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ARTICLE 13. When the laws speak of years, months,
days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of
three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days;
days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to
sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be
computed by the number of days which they respectively
have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and
the last day included.
GENERAL RULE: First paragraph, on the computation of
periods.
As to months, depending on their designation, there is
another rule. Generally, when we say months, it means
30 days but if for example a contract pertains to a specific
month of the year then you follow the number of days that
is provided in that particular month.
So, in June there are 30 days but in July there are 31
days, if the contract states that something is due by the
end of July then that thing is due on the 31st. But if your
contract says that something is due at the end of June
then that is due on the 30th.
Weeks are not provided for in Article 13 as we usually do
not deal with periods in weeks. However, when there is a
reference to a week there are two ways to compute it
according to legal experts.
A week has two meanings:
a. When computed in accordance with the calendar
- it means 7 successive days without regard to the
day of the week it shall begin; and
b. When computed without reference to the
calendar - it means beginning Sunday and ending
on Saturday
In legal matters (a) is recognized unless otherwise agreed
upon. When we say one week from Wednesday
according to (a) then we would end the week as well on
Wednesday or one week from July 1 would be July 8
because that is the computation for 7 days.
Why is it in the third paragraph it states that we should
exclude the first day and include the last day?
Because if we include the first day, we violate the 24-hour
rule provided in the first paragraph.
Example: You received an order from the court to file a
comment today at 2pm you received that order. 15 days
from now you need to file that comment and if you include
the first day you would have already lost 14 hours
because you received the order at 2pm today. But if you
exclude the first day you are able to exhaust the 15 days
and the 24-hours of the last day. That is why we exclude
the first day and include the last day.
What if there is a period and the last day of that period
falls on a holiday or on a Sunday? How do you discern
when is your deadline?
If the act to be performed within the period is prescribed
or allowed by the Rules of Court, by an order of the court,
or by any other applicable statute the Sunday or the
holiday will not be considered as the last day, the last day
will automatically be the next working day. So, in a sense
the period is extended.
Example: If it was a court order and your deadline falls on
June 12 which is a holiday and it is a Friday as well then,
the next working day will be on Monday and so technically
your deadline is extended to Monday.
But what if it is merely an agreement between among the
parties?
If it is just a contract between you and your neighbor that
you will deliver to them 5 sacks of rice by June 12, in that
case because it is merely contractual, then the act will
become due notwithstanding the fact that the last day falls
on a Sunday or holiday.
What is the technique when you compute the deadline?
No need to overthink it, you just add the period to the date
that the particular order was given.
So, if you received the order on July 1 then you add 15
days and so it will be due on July 16. If you received the
order on July 3 and you are given only 10 days to file your
pleading then that is due on July 13.
What if there is a leap year?
Because there are certain prescriptive periods in ObliCon
which will span 10 years and usually in 10 years we get 2
leap years. So, you have 2 years that have 366 days
instead of 365 days.
So, if for example, today is June 28 and we entered into
a contract that provides for a prescriptive period of 10
years from now.
Does that mean that my right will prescribe on June 26,
2013 because there are 2 leap years within the 10 years
from now?

