Brazil On The International Stage

Brazil on the International Stage
David Mares, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.013.849
Published online: 28 February 2020
Summary
Four elements of Brazil’s identity—its large size, its self-perception as part of the Western
world, its vulnerability to European intervention and to the changing world economy, and
its success in defending itself through diplomacy—have all contributed to shaping its
aspirations in the international domain. Participation in the councils of the great powers
became a means by which Brazilian diplomats could pursue a world order that was more
favorable to its interests.
But even though domestic aspirations and foreign perceptions have held out the prospect
for Brazil becoming a major power, it has lacked the capabilities—particularly on the
military and economic dimensions—to pursue a traditional path to greatness. Militarily,
Brazil has been only episodically consequential, and less so as we approach the present.
Given South America’s remoteness from the geopolitical centers of global conflict, Brazil
has faced little pressure to improve its modest security capabilities beyond what was
necessary to fend off its smaller neighbors. Brazil’s efforts to advance through
partnerships with other states have been hobbled by a historical reluctance to pool its
sovereignty. In addition, turbulent domestic politics or major economic crises have
periodically undermined Brazil’s credibility and capabilities, interrupting its rise.
How has Brazil sought to overcome the gap between its ambitions and its capabilities?
Brazil was a prominent exponent of the practice of ‘soft power’. It positioned itself
internationally as a proponent of equality among nations, international law, and the
peaceful resolution of conflicts. To this, Brazil has added a formidable cultural output and
most recently, democracy, prosperity and social inclusion. This is an attractive package,
particularly for other developing countries who want to find a similar status. This chapter
follows Brazil’s attempts in the 20th century and up through President Dilma Rousseff to
parlay this approach into a say in shaping the rules governing the international order.
Keywords: Brazil, BRICS, UN Security Council, soft power, Lula
Influence Projection
Brazil in the 20th century is the story of a large country attempting to become a great power.
Traditionally, influence in international politics is achieved by Great Powers through their
“hard power”—the ability to punish opponents through military force or economic sanctions
and competition. Brazil has emphasized “soft power” in its international relations, without
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denying the need for a minimal level of hard power. “Soft power” is the ability to attract
international actors to one’s own position on an issue and is based on the success of a
country’s economic, social, cultural and political development. International actors look to a
nation’s leadership because they seek to emulate its successes and believe in its values.
Brazil’s soft power is based on its international goals and national strengths. Brazil wants
international rules and norms that tread lightly on the sovereignty of states—equality among
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nations, international law, and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This is an attractive
agenda, particularly for other developing countries that fear and resent Great Power
unilateralism. Brazil also offers respected cultural output and often, democracy, prosperity,
and social inclusion as models.
Diplomatic, economic, and military elites all expressed ambitions for Brazil to be considered a
great power, even if they advocated different strategies to achieve this status. Moments of
upheaval in the international order provided opportunities to make the case for major power
status. Yet Brazil’s capabilities consistently fell short along both the hard and soft power
dimensions during the 20th century. It was not able to translate its potential as a large,
resource-endowed, populous country into the kind of hard power—economic or military—that
would lead major powers to reckon with Brazil as one of their own. Brazil also lacked a
compelling and attractive narrative that would attract less developed states to its lead.
During the first part of the 20th century, Brazil ambivalently followed the lead of the United
States in international relations. This was not enough to endear Brazil to the US leadership in
the form of an effective special relationship, nor was it sufficient to build a relationship
between Brazil and the Spanish-speaking republics that were concerned over US intervention
in the Americas. During the 1960s and 1970s, Brazil presented a compelling economic model,
but its human rights violations frustrated its ability to project soft power vis-à-vis Western
democracies. In addition, turbulent domestic politics and major economic crises have
periodically undermined Brazil’s credibility and capabilities and interrupted its rise.
Brazil’s International Presence
Joaquim Nabuco, Brazil’s first ambassador to the United States (1905–1910) famously noted:
“Brazil has always been conscious of its size, and it has been governed by a prophetic sense
3
with regard to its future.” Set apart from the rest of the hemisphere by culture, language,
and history, Brazil has not limited itself to regional leadership aspirations. It has also been
viewed by its neighbors as a potential great power and, at times, a threat.
Self-interest has also driven the country’s desire to participate in the fora where the rules and
norms that shape international interactions are developed. Brazil has historically been
conscious of its vulnerability to outside pressure, which has shaped its desire for autonomy
4
within the international system. Brazil’s rubber boom of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries was cut short by new production undertaken by European colonial empires in Asia
5
and Africa. Brazil’s efforts to sustain its coffee boom by withholding stocks from the
international market in the early 20th century (coffee accounted for approximately half of
export earnings) were opposed by the US government and international firms that made
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windfall profits. During the 20th century, Brazil was vulnerable to shifts in the terms of trade
for its commodity exports and became all too familiar with the conditionality imposed by
foreign financial institutions during economic crises.
It is useful to classify three active eras in Brazil’s international presence in the 20th century to
the early 21st century (this article ends in 2016 when President Dilma Rousseff was
impeached). In the first era, roughly 1899 to 1927, Brazil (the Old Republic, 1889–1930) took
its place among the important secondary powers in the construction of a new international
system seeking to construct treaties, laws, and norms to foster peaceful relations. Brazil’s
most famous foreign minister, Baron Rio Branco (1902–1912), made building a solid
relationship with the United States a cornerstone of his foreign policy, but this orientation had
7
previously guided Brazilian diplomacy and would survive into the late 1960s. A second era
(1930–1948) was heavily influenced by events leading up to World War II, the war itself, and
the postwar settlement. International politics in these first two eras coalesced economic,
military, and diplomatic domains into a broad security focus, but the Cold War and the
development of a Liberal International Order after 1948 disaggregated the multiple arenas for
international affairs. Trade, finance, and development issues had their own dynamics even
though security issues penetrated these arenas to varying degrees at specific points in time.
After World War II, Brazil’s international presence can be more fruitfully analyzed through its
activities in three specific arenas: international security, international economics (comprising
trade, finance and development), and climate and environmental realms.
The Republic of Brazil on the World Stage, 1899–1927
Brazil and Mexico were the only two Latin American nations invited to the first international
peace conference at The Hague in 1899. Although this was a prestigious recognition of
Brazil’s international standing by the Great Powers, Brazil did not attend because it felt that
its economic and domestic political situations were too weak to justify attendance and
8
because the issues did not directly affect the country. By the time of the second Hague
conference in 1907, Brazil’s domestic situation had improved sufficiently that it felt that it
would be respected at the conference; in addition, all Latin American countries had been
invited and only two did not attend. One issue in particular attracted a great deal of Latin
American interest, although it ranked low on the conference’s main agenda. The 1906 Third
Pan American Conference had discussed a common stance against the use of armed force to
collect contract debts of foreign nationals, the so-called Drago Doctrine, in preparation for the
9
upcoming Second International Conference at The Hague in 1907. Brazil did not support this
position, fearing it would discourage investment. Instead, Ruy Barbosa, leader of the Brazilian
delegation, made a strong argument popular with the smaller states for the principle of the
legal equality of nations. Brazil (along with Argentina), nevertheless, sought the special status
10
of an honorary presidency at the conference.
In the early 1900s Brazil bolstered a tradition of peaceful diplomacy to settle international
11
disputes. Rio Branco secured Brazil’s contested borders with its Spanish American
neighbors through international arbitration, bilateral negotiations, and one military
occupation (in the Acre region contested by Bolivia and Brazil), peacefully acquiring
sovereignty over vast territory. Brazil rejected Spanish colonial borders, arguing for the norm
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of uti possidetis de facto against the then-norm uti possidetis de juris. Resolutions of border
disputes that focused on physical occupation and control, rather than colonial borders
12
inherited at independence, greatly favored Brazil.
Brazil did not depend solely on soft power to advance its interests. Rio Branco and many
military officers worried that Brazil was becoming weaker relative to Argentina, and that war
13
was a possibility. Strategic rivalry not only absorbed attention of the two governments but
14
influenced their relations with the Great Powers that had interests in the region. From 1906
to 1914 Brazil acquired ships, armaments, and professional training from the major European
suppliers. Among the ships were three Dreadnought battleships from Britain, including the
largest built to that day. Some of the ships were constructed with unusual draught
requirements, which Argentines interpreted as indicating an intent to use them on the Rio
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Plata, presumably against Argentina. Rio Branco brought Brazil into close diplomatic
relations with the United States, though he failed to ride its coattails to predominance in
South America.
The competition between the two South American leaders became tense enough in 1908–1910
that British diplomats in South America reported that the Rio Plata region was experiencing a
war scare. The crisis was defused by the conjunction of three factors: Brazil’s navy revolted
and used a Dreadnought against Rio de Janeiro itself, and two of the chief protagonists,
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Foreign Ministers Estanislao Zeballos and Rio Branco, faded from the scene.
War in Europe took central stage in Brazilian foreign policy in 1914 because of the important
economic and defense roles the British and Germans played in Brazil. Brazil sought neutrality
in the war, but the belligerents made it difficult and costly. Britain limited unnecessary
imports (e.g., Brazilian coffee) and embargoed trade with Germany. Brazil was a major source
of food exports to the Allies, which rendered Brazilian shipping vulnerable to German
17
submarine attack in the Atlantic. In 1917 after Germany adopted unlimited attacks on
shipping and sank more Brazilian ships, Brazil declared war.
Brazil played a marginal role in the war, given its weak military. Brazil sent a medical
detachment to the Western front, dispatched officers to serve with the French army in
preparation for organizing their own expeditionary force, and deployed a naval squadron in
18
the South Atlantic as part of the antisubmarine effort, operating under British command. As
a member of the victorious side, Brazil received a large representation at the Versailles peace
negotiations. The Allies elevated their diplomatic representations in Brazil to embassy status.
Brazil was selected to serve on the first Council of the League of Nations and it lobbied for a
19
permanent seat.
Nevertheless, Brazil found itself without influence on the key decisions about the Versailles
20
treaty and the postwar environment. When Germany signed the Locarno treaty as the
beginning of its reintegration into the European community of nations, it expected a
permanent seat on the League Council. In this context, Brazil (as well as Spain) hoped to
parlay military and economic support for the Allies during the war into a permanent seat. But
other states did not recognize Brazil as a major power, including the smaller powers on its
21
own continent. Latin American members of the League fruitlessly appealed to Brazil to
withdraw its veto of Germany’s permanent council seat. Rather than accept a compromise
offering it (along with Poland and Spain) a semipermanent seat renewable by a two-thirds
22
vote of the General Assembly every three years, Brazil resigned from the League in 1926.
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Reintegration into Great Power Politics: World War II
Like the United States, Brazil attempted to stay on the margins of the war that erupted in
Europe in 1939. Brazil evaluated relationships with the European powers according to their
potential commercial value. However, it also used diplomacy with Germany and Great Britain
to remind the Roosevelt administration of the value of Brazil to US interests and to extract
assistance, particularly on the military dimension.
The outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 sharpened the debate in Brazil over what role it should
play internationally. The British blockade of Nazi-held areas of Europe cut off Brazil from an
important market and held up the transfer of arms Brazil had recently acquired from
Germany. The Roosevelt administration pressed Brazil to allow the United States a greater
role in defending its northeastern bulge, closest to Europe and Africa. Vargas, conscious of
Brazil’s military weakness, responded by asking for increased military assistance to allow the
country to defend itself. The Roosevelt administration slowly came around to the Brazilian
23
position as US-Argentine relations worsened and the likelihood of war increased.
Brazil played a much more extensive role on the Allied side in World War II than it did in
World War I because Vargas committed both air and ground forces to the conflict. Brazil
contributed an expeditionary force consisting of an infantry division of 25,000 personnel as
well as a fighter-bomber squadron. Both operated as part of US-led military forces in Italy
between 1944 and 1945. Brazilian units progressively improved during the conflict, and
24
Brazilian forces engaged extensively in combat, suffering well over a thousand casualties.
Brazil also served as a major source of commodity exports for the Allied powers.
Seeking an Influential Role in the New World Orders, 1950s–2016
Brazil attempted to parlay its role among the Allies into a key position in the Bretton Woods
institutions of the Liberal International Economic Order. As the United Nations (UN) system
began to take shape, Brazil participated in the UN Conference on Food and Agriculture the
UN Relief and Rehabilitation Committee, and in the preparation and conduct of the 1945
meeting of the United Nations in San Francisco. Brazil also cooperated extensively with the
United States in the establishment of the Organization of American States in 1947, and it
joined the International Atomic Energy Agency.
There was a marked departure from Brazil’s traditional growth strategy based on agricultural
exports. Nationalist economists, influenced by Raul Prebisch at the UN Economic Commission
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), advocated industrialization aimed at the
domestic market and protected by high tariff walls. They also called for a larger state role in
fostering national development and autonomy and controlling the role of foreign capital in
Brazil. These policy preferences tended to coincide with a more skeptical perspective on the
25
role of the United States in the international system.
In 1958, President Juscelino Kubitschek fruitlessly proposed Operação Pan-Americana, a

