UNIT-VIII

Major Disaster
CASE STUDY -PIPER ALPHA

Introduction:

The Piper Alpha Oil Platform was owned by a consortium consisting of Occidental
Petroleum (Caledonia) ltd, Texaco Britain ltd, International Thomson plc and Texaco
Petroleum Ltd and was operated by occidental.

The Piper Alpha Platform was located in the piper field some 110 miles north-east of
Aberdeen. The piper platform separated the fluid produced by the wells into oil, gas and
condensate .the oil was pumped by the pipeline to the Flotta oil terminal in the Orkneys
,the condensate being injected back into the oil for transport to shore .The gas was
transmitted by pipeline to the manifold compression platform MCP-01 (manifold
compression platform),where it joined the major gas pipeline from the Frigg field to St
Fergus.

There were two other platforms connected to Piper Alpha. Oil from the Claymore Platform,
also operated by the Occidental was piped to join the Piper oil line at the Claymore.
Claymore was short of gas and was therefore connected to Piper Alpha by a gas pipeline so
that it could import Piper gas. Oil from Tartan was piped to Claymore and then to Flottta
and gas from Tartan was piped to Piper and then to MCP-01.

The production deck level consisted of four modules A-D.A module was wellhead, B
module the oil separation module, C module the gas compression module and D Module
the power generation and utilities module.

There were fire walls between A and B Modules, between B and C modules, and
between C and D modules (the A/B,B/C, and C/D firewalls respectively); these firewalls
were not designed to resist blast.

At 10 pm on 6 July 1988 an explosion occurred in the gas compression module of the Piper
Alpha oil production platform in the North Sea. A large pool fire took hold in the adjacent
oil separation module, and a massive plume of black smoke enveloped the platform at and
above the production deck, including the accommodation. The pool fire extended to the deck
below, where after 20 min it burned through a gas riser from the pipeline connection
between the Piper and Tartan platforms .The gas from the riser burned as a huge jet flame
.Most of those on board were trapped in the accommodation .The lifeboats were inaccessible
due to the smoke .Some 62 men escaped, mainly by climbing down knotted ropes or by
jumping from a height, but 167 died, the majority in the quarters. The Piper Alpha
explosion and fire was the worst accident which has occurred on an offshore platform.

Following the disaster a public inquiry was set up under the public inquiries
regulations 1974 presided over by Lord Cullen to establish the circumstances of the disaster
and its cause and to make recommendations to avoid similar accidents in the future.

The inquiry’s “the public inquiry into the piper alpha disaster “(the Piper
Alpha Report or Cullen Report) (Cullen 1990) is the most comprehensive inquiry conducted
in the UK into an offshore platform disaster, onshore or offshore.

The Piper Alpha inquiry has been of crucial importance in the development of
the offshore safety regime in the UK sector of the north sea. The Piper Alpha inquiry not
only discharged the function of an inquiry into the specific disaster but made
recommendations for changes to the offshore safety regime which were accepted by the
government.

Platform systems included the electrical supply system, the fire and gas detection system,
the fire water deluge system, the emergency shut down system, the communications system
and the evacuation and escape system.

Electrical power was supplied by two main generators which normally ran off the
gas supply but could be fired by diesel-fired emergency generator and also a drilling
generator and an emergency drilling generator. In addition, there were uninterrupted
power supplies for emergency services. The main production areas were equipped with a
fire and gas detection system.
PROCESS

The fluid from the wellhead, containing oil, gas, condensate and water passed through the
wellhead Christmas tree to the two separators where the gas was separated from the oil
and water. The oil was then pumped into the mail oil line .The gas was then compressed in
the three centrifugal compressors to 675 psi, with some gas being taken off at this point as
fuel for the mail generators, and then boosted in the first stage of two reciprocating
compressors to 1465 psi .Condensate was removed and the gas was further compressed in
the second stage of the reciprocating compressor to 1735 psi. The gas then went three ways:
 1. To serve as lift gas at the wells.
2. To MCP-01 as export gas.
3. To flare.
The condensate was removed in 2 ways:

1. In the first method (phase 2) gas passed from reciprocating compressor to gas
conversion module (GCM) where it was dried.
2. In the second method (phase 1) the gas was passed through a flash drum so that
condensate was knocked off by Joule-Thomson effect. This was done before GCM
came into use.
The condensate injection pump was used to inject condensate into the main oil line.
There was normally one condensate injection pump line operating and one on
standby. Each condensate injection pump was protected from overpressure on the
delivery side by a single pressure safety valve (PSV).the PSV was on a separate
relief line rather than on the delivery line itself.