NO, Because Article 13, paragraph 1, provides that a year
consists of 365 days regardless if the year is actually a
leap year. So, my right will still prescribe on June 28, 2013
which is 10 years from now without consideration for the
2 additional days brought about by 2 leap years in that
span of 10 years.
ARTICLE 14. Penal laws and those of public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in
the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public
international law and to treaty stipulations.
Principle of Territoriality in Criminal Law - any offense
committed by anyone within the territory of the country is
an offense against the state and therefore the sovereign
state has the power to prosecute and punish the offender
be he a national or a foreigner.
Aliens who sojourn in the Philippines owe temporary
allegiance to the country, as the country is obliged to
protect them while they are in our territory. They do not
need to be here as permanent residents for the country to
afford them protection even if they are here temporarily
the country commits to protect them from crime. So, in a
sense they are also expected to owe temporary
allegiance to the Philippines by abiding by our penal laws.
Application of Article 14
DEL SOCORRO v. VAN WILSEM
G.R. No. 193707
December 10, 2014
Del Socorro married Van Wilsem in Holland in 1990 and
they had a son. Unfortunately, they divorced after 5 year
and wherein their son was 18 months old, so, Del
Socorro went home to the Philippines and then Van
Wilsem ended up not sending support to Del Socorro
and their son. Eventually Van Wilsem also went to the
Philippines and he remarried. So, Del Socorro filed for
a complaint for a violation of RA 9262 under Section 5a,
where you can file for deprivation of financial support.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Van Wilsen being a foreign national can
be held criminally liable under RA 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child? YES
RULING:
Considering that Van Wilsem is currently living in the
Philippines, we find strengths in Del Socorro's claim that
the territoriality principle in Criminal Law in relation to
Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to this case.
On this score it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of Van Wilsem in refusing to support his
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child with Del Socorro is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties are residents of the
Province of Cebu. ...on this court is undisputable that
the alleged continuing acts of the respondent in refusing
to support his child, the petitioner, is committed here in
the Philippines.
As all of the parties herein are residents to the Province
of the City of Cebu. As such, our courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offenses charged against
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over
the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
So since RA 9262 is a penal law, and Van Wilsem was
sojourning in our country at the time that he was
charged with the violation of such penal law, then the
same was made applicable to him under Article 14.
Article 15 is the Nationality Theory. It is a very important
provision because this is something that will emanate in a
lot of your Civil Law subjects, particularly in Succession
and Conflict of Laws or Private International Law.
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
So when we say family rights and duties, we already know
that these are provided in the Family Code and other
special laws relating to family law, marriage, support, and
parental authority.
When we say status, this is a term used to designate the
circumstances affecting legal situation or the sum total of
capacities and incapacities of a person in lieu of his age,
nationality, and membership. So the status usually
includes both condition and legal capacity. It embraces
matters like the end and the beginning of human
personality, the capacity to have rights in general, the
capacity to engage in legal transactions, and family
relations. Like if you say that your civil status is married,
that will imply that you are incapacitated to contract
another marriage while your first marriage is subsisting,
but it will also enable you to administer your properties as
husband and wife if it is absolute community or conjugal
partnership.
Now, when we say condition, it is a mode or state of being;
a state or situation. For example, the condition of being
inebriated—meaning the condition of being drunk and the
condition of being insane. Sometimes, there are mental
conditions that allow you to be lucid at certain intervals so
that’s why we say that being insane is a condition as well.

When we say legal capacity, as we earlier discussed, it
does not just refer to the minority, but also if for example
you are a civil interdictee and how that affects your legal
capacity to act with respect to certain rights and
obligations.
Article 15 is pretty straightforward, because if you look at
it or you read it in another way, the net takeaway is that
as long as you remain a Filipino citizen, your family rights
and duties, status, condition and legal capacity will be
governed by Philippine law. Conversely, Philippine law
will respect the national laws of foreign nationals as
regards their family rights and duties, status, condition
and legal capacity.
So, in most cases, we can actually easily apply this, but
we will learn later on that it gets pretty complicated
especially when our national laws have to be reconciled
with the national laws of other countries. But for now, let’s
start with the basic demonstration of how Article 15
applies in the case of Van Dorn v. Romillo.
VAN DORN v. ROMILLO
139 SCRA 139
Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines, while Upton is
a citizen of the USA. They married in Hong Kong in
1972 and got divorced in Nevada in 1982. They’re truly
a very international couple.
In 1983, Upton filed a suit against Van Dorn,
demanding for accounting of their supposed conjugal
property and that he be appointed as a manager of
their conjugal property. However, Van Dorn argues
that Upton can no longer file such suit as the divorce
decree issued prior has already declared that they no
longer had any community property.
The court denied the motion to dismiss by Van Dorn
because according to the court, the divorce decree
had no bearing on the case filed by Upton. Upton,
pursuant to the nationality theory. Why? Because Van
Dorn was a Filipino, therefore, according to the court,
there could be no recognition of the divorce decree as
to her because our laws do not provide for divorce.
The Supreme Court said that it is true that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to the alien’s national law.
Thus, in a sense, while the trial court was correct to
say that there is no divorce here, we do not recognize
divorce here, but pursuant to the national law of Upton,
respondent is no longer the husband of Van Dorn. He
would have no standing to sue in the case as
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petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets as he is bound by the decision—
meaning the divorce decree of his own country’s court
which validly exercise the jurisdiction over him, and
whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
So in short, because Upton had already obtained a
divorce decree in Nevada, that divorce decree was
valid as to him and as to his national law, we have to
recognize the effect of that as to Van Dorn because of
not, then Van Dorn would be placed in an unfair
situation where Upton is single according to his
national law, but Van Dorn would still become married
under our national law. Obviously, that become an
injustice to Van Dorn and therefore the Supreme Court
recognized that the divorce was valid as to Upton’s
national law, and that it also benefitted Van Dorn.
PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA
174 SCRA 653
Pilapil is a Filipino citizen. She married Geiling, a
German National in Germany.
Geiling filed for divorce three years later, and Pilapil filed
for legal separation in the Philippines while the divorce
proceedings were pending. Eventually, the divorce
decree was issued, but Geiling filed a complaint for
adultery against Pilapil after the issuance of the divorce
decree.
The question then became: Did Geiling have legal
standing to file the criminal case of adultery, considering
that the divorce decree was issued prior to the filing of
the case?
The Supreme Court said: in the present case that the
private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons.
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera cited Van Dorn v. Romillo
because in a sense, the ruling was the same. Under the
same considerations and rationale, private respondent
may no longer be the husband of petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time
that he filed the suit because in truth and in fact, he was
no longer the offended spouse at the time he filed the
suit as the divorce decree had already been issued.
RECIO v. RECIO