regional multilateral plan featuring development and technical assistance from the United
States. Contributing to frustration among Brazilian leaders were high levels of US assistance
favoring Japan and Germany, two recent enemies, over recent allies. The United States also
Page 5 of 21
rejected Brazilian efforts to improve its military capabilities for fear of upsetting a balance of
power between Brazil and Argentina. Brazil considered US efforts at equilibration in the
26
Southern Cone galling, given Argentina’s affinity for the fascist powers during World War II.
Civilian leadership thus increasingly sought a more autonomous international position. Jânio
Quadros (1961) and João Goulart (1961–1964) deemphasized alignment with the United
States, moving away from the East-West division of the world. Quadros opened relations with
the Socialist Bloc and sent Vice President Goulart on a visit to the People’s Republic of
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China. Brazil also sought international leadership among the newly decolonized states in
Africa and Asia around the principles of decolonization, disarmament, and development, an
appealing combination for newly independent states. Brazil’s relatively greater capabilities,
wealth, and diplomatic experience were attractive to the relatively inexperienced leaders who
28
viewed the rules of the international order as inequitable.
After the 1964 military coup, General Castelo Branco (1964–1967) prioritized global
Communism as the main threat to Brazil and pursued a close alignment with the United
States. Brazil supported the US-led intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965,
contributing troops and leadership to the intervention force and engaging in secret
discussions with the Johnson administration over contributing Brazilian troops to the US war
in Vietnam. But alignment with the United States did not produce the desired influx of
29
technology, loans, and investment that Brazil’s military sought.
The dynamics driving the two countries apart reasserted themselves under the administration
of Marshal Artur da Costa e Silva (1967–1969), who represented the pro-autonomy military
hard line, and they persisted throughout the rest of the military regime (until 1985). The
military administrations after 1967 sought to improve Brazil’s position in the developing
world, much as the Quadros and Goulart governments had. Brazil attempted to develop good
relations with Portugal and Africa in the 1960s and early 1970s, but the independence
movements in Portuguese Africa complicated matters. Up until November 1973 Brazil had
supported Portuguese claims in international fora, but the global oil crisis stimulated by the
Arab oil embargo shifted Brazil’s focus to the importance of gaining access to African oil.
Brazilian diplomats, business interests and military analysts attempted to play a role as
30
mediator, but the issue of independence was initially nonnegotiable to both sides.
Brazil moved rapidly from its initial hesitancy to acknowledge African nations’ independence.
In 1974 it was the 85th country to recognize Guinea-Bissau; Brazilian communists, not official
government representatives, were invited to Mozambique’s independence ceremony in June
1975, but a mere five months later Brazil was the first to recognize Angola in November 1975.
Although the United States was irritated that Brazil established relations with Marxist
revolutionary regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, Brazil’s military
government saw an opportunity for leadership in Lusophone Africa.
Brazil’s policy of refusing to follow Washington’s lead in the East-West confrontation

