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Compilation of Case Digests IN Special Proceedings
Compilation of Case Digests IN Special Proceedings
College of Law
General Santos City Extension
General Santos City
COMPILATION OF
CASE DIGESTS
IN
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Submitted to:
Submitted by:
DAN R. MILLADO
1577-17
Rule 72
1. Natcher vs. CA, G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001
Facts:
In her answer, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally
married to Graciano and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered
a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during
Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to
his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim
against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.
After trial, RTC of Manila rendered a decision holding that the deed
of sale is prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. Although the deed
of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be
regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a
compulsory heir of the deceased.
Issue:
Ruling:
In Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil. 880 [1920], it was held that, “there
lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An
action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal
remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special
proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly
so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon
an application or motion.”
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Here, Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express
rules of evidence, an action brought exclusively to declare a person
presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually presents no
actual controversy that a court could decide. In such action, there would be
no actual rights to be enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor any status to
be established. Moreover, a court action to declare a person presumptively
dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code would be unnecessary.
The presumption in the said articles is already established by law.
4. Heirs of Ypon vs. Ricaforte, G.R. No. 198680, July 8, 2013
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, G.R. No. 150206, March
13, 2009, the Supreme Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the
proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case.
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the status of the party as heirs can be made only in
special proceeding.
Ruling:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia,
together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of
the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.
The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was
a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas,
Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.
Issue:
Ruling:
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of
the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Here, it should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that
the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires
exclusive jurisdiction. The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that
"the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." A
fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between
courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction — indicates that the court with
whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the
exclusion of all other courts. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City
court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu
court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must
exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court
declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a
rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at least equal
and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate. Since the Quezon City court
took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu
court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule of
venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts.
3. Tadeo-Matias, G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
Facts:
The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition for
certiorari when said RTC rendered its decision granting the petition for
declaration of presumptive death of Wilfredo under Article 41 of the
Family Code, when said petitioner’s purpose is to claim benefits and not to
remarry.
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
Issue:
Issue:
In Cua v. Vargas, G.R. No. 156536, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 374, it
was held that, “The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex
parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do
not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be
bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued
before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice
calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial
settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been
executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the
first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides in part that, “The fact of
the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next
succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon
any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.”
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Facts:
The petitioner herein, niece of the testatrix, was named the executrix
in said will. The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice
required by law was accordingly published. On the day of the hearing of
the petition, no opposition thereto was filed and, after the evidence was
presented, the court entered the decree admitting the will to probate as
prayed for. The will was probated and the trial court appointed the herein
petitioner executrix. One year and seven months later, the appellant herein
filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order
admitting the will to probate be vacated and the “authenticated will” be
declared null and void ab initio.
Issue:
Whether or not the Order admitting the probate of the will can be
questioned on appeal.
Ruling:
In Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426, the Supreme Court held that,
“The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution
thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law,
except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or
proceedings.”
Here, this question can no more be raised in this case on appeal. After
due hearing, the court found that the will in question was valid and
effective and the order admitting it to probate, thus promulgated, should
be accepted and respected by all. The probate of the will in question now
constitutes res judicata.
2. Garcia vs. Santos, G.R. No. 204793, June 8, 2020
Facts:
Upon the death of Consuelo Garcia, one of his children Catalino filed
a petition to settle the intestate estate. This was opposed by Natividad, the
daughter of Consuelo contending that she already filed a petition for the
probate of the will of Consuelo. Eventually, the two cases were
consolidated and hearing ensued. However, RTC ruled that the will is
dubious and should not be allowed probate, giving credence to Rolando’s
testimony that Consuelo declared that she had no will and that her
properties would be equally divided between her two children. The RTC
deemed it irregular when the purported will was suddenly produced only
after Consuelo’s death and not years earlier especially since it was
allegedly executed 10 years before her death. Moreover, the will
unconscionably favored Natividad as she was named as the executrix of
the will and most of the properties were disposed in her favor. This was
reversed by the CA holding that the witnesses established the due
execution and authenticity of the will and that the authority of the court is
limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of the will.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC sitting as a probate court may pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the will.
Ruling:
No, the probate court may not pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
will.
In Baltazar v. Laxa, 685 Phil. 484, 497, 498 (2012), it was held that,
“The main issue which the court must determine in a probate proceeding is
the due execution or the extrinsic validity of the will. The probate court
cannot inquire into the intrinsic validity of the will or the disposition of the
estate by the testator. Thus, due execution is “whether the testator, being of
sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law.”
Here, inquiring into the intrinsic validity of the will or the manner in
which the properties were apportioned is not within the purview of the
probate court. “The court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination of,
and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will.
3. Nuguid vs. Nuguid, G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the probate court’s limitation not to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the will is absolute.
Ruling:
In Case, et al. vs. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522, it was held that, “If the
case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained.
On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the
same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of
time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.”
Here, these are the practical considerations that induce the Court to a
belief that it might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question.
4. Balanay vs Martinez, G.R. No. L-39247, June 27, 1975
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
In Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 (1966), it was held that, “Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.”
Facts:
The legal wife of the testator, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an
opposition alleging that petitioner having admitted her living in
concubinage with the testator, she is wanting in integrity and thus, letters
testamentary should not be issued to her. Subsequently, the lower court
denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted
in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner from December 1952 until his
death on July 16, 1974, the Will's admission to probate will be an Idle
exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic
provisions is evident.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court is correct in passing upon the intrinsic
validity of the will.
Ruling:
Here, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the
making of a donation between persons who are living in adultery or
concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot give
even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the
Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing
the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
6. Nufable vs. Nufable, G.R. No. 126950, July 2, 1999
Facts: