YUGOSLAVIA

FROM “NATIONAL COMMUNISM”

TO NATIONAL COLLAPSE
US Intelligence Community
Estimative Products
on Yugoslavia, 1948-1990

NIC 2006-004 December 2006

This paper was prepared under the auspices of

C. Thomas Fingar, Chairman, National Intelligence Council.
Inquiries may be directed to (703) 482-3578.

This publication is also available on the NIC Public Web site at:
www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_home.html under Declassified NIC Publications.

To obtain a copy of this publication, please contact:

Government Printing Office (GPO), Superintendent of Documents, PO Box 391954
Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954, Phone: (202) 512-1800, Fax: (202) 512-2250
http:\\bookstore.gpo.gov GPO Stock 041-015-00252-0 ISBN 0-16-077246-x

LLIGEN
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Preface

The National Intelligence Council is pleased to issue this collection of declassified national intelligence
reports on Yugoslavia. They cover the period from Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948 to 1990—the eve of
Yugoslavia’s collapse into secession and civil war. This material represents a valuable record for
historians, intelligence specialists, and others with an interest in the story of Yugoslavia’s break from the
Soviet Bloc and its effort to strike an independent path to “national communism.” It offers special insights
into the thinking that helped shape Washington’s responses to Yugoslavia’s independent stance and into
the Intelligence Community’s appraisals later of the internal tensions that led to the country’s ultimate
collapse.

This is the third in a series of recent publications of declassified national intelligence products—the first,
focusing on China, was released in 2004 and the next, on Vietnam, followed one year later. These
documents on Yugoslavia, like those in the previous collections, are “estimative” in nature, representing
forward-looking efforts to explain how events might unfold in the region and thereby alert policymakers to
the opportunities and challenges they might confront.

These records, some of which reach back over five decades, represent the considered judgments of the
best experts within the Intelligence Community at the time. The work of our intelligence analysts today
reflects the best of this tradition—careful review of the evidence and a reasoned approach to arriving at
judgments—but the estimative product itself has evolved, becoming much more concise and inclusive of
divergent views and showing greater transparency in how we arrive at judgments. Also, today, we search
for expertise wherever it can be found—whether it be within the Intelligence Community or the academic,
business or think-tank worlds, around the corner or around the globe. Our goal is to bring together the
best minds that can be found to consider the broadest spectrum of views and fully explore alternative
hypotheses.

The National Intelligence Council is working to improve the readability, accessibility, and, of course, the
utility of its estimative products for policymakers. Declassification, compilation, and study of earlier
estimative products complement this effort. Publication of this volume affirms our continuing
commitment—where feasible and appropriate—to tell the story of intelligence.

Putting this volume together required the efforts of a great number of people. John K. Allen and others on
the staff of the Information Review Officer for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency managed the
task of identifying and declassifying the relevant documents. Marten van Heuven, a former National
Intelligence Officer for Europe, who led the work that produced the final National Intelligence Estimate in
the collection, wrote the introduction. Ambassador Richard Kauzlarich, our current NIO for Europe,
offered valuable substantive guidance for this book. Mathew Burrows and his team in the Analysis and
Production Staff of the National Intelligence Council performed the editing and developed the format,
graphics, and all the details to bring it to publication.

I also would like to personally thank Lee Hamilton, Director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars and his staff at the Cold War International History Project, who partnered with the National
Intelligence Council to give scholars and practitioners an opportunity to take the measure of this analytic
work and draw insights for the future. Finally, we should not forget the dedicated officers of the
Intelligence Community themselves whose expertise forms this collection.

C. Thomas Fingar
Chairman, National Intelligence Council

i
ii
HISTORICAL YUGOSLAVIA
15 18 BUDAPEST 21
0 50 100 Kilometers Albanians Montenegrins
Mur
Szombathely
Szekesfehervar
Oradea
The Socialist Federal 0 50 100 Miles Bulgarians Muslims Ethnic Composition in the
AUSTRIA Graz
Szolnok
Kecskemet
Republic of Yugoslavia, 1990 Austria
Croats Serbs Former Yugoslavia, 1991
Balaton Dunaujvaros
Cluj-Napoca
Hungarians Slovaks
Villach Klagenfurt
HUNGARY Macedonians Slovenes
Mu
ra
Hodmezovasarhely
Hungary
Maribor Lendava No majority present

Danube
Kaposvar
Kranj Celje Slovenia Based on opstina data from 1991 census.
IT. Varazdin Szeged Arad ROMANIA
LJUBLJANA Pecs
Subotica
Deva
LJUBLJANA
ZAGREB ZAGREB
Trieste Slovenia Virovitica
Senta
Kikinda Hunedoara Romania
Koper Croatia
Dr
av
a
Sombor Timisoara Croatia Vojvodina
Sisak Osijek Vojvodina Petrosani a S l a v o n (autonomous
Rijeka Karlovac Sa
va Zrenjanin n
Slavonski Vinkovci Backa Novi
Palanka Sad i province)
a

i
Brod Tirgu Jiu
Danube Vrsac
45 45
Prijedor

r a j
Pula
Bihac Pancevo Drobeta-
Banja Luka Brcko Sav
Orsova Turnu
a BELGRADE Severin

a
Drin
BELGRADE

Velika Mo
Tuzla
Bosnia Bosnia and

K
Da
nu

rava
Zadar
and Zenica
Bor
be Herzegovina
Knin Kragujevac Vidin Calafat
Herzegovina SARAJEVO Zajecar
D a SARAJEVO
Serbia
Titovo Kraljevo
Sibenik Uzice l m
Split
Serbia a H e r z eg o
Ne
re
Nis t vi
tva
Prokuplje n

i
Ta
ra Pirot

a
Mostar

a
Kardeljevo
Adriatic Leskovac
Montenegro Kosovska Adriatic Montenegro
Niksic Mitrovica BULGARIA Kosovo Bulg.
Pescara Sea Dubrovnik
TITOGRAD
Kosovo
Pristina
Vranje
Pernik
Italy Sea TITOGRAD (autonomous
Tivat province)
Boka
Katorska Lake Drin Prizren
Scutari
Shkoder
Kumanovo
SKOPJE Blagoevgrad 42 In percent
42 Bar
Tetovo Others, 3.9 SKOPJE
Ulcinj

Va
Shengjin
Titov Hungarians, 1.9

rd
ar
Veles
Montenegrins, 2.5 Macedonia
Kicevo Macedonia a Serbs, 36.3
Yugoslavs, 5.4
TIRANA
ITALY Durres
Prilep
Gevgelija Macedonians, 5.9
Bari
Ohrid Bitola Kilkis
Naples 0 100 Kilometers
Lake
Ohrid
Greece Albanians, 7.7
Albania
0 100 Miles Albania Lake
Potenza Brindisi
Prespa
Thessaloniki Greece
Slovenes, 7.8
Ptolemais
15 Taranto 18 Vlore 21
Muslims, 8.9
Croats, 19.7
1912-13 1941-44 aYugoslavs are those persons who listed themselves as such 1980
Balkan Wars–Serbia Partisan warfare in the 1981 census. They are dispersed across the country.
Tito’s death, country ruled 1990
acquires N. Macedonia against Germans by collective presidency First free multiparty
1331-55
election won by
Kingdom of Serbia 1946
925-1102 1830 1929 non-Communists in
goldern age 1918 Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia
Kingdom Serbia granted Name changed to Croatia and Slovenia,
“Yugoslavia” created composed of six republics under Tito
of Croatia 1527 autonomy within Kingdom of 1965-66 1975 both moving toward
as the Kingdom of
Croatia passes Ottoman Empire Yugoslavia June 1948 Major round of Final separation; ethnic
Serbs, Croats, and
under Hapsburg Yugoslavia breaks economic reforms agreement tensions coming to a
Slovenes
sovereignty from Soviet Bloc over Trieste boil in Kosovo
1100 1900 1940 1960 1990

July 1948
1974 1988-89
Tito ends support
Constitution Resurgent Serbian
1102 1389 1718 1914 1934 to Greek 1954 increases nationalism sparks
Croatia loses Serbs defeated Turks Assassination of Austrian Assassination Communist forces Provisional settlement
1944 powers of separatist movements
independence, by Ottoman withdraw archduke at Sarajevo by of King Belgrade liberated by of dispute with Italy over the republics in Croatia and Slovenia
accepts Turks at Battle from pro-Serbian terrorist Alexander Soviets and Tito’s Partisans Free Territory of Trieste
Hungarian king of Kosovo Croatia 1878 launches WWI 1971 1989
Treaty of Berlin: 1941 Croatian Serbia amends its
• Serbia independent WWII invasion by German and “Spring” constitution to increase
• Montenegro independent Italian forces; “independent suppressed control over Kosovo
• Macedonia returned to Ottomans state” set up in Croatia under Province, troops quell
• Bosnia and Herzegovina administered ustaši extremists, puppet demonstrations by ethnic
by Austria-Hungary regime in Serbia Albanians in Kosovo
DI Design Center/MPG 409730AI/753540AI (A04646)/753543AI (R00472) 10-06
 ORE: Office of Reports and Estimates
Contents NIE: National Intelligence Estimate
SNIE: Special National Intelligence Estimate
NSSM: National Security Study Memorandum
ONE: Office of National Estimates
IIM: Interagency Intelligence
Memorandum
M/H: Memorandum for Holders

Note: Documents are complete unless otherwise noted. Page

Preface i
Timeline: Historical Yugoslavia iii
Foreword vii
Introduction ix
Publication
Number Title of Publication Date of Publication Page

1 ORE 49-48 The Trend of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations 18-Nov-1948 1

2 ORE 16-49 The Yugoslav Dilemma 10-Feb-1949 13

Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability To
3 ORE 44-49 Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949 20-Jun-1949 21

4 ORE 8-50 Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations (1950) 11-May-1950 35

5 ORE 20-50 Economic Situation in Yugoslavia 1-Sep-1950 49

6 NIE-7 The Current Situation in Yugoslavia 21-Nov-1950 79

7 NIE-29 Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951 20-Mar-1951 101

Review of the Conclusions of NIE-29, “Probability
8 NIE-29/1 of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951” 4-May-1951 115
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the
9 Likelihood of Attack Upon Yugoslavia, Through 123
NIE-29/2 1952 4-Jan-1952

10 NIE-42/1 Yugoslav Intentions Toward Albania 20-Oct-1952 135

11 NIE-93 Probable Developments in Yugoslavia 26-Jun-1953 141

Yugoslav Reaction to the US-UK Decision on
12 Memo to DCI Trieste 13-Oct-1953 155

13 NIE 31-55 Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation 23-Feb-1955 161

14 NIE 31/1-55 Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation 19-May-1955 179

v
15 NIE 31-2-55 Yugoslavia’s International Position 7-Sep-1955 199

16 NIE 31-56 Yugoslavia’s International Position 24-Jul-1956 215

17 NIE 31-57 Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects 11-Jun-1957 225

18 SNIE 31/1-57 Yugoslavia’s International Position 19-Nov-1957 239

19 NIE 15-61 Outlook For Yugoslavia 23-May-1961 251

Authority and Control in the Communist
20 NIE 10-61 Movement 8-Aug-1961 269
Memo for the
21 Director Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc 18-Jul-1963 291

22 NIE 15-67 The Yugoslav Experiment 13-Apr-1967 303

23 Memo The Yugoslav Succession Problem 10-Mar-1969 321

Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal
24 (In Response to NSSM 129) 27-Jul-1971 351

25 Memo The Crisis in Croatia 5-Jan-1972 447

Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian
26 Memo Separatist Problem 27-Sep-1972 467

27 Memo Tito’s Time of Troubles 17-Nov-1972 483

28 NIE 15-73 Yugoslavia After Tito 5-Jul-1973 507

29 IIM 76-040C The Yugoslav Armed Forces 1-Oct-1976 523

Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia
30 NIE 15-79 Vol. I-The Estimate 25-Sep-1979 565
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia
31 NIE 15-79 Vol. II-The Annexes 25-Sep-1979 579

32 M/H NIE 15-79 Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia 1-Feb-1980 619

33 SNIE 15-83 Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis? 31-Jan-1983 627

34 NIE 15-90 Yugoslavia Transformed 18-Oct-1990 653

Appendix A: Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, Robert Blum 675
Appendix B: NDU Study: A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia 695
See CD inside back pocket for searchable texts of the above 34 declassified intelligence
products on Yugoslavia.

vi
Foreword

The 34 documents in this collection comprise all of the estimative products on Yugoslavia
forwarded by the Intelligence Community to policymakers between 1948, when the
community first began producing formal intelligence estimates, and 1990, when the
Yugoslav federation began to dissolve.* The documents were produced by the Office of
National Estimates (ONE), established in 1950 for the sole purpose of producing such
“national intelligence assessments,” and, beginning in 1973, by the National Intelligence
Officer (NIO) system, an integral part of today’s National Intelligence Council. The Office
of Reports and Evaluations, ONE’s predecessor organization, produced the first five
documents in the collection.