continued into the 1980s, as the military governments disagreed with US policies toward the
31
Nicaraguan Revolution and El Salvador’s Marxist insurgency.
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The military regime also greatly expanded Brazil’s defense industrial base, seeking to improve
Brazil’s autonomy in the face of increasing restrictions on international arms transfers,
32
particularly from the United States. Brazil succeeded in becoming a major exporter of
inexpensive armored vehicles and light aircraft during the 1980s, particularly to conflict-
33
ridden parts of the Middle East and Africa.
Brazil was one of a handful of large states that refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) in 1968, rejecting the unequal structure of the NPT that allowed the existing
nuclear weapons states to keep their arsenals while prohibiting them to the rest of the treaty
34
signatories. Brazil’s leaders also argued that nuclear technology was a shortcut to
development and major power status in the world. In line with their desire for scientific and
technological development, Brazil rejected international inspections of their nuclear
technologies. Brazil pursued autonomous capabilities, including a covert program to develop
35
at least the option to pursue a nuclear explosive device. Brazil’s president, Marshal Artur da
Costa e Silva, stated in 1967: “We repudiate nuclear armament and are fully aware of the
serious risks that its spread could bring to mankind. Nevertheless, it is imperative that no
immediate or potential obstacles be created that might in any way present hindrance to the
36
full utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”
US sanctions on Brazil grew increasingly assertive in the late 1970s. Congressional sanctions
on human rights violators included the Brazilian military regime. US suspicion of Brazil’s
nuclear and missile programs led to growing restrictions on exports of dual-use
37
technologies. This created the perception in Brazil that the United States was at best
unreliable and at worst deliberately trying to entrap Brazil into a position of permanent
38
dependency.
Brazil signed an agreement with West Germany for the construction of two large nuclear
power plants, nuclear fuel cycle facilities, and for the transfer of nuclear technology. Despite
vigorous diplomatic pressure, the United States was unable to dissuade either Brazil or even
39
West Germany from the agreement. The Brazilian military regime viewed nuclear technology
acquisition as a development objective, a building block toward greater technological
autonomy, and a prestige project.
Despite Brazil’s emphasis on new capabilities, this did not lead to an arms race with its
neighbors, particularly with its long-standing rival Argentina. Under increasing pressure from
the Carter administration and the US Congress, the two military regimes began a process of
quiet collaboration on a range of economic and security issues. Brazil also sympathized with
Argentina during the Falklands-Malvinas war, and it drew two lessons from the course of the
war. The United States, which sided with the United Kingdom, was not a reliable ally for Latin
America, and Brazil was not ready militarily to defend its sovereignty. Both lessons justified
40
Brazil’s nuclear and missile programs.
Brazil’s vulnerability to the international economy, policy failures at home, and a growing
reputation as a rogue state on issues of human rights and proliferation, all undermined its soft
power even as the military government was failing to build up its hard power.
Page 7 of 21
Post-Cold War Opportunities and Challenges
The transition to democracy and the end of the Cold War created new opportunities for
rethinking Brazil’s status on the international stage. Despite new security policy challenges
for Brazil, the economic sphere could now generate its dynamics largely untethered to the
security sphere. In addition, climate change and environmental issues assumed significant
importance.
Security Policies
Brazil has continued to pursue Permanent Member status on the UN Security Council, though
in times of domestic crises the goal has taken a lower profile. Brazil has faced two principal
problems in attracting support from the Global South. Within Latin America, Argentina,
Colombia, and Mexico—some of the most influential countries in the region—are members of
the Uniting for Consensus group in the UN and oppose a permanent seat for any one Latin
American country. Security Council reforms can be vetoed by any permanent member, and
China, a fellow BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) nation and itself a
permanent member, opposes expansion of permanent seats.
Brazilian civilian leaders worked with their Argentine counterparts to bring their respective
nuclear programs into a bilateral inspection and control regime, Argentine-Brazilian
Accounting and Control Commission (ABACC). President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–
1992) established control over the parallel nuclear programs, forestalling a nuclear explosive
option for Brazil. Other aspects of the defense technology program lost funding or were
delayed, such as Brazil’s nuclear submarine program. Brazil’s burgeoning defense industry,
once a leading exporter to the developing world, collapsed in the economic crisis of the 1980s.
The administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995–2002) signed the NPT in 1998,
41
although many Brazilian academic, defense, and nuclear experts continue to oppose it.
Brazil refuses to sign the Additional Protocol, preferring alternatives that are less intrusive
42
than US-favored means. Brazil continues to develop nuclear power as a national priority and
is one of the few countries to have mastered the complete nuclear fuel cycle and export
43
significant nuclear technologies. In June 2011, the Nuclear Suppliers Group accepted the
ABACC’s provisions as sufficient to permit both Argentina and Brazil to enter the international
44
market for sensitive nuclear material and technologies.
Brazil plays an active role in the nuclear arms arena. In 1998, Brazil criticized India and
Pakistan’s nuclear tests, calling for their accession to the NPT and commitment to nuclear
disarmament. In 2003, Brazil criticized North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT and asked it
45
to rejoin the international agreement immediately. Brazil focused on using soft power and
46
positive incentives in trade and economic development assistance to influence North Korea.
Brazil joined Turkey in a controversial offer to negotiate limits on Iran’s nuclear program,
hosted Iranian leaders’ visits, and supported the inclusion of Iran in talks regarding Middle
Eastern security issues. President Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva (Lula) (2003–2010) visited Tehran
in 2010, trade expanded (much of it indirectly via Dubai), and Brazilians invested in the
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Iranian oil sector. Relations between Iran and Brazil cooled under Brazilian President Dilma
Rousseff (2011–2016) over human rights issues, but Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota noted
47
that Brazil continued to consider cooperative relations with Iran important.
Brazil participates in the New Agenda Coalition, created in 1998 to increase focus on nuclear
disarmament, and was a key driver for its 13-step process adopted at the 2000 NPT Review
Conference. Brazil chaired the 2000 and 2005 NPT conferences. Brazilian nuclear experts are
making their presence known in international organizations: Ambassador Sergio de Queiroz
Duarte was named the High Representative for Disarmament by UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon in 2007 and José Goldemberg co-chaired the International Panel on Fissile Materials
for a number of years. The country is also a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime
and supports the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which the United States
48
has not ratified.
Brazil has been an active participant in international peacekeeping operations, but it prefers a
UN mission that is authorized under Chapter VI, which requires agreement by the parties in
conflict and has limited engagement rules for the troops, rather than under Chapter VII,
which authorizes the UN Security Council (UNSC) to create a peacekeeping operation (PKO)
without agreement by the parties involved. Brazil participated in the first UN PKO mission
(First UN Emergency Force [UNEF I] in the Sinai Peninsula) with an infantry battalion, and a
49
Brazilian commanded the force twice during its mandate (1956–1967). From 1990 to 2002,
Brazil participated in nearly half of all UN PKO missions and increasingly contributed higher
skilled and ranking personnel. Brazilians headed the military contingents in Haiti (2004 to
2017), Mozambique (1993–1994), Angola, and East Timor (UNTAET), as well as holding the
position as special representative of the secretary general and transition manager in UNTAET.
In addition, Brazil contributed substantial numbers of civilian police and experts for the tasks
necessary to build a civil society that would provide the basis for lasting peace: election
monitoring, judicial reform oversight, human rights support, and economic rehabilitation.
During Lula’s two terms in office, Brazil participated in eight out of ten new UN PKOs,
50
dramatically increased its contributions from 83 to 1,367 personnel deployed. The country
also created two training centers for domestic and foreign military and civilian peacekeepers,
the Army’s Centro de Instrução de Operações de Paz in 2005 and the Centro Conjunto de
Operações de Paz do Brasil in 2010. Under Rousseff, the country became the first non-NATO
51
nation to lead the maritime mission patrolling the Lebanese coast.
Unfortunately, the complexity of militarized conflict creates challenges for Brazil’s role in
PKOs. Brazil under President Lula led the UN PKO in Haiti after President Aristide was
overthrown. The policy was criticized within Brazil because the United States had wanted
Aristide removed from office and the Lula administration did not insist on his return as part of
52
the mission, thus rewarding the anti-Aristide advocates. Brazil also voted with the majority
in the UNSC to virtually close down the UN PKO mission in Rwanda just as the 1994 genocide
was beginning.
Brazil is critical of Northern-proposed and -supported UN interventions in the Global South,