366 SCRA 437
Rederick Recio is a Filipino who was married to Editha
Samson, an Australian citizen in Malabon, Rizal. They
lived together as husband and wife in Australia, but two
years later, they obtained a decree of divorce, which
purportedly dissolved the marriage. This decree of
divorce was issued by the Australian Family Court.
Subsequently, Rederick Recio became an Australian
citizen, and then as shown by a certificate of Australian
Citizenship issued by the Australian government.
Thereafter, Rederick Recio married Grace Recio, the
petitioner herein. The marriage license of Rederick
Recio prior, indicated that he was a Filipino Citizen. But
then, they again separated so Grace Recio sued
Rederick for bigamy.
Now Rederick defended himself by presenting the
divorce decree which he obtained in his first marriage
with Editha Samson.
The question is: How should he prove that divorce
decree, and was he able to prove that divorce
decree?
SC said that the Ph law does not provide for absolute
divorce, hence our courts cannot grant it. A marriage
between two filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a
divorce obtained abroad because of Arts. 15 and 17 of
the Civil Code.
In mixed marriages involving a filipino and a foreigner,
Art. 26 of the FC allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse, capacitating him
or her to remarry. We saw this in Van Dorn vs. Romillo
and Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera.
A divorce obtained abroad by a couple who are both
aliens may be recognized in the Ph provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.
Now a comparison between marriage and divorce, as
far as pleading and proof is concerned, can be made.
Van Dorn vs Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad which may be recognized in the Ph,
provided that they are valid accoridng to their national
law. Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Essentially, what is the SC saying? It is saying that, as
with Van Dorn vs. Romillo and Pilapil
vs. Ibay-Somera, we can recognized divorce decrees
provided that the same was obtained by the alien
spouse in conformity with their national laws. However,
what is unique about Recio vs. Recio is it now
introduces the concept of proving divorce decrees.
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So what did Rederick Recio do when he introduced the
divorce decree? What he did was he just introduced the
divorce decree but he did not comply with the
authentication requirements that are provided under our
Rules on Evidence.
So the SC said that before a foreign judgment is given
a presumptive evidentiary value, the document must
first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
Indeed, the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment
itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record
of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.
Therefore, what you need to do when you prove or
introduce a divorce decree is to comply with Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Section 24. Proof of official record. — The record of
public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section
19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in
foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer
in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a)
Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. —
Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested
for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state,
in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be.
The attestation must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)
A writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either: (1) an
official publication; or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Ph, such copy must be
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Ph Foreign Service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and be authenticated by the seal of his office.
So the new learning from Recio vs. Recio is that you
cannot just present the divorce decree and expect our
courts to recognize it. You also have to prove it as a fact
and you do that by authenticating it under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132 of our Rules of Court.