The documents fall into two broad categories: 1) formal products of the national
intelligence estimative process, and 2) memoranda written and disseminated unilaterally
by ONE. The most important difference between the two categories of documents is that
the products of the formal process—mostly National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs)—were
coordinated within the Intelligence Community while the ONE memoranda were not.
Importantly, however, both the formal products and the substantive ONE memoranda
were written for and disseminated to the highest levels of policymakers, including in many
cases the President.

None of the ONE memoranda have been declassified before, and most of the NIEs and
other formal estimative products in the collection have either not before been declassified
or have only been declassified in part. The documents are presented virtually intact. The
passage of time and of Yugoslavia have made it possible to make public material which
might otherwise have been considered still sensitive. What little material has been
redacted relates to still relevant intelligence sources and methods and not to the
substance of the analysis.

The two documents included as appendices, while not estimative products, are intended
to illuminate the collection. The document at Appendix A, published in the Summer 1985
edition of Studies in Intelligence, provides a notion of what makers of policy on
Yugoslavia received by way of analysis before the formal estimative process was

________________________
* The 34 documents do not, however, represent the totality of intelligence analysis on Yugoslavia. During
the 42-year span covered by this collection, the constituent members of the Intelligence Community
produced their own stream of assessments and reports on Yugoslavia, from which the estimative products
herein were distilled. For an explanation of how estimative products differ from other forms of analysis see
the section entitled “Intelligence Analysis and Policy Formulation” in Appendix B, the National Defense
University (NDU) Case Study.

vii
established. The document at Appendix B provides context for readers not familiar with
the intelligence process and how intelligence in general and NIE 15-90 in particular
influenced the policymaking process. They are reprinted here with the permission of their
authors, the State Department’s Robert Blum, and Thomas W. Shreeve of the National
Defense University.

This collection, a joint undertaking of the National Intelligence Council and CIA’s
Information Management Services (IMS), was compiled by John Allen working under the
aegis of the National Intelligence Officer for Europe Ambasador Richard Kauzlarich. A
number of other individuals from the National Intelligence Council and from the staff (in
IMS) of the Information Review Officer for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
participated in the preparation of the collection

John K. Allen, Jr.

Mr. Allen is a 30-year veteran of the CIA who served in operations, analysis, and the
management of analysis. He served on the NIC as an NIO during 1994 and 1995. He
was on the editorial team that compiled two other collections of historically significant
estimative products—Tracking the Dragon, National Intelligence Estimates on China
During the Era of Mao, 1948-1976 and National Estimative Products on Vietnam, 1948-
1975. Mr. Allen received a B.A from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, an
MPA from Harvard University, and is a graduate of the Air War College.

Richard D. Kauzlarich

Ambassador Kauzlarich was appointed NIO for Europe in September 2003. He is a 32-
year veteran of the Foreign Service. He served as United States Ambassador to Bosnia
and Herzegovina in 1997-99 and to Azerbaijan in 1994-97. Among his other senior
positions at the Department of State, he was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the
Bureau of European Affairs responsible for relations with the former Soviet Union and
economic ties with the European Union. He also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organization Affairs and Deputy Director of the State Department’s
Policy Planning Staff. Ambassador Kauzlarich received his B.A. from Valparaiso
University and M.A.s from Indiana University and the University of Michigan.

viii
Introduction

By Marten H. A. van Heuven

Marten van Heuven served as National Intelligence Officer for Europe from September 1987 to
May 1991. Starting his career in the Department of State’s Office of the Legal Adviser, Mr. van
Heuven’s overseas Foreign Service assignments included Berlin, NATO, The Hague, and Bonn.
He also served as Deputy US Permanent Representative to the UN, Geneva. In Washington,
he worked in the Office of East European Affairs, was Director of the Office of West European
Affairs, and also served a tour in the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Mr. van
Heuven received a B.A. from Yale University, an LL.B. from Yale Law School, and a Master in
International Affairs from Columbia University. He spent a year as a Mid Career Fellow at
Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, and a year at the
Department of State’s Senior Seminar.

The estimative materials presented in this volume are an important contribution to

institutional and national history. They reflect the considered judgment of analysts from
all parts of the Intelligence Community. As my former colleague Robert L. Suettinger
has aptly noted, National Estimates put on the record the big judgments, about trends
and possible futures, irrespective of whether these judgments fit the mode of thinking of
policymakers.1 As such, the Estimates included in this volume should be of interest to
historians and scholars.

The publication of these Estimates serves an additional purpose. The issues that
affected Yugoslavia during the period of its existence survive the country’s dissolution.
The traditional description of Yugoslavia as a country of six republics, five nationalities,
four languages, three religions, two alphabets, and one party (under Tito), held the
promise of analytical and estimative complexity. Yugoslavia made good on that
promise.

Even the birth of six countries to replace what used to be Yugoslavia is not the end of
the story. It is the beginning of another story, as those diplomats, soldiers and
representatives of non-governmental organizations presently active in the region are
ready to attest. This volume contains source material for those officials and others—in
the United States and Europe—now tasked with helping to shape the future of the
Balkans. If it is true that history matters, this observation applies abundantly in an area
that seems driven, often in unhelpful ways, by historical recollections and a disposition
of its people to prefer dwelling on the past rather than facing the future.

1
Introduction, Tracking the Dragon: National Intelligence Estimates on China
During the Era of Mao, 1948-1976, p. xii, October 2004.

ix
American Involvement in Yugoslavia

Why did Yugoslavia matter to the United States? American interest in the Balkans
antedated the creation of the Yugoslav state. The atrocities committed in the first
(1912) and second (1913) Balkan wars led the Carnegie Endowment to organize an
International Committee of Inquiry, which produced a study on the causes and conduct
of the wars, published by Carnegie in 1914. In 1993, in the midst of the carnage
accompanying the breakup of Yugoslavia, Carnegie President Morton Abramowitz
reissued the Report, with an Introduction by George F. Kennan. Aggressive nationalism
was a root cause of the Balkans’ and later Yugoslavia’s troubles. In the words of
Kennan, “But that nationalism, as it manifested itself on the field of battle, drew on
deeper traits of character inherited, presumably, from a distant tribal past: a tendency to
view the outsider, generally, with dark suspicion, and to see the political-military
opponent, in particular, as a fearful and implacable enemy to be rendered harmless only
by total and unpitying destruction. And so it remains today.”2

Following World War I, President Wilson and his advisers were intimately involved in
charting the future of the Balkans before and during the Paris Peace Conference.3
During World War II, the Allies—the United States included—dealt with Yugoslavia as a
significant piece of the strategic puzzle how to contain and defeat the Axis powers.

Prologue: The 1948 Belgrade-Moscow split—an intelligence failure?

When Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, Washington began to look at
Yugoslavia as part of the broader East-West Cold War that was beginning to emerge.
Against this backdrop of US-Soviet conflict, the story of Yugoslavia told in these
Estimates begins to unfold.

To understand the Estimates, however, it is important to know about the Yugoslav-

Cominform split that preceded them. On June 28, 1948, the Cominform countries
condemned Yugoslavia for pursuing policies hostile to the Soviet Union and expelled
Belgrade from Cominform. The surprise in Washington—as, indeed, elsewhere in the
West—at the sudden news of the split, would not be the last time that the Washington
policy community was unable or unwilling to digest warnings from its diplomats
overseas, or its analysts at home. In 1990, history would repeat itself.

In a well-sourced study, published in 1985, Robert Blum concludes that the inability of
Washington to anticipate the Yugoslav expulsion from the Cominform was a story of
failed political intelligence of major proportions, in both collection and analysis
(see Appendix A).

Blum’s detailed account, however, suggests an alternative conclusion. Already in

February 1947, and in subsequent messages to Washington, U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in

2
“Introduction, “The Other Balkan Wars, A 1913 Carnegie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect”, 1993, p.11.
3
Ronald Steel, “Walter Lippman and the American Century”, Atlantic Monthly Press, Ch. 11.

x
Belgrade John Cabot warned of a possible split. In June 1947, he noted that Yugoslav
interests “may not always blindly follow Russian instructions.” He followed up with
another warning, on July 7, 1947, that “conflicts of interest with Russia are inevitable
and the intense nationalism of the country [would] play a decisive role.” Nationalism,
not ideology, according to Cabot, would drive Yugoslav policies. Reportedly, when this
message was shown to then Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, he wrote
“rubbish” across the text.

Still, Embassy Belgrade judged that there was the possibility of a split. U.S. Chargé
d’Affaires R. Borden Reams, reported to Washington on June 18, 1948, that “—for [the]
first time in history, [the] Soviet Union is faced with [a] consolidated Communist regime
outside [its] own borders willing to risk independence or even [a] contrary course.”
Reams concluded that he was “convinced that [a] definite split exists.”

Blum argues that although there were many talented officers in the State Department,
perhaps “not enough people” were focusing on inner-Soviet Bloc relations and
Yugoslavia. Maybe they lacked the time. Maybe the signals were “confusing and
misleading.” Possibly, the mind set in Washington, which was comfortable with the
certainty of who the enemies were, produced a skewed perception.

What is remarkable is not that observers did not foresee the split before it occurred. In
Communist systems, in particular, policy can be set on the whim of a single ruler, and is
by nature unpredictable. The remarkable fact is that Embassy officers, Ambassador
Cabot and Chargé Reams in particular, fingered nationalism as the underlying potent
trend that, at some point, would drive the Yugoslavs to assert their independence. As to
Washington, a Policy Planning Staff memorandum dated June 30, 1948, largely drafted
by George Kennan, concluded, “[f]or the first time in history, we may now have within
the international community a Communist state…independent of Moscow.”4

Was this an intelligence failure? It is worth recalling that, at that time, there was no
intelligence community to make estimative judgments. There was no mechanism in
Washington to filter and organize the insightful but sporadic reports of knowledgeable
and experienced diplomatic observers into a cohesive estimative opinion. That said,
there is no guaranty that, even if an intelligence community had been in place and fully
staffed at the time, Acheson would not have acted as he did. Sometimes policymakers
already have their minds made up.