frequently justified on humanitarian grounds, under the banner of “Responsibility to
Protect” (R2P), but often producing regime change. President Rousseff opened the UN
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General Assembly in September 2011 promoting the concept of a “Responsibility while
Protecting” (RWP) that would set up standards and procedures to be followed by any
intervening forces.
Brazil’s approach laid out very strict requirements for any such actions: all peaceful means of
resolution must first be exhausted; only the UNSC (or in exceptional circumstances the
General Assembly) can authorize the use of force; such use must be explicitly limited in legal,
operational, and temporal terms, with no deviation from the “letter and the spirit” of the
mandate; and the UNSC must exercise explicit and constant monitoring of the missions to
53
ensure the accountability of those authorized to use force. These stipulations, in particular
54
the latter, make it more difficult to secure agreement to intervene. The United States and a
number of NATO countries were critical of RWP, interpreting it as an obstacle rather than as a
means to improve R2P implementation.
The UN Secretary General’s ten-year report on R2P notes many challenges and the multiple
meetings at the UN to make R2P a more effective instrument, but it does not even mention
the concept of “Responsibility while Protecting,” indicating the complete failure of this
55
Brazilian proposal to influence outcomes in this critical multilateral setting.
Trade, Finance, and Development

Brazil ranks low on the openness of its economy whether measured by the World Economic
Forum’s “Enabling Trade Index,” the World Bank’s “Trading Across Borders” rank, UNCTAD
56
“import and export restrictiveness,” or WTO trade weighted average tariff. Brazil’s
manufacturing enterprises and service sector are largely disconnected from global value
chains, so although it is a major exporter of agricultural and mining products the overall
participation of Brazil in the world economy is relatively low. Brazilians have long blamed
unfair international economic structures for this situation. Brazil’s two key strategies for
improving the fairness of the international trading system in the contemporary period have
been to foment regional integration through the formation of a trade pact with its South
America neighbors, known as Mercosul, and to seize a leadership role in the World Trade
Organization, the multilateral body that negotiates the rules that order the global trading
system.
Neither strategy worked. Trade among members grew, but it grew more slowly than
members’ trade with non-Mercosul countries. Brazil and Argentina sought to inject new life
into Mercosul by negotiating a trade agreement with the European Union and by expanding
its membership to include Venezuela (2013) and Bolivia (2015). Negotiations between the EU
and Mercosul began in 1999 and faltered over protectionism on both sides. Although an
agreement in principle was reached in 2019, it still needs to be ratified by each member
country. Venezuela’s economic policies and collapse beginning in 2014 made it a negligible
player until it was suspended from membership in 2017 over its lapse in democracy.
Cardoso’s foreign policy focused on South America as the region where Brazil had the best
57
opportunity to preserve its relative autonomy in the international system. Brazil co-chaired
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations but subordinated them to Mercosul.
A successful Mercosul was expected to integrate into a US-dominated FTAA from a position of
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strength.
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Brazil joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 but only assumed an active role in
2003 when it served as midwife to the G-20 summit at the fifth ministerial meeting of the WTO
in Cancun, Mexico. Brazil coalesced the interests of large export-oriented agribusiness, as
found in Brazil and Argentina, and subsistence agriculture, as found in India and China. The
bargain is especially interesting since it demonstrates Brazil’s interest in liberalizing trade in
agriculture, a sector in which it has a comparative advantage. Brazil insisted on a proviso that
special protections were merited if they were part of a process designed to eventually
stimulate liberalization of markets and reduction of tariffs, thereby utilizing a logic based on
Northern development philosophy.
Brazil ranks among the top users of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and the Foreign
Ministry offers a course to other Latin American countries on how to develop and present
59
cases. Brazil has also pushed for the WTO to devote more attention to the relationship
between trade and exchange rates. Despite not being the preferred candidate of the United
States, Britain, or Japan, Roberto Azevedo won the WTO’s Director Generalship in 2013,
60
demonstrating the pull of Brazil’s soft power in this arena. The Brazilian strategy for
influence hit a brick wall in the failed Doha Round, leading countries of the Global North to
focus on trading “alliances of the willing” such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Brazilian governments recognize that capital flows can stimulate economic growth but have
insisted on regulatory safeguards (including capital controls) to limit the ability of investors to
shift the risks of generating profits to host countries. Brazil criticized both the United States
and China for monetary policies that seek domestic advantages while negatively impacting the
currencies of other nations. Brazil succeeded in getting the WTO to ask the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) to develop “surveillance reports” to track the relationship between
exchange rates and trade.
In 1999, the finance ministers of the largest twenty economies came together to informally
discuss responses to financial crises; Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina attended. Because the
IMF needed their increased contributions, China, Brazil, Russia, and India were able to
negotiate a collective veto over when the new credit lines they were financing would be
61
activated.
Brazil was the most outspoken in arguing that the increased contributions should be reflected
in a redistribution of voting rights to reflect the decreased weight of the Euro area and
increased weight of the emerging economies. At meetings in London in April 2009 and Toronto
in June 2010, the divisions between North and South, as well as the disagreement between
the United States and Europe over whether stimulus spending or deficit reduction was the
appropriate response, limited the effective impact of the G-20 on the international financial
institutions. But they did endorse reforms to increase the weight of developing countries in
62
the World Bank, 4.59 percent over that of 2008. The US Congress subsequently blocked
reforms that would eliminate US veto power over major reforms at the IMF.
Under Lula, Brazil attempted to create alternative sources of multilateral funding to the World
Bank and Inter-American Development Bank that would tread lightly on national sovereignty.
The first alternative Brazil supported in 2007 was the Bank of the South. Its area was broadly
defined as social programs and integration, and it was intended to begin with a capital base of
$20 billion, with Brazil, Venezuela, and Argentina each contributing $5 billion and the rest
made up of smaller quotas from other members. Among the controversial points was the
Page 11 of 21
question of voting rights, with Venezuela arguing for “one country, one vote” on all matters,
while Brazil and Argentina wanted weighted voting (based on size of contribution to the bank)
on daily business decisions and parity voting only on general policy decisions. The proposal
for the bank failed.
Brazil became a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the
BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB). The NDB is intended to support infrastructure
projects among its member nations, and the BRICS nations see this as part of their soft power
directed to other developing countries. The bank will defer to nationally produced
environment and social impact statements, enhancing sovereign control over internationally
recognized environmental and social standards. As of 2016, the NDB had not yet raised its
initial funds of $10 billion from each of the BRICS countries. The NDB expects to raise funds
in international markets, meaning it will need to maintain an excellent credit rating and thus
unlikely to behave more generously than existing multilateral banks.
As part of the BRICS’ move into major status in the international financial system, they
created the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) in 2014. The fund was initially financed
by China with $41 billion; Brazil, Russia, and India with $18 billion each; and South Africa
with $5 billion. Accessing significant funds requires an IMF agreement and evidence of
compliance with those conditions by the requesting party. By giving IMF conditionality such
great weight in its own funding decisions, the CRA does not constitute a new approach to
international payments financing more in line with Southern desires.