QUITA VS COURT OF APPEALS
In Quita vs. CA, Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both
filipinos, were married in the Ph in 1941. They divorced
in 1954, three weeks after Fe married a certain Felix
Tupas in the same locality but the relationship also
ended in a divorce. Still in the US, Fe married for a third
time to a certain (Vernmont). In 1972, the first ex
husband, Arturo Padlan, died. So technically, Fe Quita
here married three times but in the end, she still
returned to her first husband.
The alleged heirs and petitioner could not agree as to
the distribution of Padlan's estate. But eventually, the
heirs were determined due to a private instrument
acknowledging them as heirs.
The question then becomes: who is the correct
spouse, or who is the correct surviving spouse?
Because Fe Quita is saying that she's still the spouse
because their marriage was not actually nullified but
Arturo Padlan already remarried. But then, the new
spouse is saying taht she's the correct surviving spouse.
So who between Fe and the new wife is the correct
surviving spouse?
SC said that reading between the lines, the implication
is that Fe is no longer a Ph citizen at the time of her
divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the TC
to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The
purpose of the hearing is to ascertain the truth of the
matters in issue with the aid of documentary and
testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the
parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. We
deduce that the finding on her citizenship pertains solely
to the time of their marriage as the TC was not supplied
with basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the
time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether
she was still a Ph citizen when their divorce was
decreed. The TC must have overlooked the materiality
of this aspect.
Once proved that she was no longer a Ph citizen at the
time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right
to inherit from Arturo.
So in the end, the SC had to remand the proceedings
back to the TC to determine what was Fe's citizenship
at the time they obtained the divorce decree in 1954.
Only then can it be determined who is the correct
surviving spouse.
PEREZ VS COURT OF APPEALS
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We have Tristan Catindig who married Lily Catindig
twice and in two different churches. They had 4 children,
but then they decided to separate and obtained a
divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Aside
from that, they filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of
Conjugal Partnership before the RTC which was also
approved.
Subsequently, Tristan married Elmar Perez in the US.
When Perez found out that Tristan had been previously
married, she was angry, and that they even obtained a
divorce decree, but said divorce decree was not
recognized in the Ph, which made her even angrier. So
Tristan, to appease Elmar, filed for a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with the RTC of
Quezon City. Elmar, being the aggressive wife that she
is, filed a Petition for Intervention.
So the question then became: Could Elmar validly
intervene, and was the divorce decree obtained in
Dominican Republic valid?
SC said that when petitioner and Tristan married in July
14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The
divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the
Dominican Republic never severed the marital bonds
between them. It is basic that laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of Ph even
though living abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of
the Ph might be, he or she will be governed by the Ph
laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties,
or to his or her status, condition, and legal capacity.
Hence, if a filipino, regardless of whether he or she is
married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to
obtain an absolute divorce from his spouse and
eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute
divorce decree, the Ph will not recognize such absolute
divorce. So, when Tristan and Lily married on May 18,
1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions of
the Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950. In
the case of Tenchavez vs. Escano, the Sc had already
held that the foreign divorce between Ph citizens sought
and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code, is not entitled to recognition an is invalid in this
jurisdiction.
Extraterritoriality is the principle where our country is
allowed to extend its territory into another country as this
is an extension recognized under international law.
The 3rd paragraph on prohibitive laws is actually
demonstrated by how our jurisdiction does not
recognize divorce decrees obtained abroad by
Filipinos.
Because under our national law, the only ways to
terminate a marriage are to either nullify or annul it on
the basis of specific grounds are contained in the Family

code. Thus, in a case where a Filipina wife obtained a
divorce abroad and later remarried an American, the
Filipino husband can file a case of adultery against his
wife since divorce is not recognized in the Philippines.
And neither is the marriage contracted with another
party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the
foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the
country.
Ultimately, it was decided that Tristan’s marriage to
Perez was not valid because he was validly married to
Lily.
SAN LUIS VS SAN LUIS
In San Luis, we also have 3 marriages contracted by
Felicisimo. 1st marriage was with virginia Sulit, 2nd was
with Merry Corwin. They filed for a divorced that
involved a child custody.with Merry.
The 3rd marriage was with Felicidad San Luis and lived
with her for 18 years until his death. Felicidad sought
resolution for their conjugal partnership and the
settlement of state of Felicisimo. One of the children by
the 1st marriage opposed the petition stating that
Felicidad was merely a mistress. At the time of the 3rd
marriage, Felicisimo was allegedly married to Merry
Lee.
The SC held that, Anent the issue of respondent
Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters
of administration, we must first resolve the issue of
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse
abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo was
solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of
the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis
allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the
divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
This is pretty much like the case of Recio vs. Recio
where there needed be a proper proof of divorce
decree.
LAVADIA VS HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA
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The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on
September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the
solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which
adopted the nationality rule, both Atty. Luna and
Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of
Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce
between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in
the Philippines.
Atty. Luna married in a civil ceremony in Rizal and then
Church in Bulacan. Two decades later, they decided to
live separately, and entered into an agreement entitled
“Agreement for separation of property and settlement”
whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal property. Subsequently in
1976, obtained a divorce degree from Sto. Domingo
Dominican Republic and he contracted with another
marriage this time with Soledad. They returned to
Philippines and lived with each other until 1987.
Soledad, the 2nd wife, explained that she should inherit
Atty. Luna’s properties as his surviving spouse.
So, is Soledad correct? No.
Atty. Luna’s marriage with Eugenia is still subsisting.
What about the agreement? How did the SC deal with
that issue.
There is no question that the approval took place only
as an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their
execution of the Agreement were identical to the
grounds raised in the action for divorce. With the divorce
not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine
law for being contrary to Philippine public policy and
public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also
legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty.
Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their
marriage.
The divorce decree was not valid. Therefore, the
agreement could not be honored.
NOVERAS VS NOVERAS
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras
(Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988.
They resided in California, United States of America
(USA) where they eventually acquired American
citizenship.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and
returned to the Philippines, where he, according to
Leticia, had affair with Martinez. So Leticia Leticia filed