The Estimates: Paradox and Perspective

The estimative materials in this collection regarding Yugoslavia present a paradox. On

the one hand, they reflect a thorough appreciation of the state of the country over the
period 1948-1990. The factual basis for the assessments is detailed and, overall,
accurate. Trends in Yugoslav-Soviet relations, the internal political and economic
situation, and the cohesion of the country are, largely, correctly identified. Judgments

4
John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace, Oxford, 1987, pp. 157-158.

xi
about their likely evolution are mostly on the mark, even if, in some cases, hedged by
caveats.

On the one hand, the large role the Soviet Union plays as a backdrop to the Yugoslav
issue is striking. Analysts focused on the importance of Yugoslavia’s run for
independence for its broader implications within the Communist world. In some cases
the analysts seemed to be trying to estimate Soviet power and influence through
Yugoslav judgments of it as the Yugoslavs themselves dealt with Moscow

On the other hand, the Estimates on Yugoslavia do not reflect much of an effort to put
the course of the country into the mainstream of the evolution of Europe. Yet,
Yugoslavia was a key part of a Europe that was changing, on both sides of the Iron
Curtain. After the Treaty of Rome, in 1957, Western European countries started pooling
sovereignty into European Community—and later European Union (EU)—institutions,
processes and practices. Meanwhile, Eastern European countries, after the death of
Stalin, embarked on a long and uneven road toward self-assertion.

The Estimates contain sporadic references to those other events, such as the
Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the “Prague Spring” of 1968. While they do refer to
changing Kremlin policies and tactics, they are largely silent on the transition in East-
West relations, from the Cold War to the détente that followed the Cuban Missile crisis.
Nor are the Yugoslav estimative materials directly linked, for the most part, to the
growing trends within Moscow’s East European satellite states toward liberalization from
the Kremlin.

These issues, to be sure, were undoubtedly tackled by the Intelligence Community in

other estimative work directly focused on those countries and trends. Nevertheless,
what is missing in the Yugoslav estimative materials presented here is anything more
than a sketch on the broader canvas of political liberalization in Europe—both East and
West. Yet, as the last Estimate included in this volume (NIE 15-90) was being
prepared, the cascade of change was well under way. Solidarity was part of the Polish
government. The Hungarian People’s Republic had been abolished. The Berlin Wall
had come down. Germany was putting together the remaining elements toward
unification. Ceausescu was dead.

The evolution of Yugoslavia was part and parcel of this larger European tableau.
Indeed, in the lead-up to these events, the “Yugoslav experiment” must have been an
attention-getter to East Europeans, just as it was an irritant to Moscow. The estimative
materials focus largely on the latter aspect, and leave mostly unexplored the degree to
which Tito and the Yugoslav leadership saw themselves as catalysts in a changing
Europe. The Estimates focus mostly on Yugoslavia’s global role, as a leader of the
Non-Aligned Movement. They are largely silent on the Yugoslav role as a catalyst for
change in Eastern Europe, and where (if at all) Yugoslavia fit into the process of
Western European political and economic integration.

xii
Finally, the Estimates deal with the role and importance of nationalism and, in particular,
its relative nature as both a centralizing and disruptive force. In this sense, the agony of
Yugoslavia served in the early period to show that Communism was not monolithic and,
in the last period, served to usher in a post-Communist world where separatist
nationalism would contribute so much to the shaping of the new order.

The Estimates: What They Tell Us about What Washington Knew

Unlike American knowledge about the Soviet Union, which was uneven, United States
estimative intelligence on Yugoslavia was based on commanding access to much
factual information. Western engagement to bolster Yugoslavia through economic
assistance, military transfers, and diplomatic and other contacts opened the door.
Yugoslavia’s Five-Year Plans were also a relatively open book, although, as some of
the Estimates noted, this information was not of uniform quality.

The Estimates also provided policymakers with a detailed and considered analytical
picture of the complex mix of historical factors, national and regional interests, proclivity
for dispute, economic challenges and, last but not least, the role of the West, including
the United States. The Estimates were careful to point out that these factors might lead
to a range of outcomes. Indeed, several Estimates explicitly examined multiple
alternative possibilities. On the whole, the judgment calls on key issues proved right.
The Soviet Union did not use armed force against Yugoslavia. The country did hold
together after Tito’s passing, until, in 1990, it became clear it would not. The Yugoslav
“experiment” did have an effect on the evolution of Moscow’s Satellites. Western
assistance never translated into deciding influence. Paradoxically, the ability of
Yugoslavia to hold together as long as it did might have reinforced the Washington
policy of support for the political independence and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.
When this prospect became untenable, policy was slow to adjust.

The Estimates, on the whole, probably contributed to what became a settled

Washington policy view that, for reasons of regional stability and Western interests,
Yugoslavia should remain politically independent and unified. Yet, it was that policy of
support for the political independence and territorial integrity of the country that suffered
a shipwreck in 1991. The Intelligence Community saw it coming. Reluctantly but
eventually, the Washington policy community came around to this view. By then, not
surprisingly, the situation had deteriorated and would lead to armed conflict and
Western military intervention.

The story told by the Estimates from 1948 to 1990 is one of great improvisation,
orchestrated by Tito. While improvisation succeeded in achieving Tito’s foreign policy
objectives, accommodating to internal pressures for openness and decentralization,
Tito’s approach ultimately led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Even the potential
solution of a loosely confederated Yugoslavia never acquired a life of its own; the
internal pressures proved too strong. But the Estimates never fully explore the question
why Tito, whose style as a ruthless dictator worked for him, chose to create a very
different style of collective rule for his successors.

xiii
The Estimative Record

The initial focus was on the Soviet Union, and how the Kremlin would deal with a
renegade Yugoslavia. Over time, the perspective mutated into an interest in
Yugoslavia’s policy of non-alignment, which sought a careful balance between East and
West, while seeking an enlarged global role, which on occasion bumped against
Western interests. The Estimates were clear-headed about the importance of Western
assistance, but sober about the limited degree of influence the West would have on
Yugoslavia’s domestic and foreign policies. As the Kremlin’s hard line mellowed, the
Intelligence Community’s perspective refocused on a newly evolving relationship
between Belgrade and Moscow, in which Tito successfully sought to preserve Yugoslav
freedom of action, drawing on a strong sense of Yugoslav national pride. As Tito aged,
the analysis became increasingly dominated by the succession issue, and the incipient
crisis of competing and antagonistic nationalistic feelings among the constituent parts of
Yugoslavia. Finally, the Intelligence Community was riveted on the impending
disintegration of Yugoslavia.

A separation into different phases is somewhat artificial. All elements mentioned in the
Estimates were present to some degree during the entire period under review.
Nonetheless, the phases offer a rough picture of how analytic—and policy—attention to
Yugoslavia evolved.

It is hard, even with the benefit of hindsight, to evaluate the effect of this body of
estimative material on the Washington policy process. The volume of the material
suggests, however, that Yugoslavia did not suffer from a lack of analysis. The length of
some of the Estimates is noteworthy, given that they were intended principally for top
policy officials. It is reasonable to infer that the US policy world drew on the large
amount of factual material—and the analytic judgments based on it—provided in the
Estimates in organized form. It may also be assumed that US government decisions
concerning assistance to Yugoslavia were informed by the judgments that Yugoslavia
needed assistance, but that providing assistance would not give the West much
influence on Tito’s Yugoslavia. It is probably safe to conclude that the estimative record
in this volume provided a broad basis on which Washington policymakers could and did
operate. There may be another lesson here. The analysts failed to go beyond their
judgments on Yugoslavia to consider what this might mean more broadly for the US and
the West, what challenges it would pose and what opportunities, perhaps even
imperatives, for action it signified.

There also is the problem of different perspectives of policy makers in Washington on

the one hand, and those of US representatives abroad and analysts at home on the
other. Robert Blum notes correctly that, as the capital of a world power, Washington is
a city of agendas and action. Once in motion, it takes more than a suggestion from
diplomats overseas—as we saw regarding the 1948 split with Moscow—or from the
Intelligence Community to accept that a fundamental change may be in the offing. Blum
may be hitting the nail on the head when he observes, “Early in 1948 was a period of
action rather than open-minded reflection about the Soviet Bloc.” But, as historian John

xiv
Lewis Gaddis points out, “What is remarkable about American policy toward
international communism in the early days of the Cold War is how quickly the possibility
of encouraging heretical growths came to be seen, and acted upon.”5 That is the lesson
of the Yugoslavia estimates.

1948-1952: Split with Moscow and the Soviet Threat to Yugoslav Survival

The focus during this period is on the Soviet Union. The key concern is strategic, and
relates to Western efforts to contain Soviet communism. The key question is whether,
and under what circumstances, the Kremlin will seek to regain control over Belgrade. A
corollary question is how the split will affect Soviet policies toward its Satellites. There
is considerable attention to the ability of the Yugoslav economy to withstand pressure
from Moscow to undermine Yugoslav stability.

ORE 49-48, dated November 18, 1948, addresses the prospects of a Yugoslav state
outside of Kremlin control. This compact and informative Estimate addresses issues
that would occupy American policymakers for years to come. But it also identifies the
factor of Yugoslav “national” self-interest as overriding the cause of “international”
communism. In a perhaps unintended turn of phrase, the opening sentence of the
Estimate refers to the “first” major rift in the USSR’s satellite empire. This reflects an
official American appreciation of the weakness of the Soviet notion of expansion
through world communism. It explicitly states that, short of the use of armed force,
Communist party discipline “may not always guarantee the complete submission to
Kremlin authority demanded by the Soviet system.”

The Estimate expects that the rift with Tito will cause the Kremlin to purge “nationalist”
Communists in the satellite countries under its domain. It also expects Tito to
strengthen his international position. But caution will prevail on both sides. Moscow
cannot afford to drive Tito into the arms of the West. Tito, for his part, will also seek to
avoid a showdown.

The Estimate seems to hedge on the issue of possible reconciliation. There is mention
of Tito’s “slim hope of an ultimate compromise solution for the re-admission of
Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit.” But the judgment call goes the other way. “Early
reconciliation between Tito and the Cominform is highly unlikely.” Moreover, “it will
become increasingly unlikely that there can be an accommodation between the USSR
and Yugoslavia as long as Tito and his followers retain control of the Yugoslav
Government.”

ORE 16-49, issued on February 10, 1949, focuses on the paradoxes facing Tito.
Despite the rift, Yugoslavia is following Moscow’s anti-Western foreign policy line. “It is
evident, however, that as Tito’s economic situation grows more desperate and his
economic dependence on the West (particularly the US) intensifies, he may be forced to
modify his hitherto vigorous anti-Western foreign policy.”