Brazil was willing to act bilaterally in support of international development. The Banco
Nacional do Desenvolvimento (BNDES) increased its lending in the South to the extent that
63
Brazil became one of the largest aid providers to poor countries. BNDES loans abroad
totaled three times more than those provided by the World Bank in 2011 and 1.5 times more
than existing international financial institutions as a whole in 2014. In 2014, BNDES was also
the largest lender to South America. But domestic controversies over the BNDES foreign
loans and debt forgiveness efforts at home, especially in light of corruption scandals and
economic slowdown, make it difficult for the government to continue this financial
expenditure. Brazil did not rank in the top twenty donor countries for development aid in
64
2017.
Among the major international efforts of Brazil in recent decades was its contestation of
patents on HIV/AIDS medicines amid a major health crisis. Brazil, along with South Africa,
India, and Thailand, forced the pharmaceutical companies to lower their prices by threatening
to produce the drugs themselves under a declaration of national emergency. The WTO
recognized the right of countries to produce these drugs if the patent owners did not supply
them at appropriate costs and to supply them to countries without production capabilities in
the event of a national emergency (Doha Declaration of 2003). Brazil donated medicines
produced under these exceptions to Kenya and South Africa. Brazil also partnered with
UNAIDS to create the International Centre for Technical Cooperation to promote its domestic
health strategies for dealing with HIV/AIDS abroad. In 2006, Brazil signed an agreement with
Caribbean Community’s Pan-Caribbean Partnership against HIV/AIDS to transfer this
65
knowledge to the Caribbean context.
Page 12 of 21
Climate and Environmental Governance
Brazil has always been a central actor in the international debate over how to address climate
change because of its role as a large developing economy that contributes significantly to
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and its sovereignty over the majority of the world’s “lung,”
the Amazon. After the 1970s oil crisis Brazil adopted what became a relatively climate-friendly
energy production matrix, with hydro, nuclear, and biofuel energy sources. However, as a
major agricultural and cattle producer generating methane gas and deforestation in
66
Amazonia, Brazil’s activism regarding climate change is schizophrenic.
The military government focused on development and paid little attention to the
environmental costs associated with it. Under democracy a new environmental politics
67
emphasized sustainable development. But the Brazilian government remained cautious in
addressing international environmental concerns over its policies, particularly regarding the
68
Amazon rainforest, for fear of the impact on its sovereignty.
Brazil hosted the 1992 Rio “Earth Summit” in which the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted. In the negotiations leading up to the
summit, Brazil took a G-77 position promoting the concept of sustainable development, with
limited constraints on developing countries and developed countries shouldering the blame
69
and cost of mitigating climate change. Brazil positioned itself as one of the major players
70
leading global efforts to address climate change.
After the Earth Summit, Brazil played a key role as a bridge between the developed world and
71
developing countries for the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Brazil was a major proponent of the
concept of historical responsibility for GHG emissions, which meant that the developed world
would have to accept most of the costs of emissions. Eventually, this position prevailed in the
sense that developed countries (the 38 listed in Annex 1 of the Protocol) agreed to accept
72
binding emissions reduction targets. Brazil also worked with the United States to propose
the Clean Development Mechanism, by which developed countries would receive credit
toward meeting their emission reduction targets for funding reductions in the developing
73
world. This had the advantage for developed countries of funding climate change mitigation
through overseas development assistance and the multilateral banks rather than battling
domestic lobbies unwilling to assume higher costs. Even after the United States walked away
from the Kyoto agreement, Brazil played a leading role in salvaging the protocol by brokering
74
the final deal between European and developing states.
At the 2009 Copenhagen conference of parties to the UNFCCC, the BASIC countries (Brazil,
South Africa, India and China) and the United States agreed that everyone should contribute
to addressing climate change and that individual self-determined commitments by states
would form the basis of what was reviewed in the multilateral process. Brazil also played a
role in bridge-building efforts between Europe and BASIC in 2011. President Lula da Silva
announced that Brazil’s emissions reductions would need no outside assistance and proposed
significant voluntary emissions reductions over 36% below projected trends by 2020.
President Dilma Rousseff, however, was less friendly to conservation efforts and allied herself
with agricultural interests that favored further deforestation. At the 2013 Conference of the
Parties for the UNFCCC in Warsaw, the Brazilian delegation again returned to a focus on the
75
historical responsibility of developed countries for addressing climate change.
Page 13 of 21
Conclusion
Participation in the councils of the great powers is a means by which Brazilian diplomats
could pursue a world order that is more favorable to its interests. Though domestic
aspirations and foreign perceptions have held out the prospect for Brazil becoming a major
power, it has lacked the capabilities—particularly on the military and economic dimensions—
to pursue a traditional path to greatness. Brazil’s efforts to advance through partnerships with
other states have been hobbled by a historical reluctance to pool its sovereignty. In addition,
turbulent domestic politics and major economic crises periodically undermine Brazil’s
credibility and capabilities.
Brazil sought to overcome the gap between its ambitions and its capabilities by becoming a
prominent exponent of the practice of soft power. It positioned itself internationally as a
proponent of equality among nations, international law, and the peaceful resolution of
conflicts. To this, Brazil has added a formidable cultural output, democracy, prosperity, and
social inclusion. This is an attractive package, particularly for other developing countries who
want a similar status. But this is a challenging path to maintain, as evidenced by the economic
and political troubles that produced President Rousseff’s impeachment and thrust the country
into its worst economic crisis since the Depression of the 1930s.
Discussion of the Literature
The literature on Brazil’s international presence spans diplomatic history, foreign policy
analysis, and biographies. Each of these categories contributes to a full understanding of
Brazil’s international relations.
Diplomatic history: E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio Branco and the Brazilian-
76
American Alliance is the English language standard on the early 20th century. Rubens
Ricupero, A Diplomacia na Construcao do Brasil 1750–2016 (2017) was written by a long-
77
serving diplomat and instructor at the Foreign Ministry’s Instituto Rio Branco.
Foreign Policy: Since the 1970s Brazil has been a favorite subject for foreign policy analysts
focused on Third World/Global South countries which contest the international order. See
Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil, Foreign Policy of a Future World Power (1976); Sean W. Burges,
Brazil in the World: The International Relations of a South American Giant (2017); Celso Lafer,
“Brazil and the World” (2009); Carlos Milani, Leticia Pinheiro, and Maria Regina Soares de
Lima, “Brazil’s Foreign Policy and the ‘Graduation Dilemma’ in International Affairs,” (2017);
78
and Matias Spektor, “Brazil: Shadows of the Past and Contested Ambitions” (2016).
Unfortunately, most of this literature was written at the height of Brazil’s diplomatic activities
and exhibits great weakness in not evaluating the results of a Brazilian foreign policy. This
results in an exaggerated sense of the impact of Brazilian foreign policy and an inability to
understand why Brazil has failed repeatedly to have a lasting impact on the international
79
order of the era. An extended critique of the failure to place Brazilian international behavior
in a context in which Brazilian soft power competes with that of others for influence is found
in David Mares and Harold Trinkunas, Aspirational Power: Brazil on the Long Road to Global
80
Influence (2016).
Page 14 of 21
Octavio Amorim Neto’s De Dutra a Lula: A condução e os determinantes da política externa
brasileira brought sophisticated quantitative analysis to the study of Brazilian foreign policy.
The book opened a fruitful debate about what metrics best serve to evaluate competing views
81
about the determinants of Brazil’s international policies.
Biographies and Autobiographies: See José Vicente de Sá Pimentel, Pensamento diplomático

