures would be compromised (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016).
The 5G architecture requires that in order to effectively perform electronic and
telecommunication surveillance, the law enforcement agencies will be required to cooperate with
several network providers as well as the numerous stakeholders in the network (Liyanage et al.,
2018). The challenge with this requirement is that other than stakeholders being many, some of
the network providers may be based outside the United States and operating under different
jurisdictions. The current practice requires making request to only one network provider within
the federal territory. The cross-border element brought about by 5G may demand increased
international cooperation (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). International cooperation slows the pace of
investigations by increasing the time between placing the request for interception and eventual
interceptions. The risk of losing the entirety of technical copy of required information cannot be
overlooked. By this measure, it becomes important to oblige all service providers working within
the United States to implement requests made by law enforcement agencies even if it involves
reaching out partner companies overseas (Liyanage et al., 2018). What is clear is that without
lawful interceptions, agencies working under the DHS will have less evidence for purposes of
prosecution that compromises the process of delivering justice.

Mission critical communications. In the cyberspace, mission critical communication
(MCC) come under sharp focus within the fifth generation network. MCC can be described as
the ability to deliver communication means “where conventional networks cannot meet the
required demands” (Law Enforcement and Judicial Aspects Related To 5G, 2019, pg. 3).
Ordinarily, these aspects relate to disaster stricken areas or incidents involving public safety
where the usual mobile telephone system collapses leaving professional responders without
communication systems (Liyanage et al., 2018). With global terrorism threats growing by the
day, timely coordination of rescue and response measures is critical.
The need to improve timely coordination and public safety among responders such as the
fire department, enforcement agencies and emergency medical services gains urgent importance.
Demand for MCC is becoming essential for responders mentioned above (Fraga-Lamas et al.,
2016). They would require dedicated networks although the current ones including the terrestrial
trunked radio are stretched to their limits. The 5G network boasts of low latency and reliability
that can replace the dedicated channels. However, the threats of external interference including
cyber-attacks need to be addressed. For purposes of law enforcement under the DHS, these
services guarantee access to MCC network especially to avoid distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks across the network (Liyanage et al., 2018). The security assessment of potential
attacks of this nature is that terrorists have limited capacity despite their past expression of
willingness to attack.
Threats to privacy rights. A totally connected world carries significantly new risks. The
risk of cyber-attacks will become ever more potent. Hackers have previously succeeded in
compromising some of major infrastructures heavily built on emerging technologies. Fraga-
Lamas, Fernández-Caramés, Suárez-Albela, Castedo, and González-López (2016) argued that