5
Ibid., p. 149.

xv
ORE 44-49, issued on June 20, 1949, turns to the Yugoslav regime’s ability to resist
Soviet pressure during 1949. The effort is impressive. It canvasses the military,
political, economic and subversive measures available to Moscow, concluding that Tito
will withstand these pressures. The Estimate’s judgments are unambiguous: There will
be no war. Though there may be border incidents, these will not develop into large-
scale guerilla warfare. Tito will stay in power during 1949. A Soviet attempt to create
an independent Macedonia is unlikely. Cominform propaganda will rally the non-
Communist Yugoslav population to Tito’s camp. Tito is acting on his “early conviction”
that Kremlin planners do not want a war with the West, giving him the courage to defy
the USSR. And Tito can handle the estimated two percent (a remarkably specific
number) of anti-Tito elements within the Party. The Soviet Bloc will not be able to exert
sufficient economic pressure to force the collapse of the Yugoslav economy. Tito will
seek industrial imports from the West, even as Yugoslavia continues to trade with the
East.

The Estimate adds another judgment to which one element of the Intelligence
Community took exception “For the purposes of US policy,” military pressures from the
East “may eventually necessitate” Western military and economic assistance. The
Director of Naval Intelligence took a footnote: “The Office of Naval Intelligence has no
cognizance over the formulation of U.S. policy.” This is an early indication of the
reluctance of elements in the Intelligence Community to be part of analysis that
ventures into the policy arena.

ORE 8-50, issued on May 11, 1950, judges that the position of Yugoslavia has
improved. The failure of past Soviet tactics has forced Moscow to revise its estimate as
to the vulnerability of the Tito government. Future Soviet tactics will continue to be
aimed at preventing Yugoslav stabilization. But “large-scale guerilla warfare against
Yugoslavia does not appear likely in 1950.” Since Tito needs Western assistance, he
will be amenable to settling outstanding issues. The strategic significance of
Yugoslavia, as an obstacle to Soviet expansion, or as a potential Western base, “will
progressively increase as Yugoslav ties with the West grow stronger.”

ORE 20-50, issued on September 1, 1950, constitutes another (see ORE 44-49)
comprehensive attempt to assess the state of the Yugoslav economy, in answer to the
question whether Yugoslavia can hold its own in the face of continued Soviet pressure.
What is remarkable about the Estimate is the detail of the statistics on all elements of
the economy. The key judgment is that the economy has made a strong recovery from
the effects of World War II, and has adjusted to the break with the USSR. But there are
caveats. The Tito government is pursuing heavy industrialization within the framework
of a planned economy. This approach is causing innumerable problems. The Estimate
finds that Yugoslav resources are adequate to support gradual industrial expansion,
well beyond pre-war levels, but “Tito’s success in strengthening and expanding
Yugoslavia’s economy will depend primarily on the extent to which he realizes the basic
limitations on the rate and extent of economic development possible in a country of
Yugoslavia’s resources.” The bottom line is that, in 1950, the United States had a
detailed picture about the state of the Yugoslav economy.

xvi
NIE-7, dated November 21, 1950, is a snapshot of the effect of the economic crisis on
Yugoslavia’s stability. “Substantial outside aid is essential.” The dangers are internal
discontent and external pressures. But “the probability is that Tito’s police regime can
survive,” though in weakened condition. The Soviet aim remains the elimination of the
Tito government, though the Kremlin has been “unwilling thus far to launch a military
attack.” Relations with Western governments have improved; in the United Nations,
Yugoslavia is no longer a Communist mouthpiece, but is moving toward neutrality.

The Estimate addresses specifically Yugoslavia’s importance to the West. The

discussion is strategic, and reveals an evolution of the mindset in Washington.
Yugoslavia is important “as a vital link in the defense of the Eastern Mediterranean, and
the Near and Middle East; its inclusion in the bloc that forms a potential threat to the
southern flank of a Soviet attack on Western Europe; and its importance as a key
member of a potential Balkan-Near and Middle East bastion of Western-oriented states
from which the Communist Satellites and the USSR can be attacked directly.” This last
phrase is as startling as it is unusual for such a policy consideration to be included in an
Estimate. Yugoslavia is judged to be a salient in the Soviet ideological front, but of
secondary economic importance to the West, mainly as a convenient outlet for Western
manufactures.

The next few Estimates return to the question of the odds of a Soviet armed attack.
Concerns apparently were high in 1951-1952. NIE 29, issued on March 20, 1951,
begins with the premise that the Soviets, still wedded to the idea of replacing the Tito
regime with one subservient to the USSR, are unlikely to be able to overthrow Tito by a
coup. Hence, Tito’s overthrow can only be achieved by armed invasion. Moscow’s
Satellites are now judged to be capable of launching a major surprise invasion.
Combined Satellite and Soviet forces also could invade Yugoslavia. Western
assistance and military supplies, however, could enable Yugoslav forces to hold out in
the mountains. While there is evidence of preparations for a possible invasion by
Satellite forces, these “do not, however, provide conclusive evidence of an intention to
attack.” Kremlin thinking is anyone’s guess. But an attack in 1951 should be
considered “a serious possibility.” This last word stands in curious contrast to the
stronger term used in the title of the Estimate, which mentions the “probability” of an
attack. A Review of the Conclusions of NIE-29, issued on May 4, 1951, reports that
Satellite capabilities for initiating an attack with little or no warning have increased, but
there have been no major changes in Soviet strength. The NIE expresses the following
judgment: “Although developments to date do not appear to warrant the conclusion that
a Satellite attack will take place in 1951, or indicate that such an attack is more likely
this spring than later in the year, they do give added emphasis to the conclusion of NIE-
29 that ‘an attack on Yugoslavia in 1951 should be considered a serious possibility’.”

NIE-29/2, issued on January 4, 1952, revisits the threat of invasion once more. The key
judgment is that “we believe that an attack upon Yugoslavia in 1952 is unlikely.” The
judgment was not unanimous; The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the
Army, agreed that an attack was unlikely “unless the USSR is prepared to accept
general war.” He also warned about the effect of “unforeseen political events and/or

xvii
miscalculation.” The Estimate assesses the Soviets as follows: “Past Soviet actions
suggest that the Kremlin does not consider Yugoslavia as an isolated problem, but
views it as one of several factors affecting the general position of the USSR.
Consequently, there is little likelihood that the USSR will launch a Satellite attack upon
Yugoslavia without carefully assessing the effect of such an attack upon the general
Soviet political and strategic position.”

The preceding three estimative products reflect the classic analytic challenge of
distinguishing between capabilities and intentions and the importance of getting both
right. It was critical at this uncertain period in terms of developments elsewhere in
Europe and the Korean peninsula that the Intelligence Community provide clear,
unambiguous, and accurate judgments about Soviet intentions.

1953-1963: Yugoslavia and the West—the Policy of Non-alignment

The focus in this period shifts away from preoccupation with the threat of Soviet bloc
invasion to Yugoslavia’s relations with the West. The judgments are focused on
Yugoslavia’s response to the post-1955 shift in Moscow’s policy toward Belgrade. The
key question is whether, and under what circumstances, Yugoslavia can hold its own in
a bi-polar world.

NIE-93, issued on June 26, 1953, emphasizes the Yugoslav relationship with the United
States and the West. Yugoslavia will require outside military aid. Tito also needs US
economic aid, particularly to help underwrite Yugoslavia’s foreign exchange deficits.
Tito may calculate that the United States will regard Yugoslavia of sufficient strategic
importance to leave Washington no choice but to continue economic assistance. In his
contacts with the US, the UK, and France, Tito “will probably continue to seek greater
commitments from the NATO powers,” but he “will not press for full membership in
NATO.” Yugoslavia’s approach will be to “obtain the maximum Western commitments
for Yugoslavia’s defense while allowing minimum Western influence over Yugoslavia’s
domestic and foreign policies.” Given the steady pattern of Yugoslav efforts to seek a
balanced position between East and West, the mention of full membership in NATO is
surprising. It is oddly out of context with US intelligence judgments about Yugoslavia’s
foreign policy orientation up to this time.

ONE Memorandum to the DCI, dated October 13, 1953, assesses Tito’s reaction to
the US/UK decisions to leave Trieste and turn the city and surrounding area over to
Italian control. The Memorandum forecasts strong Yugoslav objections, but
unwillingness to jeopardize a growing relationship with the West that has brought
Yugoslavia much needed support.

In the mid-Fifties, in the space of 18 months, the Intelligence Community sought to

define—and redefine—-probable developments in Yugoslavia, its future orientation, and
probable effects of possible US courses of action. These National Estimates, each of
which supersedes or partially supersedes the previous one, are NIE 31-55, issued on

xviii
February 23, 1955 (superseding NIE 93), NIE 31/1-55, issued on May 19, 1955, NIE 31-
2-55, issued on September 7, 1955, and NIE 31-56, issued on July 24, 1956.

Since the rift with the Kremlin, Yugoslavia’s position has been anomalous. First, it
hoped the split might be temporary. Unremitting Soviet hostility and economic
difficulties compelled closer relations with the West. In 1950, Yugoslavia accepted
Western assistance rather than face economic collapse. Capitalizing on Western
interest in keeping Yugoslavia free from Soviet domination, Tito built up diplomatic and
military ties with the West, amounting by mid-1955 to $700 million in economic grants
and close to $1 billion in military aid. Belgrade also reoriented its foreign trade toward
the West. It accommodated itself to the Western solution to the Trieste issue, and
entered into mutual defense commitments with Greece and Turkey.

By 1955, however, Stalin had died and the Kremlin was pursuing “normalization” of
relations with Yugoslavia. Normalization included resumption of full diplomatic relations
with Moscow and the Satellites, renewed Party relations, reopening of borders,
restoration of trade in non-strategic materials, and other measures making for a more
normal relationship.

The initiatives for improved relations came from Moscow. Initially, the Yugoslavs
viewed them warily. With time, however, they warmed to renewed contacts with the
Soviet world. They began to see the possibility of “peaceful coexistence.” In April and
May 1955, Tito was conveying to Western diplomats the idea that Western security
might best be served by a neutral belt comprising Yugoslavia, Austria, a reunified
Germany, Sweden, and possibly other states. Meanwhile, Yugoslav negotiators were
showing themselves as “disputatious and unbending” on aid issues. And, on May 13,
came the announcement that a Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev and Bulganin
would shortly visit Belgrade.

The Intelligence Community assessed that “the Yugoslav regime probably believes that
its own best interests…lie in avoiding too close an association with either great power
bloc.” But the answer to the key estimative question was elusive: “The currently
unresolved state of Tito’s relationships with both the West and the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
makes it impossible to chart future Yugoslav foreign policy with any great degree of
certainty.” Meanwhile, Belgrade would view its relationship with the West strictly as “a
marriage of convenience.”

But there was clarity on a key trend: “Yugoslavia’s position vis-à-vis the two major
power blocs is in process of readjustment.” Furthermore, “[E]vidence available so far
indicates that Yugoslavia has preserved its independent status. We consider it unlikely
that Tito has as yet decided that his interest can best be served from a position within
rather than outside the Communist orbit or that he has made a covert agreement with
Moscow to join the Bloc.” But, he will “almost certainly side with the USSR on most
major international issues.”

xix
The new situation required a look at the issue of US influence. The judgment was not
encouraging: “US ability to influence Yugoslav policy—never decisive at its strongest—
has sharply declined in the last two years and will probably continue to do so.”

Two further Estimates delve into the gyrations of Yugoslavia’s policies and prospects.
They are NIE 31-57, issued on June 11, 1957, and SNIE 31/1-57, issued on November
19, 1957, which supersedes the former on foreign policy issues.

The internal situation is marked by the same trends noted in previous estimates. The
power of the Yugoslav Communist dictatorship remains intact, despite chronic popular
discontent, dissatisfaction among youth, nationalist and separatist forces, bad feelings
between the economically backward and more advanced republics, and chronic fear of
Serb domination. This relatively shallow analysis of Yugoslav internal developments
reflected both the low priority accorded to this in Washington, as well as a lack of
information.

Yugoslavia is following a foreign policy of maneuver and non-commitment, reflecting a

desire to maintain national independence, the Marxist-Leninist predilection of its
leaders, the necessity of preventing European hegemony of any one great power, the
strategic need for friendly neighbors, the continuing requirement of foreign aid, and the
unique position of a Communist country outside the Soviet Bloc.

The revolution in Hungary has subjected the relationship with Moscow to new strains.
The high point of the earlier rapprochement has been Tito’s visit to Moscow in June
1956. But now, “the Soviet leaders appear not to have foreseen the political and
ideological effects in the Satellites of restoring Tito to good standing in the Communist
world.” Thus, “it was Soviet misgivings about the course of events in the Satellites that
brought about serious strains in the relationship in the second half of 1956 and led to
renewed attempts to isolate Yugoslavia from the rest of Eastern Europe.” In fact,
Moscow started blaming Yugoslavia for Soviet troubles in Eastern Europe. But it came
around again to a softer view. SNIE 31/1-57 opens with the judgment that “The
Yugoslav leaders have appeared convinced that the USSR under Khrushchev is willing
to live with Yugoslav independence and with gradually increasing autonomy among the
Satellite regimes.” Though there have been and will be many ups and downs,
“Yugoslavia will maintain its rapprochement with the USSR.”

The Hungarian rebellion also had domestic effects on Yugoslavia, where the leadership
“appeared to be seriously concerned” about Hungarian popular disaffection. NIE 31-57
examines four “possible developments” for a post-Tito Yugoslavia. One is “a period of
crisis in which traditional national rivalries would reassert themselves and the unity of
the Yugoslav state would break down.” The Estimate does not assess the likelihood of
such a scenario, although it is interesting that the focus has shifted from the centralizing
to the disintegrative nature of nationalism. Also, the Hungarian uprising “brought to the
fore previously latent fears that US policy poses a potential threat to all Communist
states.”

xx
NIE 15-61, issued on May 23, 1961, four years later, presents a picture of a more
settled pattern. Yugoslavia is politically stable. (This stability may explain the gap
between Estimates regarding Yugoslavia.) It is gaining domestic support for its
distinctive type of mixed socialism. Personal consumption is up and annual economic
growth is at 12 percent. This picture “is unlikely to undergo substantial change in the
next several years.” Yugoslavia is judged as having skillfully exploited its unique
position as a Communist state outside the Sino-Soviet orbit. It enjoys a substantial flow
of Western military and economic aid. Its policy of non-alignment has given it
international prestige. “We do not expect any substantial change in these policies.”

NIE 10-61, issued on August 8, 1961, while not Yugoslav-specific, does address the
broad theme of authority and control in the Communist movement and also assesses
the role of Yugoslavia in the process. It paints a comprehensive picture of inexorable,
fissiparous tendencies, concluding that observable trends suggested increasing
complexity and diversity within the Communist system, and a growing challenge to
Moscow’s attempts to assert influence and control.

The Estimate frankly attributes the fact of unity within the Communist movement not so
much to the absence of conflict of interest, as to the overwhelming influence of Soviet
economic and military power. Two factors, however, are steadily eroding Moscow’s
predominance. One is the ascendance to state power of the Communist parties in
Eastern Europe. The other is the impulse given by World War II to autonomous
tendencies among the Communist parties in Europe. Both factors contribute to a
growing sense of particular national interests, and to greater self-reliance of local
Communist parties in articulating and promoting them.

Khrushchev, who succeeded Stalin after the latter’s death in 1953, was conscious of the
need for a more flexible approach. His intent, according to the Estimate, was not to
grant genuine autonomy, but to allow a more flexible policy to guarantee maximum
effective Soviet control. This new approach, however, far from assuaging restlessness
in Eastern Europe, only encouraged the release of pent-up forces wanting reform. This
evolution is stimulated further by the reversal of Stalin’s policy toward Yugoslavia and
the recognition of its Communist party’s right to a “separate road.”

The Estimate notes Albanian fears that Yugoslavia might re-establish its former tutelage
over the Albanian Communist movement, and thus constitute a threat to Albanian
independence—a theme addressed earlier in NIE-42/1, issued October 20, 1952. This
is why Albania chose to align itself with China.

The Estimate dwells on the rise of China and the competing influence of the Chinese
Communist Party in the Communist system. The Estimate considers it unlikely that the
two major Communist parties can resolve their differences, but regards an open rupture
as equally unlikely, leaving the two parties openly contending for leadership, but with
the Soviet Communist Party in the stronger position because of greater Soviet
economic and military power. These trends, according to the Estimate, could eventually

xxi
diminish the effectiveness of the Communist movement as a whole, opening new
opportunities for the West.

The Estimate further predicts that, in this field of tension, other parties will be tempted to
bargain between Moscow and Beijing, adding, cautiously but presciently, that “[I]n the
long run, some of the parties in Eastern Europe, or factions within them, may attempt to
develop further the autonomy conceded by Stalin’s successors.” The Summary of the
Estimate concludes by noting the “remarkable survival of old-fashioned impulses of
nationalism.”

1963-1967: “Revolutionary Workers’ Movement” and Return to Moscow

Picking up the analytical line of NIE 10-61, the perspective during this period shifts to
loosening cohesion in the Communist world. The key question is what place and role
Yugoslavia has in a Communist world in which Moscow must compete for allegiance.

A Memorandum For The Director on Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, issued on July
18, 1963, by the Board of National Estimates, and signed by Chairman Sherman Kent,
reveals just how much changed since the Yugoslav break with Moscow fifteen years
earlier. A terse, 13-paragraph memorandum, it presents a picture of economic progress
and political stability. Yugoslavia has a new constitution. Leadership succession
seems to have been settled by the elevation of Alexander Ranković to second position
in the government and in the party. The economy is on the upsurge. Yugoslav
pessimism about relations with the Common Market, and about Most Favored Nation
(MFN) status with the United States, is offset by optimism about Yugoslavia’s prospects
in relations with the underdeveloped world, which Belgrade sees as potential markets
for products of Yugoslav industry.

Relations with Moscow have improved significantly. This is “in very great part the
personal work of Tito,” who visited Moscow in December 1962, confirming his
impression—thus the memorandum—that Khrushchev and his associates were altering
the internal system in the USSR in the direction favored by Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is
now receiving Soviet military goods. Mutual exchanges with Moscow Satellites have
increased; there are even joint projects.

Belgrade’s previous emphasis on its independence of all “blocs” has been replaced by a
rhetoric stressing the importance of Yugoslavia’s role as part of the “international
revolutionary workers’ movement.” The change reflects the altered Yugoslav
assessment that Moscow now accepts independent behavior of other Communist
countries.

The memorandum states that Moscow is no longer working to regain control over
Yugoslavia; instead, Khrushchev seeks Yugoslav support within the Communist world,
to demonstrate that intimate relations with Moscow are possible without becoming a
Soviet puppet.

xxii
The key judgment of the estimative memorandum is that Yugoslav cooperation with
Moscow is likely to grow, though it expresses a caveat that this depends on
Khrushchev’s “political fortunes and life span.” As to Tito’s successors, the
memorandum concludes that they will continue to attach priority to maintaining
Yugoslav independence. Analysts now must begin assessing the shape and
implications of post-Tito Yugoslavia.

1967-1983: Succession and Emerging Ethnic Nationalism.

After another lengthy estimative gap, the focus during this period is the internal
evolution of Yugoslavia. Tito’s death in 1980 is the defining event of this period. The
key question is how the internal trends—ethnic nationalism in particular—driving the
transition/succession process will affect the unity of the country after Tito leaves the
scene.

NIE 15-67, issued April 13, 1967, returns to Yugoslavia with a detailed exposition of the
Yugoslav “Experiment.” It characterizes the country as a Communist state in name and
in theory, but in practice as fully independent. It gives the “experiment” high marks;
Yugoslavia has a viable and independent—though unstable—economy, it has
democratized public institutions, and it enjoys a significant global position. Progress
toward decentralization will not be smooth, but “probably irreversible.”

The discussion focuses on forces tugging at the country’s cohesion—six republics

whose people “are divided by differences in religion, nationality, language, political
experience, and economic development.” Curiously absent is any reference to the
lethal armed internal conflict during WW II and the residual animosities, which that
conflict generated. Moreover, according to the Estimate, Yugoslavia is a state “whose
political, economic, and foreign policies have for nearly 20 years reflected mainly
improvisation and compromise.”

Paragraph six of the discussion lays bare the underlying seeds of schism: Serbs,
Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians think of themselves first in those national terms,
and only secondarily as Yugoslavs. This represents an interesting and important
analytical shift. The early (e.g. 1948) emphasis on nationalism stressed the external
manifestation of Yugoslav national identity as a sign of independence from the Soviet
bloc. Now national identity is analyzed as relating to particular internal (to Yugoslavia)
ethnic interests.

Moreover, the country’s populations, except the Serbs, are haunted by fears of a return
to “greater Serb” hegemony. The unifying Soviet threat has diminished. Progressive
devolution of economic and political responsibility has enhanced the attraction of a
loose confederation, as opposed to strict central federal control. Disparities of wealth
are driving the constituent republics apart.

The Estimate notes that, while Tito has managed these problems of “particularization,”
he does not anticipate any real solution. It warns of exploitation by ambitious politicians

xxiii
of the emotional appeal of particularism, but sees, on balance, an attenuation of
particularist trends. However, should Tito die before completing his overhaul of State
and party structures, “[I]t is remotely possible that a concatenation of…unfavorable
events could endanger the cohesion of the Federation.” However, the Estimate’s
bottom line is that the state will survive intact.

An ONE Memorandum, dated March 10, 1969, deals with the succession problem, and
its effect on internal stability. The basic threat is factionalism. The picture is confused:
Ideological convictions, national antagonisms “rooted deep in history,” and personal
loyalties make prediction hazardous. Yugoslavia has been in a state of flux for nearly
two decades, in an environment of innovation and experimentation, plagued by constant
problems of antagonisms, economic weakness and political factionalism. Aware that
“liberalization of the economy generates a need for political liberalization,” Tito has now
discarded the expedient of an heir apparent, preferring not to lodge too much power in
the hands of one individual. The memorandum dryly notes, however, that as long as
Tito remains in power, there is no way to test the new system of collective governance.
But the ultimate judgment is cautiously positive: Tito’s departure will not produce an
immediate crisis.

A lengthy “Intelligence Appraisal”, issued by ONE on July 27, 1971, lays out a
detailed picture of Yugoslavia. The notation that it is in response to National Security
Study Memorandum (NSSM) 129 indicates that this is a case where the policy and
intelligence worlds in Washington are interacting. The picture is mixed. Yugoslavia
faces a difficult transition. It is moving to new, more open patterns of politics. Its
economy, moving toward radical decentralization of authority, faces problems. The
country enjoys greater contact with the West. Its leadership is preparing for the post-
Tito period.

The key question is whether Yugoslavia can survive as a single state, despite bitter
antagonisms between Serbs and Croats, Serbs and Albanians, and strong regional
rivalries and resentments. The principal power centers at the top of the Communist
Party (LCY) and the federal government appear indecisive. But there is “a good
chance” that over the long term a sense of common purpose, buttressed by a sense of
common peril, will enable the hybrid Yugoslav system to survive “essentially intact.”
The Soviet Union is seen as the most menacing threat, a view accentuated by the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Suspicions of Western Europe have
abated, and Yugoslav political and cultural views are increasingly shaped by Western
concepts.

Success in carving out international stature is providing a spur to national pride and
cohesion. Relations with the United States have improved markedly. “Belgrade seems
to have reassessed the entire course of its post-1948 relations with Washington and
concluded that American sympathy and support for Yugoslav independence is
genuine—not just an artificial and inherently temporary adjunct of the United States-
Soviet relationship.” However, the appraisal is deeply hedged. “Change and disarray
will confront the Yugoslav leadership with a variety of serious problems.” Separatist

xxiv
sentiments will weaken the federation. The Yugoslav system will remain unsettled.
Beyond these “rather gloomy near certainties,” and the “somber eventualities within
Yugoslavia itself,” the future of Yugoslavia remains indistinct. The Estimate proffers
four illustrative scenarios of possible futures. The most likely is a linear projection of the
existing Yugoslav situation: a united, independent, and non-aligned Yugoslavia. Other
scenarios are more troubling. One is a contested secession, after Croatia breaks away.
A variant is total disintegration, with a state of civil war marked by fighting, whereupon
“Yugoslavia ceases to exist.” Some republics turn to the Soviet Union for help. Others
turn to the West.

Discussion of these scenarios leads to a fundamental—and prescient—judgment: in all

these alternatives, the West and the United States may have a critical role to play. This
conclusion is worth remembering in the light of the remark in 1991, attributed to then
Secretary of State James Baker, that “the United States does not have a dog in this
fight.”

An ONE Memorandum, issued on January 5, 1972, deals with the crisis in Croatia,
where students at Zagreb University had gone on strike the previous November. The
Estimate concludes that the main share of responsibility for the crisis should be
attributed to the strong liberal wing of the Croatian Communist Party (League of
Communists of Croatia), which has sought to exploit nationalistic sentiment in order to
consolidate local power and win concessions from Belgrade. Tito bore down hard on
these manifestations of “rotten liberalism.” But he also made clear that the essentials of
his decentralized system should survive. Croatian liberals in Zagreb drew
encouragement from Tito’s assertions that there cannot be a return to the past. But his
concept of a Communist Party that guides but does not lead suffered a setback. The
Estimate identifies the conundrum posed by a basic contradiction. How should one
understand a program of decentralization that continues to be run firmly from the
center?

Two themes stand out in this Assessment. One is the appearance of nationalism, not
as a force in support of Yugoslav national unity, but of the opposite, namely separatism
on the part of the Yugoslav republics. The second theme is put as a key question.
“Can a country such as Yugoslavia—poor, backward and Balkan—long exist as a
pluralistic society within a single state?” The Memorandum’s answer: “[W]e see no
need, as yet, to revise our previous estimates that the chances are slightly better than
even that Yugoslavia will survive Tito’s death as a single state.”

An ONE Memorandum, dated 27 September, 1972, turns to the problem of Croatian

separatists. It notes official Yugoslav concern about a spate of terrorist incidents, in
Yugoslavia and abroad, such as the assassination of the Yugoslav ambassador to
Sweden. The discussion introduces two new elements. One is the fact that, at the time
of writing, there may now be a million Yugoslav “semi-émigrés” working abroad. The
second is that exact numbers are non-existent. Moreover, no one in Belgrade has an
accurate track of the activities of Yugoslavs abroad.

xxv
An ONE Memorandum, dated November 17, 1972, asked whether Yugoslavia can
somehow strike a balance between the need for central authority and the urge for
pluralistic achievement? And can Tito, in his waning years, achieve this balance?

The watershed crisis in Croatia has ended the era of federal optimism. Tito had to use
his power and had to purge many officials, in Croatia and elsewhere. The
Memorandum notes that “Tito would remind his critics that to allow the nationalists of
Croatia and Serbia to rule without restraint from the center would simply make certain
that there would ultimately be no Yugoslavia in which the democratic process could
unfold.”

The Memorandum also returns to the issue of nationalism. Nationalism is a force for
unity against perceived outside threats. As such, it represents an alternative source of
spiritual strength. “But…there are other kinds of nationalism—Croatian, Serbian,
Macedonian, etc.—which flourish in Yugoslavia, and they are directed essentially
against one another and against Belgrade” (emphasis supplied).

NIE15-73, issued July 5, 1973, examines the prospects for Yugoslavia after Tito. Stane
Dolanc, a Slovene, has emerged as Tito’s heir apparent. Elemental fear of a hostile
outside is keeping Yugoslavia together, despite a decline in federal power to help
appease certain nationalist appetites. But Tito has misjudged the balance; the
demonstrations in Zagreb took authorities by surprise. Tito, according to the Estimate,
is not about to give up “the fundamentals of [his] course: “‘pluralistic’ socialism,
international non-alignment, and national sovereignty.” “But,” the Estimate continues,
“he is now convinced that only a strong, invigorated party can carry on in his absence.
The Estimate concludes that, while Moscow would welcome a return of Yugoslavia to
the Communist bloc fold, it is likely to turn a generally amiable face to post-Tito
Yugoslavia.

NIE 15-79, dated 25 September, 1979, also addresses the prospects for post-Tito
Yugoslavia. It registers a lower confidence score than NIE 15-73 about Yugoslavia’s
sustainability. While Tito’s passing will not, during the next six months, pose a threat to
the integrity or independence of the Yugoslav state, the successor regime will face
mounting domestic and foreign challenges. The variables will be the nature of the
Soviet reaction, economic ‘stagflation,’ and the efficacy of Western assistance. The
judgment of the Estimate is that “the odds remain at least marginally in favor of
Yugoslavia’s continuing as an integral, independent state.” “Internal instability and
vulnerability to external pressures during a prolonged transition period, however, could
make even an integral Yugoslavia a recurring source of international tension.”

Though Tito can claim personal credit for Yugoslavia’s international prestige
disproportionate to its size, he is leaving inadequate and ineffective decisionmaking
structures and procedures to deal with the challenges ahead. These include growing
economic strains and sharper conflicts of interests among the constituent parts of
Yugoslavia. Moscow is likely to move cautiously: “under certain circumstances
Moscow would see advantages in a stable, viable Yugoslavia.” As to the West, the

xxvi
Estimate is clear about the limits of its influence: “No amount or kind of Western
support can stop Tito’s successors from engaging in a self-destructive succession
struggle or prevent Yugoslavia’s constituent nationalities from embarking on a civil war,
if they are determined to do so. However, skillfully timed and carefully designed and
orchestrated Western support could make a very large difference.”

A Memorandum to Holders of NIE 15-79, issued on February 1, 1980, revisits the

judgments above in the light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It concludes that
these principal judgments remain valid. The Afghanistan analogy has only limited
application to Yugoslavia.

1983-1990: Post-Tito Disintegration and Collapse

With Tito gone and transitional structures failing, the analytical focus during this period
is on the factors that are tearing Yugoslavia apart. The key question is whether it can
hold together as a federal state. NIE 15-90 addresses this question with classic
analytical rigor and honesty.

SNIE 15-83, issued on January 31, 1983, is entitled Yugoslavia: An Approaching

Crisis? It is a dense and comprehensive analysis. Two problems in particular face the
new leadership: economic slowdown and ethnic strains. The national leadership,
hostage to the need for elusive consensus, is weak. The regime will try and muddle
through. The West can help deal with financial problems; Moscow is unlikely to view
this as a challenge it must counter, but might become more deeply involved to advance
its interests. A troubled Yugoslavia will be a source of great power rivalry. A major
crisis is likely to be gradual, and unlikely within the next year. But Yugoslavia will be on
its own: Overcoming the crisis will depend on Yugoslavia’s own leadership.

NIE 15-90, issued on October 18, 1990, brings matters to a head, declaring:

Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within a year, and

will probably dissolve within two. Economic reform will not stave off
the breakup. Serbia will block Slovene and Croat attempts to form an
all-Yugoslav confederation. There will be a protracted armed uprising
by Albanians in Kosovo. A full-scale, interrepublic war is unlikely, but
serious intercommunal conflict will accompany the breakup and will
continue afterward. The violence will be intractable and bitter. There
is little the United States and its European allies can do to preserve
Yugoslav unity. Yugoslavs will see such efforts as contradictory to
advocacy of democracy and self-determination.

After 42 years, during which the judgment of the Intelligence Community had been that
Yugoslavia would remain a unitary state, the judgment this time is that it will not.
Moreover, this judgment is not hedged. It is unanimous.

xxvii
The arguments that buttress the conclusions of NIE 15-90 start with internal factors,
before briefly considering outside influences. In retrospect, these influences probably
had more effect than they were credited with in the Estimate, both within Yugoslavia, as
well as in the Washington policy community.

By the time the Estimate was being prepared for final approval, Europe was in the midst
of a profound political transformation. The Soviet empire was crumbling; its fissures
would lead to its dissolution in a little more than a year. Germany had unified. The
Communist regimes in Eastern European countries were being replaced. There was a
sense all over Eastern Europe of breaking bondage and of new political freedom.
Inside Yugoslavia, this sense was present as well, albeit distributed unevenly. It was
strongest in Slovenia and Croatia.

Moreover, the threat of Soviet intervention, for so many years the immanent inhibitor of
Yugoslav freedom of action, was perceived to be absent, once and for all. “The Soviet
Union will have only an indirect influence…on the outcome in Yugoslavia,” NIE 15-90
observes. This left the people of Yugoslavia to address their problems among
themselves.

Finally, Western influence was weak. The West was busy with its own agenda:
Germany with its unification, the rest of Western Europe with accommodating itself to a
united Germany. The Washington policy community was preoccupied with the
unraveling of the Soviet Union. Also, it was preparing for Desert Storm, the campaign
to liberate Kuwait.

Furthermore, the West lacked a common view of events ahead in Yugoslavia. Nor was
there anything like a common view how to meet future contingencies. An aversion to
instability in the Balkans was mixed with a sense of the body politic—if not the
governments—on both sides of the Atlantic that people in Eastern Europe and the
Balkans were entitled to self-determination. The chant of the marchers in Leipzig, who
peaceably called out “We are the people,” found resonance. But, as subsequent events
showed, there was, within the EU, incipient and deep disagreement about what was
happening in Yugoslavia and what to do about it. Within the United States, there were
also deep divisions of opinion and governmental indecisiveness. This lasted until the
Clinton administration set in motion the events leading to the US-brokered Dayton
Accords in 1995.

Within Yugoslavia, the sense that Serbia, under Milosevic, would block any outcome
other than one that would ensure Serb domination, ensured that the notion of a looser
Federation never took root. (The Estimate notes, interestingly, that Milosevic “will be
reelected in December 1990, in a victory as illegitimate as the previous year’s.”) The
only way out for Slovenia and Croatia was separation. The elements that had held
Yugoslavia together had lost strength. Tito was dead. The Party was weak and
disorganized. The Army was no longer an effective guarantor of unity, as its dismal
performance in the skirmish with Slovenian forces in the spring of 1991 confirmed.

xxviii
Religion—an aspect not given much attention in the Estimates—was another divisive
element. Serb Orthodox clergy played a particularly divisive role.

In sum, the Intelligence Community had plenty of material in the fall of 1990 on which to
base its conclusions. The Washington policy world and Embassy Belgrade shared an
awareness of what might happen—but there was no agreement on what to do about it.
The Intelligence Community used NIE 15-90 to make specific judgment calls, with
timelines. The policy world hesitated. NIE 15-90 did find resonance at the working level
of the Department of State’s European Bureau. At the policy level, however, it was
characterized as overblown and greeted with disdain. This unfavorable reaction should
not cause surprise. The message was unwelcome because it spelled trouble ahead for
an administration not ready to become involved in the Balkans. Indeed, this would not
happen in a decisive way until 1995.

The National Defense University Case Study (Appendix B) describes how NIE 15-90
took shape. It poses the issue of the effect of estimative intelligence on the policy
world. Estimative materials compete with many other influences on policymakers. But
they can, on occasion, make a decisive contribution. An experienced colleague once
told me that the problem with the conclusions of NIE 15-90 was that they were not
actionable, i.e. that policymakers could do nothing with them. Strictly speaking, this
comment is correct. Indeed, NIE 15-90 and earlier Estimates expressed the judgment
that there was little the United States and its European allies could do to preserve
Yugoslav unity. But the implication of a breakup inevitably posed the question how to
accommodate the resulting pieces into the European political mosaic. NIE 15-90 did
not address that issue. Nor did it speculate on how European states would react to a
breakup of Yugoslavia. To do so would have been a stretch. As it was, the Estimate
contained for policymakers a heavy dose of virtually indigestible judgments.

Concluding Observations

Now that Yugoslavia has broken apart, the new estimative and policy challenge will be
to address, as NIE 15-90 could not, how to fit the resulting new states into European
and transatlantic structures. This will be a challenge principally for European Union
(EU). However, the issue will inevitably also command US attention. The task of
estimative intelligence on the southwest Balkans will not be finished soon.

As long as the Balkans are unstable, Europe remains unstable. It is not possible now—
if it ever was—to consider those Balkan countries that were part of the Ottoman Empire
as outside Europe. While the EU is gingerly seeking its way toward further
enlargement, all the countries formerly part of Yugoslavia are members or potential
members. The EU cannot escape the challenge of devising a way to fit them into its
structures and processes. An unstable Balkans will negatively affect prospects for
effective EU cooperation with the US on global issues of common interest.

The issues will be essentially the same that characterized Yugoslavia during its
existence: religious, ethnic and linguistic diversity; historical distrust and animosities; a

xxix
legacy of pervasive cruelty and violence; nationalism; and uneven economic
development. These issues are elements of the larger problem in the Balkans, the
competition between the need for cohesion and the legacy of separatism.

Today, the United States continues to play a role in sorting out the future of the former
Yugoslav republics. Balkan stability remains an American interest, as do human rights
for the people of the region, democracy, and economic progress. American
involvement expanded even as Yugoslavia was breaking apart. With the negotiation of
the Dayton Accords, a NATO force, with a substantial US military component, provided
security while an international civilian presence sought to build an independent multi-
ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the late 1990s, NATO undertook military action to
curtail Serbia’s ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. United States forces took the lead role of
this campaign, and, together with the EU and other partners, the US is seeking
resolution of the final status for Kosovo.

Beyond the Balkans, the world today confronts Washington with a host of issues that
bedevil global efforts at conflict prevention, crisis management, and nation building.
The American experience in Yugoslavia through the period covered by these estimates
shows that Yugoslavia incorporated all of these issues—many of which are in play in
crises around the world today. Thus, today’s analysts face the same challenge as
analysts did 50 years ago—how to distinguish between capabilities and intent, clearly
state the implications of change for US interests, and understand the evolutionary
nature of estimating events and power relationships that are constantly unfolding and
changing.

xxx
 ORE 49-48

The Trend of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations

18 November 1948
The Trend of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, 18 November 1948

3
The Trend of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, 18 November 1948

(Continued...)

4
The Trend of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, 18 November 1948

(Continued...)

5
The Trend of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, 18 November 1948

(Continued...)

6
The Trend of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, 18 November 1948

(Continued...)

7
The Trend of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, 18 November 1948

(Continued...)

8
The Trend of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, 18 November 1948

(Continued...)

9
The Trend of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, 18 November 1948

10
 ORE 16-49

The Yugoslav Dilemma

10 February 1949
The Yugoslav Dilemma, 10 February 1949

13
The Yugoslav Dilemma, 10 February 1949

(Continued...)

14
The Yugoslav Dilemma, 10 February 1949

(Continued...)

15
The Yugoslav Dilemma, 10 February 1949

(Continued...)

16
The Yugoslav Dilemma, 10 February 1949

17
 ORE 44-49

Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s

Ability To Resist Soviet Pressure
During 1949

20 June 1949
Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability To Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949, 20 June 1949

21
Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability To Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949, 20 June 1949

(Continued...)

22
Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability To Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949, 20 June 1949

(Continued...)

23
Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability To Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949, 20 June 1949

(Continued...)

24
Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability To Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949, 20 June 1949

(Continued...)

25
Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability To Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949, 20 June 1949

(Continued...)

26
Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability To Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949, 20 June 1949

(Continued...)

27
Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability To Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949, 20 June 1949

(Continued...)

28
Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability To Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949, 20 June 1949

(Continued...)

29
Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability To Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949, 20 June 1949

(Continued...)

30
Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability To Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949, 20 June 1949

(Continued...)

31
Estimate of the Yugoslav Regime’s Ability To Resist Soviet Pressure During 1949, 20 June 1949

32
 ORE 8-50

Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav
Relations (1950)

11 May 1950
Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations (1950), 11 May 1950

35
Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations (1950), 11 May 1950

(Continued...)

36
Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations (1950), 11 May 1950

(Continued...)

37
Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations (1950), 11 May 1950

(Continued...)

38
Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations (1950), 11 May 1950

(Continued...)

39
Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations (1950), 11 May 1950

(Continued...)

40
Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations (1950), 11 May 1950

(Continued...)

41
Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations (1950), 11 May 1950

(Continued...)

42
Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations (1950), 11 May 1950

(Continued...)

43
Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations (1950), 11 May 1950

(Continued...)

44
Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations (1950), 11 May 1950

(Continued...)

45
Evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Relations (1950), 11 May 1950

46
 ORE 20-50

Economic Situation in Yugoslavia

1 September 1950
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

49
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

50
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

51
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

52
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

53
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

54
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

55
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

56
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

57
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

58
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

59
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

60
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

61
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

62
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

63
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

64
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

65
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

66
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

67
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

68
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

69
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

70
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

71
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

72
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

73
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

(Continued...)

74
Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, 1 September 1950

75
 NIE-7

The Current Situation in Yugoslavia

21 November 1950
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

79
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

80
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

81
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

82
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

83
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

84
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

85
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

86
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

87
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

88
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

89
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

90
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

91
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

92
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

93
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

94
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

95
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

(Continued...)

96
The Current Situation in Yugoslavia, 21 November 1950

97
 NIE-29

Probability of an Invasion of
Yugoslavia in 1951

20 March 1951
Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951, 20 March 1951

101
Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951, 20 March 1951

(Continued...)

102
Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951, 20 March 1951

(Continued...)

103
Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951, 20 March 1951

(Continued...)

104
Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951, 20 March 1951

(Continued...)

105
Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951, 20 March 1951

(Continued...)

106
Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951, 20 March 1951

(Continued...)

107
Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951, 20 March 1951

(Continued...)

108
Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951, 20 March 1951

(Continued...)

109
Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951, 20 March 1951

(Continued...)

110
Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951, 20 March 1951

111
 NIE-29/1

Review of the Conclusions of NIE-29,

“Probability of an Invasion
of Yugoslavia in 1951”

4 May 1951
Review of the Conclusions of NIE-29, "Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951", 4 May 1951

115
Review of the Conclusions of NIE-29, "Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951", 4 May 1951

(Continued...)

116
Review of the Conclusions of NIE-29, "Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951", 4 May 1951

(Continued...)

117
Review of the Conclusions of NIE-29, "Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951", 4 May 1951

(Continued...)

118
Review of the Conclusions of NIE-29, "Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951", 4 May 1951

(Continued...)

119
Review of the Conclusions of NIE-29, "Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in 1951", 4 May 1951

120
 NIE-29/2

Probable Developments in Yugoslavia

and the Likelihood of Attack Upon
Yugoslavia, Through 1952

4 January 1952
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack Upon Yugoslavia, Through 1952,
4 January 1952

123
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack Upon Yugoslavia, Through 1952,
4 January 1952
(Continued...)

124
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack Upon Yugoslavia, Through 1952,
4 January 1952
(Continued...)

125
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack Upon Yugoslavia, Through 1952,
4 January 1952
(Continued...)

126
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack Upon Yugoslavia, Through 1952,
4 January 1952
(Continued...)

127
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack Upon Yugoslavia, Through 1952,
4 January 1952
(Continued...)

128
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack Upon Yugoslavia, Through 1952,
4 January 1952
(Continued...)

129
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack Upon Yugoslavia, Through 1952,
4 January 1952
(Continued...)

130
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack Upon Yugoslavia, Through 1952,
4 January 1952
(Continued...)

131
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia and the Likelihood of Attack Upon Yugoslavia, Through 1952,
4 January 1952

132
 NIE-42/1

Yugoslav Intentions Toward Albania

20 October 1952
Yugoslav Intentions Toward Albania, 20 October 1952

135
Yugoslav Intentions Toward Albania, 20 October 1952

(Continued...)

136
Yugoslav Intentions Toward Albania, 20 October 1952

(Continued...)

137
Yugoslav Intentions Toward Albania, 20 October 1952

138
 NIE-93

Probable Developments in Yugoslavia

26 June 1953
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia, 26 June 1953

141
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia, 26 June 1953

(Continued...)

142
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia, 26 June 1953

(Continued...)

143
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia, 26 June 1953

(Continued...)

144
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia, 26 June 1953

(Continued...)

145
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia, 26 June 1953

(Continued...)

146
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia, 26 June 1953

(Continued...)

147
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia, 26 June 1953

(Continued...)

148
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia, 26 June 1953

(Continued...)

149
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia, 26 June 1953

(Continued...)

150
Probable Developments in Yugoslavia, 26 June 1953

151
 Memo to DCI

Yugoslav Reaction to the US-UK

Decision on Trieste

13 October 1953
Yugoslav Reaction to the US-UK Decision on Trieste, 13 October 1953

155
Yugoslav Reaction to the US-UK Decision on Trieste, 13 October 1953

(Continued...)

156
Yugoslav Reaction to the US-UK Decision on Trieste, 13 October 1953

157
 NIE 31-55

Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation

23 February 1955
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

161
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

(Continued...)

162
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

(Continued...)

163
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

(Continued...)

164
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

(Continued...)

165
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

(Continued...)

166
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

(Continued...)

167
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

(Continued...)

168
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

(Continued...)

169
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

(Continued...)

170
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

(Continued...)

171
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

(Continued...)

172
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

(Continued...)

173
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

(Continued...)