a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of
California, where it was granted.
Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal
Property before the RTC of Baler, Aurora.
Same issue,
The SC held that, the starting point in any recognition of
a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as
a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was
presented in evidence. The required certificates to
prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California
law on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals, we
relaxed the requirement on certification where we held
that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American
citizenwhen she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the
Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing
said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however,
it appears that there is no seal from the office where the
divorce decree was obtained.
So as in Recio v Recio and San luis v San Luis, they
had to make proper proof of the divorce decree and the
capacity of the Petitioner as to the capacity to marry
before the divorce decree could be recognized.
So, if you look at the application of the Nationality
Theory, in terms of the recognition of the Divorce
decree, the application of article 15 is pretty consistent.
ARTICLE 16 – LAW GOVERNING REAL AND
PERSONAL PROPERTY
Article 16. Real Property as well as personal property is
subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property
and regardless of the country wherein said property may
be found.
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• Lex situs / lex rei sitae – property shall be
governed by the law of the place where it is
situated.
• However, intestate and testamentary
successions shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein
the property may be found.
• Succession is an exemption to this rule because
when you allow someone to inherit from your
estate, there can only be one inheritance
belonging to one person to be passed on or
distributed. The oneness of the inheritance is not
broken by the fact that the properties belonging
to the state or found in different countries.
• Bellis vs. Bellis case
- The petitioner in the case was born in Texas,
USA. He executed a will in the Philippines and
went back to Texas where he eventually died. His
legitimate children opposed the settlement of his
estate arguing that they were deprived of their
share in his estate under the rules of Texas. The
supreme court rule that regarding successional
rights and the rights of the deceased, it is the
national law of Texas that must be applied since
he is a citizen of the country.
First Paragrah: General rule lex situs/ lex rei sitae
Example: if house is located in Davao City it is the
Philippine law that will govern its sale and lease and
Philippine law on tax will govern the payment of taxes.
Another example: Applying the nationality theory to the
disposition of property it would be difficult to access what
is the law abroad if you were a foreigner but owned a
property here. It would be difficult to comply with our rule
like that. Which is why, in terms of practicality lex situs is
the better rule to follow
Exemption to the General Rule: SUCCESSION – By
allowing someone to inherit your estate there can be only
one will, one inheritance, belonging to one person to be
passed on or distributed. The oneness of the will or
inheritance is not broken by the fact that the properties
belonging to the estate are found in different countries.
So even if you have properties say in New York and in the
Philippines. You cannot make New York laws on
succession apply to the way you dispose your estate in
New York and then you make the Philippine law apply to
the way that you dispose your estate in the Philippines.
Because there is only one inheritance and one estate, in
whole that you can distribute. You cannot split the estate