hackers were able to breach sophisticated control systems for a municipal dam. Furthermore,
illegal access to control systems in self-driving vehicles has made its way on an interstate and
sabotaging of home appliances point to increasing challenges for law enforcers (Verma &
Dombrowski, 2018). Yet, these are fundamental features that will define 5G network and set it
apart from the rest of technologies. This technology is also anticipated to revolutionize industrial
development and set the world on course for the fourth industrial revolution in smart cities
(Hollywood et al., 2017). These weaknesses have presented fault lines in the cyber space. The
introduction of IoT will not only increase the frequency of cyber threats such as crypto-jacking,
malware, and identity theft, it will also increase the impact on the safety of the general public
(Siboni et al., 2018). The DHS will come under increased scrutiny to ensure its policies not only
deliver on its core mandate, but it also upholds the core values of the American society
(Liyanage et al., 2018). One of these values is ensuring the privacy of personal data is not
violated under the multitude of data anticipated to dominate the 5G interconnectivity.
Infrastructural threats. The 5G network along with the accompanying infrastructure
and supporting technologies is bound to transform the law enforcement procedures and standards
(Jones, 2019). Major impacts are likely to be felt in the surveillance procedures particularly
cyber security, lawful interception of electronic communication, and data privacy. The DHS,
through the Cyber-security and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), is responsible for
protecting the country’s critical infrastructure. It is apparent the 5G network will portend serious
threats to the security of America’s critical infrastructure (Jones, 2019). Although the discourse
surrounding 5G revolves its impact on communication, the real impact will be felt across several
sphere of public safety including infrastructures such as electricity supply across major cities and
densely populated areas (McKinnon, 2018). Other utility supplies such as water depend on
technologies to ensure they are safely treated and supplied to the public for consumption
(Liyanage et al., 2018).
The United States financial system can also come under attack because of the integrated
nature of technologies and particularly as it will reflect under the next generation. The intrusive
nature of 5G technology is set to affect these key segments in public safety (Kumar et al., 2018).
CISA is expected to take the lead in securing important national infrastructure against cyber-
attacks that can ultimately compromise the safety and security of the nation (Jones, 2019).
However, achieving this goal will require training of law enforcement officers and adoption of
new technologies consistent with demands of the 5G ecosystem. It is important to get the
foundational issues surrounding the 5G network correct (Liyanage et al., 2018). These concerns
are shared by Australian Signals Directorate, an equivalent of the U.S. National Security
Agency, which laid out some scenarios that can unfold under the forthcoming communication
infrastructure (McKinnon, 2018). The agency cited potential breakdown in the supply of
electricity and water in densely populated areas or cities (McKinnon, 2018). It is also for this
reason the Australian Signals Directorate banned Chinese companies from participating in the
rollout of new telecommunication technology in the country. The next generation network will
underpin several infrastructures that could be brought down by cyber-attacks (Kumar et al.,
2018). These aspects make 5G infrastructure much more strategic than earlier versions.
The Chinese technology factor. The recent ban of Chinese companies from participating
in the development of 5G networks in western countries underscores the sensitivity of 5G. The
United States voiced its concerns about the leadership of Chinese companies, in particular
Huawei and ZTE Corp, in rolling out the network in the United States (Rob & Negishi, 2018).
ZTE Corp. together with Huawei is a major Chinese telecommunication company that sells
smartphones and other technology equipment. The fear the technology could be used by the
Chinese authorities to spy on America highlights the challenges the DHS will grapple with when
the technology is fully adopted in the country (Rob &Negishi, 2018). Although China has
emerged as a market leader in the development and application of the technology, the United
States and its traditional allies have shied away from buying the technology from China
(McKinnon, 2018). The ability of the Chinese companies to work independent of the Chinese
government and China’s People’s Liberation Army has been brought to question by western
democracies. In 2012, Australia banned the purchase of the country’s high-speed national
broadband from China. It followed up this ban in 2019 by excluding Chinese companies from
rolling out the 5G technology. ZTE Corp pleaded guilty of violating American laws relating to
sale of technology to Iran (Rob & Negishi, 2018). Since the technology will pervade important
sectors of security such as hospital networks and self-driving vehicles, it is important that the
DHS gets the foundational aspect of the 5G infrastructure correct.
The concern surrounding Huawei and other leading Chinese telecommunication
companies is reflected in Japan. The country is in the process of changing its procurement laws
to make it illegal to purchase 5G-related equipment from China (Rob &Negishi, 2018). This
decision follows accusations by the U.S that Chinese companies are often used by the Chinese
government to carry out cyber spying (McKinnon, 2018). The fear of infiltration of its security
infrastructure, not only by individual and group criminals, but also by hostile state actors is a
major aspect of homeland security.

The flood of interconnected household devices is perhaps the biggest consequences of the
IoT. For law enforcement officers, the concerns surround the threat of cyber-attacks particularly
denial-of-service attacks (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). This type of attack manifested in 2016 on
Twitter and Netflix that severely disabled the companies’ services for a day (McKinnon, 2018).
Emerging from the above information is the determination that 5G will be central in the
everyday public life (McKinnon, 2018). Other concerns affirm that the fifth generation will be
easier for cyber criminals to turn autonomous vehicles, implantable devices, and medical
procedures into attack weapons. The interconnectedness of networks and gadgets will become
easy targets for cyber-attacks. U.S. vulnerability is likely to grow particularly if American
technology companies lose the leadership race to develop key infrastructural equipment to China
(Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016).The most likely alternative would be to use the much-maligned
Chinese equipment. Securing all the components under the next network is a herculean task that
the DHS must prepare to tackle.
Developing the 5G infrastructure locally. If the United States builds its 5G network,
there would be several law enforcement and surveillance advantages. McKinnon (2018) posit
that the familiarity and sense of ownership absent of another state actor’s interests allows for
burgling. However, the case is not the same when equipment is sourced from political and
economic rivals(Rob & Negishi, 2018). The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has
been accused of dragging its feet in providing the airwaves necessary to support the 5G network.
Other government agencies have also been chided for being too slow in the bid to strengthen the
U.S toward dominating 5G technology (Rob & Negishi, 2018). The DHS on its part has
acknowledged it may not have the authority to prevent certain challenges relating to regulatory
processes and those that may fall outside the civilian ambit.
The executive arm of the government once recommended nationalizing 5G system in a
bid to support securing the homeland and its interests. However, this suggestion was fiercely
opposed by telecommunication companies and the legislature citing the stifling of innovation
that would be associated with such strategies (Fraga-Lamas et al., 2016). Policymakers have
since moved toward plugging potential vulnerabilities to cater for national security interests
while supporting innovative and empowering aspects of the fifth generation network (McKinnon,
2018). The government has found it appropriate to work with technology companies that form an
integral niche within the 5G ecosystem. The federal government has moved ahead to work with
device makers to strengthen the capacity for heading off attacks (McKinnon, 2018). This
measure was followed by legislation that effectively prohibits federal government agencies and
contractors from integrating Chinese telecommunication equipment in the development of the
next generation network (McKinnon, 2018).
Recommendations
The ability of law enforcement officers working under the DHS to carry out lawful
interception will be seriously compromised under the 5G network. Urgent action is required to
maintain the ability to intercept and analyze communication gadgets for purposes of preserving
law and order (Rob & Negishi, 2018). As a reflection of the global nature of the seriousness of
the problem, 16 member states gathered at Europol to deliberate on the implication of 5G and
IoT for the law enforcement process (Law Enforcement and Judicial Aspects Related to 5G,
2019). The meeting comprised of representatives of the telecommunication interception units
united under a common concern their ability to discharge lawful mandate may be weakened
substantially unless drastic action is taken to ensure there is seamless transition from 4G to 5G
regarding surveillance and telecommunication interception (Sharevski, 2018). Similar efforts

