1. Antonio H. Noblejas vs. Claudio Teehankee, et al. (G.R. No.

L-28790, April 29, 1968)

Facts:

Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of Land
Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the terms of section 2 of said Act,
the said Commissioner is declared “entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and
privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.”

On March 7, 1968, the respondent, Claudio Teehankee sent a letter which requires him to
explain why no disciplinary action must be taken against him for “approving or recommending
approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas
greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original titles.” Noblejas then answered that he
could be only suspended and investigated in the same way as a Judge of first instance and
therefore, all these actions must be submitted to the Supreme Court, conformably to section
67 of the Judiciary act (R.A. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

March 17, 1968 he received a communication from the executive secretary which states that
he is suspended and has a pending investigation for his gross negligence and conduct
prejudicial to the public interest.

March 18, 1968, the petitioner applied to the court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his
letter to the Secretary of Justice claiming the lacking of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion on
the letter.

Issue:

WON the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court,
in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes heretofore mentioned Rep. Act 1151 and
Appropriation Laws of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.

Ruling:

It is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a
District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.

In the second place, petitioner’s theory that the grant of “privileges of a Judge of First
Instance” includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to
be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right
being possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had
indiscriminately conferred the same privileges.

But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the
Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of “privileges” or “rank and
privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance” the right to be investigated by the Supreme
Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such
grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine
of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory
control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief
Executive over such officials.

WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is
ordered dismissed.
 2. Garcia v. Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106 (1972)

The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Sec. 12, Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Facts:

Macaraig took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna and San Pablo City with station at
Calamba on June 29, 1970. When he was about to perform his duties as a Judge, it was
discovered that there was no space yet for him to facilitate his trials and no pieces of furniture
and equipment necessary for him to conduct his duties. The local officials offered to furnish
him the necessary place and facilities for his court but they failed to provide. Realizing that it
would be sometime before he could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended
leave. The Secretary of Justice, however, persuade him to forego his leave and instead assist at
the DOJ (Macaraig having served in the DOJ for 16 years), without being extended a formal
detail, whenever he was not busy attending to the needs of his court.

Garcia filed an administrative against Macaraig for dishonesty, violation of his oath as a judge,
and incompetence. He alleged that Macaraig has not submitted the progress of his Courts as
required by law and that Macaraig has received salaries as a judge while he is fully aware that
he has not been performing the duties of a judge. Also questioned was the fact that a member
of the judiciary is helping the DOJ, a department of the executive charge of prosecution of
cases.

Issues:

1. May judges be detailed to assist the DOJ Secretary in connection with his work of exercising
administrative authority over the courts?

Held:

No. This practice must be discontinued. The Court looks with favor at the practice of long
standing to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the
Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority
over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in
collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of
the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least the principle of
separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the
Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the
interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the
independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the specific
constitutional precepts a check and balance between and among them, have long been
acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental
conveniences or exigencies. (Garcia vs. Macaraig, A.M. No. 198-J, May 31, 1971)
 3. In re Judge Rodolfo Manzano, 166 SCRA 246 (1988)

Facts:

On July 4, 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch
19, sent a letter of request to the Supreme Court in issuance of a resolution, (1) authorizing
him to accept the appointment and to assume and discharge the powers and duties as a
member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice; ( 2) considering his membership
in the Committee as neither violative of the independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of
Sec. 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Sec. 7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution,
and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of his present position as aforementioned,
and as a member of Judiciary; and (3) considering his membership in the said committee as
part of the primary functions of an executive Judge.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the membership in the committee is neither violative of the independence
of the Judiciary; Sec. 12, Article VIII, and the second paragraph of Sec. 7, Art. IX (B).

(2) Whether or not being a member of the said committee, at the same time being an
Executive Judge is constitutional.

Ruling:

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by
law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative functions
(Sec. 12, Art. VIII, Const itution). Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos
Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will be in
violation of the Constitution, the court is constrained to deny his request.

Accordingly, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is denied.

4. U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 PHIL 1 (1922)

FACTS:

The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 “An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding
of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General xxx to issue the necessary
rules and regulations therefor xxx”.

Pursuant thereto, the Governoe-General issued Executive Order No. 53 fixing the price at
which rice should be sold. Defendant Ang Tang Ho who sold rice at a price greater than that
fixed by Executive Order No. 53 was found guilty of violation thereof. He contested the validity
of said law averring that it constituted invalid delegation of legislative power.¹

ISSUE:

Did Act No. 2868 validly delegate legislative power to the Governor-General?

Held:

No. A law must be complete in all its terms and provision. When it leaves the legislative branch
of the government, nothing must be left to the judgment of the delegate of the legislature. The
Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons
the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued “for any
cause,” and leaves the question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion of the Gov-Gen.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a
power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to
make, its own action to depend. (US v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1)

46. Fortich vs. Corona, 239 SCRA 624 (1998)

G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998

Facts

On March 29, 1996, strikers went on protest concerning the decision of the Office of the
President issued through the executive secretary Ruben Torres which approved the conversion
of a 144 hectare of agricultural land to an agro-industrial (institutional) area. That event led to
the issuance of the so-called “win-win” resolution made by the Office of the President on
November 7, 1997 through then Deputy Executive Secretary, Renato Corona, which
substantially modified its earlier decision after it had become final and executory. The said
resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the
extent of 44 hectares and has ordered that the remainder of 100 hectares to be distributed to
the qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

Issue: Whether the Office of the president still have Jurisdiction when it entertained the
Second Motion for Reconsideration and became the basis of the Win-Win Resolution?

Held: No, When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the
Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so
modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more
authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution.
Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision
of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed
in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO
18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for
reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to
lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and
substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and
executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.