174
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

(Continued...)

175
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 23 February 1955

176
 NIE 31/1-55

Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation

19 May 1955
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

179
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

180
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

181
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

182
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

183
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

184
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

185
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

186
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

187
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

188
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

189
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

190
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

191
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

192
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

193
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

194
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

(Continued...)

195
Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation, 19 May 1955

196
 NIE 31-2-55

Yugoslavia’s International Position

7 September 1955
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 7 September 1955

199
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 7 September 1955

(Continued...)

200
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 7 September 1955

(Continued...)

201
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 7 September 1955

(Continued...)

202
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 7 September 1955

(Continued...)

203
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 7 September 1955

(Continued...)

204
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 7 September 1955

(Continued...)

205
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 7 September 1955

(Continued...)

206
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 7 September 1955

(Continued...)

207
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 7 September 1955

(Continued...)

208
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 7 September 1955

(Continued...)

209
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 7 September 1955

(Continued...)

210
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 7 September 1955

(Continued...)

211
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 7 September 1955

212
 NIE 31-56

Yugoslavia’s International Position

24 July 1956
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 24 July 1956

215
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 24 July 1956

(Continued...)

216
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 24 July 1956

(Continued...)

217
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 24 July 1956

(Continued...)

218
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 24 July 1956

(Continued...)

219
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 24 July 1956

(Continued...)

220
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 24 July 1956

(Continued...)

221
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 24 July 1956

222
 NIE 31-57

Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects

11 June 1957
Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957

225
Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957

(Continued...)

226
Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957

(Continued...)

227
Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957

(Continued...)

228
Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957

(Continued...)

229
Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957

(Continued...)

230
Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957

(Continued...)

231
Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957

(Continued...)

232
Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957

(Continued...)

233
Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957

(Continued...)

234
Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957

(Continued...)

235
Yugoslavia’s Policies and Prospects, 11 June 1957

236
 SNIE 31/1-57

Yugoslavia’s International Position

19 November 1957
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 19 November 1957

239
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 19 November 1957

(Continued...)

240
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 19 November 1957

(Continued...)

241
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 19 November 1957

(Continued...)

242
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 19 November 1957

(Continued...)

243
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 19 November 1957

(Continued...)

244
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 19 November 1957

(Continued...)

245
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 19 November 1957

(Continued...)

246
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 19 November 1957

(Continued...)

247
Yugoslavia’s International Position, 19 November 1957

248
 NIE 15-61

Outlook For Yugoslavia

23 May 1961
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

251
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

(Continued...)

252
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

(Continued...)

253
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

(Continued...)

254
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

(Continued...)

255
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

(Continued...)

256
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

(Continued...)

257
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

(Continued...)

258
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

(Continued...)

259
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

(Continued...)

260
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

(Continued...)

261
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

(Continued...)

262
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

(Continued...)

263
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

(Continued...)

264
Outlook For Yugoslavia, 23 May 1961

265
 NIE 10-61

Authority and Control in the

Communist Movement

8 August 1961
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

269
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

270
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

271
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

272
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

273
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

274
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

275
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

276
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

277
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

278
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

279
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

280
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

281
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

282
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

283
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

284
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

285
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

(Continued...)

286
Authority and Control in the Communist Movement, 8 August 1961

287
 Memo for the Director

Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc

18 July 1963
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, 18 July 1963

291
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, 18 July 1963

(Continued...)

292
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, 18 July 1963

(Continued...)

293
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, 18 July 1963

(Continued...)

294
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, 18 July 1963

(Continued...)

295
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, 18 July 1963

(Continued...)

296
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, 18 July 1963

(Continued...)

297
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, 18 July 1963

(Continued...)

298
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, 18 July 1963

(Continued...)

299
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, 18 July 1963

300
 NIE 15-67

The Yugoslav Experiment

13 April 1967
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

303
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

(Continued...)

304
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

(Continued...)

305
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

(Continued...)

306
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

(Continued...)

307
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

(Continued...)

308
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

(Continued...)

309
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

(Continued...)

310
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

(Continued...)

311
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

(Continued...)

312
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

(Continued...)

313
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

(Continued...)

314
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

(Continued...)

315
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

(Continued...)

316
The Yugoslav Experiment, 13 April 1967

317
 Memo

The Yugoslav Succession Problem

10 March 1969
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

321
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

322
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

323
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

324
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

325
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

326
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

327
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

328
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

329
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

330
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

331
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

332
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

333
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

334
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

335
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

336
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

337
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

338
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

339
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

340
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

341
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

342
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

343
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

344
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

345
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

346
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

(Continued...)

347
The Yugoslav Succession Problem, 10 March 1969

348
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal
(In Response to NSSM 129)

27 July 1971
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

351
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

352
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

353
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

354
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

355
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

356
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

357
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

358
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

359
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

360
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

361
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

362
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

363
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

364
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

365
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

366
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

367
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

368
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

369
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

370
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

371
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

372
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

373
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

374
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

375
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

376
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

377
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

378
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

379
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

380
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

381
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

382
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

383
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

384
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

385
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

386
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

387
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

388
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

389
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

390
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

391
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

392
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

393
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

394
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

395
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

396
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

397
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

398
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

399
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

400
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

401
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

402
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

403
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

404
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

405
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

406
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

407
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

408
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

409
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

410
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

411
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

412
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

413
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

414
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

415
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

416
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

417
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

418
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

419
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

420
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

421
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

422
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

423
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

424
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

425
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

426
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

427
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

428
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

429
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

430
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

431
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

432
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

433
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

434
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

435
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

436
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

437
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

438
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

439
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

440
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

441
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

(Continued...)

442
Yugoslavia: An Intelligence Appraisal (In Response to NSSM 129), 27 July 1971

443
 Memo

The Crisis in Croatia

5 January 1972
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

447
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

448
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

449
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

450
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

451
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

452
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

453
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

454
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

455
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

456
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

457
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

458
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

459
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

460
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

461
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

462
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

(Continued...)

463
The Crisis in Croatia, 5 January 1972

464
 Memo

Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the

Croatian Separatist Problem

27 September 1972
Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem, 27 September 1972

467
Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem, 27 September 1972

(Continued...)

468
Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem, 27 September 1972

(Continued...)

469
Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem, 27 September 1972

(Continued...)

470
Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem, 27 September 1972

(Continued...)

471
Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem, 27 September 1972

(Continued...)

472
Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem, 27 September 1972

(Continued...)

473
Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem, 27 September 1972

(Continued...)

474
Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem, 27 September 1972

(Continued...)

475
Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem, 27 September 1972

(Continued...)

476
Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem, 27 September 1972

(Continued...)

477
Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem, 27 September 1972

(Continued...)

478
Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem, 27 September 1972

(Continued...)

479
Yugoslavia-The Ustashi and the Croatian Separatist Problem, 27 September 1972

480
 Memo

Tito’s Time of Troubles

17 November 1972
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

483
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

484
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

485
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

486
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

487
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

488
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

489
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

490
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

491
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

492
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

493
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

494
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

495
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

496
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

497
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

498
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

499
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

500
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

501
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

502
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

(Continued...)

503
Tito’s Time of Troubles, 17 November 1972

504
 NIE 15-73

Yugoslavia After Tito

5 July 1973
Yugoslavia After Tito, 5 July 1973

507
Yugoslavia After Tito, 5 July 1973

(Continued...)

508
Yugoslavia After Tito, 5 July 1973

(Continued...)

509
Yugoslavia After Tito, 5 July 1973

(Continued...)

510
Yugoslavia After Tito, 5 July 1973

(Continued...)

511
Yugoslavia After Tito, 5 July 1973

(Continued...)

512
Yugoslavia After Tito, 5 July 1973

(Continued...)

513
Yugoslavia After Tito, 5 July 1973

(Continued...)

514
Yugoslavia After Tito, 5 July 1973

(Continued...)

515
Yugoslavia After Tito, 5 July 1973

(Continued...)

516
Yugoslavia After Tito, 5 July 1973

(Continued...)

517
Yugoslavia After Tito, 5 July 1973

(Continued...)

518
Yugoslavia After Tito, 5 July 1973

(Continued...)

519
Yugoslavia After Tito, 5 July 1973

520
 IIM 76-040C

The Yugoslav Armed Forces

1 October 1976
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

523
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

524
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

525
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

526
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

527
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

528
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

529
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

530
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

531
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

532
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

533
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

534
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

535
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

536
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

537
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

538
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

539
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

540
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

541
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

542
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

543
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

544
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

545
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

546
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

547
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

548
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

549
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

550
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

551
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

552
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

553
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

554
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

555
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

556
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

557
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

558
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

559
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

(Continued...)

560
The Yugoslav Armed Forces, 1 October 1976

561
 NIE 15-79

Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia

Vol. I-The Estimate

25 September 1979
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. I-The Estimate, 25 September 1979

565
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. I-The Estimate, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

566
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. I-The Estimate, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

567
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. I-The Estimate, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

568
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. I-The Estimate, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

569
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. I-The Estimate, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

570
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. I-The Estimate, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

571
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. I-The Estimate, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

572
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. I-The Estimate, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

573
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. I-The Estimate, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

574
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. I-The Estimate, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

575
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. I-The Estimate, 25 September 1979

576
 NIE 15-79

Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia

Vol. II-The Annexes

25 September 1979
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

579
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

580
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

581
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

582
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

583
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

584
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

585
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

586
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

587
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

588
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

589
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

590
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

591
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

592
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

593
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

594
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

595
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

596
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

597
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

598
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

599
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

600
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

601
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

602
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

603
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

604
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

605
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

606
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

607
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

608
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

609
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

610
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

611
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

612
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

613
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

614
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

(Continued...)

615
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia Vol. II-The Annexes, 25 September 1979

616
 M/H NIE 15-79

Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia

1 February 1980
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia, 1 February 1980

619
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia, 1 February 1980

(Continued...)

620
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia, 1 February 1980

(Continued...)

621
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia, 1 February 1980

(Continued...)

622
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia, 1 February 1980

(Continued...)

623
Prospects for Post-Tito Yugoslavia, 1 February 1980

624
 SNIE 15-83

Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?

31 January 1983
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

627
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

628
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

629
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

630
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

631
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

632
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

633
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

634
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

635
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

636
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

637
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

638
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

639
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

640
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

641
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

642
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

643
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

644
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

645
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

646
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

647
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

648
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

(Continued...)

649
Yugoslavia: An Approaching Crisis?, 31 January 1983

650
 NIE 15-90

Yugoslavia Transformed

18 October 1990
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

653
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

654
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

655
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

656
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

657
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

658
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

659
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

660
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

661
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

662
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

663
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

664
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

665
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

666
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

667
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

668
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

669
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

670
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

671
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

672
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

(Continued...)

673
Yugoslavia Transformed, 18 October 1990

674
 Appendix A

Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an

Intelligence Failure
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

677
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

678
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

679
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

680
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

681
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

682
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

683
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

684
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

685
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

686
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

687
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

688
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

689
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

690
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

691
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

692
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

(Continued...)

693
Appendix A, Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, August 2006

694
 Appendix B

A National Intelligence Estimate on

Yugoslavia
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

697
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

698
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

699
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

700
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

701
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

702
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

703
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

704
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

705
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

706
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

707
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

708
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

709
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

710
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

711
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

712
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

713
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

714
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

(Continued...)

715
Appendix B, A National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia, August 2006

716