according to where they are located when it comes to
Inheritance and distribution of Estate.
BELIZ VS BELIZ
Facts: Petitioner is born in Texas and a citizen of Texas.
He executed a will in the Philippines and went back to
Texas where he eventually died. His children opposed
the settlement of his estate arguing that they were
deprived their share under the Rules of Texas.
Held: Supreme court rule that regarding Successional
Rights and the Rights of the Deceased it is his national
Law that must apply to the distribution of his estate.
Note: Beliz cannot split the application of Texas Law
and The Philippines just because the Philippine law is
more favorable to his illegitimate children. Rule : One
will one inheritance
EXCEPTIONS:
• Order of Succession in Intestacy- in testate (die
without a will) rule provides who nearest to the
deceased can succeed him/ inherit from him. (ex:
nearer heirs exclude the farthest)
• Amount of Successional Rights- amount to be
distributed to the heirs. (ex: share of the
legitimate child vs illegitimate)
• Intrinsic Validity of provisions of the will-
effectiveness of the disposition/ whether the
disposition can be given effect under the PH law
(ex: validity of the condition before the heir can
inherit) Compulsory heir- inheritance cannot be
made to depend on a condition.
• Capacity to Succeed- capacity of the heirs to
inherit in accordance with the national law of the
deceased. (ex. If they killed the deceased
disqualified if found guilty).
Question: What if the provisions of the will is valid and
they complied with by our law but now you have to transfer
the deceased property which are located abroad. What
rule will govern the transfer? Ans: Discuss after the
cases.
Lecture continues: because article 15 provides that we
will also apply the national laws of the foreigners corollary
to how we apply the laws of the Philippines to the Filipino
citzens. And we also have article 16 which provides for a
different rule as to what laws govern real estate and
personal property. We are confronted with situations
where in our own law refers to the law of the foreigner to
govern a particular matter and what happens is the law of
the foreigner refers the matter back to us for us to resolve
8
in our jurisdiction under the application of our own laws.
This phenomenon is called
• Renvoi Doctrine- renvoi literally means “
referring back”. It is a situation which arises when
our law refers a case to another country for them
to apply their law but the law of the country refers
it back to our country to apply our law instead-
• Remission- Single Renvoi
• Transmission- Double Renvoi
• Lex Fori Rule- literally means “ the law of the
forum “ (the courts where the suit is brought ) shall
govern
• Processual Presumption- if the application of
the foreign law is invoked, that foreign law must
be proved as a fact by the rules of the evidence.
Otherwise, the foreign law is presumed to be the
same as that of the Philippine Law (the law of the
forum). Example: The divorce decree if you
wish prove that you are capacitated to marry
under your own law under the foreign law then
you need to present the decree, you need to
prove it in accordance with our rules on evidence
and to prove that you are capacitated to marry
using another document ex. Cert of authorization.
(RECIO V RECIO)
• NOTE: If cannot prove apply the doctrine of
processual presumption.
ORION SAVINGS BANK VS SUZUKI
Doctrine:
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall
pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person
who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.
Facts:
That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered
owner of Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42;
That the mortgage in favor of Orion supposedly
executed by Kang, with Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated
February 2, 1999, was subsequently cancelled by Entry
No. 73232/T No. 10186 dated June 16, 2000;
That the alleged Dacion en Pago was never annotated
in CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118;

That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax
and the documentary stamp tax for the alleged Dacion
en Pago on October 15, 2003;
That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118,
was never mortgaged to Orion; and
That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to
Orion to obtain possession of the titles.
Issue: Whether or not Korean Law should be applied in
conveying the conjugal property of spouses Kang?
Ruling:
RTC in favor of Suzuki; The court found that Suzuki was
an innocent purchaser for value whose rights over the
properties prevailed over Orion’s.
Court of appeals in favor of Suzuki; The Court may
inquire into conclusions of fact when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken
Supreme Court in favor of Suzuki; petition denied due
to lack of merit
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove
the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership of
property. It merely attached a “Certification from the
Embassy of the Republic of Korea”29 to prove the
existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not
qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the
property for there is no showing that it was properly
authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under
Section 24 of Rule 132.30
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of
presumed-identity approach or processual presumption
comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded
or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is
that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.31
Under Philippine Law, the phrase “Yung Sam Kang
‘married to’ Hyun Sook Jung” is merely descriptive of the
civil status of Kang.32 In other words, the import from
the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the
properties as they are registered in his name alone, and
that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have
held that registration of the property in the name of only
one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being
conjugal or community property.33 In those cases,
however, there was proof that the properties, though
registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed
either conjugal or community properties.34 Accordingly,
we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s
conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of
spousal consent.
The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove the due execution of the Dacion en Pago certified
that Kang had already paid the full purchase price for
9
the condominium. One of the arguments of Orion as to
why they were refusing to give the certificate is that
Kang's sale of the unit to Suzuki is void because
allegedly under Korean law, the sale of conjugal
property should be made with the consent of both
spouses. Essentially, what Orion was saying is that
under Article 15, looking at the National Law of Kang,
he has no capacity to dispose of the condominium unit
under his national law, which is the Korean law,
because under Korean Lae, the sale of conjugal
property should be made with the consent of both
spouses which Kang did not do in this instance.
How did the Supreme Court respond to this argument of
Orion?
The SC said: "it is a universal principle that real or
immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of
the country or state where it is located. The reason is
found in the very nature of immovable property, its
immobility. Immovable are part of the country and so
closely connected to it that all rights over them have
their natural center of gravity here. Thus, all matters
concerning the title and disposition of real property are
determined by what is known as lex loci rei sitae which
can alone prescribe the mode by which title can pass
from one person to another or by which an interest
therein can be gained or lost. This general principle
includes all rules governing the dissent, alienation,
transfer of immovable property, the validity, effect,
construction of wills, and other conveyances. This
principle even governs the capacity of the person
making a deed relating to immovable property no matter
what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be
ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it
is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae even though
under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place
the instrument is actually made, his capacity is
undoubted.
On the other hand, property relations between spouses
are governed principally by the national law of the
spouses. However, the party invoking the application of
the foreign law has the burden of proving foreign law.
The foreign law is a question of fact to be property
pleaded and proved as a judge cannot take judicial
notice of a foreign law. Accordingly, matters concerning
the title and disposition of real property shall be
governed by Philippine Law while the issues pertaining
to the conjugal nature of the property shall be governed
by the South Korean Law provided it is proven as a fact.
This is where the Supreme Court reconciled the
application or Article 16 and Article 15. Because it is
saying that the disposition of the condominium unit in
terms of its forms and solemnities are governed by
Article 16 because it is an immovable property. But if
you look at Article 15, the capacity of Kang to dispose
should be governed by his National Law. The SC
recognized that the national law of Kang should have

governed his ability to dispose of the property. But, what
happened was Orion unfortunately failed to prove the
South Korean Law. Since Orion failed to prove that
under South Korean Law Kang was incapacitated to
dispose of the property, the SC applied the Philippine
Law under the doctrine of Processual presumption.
Under the Philippine Law, the statement in the
certificate of title is merely describing his status and it
does not actually indicate that the property was
conjugal. That is how we interpret it under Philippine law
and jurisprudence provided that there is no other
evidence to prove that the property was indeed
conjugal. Accordingly, ultimately what applied was the
Philippine Law because there was failure to the Korean
law as a capacity of Kang.
If you recall earlier when we talked about the intrinsic
validity of the will being governed by person's national
law, it is given that when we talked about successional
rights, what will govern is the national law of that person.
What happens if we have to enforce the provisions of the
will in another country? You obtain a judgement and the
Philippines is saying "okay, you have to distribute the
property in accordance with Philippine law" but the
property is located in New York. How will you transfer the
property that's located in New York to yourself
considering that the inheritance was already recognized
as valid here in the Philippines.
Based on your readings, the proper process would be you
obtain the judgement here as to the distribution of the
estate. After you obtained the judgement here, you prove
the judgement abroad in accordance, for example, the law
of the state of New York. Once the judgement has been
proven abroad, that is when you follow the rule of lex loci
rei sitae for the transfer of the property in New York. The
distribution of the estate in terms of the validity of the
succession will be governed by the Philippine law. But the
when it comes to the transfer of property, the law where it
is located will govern. This ties in very neatly with Article
17 which provides:
ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by
the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their
execution.
in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public
10
order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
This is how everything comes together. If Article 15 refers
to your capacity to dispose of a real property, and Article
16 refers to the rules on how to dispose real property,
Article 17 refers to the form and the solemnities of the
contracts governing the disposition of the real property.
Needless to state, if there is anything that you should take
to heart, it should be Articles 15, 16, and 17.
Going back to Article 17, Article 17 refers to extrinsic
validities. So the technical manner of preparation of the
contract, will, or other public instrument.
Paragraph 1 provides for the general rule which is you
follow the forms and solemnities of the place where you
execute the contract, will, or other public instrument.
Paragraph 2 is an exception because it implies the
principle of exterritoriality. Exterritoriality applies to our
offices abroad because they are considered as
extensions of the Philippine territory. Precisely, because
they are considered as extensions of Philippine territory,
you have to follow the forms and solemnities established
by Philippine laws.
Let's compare the principles of territoriality vs.
extraterritoriality vs. exterritoriality.
We know that territoriality is found in Article 14 of the civil
code and also in Article 2 of the Revised Penal
Code. Extraterritoriality is also provided in Article 2 of the
RPC whereby it enumerates certain situations where the
Philippines has jurisdiction over crimes committed outside
its territorial boundaries
Extraterritoriality is the principle where our country is
allowed to extend its territory into another country as this
is an extension recognized under international law.
The 3rd paragraph on prohibitive laws is actually
demonstrated by how our jurisdiction does not recognize
divorce decrees obtained abroad by Filipinos.
Because under our national law, the only ways to
terminate a marriage are to either nullify or annul it on the
basis of specific grounds are contained in the Family
code. Thus, in a case where a Filipina wife obtained a
divorce abroad and later remarried an American, the
Filipino husband can file a case of adultery against his
wife since divorce is not recognized in the Philippines.