In accordance with the standard practices Methanol was injected into the process at
various points to prevent formation of hydrates which would tend to cause blockage

EVENTS PRIOR TO EXPLOSION

On 6th July there was a major work programme on the Platform. The extra accommodation
for the workforce was provided on the THAROS, a large floating fire fighting vessel
anchored near the platform.

The GCM was out of service on that day, so the plant operation
had reverted to phase 1 mode so the gas was relatively wet. The resulting increased
potential for the hydrate formation was recognized by the management onshore,. The
increased methanol injection rates were calculated and communicated to the platform
together with suggestions for configuration of methanol pumps. The methanol injection rate
was some 12 time greater than the phase 2 operation.

However there was an interruption of the methanol supply to the most critical point
between 4:00 and 8:00 pm that evening.
There were 2 condensate injection pump A and pump B. The operating condensate injection
pump was B pump. The A pump was down for maintenance. There were three maintenance
jobs to be done on this pump.

1. A full 24 month preventive maintenance (PM).

2. Repair of the pump coupling.
3. Recertification of the pressure safety valve, PSV.
In order to carry out the 24 month PM ,the pump had been isolated by closing the gas
operated valves (GOV’s) on the suction and the delivery lines but slip plates had not
been inserted.

Work on the coupling, which was suffering from a vibration problem, would not involve
breaking into the pump. With the pump in this state, with the GOV’s closed but without
slip plate isolation, access was given to remove PSV for testing. It was taken off in the
morning of July 6 by a two man team from the specialist contractor SCORE UK LTD.
They were unable to resolve the PSV that evening. The supervisor in this team came
back to the control room some time before 6:00pm to suspend Permit to Work (PTW)
and the team then went off duty intending to put the PSV back the next day.

At about 4.50 pm on that day, just at shift change over, the maintenance status of the
pump underwent a change .The maintenance Superintendent decided that the 24 month
PM would not be carried out and that work on the pump should be restricted to the
repair of the pump coupling.

About 9:50 pm on that evening B pump tripped out. The Lead Production Operator and
phase 1 Operator tried to restart it but without success. the loss of this pump meant
that with A pump also down condensate would be back in the flash drum and within
some 30 min would force a shut down of the gas plant. There was a possibility that if the
gas supply to the main generator was lost and if the changeover to the alternate diesel
failed, the wells would also have to be shut down. It would then be necessary to
undertake a’ black start.’

The Lead Operator in consultation with lead maintenance

hand decided to start pump A. the lead operator signed the Permit for A pump so that it
could be electrically de-isolated and restated there was no doubt that the lead operator
wanted to start the pump A.

About 9:55 pm the signals for the tripping of 2 compressors came up. Then the third
compressor tripped. Before the control room could take any action three low gas alarms
and a high gas alarm went up. The operators had his hand out to control the alarm
when he was blown across the room by explosion.

EXPLOSION , ESCALATION AND RESCUE.

The initial explosion occurred at 10:00 pm .it destroyed most of the firewalls and blew
across the rooms. The explosion was followed almost immediately by a large fireball and
also large oil pool fire. The large oil pool fire gave rise to massive smoke plume which
enveloped the platform. Majority of the personnel on the platform were in the
accommodation. The escape routes from the module to the lifeboats were impassable
.The fire water drench system did not operate. There was only a trickle of water from
the sprinkler heads.

The explosion disabled the mail communications system which was centered on piper.
The emergency procedure was for personnel to report to their lifeboat, but in practice
most evacuations would be by helicopter and personnel would be directed from the
lifeboat to the dining area on the upper deck and then to the helideck. Personnel found
the escape route to the lifeboat blocked and waited in the dining area. The
OIM(Offshore Installations Manager) told them that a Mayday (an international radio
signal by ship /plane which are in danger) signal had been sent to effect the evacuation
.In fact the helideck was inaccessible to helicopters.

By 12:15 am on 7th July the north end of the platform had disappeared/by
morning only A module, the wellhead, remained standing.