brasileiro: Formuladores e agentes da política externa (1750–1964) (2013). The Alexandre de
Gusmão Foundation brought together 26 academics and diplomats to discuss important
personalities in the making of foreign policy from the time of the Portuguese colony through
the Empire and Old Republic and modern Brazil up to the military coup of 1964. These
important diplomats and thinkers are placed in their historical contexts and their
contributions to the values and ideas in Brazilian foreign policy evaluated. A free pdf
download in three volumes is available online <http://funag.gov.br/biblioteca/index.php?
route=product/product%26product_id=507>.
Samantha Power, Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World
(2008). Biography of Brazilian UN diplomat who led peace efforts in multiple countries and
died in a terrorist bombing in Baghdad in 2003. Book discusses his views on the subject as
well as the UN bureaucracy and its limitations. The author won a Pulitzer Prize for her own
book on genocide and US foreign policy.
Luiz Felipe Lampreia, O Brasil e os ventos do mundo: Memórias de cinco décadas na cena
internacional (2009). Biography of an Ambassador and Geneva-based diplomat who became
82
Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Cardoso government, 1995–2001.
Primary Sources
Alexandre Gusmao Foundation <http://funag.gov.br/index.php/pt-br/>: The publishing arm of
the Brazilian Foreign Ministry
Eugênio Vargas Garcia, ed. Diplomacia Brasileira e Política Externa: Documentos Históricos. Rio
de Janeiro: Contrapunto, 2008.
British archives Foreign Office and Admiralty at The National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, just outside London;
also available online via paid licenses: “Documents on British Policy Overseas.”
Foreign Relations of the United States. Some papers and documents are available online <https://
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments>. The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series
presents the official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic
activity.
National Security Archive <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/project/brazil-project>. The It’s Brazil

Project includes declassified documents pertaining to US-Brazil relations.
Rubens Barbosa. The Washington Dissensus: A Privileged Observer’s Perspective on US-Brazil

Relations. Nashville TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2014.
Celso Amorim, Conversas com jovens diplomatas. São Paulo: Benvirá, 2011. A collection of talks about his
foreign policy in the Lula government to Foreign Service students by a Brazilian Foreign Minister and Minister of
Defense under three governments (Franco, Lula, and Rousseff). See also, Acting Globally: Memoirs of Brazil’s
Assertive Foreign Policy (2017), an English language memoir about three important foreign policy events.
Page 15 of 21
Links to Digital Materials
The Digital Archive <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/> contains once-secret documents from
governments all across the globe, uncovering new sources and providing fresh insights into the history of
international relations and diplomacy. The Digital Archive is overseen by the Wilson Center’s History and Public Policy
Program and focuses on the interrelated histories of the Cold War, Korea, and Nuclear Proliferation.
Missão do Brasil Junto Ás Nações Unidas <http://delbrasonu.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-br/Main.xml>.

Foreign Ministry website <http://delbrasonu.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-br/> regarding the Brazilian Mission to the
United Nations.
Further Reading
Bandeira, L. A. M. “Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations with the United States <http://
dx.doi.org/10.1177/0094582X06287338>.” Latin American Perspectives 33, no. 3 (2006): 15–16.
Dávila, Jerry. Hotel Trópico: Brazil and the Challenge of African Decolonization, 1950–1980.
Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010.
Hurrell, Andrew. The Quest for Autonomy: The Evolution of Brazil’s Role in the International
System, 1964–1985. Coleção Política Externa Brasileira Brasilia. Brasilia, Brazil: Fundação
Alexandre de Gusmão, 2013.
Kapstein, Ethan B. “The Brazilian Defense Industry and the International System.” Political
Science Quarterly 105, no. 4 (1990–1991): 579–596.
Rodrigues, José Honorio. “The Foundations of Brazil’s Foreign Policy <http://dx.doi.org/

10.2307/2609443>.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–) 38, no.
3 (1962): 324.
Selcher, Wayne Alan. The Afro-Asian Dimension of Brazilian Foreign Policy, 1956–1972.
Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1974.
Spektor, Matias. Kissinger e o Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2009.
Vieira de Jesus, Diego Santos. “The Brazilian Way: Negotiation and Symmetry in Brazil’s Nuclear
Policy <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2010.517003>.” Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 3
(2010): 554.
Notes
1. Celso Amorim, “Hardening Brazil’s Soft Power <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-

more-robust-defense-policy-for-brazil-by-celsoamorim>,” Project Syndicate, July 16, 2013.
2. Gabriel Cepaluni and Tullo Vigevani, Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times: The Quest for
Autonomy from Sarney to Lula (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012).
3. Celso Lafer, “Brazilian International Identity and Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future,” Daedalus 129, no. 2
(2000): 207–238.
Page 16 of 21
4. Cepaluni and Vigevani, Brazilian Foreign Policy.
5. Rita Shannon Koeser, “Brazil: When El Dorado Was Here <http://www.brazzil.com/2003/html/

articles/sep03/p124sep03.htm>,” Brazzil, September 2003.
6. Lincoln Hutchinson, “‘Coffee Valorization’ in Brazil,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 23, no. 3 (May 1909):
528–535; and Leon F. Sensabaugh, “The Coffee-Trust Question in United States–Brazilian Relations: 1912–1913,”
Hispanic American Historical Review, 26, no. 4 (November 1946): 480–496.
7. Matias Spektor, “Notas Sobre O Desafio Argentino Do Brasil Republicano,” Revista Cena Internacional 2, no. 2
(December 2000): 117–135; and Frederic Willian Ganzert, “The Baron Do Rio-Branco, Joaquim Nabuco, and the Growth
of Brazilian-American Friendship, 1900–1910,” Hispanic American Historical Review 22, no. 3 (1942): 432.
8. Carsten-Andreas Schulz, “Accidental Activists: Latin American Status-Seeking at The

Hague <https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx030>,” International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 3 (September
2017): 615–616.
9. Betsy Baker, “Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907) <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/

law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e305>,” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law; and Greg Grandin, “Your Americanism and Mine: Americanism and Anti-
Americanism in the Americas <https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr.111.4.1042>,” American Historical
Review Volume 111, no. 4 (October 2006): 1042–1066.
10. Schulz, “Accidental Activists,” 618–619.
11. Only once in this period did Brazil recur to coercion: In the “Acre War” of 1906 Brazil sent its troops into disputed
territory and forced Bolivia to recognize its de facto possession.
12. Hector Gros Espiell, Conflictos Territoriales en Iberoamérica y Solución Pacífica de Controversias
(Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1986).
13. E. Bradford Burns, The Unwritten Alliance: Rio-Branco and Brazilian-American Relations (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1966), 183–184.
14. Spektor, “Notas Sobre O Desafio.”
15. Hanford to Grey, July 30, 1906, Public Records Office, Foreign Office, London, Folio 371.5 f28811, p. 157.
16. Burns, The Unwritten Alliance, 185–191; and Haggard to Grey, November 28, 1910, Public Record Office,
London Foreign Office FO 371/833. XC16815.
17. Bill Albert, South America and the First World War (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
18. Albert, South America and the First World War.
19. Stanley E. Hilton, “Brazil and the Post-Versailles World: Elite Images and Foreign Policy Strategy, 1919–1929,”
Journal of Latin American Studies 12, no. 2 (1980): 351.
20. Denys P. Myers, “Representation in League of Nations Council,” American Journal of International Law 20,
no. 4 (1926): 689–713; and Chris Leuchars, “Brazil and the League Council Crisis of 1926 <http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592290108406229>,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 12, no. 4 (2001): 123–142.
21. Hilton, “Brazil and the Post-Versailles World.”
22. David Carlton, “Great Britain and the League Council Crisis of 1926,” Historical Journal 11, no. 2 (1968): 354–
364.
23. McCann, Frank D., Jr. “The Brazilian General Staff and Brazil’s Military Situation, 1900–1945.” Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 25, no. 3 (August, 1983), 299–324.
24. McCann, “Brazilian General Staff.”

Page 17 of 21
25. Nathaniel H. Leff, “Export Stagnation and Autarkic Development in Brazil, 1947–1962,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 81, no. 2 (1967): 286–301; and Andrew Hurrell, The Quest For Autonomy: The Evolution of
Brazil’s Role in the International System, 1964–1985, Coleção Política Externa Brasileira
(Brasilia, Brazil: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2013).
26. L. A. M. Bandeira, “Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations with the United States <http://
dx.doi.org/10.1177/0094582X06287338>,” Latin American Perspectives 33, no. 3 (2006): 15–16.
28. H. Jon Rosenbaum, “Brazil among the Nations,” International Journal 24, no. 3 (1969): 529–544; and Wayne
Alan Selcher, The Afro-Asian Dimension of Brazilian Foreign Policy, 1956–1972 (University of
Florida, 1974), 41–45.
29. Matias Spektor, Kissinger e o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2009).
30. Wayne A. Selcher, “Brazilian Relations with Portuguese Africa in the Context of the Elusive ‘Luso-Brazilian
Community’,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 18, no. 1 (February 1976), 25–58.
31. Bandeira, “Brazil as a Regional Power.”
32. Ethan B. Kapstein, “The Brazilian Defense Industry and the International System,” Political
Science Quarterly 105, no. 4 (1990–1991): 579–596.
33. Ken Conca, “Technology, the Military, and Democracy in Brazil,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and
World Affairs 34, no. 1 (1992): 141–177; and Conca, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers,
1991–1992 (Washington, DC: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1994), 97.
34. Antonio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira, Memorandum from Brazilian Foreign Minister Silveira to
President Geisel, US Threats and Promises and Brazilian Responses, History and Public Policy
Program Digital Archive <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115220> (1977).
35. Kapstein, “The Brazilian Defense Industry,” 593–595; and “Memorandum, Information for the President of Brazil,
No. 011/85 from the National Security Council, Structure of the Parallel Nuclear Program” (Fundação Getúlio Vargas,
February 21, 1985), History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive <https://
digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116917>.
36. H. Jon Rosenbaum and Glenn M. Cooper, “Brazil and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” International
Affairs 46, no. 1 (January 1970): 74.
37. Togzhan Kassenova, Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope: An Evolving Identity (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2014), 21.
38. Kassenova, Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope, 18–20.
39. Norman Gall, “Atoms for Brazil, Dangers for All,” Foreign Policy, no. 23 (1976): 155–201.
40. Christopher Neil Darnton, Rivalry and Alliance Politics in Cold War Latin America (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2014).
41. Kassenova, “Brazil and the Global Nuclear Order,” in Brazil on the Global Stage: Power, Ideas, and the
Liberal International Order, ed. Stuenkel and Taylor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
42. Irma Argüello, “The Position of an Emerging Global Power,” Nonproliferation Review 18, no. 1 (2011): 183–
200.
43. Ministerio de Defensa, Estrategia Nacional de Defensa <http://www.defesa.gov.br.>, 2009; and Maria
Rost Rublee, “The Nuclear Threshold States: Challenges and Opportunities Posed by Brazil and Japan,”
Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 1 (March 2010).
Page 18 of 21
44. Carlo Patti, “Weapons of Mass Destruction: Will Latin America Backtrack?” in The Routledge Handbook of
Latin American Security Studies, ed. David R. Mares and Arie M. Kacowicz (London: Routledge, 2015), 221–229.
45. Carlo Patti, “Brazil and the Nuclear Issues in the Years of the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva Government (2003–2010),”
Revista. Brasileira de Política Internacional 53, no. 2 (2010): 181.
46. Nathalia Passarinho, “Brasil vê ameaças da Coreia do Norte com ‘preocupação’, diz Patriota,” Globo.com, April 5,
2013; and Bertil Lintner, “Brazil, North Korea: Brothers in Trade <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
Korea/LF03Dg03.html>,” Asia Times Online, June 3, 2010.
47. Eduardo J. Gómez, “Why Iran-Brazil Friendship has Gone Cold <http://www.cnn.com/
2012/04/05/opinion/gomez-iran-brazil-chill/>,” CNN, April 5, 2012; Anna Mahjar-Barducci, “Brazil Moves
Away from Iran <http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2815/brazil-iran>,” Gatestone Institute
International Policy Council, February 3, 2012; and “Iran, Brazil FMs Discuss Bilateral
Relations <http://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/08/03/317045/iran-brazil-discuss-bilateral-
relations/>,” PressTV, August 3, 2013.
48. Bernard Aronson, “Can Brazil Stop Iran?” New York Times, April 3, 2012.
49. “Middle East–UNEF I: Facts and Figures <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/

unef1facts.html>,” United Nations.
50. Rita Santos and Teresa Almeida Cravo, “Brazil’s Rising Profile in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Since
the End of the Cold War,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, March 2014, p. 3.
51. Santos and Cravo, “Brazil’s Rising Profile.”
52. Alex Sánchez, “Endgame for Brazil’s Role in MINUSTAH?” Washington Office for Latin America, August 29, 2011.
53. Thorsten Benner, “Brazil as a Norm Entrepreneur: The ‘Responsibility While Protecting’
Initiative <http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user_upload/media/pub/2013/Benner_2013_Working-
Paper_Brazil-RWP.pdf>” (Working paper, Global Public Policy Institute, March 2013); and Alcides Costa Vaz,
“Brazilian Perspectives on the Changing Global Order and Security Challenges” (Working paper 376, CEPS, February
2013), 4.
54. Richard Fontaine and Daniel M. Kliman, “International Order and Global Swing States,” Washington Quarterly
36, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 98–99.
55. United Nations A/69/981–S/2015/500, General Assembly Security Council Distr., July 13, 2015, Sixty-Ninth Session,
agenda item 13, “Integrated and Coordinated Implementation of and Follow-up to the Outcomes of the Major United
Nations Conferences and Summits in the Economic, Social and Related Fields”; and item 115, “Follow-up to the
Outcome of the Millennium Summit Security Council Seventieth Year: A vital and Enduring
Commitment—Implementing the Responsibility to Protect Report of the Secretary-
General <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/
N1521764%202015%20SG%20Report%20R2P%20English.pdf>.”
56. “The Enabling Trade Index Assesses the Extent to which Economies Have in Place
Institutions, Policies, Infrastructures and Services Facilitating the Free Flow of Goods over
Borders and to Their Destination <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/
WEF_GETR_2016_report.pdf>,” Global Enabling Trade Report (2016), 13–17; World Bank Group, Doing
Business 2019 <https://www.doingbusiness.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/Annual-
Reports/English/DB2019-report_web-version.pdf> (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2019), 159; UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Key Statistics and Trends in Trade Policy <https://
unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2345> (2018), 15; and WTO, ITC, and
UNCTAD, World Tariff Profiles 2017 <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/
tariff_profiles17_e.pdf> (Geneva: World Trade Organization), 55.
Page 19 of 21
58. S. W. Burges, Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida,
2009).
59. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Itamaraty realiza debate sobre solução de controvérsias da
OMC <http://www.brasil.gov.br/governo/2013/10/o-brasil-e-o-sistema-de-solucao-de-
controversias-da-omc>,” October 10, 2013.
60. Nicolas Bourcier, “Roberto Azevedo’s WTO Appointment Gives Brazil a Seat at the Top Table,” Guardian
Weekly, May 21, 2013.
61. Ngaire Woods, “The G20 and Global Governance,” in The Quest for Security: Protection without
Protectionism and the Challenge of Global Governance, ed. Joseph E. Stiglitz and Mary Kaldor (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2013), 347.
62. Ngaire Woods, “The Impact of the G20 on Global Governance: A History and Prospective,” in Global Leadership
in Transition: Making the G20 More Effective and Responsive, ed. Colin I. Bradford and Wonhyuk Lim
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2011).
63. Richard Fontaine and Daniel M. Kliman, “International Order and Global Swing States,” Washington Quarterly
36, no. 1 (2013): 93–109.
64. Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2018 <http://devinit.org/post/

global-humanitarian-assistance-report-2018/> (Bristol, U.K.: Development Initiatives, 2018).
65. UWI Consulting, “Technical Cooperation on HIV/AIDS between CARICOM/PANCAP and the
Government of Brazil Estudio de caso <http://www.southsouthcases.info/pdf/
lac12.pdf>” (Kingston, Jamaica, UWI Consulting, 2011).
66. Kathryn Hochstetler and Eduardo Viola, “Brazil and the Politics of Climate Change: beyond the Global Commons.”
Environmental Politics 21, no. 5 (2012): 753–771.
67. Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, “An Introduction to Brazilian Environmental Law,” George Washington
International Law Review 40, no. 3 (2009): 611–613.
68. Luis Barbosa, Guardians of the Brazilian Amazon Rainforest (New York: Routledge, 2015).
69. Georgette N. Nazo and Toshio Mukai, “O Direito Ambiental No Brasil: evolução histórica e a
relevância do direito internacional do meio ambiente <http://dx.doi.org/10.12660/
rda.v223.2001.48313>,” Revista de Direito Administrativo 223 (2001); Hochstetler and Viola, “Brazil and
the Politics of Climate Change,” 758.
70. Guy Edwards and J. Timmons Roberts, A Fragmented Continent: Latin America and the Global
Politics of Climate Change (Boston: MIT Press, 2015), 77–79.
71. Hochstetler and Viola, “Brazil and the Politics of Climate Change,” 756.
72. David Held, Charles Roger, and Eva Maria Nag, Climate Governance in the Developing World (Cambridge,
U.K.: Polity Press, 2013).
73. Ken Johnson, “Brazil and the Politics of the Climate Change Negotiations,” Journal of Environmental
Development 10, no. 2 (2001): 189.
74. Hochstetler and Viola, “Brazil and the Politics of Climate Change,” 759.
75. Hochstetler and Viola, 78.
76. Burns, The Unwritten Alliance.
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77. Rubens Ricupero, A Diplomacia na Construcao do Brasil 1750–2016 (Rio de Janeiro: Versal Editores,
2017).
78. Burges, Brazil in the World; Celso Lafer, “Brazil and the World,” in Brazil: A Century of Change ed. Ignacy
Sachs, Jorge Wilheim, and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 101–119;
Carlos Milani, Leticia Pinheiro, and Maria Regina Soares de Lima “Brazil’s Foreign Policy and the ‘Graduation Dilemma’
in International Affairs,” 93 no. 3 (2017): 585–605; Matias Spektor, “Brazil: Shadows of the Past and Contested
Ambitions,” in Shaper Nations: Strategies for a Changing World, ed. William I. Hitchcock and Jeffrey W.
Legro (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 85–130.
79. See Gabriel Cepaluni and Tullo Vigevani, Brazilian Foreign Policy; and Oliver Stuenkel and Matthew M. Taylor,
eds., Brazil on the Global Stage: Power, Ideas, and the Liberal International Order (Palgrave
Macmillan US, 2015).
80. David Mares and Harold Trinkunas, Aspirational Power: Brazil on the Long Road to Global Influence
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2016).
81. Octavio Amorim Neto’s De Dutra a Lula: a condução e os determinantes da política externa
brasileira (Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2011).
82. José Vicente de Sá Pimentel, ed., Pensamento diplomático brasileiro: Formuladores e agentes da
política externa (1750–1964) (Brasilia: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2013); Samantha Power, Chasing the
Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World (Penguin, 2008); Luiz Felipe Lampreia, O
Brasil e os ventos do mundo: Memórias de cinco décadas na cena internacional (Objetiva, 2010).
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Brazil on the International Stage

David Mares, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego

Keywords: Brazil, BRICS, UN Security Council, soft power, Lula

Brazil’s International Presence

The Republic of Brazil on the World Stage, 1899–1927

Seeking an Influential Role in the New World Orders, 1950s–2016

In 1958, President Juscelino Kubitschek fruitlessly proposed Operação Pan-Americana, a

Brazil’s policy of refusing to follow Washington’s lead in the East-West confrontation

Brazil is critical of Northern-proposed and -supported UN interventions in the Global South,

Trade, Finance, and Development

Discussion of the Literature

Biographies and Autobiographies: See José Vicente de Sá Pimentel, Pensamento diplomático

National Security Archive <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/project/brazil-project>. The It’s Brazil

Rubens Barbosa. The Washington Dissensus: A Privileged Observer’s Perspective on US-Brazil

Missão do Brasil Junto Ás Nações Unidas <http://delbrasonu.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-br/Main.xml>.

Rodrigues, José Honorio. “The Foundations of Brazil’s Foreign Policy <http://dx.doi.org/

Spektor, Matias. Kissinger e o Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2009.

1. Celso Amorim, “Hardening Brazil’s Soft Power <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-

5. Rita Shannon Koeser, “Brazil: When El Dorado Was Here <http://www.brazzil.com/2003/html/

8. Carsten-Andreas Schulz, “Accidental Activists: Latin American Status-Seeking at The

9. Betsy Baker, “Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907) <http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/

10. Schulz, “Accidental Activists,” 618–619.

14. Spektor, “Notas Sobre O Desafio.”

18. Albert, South America and the First World War.

21. Hilton, “Brazil and the Post-Versailles World.”

24. McCann, “Brazilian General Staff.”

27. Cepaluni and Vigevani, Brazilian Foreign Policy.

29. Matias Spektor, Kissinger e o Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2009).

31. Bandeira, “Brazil as a Regional Power.”

38. Kassenova, Brazil’s Nuclear Kaleidoscope, 18–20.

49. “Middle East–UNEF I: Facts and Figures <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/

51. Santos and Cravo, “Brazil’s Rising Profile.”

64. Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2018 <http://devinit.org/post/

75. Hochstetler and Viola, 78.

76. Burns, The Unwritten Alliance.

The United States and the 1964 Brazilian Military Coup

French Intellectuals and Cultural Diplomacy in Brazil, 1934–1943

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