have taken place in several places around the world, most notably in Australia where the country
was concerned about the policing challenges that may emerge under the 5G network
functionality (McKinnon, 2018). Their fears are reflected in the various scholarly articles and
narratives of security experts. Consequent upon the analysis of potential impact of 5G network,
various recommendations are fronted as effective measures to help policymakers at the DHS to
develop a framework that will ensure the ability of law enforcers working under the agency is
maintained when 5G is fully adopted across the country.
Influencing the 5G Standardization Process
Influencing standard definition is one of the strategies the DHS can choose to ensure
favorable outcomes in the intersection between law enforcement and the 5G network
(McKinnon, 2018). It is crucial homeland security works with other agencies to increase political
pressure sowhen the next generation network is developed and implemented across the country,
concerns surrounding law enforcement are taken into consideration (Rob & Negishi, 2018). The
DHS should work with other high-level government representatives particularly the Department
of Defense to develop a common approach that will ease law enforcement programs during the
process of standardization (Kumar et al., 2018). One aspect of standardization would relate to
pressuring the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) mandated Third Generation
Partnership Project (3GPP) (Law Enforcement and Judicial Aspects Related to 5G, 2019). This is
a global body made up of multi-stakeholders who collaborate with various interest groups in the
telecommunication industry. They also represent telecommunication standard associations that
ultimately set the important metrics that would be implemented across the telecommunication
industry (Sharevski, 2018). These groups of suppliers and operators are an important stakeholder
group particularly in determining aspects of the network that would ultimately apply in the next
generation network.
It is notable the 3GPP membership is primarily driven by industry interests rather than
those of law enforcement. Voting rights in the group are dependent on the finances contributed
by each member with no option to veto the outcome by any authority (Kumar et al., 2018).
Telecommunication companies have far more votes compared with law enforcement authorities.
Alternatively, increasing membership of law enforcement authorities in the SA3-LI would also
help. The SA3-LI is a sub-group of the 3GPP that deliberates on issues relating to lawful
interception (Law Enforcement and Judicial Aspects Related to 5G, 2019). Besides these two
groups, the DHS may require to look at other subgroups including the wireless carriers and
satellite providers (Sharevski, 2018).It is for this reason political pressure is considered necessary
to safeguard the interests of maintaining law and order. Legislation may be necessary to force
telecommunication companies to apply law enforcement requirements other than those agreed
upon by the 3GPP (Kumar et al., 2018).
Dialogue with Operators
Dialogue with operators with a view to reaching a compromise between the industry interests
and those of security agencies can be essential in supporting the DHS goals. Given that
stakeholders in the 3GPP are global, the DHS would require channeling its interests across
various government agencies so that it goes beyond the agency interests to accommodate those
of the federal government. The challenge of law enforcement under the next generation network
will not be isolated to any particular country. Complexities surrounding law enforcement will
affect nearly every country including the early adopters of the technology (McKinnon, 2018).
The essence of dialogue is to convince operators to take into account the interests of law
enforcement when designing the all-important configurations of the 5G network.
Federal Legislation
Legislation would be necessary to entrench the interests of law enforcement in the national
laws. While standardization and dialogue could prove effective strategies to protect the ability of
police to work in the conditions set by 5G, laws might be required to streamline the
implementation of the network (Sharevski, 2018). The laws would be designed to allow for
lawful interception in a manner that maintains the status quo. The following measures could be
important in ensuring lawful interception is achieved through legislation.
Registering all providers and requiring all service providers within the United States to
extract a complete monitoring file that is also decrypted. This requirement would demand
providers to should structure their network in a manner that ensures availability of location data
(McKinnon, 2018). Service providers would also be obliged to cooperate with law enforcement
agents by ensuring that technical measures, including IMSI catcher, are integrated into the
network.
The DHS could reflect on a common legislative agenda with other security agencies in the
country especially the Department of Defense, so that it achieves greater leverage vis-à-vis the
service providers (Law Enforcement and Judicial Aspects Related to 5G, 2019). It would also be
necessary to lobby security agencies in other countries to adopt similar standards so that
international law enforcement is enhanced (Sharevski, 2018). The DHS could work particularly
with its international allies and partners in the quest to develop a common framework that is
supported in law that facilitates lawful interceptions to facilitate cross-border surveillance.
Conclusion
The DHS faces a decisive moment in the transition from the 4G network to a more robust
but challenging 5G ecosystems. Advancing technologies are usually accompanied by new
policing posture among security agencies. The new infrastructure is expected to transform nearly
every facet of life including the ability of law enforcement to carry out surveillance programs
effectively. One of the strengths of the new system is enhanced data sharing capabilities and
generation of vast metadata that can enhance surveillance work. The IMIS catchers that have
traditionally formed the basis for lawful interception of communication to collect metadata for
investigation and law enforcement will no longer be available under the new network. The
architecture of the new network will require law enforcement officers to cooperate with a large
number of service providers and network operators, some of whom are based overseas, to carry
out lawful interception. This scenario may prove time wasting and ineffective when faced with
critical incidents.
The IoT that underpins the 5G system is anticipated to enhance connectivity of smart
devices running into billions. With lower latency and increased data sharing speed, the new
network will generate vast amounts of data. However, the interconnected devices are not
particularly designed with security features in mind. The risk of illegal access to sensitive
personal data through cyber-attacks will increase substantially. Law enforcement officers
charged with securing the homeland will require retraining to empower them with necessary
skills to discharge their mandate under the transformative fifth generation network. The DHS
through the CISA must actively influence the development process to ensure the interests of
national security are considered during the planning and implementation phases of the network.
The ability of DHS to deal with the disruptive nature of the 5G network will depend to a large
extent on collaboration with other stakeholders in national security. However, it is crucial the
organization develops mechanisms that will support delivery of services according to their core
mandate. Consequently, retraining officers under its jurisdiction to empower them with critical
dynamics of 5G and IoT should be the springboard for further changes.
As the authority responsible for securing the homeland, DHS can influence the
development of the 5G network to support the process of surveillance particularly lawful
interception of communication. The department can realize this objective by working with other
federal agencies to influence the standardization of the 5G systems at the 3GPP and other bodies
responsible for developing telecommunication standards. Additionally, the DHS should lobby for
legislation that obliges network providers to support surveillance efforts at least to the current
level of surveillance capabilities. The essence of federal legislation would be to compel service
and network providers to extract complete decrypted monitoring files that also show the location
of respective communication devices.