DEL SOCORRO VS VAN VILSEM
This time, we will actually look how they have actually
applied articles 15, 16, and the 3rd paragraph of article
17.
For article 15, what did the Supreme Court say?
-On this point, we agree with Van Wilsem that Del
Socorro cannot rely on article 15 of the New Civil Code
in demanding support from him, because is a foreign
citizen. Therefore, it is his laws that will apply, and not
Philippine laws in terms of his rights as a person.
In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are
concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family
Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino
citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national
law with respect to family rights and duties.
-The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that
falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands,
we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the
laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether
he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the
consequences of his failure to do so.
So basically, if we were just to go with his national law
alone, then assuming that he was able to prove his
national law, Article 15 will have to apply. If his national
law states that he is not obliged to give support, then
supposedly we should respect it based on article 15
alone. But that will have to be reconciled later on with
Article 17.
But since in this case, Van Wilsem was unable to prove
the Netherlands law, then obviously we know that when
the foreign law is not proven properly, the doctrine of
processual presumption arises and is applied, what
happened is that the Philippine laws were presumed to
be the same as the national law of Van Wilsem.
So the Supreme court said:
-It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove
that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose
upon the parents the obligation to support their child. In
view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of
the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved,
our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same
as our local or domestic internal law. Thus, since the law
of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support
has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with the Philippine
law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance
therewith.
11
And finally, this is how the Supreme Court applied
Article 17:
So earlier we said that under article 15, the national law
of Van Wilsem could state that he is not obliged to
provide support and he should have proven that national
law in order for us to recognize it. But because he did
not prove it, the doctrine of processual presumption
applies. Therefore, he is obliged to provide support
under the doctrine of processual presumption.
But even assuming for example that we did not apply
the doctrine of processual presumption, was there a
way that we could have compelled Van Wilsem to
provide support to his child under Philippine laws?
This was where the Supreme Court applied Article
17,3rd paragraph which provides that:
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, ad those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgements
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
In this case, the Supreme Court said: "Foreign law
should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens and residents of the
forum. To give justice is the most important function of
law; hence, a law or judgement or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of
Conflict of Laws.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent's obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the
child to be denied if financial support when the latter is
entitled thereto."
In Del Socorro vs Van Wilsem, the Supreme Court was
able to use Articles 15, 16, and 17 to uphold the best
interest of the child which is to be able to receive support
from his father.
ARTICLE 18.— In matters which are governed by the
Code of Commerce and special laws, their deficiency
shall be supplied this code.
The rule under Article 18 is that if the Code of Commerce
or special laws are insufficient or deficient, the Civil Code
shall be applied to supply the deficiency. In other words,
the Civil shall be suppletory.
 12

What is an example? For example we have the that the

provision in the Civil Code which supplies the rules as to
when a contract is deemed to have been perfected. In
terms of acceptance, when do you know that a person has
accepted your offer? Is it upon transmittal of the letter
accepting the offer? Is it upon actual receipt of the letter
accepting the offer? or is it upon the time when the person
who made the offer reads the acceptance of that offer.

Among those three, it is actually the latter. There is only

acceptance when the person who made the offer actually
reads the acceptance of the offer. That is the rule that we
apply in instances where the insurance for example is
approved and transmitted to the person, but the person
died before he could receive the letter approving his
insurance. In that case, he was not yet informed before
his death of the approval, therefore there was no
acceptance of the insurance.

What about if there is conflict between the Civil Code and

the special law to which the Civil Code is supposed to
apply suppletory?

Obviously, the special law must prevail because the

special law was enacted specifically for that purpose.
Therefore we cannot apply the general law where the
special law is specific to that purpose.