References
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Running head: LAW ENFORCEMENT UNDER 5G AND INTERNET OF THINGS 1

Capstone Project: Law Enforcement under 5G and Internet of Things

secured architecture underpinning the forthcoming technology. Furthermore, the investigation

recommendations of this research would be addressed to the Department of Homeland Security

for purposes of supporting effective policy-making.

Security Aspects of IoT.............................................................................................................13

ii. Network Connectivity.................................................................................................14

iii. Data Collection............................................................................................................15

PRIVACY AND IOT....................................................................................................................16

Forms of Privacy Concerns Under 5G and IoT.........................................................................19

End to End ((E2E) Data Privacy............................................................................................19

Loss of Data Ownership........................................................................................................19

Location of Legal Disputes....................................................................................................20

Privacy Challenges in and Law Enforcement in 5G..................................................................23

Security Preparedness for 5G Network.....................................................................................28

5G-Related Law Enforcement Challenges................................................................................30

Lawful Interception of Communication................................................................................31

Fragmented and Virtual Architecture....................................................................................33

Mission Critical Communications.........................................................................................35

Threats to Privacy Rights.......................................................................................................36

The Chinese Technology Factor............................................................................................38

Developing the 5G Infrastructure Locally.............................................................................39

i. Influencing the 5G Standardization Process.......................................................................41

ii. Dialogue with Operators.....................................................................................................43

iii. Federal Legislation......................................................................................................43

methods consistent with realities in the technological environment (Hollywood, Woods,

how law enforcement agencies conduct lawful interception of telecommunication. The

how it responds to the wide-reaching technological shift posed by 5G.

safety will be more exposed to unprecedented threats in cyber space.

pressure on policing in general and surveillance in particular. As multiple systems become

Currently, electronic communication interceptions, also called wiretapping, form the

device to a specific individual.

The researcher proposes to conduct secondary research aimed at seeking effective

repositories as well as the university library.

assignment of a new spectrum in mmWave bands is designed to facilitate increased throughput

Chien & Björnson, 2017).

The development of 5G network is in part due to the proliferation of the Internet of

implementation of the next generation network.

Benefits of 5G Network to Law Enforcement

supporting the decision-making process in an objective way (Siboni, Sachidananda, Meidan,

all systems and machines around us will be automated.

Security Aspects of IoT

surroundings (Fraga-Lamas, Fernández-Caramés, Suárez-Albela, Castedo& González-López,

of data that smart devices collect.

devices by manufacturers unlike the standard practice in computing systems.

beyond the traditional security vulnerabilities of computing devices.

application of lightweight authentication algorithms in IoT devices makes it easy to manipulate

(Liyanage et al., 2018).

and broadcasting of information which contributes to narrowing of the bandwidth (Liyanage et

vulnerability of device to cyber attacks.

parties, exposing them to unintended adverse outcomes particularly from competitors.

these devices for malicious goals including identity theft.

Privacy and IoT

including Network Function Virtualization (NFV), Software-Deﬁned networking (SDN), and

unauthorized third party actors.

privacy are expected to gain added importance.

The development of 5G network architecture and supporting technologies will

manifest under the 5G infrastructure

for the public and law enforcement agencies.

enhancing socialization by determining their respective locations (Borgaonkar et al., 2019).

compromise their security.

Identity privacy encompasses protection of a subscriber’s identity information as well as